

The Politics of Increasing Religious Diversity in China

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Abstract: China has seen a remarkable growth and pluralization of religious activity over the past thirty years, a development that has rapidly overtaken the incremental and sluggish changes in the relevant regulatory structures. In much of the country, the government has managed the mismatch between religious practice and official rules by governing with “one eye open and one eye closed,” that is, by pretending not to notice violations of the regulations as long as people pretend that they are following the rules. Comparative evidence suggests that such a mode of governance can be long-lasting and effective by encouraging groups to self-censor, by allowing space for contextual experimentation, and by stressing the acceptance of nominal convention over the control of behavior. This situation is likely to continue unless China adopts a new vision of the desired relation between state and society.

Over the past two decades, religious practice of all sorts has remarkably come back to life in China. Temples to local gods have popped up like mushrooms over broad sections of the rural countryside, with some of them attracting crowds of a hundred thousand visitors for major annual festivals. Islam is increasingly visible as Muslims from China’s far west migrate to the heavily populated east side of the country, and foreign Muslims arrive in large numbers to trade in China’s coastal cities. This has further encouraged a religious rediscovery among some of the local Muslims who had long lived in those areas, and has encouraged the conversion of some non-Muslims to the faith. Christianity has grown almost everywhere, and even the “underground” church is increasingly public in its practice. Daoist and especially Buddhist temples are reviving quickly as well, sometimes in surprising ways, as with some of the majority Han Chinese who now devote themselves to Tibetan branches of Buddhism.

One of the most serious problems these rapid changes pose for the Chinese government is how to handle the new kinds of diversity that have resulted.

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In areas where local temple religion once again provides a significant source of social capital, what happens when a new Christian minority rejects existing ritual mechanisms of local unity? How do local dynamics change as thousands of internal migrants move into villages and millions more move into cities, bringing their own separate religious traditions? Religions sometimes build bridges to each other, but they also sometimes build impassable and uncivil walls.

The new diversities also pose an even more fundamental problem for the Chinese government: how much room can a Communist state leave for social networks and imaginative worlds that do not share the state's core values? For most of its history, the People's Republic of China has responded to religion with varying degrees of hostility: from impatient tolerance of what the state considered a superstitious remnant, during the first part of the Maoist period, to nearly complete intolerance of what party leaders began to see as unacceptable departures from Revolutionary cultural norms, especially during the decade beginning with the Socialist Education Movement in the mid-1960s. But with religious practice now rapidly increasing, the state has struggled to find an appropriate response.

Changes in the legal position of religion have been incremental at best since China's religion policy first loosened up over two decades ago. The government still recognizes only five religions – Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism – with each organized into a single corporatist body to represent its interests in close collaboration with state goals. Many world religions – including Eastern Orthodoxy, Judaism, and Baha'i – thus have no legal space in China, nor do indigenous Chinese redemptive societies. Confucianism has no place in the official religious world, and neither do the thousands of village tem-

ples that are not certified by the Buddhist or Daoist associations. Any religious activity outside the auspices of one of the five religious associations – the practice of Christianity in house churches being the most noted example – lies outside the law. Religious practice can be and sometimes is repressed; nevertheless, religiosity of all kinds has grown, both legal and extra-legal, and most of it has done so very much in the public view.

Thus, there is a wide gulf between the very limited religious diversity imagined by the state regulatory framework and the vast growth in actual religious life. In recent years, the state has been willing to tolerate much more than the letter of the law permits, often by simply ignoring religious behavior that does not fit the regulatory model. By governing with “one eye open and one eye closed,” as the Chinese metaphor goes, the state has created an open space where religion has fermented and expanded, even without a stable legal environment to support it. Closing one eye has allowed officials to maintain the nominal status quo for religion – in fact, for civil associations of all kinds – even while allowing new kinds of religious experiments to crop up around the country.

Religion shapes fundamental concepts of identity and society, and its growth has thus fostered and reflected major changes in China. The current system of state control forms a kind of governance by hypocrisy: much of the newly elastic religious sector lies outside the law yet is tolerated because officials act as if they cannot see. Such a system contains many inherent tensions, including the constant potential for, and occasional realization of, repression. Nevertheless, comparative evidence suggests that this kind of one-eyed governance can provide a medium for the growth of pluralism and diversity over relatively long periods of time.

