

# **The residential patterns of Swiss urban elites. Continuity and change across elite categories (1890–2000)**

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## **Abstract (190 / 200 words)**

Numerous studies have focused on wealth elites' housing, including their spatial and social exclusiveness. The insertion of the power elite in urban space has, however, largely been left unexplored. By combining positional and residential information on over 7,400 urban elites, we study how academic, economic, and political elites' residential patterns have evolved from 1890 to 2000 in the three largest Swiss cities (Basel, Geneva, Zurich). First, we uncover a long-term dynamic of suburbanization, which however does not result in even spatial dispersion: while gradually abandoning center cities, elites do not randomly disperse in the surrounding municipalities. Rather, they tend to settle in very specific areas. Second, we find that spatial differentiation of urban elites' residences varies across elite categories: economic elites tend to geographically segregate from both academic and political elites over the course of the twentieth century and settle in more privileged areas. At the same time, academic and left political elites, while historically living in distinct neighborhoods, tend to converge at the end of the century, echoing new similarities in their profile. This highlights the importance of studying the urban power elites' residential patterns in a long-term perspective.

**Keywords:** elites, cities, Switzerland, residential, patterns

## 1. Introduction

Cities play a central role for accumulating and storing power resources (Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot 2018, Atkinson et al. 2017, Savage 2021). They are home to many powerful institutions and organizations. Those who hold positions of power at the apex of these institutions, i.e., urban elites, significantly depend on urban contexts for capital accumulation, consumption and leisure, housing, and other activities. Up to the present day, cities have remained central for accumulating wealth. They have also retained their centrality in serving as pivotal hubs for economic, political, cultural, and scientific activities. Notably, major corporate headquarters are predominantly situated in cities, despite the feasibility of conducting much of the production beyond municipal or even national boundaries. At the political level, cities play an important role in regional governance and often host public administrations from municipal, regional, and occasionally national tiers. Furthermore, urban centers host universities and colleges, serving as primary crucibles for knowledge production and scientific research. This spatial concentration of leading organizations in cities underscores the importance of studying the relation to urban space of those at the top of these organizations.

To understand the relationship between the transformation of cities and their elites, scholarship has extensively focused on the super-rich, their housing, mobilities or philanthropic activities as crucial drivers of social and spatial inequalities (Fuentenebro and Acuto 2021, Beaverstock et al. 2013, Fernandez et al. 2016). Indeed, the financialization of the housing market and the acquisition of high-end property as parking spaces for footloose capital of the super-rich are (predominantly) urban phenomena. Whole industries supporting elite lifestyles are also based in urban contexts. This focus on wealth elites left other categories of elites aside, notably those occupying positions of power in economic, scientific, and political institutions. A treatment of

elites as one unified entity conceals important differences, and similarities, between these different categories of elites (Hjellbrekke et al. 2007, Bühlmann et al. 2012).

In this article, we propose an alternative perspective to the one on high-net-worth individuals and the corollary tendency to generalize from a definition of the elite that is based on economic capital. The literature has certainly shown that the current context of high spatial mobility does not prevent elites from gathering and concentrating in very specific and exclusive places (Woods 1998, Cousin and Chauvin 2021). However, what is observed for one specific category of elites may be different for another. Here, we define elites as those individuals who routinely exercise power in different social spheres thanks to their position as parliament members, company board members and directors, and university professors, and we study their residential patterns over 110 years. We identify different areas of elite concentration – city neighborhoods or suburban municipalities – at different points in time, in different cities, and across different categories of elites. By comparing different categories of elites – distinguished by their main activity in the academic, economic, or political sphere – we uncover residential patterns that vary over time and depending on the economic status of places. By studying continuities and changes in elites' residential patterns, we contribute to the understanding of social and spatial stratification of the cityscape and its diachronic evolution. Our study also shows that changes in elites' residential patterns echo the progressive fragmentation of local and national elite networks (Strebel and Mach 2023, Rossier et al. 2022) and thus reveals the complementary nature of geographical and sociological approaches to the study of the power elite.

The article is organized as follows: we first address the recent literature on urban elites' geography and develop three expectations that guide our empirical study. Then, we present our data on over 7,400 elites occupying positions of power in the three largest Swiss cities – Basel,

Geneva, Zurich – from 1890 to 2000. Our empirical section is divided into two parts. First, we identify a trend of a *general deconcentration* away from the center cities to the surrounding municipalities from the middle of the twentieth century onwards – a trend which is particularly pronounced for economic elites. In addition, we show that elites do not randomly disperse in the surrounding municipalities but tend to favor specific places. Second, we focus on differences between elite categories and observe a growing distinction in the residential patterns of economic elites, who tend to geographically segregate from both academic and political elites over the course of the twentieth century.

## **2. Residential patterns of urban elites: analytical framework and guiding expectations**

Recent decades have seen a renewal of the study of elites (Savage et al. 2008, Korsnes et al. 2018, Denord et al. 2021). According to a positional approach, the power of such individuals directly depends on the position they occupy in institutions and organizations of different spheres of activity (Mills 1956). Scholars have recently studied many dimensions of the power elite: formation and careers (Wakeling and Savage 2015, Ellersgaard et al. 2019, Griffiths et al. 2014), intergenerational reproduction (Toft and Jareness 2021, Dronkers 2003, Hansen and Toft 2021), and – predominantly – coordination and concentration measured through their integration in networks, especially corporate ones (Mizruchi 2013, Useem 1984, Larsen and Ellersgaard 2017). Scholars in the latter strand of research have shown a tendency of fragmentation of such national networks at the end of the twentieth century, after a period of strong cohesion and integration in the post-war decades (Chu and Davis 2016).

Despite these recent developments, quantitative research on the spatial distribution of elites is scarce. Important contributions include studies conducted with data from the Great British Class Survey in the UK, with a focus on the spatial location of upper-class individuals. Cunningham and Savage (2015) have shown that different types of elites – e.g., business, cultural, or legal elites – inhabit distinct neighborhoods and areas within Greater London. Savage et al. (2018) moreover demonstrated how different types of cultural capital cluster in particular areas of London and Brussels. Beyond the UK, Accominotti et al. (2018) have recently uncovered systematic associations between the residential address of New York Philharmonic subscribers and the location of their seat in the Philharmonic at the beginning of the twentieth century and Bassens et al. (2019) have examined the urban geography of elite donors to cultural institutions in Brussels. While these studies provide important starting points to understand the varied spatial distribution of different categories of elites, they lack a diachronic perspective, which is pivotal for a more comprehensive understanding of the transformation of elites' integration in the cityscape (Ellersgaard and Larsen 2023).

