

Situating Muslims' trust in parliament from a cross-national perspective: Islamic religiosity's impact in Western Europe

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We hereby confirm that data used for this manuscript is publicly available. Using publicly available data, no ethics review was required for this study. A replication package including the syntax used for this study is available online on OSF:

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Abstract

Across Western Europe, politicians and media express concerns about whether Muslims feel part of liberal democracies and trust national parliament. Although often assumed, research is actually inconclusive on whether Islamic religiosity hampers such political trust. Current study dives into this complex association by studying over 5000 Muslims across 17 Western European countries. It makes two core contributions. First, instead of comparing Muslims to non-Muslims, we address Muslims in specific to gain understanding in how various religiosity dimensions – mosque attendance, religious identification and praying - relate to trust in national parliament. Second, we theorize and test how exclusionary conditions buffer or aggravate Islamic religiosity's impact on political trust. We theorize how formal boundaries (e.g. restrictive citizenship policies) and informal boundaries (e.g. hostile public attitudes) affect Muslims' political trust and the role of Islamic religiosity herein. After uniquely harmonizing ESS, EVS and WVS data, multilevel analyses show that Islamic religiosity can relate negatively to political trust, yet its importance is gendered and contextualized. For example, Muslim men who more often attend a mosque experience less trust, and more so in exclusionary societies, whereas we find indications that mosque attendance among women stimulates such trust in the least hostile environments. Moreover, Muslims' political trust is in general lower in societies with more hostile public attitudes towards migrants and where political participation is restricted for some. Our study has thus illustrated that Islamic religiosity matters for Muslims' political trust in Western Europe but neither in clear-cut simple ways nor being all explanatory.

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Keywords: political trust, Islamic religiosity, Muslims, cross-national comparison, exclusion

Introduction

Despite heated Europe-wide debates on Islam and politics, little is known about if and how individual-level manifestations and reproductions of Islam feed into political belonging and behaviour. Specifically, while politicians and media express concerns about whether Muslims feel part of these liberal democracies and trust parliament, the number of studies exploring the association between Islamic religiosity and political trust is limited and often solely studied by comparing Muslims to non-Muslims (Hsiung and Djupe 2019; Superti and Gidron 2022). In this study we therefore theorize and unpack Islamic religiosity's potential impact on trust in national parliament, also shedding light on the larger question whether differences between Muslim and non-Muslim citizens can be ascribed to Islam as is often done.

On this matter, we offer two main contributions. First, this manuscript stresses the need to take an intracategorical approach by studying Muslims as a heterogeneous group in terms of religiosity (see Geurts 2022), also in religious terms, and thereby going beyond the popular analytical dichotomy between the religious and the non-religious (as stressed by Patrikios and Huhe, 2022). We study the multidimensionality of Islamic religiosity and doing so allows us to go beyond the predominant understanding in the general political engagement literature, which uses mosque attendance as proxy for religiosity and understands religiosity foremostly as an indicator of social capital (Moutselos 2019), as well as beyond the literature on cultural clashes reducing the Muslim non-Muslim dichotomy to deeply ingrained cultural differences.

While we consider both these theoretical mechanisms, we will theorize and empirically study mosque attendance, religious identification and individual prayer as separate dimensions of Islamic religiosity that tap into different consequences and meanings of religious practice and belonging, and that can thus relate to trust in national parliament differently. Addressing various dimensions of religiosity, both theoretically and empirically, allows us to pinpoint which mechanisms are likely at play with regards to Islamic religiosity's relationships with political trust, thus enabling further theory development in the field. Although the concept of political trust can encompass trust in various institutions, we predominantly focus on the most widely studied and measured dimension (Newton et al. 2018): trust in national parliament. National parliament is one of the core institutions of liberal democracy, and therefore a relevant category of political trust to study (see Van der Meer 2010; Zmerli et al. 2007).

In order to assess religiosity's multidimensional impact, we combine and build on insights from large-scale socio-political and sociology of religion studies on trust, in particular among migrants and minorities (Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikian 2021; Glas 2020). This helps us to understand the potential causal qualities of Islamic religiosity and to connect this to the core mechanisms identified in the general political trust literature, contributing to both of these literatures.

Our second core contribution is that we explore how cross-national differences affect Muslims' political trust and the role of religiosity, which is currently lacking (Isani and Schlipphak 2017). That trust reacts to stimuli provided by the environment has been illustrated in general trust studies (Hooghe and Zmerli 2011; Jeannet 2020; Kroknes et al. 2015; Noordzij et al. 2021; Voicu and Tufis 2017), yet the exact contextual factors are likely (partly) different for Muslims as a minority in Western Europe (Bird et al. 2011).

In that light we introduce and test contextual conditions that are likely to affect Muslims' political trust and shape the impact of Islamic religiosity. Particularly, we build on previous work by Oskooii (2020) and Simonsen (2016) addressing exclusionary policies and practices on the national level, which dovetails with the more general institutionalist literature that partly puts forward what such boundaries could be. Concretely, we study the role of laws on citizenship and political participation, seat disproportionality and public hostility towards ethnic minorities as indicators of such exclusionary circumstances.

Our contributions are summarized in our research question: *How do mosque attendance, religious identification and individual praying relate to Muslims' trust in national parliament in Western Europe, and how do exclusionary policies and practices on the national level affect Muslims' trust in national parliament and Islamic religiosity' impact on it?* To answer it, we make use of a unique harmonized dataset combining Muslim citizens from the European Social Survey (ESS), the European Value Survey (EVS) and the World Value Survey (WVS), the only three cross-national datasets including information on all three dimensions of religiosity and items on trust in the same political institution: parliament.

In total, we include 5,267 Muslim respondents from 17 countries, covering 2002 to 2020. These data are enriched with macro-level data from multiple sources including Gallagher's disproportionality index (Gallagher, 1991), MIPEX legal migration data (Solano and

Huddleston 2020), and the general public's attitudes derived from ESS (European Social Survey Cumulative File 2020). Moreover, drawing from general surveys, we can control for the general level of trust in the respective countries and years. Using multilevel regression models, we show that the dimensions of Islamic religiosity do indeed have different influences on political trust. Identification plays no systematic role, whereas particularly individual praying is often linked to lower political trust. The latter also holds for attendance, although mainly among men and seemingly more so in societies where the public is more hostile towards migrants.

Theoretical framework

Established causes of political trust

Various individual drivers of political trust have been theorized and received considerable empirical support in the existing core literature on political trust. As mentioned in the introduction, we empirically measure trust in national parliament in specific. In the theoretical section, we build on previous literature mainly addressing political trust as a broader spectrum, where possible specifying how the mentioned mechanisms relate to trust in national parliament.

