

# THE LIMITATIONS OF TEACHER PAY INCENTIVE PROGRAMS BASED ON INTER-COHORT COMPARISONS: THE CASE OF CHILE'S SNED

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## **Abstract**

Since 1996, the Chilean government has awarded teachers pay bonuses based on school performance using a complex formula that combines absolute average student test scores and inter-cohort gains from test year to test year. In this paper, we compared the bonuses schools actually received on the basis of this formula to how they would have fared under a hypothetical alternative measure of school performance—intra-cohort gains between the 4th and 8th grades in 1996–2000. We show that schools that received monetary premiums for “good performance” under the SNED program were more likely to be schools that had scored higher on the 4th grade 1996 test, but, on average, they were *not* the schools that made the highest cohort gains as students progressed from 4th grade in 1996 to 8th grade in 2000. Given what we have found, to get more SNED awards, the wise school would do much better to raise 4th grade and 8th grade scores every two years (even years for 4th grade and odd years for 8th grade) and not focus on the more difficult task of helping students make greater progress from 4th to 8th grades. Although we have data on only one cohort’s gain scores from 4th to 8th grades, our limited analysis demonstrates the possible constraints of a school-based incentive program when the available student performance data for awarding pay bonuses are inter-cohort rather than intra-cohort test score gains.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Most analysts accept that some teachers and schools are better than others at producing student learning and that a key element in “better” schooling is better teaching. Yet few school systems base teacher pay on any direct measure of teaching quality. Teachers are generally paid according to levels of education and years of experience, usually regardless of student learning results. Good teaching is often recognized by awards and by opportunities to move to schools with better working conditions—i.e., schools with students of higher social class—but rarely by higher pay.

This seemingly inefficient approach has drawn sharp critiques, particularly in the United States (for example, see Hanushek 2006). The two main lines of critique are that an undifferentiated salary structure (1) attracts lower levels of talent into teaching and is less likely to retain good teachers than would otherwise be possible, and (2) keeps the average level of teacher effort lower than would be the case if successful teachers were paid more. An example of the first line of critique is that given the current demand for skills, it is difficult to recruit university graduates highly qualified in math and science into teaching when they are paid on the same scale as English teachers. An example of the second type of critique is that if teachers who expend a lot of effort (say, out of professional pride) to make their pupils succeed are paid the same as teachers who work less, there is no incentive for them to continue to put in the extra effort.

The arguments are persuasive enough to have stimulated a number of schemes in the United States and other countries to differentiate teacher pay on the basis of performance. Such schemes generally address the second category of critiques, namely, that of teacher effort. In the United States, merit pay was quite common in the early part of the twentieth century, but then it declined (Murnane and Cohen 1986) and is now again on the rise (Ballou 2001). Many U.S. school districts, for example, select mentor teachers on the basis of teaching quality and give them extra pay. South Carolina began a bonus pay program in the mid-1980s to reward all teachers in schools making larger gains on state tests (Ladd 1999). A number of other states followed suit and more recently have shifted to incentive systems that reward individual teachers.<sup>1</sup>

Other countries also have pay incentive programs, usually on a national scale. In the 1990s, Mexico implemented a voluntary program, the Carrera

1. In addition to South Carolina, by the early 1990s, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas had all instituted some type of school performance program, as had the Dallas school district (Ladd 1999). More recently, the Denver school district and other cities have adopted individual teacher incentive pay based on student achievement gains. See Peterson 2006 and TASB 2005.

Magisterial, for teachers to be evaluated by peers and a test to qualify for higher salary (Santibanez 2002). England/Wales and New Zealand tried to implement nationwide teacher performance-based pay enhancement schemes in the 1990s but with limited success (Gordon and Whitty 1997). And, of particular interest to us in this article, Chile started a national bonus pay program in 1996, the Sistema Nacional de Evaluación del Desempeño de los Establecimientos Educacionales Subvencionados (SNED), in which teachers in schools in each of several socioeconomic groupings making the largest gains in each province in the biannual national test, the SIMCE, would receive extra pay (Mizala and Romaguera 2000, 2002).<sup>2</sup>

As Figlio and Kenny (2006, p. 2) note, countries, states, and districts implemented these merit, or incentive, programs for teachers with “virtually no evidence on [their] potential effectiveness.” In the past ten years, however, there have been a number of attempts to estimate the effects on student outcomes of incentives given to schools and individual teachers for improved performance. Ten years ago, Helen Ladd (1999) evaluated the Dallas school district’s financial reward scheme using student gains on the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills test in Dallas schools compared with pass rates in five other cities without incentives. She found that seventh-grade pass rates in Dallas were significantly higher than elsewhere, but there was no difference for third graders. Using Israeli data, Lavy (2002) matched schools receiving incentives with schools in similar communities without incentives and found positive effects of incentives on student test scores. Lavy (2005) used a regression discontinuity to test whether students in relatively low-performing Israeli high schools that were nonrandomly and “correctly” assigned to have their teachers compete for large pay bonuses in a student performance gain tournament (schools in which students had a less than 45 percent passing rate on the high school exam) did better than students in schools “mistakenly” assigned to participate because of an error in the assignment variable. Lavy also tested whether students in the treatment schools performed better than students in schools just above the 45 percent threshold. He found that these individual teacher incentives caused “more students to take a matriculation exam . . . and increase[d] the passing rate and mean test score among students who would take the exam regardless of the program” (Lavy 2005, p. 20). He also found evidence that student improvement was linked to changes in teaching techniques and greater effort by participating teachers. Glewwe, Ilias, and

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2. Beginning in the mid-1990s, Chile also substantially raised teacher salaries across the board, almost tripling the average salary for primary and secondary school teachers in real terms between 1990 and 2003 (Gonzalez 2001). There is evidence that this has substantially increased the average test score of high school graduates admitted to education faculties in Chilean universities relative to students admitted to other faculties (OECD 2004).

Kremer (2003) assessed an experiment in Kenya in which all teachers in grades 4–8 in the top-scoring schools got an equal salary bonus. The study found that students in the schools participating in the incentive program had higher short-term test scores but not longer-term achievement gains. This suggested that teachers in the treatment schools spent more time “teaching the test” but did not engage in activities to help students learn more.

Most recently, Figlio and Kenny (2006) sent questionnaires regarding the existence of teacher incentive programs in the early 1990s to high schools sampled in the National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS) 1988 follow-ups of 1990 and 1992 and matched their results with the NELS twelfth-grade test score data. Controlling for other variables, including student eighth-grade test scores, student socioeconomic status (SES), and school inputs, they found that students learned modestly more in schools where teachers received financial incentives, although Figlio and Kenny cannot distinguish whether better student performance is the result of teacher incentives or the possibility that “better” schools are more likely to implement incentive programs.

From these studies, it appears that well-designed teacher incentive schemes can have positive effects on student performance. But as Glewwe, Ilias, and Kremer (2003) suggest, not all teacher pay incentive programs achieve longer-term learning gains. In this article, we examine the relationship between student performance and teacher salary incentives in Chile’s large national SNED program. Because all schools in Chile were exposed to the SNED program in the period we study (1996–2000), there are serious methodological problems in assessing whether the incentives had an effect on student outcomes; in essence there is no control group.<sup>3</sup> Our purpose here, however, is not to evaluate whether the SNED had a positive impact on student performance in Chilean schools, but to demonstrate the possible limitations of a school-based incentive program when the available student performance data for awarding pay bonuses are inter-cohort rather than intra-cohort test score gains.

The Chilean case is not particularly amenable to testing the impact on student performance of teacher incentives, but it provides an opportunity to discuss how rewarding teachers using one set of student outcomes (because they are readily available) is related to another set of student outcomes considered a better measure of teacher productivity. Due to a delay in 1998 in Chile’s biannual testing schedule, we were able to compare how well schools fared in

3. As one of our reviewers put it, “While presumably there are schools that are so bad that they think they have no chance of getting an award, there are probably also many that did not win but might have altered their behavior in the hope of winning—in other words, *the program could have induced losing as well as winning schools to increase their effort*, and this makes it very hard to identify its true effect” (emphasis in original).

the competition for SNED awards (based on the SNED criteria of *inter-cohort* improvements on fourth- and eighth-grade test scores over two-year periods between tests) with their students' *intra-cohort* learning gains from fourth to eighth grades. This second measure is generally considered more relevant to long-term school improvement and hence more appropriate as the basis for salary incentives. Our results in comparing schools' success in the SNED competition with their intra-cohort gains suggest that when a teacher incentive program is based on measures other than those one would ideally like to use, the results for student learning may also be less than ideal.

## 2. THE SNED

The SNED was first introduced in Chile in 1996 as part of a general philosophy that promoting market incentives would result in improved student learning.<sup>4</sup>

[SNED's] principal objective is to support the improvement of the quality of education delivered by the publicly funded part of [Chile's] educational system, providing incentives and recognition to teachers in higher-achieving schools. (Chile, Ministerio de Educación 2004, p. 6, authors' translation).

The SNED is particularly interesting because Chile's market-oriented military government implemented a national voucher plan in 1981, providing the same level of per student funding to municipal (public) and private schools willing to accept vouchers (Carnoy 1998). By 1990, the year democracy was restored, the proportion of pupils in private voucher schools had risen from 14 to 34 percent, with another 8 percent attending full tuition (non-voucher) private schools. The center-left coalition that took power in 1990 kept the voucher plan in place, even allowing private subsidized schools to charge some tuition and select their pupils (under Article 23, enacted in 1996). Enrollment in private schools rose slowly over the next 14 years, so today about 38 percent of Chilean K–12th graders attend private voucher schools, and another 9 percent attend private paid schools. Private schools have almost complete flexibility in hiring and firing teachers and, to a lesser extent, in how much they pay teachers, since they can contract them part time. Teachers in private schools are on average much younger than public school teachers (McEwan and Carnoy 2000).