To provide a historical-geographical account of urban elites' residential patterns, we need to consider, on the one hand, the socio-economic and spatial development of cities and, on the other hand, the social properties and resources of urban elites. Therefore, elite studies must take on a contextual, historically-informed and empirical focus (Van Heur and Bassens 2019). Moreover, because the social distribution of power is mirrored in geographical patterns of residency (Toft and Ljunggren 2016: 2940), a dialogue with studies on socio-economic segregation is useful. Indeed, segregation studies maintain that the spatial distribution of population groups is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, involving, for instance, changes in wealth inequalities, globalization, welfare regimes, housing systems, migration dynamics, or the occupational structure of cities as

key structural factors shaping socio-economic segregation (Tammaru et al. 2015, Musterd et al. 2017, Reardon et al. 2008, Haandrikman et al. 2023). Such a multi-dimensional analytical framework is accompanied by in-depth methodological debate on metrics and scales to be used (Duncan and Duncan 1955, Massey and Denton 1988, Wong 2004). Segregation studies thus help us reflect on appropriate indicators. However, as we will show in the methods section, the attempt of cross-fertilizing elite and segregation studies poses empirical and methodological challenges.

With our focus on the residential patterns of the urban power elite we make three contributions. *First*, we precisely identify the elite endowed with power and analyze their residential patterns. Studying elite residential patterns provides insights into the socio-spatial structure of the urban landscape, as well as on the changing prestige of some specific city neighborhoods, which are complementary to a focus on social properties of the whole resident population. *Second*, our diachronic perspective allows to better understand the evolution of urban elites' residential preferences as indicators of change in city-regions' most 'valued' neighborhoods and municipalities. *Third*, putting a spotlight not on the wealthy, but on the urban power elite allows to compare different rationales that might underlie residential preferences of different elite categories thereby making further steps towards a geographical contribution to the study of elites that takes into account historical evolutions and the socio-spatial structure of cities.

Major cities are not only places for accumulation and storage of resources, but they are also crucial places for elites' exercise of power (Musterd et al. 2017, Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot 2018, Atkinson et al. 2017, Van Heur and Bassens, 2019, Savage 2021). Cities are major hubs for economic, political, and cultural activities, and urban elites have played an important role in shaping urban development. Until the nineteenth century, the centers of European cities

concentrated the most prosperous and prestigious neighbourhoods, where urban elites were living. At that time, cities were also governed by local wealthy old families with a strong rootedness in the city, so that the nineteenth century was socially but also architecturally shaped by the urban upper bourgeoisie (Savage 1993, Smith 2000). The importance of townhouses and villas on the outskirts of cities is a case in point. We could also mention the establishment of large factory compounds, which, as is the case in Swiss cities, was accompanied by the emergence of working-class neighborhoods. With the development of transport infrastructures and commercial activities, living outside of the cities has progressively become less difficult and led to suburbanization movements (Kübler 2007).

Depending on their social characteristics and preferences, elites will tend to privilege some residential areas over others, and exhibit changes in residential choice over time. Indeed, due to their high resource endowment, elites are generally able to choose their place of residence fairly freely, i.e., according to their personal preferences. However, some categories of urban elites are more constrained than others. For example, economic elites with substantial wealth are more mobile in residential terms (Cousin and Chauvin 2021) than local or regional political elites who are constrained to live in certain electoral districts by their function as representatives of a particular area.

These general considerations lead us to formulate three expectations that will guide our empirical analyses of the long-term evolution of urban elites' residential patterns. A first expectation refers to an *overall process of residential deconcentration* away from the center cities since the end of the nineteenth century, suggesting that urban elites will overall be less living in cities. Since the mid-nineteenth century, European cities expanded beyond the medieval city walls and became more socially fragmented with both the incorporation of previously independent bordering

municipalities, and the construction of new working-class districts. After the second World War, the development of urban public and private transport infrastructure and the separation between the place of work and the place of residence have also resulted in a suburbanization of settlement structures and in a further expansion of the urban space (Kübler 2007). These structural changes at the macro level will most likely also be observed at the level of urban elites and we expect them to progressively settle at greater distances from the center cities. Indeed, as open space within the city's borders shrinks and new modes of transportation allow for a daily commute to center cities, urban elites might be among the first to give up, or complement, their centrally located apartments and settle in larger houses in the green belts at the urban fringes. However, this trend does not imply that elites evenly disperse in suburban areas. To the contrary, we expect them to privilege specific neighborhoods and municipalities.

A second expectation is thus that *residential patterns will differ according to elite categories*. We expect economic elites to be more residentially mobile than political and academic elites.

Economic elites have fewer residential constraints compared to other elites. In our sample, many economic elites serve as simple board members for companies that have their headquarters in cities, a role that does not entail full-time commitment to the company. Furthermore, corporate directors increasingly hold board positions in companies spread across the globe (Heemskerk et al. 2015). While this may be somewhat different for a company's CEO and executive directors, who hold full-time positions, we assume that economic elites possess significant leeway in choosing their place of residence, including the option to reside abroad. By contrast, the situation is different for political elites. They are elected based on a territorial principle, i.e., electoral districts. Hence, they must live within the geographical area that they represent (Di Capua 2022a). Yet, within such electoral districts, political representatives still concentrate in certain



areas and are socially and spatially segregated. Unlike for academic and economic elites, the trend towards spatial deconcentration will therefore be less pronounced. Academic elites will follow an intermediary path between economic and political elites. If, at the beginning of the twentieth century, academic elites used to be closely related to other urban elites (Horvath 1996), from the mid-twentieth century onwards, and in the course of the increasing professionalization of higher education, academic elites became more autonomous from other spheres of power and the figure of the descendant of a renowned urban elite family that lived in the center city became rarer. Accordingly, we expect to observe a residential deconcentration trend for university professors, but less pronounced than for the economic elites.

Finally, a third expectation is that *elite categories' residential preferences will differ with respect to the economic status of residential areas*. Housing systems and the occupational structure of cities drastically shape the spatial distribution of social groups (Tammaru et al. 2015, Toft and Ljunggren 2016, Musterd et al. 2017). If we assume that there is a link between the characteristics of different elite categories and the characteristics of different residential areas, then residential patterns will co-evolve with the status of residential areas. The creation of new residential areas, but also differences in their populations in terms of numbers and socio-professional status, will play a key role in the residential choices of the elite.

