

The Future of Conscription: Some Comparative Reflections

James J. Sheehan

Abstract: This essay provides a historical and comparative perspective on contemporary American military institutions. It focuses on the origins, evolution, and eventual disappearance of conscription in Western Europe. By the 1970s, Europeans had developed civilian states in which the military's traditional role steadily diminished; the formal abolition of conscription after 1989 was the final step in a long, largely silent revolution. A brief survey of military institutions outside of Europe suggests why mass conscript armies will remain politically, culturally, and militarily significant in many parts of the world. Seen in a global context, the American experience appears to combine aspects of Western European civilian states with the willingness and ability to project military power.

[Conscription] is always a significant index of the society where it is found; to view it solely as a method of conducting war is to see very little of it.

–Victor Kiernan¹

When Alexis de Tocqueville listed the advantages of democracy in America that came “from the peculiar and accidental situation in which Providence has placed the Americans,” he had no doubts about which was most important. Americans, he wrote, “have no neighbors, and consequently they have no great wars . . . nor great armies, nor great generals.”² Shielded from potential aggressors by its two great ocean glacis, the United States was, for much of its history, able to avoid building those mass armies on which European states lavished so much energy and resources. When, during the Civil War and World War I, great armies were built, they were dismantled as soon as the war was over. We should not underestimate the reluctance with which Americans abandoned this tradition: the Selective Service Act of 1940 was renewed a year later with a one-vote majority in the House of Representatives and included a prohibi-

JAMES J. SHEEHAN, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1992, is the Dickason Professor in the Humanities and Professor of Modern European History, Emeritus, at Stanford University. His publications include *Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?: The Transformation of Modern Europe* (2008), *Museums in the German Art World from the End of the Old Regime to the Rise of Modernism* (2000), and *German History, 1770 – 1886* (1989).

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tion on sending draftees out of the Western Hemisphere. The abolition of the draft and the creation of an all-volunteer army in 1973 were in response to the immediate crisis of Vietnam, but these actions also represented a return to deeply rooted traditions in American political culture.

In the 1830s, as Tocqueville was writing his great book on American democracy, European states were in the process of creating new kinds of armies, founded on some form of conscription. The term itself first appeared in a French law of 1798 that called for compulsory military service for all young men between twenty and twenty-five. The system evolved in the nineteenth century, first in Prussia and then throughout Europe. The theory and practice of conscription were inseparable from the larger ideals and major institutions of the modern state. First, conscription is essentially democratic because every male (in theory, although rarely in practice) is liable to be called on to fight. Military service is linked to citizenship, that complex blend of rights and obligations that binds people to their state. The citizen army, therefore, is not simply a military institution, but also a way of expressing and acquiring those patriotic commitments essential for the nation's survival. Second, conscription requires the administrative capabilities and material resources that states did not possess until the modern era. For the system to work, governments had to be able to identify, select, assemble, train, equip, and deploy a significant percentage of their male population, retaining some of them on active duty for several years with the rest on reserve status for several more.³

In the nineteenth century, European states developed conscript armies to prepare for massive territorial conflicts in which the fate, perhaps even the exis-

tence, of the nation might be at stake. Among the great powers, only Britain did not adopt conscription, relying instead on naval power and a small professional army. Outside of Europe, Japan was the first non-Western state to adopt conscription, based on a careful study of the Prussian model. In 1873, as part of a larger program of political and social modernization, Japan introduced compulsory military service, including three years on active duty and four in the reserves. From then on, the army became the key instrument in Japan's initially successful but ultimately doomed attempt to be a great power. In the twentieth century, governments throughout the world imported the idea of conscript armies, which, like so many other European institutions, seemed to be an essential part of what it meant to be a modern state.⁴

Although the creation of mass armies was an essential function of European states, their uses were limited. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, governments were unwilling to dispatch their citizen-soldiers to fight "small wars" of colonial conquest or pacification. "Conscripts," the German statesman Otto von Bismarck once remarked, "cannot be sent to the tropics." Like Britain, whose army was constantly deployed in defense of its empire, every colonial power left these overseas battles to professionals or, whenever possible, to native forces recruited from local populations but usually commanded by European officers.⁵

