

Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism

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Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan's Security Policy

Following its devastating defeat in World War II, Japan enacted its so-called peace constitution. The constitution severely restricts Japan's use of force, relegating the country to a minimal military role in the world.¹ In the last decade, however, Japan has increasingly employed its military overseas. In November 2001, the Japanese government dispatched the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) to the Indian Ocean to support U.S. military operations against Afghanistan. After the major battles of the Iraq War ended in 2003, it sent the Ground and Air Self-Defense Forces (GSDF and ASDF) to Iraq as part of the U.S. "coalition of the willing." More recently, in March 2009, it dispatched the MSDF to the Somali coast to protect vessels from pirates. Such actions would have been unthinkable during the Cold War, and they symbolize Japan's dramatically changed attitude toward overseas military involvement.

The transformation of Japan's security policy began in the mid-1990s. In April 1996, Japan reconfirmed its strong commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance by announcing the U.S.-Japan Security Joint Declaration. In September 1997, it adopted the new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines to clarify its role and missions with regard to military contingencies around Japan and adjacent areas. In 2005 Japan agreed to take significant steps to enhance U.S.-Japan joint military operability by hosting the U.S. Army's 1st Command Division at Camp Zama, near Tokyo, and by deploying the Air Force Command of the SDF to the U.S. Yokota Base.² In January 2007, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was elevated

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The author would like to thank the following individuals for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article: Andrew Bennett, Thomas Berger, Daniel Bratton, Christopher Hughes, Hideki Kan, Yoshinori Kaseda, Ayako Kusunoki, Haruka Matsumoto, Paul Midford, Akitoshi Miyashita, Andrew Oros, Steven Reed, Sheila Smith, Brian Walsh, Yuan-Kang Wang, and Shingo Yoshida. He is also grateful to the journal's anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. This research was partially funded by Grant-in-Aid provided by Japan's Ministry of Education, Science, and Sport.

1. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution states that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." This means that Japan cannot possess or use force except for strictly defensive purposes, according to the Japanese government's interpretation.

2. Masahiko Hisae, *Beigun Saihen: Nichi-Bei "Himitsu Koshō" de Naniga Attaka* [Reorganization of U.S. forces: What happened in the U.S.-Japan "secret negotiations?"] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2005); and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, *Domei Henbo: Nichi-Bei Ittaika no Hikari to Kage* [Alliance metamorphosed: The bright and dark sides of the increasing interoperability of the U.S.-Japan alliance] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 2007).

to the ministry of defense, and the SDF assumed overseas military operations as one of its main missions, which until then had been restricted to defense of the homeland. These developments pose the following questions. First, what explains Japan's restrained security policy during the Cold War period? Second, why has Japan assumed a more active military role overseas in the last decade?

Realists such as Christopher Hughes attribute Japan's new security activism to an increase in regional threats, including China's rise and North Korea's development of nuclear weapons,³ but these do not explain Japan's lack of activism before the mid-1990s. Indeed, Japan's post-World War II security policy has been considered an anomaly from the realist perspective. Realists predict that in an anarchic international system, states seek to increase their relative capabilities to enhance their military power and security. This thinking led some realists to predict that Japan will eventually develop a nuclear arsenal.⁴ From that perspective, its reluctance to do so thus far is incomprehensible, if not irrational.

Constructivists, on the other hand, argue that Japan's security norms explain its reluctance to engage militarily abroad. Thomas Berger and Peter Katzenstein, for example, maintain that in the wake of defeat in World War II, the Japanese developed a strong antimilitarist norm, eschewing policies that could revive Japanese militarism.⁵ This logic may account for Japan's reluctance to send its military overseas during the Cold War, but it leaves open the question of Japan's recent shift to a more active security policy.

This article addresses the shortcomings of both the realist and constructivist explanations for Japanese security policy by reexamining Japanese antimilitarism. Realists and constructivists alike accept the concept of Japanese antimilitarism uncritically, although they disagree on its significance.⁶ In contrast,

3. Christopher W. Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a "Normal" Military Power*, Adelphi Papers, No. 368-9 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004).

4. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 66-69. See also Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 37.

5. Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); and Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998). Other important constructivist works on Japan include Glenn D. Hook, *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan* (London: Routledge, 1998); and Andrew L. Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2008).

6. The question of the nature and sources of antimilitarism was also put forward by Peter Liberman, "Ties That Bind: Will Germany and Japan Rely Too Much on the United States?" *Security Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 101, 129; and Akitoshi Miyashita, "Where Do Norms Come From? Foundations of Japan's Postwar Pacifism," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (January 2007), pp. 99-120.

