

“The Iraq War has revealed that the armed forces possess nothing like the depth required to implement a policy of preventive war on a sustained basis.”

Requiem for the Bush Doctrine

ANDREW J. BACEVICH

The claim that 9-11 “changed everything” is demonstrably false. What did change as a consequence of that awful day was basic US policy regarding the use of force. Having now been tested and found wanting, that new policy—known as the Bush Doctrine—may already be on its way to the ash heap of history.

SECURITY

Global Trends, 2006

Before September 11, 2001, American presidents routinely insisted that when the United States went to war it did so only defensively and as a last resort. Although not always supported by the facts related to the nation’s rise to the status of sole superpower, this sentiment accorded nicely with America’s self-image as a peaceful nation.

According to President George W. Bush, the events of 9-11 rendered those views obsolete, if not dangerous. In the face of violent Islamic radicals for whom no act, however barbarous, was beyond the pale, the administration concluded that cold war-style deterrence could no longer be counted on to work. Convinced that the prospect of these radicals gaining possession of weapons of mass destruction was not only real but becoming more acute by the day, Bush and his lieutenants determined that the United States could not afford to let the other side fire the first shot. Waging war against the unprecedented menace posed by global terror now obliged the United States to go permanently on the offensive.

Henceforth, the United States needed to shoot first even if that meant acting on fragmentary evidence. In a post-9-11 world, the Bush administration insisted, the risks of delay outweighed the risks of precipitate action. As then-national security adviser Condoleezza Rice famously remarked with regard to Iraq, “We don’t want the smoking gun to

be a mushroom cloud.” The new imperative was to eliminate threats before they could mature.

President Bush unveiled this new doctrine in a speech to graduating cadets at West Point delivered on June 1, 2002. “The gravest danger to freedom,” he declared, was to be found at “the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology.” Old conceptions of deterrence meant “nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend.” Rather than passively allowing this enemy to seize the initiative, Bush told the cadets that “we must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.”

The president went on to explain that the United States would “be ready for preemptive action when necessary.” But the substance of his remarks indicated clearly that he was referring not to preemption, but to preventive war. The distinction is crucial. Preemption implies launching a war when facing the clear prospect of imminent attack—as, for example, the state of Israel did in June 1967. Preventive war implies initiating hostilities to eliminate the possibility that an adversary might pose a future threat, again as Israel did in its 1981 attack on the partially assembled Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak. Effective June 2002, the United States embraced the concept of preventive war. This is the essence of the Bush Doctrine.

ASSUMING POWER

Formidable moral and legal objections have been raised against the doctrine of preventive war. Critics have charged that the Bush Doctrine violates the Charter of the United Nations, and that it opens a Pandora’s box, inviting any number of other nations to cite the US precedent as a pretext for their own preventive wars. According to the doctrine’s logic, Israel could easily find justification for attacking Iran—and Iran could justifiably attack Israel.

ANDREW J. BACEVICH is a professor of international relations at Boston University. His most recent book is *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War* (Oxford University Press, 2005).

But even leaving such objections aside, a doctrine of preventive war makes sense only if it works—that is, if its implementation yields enhanced security at a reasonable cost. In the American case, the Bush administration's belief in the efficacy of preventive war stemmed from its confidence in American military power. In his introduction to the *National Security Strategy* that the White House issued in September 2002, President Bush wrote that “today the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength.” The assumption underlying the Bush Doctrine, never made explicit, was that the unparalleled quality and capabilities of America's armed services made preventive war plausible.

In March 2003, the president implemented the Bush Doctrine, ordering the invasion of Iraq. In doing so, he also put to the test his administration's assumptions about American military power. That test has now continued long enough for us to draw some preliminary conclusions.

The most important of these conclusions is the following:

as measured by the effectiveness and capacity of American arms, the quality of American generalship, and the adherence of American soldiers to professional norms, this administration has badly misread what the US military can and cannot do. The sword of American military power is neither sharp enough nor hard enough to meet the demands of preventive war.

STALEMATE IN IRAQ

The Bush Doctrine requires military forces able, in the words of the *National Security Strategy*, to “conduct rapid and precise operations to achieve decisive results.” Preventive war demands a quick kill. Victory gained swiftly and economically is not only a value in itself. It also conveys an exemplary message to others: resistance is pointless. Such a victory can serve to overawe other would-be adversaries, thereby limiting the occasions requiring the actual use of force.

