

Paul K. MacDonald

Rebalancing American foreign policy

The United States faces unprecedented foreign policy and national security challenges.¹ Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the global war on terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the increasing assertiveness of Russia, the growth of Chinese military power, global climate change, not to mention the spread of poverty, infectious diseases, and ethnic and religious strife around the world: the challenges aren't limited; the resources to meet them are. The high operational tempo of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has stretched the military to the breaking point. The ongoing financial crisis and economic recession will severely limit the ability of the federal government to sustain or increase expenditures for defense and foreign aid.

The Obama administration has a unique opportunity to reorient American foreign policy and lay out a new national security strategy that more effectively strikes a balance between the ends we seek and the means we possess. Such a strategy would recognize that the United States faces considerable constraints in the realm of foreign policy. Some of these are self-

inflicted: the war in Iraq, for example, proved to be a costly undertaking that has severely burdened the U.S. military. Other constraints stem from developments outside of Washington's control. The rise of new regional powers and the erosion of the liberal consensus will increasingly limit the exercise of American power. Given these developments, Washington must not only scale back American ambitions, but also demonstrate prudence with the nation's limited resources.

In his classic book on the subject, Liddell Hart defined strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy."² While armchair generals often focus on the application of force, identifying and prioritizing the "ends of policy" are of equal, if not greater, importance. For without a clear sense of the ends, foreign policy will not only be incoherent, but often ineffective. Moreover, without realistic prioritization, foreign policy will attempt everything while, often, accomplishing nothing.

Elected on a foreign policy platform that preached modesty, the Bush administration came to define the goals of the United States in broad and lofty terms. In its 2006 *National Security Strategy*, for

© 2009 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

Paul K.
MacDonald

example, the White House boldly argued that the “ultimate goal” of U.S. policy would be to “end tyranny in our world” by creating “a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.”³ Among the specific tasks listed as essential to realizing this vision were strengthening alliances to defeat global terrorism, working with others to defuse regional conflicts, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, encouraging the development of democratic societies, and promoting free trade and open markets.

In the abstract, each of these goals is laudable, and to its credit, the Bush administration did make selective progress toward realizing its vision. But as a guide to practical planning, there are serious limitations with this vision of America’s place in the world. To begin with, there is little sense of which of these goals should be prioritized. The lack of a clear hierarchy of objectives is particularly problematic given that many of these abstract policy objectives are in tension with one another. For example, efforts to strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism in countries such as Saudi Arabia or Pakistan were frequently at odds with attempts to champion human dignity or promote democracy. Similarly, encouraging countries to open their economies to global trade and investment may pay dividends in the long term, but in the short term these policies often have the effect of exacerbating inequality and generating domestic strife. The strategy also lacks clarity on how achieving the goals it outlines will directly protect the United States. The spread of democracy may encourage the emergence of friendly regimes, but it is also possi-

ble that militant groups will use the ballot box to achieve power, as was the case with Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian elections. Working to defuse regional conflicts might promote peace and stability in some cases, but it could also embroil the United States in distant conflicts of little direct interest.

The so-called “global war on terrorism” epitomizes the drawbacks of casting the core goals of American foreign policy in such abstract and contradictory terms. Various Bush-era planning documents describe the United States as engaged in a conflict in which “the enemy is terrorism” and “building and maintaining a united global front against terrorism” is an important component of victory.⁴ These statements are not particularly useful as guides for public policy. According to the State Department, some forty-two groups around the globe employ terrorism as a strategy to accomplish their specific aims.⁵ To lump these groups together is to define the threat in a way that is overly broad: it conflates Islamic extremists in Algeria with Marxist rebels in Colombia, Shiite fundamentalists in Lebanon with Sunni radicals in Pakistan. To claim that we can or should fight terrorism in all of these locations, or that these conflicts comprise some coherent war in which a single strategy will prove effective, is unhelpful.