I argue that Japanese antimilitarism is not a monolithic concept. Rather, it consists of three elements: pacifism, antitraditionalism, and the fear of entrapment. Only by understanding the influence of these three elements is it possible to explain both Japan's past reluctance to play a military role overseas and its increasing activism over the last decade. Simply put, the existing research on Japanese antimilitarism suffers from what methodologists call "model misspecification."

This article makes three contributions to understanding postwar Japanese security policy and international politics in general. First, it demonstrates that the fear of entrapment—a state's concern that its commitments to an ally may drag that state into an unnecessary conflict⁷—has been a constitutive element of Japan's so-called antimilitarism. This finding challenges those constructivists who regard Japanese antimilitarism merely as a normative factor, as the fear of entrapment is considered a realist factor. It also demonstrates that analytical eclecticism is crucial for understanding the true nature of constraints on Japan's security policy.⁸ Second, it shows that domestic political norms, even though not directly related to security issues, can affect a state's security policy. When Berger and Katzenstein argue that Japan's antimilitarist norm constrains its external behavior, their underlying assumption is that a norm that constrains a state's security policy must be a security norm.⁹ This study suggests that although Japan's antitraditionalist norm, which reflects the Japanese people's desire for mature democracy, has been associated primarily with Japanese domestic politics, it has nonetheless had an impact on Japanese security policy. Third, the article highlights what Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink call "strategic social construction," that is, the rational behavior of normative agents.¹⁰ In the case of Japan, pacifists sometimes succeeded in con-

7. Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461–495; and Glenn H. Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 181–183.

8. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism," *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/02), pp. 153–185; Peter J. Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, "Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analytical Eclecticism," in Katzenstein, ed., *Rethinking Japanese Security: Internal and External Dimensions* (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 249–285; and Thomas S. Wilkins, "'Analytical Eclecticism' in Theorizing Japanese Security Policy: A Review Essay," *Asian Security*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (September 2008), pp. 294–299.

9. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*; and Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*. Other works focusing on the impact of security-related norms on state behavior include Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: British and French Military Doctrine between the Wars* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Nina Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

10. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political

straining Japanese security policy by appealing to the public's fear of entrapment and to antitraditionalism. In particular, pacifists' manipulation of the fear of entrapment suggests that just as rational actors use norms to achieve their goals, normative agents seek to maximize the appeal of their ideals by incorporating realist factors into their strategies.

After reviewing the constructivist-realist debate on Japanese security policy, I provide a model (hereafter called the "hybrid model") that illustrates how pacifism, antitraditionalism, and the fear of entrapment constitute Japan's antimilitarist tradition. I then offer four case studies as evidence of how the hybrid model explains Japan's security policy decisions. Finally, I summarize the case studies and discuss implications of this research for Japan's security policy and international politics.

The Debate over Japan's Antimilitarism

Over the years, Japan's post-World War II security policy has been the subject of heated scholarly debate. For constructivists, it provides significant supporting evidence for their claims regarding Japan's strong antimilitarist tradition. Constructivists argue that ideational factors explain Japan's reluctance to develop military power, including nuclear weapons. Berger and Katzenstein have conducted extensive empirical analyses to support this claim.¹¹ According to Berger, Japanese policymakers are constrained by their country's antimilitarist norm.¹² Both Berger and Katzenstein argue that this norm originated in Japan's disastrous defeat in World War II: because the Japanese people consider their military leaders the main culprits in bringing their nation to near ruin by pursuing an expansionist policy, they began to stigmatize military authority, which they continue to view with deep skepticism.

According to constructivists, the influence of Japan's antimilitarist norm is particularly evident in two aspects of its security policy. The first is the timing of the consolidation of Japan's centrist security policy, or the so-called Yoshida Doctrine, which emphasizes the importance of Japan's economic development and acceptance of the U.S. security umbrella. Berger argues that the doctrine began to solidify in 1960, when controversy concerning proposed revisions to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty led to an unprecedented level of public protest against the Japanese government. He considers this incident "a defining mo-

Change," *International Organization*, Vol. 52, No. 4 (October 1998), pp. 909–911. Finnemore and Sikkink call such agents "norm entrepreneurs." *Ibid.*, pp. 893, 985–899.

11. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*; and Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*.

12. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, p. 15.

ment in the development of Japan's new political-military culture," as then Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's "defeat led to a consolidation of the low-key, minimalist approach to defense and national security."¹³ Kishi, a supporter of revising the treaty, resigned in the wake of the protests.