Yet conscripts fought the two world wars of the twentieth century and, despite the horrendous losses suffered by their citizen armies between 1914 and 1918 and again between 1939 and 1945, every European state either retained or restored conscription after World War II. Britain, which had only belatedly and

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reluctantly introduced a draft in both world wars, preserved national service until 1960. Perhaps even more remarkably, Nazi Germany's three postwar successor states – West and East Germany and the Austrian Republic – eventually reintroduced conscription. On both sides of the Iron Curtain, therefore, the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact prepared mass armies in anticipation of a new land war between East and West. At the same time, Western European states all sent conscripts in a succession of final, futile efforts to defend their overseas possessions. Of the 135,000 troops dispatched to the Dutch East Indies in 1945, two-thirds were draftees; conscripts also represented a significant percentage of the French army stationed in Algeria in 1961. Political opposition engendered by the loss of citizen-soldiers in defense of colonial rule was one reason why governments were forced to abandon those campaigns – as well as, eventually, their empires. Not accidentally, Portugal, the least democratic of the colonial powers, was also the last to surrender its overseas possessions.

By the end of the 1960s, the security environment in Europe had begun to change. Except for Portugal's struggles in Africa, the colonial powers had already liquidated their imperial enterprises, some of them centuries old, and had done so with remarkable speed and relatively little political resistance. Equally important, the Cold War order imposed by the two superpowers essentially removed the danger of conventional war between European states; in the West, this new state of affairs made possible the growing cooperation of national economies and rising aspirations for political integration. Of course, the potential for armed conflict persisted, especially on the German-German border, which bristled with the largest

amount of lethal hardware in history. Nevertheless, to more and more Europeans, the possibility of a continental land war seemed increasingly remote. The sort of limited war that had been fought in Korea and was still going on in Vietnam hardly seemed possible in the only place in the world where the superpowers directly confronted one another. The risk of escalation to nuclear catastrophe was simply too high.⁶

These changing assessments of the military situation are clearly reflected in public opinion polls: when asked what they wanted their governments to do, Europeans consistently stressed domestic issues – a stable currency, education, health care, retirement benefits, law and order – and rarely mentioned national defense or effective military institutions. These polls do not suggest that Europeans no longer cared about being conquered; they simply didn't think that it was going to happen.⁷

The end of imperial wars and the waning salience of security concerns produced a silent revolution in European politics, a revolution that can be measured in budgets, where defense spending stagnated, in popular attitudes toward the military, and in the symbols and ceremonies of public life. The army, once regarded as essential for both national defense and national identity, moved to the margins of most people's consciousness. "Security" ceased to denote issues of national defense and came to be identified with individual welfare.

This revolution in Europeans' views of security gradually – and once again, silently – transformed their conscript armies. Every Continental country retained conscription until the 1990s. But everywhere its character changed. Armies reduced the time required in active service as well as conscripts' reserve obligation. Exemptions from the draft be-

came much easier to get, as did the right to perform alternative service, both of them ways to drain off potential political opposition to the military. The percentage of those actually conscripted and the size of the armed forces declined throughout Europe. Within the armies themselves, regulations were eased, punishments made less severe, and training less rigorous. In a few states, enlisted men were allowed to form unions, work a forty-hour week, and even receive overtime pay. The semi-official motto of the Dutch armed forces was said to be "As civilian as possible, as military as necessary." In fact, where European armies had once been seen as a way of instilling discipline and patriotic commitment in civilian society, by the 1970s they were becoming increasingly "civilianized," the products of a gradual but unmistakable readjustment of the citizen's sense of obligations to the nation.⁸

During the 1990s, after more than two decades of gradual decline, conscript armies were finally abolished in most of Europe. The most obvious reason was the end of the Cold War and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet forces, which removed even the remote possibility of a territorial threat from the East. Fiscal pressures, too, encouraged governments to take a hard and critical look at their defense budgets. Most important, it had become painfully clear that Europe's armed forces, while quite large, were militarily worthless, especially for the kind of technically sophisticated, fast-moving, and intensive combat made possible by the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. European states no longer needed mass armies to defend the homeland, but rather a relatively small number of professionals who could, if necessary, be sent on expeditions abroad, perhaps as part of a multinational peacekeeping

mission. As Bismarck had warned in the nineteenth century, such missions were not for conscripts.⁹