Trying to undermine particular terrorist groups can be an appropriate foreign policy goal of the United States. But formulating policies based on transcendental goals or vague threats muddies what we clearly know to be more urgent: that the influence of Al Qaeda is a greater priority than Basque separatists or splinter factions of the Irish Republican Army; or that the influence of Islamic fundamentalists in Pakistan is a much more pressing danger than

terrorist cells in Central or Southeast Asia. Given limited resources and the multifaceted nature of the threat, the United States must define its needs in precise and direct terms.

What, then, should be the main foreign policy goals of the United States? In many respects, it is easier to identify what the goals *shouldn't* be. First, the United States should abandon the notion that it can or should seek to discourage others from challenging its political leadership or military primacy. As recently as September 2002, the White House declared that an important benefit of America's military might was its ability to "dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."⁶ The global distribution of power, however, is already beginning to shift away from one defined by U.S. predominance and toward one that is much more multipolar, regionalized, and complex.⁷ Rising powers such as China, India, and Brazil are becoming major players in the global economy. Potential adversaries such as Russia and Iran are assertively challenging American influence within their respective neighborhoods. The National Intelligence Council (NIC) recently concluded that in the future "the United States' relative strength . . . will decline and US leverage will become more strained."⁸ American power won't evaporate overnight, nor will Washington cease to play a leading role in global affairs. But, as the NIC report makes clear, the unrivaled dominance of American power can no longer be taken for granted.

Second, the United States needs to moderate its attempts to spread democracy around the globe. Promoting

democracy is laudable, but it is not clear that U.S. efforts have produced, or can produce, their intended effects. Attempts by the United States to bolster moderate Muslim politicians often have the reverse consequence of decreasing their legitimacy in the eyes of local populations. Moreover, new democracies or countries undergoing political transition are rarely bastions of stability and political moderation, as was evidenced by Georgian President Saakashvili's clumsy and ill-fated attempts to provoke Russia for domestic political gain. The increasing prevalence of semi-authoritarian regimes – those that adopt democratic practices, such as elections, alongside authoritarian ones, such as one-party rule – suggests that it is not clear that liberal, multiparty democracy remains the most attractive model of domestic governance.

Not just democratic institutions, but many of the major elements of the postwar liberal order are being called into question. The collapse of the latest round of the Doha trade talks, for example, raised doubts about the continued viability of the global trade regime. The credibility of the United Nations has been tarnished by recent peacekeeping failures in Darfur and the Congo. The nonproliferation treaty regime is in crisis following North Korea's testing of a nuclear device and Iran's continued intransigence over its nuclear program. Russia has taken advantage of its role as one of the world's leading oil and gas exporters to bully and intimidate its neighbors, while China has proven willing to undermine global human rights regimes to protect its economic interests in Africa. Even the United States' traditional allies in Europe appear reluctant to contribute to multilateral efforts such as NATO's operations in Afghanistan. In short, the spirit of ac-

Paul K.
MacDonald

commodation and multilateral cooperation that Washington had encouraged and exploited in the past appears in limited supply today. Recently, leading powers have approached core issues so divergently that it is unlikely that the Obama administration will be able to rebuild quickly or easily the foundations of the international system around a new multilateral consensus.

If the United States cannot retain its leading position or easily reconstruct the postwar liberal order, what options does it possess? One possibility would be for Washington to accept the erosion of its hegemony and simply withdraw from global affairs. But the short-term challenges facing the United States, such as the worsening insurgency in Afghanistan, political instability in Pakistan, and the Iranian nuclear crisis, limit the attractiveness of a rapid retreat from global affairs. In addition, just because the United States will face a more complicated and fractious international environment does not mean that its leadership will always be ineffective. As Fareed Zakaria has argued, the challenge is not one of American decline, but managing the “rise of the rest.”⁹ There may be distinct limits to American power in the future, especially in regions where new economic or military rivals are increasing in strength. But the United States will still be able to work with these new regional powers on select issues of common interest.