For theorizing the impact of religiosity, the logic of the impact of socio-economic factors and social capital/integration and civic participation are most crucial. Below we briefly stipulate these mechanisms, that suggest there is a relationship between religiosity and political trust (against the null hypothesis that there is none). When we then turn to specific hypotheses on Islamic religiosity, we connect these general logics to the role of social identification and specific understandings of religious acts and formulate specific hypotheses in line with the predominant discussion of religion in the trust literature, if featuring in it. Next, for each dimension of religiosity this is followed by a reflection on these mechanisms in the context of belonging to a minoritized religious group. Doing so we build on previous research on the role of religion among migrants and their descendants and integrate this with the two core mechanisms above, leading to a discussion of alternative expectations for the religiosity dimensions.

Regarding socio-economic factors, a core mechanism is the winner-losers logic suggesting that higher levels of political trust can be found among those who are rich, happy, satisfied with life,

healthy, well-educated and high on the ladder of social and economic status; the winners of or privileged ones in society (Newton et al. 2018; Röder and Mühlau 2012). These winners have more positive first-hand experiences with the world around them and because the government is a likely cause and protector of this privilege, it will be trusted more. One important note though, which comes back in the migration literature (see Geurts 2022), is that education specifically is also linked to cognitive capabilities and being trained to think more critically and independent, which can feed into less political trust (Mayne and Hakhverdian 2017).

Social capital and civic participation have been shown to relate positively to political trust and trust in national parliament in specific, also among immigrant minorities (De Vroome et al. 2013). It is argued that more knowledge gained via social capital decreases distrust and increases the likelihood of actively engaging in politics, which feeds into more positive attitudes towards democracy going hand-in-hand with experiencing political trust (Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2012; Zmerli et al. 2007). Also embeddedness in intermediary groups creates more ties with society which has been argued to facilitate reciprocal relationships of understanding and trust in a civic setting, which spills over to higher trust in other contexts (Kaase 1999; Nannestad 2008; Putnam 2000; Uslaner 2002). As Voicu and Tufis (2017) put it: “whilst crediting others with trust, one is more likely to trust institutions that others create”.

By connecting these logics to those more prominent in research on the implications of religion among marginalized migrant populations in Western Europe, we provide a systematic theorizing of different elements of (Islamic) religiosity’s impact, showing how different dimensions work via different processes as well as tapping multiple, sometimes potentially counteracting, mechanisms. As will become clear below, the minoritized position of Muslims in Western Europe gears towards the overall interpretation that religiosity undermines political trust, whereas the general literature on political trust would suggest a positive relationship. Empirically we will test which effect is dominant per dimension of religiosity and in the conclusion we come back to and reflect on the specific mechanisms, based on the overall outcomes.

Islamic religiosity: a driving force or stumbling block for political trust?

We now turn to the role of religiosity, which is no stranger in the plethora of studies on political trust, in which the latter is conventionally treated as a pro-democratic value. However, its causal qualities have not been theorized systematically and it is often treated as a monolithic

force equated to social capital alone. Moreover, in Western European studies it seems assumed that religiosity works similar across religions, whereas our intracategorical approach does not make such an assumption. Below, we acknowledge its multidimensionality which allows for disentangling the various and diverse pathways linking religiosity to trust.

Mosque attendance

From a standard political trust framework, mosque attendance taps one's involvement in religious networks as a civic organization, bringing about civic skills. During, but also before and after services, it facilitates sharing and discussing public affairs, political information and mentality (Moutselos 2020; Oskooii and Dana 2018). Similarly, attendance is known to result in embeddedness in a social network and enhance a greater societal connectedness, which feeds into the social capital mechanism discussed above (Putnam 2000). This is underlined by research showing a positive association between church attendance and political trust (Sobolewska et al. 2015). Given that this logic is dominant in the literature, we formulate the following hypothesis for mosque attendance:

H1 *Mosque attendance has a positive effect on political trust among Muslims in Western Europe.*

However, considering particular attention to the context of marginalization and migration in Western Europe ask for reflection on the above stipulated hypothesis as it ignores that mosque attendance is more than being embedded in a civic organization. It is also about the messages given by this organization and being integrated into a group with specific norms on for example how one as a Muslim should engage with the political system in Western Europe (De Koning, 2013; Glas 2020; Jamal 2005). In this light, mosque attendance may bring about more distrust as it is likely that during services it is stressed that Allah is the only and just authority, which might undermine the national parliament standing as authority (see Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan 2012). Moreover, and more tangibly, religious organizations, in addition to driving the internalization of a certain social identity, have been argued to mobilize on experienced inequality (see Oskooii and Dana 2018) or acclimate against certain policies. Given the anti-Islam discourse across Western Europe, it is not unlikely that more frequent mosque attendees consume more and are more aware of these messages criticizing anti-Muslim politicians and how parliaments are unwilling to act against this discourse, or at least are unable to improve

Muslims' position in society (see Jamal 2005). Consequently, it is not unimaginable that relationship hypothesized might be nullified or overshadowed by this contrary effect.

when it comes to mosque attendance, studies have stressed that the frequency and meaning thereof differs for men and women (Glas 2020; Prickett 2015). While we acknowledge this genderedness, the expectations formulated above apply to men and women alike. Empirically we will assess whether results vary across genders, the theorizing of which falls beyond the scope here.

Religious identification

The social integration perspective also provides a starting point to theorize the impact of religious identification. The argument is that identifying more strongly to a societal (incl. religious) group leads to greater levels of both social and political trust, and empirical results support this expectation in general (Bègue 2002; Wisneski et al. 2009). We hereby should not ignore that many claim that love for and acceptance of others are pro-social principles at the core of Islam (Glas 2020). Following this logic, a strong identification as Muslim thus links a trusting disposition. Based on this core logic, we formulate the follow hypothesis on identification:

H2 *Religious identification has a positive effect on political trust among Muslims in Western Europe.*

However considering the context and applying the winners-losers logic interpreted broadly, it should be acknowledged that Western European Muslims are a marginalized and discriminated-against minority among which higher levels of group identification. Altogether this might actually results in more political consciousness of grievances. Such experiences can consequently contribute unfavorable attitudes towards the residence country and its responsible institutions including national parliament (Isani and Schlipphak 2017; Liebkind and Jasinskaja-Lahti 2000). Again it might be that the overall is effect is actually negative.

Individual prayer

Although less often studied in relationship to political attitudes and engagement, individual prayer is important to many religions, including Islam in which it (*salat*) is one of the five pillars. Moreover, people who pray more are often expected to be more devout, and given that Islam

as a theology might not describe definitive political institutions, but does offer a vision of just society created by God (Collin and Owen 2012; Eickelman and Piscatori, 1996) it might be that participation in activities such as prayer has been shown to increase psychological resources and civic engagement (Calhoun-Brown, 1996). However, to hypothesize that – based on this rather thin theoretical basis - prayer relates positively to Muslims’ political trust is tricky, whereas the reflection based on being a minoritized religious group leads to a hypothesis that is more theoretically supported.