In Iraq, decisive results have proved elusive. Although the initial march on Baghdad provided ample opportunity for US forces to demonstrate speed and impressive precision, successfully toppling the regime of Saddam Hussein produced not an end to war, but a wider conflict. As is so often the case in war, the enemy has refused to follow our script.

Whether this wider war resulted from carefully laid enemy plans or emerged spontaneously out of the chaos created by Hussein's overthrow hardly matters. The fact is that over two and a half years after launching Operation Iraqi Freedom with high hopes and great fanfare, the United States finds itself mired in a conflict that in a strictly military sense may be unwinnable. The armed forces that innumerable commentators have proclaimed the most advanced and most sophisticated that the world has ever seen have been stymied by 10,000 to 20,000 insurgents equipped with an arsenal of weapons dating from the 1940s and 1950s.

The enterprise launched with expectations of pocketing a quick military success has now evolved into a project that even administration officials concede may drag on for a decade or more. Although President Bush continues to insist that his aim

At the very top, US military leadership has been at best mediocre if not altogether unsatisfactory.

in Iraq is “victory,” senior military officers have been signaling just as clearly that extricating the United States from Iraq will require a

political solution, which implies something less than vanquishing the enemy. “This insurgency is not going to be settled . . . through military options or military operations,” Brigadier General Donald Alston, the chief US military spokesman in Baghdad, acknowledged this summer. “It's going to be settled in the political process.”

In Iraq, the American way of war devised in the 1980s and refined during the 1990s has come up short. In the heady aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, the Pentagon had grandly announced that this novel approach to warfare, with its emphasis on advanced technology and air power, was providing US forces with what it called “full spectrum dominance.” According to its proponents, the new model of waging war promised to banish “fog” and “friction,” the terms coined by Karl von Clausewitz to describe the qualities that had throughout history made combat such an arduous, perplexing, and chancy proposition. But in Iraq fog blankets the battlefield: after more than two years of fighting, the enemy remains a cipher. And friction, which, according to Clausewitz “makes even the simplest thing difficult” on the battlefield, has been omnipresent.

The significance of this military failure—and by the standards of preventive war, the Iraq War cannot be otherwise categorized—extends beyond the conflict immediately at hand. As the astute com-

mentator Owen Harries has noted, the conflict in Iraq has shattered the “mystique” of US forces. All the world now knows that an army once thought to be unstoppable can be fought to a standstill. Thirty years after its defeat in Vietnam, it turns out that the United States still does not know how to counter a determined guerrilla force. Far from overawing other would-be opponents, the Iraq War has provided them with a template for how to fight the world’s most powerful military to a stalemate—a lesson that other potential adversaries from Pyongyang to Tehran have no doubt taken to heart.

According to an ancient principle of statecraft, the reputation of power is itself power. By deflating the reputation of US forces, the Iraq War has considerably diminished the power of the United States and by extension has called into question the continued utility of the Bush Doctrine.

EMPTY BOOTS

The Bush Doctrine assumed not only that the United States had devised methods that endowed coercion with unprecedented effectiveness, but also that US forces possessed the wherewithal to employ these methods anywhere in the world. America’s global leadership rests, in this view, on a capacity for global power projection. Yet the Iraq War has revealed that the armed forces possess nothing like the depth required to implement a policy of preventive war on a sustained basis. Our actual staying power has turned out to be far more limited than expected.

In *Imperial Grunts*, his just published tribute to militarized global empire, the author Robert Kaplan writes that “by the turn of the twenty-first century, the United States military had already appropriated the entire earth, and was ready to flood the most obscure areas of it with troops at a moment’s notice.” While an effective policy of preventive war may well require an ability to flood obscure areas with troops, recent events have demonstrated conclusively that the United States does not possess that ability. A commitment of approximately 140,000 troops to Iraq along with a far smaller contingent in Afghanistan has just about exhausted the resources of the US Army and Marine Corps.

Some of those most critical of the Bush administration’s handling of the Iraq War argue that the key to breaking the stalemate in Iraq is to send more American troops. In fact, the soldiers needed to do so do not exist.