Changes in the cityscape may affect residential patterns of the urban elite, albeit with significant differences between categories. Economic elites' significant amounts of economic capital might induce them to settle in places that are more expensive to live in and where residents generally have a high economic status (Harvey and Maclean 2008, Webber and Burrows 2016). For political elites, a distinction based on party affiliation (left vs. center/right) is crucial, as it informs the social and spatial fragmentation of the urban landscape. Because they tend to

resemble the people they represent politically, the distinction according to party affiliation and political ideology is a crucial indicator of the differences in the profiles of the inhabitants of neighborhoods and municipalities and their evolution over time. Left political elites are more likely to be found in working-class neighborhoods and municipalities, whereas center/right political elites will be found in neighborhoods and municipalities with higher economic status (Di Capua 2022b). However, it is also likely that left political elites progressively tend to be found in middle-class neighborhoods at the end of the century, consistent with the historical transformation of their profiles and their electorate (Antoniazza et al. 2023). Finally, expectations concerning academic elites are more difficult to formulate clearly. We can however expect that university professors can probably rarely afford large estates in exclusive suburban municipalities, because they are usually less well endowed with economic capital than business elites.

### **3. The geography of urban elites in the three largest Swiss cities (1890-2000): data and research strategy**

Our study focuses on the three largest Swiss cities, namely Basel, Geneva, and Zurich. Due to the country's federal and decentralized political and economic structure, elites in Switzerland are not concentrated in one specific city – unlike in France or the United Kingdom. The Swiss economy is indeed highly regionalized, with distinct economic sectors centered in specific cities. Basel, for instance, is a hub of the pharmaceutical industry, while the Geneva region is renowned for its watch-making industry, and Zurich thrives in the machine industry. In all three cities, the banking and finance industry is very important – with Geneva being a hub for private banks, and Zurich being the leading location for commercial banks and the insurance industry. The three major

Swiss cities exhibit several variations in their geographies, despite their similar socio-spatial organization. Basel, Geneva, and Zurich differ in size and surface area and in the number of administrative sub-units (neighborhoods) and municipalities in the canton (see Online Appendix for maps of territorial divisions, and further information on the socio-spatial organization of cities and their surrounding municipalities). An inherent characteristic of the Swiss urban landscape is the stratification into neighborhoods along topographical contours. The urban expansion of the late nineteenth-century was driven by the need of accommodating new industries and their employees, and new working-class districts were positioned in proximity to industrial zones, railway hubs, and low-lying areas. More affluent segments of society gravitated towards either elevated and open areas or near lake and river shores (Walter 1994). Hence, Basel, Geneva, and Zurich, show a typical socio-spatial organization, with mixed or more advantaged neighborhoods in historic old towns and working-class areas further away.

Prior to this expansion, Swiss cities were territorially clearly delimited and enclosed within fortified walls. In the nineteenth century, these densely populated cities were relatively mixed at the neighbourhood level. It was only after their modernisation between 1850 and 1920, relatively late by international comparison, that urban areas were extended, and populations segregated. Most Swiss elites had been living in the cities since centuries and they have, thus, been decidedly urban elites, which dominated subordinate countryside areas without establishing themselves there. In contrast to many European nations, Switzerland never had a prominent nobility or monarchy. The cities of Basel, Geneva, and Zurich were not subject to monarchic rule and were governed by a local patriciate, mainly composed of wealthy merchant families, until the demise of the *ancien régime* in 1798 (Perroux 2006, Sarasin 1997). These influential families, who retained power well into the mid-twentieth century, were not only at the apex of organizations in

different spheres of power but also geographically concentrated within cities (Benz et al. 2024). Even as the influence of these urban patriciates diminished after the creation of the Swiss federal state in 1848, Swiss cities and cantons – i.e., the important regional tier in the Swiss federal structure – and the organizations and institutions situated therein continued to wield significant power, which can be attributed to Switzerland’s political, economic, and societal decentralization (Linder and Mueller 2021).

### *Data and sample*

Our data stem from a prosopographical database on urban elites in Basel, Geneva, and Zurich, covering the period from 1890 to 2000. The database is built using a positional approach: it identifies all the elites with a position of power in different social spheres in different benchmark years. The sole selection criterion for including a person in the database or not is, thus, whether they hold a position of power at a particular moment in time. The key advantage of using a positional approach is that the selection criteria for including a particular elite is objective and clear – holding a specified position of power or not. This makes the selected individuals comparable, both across contexts and over time. What is important, then, is the decision which positions to consider as positions of power. An additional challenge that comes with longitudinal research is that the same position should exist over the course of the study period, which is a challenge when covering a 110-year period. In the construction of the longitudinal database on urban elites, it was, thus, important to choose leading positions at the top of central and durable organizations. The database, therefore, includes the political authorities, the universities of the three cities, as well as the three regional chambers of commerce – organizations which all have existed uninterruptedly from 1890 to 2000, as well as the major companies from the most

important economic sectors in each city and region.<sup>1</sup> In sum, we thus focus on academic, economic, and political elites (Table 1). In what follows, we present each of these three types of elites in more details.

**Table 1.** Positions included in the database

[Table 1 near here]

Academic elites are composed of all full and associate professors at Swiss universities until 1957, and a selection for the 1980 and 2000 cohorts<sup>2</sup>. These professors are elites for two major reasons: first, they occupy the highest position in the Swiss higher education system, therefore are key actors in the production and transmission of knowledge (Morgan et al. 2022, Benz et al. 2021). Second, scholarship has demonstrated the role of professors for shaping elites' reproduction and

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<sup>1</sup> Companies tend to be less stable organizations than political authorities or universities. Over time, they can go bankrupt or they can be acquired by other companies. When studying power positions in the economic sphere over a long period of time, researchers are thus confronted with some fluctuation. Yet, given that companies play a key role in urban power structures (Stone 1989), it is pivotal to include the positions at the apex of these organizations in an analysis of urban elites (see Online Appendix for more details on the Selection of major companies in the three city-regions). Apart from the committee members of the regional chambers of commerce, the database does not include positions in interest groups or civil society organizations. The reasons for this are that there is a lot of fluctuation regarding the importance of such organizations, particularly over a 110-year period, and that they do not systematically belong to the most powerful organizations in cities.