The growth of religion in China is obvious to anyone who visits the country, but is difficult to pin down statistically. One of the problems is that official government statistics have counted only those people formally registered as “believers” within one of the five official religions. But not even the government believes that count is accurate; and we have recently begun to get independent survey data to supplement the unofficial guesses about absolute numbers that had previously come primarily from the underground church. For instance, a 2007 survey by scholars at East China Normal University estimated that 31 percent of the adult population – roughly three hundred million people – described themselves as religious. This is about three times higher than the official figure, but its reporting in the *China Daily*, an official organ of the state, indicates that the government took it seriously.¹ Even these more independent estimates are almost certainly low, since respondents know that claiming no religious affiliation is the more officially sanctioned answer.

But the problem of counting is far greater than these numbers would imply. This point was driven home to me many years ago by an old rural woman who insisted that she had no religion; she just “burned incense.” What she meant was that her practice had little in common with official state definitions of religion, that is, something based on sacred texts, mediated by clergy, and joined through a conscious act of faith. For her, worship was the act of showing respect to spirits by burning incense, and occasionally asking for their concrete intervention in the world. Texts played only a minor role, clergy were experts to be hired when needed (rather like plumbers), and faith was no more than a secondary concern. Hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens share these attitudes toward their spiritual life, and they often tell poll takers, in all good faith, that they

have no religious beliefs.² The survey questions that more effectively identify this population do not ask about belief at all, but instead ask about practice. A 2007 survey of 7,021 people from around the country illustrated the gap neatly. When asked for an opinion on whether such things as God, gods, spirits, ghosts, or Buddha exist in this world, 75.2 percent said that they did not exist. Yet when asked whether they had worshipped God or gods/spirits in the past year, 63.2 percent said they had worshipped in an institutionalized setting, at home, or at a graveside; only 35.2 percent said they never worshipped.³ Reporting of religious *practice* thus leads to much higher numbers than reporting of religious *belief*.

No matter whom we count and how we count them, there is consensus among observers that religion is far more visible than it had been before the reform period began in 1979. In some parts of China, active temples are again visible everywhere, often with more than one temple per village, and almost all of them extralegal. Meanwhile, other areas predominantly feature mosques or churches, and it is quite common to see a mix of the two. Even the most conservative numbers available – based on the registration lists of the five officially sanctioned religions – show markedly rapid increases for Buddhism and Protestantism, with slower growth for the three others.

This rapid blossoming of religion poses new problems of diversity for China. In rural Han communities, which accounted for the great majority of the total Chinese population until the very recent explosion in urban migration, it was standard practice for all residents to contribute at least token financial support and make offerings for the performance of important community rituals. The details varied, but larger temples might request a small fee from each household, while smaller temples might rotate the responsibility for

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burning incense among all the households. People were free to worship all kinds of spirits, including those with no local temples, but nearly everyone took part in larger public ritual life.

This became a problem only when some rural Han residents converted to religions that forbade the polytheistic openness of the older traditions. The resulting tensions have been expressed in a variety of ways, including, in recent years, some members of Protestant churches not only refusing to take part in “idolatrous” rituals conducted by the rest of the village, but also actively protesting when non-Christians parade their deities through the streets or set off firecrackers. On a national scale, similar tensions erupted at the end of 2010, when a village a few miles from Qufu – Confucius’s hometown and the site of a temple complex in his honor – proposed building a Protestant church with a 136-foot tower that would have dwarfed the main Confucian temple. The result was a national outcry opposing the church, branding it an offense to the dignity of Chinese tradition.

Of course, diversity does not necessarily lead to conflict, and China is also full of examples of various religious traditions living amicably side by side. For example, a small mountainous township in Yunnan is home to seven ethnic groups and four religious traditions (Catholic, Protestant, local animist, and Tibetan Buddhist), but the community as a whole has found ways to share their ritual practices. Sometimes this means making special adjustments at ritual events, such as preparing soda for the Protestants because they refuse alcohol. Still, everyone joins together, especially for major happenings. In her work on this Yunnan township, anthropologist Wu Keping describes a funeral for a local teacher conducted in such a way that followers of each of the town’s religions could take part. They even fostered a de-

spiritualized context that allowed the local cadres to carry out a brief memorial service before the minister took over. That is, ritual practice opened up the event so deeply that there was even space for official atheism to be recognized alongside each of the local religions.⁴ In general, however, we still have very few studies of how the new religious diversities are playing out on the ground, or of whether the growth of religion is dividing groups of people from each other or encouraging them to get along together.