By developing more robust bilateral economic and security relationships with regional partners, the United States can cultivate relationships that have the potential to endure despite a weakening of American economic and political influence. American foreign policy would, as a result, move away from the urge to reconstruct some grand liberal bargain and instead focus on specific threats,

whether the proliferation of nuclear weapons, instability in Iraq, terrorist attacks launched by global jihadist networks such as Al Qaeda, or increased Russian assertiveness. Such a policy should be comprised of three core principles. First, the United States must possess willingness to compromise on issues of limited importance. Washington should indeed continue to draw bright lines with regard to interests it considers vital to defend. But by accepting and acquiescing to the prerogatives of rising powers in areas of minor importance, the United States can signal its moderation while also garnering more support on issues of major importance. Second, Washington should strive to restore its position as a good faith broker in world politics, rather than play the role of global policeman or moral arbiter. In this context, standing alliances and multilateral institutions will be of less importance than impromptu diplomacy arrangements through which the United States works with ad hoc coalitions of major powers to resolve particular crises. Finally, the United States must develop the ability to anticipate new threats before they emerge and respond to them in a flexible manner once they do – not least of all for the benefits this sort of preventative approach will yield in the long run.

What might this alternative approach look like in practice? Consider nuclear proliferation, one of the top foreign policy priorities of the new administration. The issue turns on whether the emerging multipolar international system should be one with only a handful of nuclear powers, or one in which a significant number of states, both great and small, possess nuclear arsenals. While all of the major powers have an incentive to avoid the proliferation of nuclear weap-

ons, the inherent uncertainty and ambiguity of the emerging international environment create significant incentives for mid-range states or aspiring regional powers to embark on a nuclear weapons program, or to hedge their bets by acquiring the technical infrastructure to construct a weapon if necessary. In the past, the United States has met this challenge through multilateral diplomacy, but the nonproliferation regime is under serious strain. Non-nuclear weapons states increasingly question whether the nuclear weapons states intend to fulfill their nonproliferation treaty obligations, whether ensuring the supply of peaceful nuclear technology as guaranteed by Article Four or working toward eventual disarmament as required by Article Six. Moreover, the recent cases of North Korea and Iran have raised questions about the ability of the major powers to enforce the regime reliably and equitably.

Rather than focusing solely on multilateral solutions, the United States needs to approach nonproliferation questions on a case-by-case basis. Given the limitations of the global nonproliferation regime, Washington should instead seek to work together with regional powers and local allies to bring pressure on aspiring proliferators. Such an approach has produced modest success in the case of North Korea and could be possible with Iran, if the United States were to engage seriously in diplomacy with Iran instead of delegating that responsibility to the European Union. Moreover, the United States should demonstrate greater flexibility in the types of bargains it is willing to accept. For example, there may be very justifiable reasons to limit the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology, but it may be impossible to do so in each and every case. Washington should consider accepting com-

promises on access to the fuel cycle for countries such as Iran. The United States could allow a limited research-scale enrichment program, provided it could be coupled with a robust verification regime. Not only would this create possible ground for a long-term compromise with Iran, it would also generate international support for aggressive action should Tehran divert material to a weapons program. Finally, the United States should consider negotiating agreements outside of the nonproliferation regime in appropriate cases. The recent bilateral U.S.-India nuclear deal, for example, was criticized in some quarters for legitimizing India's nuclear program, which was pursued outside of the multilateral treaty framework. While there are certainly problems with the deal, especially as it relates to U.S.-Pakistani relations, the arrangement helps draw New Delhi closer to Washington and reaffirms India's general commitment to nonproliferation. Washington might even consider a similar bilateral agreement with Pakistan, could it be tied to important guarantees regarding the export of nuclear material and technologies.

There are similar opportunities to develop tailored solutions to specific policy challenges in other areas. In the case of Iraq, for example, the United States reached an agreement with the Iraqi government in November 2008 to draw down its combat forces over the next three years, but it remains to be seen whether this plan will produce a stable regime or lead to a renewal of sectarian violence. The answer is not solely dependent upon politicians in Baghdad: the policies adopted by Iraq's neighbors, such as Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, matter, too. Washington should build upon bilateral talks

Paul K.
MacDonald

it has previously held with foreign diplomats in Baghdad and work toward a formal agreement among the regional powers that would commit Iraq's neighbors to policies designed to foster political stability during this critical transitional period. As in the case of managing nuclear proliferation, this may require the United States to accept some unsavory outcomes, such as a heightened degree of Iranian influence in Iraq's internal affairs. But this cooperation is vital to achieve the more important goal of the prevention of a renewal of sectarian violence, which would threaten to draw Iraq's neighbors into a broader regional conflict.