In The Netherlands, where the number of conscripts had plummeted since the 1950s, the draft was abolished in 1993; two years later Belgium ended it. France, despite the powerful historical memories of the revolutionary nation in arms and a deep distrust of professional soldiers, announced the end of the draft and introduction of an all-volunteer army in 1996. Spain, Italy, and most of the former Communist states of Eastern Europe soon followed. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, the overwhelming majority of NATO's armed forces were professionals. The speed and ease with which European states abandoned compulsory military service reflected the long erosion of conscription's political, cultural, and military significance.¹⁰

Germany has held onto conscription longer than the other major European states. In part this is because of postwar Germany's historically rooted anxiety about professional soldiers and pride in the democratic army created after the war. Significantly, as the proponents of conscription also pointed out, the increasing number of those choosing alternative service provided the relatively inexpensive caregivers and hospital orderlies who are essential for the Federal Republic's welfare system. Without a military draft, Germany's civilian institutions might suffer. In practice, however, conscription in the Federal Republic has already come close to disappearing: between 2000 and 2009, the total number of men performing military service dropped by more than half, from 144,647 to 68,304. In any case, it was difficult to describe as compulsory a system in which a civilian alternative was now granted automatically, making the German army what one expert called "an all

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volunteer force in disguise.” Needless to say, the German troops serving as part of the NATO contingent in Afghanistan are all professionals.¹¹

At present (February 2011), conscription in Germany seems to be on the way out. Under severe pressure to cut his budget and recognizing the need for a smaller but more effective force, the energetic minister of defense, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, sought to suspend the draft (abolition would require a constitutional amendment) and introduce substantial reforms in the composition of Germany’s armed forces. It is striking that in the current German discussions, as had been the case in debates about ending conscription in other European states, the level of engagement, both among politicians and their constituents, is low. Well before they were abolished formally, Europeans’ conscript armies had ceased to be politically or culturally salient, either as a source of positive commitment or a target of active opposition.

If, as seems very likely, the German parliament agrees to suspend conscription, then only a handful of Western European states will still have a draft. These include Norway and Denmark, where military service continues to be a part of a citizen’s duty to the nation. In neither country, however, does conscription have a military purpose. There are, for example, no conscripts in the small, but quite effective, unit that Denmark has contributed to the NATO mission in Afghanistan. In addition to Norway and Denmark, three of the five Cold War neutrals – Austria, Switzerland, and Finland – still have conscript armies. (Ireland always had a small professional force; Sweden abolished conscription in Summer 2010.) Austria requires six months of active duty in what has traditionally been an underfunded and poorly equipped army. In Switzerland, on the other hand,

the army has always had a significant role, as a deterrent to aggression and as a source of national identity. There are indications, however, that in the current security environment, both of these functions are losing their central place in Swiss politics. It may be that among European states, only Finland retains a conscript army on the traditional model. In a country where 80 percent of the male population has served in the military, the prestige and importance of the armed forces remains high. Moreover, the Finnish military’s strategic objective remains territorial defense, a purpose persistently nourished by memories of the heroic Winter War against the Soviet Union in 1940 and recently reinforced by the example of Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008.¹²

With few exceptions, European military institutions continue to be profoundly affected by the global economic crisis that began in 2008. In fact, expenditures for defense, which were stagnant for decades, have been in sharp decline since the turn of the century: the European members of NATO spent 2.05 percent of GDP for defense in 1999, 1.65 percent in 2008. This trend is not likely to be reversed in the austerity budgets now being formulated throughout Europe. The British government, for example, announced drastic cuts in troop strength and equipment in a comprehensive defense review published in October 2010.¹³ One result of these budgetary pressures may be greater cooperation among European states. Britain and France, Europe’s two most important military powers, have already taken steps in this direction. But since the road to effective transnational military institutions is bound to be long and difficult, the most likely consequence of these budgetary problems is a continuation of Europeans’ dependence on the United