While the new diversities only sometimes create significant local tension, they all pose a challenge to the socialist state’s image of itself. China’s Communist Party had a split attitude toward religion almost from the beginning. On the one hand, Marx’s brief writings on religion seemed to imply that it was an unfortunate side effect of capitalist exploitation that would simply fade out on its own under Communism. His references to religion as the “opiate of the people” or the “heart in a heartless world” showed a kind of patronizing sympathy toward people for whom religion was the only escape. On the other hand, when Mao wrote his important early analysis of the peasant movement in Hunan as a potential model for revolution, he branded religion as one of the “great ropes binding the Chinese people,” putting temples in the same category as landlords: features of old China that would have to be chopped through in order to free its people. The tremendous social capital and alternative sense of identity in religion – its potential threat – was never far from the minds of party leaders. They knew how religious power had been mobilized throughout the preceding dynasty in the White Lotus, Taiping, Muslim, and Boxer rebellions, to mention only some of the largest.

Actual religious policy since the founding of the People’s Republic has wavered

between these two poles. In the 1950s, there were few attempts to do away with religion directly, even as religious groups were consolidated into five large organizations under the direct control of the central state. Religious belief, but not necessarily practice, was legally guaranteed within the confines of those five recognized associations. We have evidence of continuing religious activity, clearly known to local officials, through the early 1960s.

The United Front Work Department of the Communist Party, the department responsible for all the forms of diversity that the party was willing to tolerate, was a crucial carrier of this policy. Groups tolerated by the United Front included ethnic minorities, overseas Chinese, entrepreneurs (although not in all periods), and followers of religion. In each of these areas, the party was willing to work with people who had characteristics that prevented them from being proper Communists, such as religious belief or ownership of a private business, or that made them somehow different from the majority population, like ethnic minorities. The United Front strategy involved mechanisms to coordinate the interests of these groups with those of the state, including People's Political Consultative Congresses, which pulled representatives of these various groups into a forum where the government could propagate its views and where, in principle, these diverse interests could be articulated to the state.

By the middle of the 1960s, however, and especially with the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese party-state insisted that China be unified around "proletarian culture." Many mass organizations became less important since the diversities they represented lost their legitimacy. For the same reasons, the United Front Work Department also became largely irrelevant.

Yet after the economic reforms began to take effect in 1979, China moved away

from the more totalizing policies of the Cultural Revolution, creating far more open economic, social, and personal spaces. The political mechanisms for handling diversity returned to something like the model of the 1950s, with corporate organizations in place to represent each recognized interest group (as with the five religious associations), a newly invigorated United Front Work Department trying to coordinate all the new religious activity, and the rise of market entrepreneurs and other social groups that had briefly seemed extinct.

United Front work has in recent years combined with the party's campaign to construct China as a "harmonious society." This term was closely associated with then-General Secretary Hu Jintao, and since at least 2006, the idea has explicitly included religion. "Harmony" is a tricky concept. Some Chinese uses simply conflate it with stability, and it is no coincidence that during this same period, "maintaining stability" became a prominent slogan, accompanied by a massive investment in policing. On the other hand, musicians use the idea of harmony to indicate the coordination of tensions created by different pitches being played simultaneously. This more complex idea of harmony echoes its original Confucian uses, which also frequently refer to music or to the need to avoid monotony in food by combining different flavors. According to the Confucian *Analects*, "The petty person unites without harmonizing while the great person harmonizes without uniting" – a saying that expresses the potential of a harmonious society to incorporate multiple diversities.

In practice, these changes have left religion in a complex political position. On paper, the regulatory world for religion looks roughly like it did in the 1950s, with large and tame organizations representing

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each of the five sanctioned religions. This system recognizes limited religious diversity, but only as coordinated and channeled through a corporatist system, and only within the broader unity as socialist subjects. In reality, however, everything is different. The political vise was clearly tightening during the 1950s, progressively limiting the action of religious groups and often pushing harder than the laws and regulations seemed to demand. But now, the government in much of China has bent in the opposite direction, simply turning its gaze away from constant religious scoff-laws – from unregistered (but no longer underground) churches to the thousands of village temples – all thriving outside the five legal associations.