According to market proponents, a bonus pay plan in a country with a high percentage of private schools, even when bonuses are awarded to schools

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4. Mizala and Romaguera (2002) argue that the choice system based on voucher financing provides incentives on the "demand side" of education, whereas the SNED is "an important complement to the present educational system because it introduces an incentive to supply that is directly related to teachers" (our translation, p. 12).

rather than to individual teachers, should be particularly effective in increasing teacher effort, since private school managers, more than public school principals, can exert pressure on teachers to work harder to increase test scores. Furthermore, a school choice environment and voucher financing system such as Chile's should produce greater effort to improve test scores by private and public schools competing for students. A bonus pay scheme in such an environment should be at least somewhat effective in increasing student learning even in public schools.

SNED awards are given in each award year to the highest-rated schools within each of several sets of socioeconomic school groupings until those rewarded account for 25 percent of enrollments within each province (there are thirteen provinces in Chile). The SNED rating is achieved through a series of measures that compare schools in the same "homogeneous grouping" within each region. The grouping is based on socioeconomic level, urban/rural location, and level of schooling (basic, secondary, and special education).<sup>5</sup> Only public and subsidized private schools qualify for the SNED. In 2000–2001, the number of homogeneous groups varied between five and eleven per region (Mizala and Romaguera 2002, p. 15). The goal of the SNED is to encourage teachers in all schools to attain high levels of performance from their pupils and to keep improving without forcing low-performing students to drop out.

Once a school is assigned to its "group" in its region, its SNED rating is constructed through a series of six measures:

- The absolute score on the latest SIMCE test in the fourth and eighth grades for basic education schools, the tenth grade for secondary schools, and all three for schools that have basic and secondary education (some private schools) (37%);
- The difference in average score on the latest two SIMCE tests in fourth, eighth, and tenth grades (28 percent);
- A rating of a series of activities taking place at the school (6 percent);
- A rating by the Ministry of Education of the conditions of work at the school (2 percent);
- A rating of equality of opportunity at the school, including the promotion rate of students from grade to grade, student retention (inverse of dropout), push-out practices, etc. (22 percent); and
- A rating of teacher and parent participation in the school (5 percent).

5. Socioeconomic grouping is based on the average income of pupils' families in each school, the average education of the parents, and the vulnerability index of pupils in the school, which is constructed by the agency providing school lunches.

As in many such rating systems, this is complex enough that most administrators trying to maximize school possibilities of getting an award would probably aim just to get the highest possible score on the current SIMCE test in whatever grade is being tested. This would take care of the first two items, which count for two-thirds of the available points. In the first year the SNED bonuses were given (1996–97), a typical basic education school would have had a chance to put great effort into doing well on the 1996 fourth-grade SIMCE but perhaps not on the 1995 eighth-grade SIMCE (the law was passed in 1995, but schools probably were not geared up to respond to it).<sup>6</sup> The award was given again in 1998–99, based this time (for basic education schools) on the 1997 eighth-grade results and the 1996 fourth-grade results, including the gains in 1995–97 and 1994–96, since the 1998 fourth-grade test was postponed to 1999. In 2000–2001, the award was based on the 1999 fourth-grade results, the 2000 eighth-grade results, and the differences in the 1996–99 fourth-grade test scores and the 1997–2000 eighth-grade test scores for each school.

In theory, basic education schools in each homogeneous group in each province with high scores on the fourth- and eighth-grade SIMCE tests and reasonable gains from test year to test year should have received more bonuses than schools that did poorly on both counts. Since the SNED makes awards adjusting for average socioeconomic background of students in a school and whether the school is in an urban or rural area, it is not surprising that the awards are well distributed among private and public schools and among urban and rural schools (Mizala and Romaguera 2002). It also turns out that during 1996–2000, almost one-half of the schools received at least one award. The awards are about US\$400–500 annually per teacher in bonus-winning schools (about 5 percent of annual salary), but since so many schools (about 1,600–2,200, depending on the year) and teachers (about 30,000) get the bonuses every year, the government spent US\$12.5 million on bonuses in 1996–97, US\$13.5 million in 1998–99, and US\$16.5 million in 2000–2001.<sup>7</sup> SNED spending has since risen to US\$18.5 million in 2004–5.<sup>8</sup> Most SNED winners received only one award in four years, suggesting that the size of the incentive is much smaller as a proportion of the total salary earned in four years.

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6. It is important to note that in the first year the SNED was awarded (1996–97), more schools but fewer teachers (2,274/30,600) got the award than in subsequent years (1,832/31,400 in 1998–99 and 1,699/32,600 in 2000–2001). See OECD 2004, table 9.
  7. The U.S. dollar figures were estimated from Mizala and Romaguera 2002, table 4. Chilean pesos in that table are in 2000 prices. We converted them to dollars using the July 2000 exchange rate of 514 pesos per dollar.
  8. See Chile, Ministerio de Educación 2004, table 1. We used the July 2004 exchange rate of 640 pesos per dollar.

Furthermore, the impact of SNED awards on teacher behavior was probably attenuated by a simultaneous government policy of sustained and large increases in teacher salaries across the board beginning in the early 1990s. In real terms, actual teacher base monthly salaries in municipal (public) schools increased an average of 8.4 percent annually in 1990–2000 but slowed to 3.9 percent annually in 1996–2000. The minimum salary in private subsidized (voucher) schools increased at a lower rate in the decade as a whole, but also at about a 4 percent rate in 1996–2000 (OECD 2004, figure 6). The SNED component was intended to make at least a portion of teacher salary dependent on school performance, but the broader policy complicates any assessment of the effect of the incentive portion on teacher effort, since teachers were getting large salary increases even when their schools were not winning the SNED competitions. For example, the absolute amount of increase in real (2001 pesos) monthly salary in municipal schools resulting from the general annual salary raises was 22,500 pesos in 2001 pesos (about \$400 in 2001). For those teachers who won SNED awards, the increase in monthly salary for the award year was a similar 23,000 pesos in 2003 pesos (OECD 2004, p. 51). Thus the SNED award was sizable (about equal) compared with the regular average annual salary increase, but teachers were also guaranteed salary increases even if they did not get the SNED, and the SNED's effect was probably further diluted because it was awarded only every two years.

Teachers in each school are required to get 90 percent of the amount awarded to the school. The other 10 percent also goes to teachers—those considered particularly outstanding by administrators and colleagues. So teachers allegedly should have an incentive to improve their students' academic performance, at least performance as measured by the SIMCE test. Since average salaries in private subsidized (voucher) schools are generally lower than in municipal schools, this also suggests that SNED awards could provide a greater incentive for teachers to improve student performance in voucher schools.<sup>9</sup>

Awarding bonuses for a school's absolute score on a test in grade 4 in, say, 1996, for a school's absolute score on the eighth-grade test in 1997, and for gains compared with a test in the same grade two years earlier may promote increased learning in the fourth-grade cohort of 1996, the eighth-grade cohort


9. Any award scheme that mostly rewards all the teachers in a school for the efforts of the teachers in one or two grades (in this case, fourth and eighth grades) is vulnerable to free riding. Because the SIMCE tests only mathematics and language, the free-riding problem is even greater, since in the eighth grade not all teachers are responsible for any improvements that might occur from cohort to cohort. Schools that are able to shift resources from teachers and courses not involved in the competition (thereby reducing the free-rider problem, since teachers not in the competition would be giving up resources to those who are) may be more successful in obtaining a pay bonus for all the teachers but may not be helping students in the school to improve their overall learning as they progress from grade to grade.



of 1997, or later cohorts in the fourth and eighth grades.<sup>10</sup> But it does not necessarily promote increased learning for a given 1996 fourth-grade student (or cohort of fourth-grade students) in grades 1–3 or between the fourth and eighth grades.<sup>11</sup> Even schools that are effective in mobilizing their fourth-grade teachers to increase the fourth-grade test score for their 1996 cohort may not necessarily carry that effort over to the other grades, for two main reasons: the SNED does not provide an incentive to increase intra-cohort gains, and the organizational skills required to raise scores on a particular test may not be the same as those required to increase learning over a three- or four-year period.

Thus rewarding absolute scores on periodic SIMCE tests in fourth and eighth grades may induce schools to try to raise achievement in those grades but may not produce overall learning gains in a given cohort. In figure 1, we show three hypothetical schools with different patterns of test scores corrected for student SES. School 1 does relatively well in the fourth- and eighth-grade tests but has negative gains from fourth to eighth grade. School 2 has steady relative gains from fourth to eighth grade but does relatively poorly on the fourth-grade test and ends up equal to School 1 only by eighth grade. School 3 starts out higher than the other two schools in fourth grade, has a much smaller gain than School 2 from fourth to eighth grade, but ends up higher than both Schools 1 and 2 by eighth grade. Under the point system outlined above, School 1 is likely to get a SNED award, as is School 3. School 2 is unlikely to get an award, even though it made by far the largest gains in student learning between grades 4 and 8. If SNED's main objective is to reward absolute achievement reached in eighth grade, its current reward system may work. If the idea is to reward intra-cohort gain, it may well not.

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10. There was some evidence that the SNED does increase student achievement in a subsample of Chilean schools that just made the cut to get an award in the previous round or did not make the cut but were close enough to get an award (Mizala and Romaguera 2005). Mizala and Romaguera reason that teachers and administrators in such schools would be motivated to try harder to get a SNED award in the next round, whereas in very low-scoring schools, there is too little chance of a SNED award to affect teacher effort, and in high-scoring schools there is an assumption that they are doing well and do not need to make additional efforts.
  11. Many other problems are associated with using inter-cohort gains over time to measure school performance. For example, Mizala, Romaguera, and Urquiola (2006) have recently shown that average SIMCE school test scores within social class groups of schools fluctuate from cohort to cohort such that school rankings vary from test to test unsystematically. Thus small variations in cohorts could, for many schools in Chile, influence whether they get a SNED award much more than does teacher effort. This also introduces a great deal of “error” (extraneous factors not associated with teacher effort that can influence the level of test scores in a particular grade in a particular year). Thomas Kane and Douglas Staiger have shown that small schools are likely to have greater variation in test scores across cohorts in a given grade because a few additional well- or poorly performing students from one year to the next have a greater impact in a small school than in a larger school (Kane and Staiger 2001; see also Rothstein 2004 for a summary of other problems). It is interesting to note that the average size for those schools that got SNED awards appears to have increased between the first award year (1996–97) and the third award year (2000–2001) (OECD 2004, table 9).