States, a dependence most dramatically expressed in the remarkable survival of NATO decades after the disappearance of the common adversary against which the alliance was founded.¹⁴

An unspoken assumption behind Europeans' budgetary debates is that military spending has become discretionary, an expense to be weighed against a variety of other demands on the state's resources – not, as was long the case, a necessary price to ensure national survival. European governments recognize that they still face profound dangers: terrorism, organized crime, and in some countries, increasingly violent social protests. And there are occasions when states may want to project power by sending an expeditionary force abroad. But the preservation of order and the deployment of troops on some distant mission are very different from the defense of the nation from existential threats, the purpose for which the mass conscript army had originally been created.

Soon after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the American political scientist Robert Keohane remarked that “one of the most vexing questions in Europe today is where the frontier between the West European zone of peace and Eurasian zone of conflict will be.”¹⁵ On the western side of this line, conscription has largely disappeared and military service has become limited to a relatively small group of professionals who are compensated, like firefighters and police officers, for the risks they are asked to take on behalf of their fellow citizens. On the other side of the line, however, where the survival of the nation might still be at stake, military service remains both a political obligation and a strategic necessity.

But while the line between the peaceful and conflictual parts of Eurasia may be

ill-defined – frontiers are, by definition, contested and imprecise – there is good reason to suppose that it runs directly through the former Soviet imperium. On the peaceful side are the Soviet Union's former Eastern European satellites and the three newly autonomous Baltic republics. Despite some hesitation and reluctance on both sides, these states eventually joined NATO; with the exception of Latvia and Lithuania, they, like their new allies in the West, have abolished conscription in favor of small professional forces. In 2008, there were only 4,000 conscripts among the 317,000 military personnel in the new NATO members from the East. Moreover, again as in the West, military expenditure in the East has continued to decline: except for Bulgaria (2 percent), Poland, and Romania (each 1.9 percent), the Eastern European states are well below the stated NATO goal of allocating 2 percent of GDP to defense. What the eminent military sociologist Martin Shaw once called “the last bastions of classical militarism in the northern industrial world,” the former Communist regimes of Eastern Europe have become, within little more than a decade, civilian states on the Western European model.¹⁶

On the other side of the frontier are the remaining Soviet European and Central Asian successor states. All these states retain conscript armies. Some, such as Belarus, are among the most militarized states in the world. Where there are still external threats and ongoing territorial disputes, as in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, military institutions have an importance far greater than in the civilian West.

With just over half of the old Soviet Union's population and three-fourths of its territory, the Russian Federation is far and away its most important successor state. Russia's military capacity

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was among the casualties of the Soviet Union's extraordinary implosion. Even before the USSR disappeared in 1991, the Soviet military suffered a series of stunning blows, including defeat in Afghanistan and the loss of its bases in Eastern Europe. After 1991, morale and cohesion deteriorated precipitously, attended by endemic corruption, criminality, and brutality. At present, Russia is supposed to have over one million men on active duty, with another twenty million reservists, but in practice only a small percentage of these forces are deployable. Since the 1990s, there have been several efforts at reforming the military, the latest and most ambitious of which was introduced in September 2008, following the rather mixed results of Russia's brief invasion of Georgia that summer. Although conscription remains in effect (early in 2008 the length of service was reduced to one year), the reformers want to create a smaller, better trained and equipped force that is permanently ready for deployment. But formidable barriers to effective reform remain, including the pervasive weakness of the Russian administrative apparatus, the economic problems created by the global decline in energy prices, and, perhaps most serious of all, the long-term effects of Russia's devastating demographic decline. According to the Chief of the Russian General Staff, in 2012 the number of draft-eligible males will be half of what it was in 2001.¹⁷