<sup>2</sup> Given the strong expansion in the number of professors in the second half of the twentieth century, we have restricted the sample of professors for the cohorts of 1980 and 2000, by only including full or associate professors that either hold additional administrative roles within their university (for instance deans or rectors), within the Swiss academic system (e.g., at the Swiss National Science Foundation) or that have acquired significant amounts of research funding. In that way, the exclusive character of the academic elite is preserved also for the later cohorts.

coordination, especially by bridging between industrial and scientific activities, with evidence from the pharmaceutical and machine industries (Busset et al. 1997).

Economic elites are more common to the study of (urban) elites. Our sample includes all board members and executive directors of major companies from the most important economic sectors<sup>3</sup> (see Table A2.1 in Online appendix for an overview of the selected companies by city and benchmark year). For each benchmark year, this yields between 49 and 38 companies. In addition to the board members and executive directors of these companies, the database also includes leading figures in regional business interest associations, i.e., the board members of the regional chambers of commerce.

The third group of elites are political elites, i.e., members of local and regional parliaments and governments. While local and regional members of parliament might not wield a lot of power in many countries, in Switzerland they can make significant decisions, due to its federalized and decentralized structures. The local and the regional level of government account for 30 and 40% of total public spending, respectively. Municipalities and cantons can decide on a number of important issues, such as educational policies, the naturalization of foreigners, and local and regional taxation. The largest Swiss cities are exceptional in that their budgets and administrations rather resemble larger regional rather than local governments. Local and regional elected officials, thus, wield significant power in the multilevel structure of the Swiss state.

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<sup>3</sup> For each of the three cities, the sample includes the major public and private banks as well as insurance companies. For the city of Basel, the main pharmaceutical companies were selected (as well as the textile industry, at the beginning of the twentieth century); in Geneva the main economic sector aside from financial services is the watch-making industry for a large part of the twentieth century; and in Zurich companies from the machine industry are included.

We classify political elites into left and center/right based on their party affiliation and these parties' positions on the economic left-right cleavage: members of the social democratic, the green, and communist parties are classified as left whereas members of the Christian democratic, the liberal, and agrarian-conservative parties as center/right. Unlike in other European countries, the Swiss party system has remained comparatively stable over the course of the twentieth century – particularly when it comes to its four largest parties – and we can hence employ this classification for the whole historical period.<sup>4</sup>

The individuals that hold these positions of power are identified in archival documents of the respective organizations as well as in official documents such as the Swiss Official Gazette of Commerce for six benchmark years: 1890, 1910, 1937, 1957, 1980 and 2000.<sup>5</sup> Since some

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<sup>4</sup> While the meaning of left and right has evolved over the course of the century, we refer mainly to an economic definition of left and right that captures the degree to which parties support redistribution and state intervention in economic markets and which is the main cleavage that structured West European party systems throughout the twentieth century (Caramani 2004). On this economic left-right cleavage, parties in Switzerland have remained clearly positioned throughout the twentieth century, with the social democrats (alongside smaller communist/Marxist parties) advocating for more redistribution and state intervention in the economy, as opposed to the remaining parties against such measures. In the final quarter of the twentieth century, the Swiss party system – like many party systems in Western Europe – went through a period of dealignment and fragmentation, with new parties entering the scene or with traditional parties changing their position (Kriesi et al. 2008). In the Swiss case, the green party emerged in the 1970s and 1980s, which mainly competed for voters with the social democratic party as they take on essentially identical positions. The other major development was the transformation of the Swiss People's party from an agrarian to a right-wing nationalist conservative party and its opposition to internationalization and immigration. However, these transformations did not have a major impact on parties' positions on the economic left-right cleavage. See Altermatt and Luginbühl (2016) for an overview on the evolution of the Swiss party system since the nineteenth century. For a discussion of Basel, Geneva, and Zurich's party systems in the twentieth century as well as an analysis of urban political elites' profiles in Basel, Geneva, and Zurich since the beginning of the twentieth century, see Antoniazza et al. (2023).

<sup>5</sup> These benchmark years were chosen to capture key historical moments: the period of the expansion and modernization of Swiss cities (1890), the end of the long 19<sup>th</sup> century and before World War I (1910), the interwar

individuals may belong to two or three categories at the same time, Table 2 shows a total of 7,758 positions of power corresponding to a population of 7,458 elites between 1890 and 2000.

**Table 2.** Total sample (n=7,758 positions)

[Table 2 near here]

We managed to identify the place of residence of 6,978 elites (Table 3) through archival research, mainly inhabitant registries of the three cities, address registries of university professors, and the Swiss Official Gazette of Commerce. While it would have been interesting and relevant to expand the study period to the 2020 cohort (for who we gathered biographical information), we could not include contemporary elites in the analysis due to a lack of systematic information on their places of residence. In times of digitalization and mobile phones, landlines and registries of physical addresses have lost their importance, and we were, thus, not able to identify the street addresses for a substantive number of contemporary elites: we would simply not find any information on their place of residence. For this reason, we could unfortunately not include data on contemporary elites and our analysis remains limited to the twentieth century.

The raw information on a person's place of residence (street name and number and municipality name) was processed through the Swiss official building registry to get coordinates. Apart from the exact place of residence, this allowed us to identify the corresponding city neighborhood and/or municipality a person was living in (see Online Appendix for more information about

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period (1937), the postwar period (1957), the period before (1980) and after (2000) financialization of the economy and autonomization of politics and academia.



address data sources and processing). Table 3 displays the available and missing data on addresses.

**Table 3.** Address data for elites: available and missing data

[Table 3 near here]

Note. Since some individuals may be affiliated with two or three regions, the total number of addresses with municipal information displayed is 7,035 instead of 6,978.

In what follows, we refer to three different geographical areas, which we briefly introduce here. The lowest political and administrative unit in Swiss official statistics is the municipality. This can be a major city, such as Basel, Geneva, or Zurich, or a small surrounding municipality. We use the term ‘municipality’ to designate municipalities other than the three cities. With the term ‘center city’ or ‘city’ we, then, refer to the three major cities in our analysis, Basel, Geneva, and Zurich. Finally, we use the term ‘neighborhood’ to refer to the main administrative subdivisions within these three cities. For a limited number of indicators – such as population size – official statistics on these administrative subdivisions within cities are available and they allow for a more fine-grained geospatial analysis. However, only major cities are subdivided into neighborhoods as official categories in public statistics but not smaller municipalities.<sup>6</sup> In the

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<sup>6</sup> More descriptives on population size and surface of geographical areas are displayed in the Online Appendix (Tables A2.2 and A2.3).

following, we refer to both the neighborhood-level for the center cities and the municipality-level for surrounding municipalities as ‘geographical areas.’<sup>7</sup>

### *Methods and indicators*

In this section, we describe the method and indicators we used to measure historical evolution in elites’ residential patterns. Although inspired by the methodological discussion from segregation studies, we cannot directly apply the metrics proposed in this literature. Rather, we need to adapt them to the specific issues related to our material.