**Figure 1.** Chile: Hypothetical Standardized Test Score Paths, Three Schools, Grades 3–8

One of the main obstacles to developing an incentive pay program in Chile based on intra-cohort student learning gains is the system of testing. Chile tests students every two years in the fourth and eighth grades of basic education, and then in the second year of secondary school (tenth grade). Fourth graders are tested in even years and eighth graders in odd years. It is thus impossible to compare the test score of a fourth grader with his or her test score four years later. Many U.S. states now test students in most grades every year. States could estimate and compare the gain scores of a school's cohorts from grade to grade if testing agencies assigned identifying numbers to every student taking the tests. More states are beginning to develop such student-level longitudinal databases, but they are still relatively limited (for an example of using such data to estimate teacher effects on student performance in Texas, see Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain 2005; for North Carolina, see Clotfelder, Ladd, and Vigdor 2007).

Nevertheless, because of an anomaly in Chile's testing schedule, it is possible to compare the 2000 eighth-grade SIMCE scores with the fourth-grade scores for the same school in 1996.<sup>12</sup> The eighth-grade test was postponed from 1999 to 2000.<sup>13</sup> This provides an estimate of cohort gain scores by

12. According to Lorena Meckes (personal communication, March 5, 2007), the SIMCE coordinator in the Chilean Ministry of Education, the fourth-grade test was not applied in 1998 because applying both the eighth- and tenth-grade SIMCE in 1995 was so onerous for the ministry that it was decided to apply the tenth-grade SIMCE alone in 1998 and to delay the fourth-grade test until 1999 rather than apply both at once.

13. This raises the important question of why Chile's Ministry of Education (MOE) has not focused on setting testing dates to be able to estimate value added. For example, the MOE could test fourth, eighth, and tenth graders biannually in the same calendar year. This could provide regular intra-cohort gains by individual students, and the additional cost could be minimized by testing fourth

school in a period marked by three SNED awards. The stated purpose of the SNED is to improve student learning, and one important component of student learning is cohort gains. It is therefore interesting to analyze whether the current manner of providing incentives based on available inter-cohort test scores also rewards those schools that make the greatest gains in test scores in the final four years of basic education. Cohort gain estimates aggregated to the school level are fraught with problems, which we discuss. Thus we have to be careful about inferring any causal relations from our analysis. Yet the analysis does suggest that incentive programs using schools' absolute test scores and inter-cohort increases in a given grade may not reward schools that have the highest gain scores for specific cohorts of students as they move from grade to grade.

### Methodology

As we argued earlier, Chile, like many other countries, tends to measure educational improvement by inter-cohort test score increases, but this is not necessarily the best measure of student learning gains or school quality. Many analysts feel that *intra*-cohort test score gains provide a more meaningful measure of educational improvement (see, for example, the discussion around charter school performance in Carnoy et al. 2005). In that measure, schools contribute the most to student performance when the same cohorts of students make the largest improvement in test scores from grade to grade. Our main interest, therefore, is whether SNED awards are positively related to cohort achievement gains from the fourth to eighth grades.

The disadvantage in modeling this relationship is that the SNED program does not make awards on the basis of learning gains by cohorts of students while they are in a particular school. Thus the incentive program gives schools no direct indication that they would be rewarded for increasing student gains in the four years between fourth and eighth grades. Yet it is not unreasonable to assume that the Ministry of Education should want SNED's monetary incentive to somehow have this effect, since the aggregate learning gains that pupils make from one grade to the next are a more direct measure than inter-cohort

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and eighth graders on the same day. A number of interviews with MOE officials in 2003 indicated that since the "purpose" of the SIMCE test was originally only to estimate the level of student performance by school without even comparing inter-cohort changes over time, testing students in the fourth grade in even alternate years and in the eighth grade in odd alternate years served that purpose. The timing of the tests continued even when the tests began to be used for other purposes, including as a measure of teacher "effort" in awarding pay bonuses to higher-performing schools (OECD 2004, pp. 89–95). The 2004 OECD report on Chilean education recommended a new focus on intra-cohort gains, and the MOE is gradually changing the test schedule to begin accommodating that recommendation.

gains of how much *school effort* (rather than cohort variation) influences average student performance.

The advantage in modeling this relationship is that when SNEDs do not specifically reward on the basis of cohort gain, SNED awards are not endogenous to cohort gains.<sup>14</sup> Endogeneity may still be a problem if some unmeasured factors affect both the probability of a school getting a SNED award and its intra-cohort gain score. An example of this possibility is reflected in the fact that the number of SNED awards is highly correlated with the cohort's base fourth-grade score in 1996—in other words, with the initial *level* of student performance in a school. If some unobserved factor caused a school to have a high initial score and a subsequent low intra-cohort gain, any inferences about the relation between the number of SNED awards and intra-cohort gains would be biased. Much of our analysis focuses on coming to terms with this issue, in part by analyzing how each year's SNED award is related to intra-cohort gains. Although we never resolve the problem, we are still able to gain insights into the limitations for school improvement of using inter-cohort test scores for awarding teacher pay bonuses.

One way to express the SNED relation to student test score gains is to make the fourth- to eighth-grade cohort gain the dependent variable, with the number of SNED awards won by the school the independent variable—if SNED awards are associated with student improvement, the more money awarded the teachers in a school, the greater should be the observed cohort gain by students in that school.

We can also model the relationship by assuming that the “latent variable” in the SNED program—the variable that policy makers could not measure directly in 1995 (when the SNED law was passed) but would have liked to proxy with their school rating scheme—was the learning gain made by cohorts of students in the same school. In that case, we can pose the question as follows: In the period 1996–2000, were Chilean schools with greater gains in these last four years of basic education more likely to win SNED bonuses? That is, if policy makers had been able to use cohort test score gains as the basis for awards, would this have produced the same award pattern as the current SNED rating system? This second model makes the number of SNED awards in the period 1996–2000 (from zero to three awards) the dependent variable and the fourth- to eighth-grade gains in math and language scores in the cohort

14. In their analysis of whether SNED awards have a significant positive influence on test score increases in the grade that is being tested that year, Mizala and Romaguera (2005) had to deal with the endogeneity problem, since the “causal variable” (a SNED award) is based on the value of the dependent variable (fourth- and eighth-grade test scores increase over time). Mizala and Romaguera use a school fixed effects model to reduce the probable bias in their estimates. Their results suggest that the SNED may have positively influenced midlevel scoring schools to improve performance.

of students who were in the fourth grade in 1996 and the eighth grade in 2000 an independent variable. Although we again must be careful not to draw strong conclusions on the basis of one (potentially poorly) measured intra-cohort gain, estimating this model can be suggestive of the relationship of school gains to the present pattern of SNED awards.

Many Chilean schools (mainly private, but also some public) can ask pupils to leave, so we have to be conscious of schools implicitly attempting to increase cohort gains by reducing the number of poorly performing students in the higher grades of basic education. The SNED rating system gives fewer points to schools that engage in such practices, as measured by higher dropout or lower promotion rates, so schools that receive more SNED awards could have lower fourth- to eighth-grade cohort gains because they retain lower-gaining pupils. One way to control for this problem would be to aggregate *individual* students' gain scores by school. Unfortunately, the SIMCE did not record individual student scores until 1997, on the eighth-grade test in that year. Because the fourth-grade SIMCE data are available only at the school level, we are unable to estimate school gains aggregated across individual students. However, we are able to estimate the number of students in each school in the fourth grade in 1996 and the eighth grade in 2000. The ratio of eighth to fourth graders approximates loss rates, although this does not account for movement between schools that favors higher-scoring schools, which attract better students from worse-scoring schools between the fourth and eighth grades and push lower-scoring students to lower-scoring schools. Since higher-scoring schools in a homogeneous grouping are more likely to have been awarded more SNED bonuses, if such student movement across schools exists, it will bias upward the relationship between number of SNED awards and cohort gain.

Cohort gain scores can be affected by a "ceiling effect." Schools with high relative test scores on the 1996 fourth-grade test may also have high relative scores on the 2000 eighth-grade test, but their relative gain score may be low because they are near the highest possible absolute score on both tests. Schools whose students score relatively low on the 1996 fourth-grade test have a lot more room to improve on the eighth-grade test.

Relatively high scoring schools in 1996 on the fourth-grade test are also likely to not do as well *relative* to other schools because of regression to the mean. Schools that scored lower than other schools in 1996 may have done so because they had a bad year, not because they are bad schools. They are likely to have a relatively larger relative gain between the fourth and eighth grades as they bounce back, but they may be penalized by the SNED rating system for getting relatively low scores on both tests even though the gain for their students is relatively large. We check these effects by controlling for the initial

1996 fourth-grade test score and interpreting the complex set of possibilities that result when we include this control.

We can also test whether a particular pattern of awards is associated with larger fourth- to eighth-grade cohort gains. For example, schools that received an award in 1998–99, more heavily weighted by their eighth-grade gain, may have been more likely to have had larger cohort gains.

