

# THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF ESCALATED REPRESSION\*

Rune Ellefsen<sup>†</sup>

*This article examines the unpredictable consequences of escalated repression on the dynamics of contention. By examining sequences of interactions among contenders in the course of one conflict, analysis traces pathways through which the escalation of repression impacts activists and protest targets in ways that seemingly go against the intentions of repressive agents. Three types of outcomes of repression are identified: a worse situation for protest targets; triggered radicalization; and a “chilling effect” on lawful protest. This article contributes by demonstrating a temporally sensitive approach that traces how certain pathways combine to produce these unintended outcomes. The empirical case studied is the life cycle (1999–2014) of the British conflict between the Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty animal rights campaign and the Huntingdon Life Sciences corporation, which also involved the government, criminal justice agencies, and private businesses.*

Repression<sup>1</sup> denotes practices “whose purpose is to prevent or diminish direct and non-institutional challenges to social, cultural and/or political power,” that is, protest and social movements (Earl 2011: 262). I use the concepts of repression and protest policing to describe efforts of social control that aim to prevent or diminish protest, activism, and social movements,<sup>2</sup> involving both state and private actors as well as “hard” and “soft” measures (Jämte and Ellefsen 2020). This article examines how the escalated repression of a social movement campaign impacts the dynamics of contention between campaigners, their targets, and agents of repression (Suh 2014). By examining sequences of interaction between these actors, I trace the pathways whereby repression impacts<sup>4</sup> activists and protest targets in ways that seemingly go against the intentions of the agents of repression. Following a “relational approach” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007), this article sets out to answer the question of how and why the escalation of repression affects conflict dynamics in ways that go against the intention of repressive agents.

The conflict in Britain between the animal rights campaign, Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC), and the transnational corporation Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS) is the case being studied. This case stands out in the history of the international animal rights movement because of campaigners’ tactical innovations, the great impact on its targets, and international diffusion. On the other hand, SHAC triggered what developed into an unprecedented level of repression in the history of this movement in Britain (Mills 2013). The case involves activists, a corporation and its business partners, and the British government, which—together with its criminal justice arm—a implemented the move to escalate repression. I have chosen this case because it is well-fitted for retrospectively studying the impacts of escalated repression throughout the life cycle (1999–2014) of one delimited protest campaign.

This article contributes to the literature on the dynamics of contention and repression by explaining the ways in which repression produces unforeseen and unpredictable consequences that crucially affect how contention develops. I argue that the identified pathways, through which escalated repression leads to specific consequences, might transfer across movements and be similar to those found in existing research. My analysis examines how escalated repression triggered sequences of effects that had three different end-results, which seemingly

---

\* I would like to thank the editors of *Mobilization* and the four anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback on earlier versions of this article.

<sup>†</sup> Rune Ellefsen is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law, University of Oslo, Norway. Please direct all correspondence to: rune.ellefsen@jus.uio.no.

were contrary to the intentions of the repressive agents. I argue that the initiation of extensive protest repression operations is highly likely, across cases, to trigger consequences that are unwanted by the repressive agents.

## THE INTERACTIVE DYNAMICS OF REPRESSION AND PROTEST

Seeking to identify the consequences of repression on the evolution of one conflict process, I draw on the relational approach and relate it to literature on the impact of repression on protest. The aim of identifying these consequences by examining sequences of interaction fits well with a relational research approach; it looks at how contention develops by tracking the interaction between several contending parties over time (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). Charles Tilly, Doug McAdam and Sidney Tarrow (2001) formulated the relational approach in the early 2000s. They built on Tilly's previous work on contentious politics but insisted more clearly on the need for a dynamic, relational understanding of various forms of contention (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 2008). This involved identifying relational (or environmental or dispositional) mechanisms and processes as fundamental explanations of specific episodes and forms of contention (Tilly 2008: xv). Their idea is that several mechanisms build into processes, either sequentially or in tandem (Tarrow 2015: 91).

McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly admitted and discussed earlier weaknesses and issues in their approach, regarding, for example, how exactly mechanisms are identified and accounted for (McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow 2008; McAdam and Tarrow 2011; see also the special issue in *Qualitative Sociology* 2008, issue four). Even though Tilly and Tarrow tried to remedy defects in their earlier work, their subsequent book, *Contentious Politics* (2007), still met similar criticisms because of the lack of solid empirical evidence and a tendency to be imprecise (Klandermans 2008). Despite these criticisms, a considerable number of scholars continue to espouse the core ideas of the relational approach (e.g., Bosi 2012; Goldstone 2004). I also align with the tenets of this tradition but seek to identify pathways by which escalated repression leads to a specific type of outcome. A pathway is a delimited process but, instead of seeking out mechanisms, I trace the series of consequences that make up the pathway in order to provide an empirically grounded descriptive explanation.

### *Effects of Repression on Protest and Dynamics of Contention*

A broad range of social movement literature has examined the impact of repression and protest policing (i.e., the police handling of protest events) on social movements. In this article, the concepts of repression and protest policing are used interchangeably and suggest a broad take on policing and repression, which include preventive, reactive, penal, investigatory and other—overt and covert—control measures by state and/or private actors. This understanding is in line with criminological research which has identified an international trend in the characteristics of policing which is referred to as plural policing (Crawford 2008). Ian Loader (2000) explains the nature of this pluralization as policing “by,” “through,” “beyond,” “below,” and “above” the government. These dimensions also apply to plural protest policing, and the ways in which this type of policing occurs: *by* government-initiated action (e.g., by steering responses involving state and government agencies), directly through government action (e.g., through Home Office initiatives), *beyond* the government via its criminal justice arm, *below* the government by involving private organizations, and *above* the government through transnational cooperation or agencies (e.g., through Europol). This article focuses on policing and repression that is largely government-initiated, implemented, and led by the police. Also involved are additional actors and agencies within government and criminal justice, and private business actors that cooperate with them. Research needs to be sensitive towards the multiple forms and dimensions of repression and protest policing carried out by agencies and actors beyond the public police (the state police forces), which involve private actors, organizations,

and state agents outside the criminal justice system (Button and John 2002). Policing and repression of protest can involve much more than the coercive actions of public police forces and criminal justice agencies. This approach thus counters the tendency in much existing social movement research on repression, which has largely ignored techniques of repression that do not manifest by coercive force (Earl 2003: 46).

Research on repression in the social movements field has examined how a regime's capacity and propensity for repression affects the opportunities for protest (Tilly and Tarrow 2007), and how specific forms of repression and protest policing might impact protesters (Linden and Klandermans 2006; Ferree 2004; for a review see Earl 2011). Much of the literature on repression, however, is largely concerned with singular effects of repression on protest (Earl 2003: 2011); for example, how repression impacts the frequency of public protest (Chang 2008). My relational approach, however, involves shifting the focus from single outcomes to an analysis of processes of "interrelated effects" that go beyond the actors' achievement of goals to consider indirect and unintended consequences of repression (Bosi 2016). For the scope of this article, research which employs relational and process-oriented approaches to repression and protest policing are thus the most relevant (Davenport, Johnston, and Mueller 2005; Waddington 1994; della Porta and Reiner 1998). This strand of research has, for example, shown how repression causes movements to make tactical adaptations throughout battles (McAdam 1983; Koopmans 1993; Meyer and Staggenborg 2008) and how protesters and agents of repression change their strategies through processes of interaction (della Porta 2014; Bosi, Demetriou and Malthaner 2015; Alimi, Demetriou and Bosi 2015).

Repertoires of repression and protest emerge, and change, in the course of physical and symbolic interaction between social movements and agents of repression, including their allies and third parties (della Porta 2014). A change of tactics often has unpredictable consequences. Research provides many examples of how repression has been self-defeating. In the 1980s, during interaction between protesters and the police in Germany, claims of police brutality often followed the authorities' decision to deploy units from different states to police protest events. This meant there was a lack of coordination and that the police had little knowledge of the area, which may have led to escalation of the conflict, despite the deescalation strategy of police leaders (della Porta and Reiner 1998). Waddington's case study of the "Battle of Seattle" in 1999, lists police tactics employed against global justice movement protesters that may have helped bring about disorder, rather than order (Waddington 2012: 113–5). Noakes et al (2005: 251) maintain that strategic incapacitation of protesters is likely to aggravate existing tensions between police and protesters. Mitchell and Staeheli (2005) expand on this argument and point to the violence that erupted during the post-Seattle protests in Washington, and those in the anti-war demonstration in New York in February 2003, as evidence of a backlash against police attempts to manage and "incorporate" social movement protest.