The second aspect that constructivists highlight involves the institutional constraints imposed on Japan's security policy after World War II. According to Berger, the Japanese people's deep-rooted fear of the military has constrained the government's defense planning and is responsible for the imposition of normative restraints on Japan's military policy.¹⁴ For instance, the Japanese government interprets Article 9 of the Japanese constitution as follows: Japan possesses the right of collective self-defense, but it is not permitted to exercise it. This interpretation is uniquely Japanese, given that the right of collective self-defense is clearly stated in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In addition, Japan's Three Nonnuclear Principles—the policy of not possessing, producing, or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan—has arguably narrowed the country's security policy options. Constructivists note that the adoption of these principles can be explained only through an understanding of Japanese antimilitarism.

Realists claim that constructivists exaggerate the influence of the antimilitarist norm in Japan's security policy.¹⁵ Jennifer Lind argues that Japan's behavior in this regard can be explained as buck-passing to the United States.¹⁶ Paul Midford and Christopher Twomey maintain that Japan's security policy is consistent with defensive realism: Japan avoids a military buildup because it would trigger an arms race with neighboring states.¹⁷ Richard Samuels and Eric Heginbotham argue that Japan is a realist state that specializes in "techno-nationalism," a nationalistic desire for self-sufficiency and excellence in technology for the purpose of enhancing national security.¹⁸ These realist ar-

13. *Ibid.*, p. 45. Katzenstein similarly argues that Japan's antimilitarism began to take shape after this incident. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security*, pp. 2–3, 30, 58.

14. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, pp. 50–52, 194.

15. Others argue that changes in Japan's domestic political structure explain recent changes in Japanese security policy. J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels, *Nine Lives? The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan* (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center Press, 2005); and Tomohito Shinoda, *Kantei Gaiko: Seiji lidashippu no Yukue* [Cabinet Office diplomacy: Direction of political leadership] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 2004).

16. Jennifer M. Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy," *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 92–121.

17. Paul Midford, "The Logic of Reassurance and Japan's Grand Strategy," *Security Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Spring 2002), pp. 1–43; and Christopher P. Twomey, "Japan, a Circumscribed Balancer: Building on Defensive Realism to Make Predictions about East Asian Security," *Security Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer 2000), pp. 167–205.

18. Richard J. Samuels, *Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994); and Eric Heginbotham and Richard J.

guments, however, do not explain the timing of the Yoshida Doctrine's consolidation or the institutional constraints on Japan's security policy.

Japan's antimilitarist model also has its limitations. First, it cannot explain the recent changes in Japan's security policy. Although constructivists might argue that Japan's antimilitarist norm is diminishing in importance, they do not address questions concerning the timing and the reasons for such a change. Second, constructivists have not detailed the causal process through which Japan's antimilitarist norm has influenced governmental policy decisions.¹⁹ For instance, Berger does not provide context for the policies or decisions that he attributes to Japanese antimilitarism. Although this omission is understandable given the broad range of Japanese security decisions he covers over an extended period, the possibility that the antimilitarist norm and its claimed effects on the Japanese government's policy choices are spurious cannot be ruled out. Indeed, Tsuyoshi Kawasaki notes this problem in the antimilitarists' interpretation of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), Japan's first comprehensive defense strategy developed after World War II. Although Berger argues that the NDPO was heavily influenced by the antimilitarist norm, Kawasaki, who examined the policy papers written by Takuya Kubo, a senior JDA official and primary architect of the NDPO, concludes that the thinking behind the NDPO was influenced significantly by realism, and that antimilitarism's impact on the NDPO was marginal at best.²⁰

In the next section, I introduce the hybrid model to explain more fully the motivations behind Japan's post-World War II security policy. I then briefly discuss my research design.

The Anatomy of Japanese Antimilitarism

The hybrid model aims to explain why Japanese security policy has been severely constrained in some cases but not in others.²¹ Rather than considering

Samuels, "Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy," *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 171–203.

19. For the importance of analyzing the causal mechanism of ideas, see Albert S. Yee, "The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies," *International Organization*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 69–108.

20. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, "Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy," *Pacific Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (June 2001), pp. 221–240. The view that Kubo was a hard-core realist is underscored by his regard for Japan's latent capacity to develop nuclear weapons as a means of persuading the United States to maintain its defense commitments to Japan. Takuya Kubo, "Boeiryoku Seibi no Kangaekata" [An approach to developing defense capabilities], Office of Dr. Akihiko Tanaka, University of Tokyo, *Sekai to Nihon* [The world and Japan], <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/?worldjpn/documents/texts/JPSC/19710220.01J.html>.

21. Although the hybrid model is less parsimonious than the antimilitarist model, it may have more leverage if it can explain more variations in Japan's security policy. On the concept of lever-

antimilitarism as a single norm, the model treats it as a combination of three factors: pacifism, antitraditionalism, and the fear of entrapment. The greater the synergy among these three factors, the greater the opposition to an active security policy. This section analyzes these factors and explains how each is operationalized.