Model 1 estimates the average school cohort gain in mathematics and Spanish (as measured by the difference in normal curve equivalent [NCE] scores)<sup>15</sup> as a function of the number of SNED awards (or dummy variable for various combinations of SNED awards), the type of basic education school, average school SES (vulnerability index), whether the school is rural or urban, the region in which the school is located, the ratio of the number of students who took the eighth-grade test in the school in 2000 to the number who took the fourth-grade test in 1996, the number of students in grade 4 in 1996, and the average school score in 1996. The latter variable is a way to control for regression to the mean, but it has the disadvantage that it is highly correlated with the number of SNED awards. Because of this correlation, there are good arguments for *not* including the fourth-grade score in the regression, primarily because one actual feature of schools with higher fourth-grade scores in 1996 is that they were likely both to get more SNED awards and to have lower intra-cohort gain scores. We use ordinary least squares (OLS) for this estimate.

Model 2 estimates an ordered logit regression of the relationship between SNED awards to basic education schools in 1996–2000 and the fourth- to eighth-grade cohort gain, again measured by the difference in NCE scores. The ordered logit is similar to a multinomial logit, except that the ordered logit attempts to find the “latent” values of the ordinal variable. Thus, even though the dependent variable is the number of awards a school received, the ordered logit assumes that the “value distance” from zero to one awards is not necessarily the same as the value distance from one to two and from two to three awards. Our model estimates the probability of an award as a function of the average cohort gain in 1996–2000 in math or language, the type of school, the socioeconomic vulnerability index of students in the school, whether the school is rural or urban, the ratio of the number of eighth-grade (2000) to fourth-grade (1996) students, and the school’s score on the 1996 fourth-grade test. We include a set of dummies for regions, even though the SNED awards are made in each region and therefore should be independent of region.

15. The SIMCE fourth- and eighth-grade tests have different scales (the fourth-grade test is graded on a 100-point scale and the eighth-grade test on a 350-point scale). The questions on each test are based on the fourth- and eighth-grade curricula. In order to make the tests comparable, we converted them to NCE scores. NCE is a measurement of where a student falls on a normal curve, indicating a student’s rank compared with other students on the same test.

We estimate two other sets of models that attempt to get at the relation of SNED awards to cohort gains across groups of schools catering to students with different family resources. In the first of these models, we divide schools into terciles of the vulnerability index. SNED awards are consciously made within social vulnerability category to allow for differences in the level of SIMCE scores among schools with students of lower and higher socioeconomic backgrounds. The idea is to provide incentives for improvement for both lower- and higher-scoring schools. So we would like to know the relationship between SNED awards and cohort gains across school SES groups. In the second model, we compare the relationship across types of schools. Especially in urban areas, where there is considerable choice among schools, more motivated parents are more likely to send their children to subsidized private schools, and parents with more resources (and perhaps even more motivation) are likely to use subsidized private schools charging fees.

Are SNED awards associated with greater cohort gains in higher or lower SES schools? Do the awards seem to have a greater impact on cohort gains in private or public schools? This approach compares more “like” schools, at least in terms of the resources that students’ families provide. In that sense, we may get less biased estimators of the relationship between the number of SNED awards and cohort gain.

**Model 1**  $NCE_{diffj} = f(NSNED_j, TS_j, V_j, R_j, N_j, D_j, Region_j, SIMCE_{96j})$

**Model 2**  $Prob(0, 1, 2, 3 \text{ Awards})_j = g(GS_j, TS_j, V_j, R_j, N_j, D_j, Region_j, SIMCE_{96j})$ ,

where  $NCE_{diffj}$  = normal curve equivalent score (NCE) of school  $j$ 's 2000 eighth-grade SIMCE test minus school  $j$ 's average NCE score on the 1996 fourth-grade SIMCE test;

$NSNED_j$  = dummy variables for the number of SNED awards received by school  $j$ , or an array of dummies representing the eight possible combinations of SNED awards; in both, omitted dummy is zero awards;

$TS_j$  = dummy variable for school  $j$ 's type of school, with private subsidized accepting fees omitted from the regression;<sup>16</sup>

$V_j$  = average social vulnerability index of students in school  $j$ ;

16. Public municipal schools are divided into two categories, municipal corporation and Departamento de Administración de Educación Municipal (DAEM). Private schools are divided into subsidized and paid. Full paid (non-voucher) schools do not qualify for SNED awards, so they were dropped from the sample. Each of the three remaining types of schools (corporation, DAEM, subsidized private) is divided into those that charge fees and those that do not. In the SIMCE data set we use, there are only seven municipal corporation and eight DAEM municipal schools that charge fees. But the number of private subsidized schools that charge fees is larger than the number of those that do not.

**Table 1.** Chile: Proportion of Schools Receiving SNED Awards, 1996–2000, Full Population of Schools and Our Sample

Number of Awards	Total Population of Schools	Our Sample
0	57.1	47.1
1	27.3	28.3
2	11.7	17.6
3	3.9	6.0
Total number	9,247	3,848

Sources: Mizala and Romaguera 2002, table 6; authors' estimate for our sample.

$R_j$  = dummy for whether school  $j$  is rural;

$N_j$  = ratio of the number of students in school  $j$ 's eighth grade in 2000 to the number of students in school  $j$ 's fourth grade in 1996;

$D_j$  = the number of fourth-grade students in school  $j$  in 1996 who took the SIMCE test (a proxy for school size);

Region = dummy variable for the region in which school  $j$  is located, with Santiago metropolitan area omitted from the regression;

$SIMCE96_j$  = school  $j$ 's average score on the 1996 fourth-grade SIMCE test.

## Data

The data used to test these models come from several sources: the 1996 fourth-grade SIMCE results, the 2000 eighth-grade SIMCE results, and the compiled SNED data that indicate SNED awards by school, year of award, and number of awards received by each school in 1996–2000. A fourth bonus was awarded in 2002–3, but we did not include that in our analysis. All the data were obtained from Chile's Ministry of Education (MINEDUC).

Since the SIMCE fourth- and eighth-grade tests are graded on a different scale, we created an NCE score for each test (the NCE sets the mean at 50). Thus, the difference in cohort math score ( $NCE_M$ ) and cohort Spanish score ( $NCE_C$ ) is expressed as the difference between NCE scores on the two tests.

Mizala and Romaguera (2002, table 6) estimate that more than nine thousand schools were involved in the SNED competition in the period 1996–2000 (see table 1). They do not specify which kinds of schools are included in the nine thousand, but the list we received from the Ministry of Education included secondary schools, technical middle schools, special education schools, and kindergartens. According to Mizala and Romaguera, 43 percent of these schools received at least one award.

The data set of schools for which we had fourth- to eighth-grade gain scores and that were also listed in the SNED compilation includes almost



**Table 2.** Chile: Breakdown of School Sample by Type of School

Type of School	Number	Percent
Municipal corporation (public), no fees	697	16.3
DAEM (public), no fees	1,854	43.4
Private subsidized, no fees	532	12.5
Private subsidized, with fees	754	17.7
Municipal corporation, with fees	7	0.2
DAEM, with fees	8	0.2
Private paid	419	9.8
Total	4,271	100.0

Source: Authors' estimates.

4,300 schools. From the SNED list of 9,400 schools, about 2,000 can be quickly identified as high schools, kindergartens, and special schools. Many rural schools do not go up to the eighth grade and so have no cohort gain score. Of the 4,300 basic education schools, we also eliminated about 400 private paid schools, since the latter are not eligible for SNED awards. Thus our data set represents a subset of the total number of schools in Chile, about 60 percent of all basic education schools and a much higher proportion of all schools with a full program up to eighth grade.

We can compare our sample's proportion of schools by number of awards in 1996–2000 with that of Mizala and Romaguera (table 1). The comparison suggests that a lower proportion of schools in our population did not get SNED awards, probably because we have eliminated many rural schools and high schools. We have a higher proportion of two- and three-time winners, probably for the same reason.

Table 2 shows the breakdown of our population by fiscal type—type of public school, type of private subsidized school (those that accept and do not accept fees), and private paid schools, which are not eligible to participate in the SNED competition (these are excluded from our analysis).

Average scores on the fourth- and eighth-grade SIMCE tests vary by type of school and by the number of SNEDs awarded to a school. Table 3a shows the means for the raw scores, but the results are similar for NCE scores. The standard deviation of raw scores on each of the fourth-grade tests (math and Spanish) is about 7.5 points, and is 18 points for the eighth-grade scores. Schools that received three awards scored about 1.2 standard deviations above the mean on the 1996 fourth- and eighth-grade tests and almost two standard deviations above schools getting no awards. Thus schools where students score high on the tests receive more awards. The differences in test scores within school types for schools getting no or several SNED awards are smaller,

mainly because awards are made taking some account of students' social class. Students in public schools are more likely to be disadvantaged than students in private schools, especially those students in private schools requiring fees. Table 3b shows the mean NCE scores by type of school and table 3c by terciles of SES and 1996 fourth-grade test score. A consistent pattern of lower cohort gains is shown for higher-scoring schools (schools with higher tercile SES and higher tercile fourth-grade test scores), although private schools generally have the same or slightly higher gains than public schools, and the relation between higher fourth-grade score and lower intra-cohort gain is much weaker in (on average high-scoring) fee-charging private schools than in other voucher schools and public schools. This suggests that we may find a weak relationship between cohort achievement gains and SNED awards if higher-scoring schools tend to get more awards.<sup>17</sup>

### 3. RESULTS

The results for the OLS regressions estimating average school gain score as a function of the number of SNED awards and other variables are shown in tables 4a and 4b. The school gain score is expressed as a change in the school's NCE score. The first regression (1) includes only dummy variables for the number of SNED awards, with zero awards for the reference dummy. Estimate 2 adds controls for the type of school and region, and estimate 3 adds the school's average vulnerability index, whether the school is rural, a proxy for school dropout/push out (the ratio of the number of eighth graders in the school who took the 2000 SIMCE to the number of fourth graders who took the 1996 SIMCE), and a proxy for school size (the absolute number of fourth graders in each school taking the 1996 SIMCE test).<sup>18</sup> Estimate 4 adds a control for the school's NCE score on the fourth-grade test. Estimate 5 includes dummy variables for each combination of SNED awards rather than the number of awards, and estimate 6 adds a control for the school's NCE score on the fourth-grade SIMCE test.