A number of researchers claim that the general style of the public police's handling of protest events in Western Europe and the U.S. has shifted from one of "escalated force" (based on the use of force) to one of "negotiated management" (based on communication and dialogue) over the last four to five decades (see Davenport, Johnston and Mueller 2005; Waddington 1994; della Porta and Reiner 1998).<sup>3</sup> This shift came about as the police learned from watershed events that made clear how their use of extensive force in protest policing led to various unintended consequences: conflict escalation, increased violence between police and protesters, and decreased public legitimacy of the police (Waddington 2012: 10–11). This illustrates how the police can learn lessons from the unintended consequences of protest policing and thereby change their strategies and tactics. By analyzing such organizational changes in the police response to protest events, researchers can help provide "a better understanding of both consequences of social movements and developments in protest policing" (Wahlström 2016: 285). We can contribute further, as this article does, by following the subsequent impact of transformed repression on the movement, its protest targets, and for the agents of repression themselves.

Research has shown many examples of how escalated repression was instigated in order to demobilize social movements but paradoxically led to increased mobilization; a so-called “backlash mobilization” (Sullivan and Davenport 2017). This type of “unintended effect” of repression (Chang 2008; Chiarello 2018; see also Fillieule 2015) has been referred in the literature as the “iatrogenic effects” (Lindekilde 2012) and “backlash effects” of repression (Andrews 2004). Unintended outcomes of repression (and of protest) vary along a continuum of importance for the contending actors and for social movement scholars: some are trivial, while others can produce significant backfire effects (see Lindekilde 2014 on “backfire mechanisms”) by directly challenging an intended outcome, or even reversing a previous success (e.g., Jasper and Poulsen 1993). We also know that short- and long-term outcomes can differ (Suh 2012), and potentially shift from being negative to positive for an actor in the course of a conflict (Ellefsen 2018), while the aim of repression also might change over time. The significance of temporality must therefore be recognized when outcomes are to be explained. In the analysis, I specify whether the found outcomes were short or long term, whether they directly or indirectly resulted from escalated repression, and also assess whether the found outcomes seemed desirable (positive) or undesirable (negative) for agents of policing, protesters, and protest targets (c.f. Marx 1988).

### THE SHAC-HLS CONFLICT

The empirical case being studied is the conflict in Britain between Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) and Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS)—delimited to the conflict’s duration from 1999 to 2014—which also involved the business partners of HLS, the British government, and its criminal justice arm. SHAC was a social movement campaign established in England in 1999 with the single aim of closing down HLS, one of the world’s largest contract research laboratories. SHAC developed out of the grassroots animal rights movement in Britain, and HLS was chosen as its primary target because it made extensive use of animals for product testing and laboratory experiments.

SHAC was positioned on the radical flank of the international animal rights movement, and it developed a sophisticated strategy to inflict economic damage on HLS. SHAC’s innovative strategy involved approaching any company that had a business connection with HLS—their customers, the banks offering them loans, couriers, shareholders, stock exchanges trading HLS shares etc.—informing them about HLS’s experiments on animals and calling on them to cut links with HLS. If they did not comply, SHAC would announce (e.g., through newsletters, websites and mailing lists) that they were a protest target, and various lawful and unlawful actions would usually follow—until the targeted company dropped their business with HLS (Baron and Diermeier 2007). Singling out target companies and disseminating contact details of both companies and the people behind them enabled a broad spectrum of campaigners and activist groups to make use of the information and see the impact of attacking targets collectively using a diverse set of tactics. This strategy proved effective: over 250 companies, from small firms to some of the world’s biggest corporations, cut their ties to HLS because of the campaign (Mills 2012). This caused HLS serious problems in regards to their operations, reputation, and finances.

The early successes of the SHAC campaign encouraged its diffusion across national borders. It developed into a transnational grassroots campaign, combining lawful and unlawful means in a bid to close down HLS through financial pressure (Donovan and Coupe 2013). The unlawful tactics of clandestine militants led criminal justice agencies to pay closer attention to the campaign. A risk assessment report published in 2004 by the London-based Aegis Defense Services reflects the level of concern felt about the economic impact of the campaign. The report claimed that “animal rights extremists” posed one of the most serious threats to Britain’s economy at that time because of the increasing intimidation of companies linked to animal experiments (Evans 2004). This, combined with government lobbying by HLS and their

wealthy allies, was a wake-up call to the British government that then introduced a series of increasingly repressive measures to deal with the SHAC campaign (Mills 2012: 51; see also Home Office 2004). Escalation of repression consisted of multiple initiatives involving the British government, the criminal justice system, tighter cooperation with and counseling of protest targets, and even international initiatives through Europol and cooperation with the FBI (see e.g., Upton 2012). Subsequently, SHAC organizers announced the dissolution of the campaign in 2014 (SHAC 2014).

Existing research on the SHAC-HLS conflict provides valuable knowledge about why and how escalated repression was introduced (Mills 2012: 2013), the new forms of repression that were introduced particularly to tackle the SHAC campaign (Ellefsen 2016a; Donovan and Coupe 2013), and the tactical innovations of protesters and agents of repression throughout the conflict (Ellefsen 2016b; Ellefsen 2018; Metcalfe 2008). Existing literature provides important knowledge on this conflict and its dynamics, but no one has examined how and why the seemingly unintended consequences of the escalating repression came about. The existing literature has, however, provided much of the ground that rendered this study possible. These previous works assisted this study by offering detailed accounts of the measures and actors that were engaged in the policing of SHAC, thus enabling analysis for this article.

## METHODOLOGY

The data used for this article were collected in England in 2013 and 2014 by triangulating qualitative methods and data sources: twenty-five semistructured interviews (twenty activists, one activist solicitor, two police representatives, one representative from HLS and one of a countermovement organization), six weeks of trial observation (two criminal cases in the Crown Court against SHAC activists), participant observation amongst activists in relation to the trials, and four activist events about repression (two in England, one in Luxembourg and one in Spain). I also gathered various documents published by key players (e.g., activist pamphlets and press releases from the Crown Prosecution Service). Police and government strategy documents were particularly important for my ability to establish the intentions behind police operations and government efforts targeting SHAC.

Activist interviewees were mainly chosen because of their position within the SHAC campaign. I looked for activists who were (or had been) part of, or close to, the core organizing group of SHAC who organized much of the campaign. I sought them out because of their involvement in developing strategy, their deep knowledge about the campaign, and their experience of being targeted by and adapting to repression over time. I interviewed a solicitor, who had represented many SHAC activists during criminal trials, and four opponents of the protesters: one police officer with on-the-ground experience of policing SHAC protests, another police representative with extensive experience from the policing of “animal rights extremism” in Britain, one senior figure from Huntingdon Life Sciences, and a representative of the countermovement to SHAC. Pseudonyms are being used to protect the identity of interviewees. In all, the data consists of transcribed interviews, publications from the players involved, various documents about the conflict, and my field notes. Data were coded using the Nvivo software based on predefined codes and additional ones that emerged in the material. All codes aimed to capture tactical innovations among the key players of the conflict, the consequences these had on the ensuing interaction, as well as the consequences of repression for protesters and others.

Social movement researchers have emphasized the analytical and methodological difficulties of identifying and assessing social movement outcomes (Bosi and Uba 2009; Amenta et al. 2010). The same challenges apply for studies of the consequences of repression. The most fundamental problem being that of causal attribution, as determining the causality of the outcome of interest, involves the major difficulty of separating the role of repression (or protest) from other factors (Giugni and Bosi 2012). It can also be challenging to establish whether an impact of a certain instance of repression is intended or unintended. For example, the intentions of

agents of repression may be made explicit and clearly stated in public, and thus be easily traceable, but there might also be intentions that are implicit, unstated, and thus much harder to establish empirically (Brouder 1992). A methodologically helpful feature of the SHAC-HLS conflict is that a series of repressive measures were introduced explicitly—and selectively—to control SHAC activists and the faction of the animal rights movement in Britain that surrounded them (Ellefsen 2016a; 2016b). This has made it easier to trace the introduction of policing initiatives, their aims and implementation, in the data material. For example, the British Government published the policy document “Animal Welfare: Human Rights—Protecting people from animal rights extremists” (Home Office 2004), which laid out the government’s strategy on tackling SHAC (and similar groups) by setting out a list of forthcoming measures and descriptions of what they sought to achieve. Several measures were intended to help “provide the best possible protection” to SHAC’s targets (Home Office 2004: 13). Other key sources for the intentions of agents involved in repression of SHAC—and for what they themselves saw as unintended consequences of repression—are journal articles and doctoral dissertations published by police researchers<sup>4</sup> that were closely involved in the repressive initiatives targeting SHAC in Britain<sup>5</sup> (Mills 2012; Donovan and Coupe 2013; Mills 2013). Interviews with police and HLS personnel also provided insight into the aims of their counter-responses to SHAC and their perception of their unwanted consequences.

The triangulation of different types, and opposing sources, of data about the same events also helped strengthen my analysis in terms of validation, as I could “control” the credibility of findings by crosschecking with several data sources (Lewis, Ritchie, Ormston, and Morrell 2014). This assisted my descriptive analysis, which traces “what followed what” through the explicated pathways and further reflects the epistemological idea that “to describe the unfolding of a process is to explain the process” (Alimi, Demetriou and Bosi 2015: 34).

