

such as “Providing assistance to those most affected by climate change” (p. 57), are much more practicable.

There are stylistic drawbacks to this book. For example, at times it reads like a doctoral dissertation and at others like a reprinted journal article: “this paper seeks to theoretically examine the usefulness of the lens of environmental justice in understanding global politics from a North-South dimension” (p. 8). There is also the annoying practice of not including page numbers for the very many quotes and citations. Anyone wanting to unearth the original sources will have to do a lot of unnecessary digging. The index is very short; terms such as common but differentiated responsibility, equity (a common synonym for justice in the context of this book, although this is barely addressed) and responsibility do not appear. The book also misses much of the literature on this topic.

This book is most suited to patient students and scholars, who will be rewarded with some important, if well-rehearsed, insights on international environmental justice. The book deserves a place alongside existing literature in this field.

Economy, Elizabeth C. 2004. *The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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China is the world's most rapidly developing country as well as a nation suffering greatly from environmental degradation. Water is increasingly scarce; forest resources have shrunk; fully one-fourth's of China's land area is now desert; air, land, and water are heavily polluted. Indeed, China's rivers do run black, as Elizabeth Economy titles her comprehensive and readable account of changes to China's environment in the era of economic reform.

Although China's environmental problems are comparable to those of other developing nations, the scale of the Chinese population—1.3 billion—in an area somewhat larger than the United States makes the case of China exceedingly important in global environmental politics. Too, China contributes greatly to three serious global environmental problems—greenhouse gas emissions, transboundary acid rain, and biodiversity loss. For these reasons, readers of this journal should pay attention to the prospects for the improvement of China's environmental protection regime.

Economy's first chapter surveys the serious problems of environmental degradation in China and their cost, estimated at 8 to 12 percent of GDP. She distinguishes her book from other interpretations by its focus on political institutions and politics, asking these questions:

- “Who are the key actors and what is their relative power?”
- How are resources allocated to environmental protection?

- How is environmental policy formulated and implemented?
- What incentives do or do not exist for government, business, and society in China to advance goals of environmental protection?" (p. 14)

Economy next reviews China's environmental legacy, finding that economic development has always been a higher priority than environmental protection. China's tradition of Confucian humanism has impaired environmental governance because of the lack of independent scientific inquiry, a transparent political system, and accountable leadership (p. 27). Too, the tendency of China's leaders to devolve authority to the provincial and local levels has been an obstacle to sustainability. She finds the Maoist attempts to overcome nature, seen in the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, as equals to the worst environmental excesses of the imperial era.¹

Chapter 3 examines the environmental cost of China's very rapid economic development since the onset of Teng Hsiaoping's economic reforms in 1978. For example, the township and village enterprises, which are critical to rural economic development, are also responsible for 50 percent of pollution nationally (p. 63). Economic development has led to increased use of coal (supplying two-thirds of China's energy needs), unsustainable logging, loss of grasslands, water scarcity, more vehicles in use and resulting increases of pollution, mistaken government policies on grain production and food security, and serious loss of topsoil—all of which are related to biodiversity loss, climate warming, and desertification. These problems have increased public health risks, led to displacement of from 20 to 60 million people, and, Economy claims, caused 170,000 protests in 2000 alone.²

Economy then turns to the institutional and political problems that challenge a "greening" of China: weak central environmental protection laws and institutions, limited investment, and few incentives. Environmental policy lacks a strong centralized focus, and other interests generally prevail over environmental protection. The State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) was not formed until 1988 and lacked cabinet status until 1998. Environmental laws are over-broad, reading like policy statements instead of specific directives. Implementation and monitoring functions are relegated to local environmental protection bureaus. They are well supplied with personnel, but operate under provincial or municipal control and are poorly funded. Investment by the state in environmental protection in the 2001–05 plan period is 1.3 percent of GDP (about \$85 billion US), less than half of that needed for sustainability (p. 107). In areas where local leaders are pro-environment, with high income and connected to the international community, such as Shanghai, Dalian, and Zhongshen, progress has been made (p. 128).

1. This contrasts with Judith Shapiro's view of Maoist rule as "an extreme and revealing example of a general pattern . . . the transparency of the link between human political repression and the effort to conquer nature by portraying and treating it as an enemy" (Shapiro 2001, 201).
2. The demonstrations, Economy notes, are "in cities where unemployed SOE (state-owned enterprise) workers and migrant laborers make for a potentially explosive combination" (p. 84).