When we do not control for the level of the fourth-grade test (estimates 1–3), the relationship between getting SNED awards and school gain score is negative and highly robust. A school receiving two SNED awards averaged a cohort math NCE gain score that was about 3 percentage points less than

17. The bias caused by a ceiling effect is less apparent. For the very highest-scoring schools (fee-charging voucher schools), fourth- to eighth-grade gains are about the same as for lower-scoring schools. Public schools scoring high on the 1996 fourth-grade test have lower fourth- to eighth-grade gains than lower-scoring public schools. We think the private school data suggest that there is less a ceiling effect in the public schools than a regression to the mean, but, on the other hand, private schools can push out lower-scoring students.

18. Even though SNED awards are made within each region, we included regional dummies to correct for any regional effect.

Table 3a. Chile: Mean 1996 Absolute Grade 4 and 2000 Grade 8 Scores, by Number of SNED Awards and Type of School

No. of SNEDS	MUNICIPAL CORPORATION SCHOOLS		DAEM SCHOOLS		PRIVATE SUBSIDIZED, NO FEES		PRIVATE SUBSIDIZED, WITH FEES		TOTAL ALL SCHOOLS	
	Mean Score	No. of Schools	Mean Score	No. of Schools	Mean Score	No. of Schools	Mean Score	No. of Schools	Mean Score	No. of Schools
<b>Grade 4 Mathematics</b>										
<b>0</b>	63.7	372	62.8	858	61.3	278	69.5	301	63.9	1,809
<b>1</b>	68.0	194	67.0	569	68.5	141	74.3	215	68.8	1,119
<b>2</b>	72.6	102	73.0	318	73.2	94	79.2	164	74.5	678
<b>3</b>	73.6	29	76.5	109	78.9	19	82.1	74	78.1	231
		<b>697</b>		<b>1,854</b>		<b>532</b>		<b>754</b>		<b>3,837</b>
<b>Grade 4 Spanish</b>										
<b>0</b>	64.1	372	63.3	858	62.0	278	70.6	301	64.5	1,809
<b>1</b>	68.7	194	67.3	569	69.3	141	75.7	215	69.4	1,119
<b>2</b>	72.4	102	72.5	318	73.6	94	80.6	164	74.6	678
<b>3</b>	74.4	29	76.1	109	78.7	19	82.7	74	78.2	231
		<b>697</b>		<b>1,854</b>		<b>532</b>		<b>754</b>		<b>3,837</b>

Table 3a. Continued

No. of SNEDS	MUNICIPAL CORPORATION SCHOOLS		DAEM SCHOOLS		PRIVATE SUBSIDIZED, NO FEES		PRIVATE SUBSIDIZED, WITH FEES		TOTAL ALL SCHOOLS	
	Mean Score	No. of Schools	Mean Score	No. of Schools	Mean Score	No. of Schools	Mean Score	No. of Schools	Mean Score	No. of Schools
<b>Grade 8 Mathematics</b>										
<b>0</b>	229.6	372	230.9	858	228.5	278	247.0	301	233.0	1,809
<b>1</b>	236.2	194	237.7	569	244.9	141	261.0	215	242.8	1,119
<b>2</b>	243.8	102	243.3	318	249.8	94	272.0	164	251.2	678
<b>3</b>	250.8	29	252.9	109	266.4	19	279.9	74	262.4	231
		<b>697</b>		<b>1,854</b>		<b>532</b>		<b>754</b>	<b>240.8</b>	<b>3,837</b>
<b>Grade 8 Spanish</b>										
<b>0</b>	229.5	372	230.5	858	229.1	278	248.2	301	233.0	1,809
<b>1</b>	236.2	194	237.1	569	245.6	141	261.4	215	242.6	1,119
<b>2</b>	244.2	102	241.6	318	250.4	94	271.4	164	250.4	678
<b>3</b>	249.9	29	250.7	109	261.8	19	281.3	74	261.3	231
		<b>697</b>		<b>1,854</b>		<b>532</b>		<b>754</b>	<b>240.6</b>	<b>3,837</b>

Sources: SIMCE grade 4 1996, SIMCE grade 8 2000, data on SNED awards by school, 1996, 1998-99, and 2000 from Chile Ministry of Education.

**Table 3b.** Chile: Mean 1996 NCE Grade 4 and 2000 Grade 8 Scores, by Type of School

	MUNICIPAL CORPORATION SCHOOLS		DAEM SCHOOLS		PRIVATE SUBSIDIZED, NO FEES		PRIVATE SUBSIDIZED, WITH FEES		TOTAL ALL SCHOOLS	
	Mean Grade 4 Score	Mean Grade 8 Score	Mean Grade 4 Score	Mean Grade 8 Score	Mean Grade 4 Score	Mean Grade 8 Score	Mean Grade 4 Score	Mean Grade 8 Score	Mean Grade 4 Score	Mean Grade 8 Score
Mathematics	60.8 (5.1)	61.7 (3.5)	60.9 (6.1)	62.1 (3.8)	60.6 (7.0)	62.6 (5.2)	66.2 (6.4)	67.3 (6.1)	61.9 (6.5)	63.1 (4.9)
Language	62.6 (5.5)	62.7 (3.4)	62.6 (6.3)	62.9 (3.7)	62.6 (7.7)	63.7 (5.4)	69.4 (7.4)	68.7 (6.0)	63.9 (7.2)	64.1 (5.0)

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

**Table 3c.** Chile: Mean 1996 NCE Grade 4 and 2000 Grade 8 Scores, by School SES and School Initial 1996 Test Score

	LOWEST TERCILE SES SCHOOLS		MIDDLE TERCILE SES SCHOOLS		HIGHEST TERCILE SES SCHOOLS	
	Mean Grade 4 Score	Mean Grade 8 Score	Mean Grade 4 Score	Mean Grade 8 Score	Mean Grade 4 Score	Mean Grade 8 Score
Mathematics	59.2 (6.5)	61.2 (3.8)	60.7 (5.1)	61.8 (3.4)	65.9 (5.7)	66.2 (5.6)
Language	60.5 (6.4)	61.9 (3.5)	62.3 (5.5)	62.9 (3.6)	68.9 (6.6)	67.6 (5.6)
	LOWEST TERCILE TEST SCORE SCHOOLS		MIDDLE TERCILE TEST SCORE SCHOOLS		HIGHEST TERCILE TEST SCORE SCHOOLS	
	Mean Grade 4 Score	Mean Grade 8 Score	Mean Grade 4 Score	Mean Grade 8 Score	Mean Grade 4 Score	Mean Grade 8 Score
Mathematics	60.0 (3.3)	65.0 (3.0)	61.7 (1.5)	62.5 (3.1)	69.0 (3.8)	66.8 (5.6)
Language	56.4 (3.3)	60.8 (2.8)	63.5 (1.6)	63.3 (3.0)	71.8 (4.7)	68.2 (5.4)

Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.

**Table 4a.** Chile: OLS Estimates of Average School NCE Mathematics Gain Scores from Grades 4–8 as a Function of the Number of SNED Awards, 1996–2000

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SNED 1	-1.19** (0.18)	-1.18** (0.18)	-1.07** (0.18)	0.73** (0.14)		
SNED 2	-3.28** (0.21)	-3.31** (0.21)	-3.19** (0.21)	1.03** (0.17)		
SNED 3	-3.60** (0.33)	-3.50** (0.33)	-3.29** (0.32)	2.37** (0.26)		
Public corp., no fees		-0.46+ (0.25)	-1.32** (0.27)	-2.71** (0.20)	-1.22** (0.27)	-2.72** (0.21)
Public DAEM, no fees		-0.25 (0.23)	-1.39** (0.25)	-2.63** (0.19)	-1.28** (0.25)	-2.63** (0.19)
Private subsidized, no fees		0.24 (0.28)	-0.42 (0.29)	-1.87** (0.22)	-0.36 (0.28)	-1.87** (0.22)
Vulnerability index			0.03** (0.00)	-0.03** (0.00)	0.03** (0.00)	-0.03** (0.00)
Rural			0.04 (0.26)	1.10** (0.20)	0.14 (0.26)	1.09** (0.20)
Grade 8/4 enrollment			-2.09** (0.20)	-1.20** (0.15)	-2.03** (0.20)	-1.21** (0.15)
School size			-0.004* (0.002)	0.004* (0.002)	-0.005* (0.001)	0.005* (0.001)
SNED 1 1996					0.69** (0.23)	0.81** (0.18)
SNED 1 1998					-2.60** (0.32)	0.46+ (0.25)
SNED 1 2000					-2.18** (0.24)	0.77** (0.19)
SNED 2 96&98					-1.95** (0.29)	1.10** (0.23)
SNED 2 98&00					-4.58** (0.27)	0.97** (0.24)
SNED 2 96&00					-1.97** (0.51)	0.88** (0.40)
SNED 3					-3.29** (0.32)	2.35** (0.27)
1996 Grade 4 math SIMCE score				-0.64** (0.01)		-0.64** (0.01)
Region dummies included	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	2.36**	2.50**	4.40**	43.59**	4.32**	43.43**
N	3,835	3,835	3,823	3,823	3,823	3,823
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.07	0.08	0.13	0.51	0.17	0.51

\*\*estimated coefficient statistically significant at 1% level; \*estimated coefficient statistically significant at 5% level; + estimated coefficient statistically significant at 10% level

Sources: SIMCE grade 4 1996, SIMCE grade 8 2000, data on SNED awards by school, 1996, 1998–99, and 2000 from Ministry of Education.