## FINDINGS: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF ESCALATED POLICING

My analysis identifies and describes sequences of events that constitute pathways to three categories of unintended outcomes of escalated policing: the worsening of the situation for protest targets; the triggering of radicalization; and the chilling effect on lawful protest. Analysis takes escalated policing as the starting point. This escalation was, however, the result of preceding events that are explicated in existing research and which I build on (e.g. Ellefsen 2018; Mills 2013; Metcalfe 2008). Analysis draws heavily from earlier works (Ellefsen 2016a, 2016b; 2017; Ellefsen and Busher 2020) that have presented detailed accounts and a timeline of the conflict between SHAC, HLS, and state agencies in the UK (1999–2014), including a chronology of the successive measures taken by various actor to tackle the SHAC campaign.


### *Worsening the Situation for Protest Targets*

This unintended consequence of repression is what Gillham and Marx (2000: 222) call a “spill-over effect”: when actions directed at one group unintentionally affect others. The impact here resulted from police action that affected both protesters and their targets, which worsened the situation for those becoming protest targets, helped the activists, and was clearly undesirable for the agents of policing.

Figure 1 depicts the paths through which the escalated policing mechanism results in the unintended outcome of worsening the situation for protest targets. The left path shows the indirect effect of escalated policing on protest targets, and the right path shows the direct.

Escalated policing involved increased cooperation between the government, the criminal justice agencies, HLS and some of the wealthy protest targets to control and diminish protest. Secondly, it also involved efforts by the British government and criminal justice actors to give existing and potential protest targets advice on measures to increase their security and ability to handle protests (Ellefsen 2016b).<sup>6</sup> These two dimensions of escalation combine in the left path of figure 1, while only the second dimension is central in the right path.

**Figure 1.** Paths Whereby Escalated Policing Results in the Short-Term Worsening of the Situation for Protest Targets.



*Tactical Innovation → Increased Impact of Protest*

The second dimension of escalation mentioned above led HLS and the more resourceful protest targets to enhance their security and resilience to the campaign’s actions (Ellefsen 2016b). The first dimension resulted in new forms of repression being developed, through increased surveillance of SHAC activists and when HLS and the wealthier companies started to obtain High Court injunctions that put legal restrictions on protesters (Ellefsen 2016a).<sup>7</sup> These developments decreased protesters’ ability to effectively impact these wealthy targets that were formerly prioritized (Mills 2015). In order to maintain momentum and their impact, campaigners had to make “tactical innovations” (McAdam 1983). In 2004, this led them to increasingly go after “softer” (smaller, less wealthy) secondary and tertiary targets, because they seemed more likely to give in to SHAC’s demand that they should cut their links to HLS (Mills 2012). This is illustrated in the account given by Joan<sup>5</sup>, a former SHAC activist and Animal Liberation Front (ALF) prisoner:

Author: Did repression affect which forms of targets you went after, in terms of secondary and tertiary targets?

Joan: The big companies like Novartis started to use tools like injunctions, which really limited activity against them. Then I think people were a bit more frightened of doing direct actions against the bigger companies. The consequences would be bigger. [...] Say if you do a demo on an industrial estate with all the massive pharmaceutical companies, you will get like loads of cops. But if you go to this tiny courier, then it’s easier to get away with more. You know, so it’s a level of like...whose premises they are, who has more power.

The introduction of new tools to control protesters affected protesters' choice of targets and, at the same time, HLS and wealthy protest targets (customers of HLS) became better able to defend themselves against protests (Ellefsen 2016b). This increased resilience therefore led protesters to switch to less resilient targets, as explained by Heather from the HLS leadership:

As they [the protesters] began to realize the company [HLS] was quite resilient, the company was pretty well set up to cope with a lot of what they did and could support their staff quite well, even though it was really tough, they [the protesters] thought: well actually other targets are less resilient, or might be less resilient, let's try focusing on other targets to see how successful these similar tactics are against other targets. And if you are a supplier of HLS and they can work out who those suppliers are, which is quite easy to do, then you [the protesters] target the company and you target the managing director of that supplier. Why should he then supply HLS?

By shifting from big corporations to smaller firms, protesters were thus able to secure momentum and pressure on the primary target was maintained, and even increased pressure, as their tactical innovation proved successful and led over one hundred companies to give in to the campaign's demands during 2004 (Ellefsen 2016b). This made the situation worse for those who became protest targets, and it increased the negative impact on HLS's finances and ability to operate rather than reduce it—in the short term (Mills 2012).

A similar tactical shift occurred later in the conflict on the international level. After 2007, the level of SHAC activity in Britain decreased, but simultaneously more militant actions took place in mainland Europe (Europol 2014). The move of campaign activity to other countries coincided with the peak of escalated policing of SHAC in Britain. This meant that the direction of the SHAC campaign, once again, shifted towards softer targets in countries less prepared for this type of protest (Mills 2013). Chris, a senior police interviewee from a former police unit tasked with countering domestic extremism, also confirms this. Chris says the shift to protest targets outside the UK created a need to intensify police cooperation across Europe: "The export of the UK's experiences in policing ARE [animal rights extremism] has been vital. Especially as the success of the UK response has obviously led to the targeting [by protesters] of softer targets abroad."

By means of this shift, activists could go about with less hindrance from agents of policing or from laws brought in to tackle SHAC and similar campaigns in Britain. This, again, had—in the short term—a negative effect for those becoming protest targets, and thus on HLS. It gave the protesters some leverage and had highly problematic consequences for the agents of repression (Mills 2013). I perceive these consequences, and those in the next pathway, as unintended because that is how they were viewed by several sources among the police and protest targets. They went contrary to the aims of escalated repression, which were to increase the protection of protest targets and decrease the impact of SHAC.

### *Preemptive Policing Efforts Towards Protest Targets → Rising Fear and Costs for Targets*

The other path that led to a worsening of the situation for protest targets was closely related to the one just described and became even more important after protesters moved to targeting smaller companies and firms. These were softer targets because they had less economic investment in maintaining business with HLS, smaller budgets, and no separate security department—unlike the transnational corporate targets—and thus were more vulnerable (Mills 2012). The vulnerability of these new targets was precisely what made preemptive policing efforts (figure 1, left path), aimed at forestalling potential future crime, problematic. Peter, formerly active in the SHAC campaign, describes how this dynamic played out:

We turned up at one place [protest target] and the guy said, "The police have just been here." So, we were asking, "Why were the police here?" He said, "They were telling us all about you. You are these crazy people. And the police told us to put roller shutters on our doors, and roller shutters on our windows and get security cameras, and get all of this, fast." So, we thought, this

is a small business, and this is costing them thousands and thousands of pounds. We walked out of there thinking, what the fuck are the police doing? They are doing our job for us [mild laughter].

Several other activist interviewees made the same point. Escalation of policing efforts against SHAC meant the police preemptively contacted companies that had been identified as, or could potentially become, a SHAC target to inform them about the modus operandi of the SHAC campaign and its history of militant action, which even included arson attacks and property destruction at the homes of target company's employees. To increase awareness and preparedness for attacks, the police would recommend a variety of security measures that the company ought to implement. The National Extremism Tactical Coordination Unit (NETCU) was a police unit particularly engaged in this type of contact and advised companies about the SHAC campaign and similar types of animal rights activism (Donovan and Coupe 2013). Established in 2004 as a reaction to the SHAC campaign and its surrounding movement, one of NETCU's main tasks was to liaise with protest targets and to be their contact point (Home Office 2004). Rebecca, a former SHAC organizer and prisoner, acknowledges the effect of NETCU on potential targets:

Apparently, NETCU was visiting all companies that were potentially a target for animal rights to advise them. This one company had not had protests against them. They never have, but NETCU was just going around visiting, and taking along with them press cuttings, like; "Ooh, look what happens." Which is...it's quite strange, because in our trial a big part of the case against us was how we created a climate of fear. And that was really like focused on in court, you know, that the promotion of direct action and everything made a climate of fear. You know, we were prosecuted for that. And yeah, NETCU could go around promoting a climate of fear [mild laughter] and that's OK? [laughter].

A rise in the cost of preventative security measures to protect against campaigners, I assume, increased the likelihood that smaller companies with limited budgets would sever their links to HLS. The fact that companies were even sought out and advised by the police, before they had any experience of the campaign, seemingly added negatively to their assessment of the risks involved in maintaining a business relationship with HLS (Baron and Diermeier 2007). I anticipate that they would thus be more inclined to capitulate to the protesters' demands, even before becoming a target. The number of smaller companies that did cut their business connections to HLS—in the period following the use of this tactical innovation dating from 2004—makes it seem highly likely that this part of escalated policing helped increase targets' fear of protesters and affected their assessment of the risks and potential financial consequences of doing business with HLS (Ellefsen 2016b).