Similarly, much has been made of Russia's recent aggression against Georgia and the possibility of a "new cold war." But the solution to rising tensions with Russia lies in finding areas of common interest, and not in political brinkmanship. To this end, the United States should seek to accommodate Russian interests in areas of minor importance while articulating to Moscow the cost of renewed competition. For example, as is presently being considered, the Obama administration could seek to arrange a deal with Moscow to cancel the planned deployment of missile defense systems to Eastern Europe in exchange for renewed progress on bilateral arms control. A similar compromise could be struck on the planned expansion of NATO, with the United States agreeing to moderate the scale or speed of enlargement in exchange for a public commitment from Russia to cease meddling in the internal affairs of countries in the near abroad, such as Georgia and Ukraine. Even while striving to be moderate, Washington nevertheless should be clear about what bright lines must not be crossed, whether aggression against allies or the coercive manipulation of

oil and gas shipments to Europe. Such a strategy will not transform Russia into a friend or ally, and it is entirely likely that Russia will continue to behave like a regional bully. But given Russia's increasing power, the United States must be modest in its goals. Occasional cooperation with Moscow on vital issues relating to arms control may not lay the groundwork for unending friendship, but it can help moderate the consequences of competition.

Moderating U.S. goals in the face of a changing international environment is especially important given the limits of America's military capabilities. The high operational tempo of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has degraded the current capabilities of the U.S. military. Nearly two-thirds of home active-duty army brigades are rated as not ready for service, largely because they lack the equipment to train properly between overseas deployments.¹⁰ Inhospitable operating environments and lengthy deployments have also contributed to the decline in the reliability of hardware and equipment, as well as soaring maintenance costs. The army has also had a difficult time retaining mid-career officers and meeting elevated recruiting goals.¹¹ The cost of recruiting and retaining active-duty military personnel has skyrocketed, both because of the need to increase pay and because of rising health care expenses for veterans.¹² Rebuilding America's military capabilities in the wake of these two conflicts is an important priority for the new administration.

Adding to this challenge, the Pentagon is in the midst of an ambitious program to transform the military.¹³ The navy is committed to developing a new generation of surface ships, while the air force is in the process of modernizing its fleet

of tactical fighters and tanker aircraft. Such efforts have been complicated, however, by the fact that many of the next-generation weapons systems have been plagued by cost overruns and delays. For example, the army's Future Combat System is an estimated 48 percent over budget and more than four years behind schedule.¹⁴ This example is not unique: since the end of the cold war, the acquisition costs of major weapons programs have increased an estimated 120 percent while the funding provided for these programs has increased only 57 percent.¹⁵ According to John Christie, the inability of the military to continue to finance its acquisition needs raises the gloomy prospect that "the U.S. military will cease being a significant influence in world events because of a shrinking force structure."¹⁶ This impending shortfall is even more alarming given the rapid growth of military budgets in the past eight years. Under the Bush administration, spending on defense almost doubled, from \$294 billion in FY 2000 to more than \$647 billion in FY 2008. Given a weak economy, shrinking tax receipts, and a ballooning federal budget deficit, it is unlikely that the Obama administration will be able to increase the size of the Pentagon budget to meet the escalating costs of defense acquisition.