Such policies of lax implementation are necessarily informal: if they were formalized, they would be visible in the regulatory system and thus subject to its rules. Informality, however, also brings the possibility of uneven enforcement, which certainly is the case across China. The classic distinction between fire alarms and police patrols, conceived by political scientists Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz in a study of congressional oversight in the United States, is a useful lens through which to view the question of policy enforcement in China.⁵ In the police-patrol model, the state constantly monitors its subjects, actively looking for potential trouble. Fire alarms, on the other hand, wait passively, becoming active only in an emergency.

Religious policy implementation in most areas of China has now moved from police patrols toward fire alarms. The exceptions tend to be in areas with a confluence of religious and ethnic diversity working also in combination with strong tensions between state and local interests. Above all, this dynamic exists in Tibetan regions and in some of the Muslim areas of the northwest, where the government

monitors religion very closely and often tries to override religious meanings (for instance, by demanding that national flags be hung inside monasteries). The unintended result has often been the sharpening of tensions. In much of the rest of the country, however, fire alarms tend to be the rule. Local officials increasingly leave religion alone so long as they feel that no lines have been crossed.

As McCubbins and Schwartz explain, “[F]ire-alarm oversight tends to be particularistic . . . it arguably emphasizes the interests of individuals and interest groups more than those of the public at large . . . [E]ven if fire-alarm oversight deemphasizes some public-interest concerns, it gives special emphasis to a concern for the interests and rights of individual citizens and small groups.”⁶ Their observation captures a critical dynamic in the fire-alarm oversight of most Han Chinese religion, which relies heavily on informal understandings between officials and practitioners. It is as if government officials agree to pretend that they cannot see, so long as followers agree to pretend that they are not breaking the rules. That mechanism explains why we can have tens or (if we include those who occasionally burn incense) hundreds of millions of people openly practicing religion outside the legal framework. This is governance by mutually accepted hypocrisy.

The winks and nudges that allow this to work have built a fragile scaffolding on which to hang such a rapid religious expansion. The unspoken and informal line defining what is permissible encourages some groups to push against the limits of political possibility. A few urban churches have done this consistently, creating constant tension with local authorities as they strive for an end to hypocrisies and to their extralegal standing. Many other unregistered churches, however, have opposed this strategy, arguing

that it undermines a status quo that they can live with, and that it encourages the government to treat them more harshly.

Governing with one eye closed can also make policy seem capricious. It can be quite difficult to understand why one group suddenly loses its place of worship, or why one temple is awarded legal registration while another is refused. In most cases, such situations encourage active self-censorship – unpredictable risk encourages people to be cautious – which is one of the reasons the policy continues. But on the other hand, unclear rules can sometimes encourage aggrieved or demanding groups to push the boundaries. Thus, occasional acts of repression become necessary to remind people that there is a line that cannot be crossed, even if it is invisible. Some repression seems obvious, as occurred after the large social protests of Falun Gong in 1999 or the uncivil actions of extreme Christian offshoots like Eastern Lightning; but in other cases, it is simply unpredictable. The fire-alarm dynamic has created far more social space in the eastern regions of the country than did the constant pressure of police-patrol styles of religious control, but it carries its own modes of repression as well.

Why govern through hypocrisy? Why not simply rationalize the rules to fit the desired situation on the ground? Religious policy is certainly not the only area in which China governs by closing one eye, and sometimes in the past the state has indeed changed the legal framework to match a new reality. Perhaps the most important such case in recent history concerned the rise and decline of “township and village enterprises” in the 1980s. Early in the reform period, very few entrepreneurs dared to create private enterprises on anything greater than a tiny scale. They feared both the punitive tax situation for private companies and the dan-

gerous accusation of being a capitalist. The answer for many was to register with township and village governments as collective enterprises. Such registrations were often purely nominal, however, and typically involved the private entrepreneur simply paying a fee to local officials in exchange for the registration status. So in an important sense, much of the most vibrant sector of the economy consisted entirely of scofflaws. In that case, however, the central government decided after a few years to change the situation by revising tax laws and creating much more legitimate space for large private business. In the case of township and village enterprises, governing through hypocrisy appears to have fostered a few years of experimentation, and to have allowed the central government to make its peace with a more market-based economy. After that, they changed the rules, creating more incentives to register as an independent company, in turn allowing officials to open both eyes.