The unintended impacts in this category were all short term, observed over a number of years from the early stage of the conflict and well into its second half. In the end, the SHAC campaign was dismantled and these impacts came to an end. However, even if the observed outcomes were short term, they are a testament to the serious and contradictory impacts of protest policing that, in some cases, impacted protest targets over many years and were an important factor in the overall evolution of the conflict. This category demonstrates the importance of including actors beyond the protesters and police in analysis, as protest targets play a key role in the identified dynamic. Including such nonstate actors seems crucial to understanding repression and criminalization directed at social movements and their campaigns. For example, nonstate actors' roles were crucial in initiating repression in the case of SHAC by lobbying and pushing for new laws or obtaining High Court injunctions to control protest (Ellefsen 2016). The police, Home Office, and nonstate actors also cooperated closely by exchanging intelligence and codeveloping strategies for how to deal with SHAC activists as well as clandestine attacks at properties or executives' homes. These actors even created an international forum within Europol for police and industry representatives to regularly meet and develop counter-responses to what they deemed the serious threat of "international Animal Rights Extremism" (Europol 2011).

### Triggering Radicalization

This unintended outcome of repression is what Gillham and Marx (2000: 223) label an “escalation effect”: an impact that works to escalate the conflict and raise the level of confrontation, rather than achieving the goal of reducing it. The radicalization effect was observed in the short term and had undesirable impacts for the agents of repression and the protest targets affected. It also had a two-fold effect for protesters. It provided grounds for the legitimization of increasingly repressive state reactions that would have been undesirable. On the other hand, radicalization reflected efforts by protesters to maintain momentum that they seemingly obtained to some degree, in the short term.

**Figure 2.** Paths Whereby Escalated Policing Triggers Short-Term Radicalization of Protesters




Figure 2 depicts the pathways through which the escalated policing results in a short-term unintended outcome. Both paths lead to direct effects from escalated policing on protesters. It is important to note that the two paths function in conjunction, and if only one were present the outcome could differ in its degree.

Repression that aims to demobilize a social movement can sometimes radicalize it, or at least sections of it (e.g., White 1989). The causal dynamics in the path involving *overcontrol of lawful protest* (figure 2, right path) differ from those of *indiscriminate repression* (figure 2, left path).

#### *Overcontrol of Lawful Protest → Diminished Opportunities for Meaningful Protest*

Escalated policing sometimes involves an “overcontrol” of lawful protest, such as when policing makes protest invisible to the public or when protesters are controlled to a point where they have no ability to make an impact on the protest target. Overcontrol can leave protesters with the impression that their lawful demonstrations are useless (della Porta and Reiner 1998: 29). In a study on the Provisional Irish Republican Army, White (1989) shows that support for

political violence originates from conscious decisions made when people come to see peaceful protest as ineffective. In the SHAC case, the impacts of overcontrol are evident in the reflections of Peter, a former SHAC activist and ALF prisoner:

The law was being used to minimize any kind of effective form of [lawful] protest. I think one of the aspects of protest is that it has to have an effect. It has to be allowed to have effect. If you say: “you can have protest,” but you put all these conditions and limitations on it, so that it gets reduced to a mere expression, then there’s no point in having protest at all. And so, I do think that affected a shift to militancy and underground action.

The radicalization triggered by escalated policing through overcontrol might turn people toward militancy because it seems to be left as a way of having an actual effect. This insight shows that policing can be a driving force in group-level radicalization processes, contrary to standard explanations in security studies which treat the movement or extremists as the sole drivers of such processes (Alimi, Demetriou and Bosi 2015: 13). The same dynamic is described in what Rebecca, a former SHAC organizer, says about campaigners’ response to overcontrol:

I think the more that the government clamped down on these things [lawful protest], the more the illegal direct action picked up. I guess people were frustrated that their right to protest kept being infringed upon, and so people found other ways. Also, companies kept bringing in injunctions [obtained in the High Court<sup>8</sup> to restrict protest] against protesters, that in effect banned protest, and so, again, that led to an increase in more clandestine actions.

The quote points to the escalating repression, by state agencies and private companies, which restricted lawful avenues for protest. There were fewer opportunities for protesting lawfully in what campaigners saw as a meaningful way. The same line of reasoning was expressed by many activist interviewees and was found in their publications. Heather, from the HLS leadership, also commented on the effect of injunctions and referred to how their impact increased over the years, as protest targets “got—from our [HLS’] point of view—better and better injunctions.” As time went on, the injunctions imposed more and tighter restrictions on protesters, thus diminishing the opportunity for meaningful protest within the limits of the law (Ellefsen 2016a).

When the police and others clamped down on the campaign, and many of its lawful expressions, it pushed some people away from increasingly costly (and ever less effective) lawful protests and into unlawful action (Mills 2012). Previous research reveals that tough protest policing has featured in many cases where political violence has developed (e.g. della Porta and Reiter 1998; della Porta 2013). According to Bob, a former SHAC activist and animal rights prisoner, some of the activists even discussed taking the whole campaign underground (thus operating only clandestinely) as a response to the overcontrol of lawful protest activities (see also Hafez 2003 on how repression might push protesters into clandestinity).

This path recalls what Alimi, Demetriou and Bosi (2015: 42-3) found in their comparative study, where group-level radicalization results from dramatically decreasing political opportunities for a movement, or a specific movement campaign (or group), as former opportunities to have a political impact are closed off. Even though SHAC never sought to impact the state or institutional politics, it was the government and its criminal justice forces that closed off previously available opportunities for lawful protest (Ellefsen 2016b). While the end-result of this and the following pathway goes against the declared aims of escalated repression (as formulated in strategy documents, interviews and other sources), the agents of repression might still have seen radicalization and increased militancy among protesters as a partial advantage that could legitimize further escalation of repression to disrupt the SHAC campaign.

### *Indiscriminate Repression → Anger and Justification of Increased Militancy*

Escalated repression has different impacts according to how it is directed, such as which parts or factions of a movement or campaign it targets (Ellefsen 2018). Either repression can

target a movement's militant clandestine faction exclusively or it can be indiscriminate. The impacts of indiscriminate repression go beyond underground militants to affect the whole movement, or several parts of it, without clearly distinguishing between lawful and unlawful protest or between militant and moderate flanks. Indiscriminate repression is more likely to arouse feelings of injustice and anger because it includes crackdowns on lawful protest (Fillieule 2015). Many of the activist interviewees comment upon this type of indiscriminate policing. Dave, a pioneer animal liberation activist and former ALF prisoner describes a related change in the direction of policing that emerged during the SHAC campaign:

When I first got involved in the movement in the 1980s, if you had a demonstration, the police would quite happily walk past you, as if you were sort of virtually invisible. If you weren't standing in the middle of the road or something, the police would be bored by your action, and it wouldn't be on their agenda. But now, they treat you very much the same as if you just smashed a window, or as if a window has just been smashed in the area, so it's that group suspicion. You're all now under suspicion. [...] So, there came a time when the police would treat everyone that did any form of grassroots animal campaigning as a criminal, as a prospective criminal.

In a cross-case comparative study of clandestine political violence, della Porta (2014) found that escalated policing frequently emerged as a mechanism at the onset of clandestine political violence. In all della Porta's cases, radicalization of the forms of protest employed interacted with repressive policing styles that were often indiscriminate, hitting not only violent militants but also nonviolent activists (della Porta 2014). The findings of della Porta resonate with the path seen here (figure 2, left path). The radicalizing impact of repression was seen at various stages of the SHAC campaign. Towards its later phases, the number of both lawful and unlawful protests declined but, as Matthew Worrall, the spokesperson for the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry describes, what was different was that the clandestine unlawful actions that did occur were more violent: "We've seen a few examples of car bombs and crude incendiary devices recently. There seems to be a move towards outright terrorism" (Merali 2006).

Dave puts it clearly: "Obviously, there's the point of view that, look, if we can't go and shout 'Evil! Evil!' outside the laboratory, and we get arrested for that—then we may as well resort to more militant actions." These examples support earlier findings showing that escalated policing and repressive events that target a movement indiscriminately help to justify more militant tactics in the eyes of protesters (della Porta 2013: 33; see also Johnston 2014 on "anger spirals").

Analyzing interactions between protesters, their targets, and agents of repression enables an understanding of these interactive processes that fuel violent escalation (della Porta 2014). The two paths leading to group-level radicalization, depicted in figure 2, work in conjunction but involve different dynamics. First, the overcontrol of lawful protest can occur independently of whether indiscriminate repression takes place. Overcontrol of protest makes the shift from lawful to unlawful protest seem more attractive and viable because lawful protest is heavily controlled and thus made impotent. On the other hand, indiscriminate repression affects both those already involved in militant action and those carrying out lawful protest. Overcontrol can thus potentially be an element in indiscriminate repression, as it targets both lawful and unlawful protest. While overcontrol can make people lose belief in the usefulness of continuing with lawful protest and stop taking part, I anticipate that some will switch to unlawful tactics rather than giving up protest altogether. For those operating unlawfully, indiscriminate repression can trigger the use of increasingly militant forms of action (e.g., moving from smashing windows to arson attacks). In this way, both paths in figure 2 can lead to group-level radicalization, i.e., an increased justification for and potential employment of unlawful and militant repertoires of action.