In September 2001, when President Bush committed the United States to an open-ended global

war against terror, he chose not to increase the size of America’s military establishment. It was the first time in its history that the United States embarked on a major conflict without expanding its armed services, the president and his advisers tacitly assuming that the existing active duty force of 1.4 million backed up by reserves would suffice for whatever tasks lay ahead. Rather than summoning his fellow citizens to the colors, President Bush famously urged them to go on vacation to rescue the ailing airline industry.

The president’s belief that the existing military was large enough turned out to be deeply flawed. Four years after 9-11, the reserves are close to breaking—both recruiting and reenlistment are in free-fall. As for active duty forces, in fiscal year 2005 the heavily burdened US Army experienced its worst recruiting year in over a quarter-century. Whether or not sufficient numbers of volunteers can be found to maintain even the existing force has emerged as a pressing question, despite the fact that at present only 0.5 percent of the American population is in uniform.

Without question, the Pentagon’s arsenal contains a sufficient number of bombers, missiles, and attack aircraft carriers to launch strikes against Syria or Iran or North Korea, as some supporters of the Bush Doctrine might advocate. But if the requirement goes beyond inflicting punishment—if it includes putting “boots on the ground”—then the men and women to fill those boots are in increasingly scarce supply.

The Bush Doctrine has brought into sharp relief a mismatch between the administration’s declared ambitions and the military resources available to pursue those ambitions. Yet, having decided after 9-11 not to mobilize the country, President Bush cannot now ask Americans to cancel their vacations and instead report to their local recruiter.

HABITS OF THE HIGHLY INEFFECTIVE

A doctrine of preventive war also assumes the availability of military leaders who can effectively translate into action the directives of their political masters. It is one thing to order a preventive war; it is another thing to win it.

Ever since the armed services recovered from the debacle of Vietnam, quality leadership has been a hallmark of the American military establishment. Members of the officer corps take their profession seriously. Nothing in the tactical performance of US forces in Iraq or Afghanistan ought to raise second thoughts on that score. The lieutenants, captains,

THE STRANGE TRIUMPH OF UNILATERALISM

G. John Ikenberry

OVER THE PAST few years almost all of the world's global and regional governance institutions have weakened. Indeed, it is possible to observe a systematic erosion of the authority and capacities of international institutions and regimes in the security, economic, and political realms. In the 1970s, Samuel Huntington, Michel Crozier, and Joji Watanuki wrote about the "crisis of governability" in the advanced democratic world, in which governments were losing the ability and public confidence to confront fundamental problems of managing domestic economies and addressing crime and welfare. Today, it appears as if the governance crisis has gone global.

- *The United Nations.* At a September summit, member states failed to agree on "grand bargain" reforms of the Security Council. The UN is still vital in peacekeeping and supervising elections, but efforts to make it a central vehicle for global security cooperation and collective decision-making on the use of force have failed. UN management is under a cloud, and efforts to implement reforms have been frustrated.

- *The European Union.* Voters this spring rejected the EU constitution, and Europeans are in the midst of a continent-wide rethinking about what comes next. This is a setback for those who would like Europe to play a more active global role in providing leadership and public goods. The federal vision of Europe is dead. In its place is European political drift.

- *NATO.* The Atlantic alliance still exists, but it has declined as a vehicle for serious strategic cooperation between the United States and Europe. Washington is drawing down its troop deployments in Germany, and the idea of an Atlantic security community increasingly has a ring of nostalgia about it.

- *The G-8 Summit.* Aside from the Bonn summit of 1978, the Group of Eight has always been a disappointment as a mechanism for summoning collective action.

- *World Trade Organization.* The WTO is perhaps the strongest link in the global system of rule-based cooperation. But efforts to reach agreement on agriculture subsidies and other tough issues so far have failed. In the meantime, narrow bilateral or regional trade agreements are proliferating. Some argue that the age of big, multilateral trade agreements is over.

- *The nuclear nonproliferation regime.* Most people outside of Washington think the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is in crisis. The bargains have broken down. Washington has ignored NPT obligations; the

Bush administration did not even send the secretary of state to this year's five-year review meeting. Overall, treaty-based arms control is going nowhere, and the United States has pulled back from or resisted a wide range of global security treaties.

- *The American provision of governance.* It is often remarked that the United States itself is a "private" provider of governance through enlightened—if self-interested—rule making and institution building. This "liberal hegemonic" logic of international order, which informed American foreign policy in the past, has been partially replaced by a conservative nationalist logic that questions the whole idea of global governance and rule-based order.