The trends we called *general deconcentration* and *differentiation* among categories of elites above resonates with two indicators used in studies of residential segregation, namely *evenness* and *concentration*. A population group is said to be segregated when unevenly distributed over areal units. Evenness is minimized and segregation thus maximized when members of different groups do not share a common area of residence (Massey and Denton 1988). The ‘dissimilarity index D’, as introduced by Duncan and Duncan (1955), is the most widely used measure of residential evenness and involves a calculation of proportions based on populations in given groups and areas. Second, *concentration*, as referring to the relative amount of physical space occupied by a particular group in the urban environment can be measured by calculating a relative concentration index (RCO), which measures the share of urban space occupied by group

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<sup>7</sup> For this study we mostly rely on the R package *sf* developed and maintained by Edzer Pebesma. Data processing to take account for municipal mergers was facilitated by the Swiss Municipal Data Merger Tool (SMMT R package) developed by Knechtel and Stutzer (2021). Neighborhoods and municipalities have not been stable over the course of the covered period, due to municipal mergers or due to administrative redistricting. We use the present-day administrative divisions and project them on the previous benchmark years. In most cases, previous units were consolidated into new ones, which allows us to aggregate the indicator data for the prior units to the geographical boundaries of the new units.

X compared to group Y (Massey and Denton 1988). We face two major issues when applying these metrics to our data. First, a fully efficient comparison of socio-economic segregation between the three cities would require harmonized information on the whole population, not only on elites. However, such geo-coded, register-based, individual-level data that would be needed to ‘provide strictly comparative measures of socio-economic segregation’ (Haandrikman et al. 2023: 2) between the three cities is not available. Second, as discussed by Reardon et al. (2008) and Wong (2004), we face an issue of scaling, that is we cannot focus on smaller units than neighborhoods, e.g., the block level. We could then only compare the evenness and concentration of elites across neighborhoods/municipalities, without the precision needed to assess block-level dynamics. Finally, applying these indicators to our data is not feasible due to the relatively small sample of the urban elite population, which does not allow to calculate these metrics that are designed to be applied to the whole urban population. However, even if we cannot apply these metrics as they stand, we have developed a strategy that aims to come close. In what follows, we present three sets of indicators we used to assess the expected trends of *general deconcentration* away from center cities, and *differentiation* among categories of elites.

The first set of indicators measures *general concentration* as the distance of elite addresses to the center of the city in which a person holds a power position. We distinguish four degrees of proximity: 1) in one of the three center cities,<sup>8</sup> 2) in another municipality in the same canton in which the city is located, 3) elsewhere in Switzerland, or 4) abroad. This indicator provides us with information on the overall evolution of urban elites’ geographical distribution over time.

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<sup>8</sup> For the case of Zurich, we additionally consider elites that live in the city of Winterthur as living in the city and not as living in a surrounding municipality. Winterthur is the second major city of the canton of Zurich, and the six biggest city of Switzerland and is home to important companies – notably in the machine industry included in our sample of companies.

From this indicator we can assess whether the share of the elite living outside cities increases over time, but not *where* exactly they reside. In addition, we also measure the median distance between the elites of a particular category in the same region. For instance, the median distance between all Genevan university professors' place of residence in 1957. This complementary indicator helps us to capture potential proximity tendencies within categories of elites. However, this indicator alone may be misleading, as a median gives no information about the distribution of places of residence, or their concentration in particular areas.

Consequently, the second set of indicators directly concerns the way in which elite residences are distributed across geographical areas. By referring to what we call *differentiation* among categories of elites, it measures the share (in per cent) of a particular elite category, in a given benchmark year, and a given city-region that lives in a particular geographical area. For instance, we calculate the percentage of all Zurich economic elites that live in the municipality of Küsnacht in 1980 – a municipality well-known for its high number of wealthy residents. Using city neighborhoods and municipalities home to at least one elite as units of analysis, we then correlate the percentage of different categories of elites in the different benchmark years to assess whether they increasingly settle in the same or in different geographic areas. From this information we can get a better understanding of the distribution of urban elites. However, while we can draw some conclusions about the geographical areas most favored by elites, we cannot yet link the residential preferences of elites with the characteristics of residential areas.

Hence, the third set of indicators refers to the economic status of geographical areas – a neighborhood or a municipality – and its association with the presence of different categories of elites. The long time frame and limited availability of official data at the municipal and neighborhood levels during the initial benchmark years allows only for a partial, yet significant,

overview of the economic status of geographical areas (see Table A2.4 in the Online Appendix for details on the indicators used). To ensure comparability, we constructed a scale for the economic status of geographical areas of each city/region around five quantiles, for each benchmark year. This enables us to assess the economic status of specific geographical areas in relation to others within the same city-region at a given point in time. For instance, we can explore whether left political elites tend to concentrate in neighborhoods or municipalities with relatively lower economic status. In addition, in the Online Appendix we provide information on the population density of geographical areas and the presence of different elite categories.

#### **4. Results: the long-term changes of Swiss urban elites' residential patterns**

Our detailed methodological section aimed to demonstrate the need to integrate different indicators to understand the evolution of Swiss elites' residential patterns. In this empirical section, we first focus on describing the *general deconcentration* and in a second step on the *differentiation* between categories of elites. Interpreting these results in terms of evenness, i.e., the general distribution of elites in the urban and suburban areas, and relative concentration, i.e., their differentiated preferences for living in specific areas, requires certain elements of context. Addressing elite geographies as a multi-dimensional phenomenon indeed requires detailed information on elite preferred places of residence, and an account of neighborhoods' and municipalities' characteristics. Therefore, in addition to our indicators on the economic status of geographical areas, our empirical analysis is accompanied by an Online Appendix, which displays maps of the cities of Basel, Geneva, and Zurich, including information on their socio-spatial structure. It also provides maps of the distribution of each elite category at each

benchmark and for each city, as well as further information on neighborhoods' and municipalities' population density.