Escalated policing of diverse campaigns, some of which act outside the law while others stay within it, is particularly challenging for the police (Button, John and Brearley 2002). As Chris, a former senior officer of a counterextremism unit says:


The difficulty [in the policing of domestic extremism] is and has always been how to recognize those campaigners that want to take the further step and become involved in criminality such as harassment and intimidation in an effort to further their cause. At the moment, it has been argued by some that the police adopt a broad response and treat groups not individuals as potential threats. Clearly, under this response individuals who are carrying out lawful protest will be caught in a net.

The diversity of groups and tactics, seen in the SHAC campaign, also characterized many large antisummit demonstrations by the global justice movement during the late 1990s and early 2000s. In this movement, hundreds of diverse organizations and groups acted alongside each other. The preprotest briefings and training of the police in Genoa—prior to the 2001 G8-summit—reflect the challenges involved, as police had to control a diverse movement that included proponents of property destruction and political violence (e.g., Waddington 2012). One police officer said, in a comment on the training he and his colleagues had received, “They taught us only to repress, not to prevent; the no-global [global justice] movement was presented to us as an enemy, there was no training about the various components of the movement, no distinction between violent and peaceful groups” (della Porta, Peterson and Reiter 2006: 31). The policing of diverse movements is a real challenge for agents of policing as it carries the great risk of indiscriminate repression and the overcontrol of lawful protest (Button, John and Brearley 2002).

### *The Chilling Effect on Lawful Protest*

This seemingly unintended outcome of repression is mainly a type of “spill-over effect” (Gillham and Marx 2000: 222): when actions directed at one group unintentionally affect others. In this case, the target group was those protesting by unlawful means. The outcome here resulted from police action vis à vis both lawful and unlawful factions of campaigners, causing a long-term outcome that was negative for campaigners’ ability to protest lawfully and thus for the overall campaign (Ellefsen 2016a). For HLS, it was seemingly positive as it contributed to the marginalization of the campaign and thus decreased campaigners’ ability to push HLS towards bankruptcy. For the government and the criminal justice agencies, infringing on civil liberties goes against their publicly stated aims. In practice, however, the direction of their escalating policing operations seemed to change during the campaign: eventually any SHAC-related protest was treated as criminal (Ellefsen 2016b). This change of policing intent over time requires attention, as does the possible discrepancy between the publicly stated and the unstated aims of policing. It is therefore necessary to ask whether some of the deterring or “chilling effect” (Fernandez 2008: 163) on lawful SHAC protest was intentional.

Figure 3 on the following page depicts the pathways through which the escalated policing mechanism results in a long-term unintended outcome. Both paths involve direct effects of escalated policing on protesters. The two paths in figure 3 are closely related. The left path involves legal changes that make previously lawful protest unlawful (criminalization) and changes in police practice regarding what they accept during protest activities. The right path indicates the increasingly hostile policing of lawful protest and the fear and insecurity this created among activists.

**Figure 3.** Paths Whereby Escalated Policing have Long-Term Chilling Effects on Lawful Protest.

### *Criminalization and Changed Policing Practices → Decreased Opportunity for Lawful Protest*

In this pathway (figure 3, left path), escalated policing led to the criminalization of previously lawful protest activity. Changes in policing practice shifted the boundary between what was deemed lawful and unlawful protest. For example, the police clamped down on protest activities that had previously been accepted and were perceived as lawful by protesters (Ellefsen 2016b). The injunctions mentioned above, obtained by private companies to control protest, also banned or restricted certain aspects of protest activity. For example, they banned the use of loudspeakers, limited the number of protesters and the duration of protest, or would only allow protest in designated protest areas.<sup>9</sup> Costigan and Stone (2017: 429) write that the “breadth of injunctions granted to companies is concerning, especially as the orders are not limited to those engaging in intimidation but extend to peaceful protesters.” The British Joint Committee on Human Rights has raised concern that these injunctions “have the potential for overbroad and disproportionate application” (House of Commons 2009: 69).

One example of a changed policing practice is the switch towards efforts to stop economic funding of the SHAC campaign. In an organized clampdown aimed at SHAC and the movement surrounding it in England, SHAC activists and other animal rights groups were suddenly prevented by the police from collecting donations at public stalls. The effect of this change in policing practice is described in this quote from Peter, a former activist in the SHAC campaign and the ALF:

It [escalated repression] affected the wider animal welfare, animal rights community. A woman in Croydon, who collected for the local dog sanctuary, and had done that week in, week out. . . .

She was arrested or had to stop what she was doing. And there was an organization, you've probably heard of them, Animal Aid [bigger animal rights NGO], and they do street stalls. And what was particular about them was they actually had permits from the local council. And they got arrested by the police! Animal Aid put out a statement about it, so this goes into a broader point that it was in the mindset of the police that anything connected with animal rights was automatically suspicious.

The police crackdown on collecting money is confirmed by several sources recorded in the data, as is the fact that the mainstream Animal Aid organization was negatively affected (Laville 2007). This example demonstrates how a sudden change in what was accepted by the police had unintended impacts beyond the SHAC campaign, negatively affecting even the lawful work of mainstream animal rights organizations. Chris, a former liaison officer in a counterextremism unit, also acknowledges the negative effects criminalization and changed policing practice had on lawful protest under the animal rights banner. He explains why escalated policing was seen as necessary:

The laws on protest in the UK have been changed by the policing of ARE [animal rights extremists] and at the moment I do believe there is an imbalance on the side of the state. You could say that until the courts and the ECtHR [European Court of Human Rights] catch up, this situation will remain. I do believe however that the tactics used by SHAC of intimidation/harassment have been very successful. So successful that the British government had to bail HLS out of financial difficulties because banks would not do business with them because of the fear of being targeted. This was a perverse example of "economic terrorism."

This pathway involved shifts in the boundary between what was deemed lawful and unlawful in terms of protest, in a way that limited opportunities for lawful protest. These shifts also contributed to creating insecurities among campaigners about what would be treated as unlawful or unacceptable by the police and state.

### *Repressive Policing of Lawful Protest → Insecurity About the Risk of Participation*

In this pathway (figure 3, right path), escalated policing involved increasingly repressive policing of lawful protest events linked to the SHAC campaign and an increased hostility and intensity in policing which led to a rising insecurity among protesters (Ellefsen 2016a). There was anxiety about the perceived increased risk of police sanctions, arrests, and indictments for taking part in lawful protest related to SHAC according to interviewees.

The massive policing efforts to tackle SHAC reduced unlawful protests in the end but also reduced lawful protest under the animal rights banner. Compared to 2006, there was a marked drop in the number of lawful and unlawful protests against companies linked to animal research and testing in 2007, according to police register data (Mills 2012). This decline continued throughout 2010 (the last year for which police data are available). Nevertheless, as Mills (2012) underlines, only some of these animal rights incidents would have been unlawful, while the majority would have been lawful protests. The strategy adopted by the criminal justice agencies and corporate actors succeeded in reducing criminal activity but also impacted lawful protest. Success thus came at the expense of freedom of expression and the right to assembly, as people became fearful of the consequences of protesting under the animal rights banner (Mills 2012). Vicky, a former SHAC organizer, describes the climate among animal rights activists at the very end of the SHAC campaign:

Whether you're being effective or whether you're being illegal, whichever, then the state is going to come down on those. Even as a peaceful campaigner that doesn't do anything wrong at all, there is still a chance that you'll be arrested. Just from being somewhere with other people, doing a demo.

Negatively impacting on civil liberties is generally regarded as being contrary to the public role of the police in liberal democracies. However, the intentions of the police in operations that impacted both unlawful and lawful factions of the SHAC campaign are ambiguous. The SHAC campaign achieved its temporary successes through a combination of lawful and unlawful actions by multiple groups, where each faction leveraged the other (Ellefsen 2018). The fact that the most militant clandestine activists were hard for the police to catch, and that the lawful protesters were seen as part of the overall “violent threat” of the campaign (see Europol 2011: 30), are presumably key reasons why escalated policing eventually included the lawful side of the campaign. Vicky, a former SHAC organizer and prisoner, reflects on why, in the end, both the lawful and unlawful sides of the campaign were targeted by the government and police in order to stop the whole campaign: “They [the Police and Crown Prosecution Service] needed to link the lawful side of SHAC to the criminal side to get their convictions. You know, because they were interested in getting the whole campaign, not just individuals.”