Among the members of NATO, only Turkey clearly occupies a position on the conflict side of Keohane's frontier. Turkish troops have long defended a contested border on Cyprus and fought a long, bloody civil war against the Kurds. How the creation of a semi-autonomous Kurdish territory in Iraq will affect Turkey is by no means clear. In any case, unlike its European counterparts, Turkey's mili-

tary budget has not dramatically declined; conscription remains in force, exemptions are rare, alternative service is virtually impossible. Militarily and politically, the army played a central role in the emergence of the Republic from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Despite recent efforts by the Erdogan government to limit the army's influence, the generals continue to be a powerful political force. Indeed, the sharp differences between civil-military relations in Turkey and Europe represent another barrier to Turkey's absorption into the European Union. Unlike the rest of the EU, Turkey is not a fully developed civilian state; the possibility of international and domestic violence remains very much a part of Turkish political life.¹⁸

In most of Eurasia, the political role of the army is closer to the Turkish model than to the civilian states of Western Europe. In a few places like Myanmar the military rules directly; sometimes, as in Thailand, its power is veiled by a diaphanous curtain of civilian authority. Most often, the army acts, as it traditionally did in the Turkish case, as a kind of "deep state," using the threat of a coup to set limits on what governments can and cannot do. Nowhere is this situation more dramatically clear than in the political crisis now unfolding in Egypt. Thus far (early February 2011), the army has played a cautious role, refusing to use deadly force against demonstrators but not abandoning the government. Where the loyalties of Egypt's conscripts lie remains uncertain, but for the army's leaders, more than three decades of power and influence are at stake. ("It is," notes one well-informed observer, "an open question how much power the military has, and they might not even know themselves.")¹⁹

In North Korea, where Kim Jong Il is seeking to extend his family's control

into the third generation, his heir apparent was made a four-star general before he was appointed to the Central Committee of Korean Workers' Party, a sequence that underlined how the army has consolidated its hold on political power. With terms of active duty from five to twelve years and reserve obligations up to the age of sixty, North Korea has what is perhaps the world's most extensive and socially intrusive system of conscription.

The border between the two Korean states may be the most heavily fortified, but it is by no means the only contested frontier in East Asia. Some of the territories involved in these disputes are very small, and in others the conflict is largely inert; but there are some – Kashmir, for instance, or parts of the Sino-Indian border – that remain volatile enough to erupt into large-scale international violence. With two major powers, India and China, and a number of unstable and potentially aggressive smaller states, the rivalries and tensions within East Asia somewhat resemble the European international system before 1914. Not surprisingly, it is here that the mass conscript army continues to provide the foundation of national defense.

In the past few years, a number of experts have argued that conscription, like the modern state from which it developed, was on its way to historical oblivion. The international studies scholar Eliot Cohen, for example, recently declared that “the age of the mass army is over.”²⁰ Perhaps. There is no question that in many parts of the world, conscript armies have been dissolved or diminished; quality, represented by the ability to use complex new weapon systems, has replaced quantity as a measurement of military power. In much of Europe, the rise of civilian states has changed the balance between rights and duties that had

once made military service inseparable from citizenship. But in many parts of Eurasia, especially on the wrong side of the frontier separating zones of peace and conflict, conscript armies designed to protect the territorial interests of states are still centrally important and a war between states remains a constant danger. Here, civilian states on the European model have not developed: military service remains an important part of young men's lives, conscript armies have political and cultural significance, and the officer corps often plays an important role. In countries such as Egypt, North Korea, Thailand, Burma, and Pakistan, conscription still has a future, which will help shape the future of these nations.

Where does the United States fit into this picture? With its massive military budget and globally deployed armed forces, it is surely not a civilian state on the European model. However divided they may be on the use of force in specific situations, most Americans agree that as a world power, the United States must be willing and able to project military power to defend its interests throughout a dangerous world. And yet, unlike those states where military service remains a national obligation, the United States counts on professionals to meet its extensive global commitments. The burden of America's mission in the world, therefore, is carried by a relatively small portion of the population, whose sacrifices are honored but not shared by the larger society. In a sense, the United States is a civilian state with significant military obligations. Many of the other essays collected in this volume examine the tensions that arise from this uneasy mix of values and aspirations.