Chapter 5 discusses the “politics of the environment” in terms of China’s environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOS). Some 230,000 “officially designated” NGOs operate (p. 132) but those organized by government agencies outnumber grass roots organizations.³ Economy introduces three environmental activists and briefly discusses the earliest ENGOS, such as Friends of Nature. She believes that the media are an essential element of environmental activism and points to the 47,000 articles related to the environment in China’s 70 newspapers by 2000 (p. 168).

The sixth chapter evaluates China’s eager embrace of international environmental institutions and particularly funding from abroad. China has become actively engaged in recent international conferences. After the Rio Summit in 1992, China was the first nation to adopt Agenda 21 as policy, and it began to incorporate the “sustainable development” concept in planning instruments. Economy estimates that 80 percent of China’s environmental protection budget comes from abroad, and it is the largest recipient of World Bank and GEF environmental funding. Nonetheless, pro-development agencies such as the State Development and Planning Commission water down international recommendations (p. 190); less than robust enforcement and lack of incentives weaken opportunities to transfer clean energy and other environmental technology. This chapter concludes with brief analyses of how economic development planning in the Three Gorges Dam, West-East Gas Pipeline, and “Opening the West” initiatives threatens to upset further the precarious ecological balance.

In chapter 7 Economy compares China to countries facing similar environmental problems, but which democratized. She is optimistic about Eastern European states whose governmental awareness of environmental problems, growth of activism, and political change led to a significant reduction in pollution (p. 234). Yet Asian Pacific states such as South Korea and the Philippines responded poorly to the environmental challenge, because elites responsible for environmental protection were closely linked to business leaders. Economy explains environmental progress in Eastern Europe by: 1) the ability to tap into broader social discontent; 2) linkages of ENGOS with other NGOs, and 3) coalescence around particular environmental challenges (p. 252). For China to echo their success would require “a unifying aspiration,” “a means of communication,” and issues or events serving as catalysts for change (p. 254). None of these conditions is impossible to satisfy in China.

Looking to the future, Economy envisions a continued use of campaigns to promote remedies, but believes they will not resolve difficult environmental problems. She hopes for the institutionalization of an environmental governance regime, notwithstanding SEPA’s size (one-twentieth as large as the US EPA). Instead of urging readers to rejoice or despair, she presents three scenar-

3. Economy does not specify the number of ENGOS in China today. Schwartz (2004, 36) says there are 2,000 registered groups, but believes most are organized by government agencies and only 40 are civic associations. This reviewer identified three dozen viable ENGOS in his 2004 study, and most were in Beijing.

ios: 1) China “goes green;” 2) nothing fundamental changes, and environmental problems remain a drag on the economy, or 3) there is “environmental meltdown.”

Altogether this is a very good, balanced review of China’s environmental problems. It displays advances in knowledge since publication of Ross’s pioneering *Environmental Policy in China*,⁴ although Economy’s study lacks the analytical framework of this work. It treats many of the same themes in *Managing the Chinese Environment*,⁵ but in a more integrated fashion. By emphasizing the enormity of China’s environmental challenge, Economy adds to the debate among scholars and statesmen as to what actions by developed countries can mitigate China’s environmental degradation and correspondingly help forestall global environmental crises.

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Hey, Mr. Tally Man, tally me banana...

Taylor, J. Gary, and Patricia J. Scharlin. 2004. *Smart Alliance—How a Global Corporation and Environmental Activists Transformed a Tarnished Brand*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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Who can forget the Chiquita Banana Lady? The image of the gaily decked-out Central American woman has been around since the 1930s (as the symbol of United Fruit), making Chiquita one of the best-known and most-recognized product brands in the United States for decades. Today, goes the conventional wisdom, the most important thing a company owns is its brand. Where bananas are concerned, that makes a great deal of sense. After all, aside from the sticker, who can tell two brands apart?

Chiquita, though, has been badly bruised by its share of public relations problems. For much of the 20th century, United Fruit (UF) was the literal landlord of many of the infamous “banana republics.” In the early 1950s, the populist Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz tried to tax and confiscate UF

4. Ross 1988

5. Edmonds 2000.