**Table 4b.** Chile: OLS Estimates of Average School NCE Spanish Gain Scores from Grades 4–8 as a Function of the Number of SNED Awards, 1996–2000

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SNED 1	-1.51** (0.18)	-1.45** (0.18)	-1.31** (0.17)	0.68** (0.13)		
SNED 2	-3.78** (0.21)	-3.72** (0.21)	-3.61** (0.21)	0.85** (0.16)		
SNED 3	-4.36** (0.33)	-4.10** (0.33)	-3.85** (0.32)	2.10** (0.25)		
Public corp., no fees		0.53** (0.25)	-0.86** (0.27)	-2.64** (0.19)	-0.78** (0.26)	-2.64** (0.19)
Public DAEM, no fees		0.96** (0.23)	-0.81** (0.25)	-2.53** (0.18)	-0.70** (0.25)	-2.52** (0.18)
Private subsidized, no fees		1.23** (0.28)	0.15 (0.28)	-1.66** (0.20)	0.21 (0.28)	-1.65** (0.20)
Vulnerability index			0.05** (0.00)	-0.03** (0.00)	0.05** (0.00)	-0.03** (0.00)
Rural			-0.05 <sup>†</sup> (0.26)	0.89** (0.18)	-0.39 (0.25)	0.88** (0.18)
Grade 8/4 enrollment			-1.90** (0.20)	-1.31** (0.14)	-1.84** (0.19)	-1.31** (0.14)
School size			-0.005* (0.002)	0.005** (0.001)	-0.005* (0.001)	0.005* (0.001)
SNED 1 1996					0.61** (0.23)	0.85** (0.18)
SNED 1 1998					-3.27** (0.31)	0.15 (0.23)
SNED 1 2000					-2.35** (0.24)	0.73** (0.18)
SNED 2 96&98					-2.42** (0.28)	0.95** (0.21)
SNED 2 98&00					-5.04** (0.27)	0.69** (0.22)
SNED 2 96&00					-2.01** (0.50)	0.82* (0.37)
SNED 3					-3.85** (0.31)	2.04** (0.25)
1996 Grade 4 math SIMCE score				-0.64** (0.01)		-0.63** (0.01)
Region dummies included	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	1.55**		2.61**	43.78**	2.53**	43.38**
N	3,835	3,835	3,823	3,823	3,823	3,823
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.10	0.19	0.19	0.59	0.23	0.59

\*\* estimated coefficient statistically significant at 1% level; \* estimated coefficient statistically significant at 5% level; <sup>†</sup> estimated coefficient statistically significant at 10% level

Sources: SIMCE grade 4 1996, SIMCE grade 8 2000, data on SNED awards by school, 1996, 1998–99, and 2000 from Ministry of Education.



a school that received no awards. Schools with three awards also had about 3 percentage points less in gain scores than schools with zero awards and 2 points less than those with one award. Since one standard deviation in NCE math test score difference is about 5 percentage points, the effect size of getting more awards is large. Thus those schools that received more SNED awards in this period were also less likely to have higher cohort gain scores.

However, controlling for the level of pupil performance on the fourth-grade test in 1996, the number of SNED awards received by the school is positively related to the gain pupils made between the fourth and eighth grades (estimate 4). At the mean of the fourth-grade math score (63 percent), schools with one SNED award had a 0.7 percent higher cohort gain than schools with no awards. This type of estimate helps account for regression to the mean and ceiling effects, but the problem with it in this particular case, as we discuss below, is that the number of SNED awards is highly correlated with the school's initial fourth-grade test score.<sup>19</sup>

When we identify the various possible combinations of SNED awards but do not include the 1996 fourth-grade score as a control, those schools that got an award in 1996 average a positive cohort gain relative to schools that received no awards, but all other award recipients had relatively lower absolute cohort gains than schools receiving no awards. Again, when we estimate the effect of SNED awards on schools with similar 1996 fourth-grade SIMCE scores, getting an award in 1998–99 seems to have little relation to cohort gain score, and those schools with three awards appeared to have much higher relative gains.

Once we include the 1996 fourth-grade score as a control variable, getting one or two awards in any year has a similarly positive relation to the intra-cohort gain. Schools with a similar 1996 fourth-grade score that received three awards tend to have a much larger intra-cohort gain. In terms of the absolute gain, getting that first award (1996) is associated with a larger gain than for other award years. This is an interesting result. It indicates that schools receiving the initial award in 1996 also achieved higher cohort gain scores. This result is independent of whether or not we control for initial fourth-grade test scores. It suggests that there were more schools in 1996–97 that had high 1996

19. This is a common problem in drawing inferences from production functions that use test score differences as the dependent variable (Rogosa 2001). For example, in California, when a school's student SES is used as an independent variable and school test score differences from year to year as the dependent variable, the coefficient of SES is negative; but when initial score is included, it is positive. There is a high correlation between SES and initial score. Rogosa (2003) argues that lower SES students made larger gains over time, so the positive coefficient for SES controlling for initial score yields misleading results. Because of the threat of multicollinearity, we computed the variance inflation factor for the estimated equations in tables 4a and 4b—none of the VIF values is higher than 4.

**Table 5a.** Chile: Ordered Logit Estimates of Number of SNED Awards as a Function of Average School NCE Mathematics Gain Scores from Grades 4–8, 1996–2000

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
Grades 4–8 NCE score gain, 1996–2000	–0.11**	–0.11**	0.08**
Public corporation, no fees	–0.68**	–0.71**	0.20
Public DAEM, no fees	–0.35**	–0.48**	0.35**
Private subsidized, no fees	–0.49**	–0.57**	0.12
Vulnerability index		–0.00 <sup>+</sup>	0.02**
Rural		0.56**	0.04
Grade 8/4 enrollment		0.07	0.10
School size		0.001	–0.001
1996 grade 4 math SIMCE score			0.26**
Region dummies included	NO	YES	YES
<i>N</i>	3,835	3,823	3,823
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.014	0.020	0.142

\*\* estimated coefficient statistically significant at 1% level; <sup>+</sup> estimated coefficient statistically significant at 10% level

Sources: SIMCE grade 4 1996, SIMCE grade 8 2000, data on SNED awards by school, 1996, 1998–99, and 2000 from Ministry of Education.

fourth-grade scores and also had higher fourth- to eighth-grade intra-cohort gains, but this relationship did not obtain in other years. As we noted earlier, about 450 (25 percent) more schools (although not more teachers) received SNED awards in 1996–97 than in 1998–99. Were many of the small schools among the 1996–97 award winners subject to cohort fluctuations, and therefore not receiving subsequent awards but able to produce higher intra-cohort gains in that particular cohort?

Tables 5a (mathematics) and 5b (Spanish) show the estimates of Model 2, the ordered logit of the number of SNED awards schools received in 1996–2000 as a function of test score gain and other variables. Logit regressions yield maximum likelihood estimators, but the results here are translated into marginal effect coefficients.

As in Model 1, the Model 2 results show that schools with higher average cohort NCE gain scores from the fourth to eighth grades were likely to get significantly *fewer* SNED awards in the period 1996–2000 than schools with lower gain scores. The relationship between gain scores and the likelihood of winning more SNED awards remains essentially unchanged when we add the regional dummies, the vulnerability index, and whether the school is rural or urban. SNED awards are supposed to be “independent” of region, average school SES, and rural/urban—that is, the awards are made to schools within

**Table 5b.** Chile: Ordered Logit Estimates of Number of SNED Awards as a Function of Average School NCE Spanish Gain Scores from Grades 4–8, 1996–2000

Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)
Grades 4–8 Spanish NCE score gain, 1996–2000	–0.12**	–0.12**	0.08**
Public corporation, no fees	–0.54**	–0.64**	0.29*
Public DAEM, no fees	–0.21*	–0.40**	0.47**
Private subsidized, no fees	–0.35**	–0.48**	0.18
Vulnerability index		–0.00	0.02**
Rural		0.50**	–0.02
Grade 8/4 enrollment		0.05	0.19**
School size		0.00	–0.00 <sup>+</sup>
1996 grade 4 math SIMCE score			0.25**
Region dummies included	NO	YES	YES
N	3,835	3,823	3,823
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.013	0.019	0.144

\*\*estimated coefficient statistically significant at 1% level; \*estimated coefficient statistically significant at 5% level; <sup>+</sup>estimated coefficient statistically significant at 10% level

Sources: SIMCE grade 4 1996, SIMCE grade 8 2000, data on SNED awards by school, 1996, 1998–99, and 2000 from Ministry of Education.

each of those categories. The coefficient of school gain score does drop slightly (somewhat more for math than for Spanish) when the ratio of the number of eighth-grade to fourth-grade test takers is included in the regression.<sup>20</sup>

The logit regressions yield the probability of getting, say, two awards if a school's NCE gain score from fourth to eighth grade is a point above the mean gain of all the schools in the sample.<sup>21</sup> For both math and Spanish, the probability of having received no awards in 1996–2000 is about 3 percent higher for schools with one percentage point higher NCE gain score, other characteristics controlled for, and the probability of getting two awards is about 1 percent *less* for one percentage point higher NCE gain score. In terms of “effect size,” a standard deviation increase in NCE test score gain (five points)

20. The estimated coefficients of the control variables should be interpreted with care, since the regression includes the fourth- to eighth-grade gain. For example, given the same cohort gain, municipal schools and private voucher schools that do not charge fees are likely to get significantly fewer SNED awards than are private voucher schools that do charge fees, even when we control for the vulnerability index. Mizala and Romaguera (2002) report that in metropolitan Santiago, the highest SES schools were more likely to have received a SNED award than lower SES schools, but, according to our results, this seems to occur mainly through the clustering of higher SES students in private subsidized schools that charge fees. Private subsidized schools that do not charge fees get fewer SNED awards than DAEM public schools, controlling for average SES and cohort gain differences among schools.

21. The mean gain was 1.2 NCE points in math and 0.2 points in Spanish.

was associated with a 15 percent higher probability of getting no awards and a 5 percent lower probability of getting two awards.