The quote recounts the series of high-profile trials against SHAC organizers and activists between 2009 and 2014, where many activists were charged with (and sentenced for) conspiracy to blackmail (see notes 5 and 10). In the criminal trials, proof was presented in court that some activists had been operating on both sides of the law. In other cases, however, SHAC defendants were not suspected of involvement in militant clandestine actions but were nonetheless sentenced to years in prison for being part of a larger conspiracy to blackmail—where the lawful and unlawful sides supposedly colluded. This assumption is clearly conveyed in a press release that the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) issued after the sentencing of one SHAC organizer to six years in prison (Crown Prosecution Service 2014):

The prosecution did not allege that [the defendant] herself had committed any of the direct action offences, but the jury has found her guilty of knowingly being involved in an agreement with others [those acting unlawfully] to pursue the objectives of SHAC by such threatening and intimidating actions.

Twelve SHAC organizers received prison sentences (up to eleven years) between 2008 and 2014, totaling 72 years (Mills 2012).<sup>10</sup> But this does not mean all of them took part in clandestine unlawful actions or that the lawful and unlawful sides were the same. However, blurring or removing the distinction between the lawful and unlawful sides of the campaign was crucial for the police and the prosecution during the trials. The prosecution strategy of the CPS proved successful, as it took out the chief organizers and halted the overall campaign by criminalizing any involvement in running the lawful SHAC UK campaign organization (Ellefsen 2018).

These events, the above mentioned instances of repression of lawful protest events, and the police’s own studies of its overall policing strategy (e.g., Donovan and Coupe 2013) show that police operations to tackle the SHAC campaign eventually adopted the aim of cracking down on any SHAC activity, including its lawful forms (Mills 2012, see chapters 5–7). By the end of the conflict, it was seemingly intended that the lawful part of the campaign was targeted and negatively impacted. This finding underscores the importance of the shifting aims of policing and of the fact that actual practices and results of policing might conflict with its officially stated intent. Criminal justice agencies publicly stated their aim was only to target criminal activity, but in the end, their strategy involved depicting and treating as criminal the whole campaign and anyone connected to SHAC protest—even though protesting under the SHAC banner was never unlawful *per se* (Crown Prosecution Service 2014).

While I observed the first two categories of unintended outcomes only in the short term, within the conflict in question, this third category includes longer-term unintended impacts observed throughout, and even after, the campaign. The chilling effect of escalated policing on lawful protest seemingly left behind a legacy of changed legal landscapes and narrower opportunities for future protests (see della Porta 2011 on “eventful protest”). This last pathway underlines the importance of analytical sensitivity towards the shifting aims of policing: something that was initially unwanted might subsequently become part of the intended outcome of a changed strategy of repression.

## DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This article contributes to the literature by unpacking how and why escalated repression of protest can trigger radicalization and impact negatively on civil liberties. I present the novel finding that escalated policing can worsen the situation for protest targets. This was done by analyzing the players' interaction, their tactical changes, and consequences thereof throughout the life cycle of the conflict (1999–2014). I assume that cases of large-scale escalation of protest repression are likely to produce results—either in the short or long term—that do not match the intentions of those who initiated the escalation. I do not, however, argue that repression will always lead to radicalization, infringements of civil liberties, or a worse situation for protest targets. These outcomes depend on the situation and the dynamics of the conflict in question.

This study involves a diverse social movement campaign in a Western liberal democracy that combined conventional, transgressive, and violent repertoires of action in the campaigners' targeting of private companies and corporations. They were met by nonlethal repressive methods that mainly involved the criminal justice sector (Ellefsen 2016a). The pathways identified in this case, whereby repression triggered outcomes that primarily went against the intentions of the agents of repression, are similar to patterns found in cases beyond the social movement field. I thus argue that these pathways are likely to occur in a range of movements and cases. Escalated repression where there is state collaboration with targets, and protection of them, helps to make these targets harder to attack. This has led Islamist terrorist groups, for example, to increasingly go after softer targets in Western Europe such as civilian targets in public areas (Hemmingby 2017). This tactical innovation thus worsens the situation of those who become new targets and are seen by terrorists as the best chance for operational success (Hemmingby 2017). Criminological literature on situational crime prevention has shown how police efforts targeting crime in delimited areas and spaces may trigger an unintended "displacement" of those crimes to other areas where there is no police presence (Hesseling 1994). These examples show how escalated policing pushes terrorists and criminals to innovate and move to softer targets that will enable them to increase (or at least maintain) their impact, as was found in this study (left path of figure 1). This reflects the broader relevance of studies shedding light on conditions that are likely to lead to these types of unintended consequences of escalated policing.

The other pathway that worsened the situation for protest targets (the right-hand path of figure 1) seems less likely to transfer to other situations than the one just described. This path seems more closely related to the targeting strategy of the protesters. In the case of SHAC, the strategy was to target companies with business links to the primary target (HLS) in order to convince them to terminate their connection with it. The size, wealth, and resources of target companies seem to be crucial factors in determining the likeliness that escalated policing will have a negative effect on such targets. Escalation of repression that involves police and security agencies approaching companies to warn them that they may be targeted, and advising them to invest in greater security, might scare off smaller firms that have little to gain from maintaining business links to the primary target (HLS). This negative effect of escalated policing, I assume, is less likely to be found if targets are wealthy companies or corporations that are more resilient. Small companies with little economic interest in maintaining links with the primary target seem most likely to be negatively affected by escalated policing, as is seen in this path (right-hand path of figure 1).

The pathways leading to triggered radicalization (figure 2) and a chilling effect on lawful protest (figure 3) resemble findings in existing social movement research more closely than the pathways that were found to worsen the situation of protest targets (figure 1). Similarly, social movement scholars have shown that escalated repression has triggered the radicalization of protesters, because their legal protest was overcontrolled (Alimi, Demetriou and Bosi 2015) or because indiscriminate repression of violent and nonviolent protesters created anger and increased support for violent tactics (Bosi 2012). Similar findings to my own on how escalated repression can have a chilling effect on lawful protest have been reported in other social movement studies. For example, increasingly repressive policing creates insecurity among

protesters, making them hesitate to participate in lawful protest (Starr et al. 2008), and sudden criminalization of previously lawful forms of protest limits the opportunities for lawful protest (Fernandez 2008). The ways in which these consequences of escalated repression unfold are evident both in existing literature and in this study. Often, the unintended consequences of repression seem closely related to whether repression not only affected violent protesters, or those breaking the law, but also those acting nonviolently and within the law as part of the wider movement or campaign.

Despite this study's overlap with previous findings, my analytical approach differs somewhat from those adopted in other studies. I capture the interrelatedness of several pathways and the ways in which certain sequences of effects combine to produce the unintended end-results. Such an analytical approach, I argue, can help research better grasp the complexity and temporal contingency of the outcomes of repression, including the short and long-term pathways that influence dynamics of contention in a single case study.

Understanding whether short- and long-term consequences of repression are successful or counterproductive for agents of repression entails comparing its outcomes with their intentions. When researching the consequences of repression during a conflict, I argue that it is helpful to distinguish the phases of escalating repression: (1) the strategic planning and decision making that largely takes place prior to the point or situation in which the repressive strategy is to be implemented; (2) the implementation of the strategy and strategic decisions and adjustments made during the implementation phase; (3) the short-term impact of the strategy; and (4) its eventual long-term outcome. The first phase of strategic planning and decision making is where scholars are most likely to find the initial intentions of escalation (or specific operations) of repression (e.g., by examining strategy documents or interviewing decision makers), while the next three phases can be traced and compared in terms of correspondence with, or deviance from, the initial aims. The second stage, where strategy is put into practice, might include changes or adjustments to the initial strategy and its intentions. In order to capture the temporal dynamics and contingent outcomes of repression, I argue that empirical investigation therefore should—ideally—retrieve data from all these stages, as I have done for this article. The rapid changes that will often unfold across these stages underline the need to be sensitive towards the temporal contingency of intent and outcomes. This is particularly acute in studies of ongoing waves of repression and protest, because what research finds in one stage does not necessarily apply to subsequent stages (e.g. Ellefsen 2018). This is demonstrated in figure 3, where the intent and strategy of the police changed markedly over time. These points further illustrate the methodological advantage of studying waves of repression and protest in retrospect, after their contraction.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Throughout the article, the terms “repression”, “protest policing”, and simply “policing” are used interchangeably to refer to state and private efforts to control social movement protest—this implies an understanding of policing as being broad and “plural” (Loader 2000; Ellefsen 2016b).

<sup>2</sup> A “social movement” is understood here as “networks and individuals and organizations that have common identities and conflictual aims and that use unconventional means”; while “protest” refers to the “nonroutinized ways of affecting political, social, and cultural processes” (della Porta 2013: 14-15). I primarily refer to protest because it is more general and refers to practices of protesting, rather than the form and setting in which it occurs. As social movements are homogenous and often consist of a variety of factions and flanks (see Ellefsen 2018: 117-119 on SHAC), referring more broadly to “protest” keeps the focus above those movements-internal constellations.

<sup>3</sup> Impact, outcome, result, and consequence are used interchangeably throughout the article. These terms are used for referring the various ways actors involved in contention influence each other, in the short or long run. Analysis specifies whether the found effects were short or long term.