MORE DEMAND, LESS SUPPLY

It is not unfair to ask: where are the vibrant and growing global and regional institutions to help us collectively tackle the great problems of our age? If the United States is not providing "private" global governance, and if the postwar institutions and functional regimes run by the United States and the other "stake holders" of the international system are in decline or disrepair, where is this taking us? Are we in an era when the demand for cooperative mechanisms and institutionalized collective action is growing but the supply is dwindling? It sure looks like it.

There are several possible explanations for this observed crisis of governance. First, it is possible that the basic observation is wrong—governance is not in decline. Realists would say: certainly there is a crisis in global governance, but it is a 500-year crisis, if not longer. The underprovision of cooperation is inherent in world politics. Things are neither worse nor better than at earlier moments. We should be thankful for the long pause in great-power war and the failure of other major states to balance against the United States.

Second, much of the crisis may have to do with shifts in US policy. This is the hegemonic stability argument—namely, that the supply of rules and institutions ultimately hinges on the logic of behavior that informs the most powerful state in the system. Today, the United States does not have an inclination to sponsor, support, fund, and enforce global rules and institutions.

Third, the crisis may be driven by an inability to infuse international regimes and institutions with democratic accountability and legitimacy. The failure of the European constitution may be the most direct casualty of this sort of constraint. But it may be a more general problem of building and pooling authority above the level of states.

Fourth, more cooperation may be taking place, but just not in the old-style global treaty-based institutional

G. JOHN IKENBERRY, a Current History contributing editor, is a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University. A version of this commentary originally appeared in "America Abroad" at TPMCafe.com.

way. Princeton's Anne-Marie Slaughter argues that an entire world of intergovernmental networks is flourishing below the political radar screen. They tend to be informal, practical, and executive-based. They escape the problem of democratic accountability largely because they operate unnoticed. The implication of this view is that there is really not a crisis of governance, merely a shift in the forms of governance.

Finally, there is a view that the crisis is real but is driven by deep shifts in the nature of the challenges that states face. In the economic realm, for example, multilateral trade rules and cooperation were possible during the long postwar era when tariff barriers were the most important impediments to open trade. Tariff reduction lent itself to multilateral exercises. Today, the blockages are built into domestic legislation—blockages that are more difficult to negotiate in global multilateral settings. Likewise, some observers argue that the new security threats—weapons of mass destruction in the hands of illegitimate, unstable, or untrustworthy states—cannot be handled by treaty-based arms control regimes that emerged in the decades of US-Soviet bipolar nuclear summitry. The crisis of governance in this view is driven by a mismatch between the nature of the problems confronting states and the traditional ways in which collective action has been organized.

MADE IN WASHINGTON

So which is it? As descriptions of the current landscape, these are not all competing or mutually exclusive. New forms of informal cooperation are evident. Still, it is clear something is very wrong with the current system of governance. Looking into the future—with the growing complexities and dangers associated with continued globalization of economies, societies, and cultures and the privatization of technologies of violence—it is obvious that the world will need more, not less, institutionalized cooperation. If we are in an age of declining institutionalized cooperation, well, ergo—we do have a growing problem or, yes, crisis.

In my view, the crisis is generated primarily from choices made by the United States. Washington does not appear to be doing as much today as in the past to sponsor and operate within a system of consensual rule-based governance. Why America is less willing to do so is actually a complex issue. Some of it is very specifically about the Bush administration, and thus about biases and viewpoints that eventually will pass from the scene as President Bush and his team leave office.

But there are also deeper structural shifts in the United States and the global system that make Washington less interested in rule and governance provision. American unipolarity seems to have created problems in how the United States thinks about the provision of international rules, institutions, and public goods. In the past, America provided global “services”—such as security protection and support for open markets—that made other states willing to work with rather than resist US preeminence. The public goods provision tended to make it worthwhile for these states to endure the day-to-day irritations of American foreign policy. But the trade-off seems to be shifting. Today, the United States appears to be providing fewer global public goods while at the same time the irritations associated with US dominance seem to be growing.