Further complicating matters is the uncertainty about what missions the U.S. military will be asked to perform in the coming years and whether the Pentagon should focus on acquiring new capabilities relevant to fighting terrorists and insurgents or focus on modernizing weapons systems designed to meet threats from potential state competitors.¹⁷ The military could, in theory, develop multiple competencies, including both counterinsurgency operations and conventional maneuver warfare, to

meet these multifaceted challenges. In practice, however, there are important tradeoffs. For instance, the burdens of the Iraq and Afghanistan operations have already eroded traditional war-fighting capabilities. A recent army white paper estimates that more than 90 percent of soldiers in field artillery units are operating outside their occupational specialties and thus are uncertified to perform their artillery support role.¹⁸

The growing emphasis on fighting insurgencies and unconventional wars has also muddied defense acquisition. For example, the Pentagon has invested billions of dollars to develop and acquire new surface ships that the navy had claimed would enhance its ability to support counterinsurgency missions in inshore waters. Critics charge that these new ships, which include the *Zumwalt*-class "stealth" destroyer and the Littoral Combat Ship, may be too large to accomplish the inshore missions for which they are intended, yet too vulnerable to contribute to the navy's traditional mission of maintaining blue-water supremacy. Indeed, after an estimated \$11 billion in research and development, the navy recently reversed course and recommended scaling back the *Zumwalt* destroyer program, citing evidence that these ships could not conduct traditional blue-water missions such as area air defense and anti-submarine warfare.¹⁹ Thus, in the absence of clear direction, the Department of Defense may find that in an effort both to maintain a traditional war-fighting capability and to acquire the capabilities to meet new threats, it might end up with costly weapons systems that can do neither.

What type of military capabilities should the United States seek to rebuild

Paul K.
MacDonald

in the period of diminished resources? The typical answer to this question begins by listing a number of expensive and allegedly irrelevant weapons systems that should be cut. The usual suspects include Ballistic Missile Defense, the F/A-22 Raptor advanced fighter, the aforementioned *Zumwalt*-class destroyer, and the army's Future Combat System. Assuming cuts to these specific weapons systems would be prudent, they make up only a relatively small portion of the defense budget. A recent report by the Institute for Policy Studies recommended the elimination or reduction of eleven different defense program areas, but the combined savings of these cuts would have been \$48.7 billion – about 8 percent of total military spending.²⁰ While this is an important start, policies to scale back unnecessary systems and reform the acquisition process alone are not durable solutions to increased budgetary pressure.

Rather than simply tinker with existing programs, the United States needs to rethink fundamentally what it hopes to accomplish with its military forces in the coming decades. Without any genuine military competitor at this exact moment, the United States misdirects its resources by investing in expensive weapons systems designed to ensure dominance against every imaginable adversary, everywhere around the globe. At the same time, building a military that is designed exclusively to combat asymmetric threats posed by insurgents and terrorist groups risks degrading the ability of the United States to respond to more assertive rising regional powers in the medium to long term. Instead, a force must be created that can respond to the diversity of missions that will be faced in the coming decades.

In doing so the military should seek first to create a hybrid force capable of

meeting diverse threats across a variety of areas of operations. Rather than training individual units broadly, the military should allow for greater specialization and the development of forces tailored to meet specific challenges. In addition, this force should consist of units that are more tightly integrated across services and with civilian agencies. Individual military branches should not be viewed as isolated instruments and should be coordinated more closely with all of the elements of American power.

What might this look like in practice? Take the U.S. Army, for example. At the moment, the army is focused on training units for “full-spectrum” operations, whether counterinsurgency or traditional high-intensity combat.²¹ However, the expectation that individual units can do everything is unrealistic, especially when high operational tempo leaves little time for training and has thinned the ranks of skilled officers. This policy also encourages a “one force fits all” approach, with only a single option to meet any challenge. Going forward, army leadership should consider proposals to develop a more specialized force consisting of a mix of units of different sizes, each with a different core competency.²² Some units could be tasked with preparing to fight conventional wars against regional competitors while others could train to perform non-traditional tasks such as counterinsurgency or post-conflict reconstruction. In developing this specialized force, the army should focus on improving the particular skills of its soldiers, rather than the technological sophistication of their armored vehicles. Advanced technology is no substitute for soldiers who can interface effectively with a local population. To this end, the army should continue to invest in developing critical language skills and in expanding training

for non-combat roles, including military advisors and reconstruction teams. At the same time, the army cannot become too intellectually focused on any one region or any one particular threat. In an unpredictable world, with multiple regional powers, the army must be specialized for particular roles but not overly specific.