First, theological drivers of trust mentioned above might not work similarly for a minoritized group. The bond between more frequent praying respondents and Allah could easily take precedent: praying indicates a priority to religious life over worldly affairs, creating fewer motivations to trust and engage in politics, whereby the ultimate authority is put with the deity, as also discussed above (Just et al. 2014).

Moreover, next to these general religious principles, focusing on specific guidelines that devout Muslim are more likely to follow (Doerschler and Jackson 2011) also suggests a negative link between praying and political trust. For instance, Wisneski and colleagues (2009) concluded that those who show strong moral convictions experience lower levels of political trust as there is a greater chance parliaments make decisions that are not in line with one’s beliefs (see also Isani and Schlipphak 2017).

Finally, individual praying might be an individual and partly private act, but it can still take place in public spaces. Those who pray more may also more often run into experiences of hostility towards them, which, as argued above, can hamper trust in institutions that do not prevent these processes. Given these different arguments, we formulate the following hypothesis for prayer:

H3 *Individual prayer has a negative effect on political trust among Muslims in Western Europe.*

One more reflection is in place here. The importance of the act of praying might hold particularly for Muslim women, who are sometimes (socially) barred from praying in the mosque despite the required *salat*. We can thus expect a genderedness of praying: although in the general sense the hypothesis applies to both men and women, the genderedness of praying’s impact is assessed empirically in this study.

The importance of in- and exclusionary environments

Above, we already drew attention to the hostility in the Western European context in understanding why and how Islamic religiosity might matter for political trust. Below we theorize the direct impact of exclusionary environments as well as its (reinforcing) interplay with Islamic religiosity. Doing so, we view and explore in- and exclusive environments as the ends of the same continuum, and we apply and build on Oskooii's (2020) theoretical perspective regarding the relationship between discrimination and political behaviour. We extend this perspective to political trust, also showing how it dovetails the political science literature on formal institutions' impact on trust (e.g. Van der Meer 2010; Wängnerud 2009) with existing literature on boundaries, suggesting policies and practices on the national level can signal, enable and indicate who does and does not belong via societal (interpersonal) boundaries, so-called informal boundaries, and political (systematic) boundaries, so-called formal boundaries (Simonsen, 2016). The more bright such boundaries are towards Muslims, the more exclusionary we consider the national context to be.

In the case of political engagement, Oskooii (2020) proposes that facing "laws, policies, practices, symbols or political campaigns and discourse that aim to deprive some citizens of resources or rights based on group membership" (p.868) can motivate individuals to act collectively against institutions. This engagement implies a negative assessment of the institutions based on the experience of discrimination, thus implying low political trust. And indeed, a core understanding in the trust literature, that partly underlies the winners-losers logic, is that trust is partly experience based (Uslaner 2002). More specifically, and considering a minority context, there are two mechanisms via which such political and societal boundaries will bring about lower levels of political trust.

First, following the rejection disidentification model (Bobowik et al. 2017; Liebkind and Jasinskaja-Lathi et al. 2000), we expect that exposure to and experience with more exclusionary circumstances results in a lower sense of belonging and more unfavourable attitude towards the Western European countries and its domestic institutions, bringing about a lower level of political trust (De Vroome et al. 2013). Second, referring back to the winners-losers logic, a low(er) standing in society links to lower trust in institutions as this low(er) standing is attributed to the political system (Newton et al. 2018; Röder and Mühlau 2012). Minoritized citizens are likely aware of specific exclusionary boundaries, signaling their groups' low(er)

standing in society, which negatively affects the assessed performance of political institutions and actors, including the parliament which is seemingly unable to prevent or protect those exposed to these exclusionary circumstances (De Vroome et al. 2013; Kumlin and Rothstein 2010; Maxwell 2010). More inclusive circumstances can vice versa bring about a more positive evaluation of and thus trust in national parliament.

H4 *The more exclusion is present in society, the lower the levels of political trust among Muslims in Western Europe.*

Importantly, we also expect that these national circumstances affect the association between Islamic religiosity and political trust, as can be deduced from the reasonings on how the different manifestations of religiosity might lead to negative effects on trust, which already refer to these exclusionary contexts. If in a context this hostility is more pronounced, so if people run into these boundaries more so to speak, it is likely that the reactionary elements of religiosity are activated more. In other words, in these contexts negative messages on the political elite might be stronger in and around mosques, the feeling of a lack of privilege for one's group might be stronger among those who identify strongly as Muslim, and the hostility towards praying in public might be stronger. Particularly in these contexts, the more religious can be expected to have lower trust, as also indicated for the Canadian case in which Muslims who faced more discrimination experienced less political trust (Dilmaghani 2019). This implies that more exclusive circumstances bring about a stronger negative association and/or limit possible positive associations between various dimensions of Islamic religiosity and political trust.

H5 *The more exclusion is present in society, the more likely is a (stronger) negative association between (any dimension of) Islamic religiosity and political trust among Muslims in Western Europe.*

Data and Methods

Synchronizing survey sources

To test our hypotheses, we need a dataset covering three religiosity dimensions, sufficient number of macro-level contexts, and a considerable sample of Muslim respondents. Thereto, we created a pooled data source that combines all Muslim respondents from multiple cross-

national surveys on Western European countries' populations (see Spierings, Geurts and Kollar, 2024 for full code).

First, we listed all surveys - both general population and specific migrant- or ethnic minority surveys - that include multiple Western European countries (for comparability), items on political trust and the three religiosity dimensions. Only trust *in parliament* turned out to be available across surveys. Given these criteria we could include the European Social Survey, European Values Study, and World Value Study. Other datasets found unsuitable include CILS4EU, CSES, EURIslam, EES, FRA's EU-MIDIS, and 2,000 Families data.

After selecting all adult Muslims (based on self-identified denomination) with valid scores on our core variables we were left with 5,267 respondents from 17 countries, covering a time span of 19 years (see online Appendix A). To the best of our knowledge, this presents the largest existing dataset on European Muslims to study the relationship between Islamic religiosity and trust in national parliament.¹

Combining data to enable our novel analyses, evidently, comes with its challenges. Most importantly, the different datasets use different specific measurements for the same concepts.² We build on procedures introduced in previously published work on Middle Eastern data (Spierings 2019): aligning answer categories and applying the logic of standardized effects (which corrects for different dispersions on variables). Below and in the appendices more detailed information is provided.³ Given the procedures, these variables should not be used to provide descriptive insights, but do allow for positioning each and every respondent relative to the others on all our core variables, which is crucial for assessing Islamic religiosity's *relation to* political trust across Western Europe.