#### *4.1 General trends of deconcentration*

The general trend of elites' deconcentration away from center cities is illustrated by Figure 1, which shows the evolution of the place of residence of economic, academic, left and center/right political elites across the following place categories: within the cities' boundaries, in other municipalities within the same canton, elsewhere in Switzerland, and abroad.

#### **Figure 1.** Evolution of elites' place of residence (1890-2000)

[Figure 1 near here]

The average proportion of elites residing in the city remains relatively constant at approximately 70 per cent until 1937, but gradually declines to reach 43 per cent by 2000. This deconcentration trend is accompanied by an increase in the overall percentage of elites residing in suburban municipalities close to the cities. It also aligns with the broader demographic evolution of major Swiss cities, as they experienced a population peak in the 1960s, followed by a gradual decline in the course of suburbanization processes.

Figure 1, however, indicates strong differences between the four categories of elites. Economic elites have witnessed a consistent decline in the percentage residing in center cities, particularly since 1937, and they have become increasingly dispersed across Switzerland. Thus, they most clearly abandon center cities, with a notable proportion residing elsewhere in Switzerland, or even abroad by 2000. Academic elites also moved away from center cities, with a stark change between 1957 and 1980. Unlike economic elites, however, over 80 per cent of academic elites

still resided either in center cities or in municipalities within the same canton by the end of the twentieth century. As expected, political elites, constrained by electoral districts, display limited changes in their residential locations. The higher percentage of center/right political elites who are living outside the cities, compared to the left political elites, is indicative of the evolution of urban-suburban divides in the political ideology of the electorate (Sellers et al. 2013). While not directly an indicator of *evenness* because it does not include information on the share of inhabiting elites in relation to the population of places, the opening descriptive observation of a *general deconcentration* also stresses the differentiated residential patterns across elite categories. Hence, urban power elites do not constitute a homogeneous group.

A step further towards more descriptive insights to where elites live involves a rather crude, yet insightful, measure of the degree of proximity of elites' place of residence within each category. While we find clear evidence for elites moving away from center cities, which confirms our first expectation of a deconcentration process, this does not necessarily mean that they also live less close to one another. Figure 2 indeed shows that the median distance (in kilometers) between elites' places of residences of the same category varies very little over time, suggesting that despite deconcentration tendencies, elites' residences are not evenly spread across suburban municipalities.

**Figure 2.** Median distance (km) between different categories of elites

[Figure 2 near here]

When considering all elites together, there is no clear evidence that elites would evenly disperse within and around the cities until 1980. The exception of the year 2000 reflects the impressive

splintering of economic elites. We observe that the median distance between economic elites' place of residence is substantively larger than among political and academic elites. Yet, it does not necessarily increase gradually as is the case for economic elites' flight from center cities. Rather, we observe a stark increase between 1980 and 2000 – suggesting that economic elites not only abandon center cities but live also further apart from one another. This can be explained by an increasing share of foreigners on company boards who have their address abroad (see Figure 1 and Strebel and Mach 2023). Academic elites exhibit a notable tendency to reside in close proximity to one another, despite an observed increase in the median distance between their places of residence, coinciding with their dispersion from center cities from the 1980s onwards. No notable trend can be observed with regard to political elites, who, as we have mentioned, are tied to their electoral districts.

From these first empirical findings, we observe that urban elites are less present in center cities, and more so in suburban municipalities over time. They also suggest that elites' places of residence are not randomly dispersed. Still, we now need to show more precisely where elites live and assess whether there is a link between the characteristics of elites and the characteristics of the places they inhabit.

#### *4.2 Differentiation between elite categories*

In this section, we explore how residential patterns differ across elite categories. To do so, we rely on our second set of indicators to measure the share of a particular type of elite that lives in a particular city neighborhood or municipality. In a second step, we will focus on the relationship between the economic status of residential areas and the presence of different elite categories. These two subsequent steps are needed for approaching a measure of elites' *relative*



*concentration*, which implies to compare the share of elites who inhabit the different areas, together with an account of these places' socio-economic characteristics.

Figure 3 is a map of the city of Zurich and its surrounding municipalities<sup>9</sup>. It illustrates the geographical areas with the highest percentage of left political elites and of economic elites. A first observation is that only a few municipalities and neighborhoods exhibit a high concentration of elites. A second observation is that both categories are exclusive regarding their residential patterns: economic elites are concentrated in geographical areas on the east side of lake Zurich, places known to be home of the bourgeoisie for a large part of the twentieth century. Left political elites reside in the Western part of the city in neighborhoods known to be home to the working-class.

**Figure 3.** Share of economic and left political elites in Zurich (per cent by geographical area)

[Figure 3 near here]

From Figure 3, we also observe clear shifts over time. In 1910, economic elites were numerous to live in upper-class neighborhoods in the city (Enge, Fluntern and Hottingen). From 1957 onwards, they have favored the wealthiest surrounding municipalities (Zollikon, Küsnacht and Erlenbach). These elites indeed appear to be very selective in the places they inhabit. The impressively high proportions of economic elites living in only a few chosen areas are driven by the possibility for Swiss municipalities to set their own tax rates (Linder and Mueller 2021). The suburban municipalities on the east side of lake Zurich have long been known to attract wealthy

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<sup>9</sup> The full picture including the distribution of all elite categories at every benchmark year and in each city is displayed in Online Appendix.

taxpayers through low tax rates and hence are commonly referred to as the *Goldküste* (gold coast), a name which highlights the fact that these municipalities have been home to some of the wealthiest residents of Switzerland in the twentieth century (Legentilhomme and Leimgruber 2023). Left political elites do not show this pattern. If they used to be highly represented in traditional working-class neighborhoods such as Sihlfeld or Hard, they are much more dispersed in 2000, which is likely to echo the general shift to the political left of the city and hence a more equal and less concentrated distribution of left political elites across city neighborhoods (Antoniazza et al. 2023).

The dispersion of economic elites along the lake can also be found in Geneva, as displayed in Figure 4. There, economic elites display a movement from the city center (neighborhoods of Cité-Centre and Champel-Roseraie) to the municipalities on the West side of Lake Geneva (Chêne-Bougeries, Cologny, Collonges-Bellerive). In Basel (see Figure 5), they equally relocate from the city neighborhoods (St-Alban, Am Ring and Vorstädte) to wealthy suburban municipalities such as Bottmingen, which is one of the *Villenvororte* (mansion suburbs), i.e., among the wealthiest municipalities in the neighboring canton of *Basel-Landschaft*.