There are similar opportunities in the other military branches. The air force needs to develop a correspondingly hybrid force that is not simply dominated by advanced tactical fighter aircraft. Developing advanced airlift capabilities to move American forces quickly to hot spots is a pressing need, as is meeting the growing demand for unmanned aerial vehicles to support counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions. Similarly, despite occasional rhetorical statements to the contrary, the navy remains committed to a blue-water fleet organized around the carrier strike group. Given the potential threats posed by submarines and anti-ship cruise missiles to expensive platforms such as aircraft carriers, there may be reasons to shift emphasis toward a more diverse fleet with surface ships capable of operating in a variety of different contexts, including hostile and contested waters closer inshore.²³

To a certain extent these recommendations echo those made by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who in a recent *Foreign Affairs* article encouraged the United States to develop a “better balance in the portfolio of capabilities it has” and to “institutionalize capabilities such as counterinsurgency and foreign military assistance.”²⁴ This is an important step in the right direction. Over the long term, however, the military must go beyond simply shifting priorities. The distinction between the services is becoming increasingly obso-

lete; operations on land, at sea, and in the air are not easily separated from one another. In the short term, the four branches need to work more closely with each other to increase the effectiveness of military operations, whatever their specific purpose. Over the long term, the military should move toward an integrated force divided more by specialized role than by branch or service.²⁵ One could imagine the development of standing forces with integrated components: a counterinsurgency rapid reaction force consisting not simply of army trainers and advisors, but also of air force unmanned aerial vehicles to provide intelligence and navy vessels to interdict arms smuggling and combat piracy in littoral waters.

Finally, the United States should promote greater coordination between the military and civilian agencies, especially in the context of counterinsurgency and nation-building efforts. A promising model is the Provincial Reconstruction Team, first used in Afghanistan, in which a small military contingent works closely with civilian experts and host government representatives to encourage governance, provide security, and deliver targeted assistance to a local population.²⁶ Going forward, the military should formalize this cooperation, encouraging the development of units tasked for nation-building and advisory missions in which there is a dedicated civilian contribution.²⁷ By combining hard and soft power, the United States can maintain its influence despite constraints on available resources.

The United States is at a crossroads in its foreign and national security policy. The national security challenges are extensive while the capabilities available to meet them are under severe strain. New political and economic powers are

Paul K.
MacDonald

emerging across a variety of regions, and the United States can no longer be assured of unrivaled power and influence. These trends suggest that Washington cannot wield its power indiscriminately in pursuit of ambiguous and wide-ranging goals. Rather, it must marshal its limited means to accomplish specific goals in vital areas, working in conjunction with long-standing allies, emerging powers, even potential enemies. To help accomplish these limited goals, the U.S. military must become a much different institution. It can no longer remain a collection of branches dedicated to fighting large-scale conventional wars against rival states, but must transform itself into a hybrid force that can meet specialized challenges in a diverse and chaotic world in coordination with its civilian counterparts.

Observers have anticipated America's decline numerous times before and have been proven wrong: just think of the military rebuilding itself in the aftermath of Vietnam or following post-cold war trimming of the defense budget. But the argument presented here is not another simple, overly pessimistic exercise

in what Samuel Huntington has called "declinism."²⁸ The rise of new regional powers has not eliminated America's influence; it has simply attenuated and complicated it. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have not destroyed American military power; they have simply exposed certain limits to its effective application. But while it would be a mistake to prophesy the imminent decline and fall of America in the world, it would be just as erroneous to engage in American triumphalism. There is no more certain way to accentuate the limits in American power or to accelerate the erosion of American influence than by adopting policies designed to prolong American dominance. In this respect, the United States is its own worst enemy. As evidenced by the complications in Iraq and Afghanistan, with great power comes the opportunity to make great mistakes. By moderating its ends and relying on specialized means, the United States can be prepared for whatever uncertainties await it in the coming decades while acclimating itself to a world where it has much to lose and little to gain.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ I would like to thank Stacie Goddard, Mike Glosny, Joe Parent, James McAllister, and Alex Montgomery for their helpful comments. Any errors are my own.
- ² B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: Penguin, 1991), 321; see also Richard K. Betts, "Is Strategy an Illusion?" *International Security* 25 (2) (Autumn 2000): 5.
- ³ White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (March 2006), 1.
- ⁴ See White House, *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (February 2003), 1; and White House, *Progress Report on the Global War on Terrorism* (September 2003), 2.
- ⁵ Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2007* (April 2008), 267–268.
- ⁶ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (September 2002), 30.
- ⁷ See, for example, Robert A. Pape, "Empire Falls," *The National Interest* (January/February 2009).
- ⁸ National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World* (November 2008), vi.