<sup>4</sup> One of the researchers, Gordon Mills, previously worked in a national police agency that dealt with “domestic extremism” with SHAC as a key issue, under the Association of Chief Police Officers Terrorism and Allied Matters committee (Mills 2013).

<sup>5</sup> Here is one example of how these publications provide details on the intentions/aims of operations/actions initiated by agents of repression: “Following liaison with the Crown Prosecution Service, it was decided [by the police] to investigate a case for conspiracy to blackmail against those who organized the [SHAC] campaign rather than deal with individual

offences as they occurred. [...] This investigation aimed to link the ostensibly lawful campaign of protest and demonstration by SHAC with the unlawful, criminal campaign of intimidation, badged as ALF [Animal Liberation Front].” (Donovan and Coupe 2013: 123) The police and Crown Prosecution Service eventually employed this strategy and obtained the stated aim.

<sup>6</sup> In the SHAC case, state actors plainly directed the main responses towards campaigners. The Government initiated them, and the police implemented them by, for example, establishing partnerships with corporate actors. This form of policing shares characteristics with “third party policing” (Mazerolle and Ransley 2005), that is, policing where police engage with other organizations and use a range of civil, regulatory, and administrative laws to create or enhance crime control and prevention networks (Wakefield and Fleming 2009). The aim of third party policing is to enable the police to take advantage of legal powers and levers not otherwise available to them, such as employing private security, or imposing license or movement restrictions (Wakefield and Fleming 2009).

<sup>7</sup> More than thirty injunctions were obtained by SHAC’s protest targets between 2003 and 2014 (Ellefsen 2016). In 2014, an injunction obtained by Novartis (a SHAC protest target) covers anyone protesting animal research at its facilities in England and Wales; the injunction bars “harassment or intimidation” of Novartis’ employees, including “abusive or threatening” posts on websites or social media. The injunction even restricts demonstrations to six people or fewer, to only be inside designated protest areas, and to forbid uses of amplified sounds, costumes, face-coverings and “blood-splattered costumes” (Chellel 2014).

<sup>8</sup> Under the Prevention from Harassment Act 1997. This also involved criminal liability (a custodial sentence up to five years) for anyone breaching the conditions set in the injunction. The act was originally introduced to tackle the problem of “stalking” with the intent of protecting individuals, mainly women, close-knit family, and social groups from harassment by “stalkers.” The range of behaviors that the act sought to control, however, have expanded considerably beyond stalking, and today the act enables private companies to obtain injunctions via the Court to control and delimit protest (Mills 2015). According to Mills (2015:128), The Home Office has stated that the range of behavior constituting an offence under the act is now “potentially very wide.” See Mills (2015) for more on the use of injunctions by private actors against British animal rights protesters.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, restrictions put on lawful protest in the case of Harlan Laboratories UK v Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty [2012] EWHC 3408.

<sup>10</sup> In addition to the prison sentences, several campaigners received a variety of punishments, including suspended custodial sentences (not involving unconditional time in prison), community service, fines, and Anti-Social Behavior Orders (ASBOs), for their involvement in different parts of the SHAC campaign. A few were even given indefinite ASBOs, which banned them from any involvement in campaigns against HLS for the rest of their lives, which is rare (Mills 2012; see Ellefsen 2016a; 2016b; 2018 for details on the sentences and how law was used to tackle SHAC). Several activists were also imprisoned for underground criminal actions against HLS, like one Animal Liberation Front activist, who received a 12-year sentence in 2006 for arson attacks (Addley 2006).

## REFERENCES

- Addley, Esther. 2006. “Animal Liberation Front bomber jailed for 12 years.” *The Guardian*, 8 December 2006. <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2006/dec/08/animalrights.uknews>, retrieved March 26, 2020.
- Alimi, Eitan Y., Lorenzo Bosi, and Chares Demetriou. 2012. “Relational Dynamics and Processes of Radicalization: A Comparative Framework.” *Mobilization* 17(1): 7-26.
- Alimi, Eitan Y., Chares Demetriou, and Lorenzo Bosi. 2015. *The Dynamics of Radicalization: A Relational and Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Amenta, Edwin, Neal Caren, Elizabeth Chiarello, and Yang Su. 2010. “The Political Consequences of Social Movements.” *Annual Review of Sociology*, 36(1): 287–307.
- Andrews, Kenneth T. 2004. *Freedom is a Constant Struggle: The Mississippi Civil Rights Movement and its Legacy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Baron, David P., and Daniel Diermeier. 2007. “Strategic Activism and Nonmarket Strategy.” *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy* 16: 599-634
- Bosi, Lorenzo. 2016. “Social Movements and Interrelated Effects: The Process of Social Change in the Post-Movement Lives of Provisional IRA Volunteers.” *Revista Internacional de Sociologia*, 74(4): e047. DOI: 10.3989/ris.2016.74.4.047
- . 2012. “Explaining Pathways to Armed Activism in the Provisional Irish Republican Army.” *Social Science History*, 3(3): 347-390.
- Bosi, Lorenzo, Demetriou, Chares, and Malthaner, Stefan, 2015. *Dynamics of Political Violence*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Bosi, Lorenzo, and Katrin Uba. 2009. “Introduction: The Outcomes of Social Movements.” *Mobilization*, 14(4): 409–415.
- Bosi, Lorenzo, Marco Giugni and Katrin Uba. 2016. “The Consequences of Social Movements: Taking Stock and Looking Forward.” Pp. 3-38 in *The Consequences of Social Movements*, Lorenzo Bosi, Marco Giugni and Katrin Uba, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Brouder, Jean-Paul. 1992. "Undercover Policing in Canada: Wanting What is Wrong." *Crime, Law and Social Change* 18(2): 105–136.
- Button, Mark, Tim John and Nigel Brearley. 2002. "New Challenges in Public Order Policing: The Professionalisation of Environmental Protest and the Emergence of the Militant Environmental Activist." *International Journal of the Sociology of Law* 30(1): 17–32.
- Button, Mark and Tim John. 2002. "'Plural Policing' in action: a review of the policing of environmental protests in England and Wales." *Policing and Society*, 12(2): 111–121.
- Chang, Paul Y., 2008. "Unintended Consequences of Repression: Alliance Formation in South Korea's Democracy Movement (1970–1979)." *Social Forces* 89(2): 651–677.
- Chiarello, Elizabeth. 2018. "Where Movements Matter: Examining Unintended Consequences of the Pain Management Movement in Medical, Criminal Justice, and Public Health Fields." *Law & Policy* 40(1): 79–109.
- Costigan, Ruth, and Richard Stone. 2017. *Civil Liberties and Human Rights*. 11<sup>th</sup> ed. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Crawford, Adam. 2008. "Plural Policing in the UK: Policing Beyond the Police." *Handbook of Policing* second edition, Tim Newburn, ed. Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing.
- Crown Prosecution Service. 2014. *Press Statement Released 17 March 2004 by Crown Prosecution Service Wessex*. Received (on request) by email from CPS Wessex.
- Davenport, Christian, Hank Johnston and Carol Mueller, eds. 2005. *Repression and Mobilization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- della Porta, Donatella. 2011. "Eventful Protest, Global Conflicts." *Distinktion: Journal of Social Theory* 9(2): 27–56.
- . 2013. *Clandestine Political Violence*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2014. "On Violence and Repression: A Relational Approach." *Government and Opposition* 49(2): 159–187.
- della Porta, Donatella, and Herbert Reiter (eds.) 1998. *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstration in Western Democracies*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- della Porta, Donatella, Abby Peterson and Herbert Reiter, eds. 2006. *The Policing of Transnational Protest*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
- Donovan, John, and Richard Timothy Coupe. 2013. "Animal Rights Extremism: Victimization, Investigation and Detection of a Campaign of Criminal Intimidation." *European Journal of Criminology*, 10(1) 113–132.
- Earl, Jennifer. 2003. "Tanks, Tear Gas, and Taxes: Toward a Theory of Movement Repression." *Sociological Theory*, 21(1): 44–67.
- . 2011. "Political Repression: Iron Fists, Velvet Gloves, and Diffuse Control." *Annual Review of Sociology* 37: 261–84.
- Ellefsen, Rune. 2016a. "Judicial Opportunities and the Death of SHAC: Legal Repression along a Cycle of Contention." *Social Movement Studies*, 15(5): 441–456.
- . 2016b. "Relational Dynamics of Protest and Protest Policing: Strategic Interaction and the Coevolution of Targeting Strategies." *Policing and Society*, DOI:10.1080/10439463.2016.1262366.
- . 2018. "Deepening the Explanation of Radical Flank Effects: Tracing Contingent Outcomes of Destructive Capacity." *Qualitative Sociology* 41(1): 111–133.
- Ellefsen, Rune, and Joel Busher. 2020. "The Dynamics of Restraint in the Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty Campaign." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 13(6): 165–179.
- Evans, Michael. 2004. "Extremist Animal Rights Activists Pose Main Threat to Economy." *The Times online*, 10 December 2004. Url: <https://archive.li/IONVo> Retrieved 10 March 2017.
- Europol. 2011. *TE-SAT 2011: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report*. The Hague: European Police Office.
- . 2014. *TE-SAT 2014: European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2014*. The Hague: Europol.
- Fernandez, Luis. 2008. *Policing Dissent: Social Control and the Anti-Globalization Movement*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Ferree, Myra Marx. 2004. "Soft Repression: Ridicule, Stigma, and Silencing in Gender-Based Movements." Pp. 85–101 in *Authority in Contention*, edited by Daniel J. Myers and Daniel M. Cress, eds. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
- Fillieule, Olivier. 2015. "Disengagement from Radical Organization: A Process and Multilevel Model of Analysis." Pp 34–63 in *Movements in Times of Democratic Transition*, eds. Bert Klandermans and Cornelis van Stralen, eds. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