**Figure 4.** Share of economic and left political elites in Geneva (per cent by geographical area)

[Figure 4 near here]

**Figure 5.** Share of economic and left political elites in Basel (per cent by geographical area)

[Figure 5 near here]

One key feature stemming from these maps is that urban elites have not always lived in rather exclusive well-off places such as the municipalities of the *Goldküste*, or Coligny and Collonges-Bellerive near Lake Geneva. During the first half of the twentieth century, elites were numerous to inhabit rather dense and mixed neighborhoods. Certainly, a certain social diversity in these neighborhoods, particularly in the old towns, such as *Cité-centre* in Geneva or *Vorstädte* in Basel, does not mean that the different population groups live in the same areas (Walter 1994).

Unfortunately, the data available to us does not allow us to go into more detail on this issue. However, we can empirically demonstrate a dynamic of transformation over the long term.

The mapping of the distribution of elites in the cities suggests a relationship between elite categories and specific place characteristics. To assess this relationship in a more systematic way, Figure 6 shows correlations between categories of elites and the economic status of geographical areas.

**Figure 6.** Correlation between the share of different categories of elites and the economic status of geographical areas<sup>10</sup>

[Figure 6 near here]

Figure 6 shows that academic, economic, and center/right political elites all tend to be more concentrated in geographical areas with a higher economic status. There is no clear diachronic trend to these relationships: the fact that academic, economic, and center/right political elites live

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<sup>10</sup> Correlation is based on all geographical areas that are home to at least one elite. Numbers indicate total number of geographical areas used for the calculation. Dots indicate the correlation coefficient and lines 95 per cent confidence intervals.

in well-off geographical areas seems to be a timeless phenomenon. Academic elites thus tend to inhabit the more bourgeois city neighborhoods but they can be found in much smaller proportions in the wealthiest surrounding municipalities. In contrast to the economic elites, who dispersed much more to wealthy suburban municipalities, they remained close or within the cities. Within the cities they tend to concentrate in neighborhoods that are home to institutions of high-brow culture, such as art museums and opera houses.

Again, left political elites differ from other elites: we can see no statistically significant correlation between the economic status and the share of left political elites living in a particular geographical area. In contrast to other types of elites, they do not tend to live in more well-off places. We observe a strong differentiation between center/right and left political elites. The former are overwhelmingly concentrated in the same geographical areas as economic and academic elites. In contrast, left political elites exhibit very different residential patterns. They are mainly concentrated in working-class neighborhoods such as Sihlfeld in Zurich, St. Johann in Basel, as well as Grottes in Geneva.<sup>11</sup>

In a last step of our analysis, we assess the degree of differentiation between the four categories of elites. To do so, we calculated the correlation between the percentage of one category of elite

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<sup>11</sup> The full picture of the share of economic, political, and academic elites in the three cities for all benchmark years as displayed in the Online Appendix clearly corroborates the observation that left political elites continue to live in historical working-class neighborhoods, which have gradually transformed into more middle-class neighborhoods in the more recent period. Additional correlation between the share of different elite categories and the population density of geographical areas (logarithmic population density per square kilometer) indicates that the correlation between the share of left political elites and population density remains stable, in contrast to economic, academic, and center/right political elites who tend to inhabit less densely populated places over the course of the twentieth century.

living in a particular geographical area with that of another category for each benchmark year (figure 7).<sup>12</sup>

**Figure 7.** Correlation between the shares of elites living in a particular geographical area

[Figure 7 near here]

Economic elites increasingly live in different neighborhoods than academic and center/right political elites over the course of the twentieth century. For instance, the correlation between the share of academic and economic elites living in a particular geographical area in 1890 is very high and amounts to almost 0.8. This means that when a high percentage of academic elites live in a particular geographical area, we are also very likely to find a high proportion of economic elites in that place at the end of the nineteenth century. By contrast, in 2000, the same correlation only amounts to around 0.4, which indicates that the two elite categories reside less in the same places at the end of the twentieth century. In other words, economic elites, seem to increasingly inhabit geographical areas where no other urban elites live. The same is, however, not true when comparing other categories of elites, e.g., academic and left political elites. While they were not concentrated in the same geographical areas through most of the twentieth century, they increasingly seem to settle closer since the new millennium. This phenomenon can be attributed to the diminishing presence of working-class representatives within left political elites. They are progressively supplanted by politicians with a middle-class, white-collar profession who engage

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<sup>12</sup> For this calculation, we only include geographical areas that host at least one academic or economic elite member. Not doing so would highly inflate the correlation coefficients due to the substantial number of geographical areas that are home to no elite other than one political one.

in roles within public administration, social and healthcare sectors, and notably, academia (Antoniazza et al. 2023).

## 5. Conclusion

This study has examined the evolution of the residential patterns of over 7,400 positional elites in major Swiss cities over the course of the twentieth century. These patterns are characterized by both changes and continuities. The most important changes are that Swiss urban elites' residences have undergone a *general deconcentration* away from center cities over the course of the twentieth century. We also observe an increased differentiation across elite categories.

Particularly economic elites are less and less found in the same areas as other categories of elites. This shows that the social fragmentation of elite networks that has been documented in previous studies is paralleled by a spatial differentiation of elites' places of residence (Strebel et al. 2021). At the same time, we also observe important continuities. For one, elites do not evenly disperse as they move away from center cities. Rather, we find evidence that different categories of elites show different residential patterns. Moreover, we find a stable association over time between elite characteristics and the economic status of places.

By way of concluding this article, we draw on our main findings to elaborate on both our study's limitations and potential directions for future research. First, we discuss issues raised by segregation studies, which we could not address in this study and that could be incorporated into future research. Second, we show how the analysis of elites can contribute to a better understanding of urban planning by considering their decision-making power (in relation to the positions they occupy). Finally, we emphasize the value of further developing the question of

how elites appropriate the places they live in, and in so doing, influence the spatial organization of social inequalities.