When we control for the school average fourth-grade score, a higher fourth- to eighth-grade gain (relative to predicted gain) score is associated with an *increased* probability of getting a SNED award. The positive coefficient of gain score translates into a 10 percent *lower* probability of having received no SNED awards for schools with an average fourth-grade test score in 1996 and a one standard deviation higher NCE gain score in 1996–2000. With a standard deviation higher gain score, a school would have a 5 percent higher probability of having received two awards. Nevertheless, when all other variables are controlled for, a school with a standard deviation higher fourth-grade score in 1996 (which would have greatly increased its students' chances of making *lower* gains by eighth grade) had a 42 percent lower probability of getting no awards and a 21 percent higher probability of getting two awards. One reason is that schools in which students made large gains between the fourth and eighth grades were more likely to have scored lower in the 1996 fourth-grade SIMCE test. Schools in the lowest tercile on the 1996 fourth-grade test averaged five NCE points of math gain between the fourth and eighth grades, from 55 NCE to 60 NCE, whereas schools in the highest tercile on the fourth-grade test averaged a two-point loss, from 69 NCE to 67 NCE. Yet the highest tercile scoring schools on the fourth-grade test were more likely to get SNED awards.

SNED awards are made on the basis of test scores adjusted for the SES of students in the school. This results in lower SES schools getting more SNED awards than middle SES schools and almost as many as the highest SES schools, despite lower tests scores.<sup>22</sup> Furthermore, lower social class schools average somewhat larger cohort gains than higher social class schools (table 3c). Thus the relationship between cohort gains and the number of SNED awards should favor lower socioeconomic class schools. However, the results of the OLS and logit estimates suggest the opposite, although the differences are not large except for the few schools that received three awards. Table 6 shows

22. The number of schools getting SNED awards by the socioeconomic level of students in the school is the following:

Number of SNED Awards	LEVEL OF SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF STUDENTS IN SCHOOL		
	Lowest Tercile	Middle Tercile	Highest Tercile
0	613	657	539
1	363	380	376
2	232	192	254
3	72	51	108

Even in the lowest SES group, more than half (52 percent) of the schools got at least one SNED award. This figure climbs somewhat to 57 percent in the highest SES group.

**Table 6.** Chile: OLS Estimates of Average School NCE Mathematics Gain Scores from Grades 4–8 as a Function of the Number of SNED Awards, by Level of School SES (Lower Third, Middle Third, Higher Third), 1996–2000

Variables	LOWER SES		MIDDLE SES		HIGHER SES	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
SNED 1	-1.47**		-1.31**		-0.25	
SNED 2	-0.35		-0.26		-0.29	
SNED 3	-4.87**		-3.38**		-1.31**	
SNED 1 1996		0.59		0.60 <sup>+</sup>		1.15**
SNED 1 1998		-0.46		-0.34		-0.4
SNED 1 2000		-3.83**		-2.57**		-1.32**
SNED 2 96&98		-0.66		-0.46		-0.5
SNED 2 98&00		-2.81**		-2.70**		-1.05**
SNED 2 96&00		-0.49		-0.35		-0.4
SNED 3		-2.65**		-2.48**		-0.73
Rural, grade 8/4 enrollment, school size included	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Region dummies included	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	1,279	1,279	1,276	1,276	1,268	1,268
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.17	0.23	0.19	0.21	0.05	0.06

<sup>+</sup> estimated coefficient statistically significant at 10% level; \*\* estimated coefficients statistically significant at 1% level

Sources: SIMCE grade 4 1996; SIMCE grade 8 2000, data on SNED awards by school, 1996, 1998–99, and 2000 from Ministry of Education.

that lower SES schools receiving one or three SNED awards were more likely to achieve lower intra-cohort gain scores in mathematics than schools that received no awards and that this relationship is stronger than for schools in the middle and particularly the higher SES groups.<sup>23</sup> A lowest tercile SES school that received one SNED award achieved about 1.5 points lower gain score than a school in the same group that received no awards. In the highest SES group the difference was not significant.

When the SNED variable is defined by the specific year of the award, we observe that the positive cohort gain associated with schools that received the 1996 award (table 5a) is concentrated in the highest tercile SES group of schools. This suggests that there is a group of higher SES schools that did well enough on the fourth-grade test in 1996 to qualify for a SNED award and went on to also have relatively high cohort gains in 1996–2000. Schools in

23. The variance inflation index for the lower and middle SES groups exceeded 10 when we included the type of schools. We therefore omitted this variable and the VIF values dropped in all the regressions to below 2.2.

**Table 7.** Chile: Ordered Logit Estimates of Number of SNED Awards as a Function of Average School NCE Mathematics Gain Scores from Grades 4–8 by Level of School SES (Lower Third, Middle Third, Higher Third), 1996–2000

Variables	Lower SES	Middle SES	Higher SES
Grades 4–8 NCE math score gain, 1996–2000	–0.12**	–0.14**	–0.05**
Rural	0.57**	0.27	–0.40
Grade 8/4 enrollment	0.01	0.10	–0.11
Vulnerability index and school size included	YES	YES	YES
Region dummies included	YES	YES	YES
N	1,279	1,276	1,268

\*\* estimated coefficient statistically significant at 1% level

Sources: SIMCE grade 4 1996, SIMCE grade 8 2000, data on SNED awards by school, 1996, 1998–99, and 2000 from Ministry of Education.

the lowest and middle SES groups that got an award in 1996 also tended to have positive cohort gains, but they were much smaller or negligible.

The other interesting result from defining the specific year of the award is that those schools getting an award in the 2000–2001 competition were the ones with the largest drop in intra-cohort gains in 1996–2000 and were the ones with the highest correlation with the 1996 fourth-grade score. This was particularly true for the lower and middle tercile schools. So the schools that got the SNED award in 2000–2001 (or any combination of awards that included that award) had higher fourth-grade scores in 1996 (and higher eighth-grade scores in 2000) compared with other schools in their SES group, but also had negative fourth- to eighth-grade intra-cohort gains.

Table 7 shows the same result based on the ordered logit analysis: in all three socioeconomic groups of schools, those with higher intra-cohort gains in mathematics between the fourth and eighth grades got significantly fewer SNED awards, but the negative coefficient for the highest group is about one-half those in the lowest and middle SES groups. One conclusion we might draw is that in higher-level SES schools, there is less inconsistency in getting SNED awards and making math (and Spanish) cohort gains—high SES schools may have the capacity to score high on the fourth-grade test *and* make fourth- to eighth-grade gains. Another conclusion is that the adjustment for school social class may distribute SNED awards more equitably among schools, but it is not positively related to the likelihood that (particularly lower social class) schools with more awards have higher cohort gains. The results for Spanish scores are very similar.

A second way to break down the relationship between SNED and intra-cohort gain is by type of school. Again, since the estimates for math and Spanish are so similar, we present only the math results (table 8 for the OLS

**Table 8.** Chile: OLS Estimates of Average School NCE Mathematics Gain Scores from Grades 4–8 as a Function of the Number of SNED Awards, by Type of School, NCE 1996–2000

Variable	PUBLIC CORPORATION SCHOOL, NO FEES		PUBLIC DAEM SCHOOL, NO FEES		PRIVATE SUBSIDIZED SCHOOL, NO FEES		PRIVATE SUBSIDIZED SCHOOL, WITH FEES	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
SNED 1	-1.36**	0.38	-1.27**	0.57**	-1.00 <sup>+</sup>	1.53**	-0.43	0.80*
SNED 2	-2.91**	0.80**	-4.23**	0.77**	-3.22**	1.42**	-1.42**	1.01*
SNED 3	-1.84*	2.54**	-4.83**	2.03**	-2.61*	3.44**	-1.47*	1.92**
Grade 8/4 enrollment	-1.92**	-0.72*	-2.36**	-1.00**	-1.55**	-0.93*	-1.97**	-1.69**
1996 grade 4 math SIMCE NCE score		-0.68**		-0.73**		-0.61**		-0.37**
Region dummies included	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
School size, rural, vulnerability included	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Constant	4.39**	41.54**	5.26**	44.52**	5.19**	38.17**	3.71**	25.88**
N	696	696	1,851	1,851	527	527	749	749
R <sup>2</sup>	0.11	0.56	0.17	0.65	0.10	0.49	0.03	0.20

Notes: Equation 1 does not include the 1996 grade 4 average school math score variable; equation 2 does. \*\* estimated coefficient statistically significant at 1% level; \* estimated coefficient statistically significant at 5% level; <sup>+</sup> estimated coefficient statistically significant at 10% level

Sources: SIMC grade 4 1996, SIMC grade 8 2000, data on SNED awards by school, 1996, 1998–99, and 2000 from Ministry of Education.

and table 9 for the ordered logit). They suggest that the number of SNED awards is negatively related to intra-cohort gains across public and private subsidized schools, but the negative relation is weaker in private subsidized schools than in public schools (most public schools are DAEM) and is weakest in those private schools that charge fees. The results are consistent with the SES partition we estimated in tables 6 and 7, for good reason: SES groups in Chile are highly stratified by type of school (OECD 2004). This makes it difficult to separate type of school effects from peer effects.

Thus, although getting more SNED awards is associated with lower cohort gains even in fee-charging private schools, such schools are more likely than public schools to get more awards and still have higher cohort gains, whether this is the result of greater school effectiveness in fee-charging private subsidized schools or the result of much higher family resources available to pupils who attend such schools. Once we control for initial fourth-grade test score, the relationship for them between the number of SNED awards and cohort gain is more highly positive for private schools, suggesting either that private schools—especially fee-charging private schools—may have greater capacity to start from higher fourth-grade test scores, achieve higher inter-cohort gains (rewarded by SNED), and still achieve intra-cohort gains between fourth and eighth grades (table 8), or that they have an easier task of achieving all these goals because of their pupils' higher SES.<sup>24</sup> These conclusions vary somewhat across different years of awards, but they are generally consistent across award years. The logit regressions by type of school confirm these relationships (table 9). Although the coefficient of 1996 fourth-grade test scores is about the same across different types of schools, the number of SNED awards was less related to this “relative” cohort gain score in private subsidized schools charging fees, suggesting again that such a school (generally serving a higher social class student) was somewhat more likely than a public school or a private subsidized school not charging fees to win SNED awards and realize positive cohort gains.