A somewhat different dynamic now appears to be at play for religious policy, in part because fundamental political reform has been much harder to achieve than economic change. Governing religion with one eye closed offers China the advantage of creating a significant space for diversifying identities and for people to contribute to the general welfare by creating independent social ties. This form of management does not require China to move away from the fundamentally corporatist and authoritarian model of state/society relations that it has adopted for three decades now. Perhaps unsurprisingly, non-governmental organizations – which also address newly diverse identities (from migrant workers to sports car enthusiasts) and serve important social functions – have rates of non-registration or false and misleading registrations roughly comparable to what we see with religious groups.

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To some extent, every country has areas governed with one eye closed. Prostitution in the United States provides a small example, with no systematic state attempt to stamp it out, but also no attempt to change the law to match the situation on the ground. What lawmaker would dare propose it? In that case, the need to publicly proclaim a certain morality overrides any desire to make the rules realistic. The result is a mode of occasional repression, creating a dynamic not too different from China. The “don’t ask don’t tell” policy toward homosexuality in the American military was an attempt to do something similar, though it was ultimately less sustainable.

Historically, the case most similar to contemporary China’s religion dilemma may be the clandestine churches that popped up around Europe, and especially in Holland, between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. From the outside, these churches appeared to be ordinary residential buildings, and typically their ground floor fit this description. But the second floors of these buildings opened up into large extralegal houses of worship, most often Catholic, but also in smaller numbers Mennonite, Lutheran, and Jewish. The Netherlands had been one of the most disastrous battlefields in the Thirty Years’ War, which pitted Catholics against Protestants in vastly destructive combat. The formulas of the treaties of Westphalia, which finally ended the war, demanded that each nation’s ruler would henceforth determine the religion of his people (*cuius regio, eius religio*). This recipe for the religious cleansing of each country gave minority religions the right to leave, and allowed them no other public existence.

Yet those treaties did leave a small space for completely privatized religion, where minority religious groups could occasionally meet outside the public sphere. The result, before very long, was several

dozen clandestine churches in Amsterdam alone. But of course, there was nothing really clandestine about them. Surviving records show that state officials clearly knew about them, and dealt with them largely by closing their eyes in ways not so different from what we see today in China. The historian Benjamin Kaplan has referred to this as the “fiction of privacy,” because such religions were truly “private” only in fiction – in the eyes of the law and of the officials who looked the other way.⁷

Kaplan has suggested that these hypocrisies lasted so long in Holland because they granted the country a certain amount of diversity, even as it claimed a complete Calvinist moral hegemony. Sometimes the point of a law is to state a moral ideal rather than to regulate actual practice. That seems to be the main reason why it took centuries before the Dutch began to think of their policy toward clandestine churches as problematic (ultimately recognizing multiple legitimate religions within the country), why prostitution policy seems unlikely to change in the United States, and why China still shuts one eye to the realities of religious behavior on the ground.

The regimes that controlled Taiwan during the twentieth century – the Japanese colonial government, the Nationalist Party authoritarian state, and the democratic government after 1987 – also tended to govern religion through similar pretenses. For example, early in the twentieth century, the Japanese repressed part of an annual ritual for the dead in which young men climbed long bamboo poles to retrieve flags and food offerings from the top (called *qiang gu*, “stealing from the lonely ghosts”). The state feared the large crowds, rowdy atmosphere, and apparently frequent injuries at the event. In the town of Sanhsia, the local people, as good subjects of the empire, agreed to end the custom. In its place, they said, they were sponsoring a pole-climbing contest for

village teams in order to meet the Japanese Emperor's desire for healthy subjects. Half a century later, when the newly arrived Nationalist regime tried to discourage the practice of offering specially fattened whole pigs at birthday celebrations for deities, Sanhsia's people again agreed, and promised instead to hold a contest to encourage better agriculture: the farmers who could raise the fattest pigs would have them displayed in front of the temple on the god's birthday. In both cases the rituals continued fundamentally unchanged, but were simply covered with a fig leaf of adherence to the new policy.