- Gillham, Patrick F. and Gary T. Marx. 2000. "Complexity and Irony in Policing and Protesting: The World Trade Organization in Seattle." *Social Justice* 27(2): 212–236.
- Giugni, Marco and Lorenzo Bosi. 2012. "The Impact of Protest Movements: On the Establishment: Dimensions, Models, and Approaches." Pp. 17-28 *The Establishment Responds: Power, Protest and Politics since 1945*, Pp 17-28 in S. Katrin Fehlenbach, Martin Klimke, Joachim Scharloth, and Laura Wong, eds. New York: Palgrave.
- Goldstone, Jack A. 2004. More Social Movements or Fewer? Beyond Political Opportunity Structures to Relational Fields. *Theory and Society* 33(3): 333–365.
- Hemmingby, Cat. 2017. "Exploring the Continuum of Lethality: Militant Islamists' Targeting Preferences in Europe." *Perspectives on Terrorism* 11(5): 25-41.
- Hesseling, Rene B. P. 1994. Displacement: A Review of the Empirical Literature. *Crime Prevention Studies*, ed. R. V. Clarke: 197-230. Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press.
- Home Office. 2004. *Animal Welfare—Human Rights: Protecting People from Animal Rights Extremists*. London: The Home Office Communication Directorate.
- House of Commons. 2009. *Joint Committee on Human Rights: Demonstrating Respect for Rights? Follow-up*. Twenty-second Report of Session 2008–09. HL Paper 141 HC 522. London: The Stationery Office Limited.
- Jasper, James M. and Jane Poulsen. 1993. Fighting Back: Vulnerabilities, Blunders, and Counter-mobilization by the Targets in Three Animal Rights Campaigns. *Sociological Forum*, 8(4): 639-657.
- Jämte, Jan and Rune Ellefsen. 2020. The Consequences of Soft Repression. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 25(3): 383-404.
- Johnston, Hank. 2014. "The Mechanism of Emotion in Violent Protest." Pp. 27-50 in *Dynamics of Political Violence: A Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict*, Lorenzo Bosi, Chares Demetriou, and Stephan Malthaner, eds. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Klandermans, Bert. 2008. "Review of Contentious Politics." *Social Forces* 86(4): 1855-1857.
- Koopmans, Ruud. 1993. The Dynamics of Protest Waves: West-Germany, 1965 to 1989. *American Sociological Review*, 58(5): 637-658
- Laville, Sandra. 2007. "Police Crack Down on Animal Rights Fundraising Stalls." *The Guardian*, 22 February 2007. Url: <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/feb/22/topstories3.animalwelfare> Retrieved 21 April 2017.
- Lewis, J., Ritchie, J., Ormston, R., and Morrell, G. 2014. "Generalising from Qualitative Research." Pp. 347-367 in *Qualitative Research Practice: A guide for Social Science Students and Researchers*, J. Ritchie, J. Lewis, C. M. Nicholls, and R. Ormston, eds. London: Sage.
- Lindekilde, Lasse. 2012. "Neo-liberal Governing of Radicals: Danish radicalization Prevention Policies and Potential Iatrogenic Effects." *International Journal of Conflict and Violence* 5(2): 109–125.
- . 2014. "A Typology of Backfire Mechanisms." Pp. 51-70 in *Dynamics of Political Violence: A Process-Oriented Perspective on Radicalization and the Escalation of Political Conflict*, Lorenzo Bosi, Chares Demetriou, and Stephan Malthaner, eds. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Linden, Annette, and Bert Klandermans. 2006. "Stigmatization and Repression of Extreme-Right Activism in the Netherlands." *Mobilization* 11(2): 213–28.
- Loader, Ian, 2000. "Plural Policing and Democratic Governance." *Social and Legal Studies* 9(3): 323–345.
- Marx, Gary T. 1988. *Under Cover: Police Surveillance in America*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Mazerolle, Lorraine and Janet Ransley. (2005). *Third Party Policing*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- McAdam, Doug. 1983. "Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency." *American Sociological Review* 48(6): 735–754.
- McAdam, Doug, and Sidney Tarrow. 2011. "Introduction: Dynamics of Contention Ten Years On." *Mobilization* 16(1): 1-10.
- McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McAdam, Doug, Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow. 2008. Progressive Polemics: Reflections on Four Stimulating Commentaries. *Qualitative Sociology* 31(4): 361-367.
- Merali, Zeeya. 2006. "Animal Activists Flee UK Clampdown." *Daily News*, May 13, 2006. <https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn9154-animal-activists-flee-uk-clampdown/> Retrieved 21 April 2017.
- Metcalf, David. 2008. "The Protest Game: Animal Rights Protests and the Life Sciences Industry." *Negotiation Journal* 24(2): 125–143.

- Meyer, David S. and Suzanne Staggenborg. 2008. "Opposing Movement Strategies in U.S. Abortion Politics." *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 28: 207–238.
- Mills, Gordon. 2012. "Assessing the Challenge of Policing Animal Rights Extremism in the UK and the Changing Impact on Community Safety and Human Rights in the Period 2004–2010 (Unpublished doctoral dissertation)." London Metropolitan University, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities.
- . 2013. "The Successes and Failures of Policing Animal Rights Extremism in the UK 2004–2010." *International Journal of Police Science and Management* 15(1): 30–44.
- . 2015. "'Injunctivitis': A Blurring of the Policing of Protest or a Vision of the Way Ahead?" *International Journal of Police Science and Management* 17(2): 128–133.
- Mitchell, Don and Lynn A. Staeheli. 2005 "Permitting Protest: Parsing the Fine Geography of Dissent in America." *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 19(4): 796–813.
- Noakes, John A., B. Klocke and Patrick F. Gilham. 2005. "Whose streets? Police and Protesters Struggle over Space in Washington, DC, September 2001." *Policing and Society* 15(3): 235–54.
- Starr, Armory, Luis A. Fernandez, Randall Amster, Lesley J. Wood, Manuel J. Caro. 2008. "The Impacts of State Surveillance on Political Assembly and Association: A Socio-Legal Analysis." *Qualitative Sociology* 31(3): 25–270.
- SHAC. 2014. "Introduction to SHAC." Retrieved May 16, 2014 at [http://shac.net/SHAC/shac\\_intro.htm](http://shac.net/SHAC/shac_intro.htm).
- Suh, Doowon. 2012. "Intricacies of Social Movement Outcome Research and Beyond: 'How Can You Tell' Social Movements Prompt Changes?" *Sociological Research Online* (4)3: 1–11.
- . 2014. "What Happens to Social Movements After Policy Success? Framing the Unintended Consequences and Changing Dynamics of the Korean Women's Movement." *Social Science Information* 53(1): 3–34.
- Sullivan, Christopher Michael, and Christian Davenport. 2017. "The Rebel Alliance Strikes Back: Understanding the Politics of Backlash Mobilization." *Mobilization* 22(1): 39–56.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 2015. "Contentious Politics." Pp. 867–108 in *The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements*, eds. Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani, eds. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Tilly, Charles. 2008. *Contentious Performances*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Tilly, Charles, and Sidney Tarrow. 2007. *Contentious Politics*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.
- Upton, Andrew. 2012. "'Go On, Get Out There, and Make it Happen': Reflections on the First Ten Years of Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC)." *Parliamentary Affairs* 65(1): 238–254.
- Waddington, David P. 2012. *Policing Public Disorder: Theory and Practice*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. New York: Routledge.
- Waddington, P.A.J. 1994. *Liberty and Order: Public Order Policing in a capital City*. London: UCL Press.
- Wahlström, Mattias. 2016. "Watershed Events and Changes in Public Order Management Systems: Organizational Adaptation as a Social Movement Outcome." Pp. 285–313 in *The Consequences of Social Movements*, Lorenzo Bosi, Marco Giugni and Katrin Uba, eds. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Wakefield, Alison, and Jenny Fleming. 2009. "Third Party Policing." Pp. 303–305 in *The SAGE Dictionary of Policing*, Alison Wakefield and Jenny Fleming, eds. London: Sage.
- White, Robert W. 1989. "From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army." *American Journal of Sociology* 94(6), 1277–1302.