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- ¹ Victor Kiernan, "Conscription and Society in Europe before the War of 1914–1918," in *War and Society: Historical Essays in Honour and Memory of J. R. Western, 1928–1971*, ed. M.R.D. Foot (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1973), 141.
- ² Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Everyman's Library, 1994), 288–289.
- ³ The classic analysis of conscription's political significance is Morris Janowitz, "Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies," in *The Military and the Problem of Legitimacy*, ed. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Jacques Van Doorn (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976), 77–92.
- ⁴ See David Ralston, *Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Techniques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600–1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
- ⁵ See Bruce Vandervort, *Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830–1914* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998).
- ⁶ On the changing security environment in postwar Europe, see James J. Sheehan, *Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?: The Transformation of Modern Europe* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), chap. 7.
- ⁷ For some examples, see the data in Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).
- ⁸ See Sheehan, *Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?*, chap. 8. The best collection of information on military institutions is *The Military Balance*, published annually since 1959 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. On The Netherlands, see F. Olivier and G. Teitler, "Democracy and the Armed Forces: The Dutch Experiment," in *Armed Forces and the Welfare Societies: Challenges in the 1980s*, ed. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 54–95.
- ⁹ For changing patterns of conflict, see Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, "Armed Conflicts, 1946–2009," *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (4) (2010): 501–509; Andreas Wenger et al., *Strategic Trends 2010* (Center for Security Studies, ETH Zürich, 2010); and the essays in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, eds., *Rethinking the Nature of War* (London: Frank Cass, 2005).
- ¹⁰ See James Burk, "The Decline of Mass Armed Forces and Compulsory Military Service," *Defense Analysis* 8 (1) (1992): 45–59; and Curtis Gilroy and Cindy Williams, eds., *Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007). There is a careful study of the French case in J. Justin McKenna, "Towards the Army of the Future: Domestic Politics and the End of Conscription in France," *West European Politics* 20 (4) (1997): 125–145.
- ¹¹ Enlistment data from *Der Spiegel*, July 29, 2010. Quotation from Gerhard Kümmel in Gilroy and Williams, *Service to Country*, chap. 8.
- ¹² Henning Sørensen, "Conscription in Scandinavia during the Last Quarter Century: Developments and Arguments," *Armed Forces & Society* 26 (2) (2000): 313–334. Pauli Järvenpää, "Finland's Defence Policy: Sui Generis?" *Baltic Defence Review* 11 (1) (2004): 129–134.
- ¹³ See Judy Dempsey, "The Peril that NATO Can't Ignore," *The New York Times*, November 10, 2010, and "Briefing. The Cost of Weapons," *The Economist*, August 28, 2010, 20–21.
- ¹⁴ While the persistence of NATO points to the enduring importance of the United States for European security, NATO's continuing effort to define its military and political objectives underscores the inherent difficulties in sustaining the Atlantic relationship. The most recent effort to shape the alliance to meet the challenges of a post-Cold War world was the Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010; for a concise analysis, see

two fine articles on “The Future of NATO,” in *The Economist*, November 13, 2010, 27–30, and November 25, 2010, 24–25. James J. Sheehan

- ¹⁵ Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *After the Cold War: International Institutions and Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 6.
- ¹⁶ Martin Shaw, *Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization, and War at the End of the Twentieth Century* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), 163. On the armed forces of the former Communist states, see the data in *The Military Balance 2010* and the useful summary by Jeffrey Simon, “NATO’s Uncertain Future: Is Demography Destiny?” *Strategic Forum* no. 236 (October 2008): 1–7.
- ¹⁷ On the difficulties of reform, see Carolina Pallin, *Russian Military Reform: A Failed Exercise in Defence Decision Making* (London: Routledge, 2009). For the most recent efforts, see the chapter on the Russian Federation in *The Military Balance 2010*.
- ¹⁸ On the Turkish armed forces, see *The Military Balance 2010* and “A Special Report on Turkey,” *The Economist*, October 23, 2010.
- ¹⁹ Thanassis Cambanis, “Succession Gives Army a Stiff Test in Egypt,” *The New York Times*, September 12, 2010.
- ²⁰ Quoted in Colin Gray, *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005), 172.