Trust in parliament

¹ Additional analyses, as reported and discussed in Online Appendix F, using the same data sources and modelling strategy show that the effects of the different religiosity variables are substantively different for Muslims and Christians in Western Europe, which above all warrants an intracategorical approach, studying Muslims as a heterogeneous group.

² The analyses have been rerun per country to assess whether differences exist and whether these can be linked to methodological differences between the surveys (e.g. different items used to measure a concept). These analyses are discussed in more detail in Online Appendix H. They show that only one of nine potential differences between the survey sources regarding religiosity was statistically significant. More importantly, this difference could not be linked to methodological issues and the variation found did not undermine the overall patterns found and conclusions drawn.

³ Exact codes are available from the authors and will become publicly available.

Each of the surveys includes items on trust in one or more political institutions, whereby the surveys applied here asks about trust in parliament specifically. In line with our theorization and the literature we relate to, trust in parliament focusses on the functioning of the system (opposed to specific parties, incumbent government, or the notion of democracy as such) (Van der Meer 2010; Zmerli et al. 2007) and scores thereon seem to represent differences in this larger underlying concept rather well, also among minority groups (Spierings & Vermeulen, 2023). Moreover, Online Appendix G, which assess our results on the same but smaller sample on trust in politicians and in political parties as well as an index of all three, leads to the same conclusions and the three items load on 1 single factor (loadings>.8) in an exploratory factor analysis.⁴

The ESS data include a 11-point variable for which the question is phrased as follows (ESS 2022): “*please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly, [country]’s parliament.*” EVS and WVS use a slightly different question (e.g. EVS 2020): “*tell me, for each item listed, how much confidence you have in them, is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much or none at all. Parliament?*” (A great deal, quite a lot, not very much, none at all).

Combining these data, two issues need addressing: the number of answering options and question phrasing. Regarding the latter, the questions are very similar, particularly so when we realize that ‘confidence’ and ‘trust’ translate in many languages the same. Focusing on the four languages that cover the countries with the most respondents (Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland), ESS, EVS and WVS questionnaires use the same words: *confiance* (French), *Vertrauen* (German), *fiducia* (Italian), or *vertrouwen* (Dutch). Regarding the answer categories, we find two very similar dispersions when both are linearly rescaled from 0 to 10, with means of 5.5 and 5.2 and standard deviation of 2.5 and 2.8 respectively. Still the 11-categories item has a somewhat lower spread, so we use the standardized z-scores based on our total sample of Muslim citizens in Europe. Alternatively, we could rescale linearly (see above) or non-linearly to two 4-category variables.⁵ The correlation between these options is

⁵ Rescaling: 0-2=0; 3-4=1; 5=1.5; 6-7=2; 8-10=3.

0.970 and 0.998. Using these alternatives does not lead to substantially different results. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics on our variables.

[Insert Table 1 around here]

Three dimensions of Islamic religiosity

Regarding Islamic religiosity, we focus on mosque attendance, affective religiosity (particularly religious identification), and individual prayer. Each of three included data sources includes items that tap these concepts. Below we describe how we created the three indices used in the regression models. Not only are they conceptually different, they are so empirically too. The correlations between the three indices is between 0.34 and 0.50; well below the standard correlation cut-off in terms of multicollinearity (i.e. $>0.7/>0.8$). To illustrate, of those who pray daily or more frequently, over half does not go to mosque weekly or more. And among those who hardly ever pray about half visits the mosque weekly or more often.

Mosque attendance is asked with three different but highly similar items across surveys (see online appendix B). All questions are variations on “How often do you attend religious services?” and have seven or eight answering options ranging from never to daily. Across surveys we could regroup the answers to capture 0 ‘never to less than yearly’, 1 ‘yearly to monthly’ 2 ‘weekly’ 3 ‘more than weekly’. Each of the categories represents at least 13% of our sample and close to 700 cases or more. Comparing results using an interval variant of this variable with those using a set of four dummy variables shows that the interval variable captures the relationship well. These results are presented below

For respondents’ degree of identification with their faith, all surveys include a standard item measuring the self-identified religiousness of a respondent (see online appendix B). In EVS and WVS, the number of answering categories (3) is very limited, but both also include another item that conceptually fits affective religiosity (see Glas 2020) and has a more fine-grained answering scale (10-point): the importance they attach to their god. Empirically, the discussed items also fit together, as other studies have illustrated that they tap one underlying concept (Spierings 2019). In our data we find that from the lowest to the highest of three categories of religiousness, the average on the 0-to-9 variable on god’s importance is respectively 1.1, 5.8 and 8.1. This lends further support for our decision to take them together into a single indicator for the more abstract concept of degree of identification.

As the three used items were of different types, not each available across all surveys, and had different ranges, we could not recode the variables as done for attendance. Building on the same logic as calculating the relative impact in a regression model via standardized Beta-coefficients - we calculated the z-values of respondents on each of the items (all of them having at least 1,200 respondents in our master Muslim-only database) and took the average of the available standardized scores items. Doing so, each and every respondent is ascribed a score on identification relative to the other respondents, taking into account that some survey items might return higher scores because of the formulation or options offered. The final variable does not allow precise descriptive analyses, but does enable us to assess the relationship between affective religiosity and political trust.

For individual praying, we used the recategorizing approach as discussed for attendance. In all three survey the question stem reads “How often do you pray?”. EVS and ESS explicitly added “*apart from or outside of religious services*” to the question, while WVS made this distinction clear in the answering option (see online appendix B). Across surveys, all with seven or eight answering options, we have been able to distinguish: 0 ‘(practically) never’ 1 ‘infrequent’ 2 ‘at least weekly’ 3 ‘daily or more often’.

Macro-level: Exclusionary environments

Our focus on exclusionary contexts encompasses formal political and informal societal exclusion, whereby we try to capture different manifestations here of, given existing macro-level data: Hostile public attitudes, disproportionality of parliament, restrictions to migrants’ political participation, and exclusionary citizenship and equality laws. A factor analysis on the ten final variables used (see online appendix C) indeed shows this clustering, supporting that we combine our five public attitudes items and our three citizenship and equality laws in two respective indices. The items related to disproportionality and political participation did not clearly load on those factors and are included singularly.

First, hostile public attitudes were based on the European Social Survey data (2002-2018; ESS). Per countryyear we calculated the average score on the full general nationally representative data set for five items: Allow many/few immigrants of (i) different race/ethnic group from majority/(ii) poorer countries outside Europe; (iii) Immigration bad or good for country's economy; (iv) Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants, and (v) Immigrants make country worse or better place to live. To calculate the overall index the 4- and

11-category means were linearly rescaled to run from inclusive (0) to exclusionary (10) and averaged. Missing countryyear scores were interpolated linearly if data were available for the same country prior to and after the missing data point.