The town hall in Sanhsia is just down the road from the main temple, and almost all of the officials were locals, even under Japanese rule. That is to say, there is no chance that the local state was actually being fooled. Instead, just as in Holland historically or China today, officials agreed not to notice what was really happening in exchange for townspeople's hypocritical claims to be following policy. While these particular rituals are again officially tolerated in contemporary Taiwan, one governmental eye continues to close, especially in regard to the requirement that temples register. Although there are no longer political obstacles to registration, the process does require a certain amount of financial transparency that many temples prefer to avoid. In one town I visited, officials told me they had done a detailed history of every local temple, but could not make it public because doing so would mean admitting that they knew about the unregistered temples' existence, in turn mandating that the officials enforce the law. One eye stayed firmly closed.

Like the Dutch case, these Taiwanese examples remind us that nominal acceptance of the conventions of the law may be more important to officials than substantive obedience to the law. This may be particularly true when the perceived costs

of repression are higher than the apparent risks of allowing the behavior to continue. At the same time, nominal adherence to the conventions of the law must be valuable enough that the state chooses not to change the law itself. While deeper study of comparative cases might help us draw broader conclusions about when one-eyed governance becomes important, even these few examples suggest that there is nothing uniquely Communist or uniquely Chinese about this political strategy.

What does China gain from insisting on the artifice that there are only five religions, and that each adherent is carefully registered in one of the five corporatist religious institutions? Officials I have spoken with understand perfectly well how broad the gap is between their fictive corporatist religion (in contrast to the Dutch fictive privatized religion) and real religion as practiced by the Chinese people. They, too, are frustrated by the hypocrisies that the current system forces on them, and by the state's apparent inability to change the system.

Changes to a more transparent system are not impossible, as China's earlier experience with township and village enterprises showed. Why has China not done so? There are probably two primary reasons. First, governing with one eye closed is much more effective and is potentially much longer-lasting than most standard political theory would allow. As the Dutch case shows, such a system can work for centuries to maintain religious diversity in difficult circumstances, in spite of the injustice and necessary informality that goes along with it. And as in Taiwan, this mode of governing religion helps to maintain a vibrant local social world, without any major threat to the political order. A simple comparison of the fire-alarm system of one-eyed religious governance in most of China to the police-patrol system

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of two-eyed governance in Tibetan and Uyghur areas shows how much easier it can be to tolerate religious diversity through the informal mechanisms of looking the other way than through the strict enforcement of the law.

The second reason the status quo has lasted so long is that changes in religious governance in China would have repercussions that reach far beyond religion itself. The apparently straightforward step of allowing any apolitical religious

group to register would consequently begin to dismantle the corporatist system of control. Such a change could not be limited to religion, but would require a fundamental reimagining of the state/society relationship in China. This step would be nearly as radical for social relations as the reforms that began in 1979 were for the economy. And it will require bolder social and political leadership than we have seen so far.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Jiao Wu, "Religious Believers Thrice the Estimate," *China Daily*, February 7, 2007, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-02/07/content_802994.htm.
- ² For a good discussion of the problems this has caused in the Hong Kong census, see Joël Thoraval, "The Western Misconception of Chinese Religion . . . and Its Consequences – A Hong Kong Example," *China Perspectives* 3 (February 1996): 58 – 65.
- ³ These data come from The John Templeton Foundation, "Spiritual Life Study of Chinese Residents," led by Fenggang Yang, Victor Yuan, Anna Sun, Lu Yengfang, Rodney Stark, Byron Johnson, Eric Liu, Carson Mencken, and Chiu Hei-Yuan (2007). The data are publicly available at the Association of Religious Data Archives, <http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/SPRTCHNA.asp>.
- ⁴ This is based on the recent research of Keping Wu, "'Primitive' Pluralism: Public Life in Multi-ethnic and Multi-religious Villages of Southwest China," unpublished manuscript (2013).
- ⁵ Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms," *American Journal of Political Science* 28 (1) (February 1, 1984): 165 – 179.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, 172.
- ⁷ Benjamin J. Kaplan, "Fictions of Privacy: House Chapels and the Spatial Accommodation of Religious Dissent in Early Modern Europe," *American Historical Review* 107 (4) (2002): 1031 – 1064.