Our study provides a so far missing account of urban power elites' residential patterns over an extensive time period. Empirical evidence suggests that the potential of a 'distinctly geographical contribution to the study of elites' (Woods 1998: 2107) must consider different residential patterns for different categories of elite (Cunningham and Savage 2018). Indeed, what is true for the wealthiest, i.e., the economic elite in our case, may not be for others, especially left political elites. Our results clearly confirm that we cannot generalize from wealth elites to the entire power elite (Van Heur and Bassens 2019). Indeed, elites do not choose their place of residence randomly, but prefer a limited number of residential areas that correspond to their social status. Yet, our analysis shows that elites have not always been segregated in wealthy and exclusive areas but used to live in more mixed and denser neighborhoods in center cities – even if they might have been segregated at the block level. It is only from the mid-twentieth century onwards that especially economic elites appear to sort into more exclusive enclaves, for example the *Goldküste* area in Zurich. Future research should further investigate this dimension to overcome an important methodological limitation of our study, namely our focus on the geographical scale of neighborhoods and municipalities (Wong 2004, Reardon et al. 2008). More precise data at the block level would, for instance, allow for a more nuanced analysis of elites' residential patterns and potential segregation.

It would be desirable to strengthen the theoretical and methodological cross-fertilization between elites and segregation studies, for instance by addressing the role of contextual factors that might impact elites' residential geographies. These contextual factors might either consist in socio-structural transformations, such as cities' changing occupational structures, e.g., the changing

share of managers and professionals with regard to that of ‘unskilled’ workers (Tammaru et al. 2015: 14). Such contextual factors might also consist in city-specific policies, and governance practices, such as housing policies, which impact urban development. The latter, by defining the availability, cost, density and residential requirements of public housing projects and other affordable housing, definitely contribute to shape both levels and scale of segregation patterns (Reardon et al. 2008: 509, Haandrikmann et al., 2023). A limitation of our study in this regard is, that we are not able to give an account of individual elites' nor of general populations' migration dynamics. Thus, we are limited in interpreting the variations of populations and their status within and across the considered geographical areas. For instance, we cannot measure the effect of gentrification and suburbanization processes of elite and middle-class residents on driving segregation, and the way these processes are linked to public authorities' attempts to balance market forces by shaping the urban scape and intervening in market dynamics (Musterd et al. 2017: 1077). Methodologically, the integration of ‘centralization’ measures would typically enhance our understanding on how gentrification and suburbanization processes could have challenged prior confinement of minorities to declining central city areas (Massey and Denton 1988).

These insights from segregation studies may benefit from a deeper understanding of elites' decisional power. Drawing on this alternative approach to elite influence (Dahl 1961, Hoffmann-Lange 2018) would definitely refine our understanding of the ‘role of local institutional, morphological, historical and spatial contexts in mediating effects of more universal/generic structural factors on patterns of segregation’ (Tammaru et al. 2015: 3). Segregation studies often define socio-economic inequalities through income-based indicators – such as Gini coefficients – as well as occupation and education levels (Musterd et al. 2017: 1063). We encourage further



research to draw on our findings on the continuing presence of the left political elite in the center cities to further investigate their effective influence on governing and organizing (the fight against) socio-spatial inequalities.

Finally, the focus on positional elites opens further research avenues on whether their social ties in organizational networks are mirrored by their proximity in geographical space. Indeed, the spatial fragmentation process of economic elites from the 1980s onwards that we have uncovered is paralleled by a fragmentation of Swiss national and urban business elite networks in the same period. From the 1990s onwards, the financialization and internationalization of the business sector has led to an outright collapse of business elites' networks (Rossier et al. 2022, Strebel and Mach 2023). This points to promising avenues for future research on the history of the socio-spatial structuration of cities and urban areas as seen 'from the top'. Examining the links between the social and the spatial proximity of urban elites can help us better understand the geography of urban power and its historical evolution. Indeed, further research may investigate the extent to which informal networks, which play a decisive role in reproducing elites' power, depend on neighborhood cohesion, i.e., a sense of community shared by residents who share similar resources and values (Blokland and Savage 2008, Méndez et al. 2021). Such an agenda also requires a detailed analysis not only of where elites live, but also how they perceive and contribute to shaping their environment (Pinçon and Pinçon-Charlot 2018). We have shown that there are significant limitations to the use of traditional indicators derived from segregation studies. On the one hand, the small number of urban elites and the very significant changes in the population of geographical areas make these measures vulnerable to small variations. On the other hand, it is crucial to consider that the different categories of elites exhibit very different

residential patterns. Taking political elites into consideration, particularly those on the left, has shown the value of a detailed and scrupulous descriptive approach.

Our comparative and historical approach to the geography of urban elites contributes and expands on the few existing studies that have taken a quantitative-descriptive approach to study the spatial distribution of different categories of urban elites (Cunningham and Savage 2018, Savage et al. 2018, Bassens et al. 2019). Future research could build on these insights and study the transformations of certain elite neighborhoods and municipalities in particular historical moments in a more qualitative way. Our quantitative analysis provides for an entry point to this kind of analysis by highlighting potentially interesting cases to be examined in more detail, combining geographical features in a refined framework with elite's differentiated endowment in resources, values, and behaviors.

### **Declaration of interest statement**

The authors have no competing interests to declare.

### **Data availability statement**

The data and R code that support the findings of this study are openly available on Zenodo at <http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.11067151>.

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**Table 1.** Positions included in the database

<b>Sphere</b>	<b>Positions</b>
Academic	Professors at the city's university
Economic	Board members and directors of major companies from the most important economic sectors: financial services, pharmaceutical, watchmaking, and machine industries.  Board members of cantonal chambers of commerce
Political	Members of local and cantonal parliament/government


**Table 2.** Total sample (n=7,758 positions)

	1890	1910	1937	1957	1980	2000	Total
Academic Elites	176	246	311	391	251	276	1,651
Economic Elites	380	390	382	376	404	429	2,361
Political Elites	595	631	606	598	656	660	3,746


**Table 3.** Address data for elites: available and missing data

	Basel	Geneva	Zurich	Total
Total number of elites	2,069	2,076	3,313	7,458
Information on the municipality	1,925	1,937	3,173	7,035
Information on street name and	1,770	1,747	2,138	5,655
No information	144	139	140	423


**Figure 1.** Evolution of elites' place of residence (1890-2000)




**Figure 2.** Median distance (km) between different categories of elites



**Figure 3.** Share of economic and left political elites in Zurich (per cent by geographical area)




**Figure 4.** Share of economic and left political elites in Geneva (per cent by geographical area)






**Figure 5.** Share of economic and left political elites in Basel (per cent by geographical area)



**Figure 6.** Correlation between the share of different categories of elites and the economic status of geographical areas



**Figure 7.** Correlation between the shares of elites living in a particular geographical area