Second, disproportionality of the parliament (i.e. a stronger discrepancy between the percentage of votes parties receive and their percentage of seats in parliament) has been shown to lead to more skewed (descriptive) representation (Wängnerud 2009) signifying political exclusion in terms of underrepresentation of Muslim minority citizens (on which no direct data across years and countries is available). We used the least square index as provided by Gallagher (1991). For election years we took the score after the election and used that for all years up until a new election. A higher score indicates a higher degree of disproportionality. Of the macro-level variables this is the only one which has a distribution that is neither normal or evenly spread; however, using a rescaled variable based on the natural logarithm (i.e. leading to a better distributions) leads to the same conclusions (see Online Appendix G for the details.)

Third, restrictions on the political participation of migrants are captured in the widely-used Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) data (Solano and Huddleston 2020). The used index makes use of expert surveys and covers migrant voting rights, the strength and presence of migrant consultative bodies, and funding of immigration organizations, in other words, enfranchising, informing, consulting and involving people with a migration background. While, evidently, not all Muslims are migrants, almost all Muslims in the countries studied here will have at least one migrant parent. We reversed the 0-100 index so that a higher score indicates more exclusion. MIPEX present data as of 2009, but turned out rather stable within countries over the years, therefore we imputed the missing years by the country average for a country.

Last, we combined three MIPEX 0-100 indices on citizenship and equality laws, a higher score indicating more exclusion, imputed the same way as discusses above. The three items focus on the access to permanent residency, access to nationality, and having effective legal protection against anti-discrimination.

None of the correlations between the macro-level variables is higher than 0.8 (or 0.6 for that matter), making multicollinearity issues highly unlikely. For more information see Online Appendix G, which reports and discussed the correlations as well as additional robustness checks.

Control variables

The ESS, EVS and WVS all provide data on core socio-economic, demographic and migration-related control variables for the study at hand, that are often linked to trust (Uslaner 2002; Newton et al. 2018). By recategorizing these alike to what has been discussed above, we include the following variables.

Age is measured in years. Gender was included by a dummy indicating identification as female. Migration status, we included by considering whether the respondent was born in the country of residence (so-called 'first generation'), in another country ('second generation) or whether this is unknown (which we include to not lose respondents). Regarding education, we distinguish between no education, primary education, secondary education, and tertiary education. For main daily activity, we make a distinction between being employed (for a considerable number of hours), being in education, or being non- or unemployed. Lastly, relationship status distinguishes married/partnered, never married, and other (including divorcees and widows).

At the macro-level, we included the level of parliamentary trust among the general public for each countryyear as control. This is calculated by taking the weighted average of the original full surveys used here. As discussed in detail in the results section and Online Appendix G, we also ran the core models without this variable. Overall this leads highly similar conclusions. Of the countryyear outcomes we took the standardized values (see above on the dependent variable).

Modelling strategy

In line with the data structure, and given our goal of assessing the context-dependency of micro-level relationships, we estimate three-level multilevel models: individuals nested in countryyears nested in countries, with random intercepts for both countryyear and country. To account for survey differences and temporal trends, we include dummies for the different source surveys and a linear time variable. The main models have been rerun for women and men (Table 2) and for first- and second-generation respondents (online appendix D) separately. This assesses whether results hold across groups or whether they apply to a specific gender for instance (see theory section). To assess Hypothesis 5, we include cross-level interaction terms in the later models. As recommended (Giesellmann & Schmidt-Catran, 2019; Heisig & Schaeffer, 2019), the slope of the individual-level religiosity variables is part of the random part of the model at the countryyear level for the interaction models, which prevents false positives

on the interaction terms.⁶ Where these models suggest meaningful interaction effects we have graphically depicted them based on the models presented in Online Appendix E, by plotting the relationship between the religiosity dimension and trust for different levels of the macro-level variable with confidence intervals for the estimated level of trust (panels A in the figures) as well as the effect of the religiosity dimension for the different levels of the macro-level variable, with confidence interval of the estimated effect (panels B).

As there are restrictions in terms of effective number of variables that can be added to our models at the contextual level and the results at this level might be at risk of being influenced by extreme or outlier cases, we (a) run the macro-level models adding one macro-level variable at a time and (b), in the case of finding potential interaction effects, rerun the direct effect models *per country* for the countries with sufficient respondents and plot the B-coefficients for the respective religiosity dimension against the macro-level variables (panels C in the figures). If results are similar across these approaches, we can draw rather robust conclusions on the existence of context-dependent effects. Details are provided in the results section where relevant.

Results

Control variables and overall model

Before turning to testing the hypotheses, let us briefly assess the results for the control variables and model as a whole. The level of trust in parliament among the general population is a strong explanatory factor of the trust among Muslim citizens (e.g. Table 2, Model 1). Importantly, political trust and for instance anti-migrant attitudes are clearly related among general populations (Kokkonen and Linde 2022). Consequently, the strong effect of macro-level trust might indicate that to some extent we now overcontrol for the macro-level exclusionary context variables. Therefore, we also ran Model 1 as well and the interaction models without this variable (see Model 2 and Online Appendix G), and will return to these results were relevant below.

⁶ Based on Giesselmann, M., and Schmidt-Catran (2019) one might argue that when tested cross-level interactions in models nesting individual in repeated cross-sectional multicountry survey, it is also wise to check whether adding the slope of the countryyear variable in the random part of the country level of the model matters to avoid false positive (i.e. Type II errors). As we only find a potentiation cross-level interaction between public hostility (varies at the countryyear level) and attendance, we also re-estimated that model including the slope of public hostility in the random part at the country level. The cross-level interaction remain statistically significant ($p=.018$ instead of $p=.015$).

Our time variable suggests a rather stable increase in trust among Muslim citizens in Western Europe, and this result remains if only time is included as explanatory variable or when it is estimated curvilinearly.⁷ Substantively, this result contrasts an often mentioned decline in political trust. We find a positive trend among one of the least welcomed communities across Western Europe, a result that deserves further analysis.

At the micro-level, most notably, we do not find a clear positive impact of education, which is found in a majority of studies on high-income consolidated democracies (Mayne and Hakhverdian 2017). However, also in Mayne and Hakhverdian's overview there are a few studies (studying the general population) finding no significant results, and among Muslim populations in the Middle East negative relations with (generalized) trust have been found too (Spierings 2019). This result indicates the relevance of analyzing minorized ethnic groups in Western countries to shed more light why and how antecedents exert influence.⁸ Also, we find that so-called second-generation citizens are less trusting than first-generation citizens, which is in line with previous research studying the evaluation of public institutions (Röder and Mühlau 2012).