It might be useful to think of the dynamic this way: the United States is unique in that it is simultaneously both a provider of global governance and a great power that pursues its own national interest. When America acts as a “liberal hegemon,” championing the WTO, for example, or reaffirming its commitment to cooperative security in Asia and Europe, it is seeking to lead or manage the global system of rules and institutions. When it is acting as a nationalist great power, by protecting its steel and textile industries, for example, it is seeking to respond to domestic interests and its relative power position among nations. And today, these two roles—liberal hegemon and traditional great power—increasingly are in conflict. ■

and colonels know their business. They are smart, seasoned, and tough. Whether military leaders at the topmost echelon of command understand the operational and strategic imperatives of preventive war may be another matter, however.

In all of the controversy that the Iraq War has generated, the performance of the most senior US officers—the three- and four-star commanders—has attracted surprisingly little attention. Yet a strong argument can be made that at the very top, US military leadership has been at best mediocre if not altogether unsatisfactory. Two examples will suffice to make the point: General Tommy Franks and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez.

As commanding general of US Central Command, Franks planned and directed the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. In Afghanistan, the forces commanded by Franks handily toppled the Taliban regime and scattered, but did not destroy, the Al Qaeda cadres that had used Afghanistan as a safe haven. Osama bin Laden, Al Qaeda's supreme leader and the chief architect of the 9-11 attacks, eluded capture and remains at large. Although ousted from power, the Taliban refused to submit to the new American-installed political order. The effort to pacify Afghanistan continues, a low-level war that may become virtually perpetual. The decision gained by Franks in Afghanistan qualifies at best as partial and incomplete.

By comparison with Iraq, however, Afghanistan looks like a triumph. When it came to planning Operation Iraqi Freedom, General Franks counted on “shock and awe” to paralyze the Iraqi army and facilitate a lightning advance on the Iraqi capital, seen as the centerpiece of Baathist legitimacy. For Franks, Baghdad in 2003 became like Berlin in 1945: capturing it, he believed, meant endgame.

Even before the war began, dissenting voices warned otherwise. Studies undertaken by the State Department and the US Army War College forecast major challenges *after* Hussein and his henchmen had been removed. Most famously, General Eric Shinseki, then the army chief of staff, suggested that the occupation of Iraq was likely to require “several hundred thousand” soldiers.

These warnings turned out to be prescient. Franks failed to appreciate the political forces that Hussein’s removal from power would unleash. His planning for “Phase IV”—the occupation of Iraq—verged on the non-existent. As a consequence, the disorder produced by the overthrow of Hussein

caught Franks and his subordinates flat-footed. Out of that disorder there emerged an intense struggle to determine the future of Iraq, a struggle that soon became an insurgency that aimed to oust the “occupying” Americans.

Hardly had the outlines of that insurgency begun to emerge than Franks departed the scene, retiring to write his best-selling memoirs (in which he dismisses Shinseki as an ill-informed meddler). The man inheriting the mess that Franks left in his wake was General Sanchez, who served as senior US ground commander in Iraq for the insurgency’s first full year. His mission was clear: snuff out the insurgency. Instead, Sanchez fueled it.

Historians of the Iraq War will likely remember Sanchez as this conflict’s William C. Westmoreland—the senior commander who, in failing to grasp the political-military nature of the problem he faced, set US forces on an erroneous course from which recovery became all but impossible.

General Westmoreland, of course, was the senior US commander in South Vietnam from 1964 to 1968. Working within the very narrow constraints imposed on him by the Johnson administration, he concluded that the best way to defend South Vietnam was to capitalize on superior US firepower and mobility to crush the North Vietnamese commu-

nists. Westmoreland committed the United States to a protracted war of attrition, confident that his forces could inflict casualties at a rate that the enemy could not sustain. He miscalculated and the ultimate result was American defeat.

Similarly, Sanchez in 2003 judged the correlation of forces in Iraq to be in his favor and decided that a tough, aggressive strategy would disarm the insurgency before it could gain momentum. He too miscalculated, as badly as Westmoreland had. Rather than intimidating the insurgents, his kick-down-the-door tactics emboldened them and alienated ordinary Iraqis who came to see the Americans not as liberators but as an alien occupying force. Over the course of Sanchez’s tenure in Baghdad, the insurgency grew in scope and sophistication. His successors have been struggling ever since to regain the upper hand. Today, the conflict drags on, erod-

ing American popular support for the war and sapping the strength of the forces engaged.