#### 4. DISCUSSION

Since 1996, the Chilean government has awarded teachers pay bonuses based on school performance using a complex formula that combines absolute average student test scores and inter-cohort gains from test year to test year. This pay incentive system was designed using an existing testing regime that was intended for other purposes. In this article, we compared an actual and

24. However, they may do so by pushing out weaker students and replacing them with stronger students drawn from public schools in the fifth to eighth grades.



**Table 9.** Chile: Ordered Logit Estimates of Number of SNED Awards as a Function of Average School NCE Mathematics Gain Scores from Grades 4–8, 1996–2000

Variable	PUBLIC CORPORATION SCHOOL, NO FEES		PUBLIC DAEM SCHOOL, NO FEES		PRIVATE SUBSIDIZED SCHOOL, NO FEES		PRIVATE SUBSIDIZED SCHOOL, WITH FEES	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Grades 4–8 math NCE score gain, 1996–2000	-0.12**	0.11**	-0.13**	0.09**	-0.09**	0.11**	-0.05**	0.07**
Grade 8/4 enrollment	0.02	-0.08	0.12	0.16	-0.16	-0.08	0.12	0.18
1996 grade 4 math SIMCE score		0.29**		0.27**		0.28**		0.24**
Region dummies included	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Vulnerability, rural, school size included	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	696	696	1,851	1,851	527	527	749	749

Notes: Equation 1 does not include the 1996 grade 4 average school math score as an independent variable; equation 2 does. \*\* estimated coefficient statistically significant at 1% level

Sources: SIMCE grade 4 1996, SIMCE grade 8 2000, data on SNED awards by school, 1996, 1998–99, and 2000 from Ministry of Education.

a hypothetical situation: on the one hand, the SNED program actually paid bonuses to teachers in schools on the basis of how well the schools did on fourth- and eighth-grade test scores and inter-cohort gains; on the other hand, we have information about how well Chilean schools did on an alternative measure of school performance—inter-cohort gains between the fourth and eighth grades. But since bonuses were not actually paid for intra-cohort gains, we cannot infer that our estimated relations would obtain had bonuses been given on that basis. It is difficult to argue that schools would have behaved any differently under an incentive scheme rewarding intra-cohort gains than they did under the actual SNED, since there is little evidence that teachers systematically responded even to the inter-cohort incentive by raising scores in the fourth and eighth grades, and some evidence that test scores in those grades depended more on cohort variations and random fluctuations than any teacher effort (Mizala, Romaguera, and Urquiola 2006).

That said, our results do provide some interesting insights into which schools got awards and which schools had higher intra-cohort gains, and how the two outcomes were related.

We are able to show that at the end of the 1990s, schools that received monetary premiums for “good performance” under the SNED program were more likely to be schools that had scored higher on the fourth-grade 1996 SIMCE (and almost certainly on the 1999 fourth-grade SIMCE, although we were not able to analyze those data). On average, they were *not* the schools that made the highest cohort gains as students progressed from fourth grade in 1996 to eighth grade in 2000. However, schools receiving just one award in 1996 (the first year the pay bonuses were awarded) also had *higher* intra-cohort gains. Since cohort “noise” seems to be an important factor in how schools score on the SIMCE test, one explanation is that many of the schools getting this initial award may have had a “good” cohort in fourth grade that year and received a bonus for it, although the fourth-grade score in 1996 does not seem to be highly correlated with getting that award. This was the cohort for which we were able to measure intra-cohort gains, and there was a positive relation between getting the award for that good cohort and the same cohort’s gains between the fourth and eighth grades.

To the contrary, schools that got the 2000 award also had high 1996 fourth-grade test scores but were likely to have negative intra-cohort gains. It seems, then, that those lower- and middle-income schools with higher-performing cohorts in fourth grade in 1996 *and* 1999 (*and* eighth grade in 2000) were the ones that made the smallest intra-cohort gains in 1996–2000. We cannot tell whether the schools that received the 2000 SNED award (or combinations of awards that included the 2000 award) were more successful in getting their fourth graders to score higher on the SIMCE test in 1996 and 1999 or just

happened to have good fourth-grade cohorts in those years, but whatever the case, they did not fare well on intra-cohort gains.

Fee-charging private subsidized schools were more likely to get SNED awards than any other type of school, despite the fact that SNED ratings are adjusted for students' socioeconomic backgrounds. They were also the type of school that had the highest scores at both the fourth and eighth grades and about the same average cohort gains between fourth and eighth grades as public schools and somewhat lower gains than private subsidized schools that did not charge fees.<sup>25</sup> Yet the negative relationship between receiving SNED awards and intra-cohort gains for fee-charging private voucher schools was weaker than for other types of schools. Thus it appears that in the category of schools catering mainly to higher SES students, higher intra-cohort gains were less at odds with receiving SNED awards than in other categories of schools—and those categories are more likely to cater to lower SES students.

It is also possible that higher SES schools, whether public or private, do better at cohort gains, but we have no evidence for that—all our estimates suggest that, other variables controlled for, higher average SES schools within each school type have lower intra-cohort gains. And it is likely that there is some regression to the mean—some schools that scored high on the 1996 fourth-grade test may have just had an unusually good day.

Our analysis should not be interpreted as arguing that the SNED fails to provide incentives for schools to improve. Rather, it raises questions about (1) what the SNED is rewarding (since there is apparently a lot of inter-cohort noise), (2) what the SNED is promoting schools to do, and (3) whether that type of incentive achieves desired educational goals, particularly for low SES, low-scoring schools.

Given what we have found, to get more SNED awards, the wise school would do much better to raise fourth-grade and eighth-grade scores every two years (even years for fourth grade and odd years for eighth grade) and not focus on the more difficult task of helping students make greater progress from fourth to eighth grade (see table 10). This is logical, since the SNED does not mention intra-cohort gains and there is no systematic way to measure them using the SIMCE tests. Public schools and lower socioeconomic class private schools (those that do not charge fees) may also have had much more success in raising fourth-grade scores across cohorts than in raising

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25. The school average 2000 SIMCE eighth-grade scores are correlated with 1996 fourth-grade scores, but the correlation is much lower in public schools than in private subsidized schools, particularly lower than in fee-charging private subsidized schools. Fourth-grade score predicts only 27 percent of the variance in eighth-grade score among public DAEM schools but 55 percent of the variance in private subsidized schools that charge fees.

**Table 10.** Chile: Increase in Probability of a School's Receiving 0, 1, 2, or 3 SNED Awards Associated with a One Standard Deviation Increase in School NCE Mathematics Gain Score from Grades 4–8 or a One Standard Deviation Increase in 1996 SIMCE NCE Mathematics Score, 1996–2000

Variable and Number of SNEDs	PUBLIC COOPERATION SCHOOL, NO FEES		PUBLIC DAEM SCHOOL, NO FEES		PRIVATE SUBSIDIZED SCHOOL, NO FEES		PRIVATE SUBSIDIZED SCHOOL, WITH FEES	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
	School with S.D. higher 1996 grade 4 math SIMCE score							
0 SNEDs		-0.36**		-0.32**		-0.35**		-0.28**
1 SNED		0.18**		0.13**		0.18**		0.04**
2 SNEDs		0.14**		0.16**		0.15**		0.24**
3 SNEDs		0.03**		0.04**		0.02**		0.06**
School with S.D. higher grades 4–8 math test score gain, 1996–2000								
0 SNEDs	0.14**	-0.14**	0.11**	-0.11**	0.11**	-0.14**	0.06**	-0.08**
1 SNED	-0.06**	0.07**	-0.04**	0.04**	-0.04**	0.07**	-0.06*	0.01*
2 SNEDs	-0.06**	0.05**	-0.06**	0.05**	-0.06**	0.06**	-0.04**	0.05**
3 SNEDs	-0.02**	0.01**	-0.02**	0.01**	-0.01**	0.01**	-0.02**	0.02**

Notes: Equation 1 does not include the 1996 grade 4 average school math score as an independent variable; equation 2 does. Standard deviation equals 5 NCE points. \*\*estimated coefficient statistically significant at 1% level; \*estimated coefficient statistically significant at 5% level

Sources: Table 7; SIMCE grade 4 1996, SIMCE grade 8 2000, data on SNED awards by school, 1996, 1998–99, and 2000 from Ministry of Education.

eighth-grade scores. This is also logical, given the more complex material covered on the eighth-grade test. It would also be more difficult to influence eighth-grade results if the school had not been focusing on increasing cohort gains between the fourth and eighth grades. According to a recent report by the OECD (OECD 2004), it is the case that upper-grade teachers (fifth to eighth grades) in Chilean schools are less well trained than lower-grade teachers to deliver the math and language curriculum in their grades, particularly the new curriculum introduced in the late 1990s. Our results are consistent with the notion that most schools have much more capacity to respond to raising fourth-grade scores than to increasing how much pupils learn between the fourth and eighth grades. The schools with the highest capacity to do both seem to be those with the highest social class pupils and charging fees.

We have done our analysis using only one cohort's gain scores from the fourth to eighth grades. Other fourth- to eighth-grade cohorts may have performed differently, and the relationship between their gains and the number of SNED awards a school received may have varied considerably across cohorts. We have no way of testing this variation in Chile with existing data. Yet our limited analysis suggests that the present pay incentive scheme may be rewarding teachers in many schools with the lowest intra-cohort gains. If intra-cohort gains are an important indicator of a teacher's or a school's productivity, student evaluation systems would need to measure such gains and teacher pay incentive schemes should be changed to reward them.

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