While these results are not at the core of our study, we highlighted them as they help to assess our data and model as well as support the larger claims underlying our study: bringing together the political trust and literature on minorities inclusion processes provides fruitful ground for better understanding the causes and mechanisms, also stressing that we should be careful in extending conclusions of 'general population' studies in Western Europe to specific minority groups (who are part of those general population), with education offering a prime example.

[Insert Table 2 around here]

Average effects for the religiosity dimensions

In Models 1 and 2, we do not find a statistically significant relationship between *mosque attendance* and political trust. Hypothesis 1 can be considered falsified, the more so because

⁷ Including as nine categories gives following coefficients (ref: first two years): .06; .09; .17; .04; .14; .15; .15; .26. Quadratic term, if added is insignificant ($p > .8$).

⁸ Explanations for finding no positive effect included being socialized in authoritarian regimes (see Spierings 2019), and being more aware of ethno-religious-based exclusion, often perceived more by higher-educated (Geurts 2022). Mayne and Hakhverdian (2017) do indeed theorize this more.

zooming in shows a nuanced picture, with *negative* associations between Islamic religiosity being present under specific circumstances.

Particularly, Model 3b shows a statistically significant, albeit substantially limited, negative relationship between mosque attendance and trust in parliament among men. Additional models, including attendance as a set of dummies shows that weekly attending citizens are less trusting than those who go less often and that particularly men who go multiweekly have lower trust. Among women, this is not found, whereby it deserves notice that less than 1 in 5 women in our sample visits the mosque weekly or more often, whereas this is over 2 in 5 among men. The particularities of women's mosque attendance, including not having access to mosques in their neighborhood (Nyhagen 2019), might interfere with the mechanisms at work.

Also, as will be discussed in more detail below, we find that the attendance-trust link is conditioned by context. In contexts where the public is more hostile, we find negative effects while in the least hostile contexts we even find positive effects.

The results for the degree of religious *identification* are rather clear: we find no systematic relationship, not in the overall model (Table 2), not when included separately, non-linearly, or only using ESS with the 11-point identification variable (in additional analyses)⁹, and not in only the more inclusive or more exclusive societies (see online appendix E). Thus, overall Hypothesis 2 needs to be rejected. Still, it might be possible that the discussed counteracting mechanisms might be at play and balance each other out.

Regarding the link between *prayer* and political trust, our results are conditionally supporting Hypothesis 3, predicting a negative relationship (Table 2). The negative effect is reproduced across models with similar B-coefficients (among men and women, see Table 2, and migrant generation, see online appendix D). The clearest negative and significant effect is found among women. In combination with the gender-split results for attendance, this might suggest that praying taps into similar mechanisms as attendance (e.g. indicating a stronger group consciousness and discrimination as well as commitment to more conservative guidelines that are not enacted by parliament). Women who do not attend mosque frequently might revert to

⁹ Only including identification: $p=.67$. Adding a quadratic term (Table 2): $p\text{-values}>.45$. Estimation Model 2 on ESS only: $p=.249$.

praying, and indeed on daily praying women score eight percentage points higher than men in our data.

Context-level exclusion effects

Acknowledging that exclusion can take different shapes, we studied four different manifestations added together in the model (Table 2) as well as one by one. However, before adding those, the macro-variance is estimated with only time and the general publics' trust being included. The country-year-level variance was significant ($p=.025$) and the variance at the country level had a p-value of .051 (see Table 2, Model 1), which we consider meaningful given that seventeen countries are included.

Part of the contextual variance in trust in parliament among Muslims can be ascribed to our indicators of hostility. Clearly not all tested relationships are statistically significant, but those that are all show negative effects. Also, comparing Model 1 to Model 2 shows that it matters whether the trust levels of the general publics are included. With it included, more exclusionary laws and policies toward migrant participation – arguable the factor closest linked to the political domain – shows a negative relationship to Muslims' trust in parliament. The coefficient seems small, but the variable's scores run from 0 to 80. Without trust among the general population included (Model 2), the effects of the macro-level variables turn more strongly negative and we also find that the publics' level of anti-migrant attitudes relate negatively to trust. Moreover, only including this substantive macro-level variable shows a negative relationship ($b=0.16$) that is significant ($p<0.01$). We should be careful in drawing strong conclusions on this, but given the interrelatedness of political trust and anti-migrant attitudes among the larger population, it deserves consideration that macro-level trust partly overcontrols for the impact of anti-migrant publics. Put differently, there is some support for Hypothesis 4, whereby we find indications of both formal and informal boundaries playing a role in Muslims' political trust, on top of the overall political trust in a certain context.

Do exclusionary contexts aggravate religiosity's impact?

Lastly, we theorized that the contextual exclusion might also shape the way in which individual-level religiosity relates to Muslims' political trust (Hypothesis 5). As shown in online appendix E, only 1 out of 12 tested interaction effects is statistically significant, regardless of testing them separately or together. In other words, the impact of religiosity dimensions on political trust is

rather stable across contexts studied here, largely falsifying our hypotheses on cross-level moderations.

Which effect *did* show significant variation by level of exclusion? The results for attendance indicate a particular negative impact of attendance in contexts with more hostile native publics (interaction effect is negative with $p < 0.05$ ¹⁰ – online appendix E), as is depicted in Figure 1a, showing the downward slope for a context 1 standard deviation more hostile than average. Figure 1b additionally shows the effect across the range of contexts in terms of public hostility. As shown, the effect of attendance is negative and statistically significant (the confidence interval, also presented in the figures, does not include 0) from around a hostility level of 6.5, which is around half a standard deviation above the mean context on public hostility (see Table 1). The positive coefficient for lower hostility contexts is not significant (and less hostile context do not exist in our sample (see Table 1)). Lastly, Figure 1c shows the b-coefficient of attendance (vertical axis) against the level of public hostility (horizontal axis) per country (each marker is a country), based on re-estimating the model for attendance per country separately.¹¹ This also shows that in a more hostile environment a stronger negative impact of frequent attendance exists. The only three cases with a positive B-coefficient (above 0 vertically) are among the most inclusive countries (on the left of the panel). This includes Denmark, which based on the figure could be considered one of two potentially influential or outlier cases; the other being Sweden in the upper lefthand corner. Without these two cases, the results remain to show a negative significant interaction effect ($p = .018$).

[Figure 1 around here]

Given the gendered effect of attendance on trust, we also estimated the interaction model for men and women separately. The interaction term is negative for both ($B = -0.07$ and -0.05 for men and women respectively), but only statistically significant for men ($p < 0.1$). Figure 2 shows similar plots to those discussed above. For men, the negative effect is a bit more pronounced than in general (as shown by comparing the slopes of Figure 1a and Figure 2a), and a statistically significant negative effect around being reached in contexts that score about

¹⁰ Also $p < .05$ when only this interaction term is included.

¹¹ This also allows the control variables' impact to vary between countries, creating an additional robustness test: finding the same result decreases the risk of a Type-2 error. Countries > 100 respondents included.