A doctrine of preventive war requires that the forces engaged accomplish their mission swiftly,

economically, and without leaving loose ends. The generals employed to implement the Bush Doctrine have not demonstrated an ability to deliver those results.

THE TARNISHED MILITARY

Especially in a democracy, a doctrine of preventive war also requires soldiers who manifest a consistently high level of professionalism. To maintain public support for what is, stripped to its essentials, a policy of aggression, the military forces committed to the enterprise must acquit themselves with honor, thereby making it easier to suppress questions about the war’s moral justification. As long as US soldiers in Iraq behave like liberators, for example, it becomes easier for President Bush to maintain the position that America’s true purpose is to spread the blessings of freedom and democracy.

Sadly, in the dirty war that Iraq has become, a number of American soldiers have behaved in ways that have undermined the administration’s liberation narrative. This is a story in which the facts are as yet only partially known. But this much we can say for sure: after the revelations from Abu Ghraib prison and the credible allegations lodged recently by Captain Ian Fishback regarding widespread detainee abuse in the 82d Airborne Division, and with other

The sword of American military power is neither sharp enough nor hard enough to meet the demands of preventive war.

accounts of misconduct steadily accumulating from week to week, it is no longer possible to pass off soldierly misbehavior as the late-night shenanigans of a few low-ranking sadists lacking adequate supervision. Unprofessional behavior in the ranks of the American military may not have reached epidemic proportions, but it is far from rare.

More sadly still, the chain of command seems determined to turn a blind eye to this growing problem. The courageous Fishback labored for 18 months to interest his superiors in the problem that he had witnessed in Iraq. Only when he brought his concerns to the attention of Human Rights Watch and the US Congress did anyone take notice. A year and a half after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, the only senior officer to have been held accountable is a female reservist, Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, who was demoted and forced to retire. Karpinski's complaint of an old boy's club using her as a convenient scapegoat is self-serving, but it may well contain an element of truth. The American officer corps once professed to hold sacrosanct the principle of

command responsibility. No more. At the very least it no longer applies to those occupying the executive suites in Baghdad and Washington.

The US military may well be teetering on the brink of a profound moral crisis. Another conflict like Iraq could easily prove the tipping point. That prospect alone ought to temper the Bush administration's enthusiasm for any further experiments with preventive war. At its conception, the Bush Doctrine represented a radical departure from the best traditions of American statecraft. Efforts to implement the doctrine have cost the nation and especially its military dearly without appreciably enhancing American security. It is too much to expect that this administration, committed to the proposition that it must never acknowledge error, will officially abrogate the Bush Doctrine. But the administration ignores reality at its peril. As it contemplates the wreckage caused by its preventive war in Iraq, the White House may well come to see the wisdom of allowing the Bush Doctrine to die a quiet and unlamented death. ■

The Nonproliferation Review

Editor Scott Purdy, Monterey Institute of International Studies, USA

Volume 13, 2006, 3 issues

Print ISSN 1073-6700

Online ISSN 1746-1766

Institutional Rate (Print and Online) US \$264 / £162

Institutional Rate (Online only) US \$255 / £154

Personal Rate (Print Only) US \$54 / £32

A revised journal concerned with the causes, consequences, and control of the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The Review features case studies, theoretical analyses, and policy debates on such issues as individual country programs, treaties and export controls, WMD terrorism, and economic and environmental effects of weapons proliferation.

Authors come from many regions and disciplines. With subscribers in 50 countries, the Review has proven to be an essential resource for policymakers and scholars worldwide.

The Nonproliferation Review is published in conjunction with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) of the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Visit <http://cns.mils.edu/> to read more about the CNS.



Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

www.tandf.co.uk/journals

s@ra
Taylor & Francis Group

Scholarly Article Research Alerting

SARA is a free email service alerting you to new articles. Register by email and you can request to receive alerts by keyword or by date. For more information visit www.tandf.co.uk/sara.

@update.us
Taylor & Francis Group

Register your email address at www.tandf.co.uk/updates to receive information on books, journals and other news within your area of interest.

For further information, or to request a sample copy please contact Scott Purdy

Online at the below address and quote reference: NP1304/1

Taylor & Francis Group, 4 Park Square, Milton Park,

Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN, UK

Email: scott.purdy@tandf.co.uk

Fax: +44 (0)207 017 6719