- ⁹ Fareed Zakaria, "The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2008).
- ¹⁰ Andrew Feickert, "U.S. Army and Marine Corps Equipment Requirements: Background and Issues for Congress," *CRS Report for Congress* (December 20, 2006), 8–10, 22–23.
- ¹¹ Government Accountability Office, "Military Personnel: Preliminary Observation on Recruiting and Retention Issues within the U.S. Armed Forces" (March 16, 2005), 6–8.
- ¹² Between FY 1999 and FY 2005, the per-service-member cost grew by 33 percent above inflation. Pat Towell, Stephen Daggett, and Amy Belasco, "Defense: FY2008 Authorization and Appropriations," *CRS Report for Congress* (January 23, 2008), 15.
- ¹³ See Richard K. Betts, "A Disciplined Defense: How to Regain Strategic Solvency," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2007).
- ¹⁴ Government Accountability Office, "Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapons Systems Continue to Experience Cost and Schedule Problems under DoD's Revised Policy" (April 2006), 9–10.
- ¹⁵ Government Accountability Office, "Defense Acquisitions: Better Weapon Program Outcomes Require Discipline, Accountability, and Fundamental Changes in the Acquisition Environment" (June 3, 2008), 3.
- ¹⁶ John D. Christie, "DoD on a Glide Path to Bankruptcy," *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute* 134 (2008): 23.
- ¹⁷ See Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, "The Defense Inheritance: Challenges and Choices for the Next Pentagon Team," *Washington Quarterly* 31 (4) (Autumn 2008): 59–76.
- ¹⁸ Sean MacFarland, Michael Shields, Jeffrey Snow, "The King and I: The Impending Crisis in Field Artillery's Ability to Provide Fire Support to Maneuver Commanders" (U.S. Army, 2008).
- ¹⁹ Mackenzie M. Eaglen, "Changing Course on Navy Shipbuilding: Questions Congress Should Ask Before Funding," *Heritage Foundation Backgrounder* (October 7, 2008), 3–4.
- ²⁰ Institute for Policy Studies, *A Unified Security Budget for the United States, FY 2009* (September 2008), 21–26.
- ²¹ U.S. Army, *Army Posture Statement: A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities* (February 26, 2008), 14.
- ²² For various specific proposals, see Congressional Budget Office, *Options for Restructuring the Army* (May 2005).
- ²³ For a similar proposal, see W. P. Hughes, Jr., "A Bimodal Strategy for the National Maritime Strategy," *Naval War College Review* 60 (2) (Spring 2007): 29–47.
- ²⁴ Robert M. Gates, "A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2009).
- ²⁵ See, for example, various proposals in Andrew R. Hoehn, Adam Grissom, David A. Ochmanek, David A. Shlapak, and Alan J. Vick, *A New Division of Labor: Meeting America's Security Challenges Beyond Iraq* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2007), esp. 51–59.
- ²⁶ See discussion in Michael J. McNerney, "Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?" *Parameters* (Winter 2005/06): 32–46.
- ²⁷ For initial efforts, see Thomas Baltazar and Elisabeth Kvitashvili, "The Role of USAID and Development Assistance in Combating Terrorism," *Military Review* 87 (2) (2007).
- ²⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S. – Decline or Renewal?" *Foreign Affairs* (Winter 1988/1989).