6 on public hostility (i.e. the mean; Figure 2b). Also, the country-based plot (Figure 2c) shows that the Danish case is no longer an outlier. In brief, the negative attendance effect in hostile contexts seems more certain and stronger among men. Noteworthy here is also that the only two per-country (marginally) significant effects that were found among women were both positive relationships between attendance and trust and both in relatively less exclusive countries (Denmark and Sweden).

All in all, there is some indication that attendance's negative influence on trust is particularly present among men and in contexts in which the public is more hostile towards migrants. At the same time, among women we find some indications that attendance might actually have a positive effect in the least hostile environments. Given the sparsity of clear interaction results we do not corroborate Hypothesis 5, but fully refuting it also seems too harsh, given the results discussed above. In the conclusion, we come back to the interpretation and implication of this set of results.

[Figure 2 around here]

Conclusion and Discussion

This study has contributed to the scarce amount of research studying the association between Islamic religiosity and political trust (Hsiung and Djupe 2019). We do so by studying Muslims in Western Europe and offer two key contributions. Firstly, instead of comparing Muslims to another group and assuming differences can be ascribed to Islamic religiosity or studying the impact of religiosity as similar across religions¹², we study differences *among* Muslims in Western Europe and distinguish several dimensions of Islamic religiosity to study its importance for trust in national parliament. Second, we take a cross-national approach to find overall patterns while realizing that political trust is subject to its surroundings, and in doing so illustrate how certain exclusionary policies and practices on the national level affect Muslims' political trust.

In general, we find that Muslims' political trust is lower in countries where public attitudes towards migrants are more hostile and where political participation is restricted for some. Muslim men who more often attend a mosque experience on average lower trust in

¹² Online Appendix F shows the effects of the dimensions studied here do indeed differ by religion.

national parliament, and even more so when the public is more hostile towards migrants. Among women, a negative association between praying and trust is found. Surprisingly, we find no association between religious identification and trust in parliament. Below, we reflect on what this combination of results implies for the theories and literatures brought together in this study.

With respect to mosque attendance, we could initially conclude that the found negative relationship among men does not support the social capital literature, at least in terms of mosque attendance being considered a form of civic activity or integration, although bonding capital could of course have been strengthened by mosque attendance. However, considering the found indication of a context-dependency, considering the more general observation that the West European context has been rather hostile towards Islam at least since 2001 (Vermeulen 2018), and considering that we even found some positive relationships in the least hostile contexts draws out a more nuanced story, that might bear larger significance on the political trust literature.

Among men, we find support for the idea that integration in the religious community mobilizes grievances towards parliament, which is mostly likely to work via consumption of what is preached at the mosque or exchanged in communication with others in the context of mosque attendance. Additionally, and also in line with the negative effect of praying for women, the discrepancy between the moral convictions in the country of living and those dominant in 'the average' mosque or among devout prayers seem to feed into some distrust too. Part of this story might also be that the often praying women are actually more likely to be partnered with often attending men. Considering the strong interhousehold political socialization (Iyengar et al. 2018; Stoker and Jennings, 1995), this would further support our interpretation. However, it also flags the importance of more research taking gendered effects, including partner effects, into account and trying to disentangle the group consciousness about marginalization from the impact of dissatisfaction with the moral direction a country takes.

Moreover, the gendered effects found, including a positive impact of attendance in the least hostile environments for women, suggest that attending mosque does also lead to the transfer of civic skills and political knowledge, particularly among regular attending women. It are these women that are likely to be more conservative and potentially less involved in networks bridging between minority groups and general society, including politics. Then, in a

relatively low hostile setting, mosques might provide them with political information, which outweighs the negative effect between devout Muslims and parliament's policies due to moral discrepancies.

Phrased more generally, and referring back to the larger literature on political trust, we find some support for the positive effects mentioned in the social capital literature (De Vroome et al. 2013; Putnam 2000). Yet, for a problematized and minoritized religious group these effects seem to be largely overruled by a stronger impact of mosque attendance via mechanisms of group consciousness and experiences of marginalization that are assumed to be communicated via mosque attendance. The latter realization actually can be considered a manifestation of the privilege or winners-losers mechanism (Newton et al. 2018; Röder and Mühlau 2012). The negative formulation here seems to be the dominant process in Western Europe today when it comes to linking Islamic religiosity, and mosque attendance in particular, to political trust. This logic also points to new questions for other minorities and how they relate to the political system: the winners-losers logic often focused on the winners and little on the marginalized groups. Our results suggest that for other minorities that are mobilized in organizations, similar processes are likely. Moreover, people belong or identify with different groups and marginalization is an intersectional process, raising questions like whether this process works differently for different ethnic groups, such as Muslim people with a Middle Eastern or a Bosnian background. Such ethnic differences, and complexities more general, were impossible to study here but do deserve more attention in future work.

Part of our starting point and interpretation above stresses the importance of the context. This context is partly comparable across Western Europe; yet partly varies between the countries and years studied. Besides indications of an interplay between public attitudes and mosque attendance, we also show that restriction in the political participation of ethnic minorities and the general publics' trust level translate to the political trust of Muslims in a country. At the same time, our results suggest that not all forms of such exclusionary policies and practices have the same power and that they relate to general trust in society, which deserves further study among Muslims citizens in specific. Again, this might apply to other groups as well. For instance, the social boundary of public opinion on LGBTIQ+ people might also inform LGBTIQ+ citizens' political trust. We hope to have provided directions in studying these interactions between national contexts and minority members in shaping their political attitudes.

Still, we should acknowledge that we found only little interplay between Islamic religiosity on the individual level and the differences in exclusionary boundaries in European societies, which is in line with a recent study conducted on how such contextual factors shape the link between Islamic religiosity and voting (intentions) (Kollar et al. 2023). The limited power on the macro level may be part of why there are hardly any significant interactions between these two, although previous studies with similar number of cases have illustrated the context-dependency of religiosity on trust in other regions and on other outcomes in Europe (Glas and Alexander 2020). A missing link here might be that of subjective experiences. Indeed, previous research has illustrated that it is not so much the objective level of exclusion that intersects with Islamic religiosity, but that individual perceptions of exclusion are key (Röder and Spierings 2022). We recommend future research to dive into this, as well into other underlying mechanisms that may explain findings like why prayer relates negatively to political trust, for which qualitative research is key. Our study has illustrated that Islamic religiosity matters for political trust but neither in clear-cut simple ways nor being all explanatory. Its importance is gendered and contextualized, whereby we found a negative impact of attendance among men and of praying among women, both explainable by a focus on group consciousness of exclusion indicating Muslims' non-belonging in society which may strengthen moral convictions ill-fitting Western European societies.

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Table 1. Descriptive statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
Core micro-level variables					
Trust towards parliament (z values)	5,267	-2.18	1.78	-	1.00
				.00	
<i>Strong distrust¹</i>		0	1	.12	
<i>distrust¹</i>		0	1	.20	
<i>Neither distrust, neither trust¹</i>		0	1	.18	
<i>Trust¹</i>		0	1	.29	
<i>Strong trust¹</i>		0	1	.21	
Mosque attendance	5,267	0	3	1.20	0.95
<i>Never</i>		0	1	.24	
<i>Irregularly</i>		0	1	.45	
<i>Weekly</i>		0	1	.18	

<i>Multiple times a week</i>		0	1	.1	
				3	
Religious identification (z values)	5,2	-4.06	1.18	.0	.97
	67			1	
<i>How religious are you?²</i>	4,3	0	10	7.	2.37
	59			19	
<i>Are you a religious person²</i>	894	0	2	1.	.40
				84	
<i>How important is god in your life?²</i>	899	0	9	7.	2.16
				68	
Praying outside religious services	5,2	0	3	2.	1.11
	67			02	
Core macro-level variables					
Hostile public attitudes	207	4.13	7.55	6.	0.67
				08	
Disproportionality parliament	207	0.63	21.95	5.	4.86
				17	
Restrictions political participation migrants	207	0	80	35	20.00
				.8	
				7	
Excluding citizenship and equality laws	207	9.00	65.33	34	16.76
				.1	
				9	
Control variables					
General public's trust in parliament	207	-2.68	1.99	0.	0.98
				04	

Female (ref. = no)	5,2	0	1	0.	0.50
	67			45	
Age (in years)	5,2	15	80	35	13.50
	67			.6	
				2	
Migration generation					
<i>Second generation</i>	5,2	0	1	.3	
	67			0	
<i>First generation</i>	5,2	0	1	.6	
	67			5	
<i>Unknown</i>	5,2	0	1	.0	
	67			5	
Education level					
<i>Lower than secondary</i>	5,2	0	1	.2	
	67			0	
<i>Secondary education</i>	5,2	0	1	.5	
	67			7	
<i>Tertiary education</i>	5,2	0	1	.2	
	67			3	
Main daily activity					
<i>Employed</i>	5,2	0	1	.4	
	67			8	
<i>In education</i>	5,2	0	1	.1	
	67			6	
<i>Other</i>	5,2	0	1	.3	
	67			6	

Relationship status

<i>Never married</i>	5,2	0	1	.2
	67			7
<i>In durable relation</i>	5,2	0	1	.6
	67			0
<i>Other (incl. divorced / widowed)</i>	5,2	0	1	.1
	67			2

Notes: (1) As z-values are standardized they give little background information on the spread and scale of trust in parliament. Therefore this descriptives table includes descriptives of a categorical variant of the trust variable. While it provides a general grasp of the dispersion on the variable, it should be interpreted carefully as the categorization is partly artificial. The survey items with five categories are copied to these categories as is; those with four answering categories do not have a middle answer and were recategorized in either the distrust or trust categories here; finally those with 11 categories were recoded as followed: 0-2; 3-4; 5; 6-7; 8-10; (2) Of these three items the z-values are used to create the final index; the scores here allow for a more substantive descriptive assessment of the level of religious identification, while the index' descriptives should be used for model interpretation.

Table 2. Multilevel regression models estimating the impact of Islamic religiosity on trust in national parliament among self-identified Muslim citizens in Western Europe (2002-2020).

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3a women only	Model 3b men only
FIXED EFFECTS				
MICRO-LEVEL VARIABLES OF INTEREST				
Mosque attendance (0-3)	-.02	-.02	.02	-.05*
Religious identification	.02	.02	.01	.03
Individual praying	-.03*	-.03*	-.04#	-.02
MICRO-LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES				
Female (ref = no)	-.03	-.02	-	-
Age (in years)	.00	.00	-.003#	.004*
Migration generation (ref = 2nd)				
First generation	.27***	.27***	.28***	.27***
Unknown	.29**	.29**	.24*	.35**
Education level (ref = low)				
Secondary education	-.06	-.06	-.17**	.02
Tertiary education	.03	.03	-.06	.09
Main activity (ref = employed)				
In education	.22***	.23***	.11#	.34***
Other	-.01	-.01	.05	-.08#
Relationship status (ref = never married)				
In durable relation	.09*	.09*	.03	.11#
Other (incl. divorced / widowed)	-.00	.00	-.01	-.00

MACRO-LEVEL VARIABLES

Hostile public attitudes	.04	-.10 [#]	.04	.02
Disproportionality parliament	.00	-.01	-.01	.01
Restrictions political participation migrants	-.003 [#]	-.005 [*]	-.00	-.005 [*]
Excluding citizenship and equality laws	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.00
Trust in parliament (general population)	.25 ^{***}		.22 ^{***}	.26 ^{***}

SYSTEM VARIABLES

Time (in years; 2002=0)	.01 ^{**}	.01 ^{**}	.01 [#]	.02 ^{**}
Source survey (ref = ESS)				
WVS	-.14	-.14	-.29 [*]	.05
EVS	-.01	-.02	-.08	.03
Intercept	-.42	.51	-.22	-.48

RANDOM EFFECTS


Country-level intercept	.02 [#]	.02 [#]	.02 [#]	.01
Countryyear-level intercept	.01 [*]	.02 ^{***}	.01	.01

MODEL STATISTICS

BIC	14,571.406	14,613.053	6,484.792	8,153.148
N _{year} = 17; N _{countryyear} = 207; N _{individual} :	5,267	5,267	2,876	2,391


*** P<0.001 **p<0.01 *p<0.05 #P<0.1 (macro-level effects and split model only)

Figure 1a. Estimated relation between attendance and trust towards parliament for different levels of ‘hostile public attitudes’, with 95% confidence intervals




Note: Only countries with at least 100 cases are included here.

Figure 1b. Estimated effect of attendance on trust per level of hostility, with 95% confidence intervals




Note: Only countries with at least 100 cases are included here.

Figure 1c. B-coefficient of attendance on trust towards parliament per country, plotted against the score on ‘public hostile attitudes’




Note: Only countries with at least 100 cases are included here.

Figure 2a. Estimated relation between attendance and trust towards parliament for different levels of ‘hostile public attitudes’, *among men only*, with 95% confidence intervals




Note: Only countries with at least 100 cases are included here.

Figure 2b. Estimated effect of attendance on trust per level of hostility, *among men only*, with 95% confidence intervals



Note: Only countries with at least 100 cases are included here.

Figure 2c. B-coefficient of attendance on trust towards parliament per country, plotted against the score on 'public hostile attitudes', *among men only*



Note: Only countries with at least 100 cases are included here.