The study is based on two assumptions. First, the intensity levels of the Japanese people's pacifism and antitraditionalism have remained relatively constant since the 1960s. This assumption is reasonable because constructivists argue that once institutionalized, norms tend to persist despite changes in material factors.²² The second assumption is that each of the three factors in the hybrid model does not exclusively influence distinct groups of citizens. Although elites and activists may be divided into pacifists or antitraditionalists, it is more realistic to assume that ordinary Japanese are influenced by all three factors.

PACIFISM

Pacifism denies any meaningful role for the military and the use of force as a means to pursue a state's national interests. In the context of postwar Japanese politics, pacifists supported Japan's complete disarmament, neutrality between the Western and communist blocs, and the abolition of the U.S.-Japan alliance. They also strongly supported legal constraints on Japan's use of military force.

Although Berger notes that antimilitarism is not the equivalent of pacifism, pacifism comes closest to what he defines as antimilitarism in the sense that Japan's pacifists detest military organizations.²³ In the late 1940s, pacifist intellectuals in Japan published collections of writings by soldiers who were students when conscripted and killed in the Pacific War. The writings described their battleground experiences and the brutality and selfishness of career military officers, often in contrast with the writers' idealism and reluctance to fight a senseless war. These publications became best-sellers.²⁴ In 1950 a group of Japanese pacifists established organizations such as the Japan Memorial Society for the Students Killed in the War, or Wadatsumikai, hoping to spread their antimilitarist views.

age, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference for Qualitative Research* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 29–31.

22. Finnemore and Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," p. 894.

23. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, pp. 27, 30.

24. Yoshiaki Fukuma, "*Sensotaiken*" no *Sengoshi* [Postwar history of "war experiences"] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronshinsha, 2009), pp. 12–13, 19–21, 46; and Franziska Seraphim, *War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945–2005* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 135–155.

Japanese pacifists can be divided into two groups. The first comprises left-leaning pacifists and includes members of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and labor unions, as well as Japanese communists. Better organized than the other pacifist group or the antitraditionalists, members of this group have played a leading role in opposing Japan's adoption of an active security policy. The second group consists of those who genuinely believe in the pacifist philosophy. Intellectuals such as peace activist/scholar Ikutaro Shimizu, liberal scholar of international politics Yoshikazu Sakamoto, and novelist Makoto Oda have been among this group's most influential members. Both groups hold to a strict interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution and oppose any policy initiative that seems to enhance Japan's military profile.

ANTITRADITIONALISM

According to Joji Watanuki and other leading scholars of Japanese political ideology, postwar Japanese politics can be described as an ideological competition between Japan's traditionalists and antitraditionalists.²⁵ Japan's traditionalists believe that Japan possesses unique social values, such as obedience to and respect for authority, emphasis on group unity, self-sacrifice, and perseverance. They claim that the political and social reforms instituted by the United States during the occupation weakened these values, and they have sought to restore them by amending the Japanese constitution. Japan's antitraditionalists have instead sought to promote liberal democracy in their country. For example, fearing that the traditionalists might try to undermine Japan's fledgling democracy, the antitraditionalists resisted some of their policies, such as revising the country's postwar constitution. Although antitraditionalists often cooperate with pacifists on security issues, their core mission is to protect and deepen Japanese democracy.

Antitraditionalism differs from Berger's conception of antimilitarism in two important respects. First, Berger regards antimilitarism as a security norm, whereas antitraditionalism is considered primarily a domestic political norm. In his words, antimilitarism reflects a politico-military culture that "encompasses orientations related to defense, security, the military as an institution, and the use of force in international affairs."²⁶ In contrast, antitraditionalism, as defined by Watanuki and other scholars, primarily reflects a desire to improve the quality of Japanese democracy; security issues become relevant

25. Joji Watanuki, *Nihon Seiji no Bunseki Sikaku* [An analytical angle of Japanese politics] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1976), pp. 181–211; and Ichiro Miake, *Seitoshiji no Bunseki* [The analysis of support for political parties] (Tokyo: Shobunsha, 1985).

26. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, p. 15.

for antitraditionalists only within this very broad framework of domestic politics. Second, whereas antimilitarists blame Japan's military organizations for thrusting the country into World War II, antitraditionalists maintain that the underlying cause for the rise of Japan's prewar militarism lay in the very nature of Japanese society. The works of Masao Maruyama, the most influential political theorist in postwar Japan, capture this view. According to Maruyama, the Japanese people's extraordinary deference and obedience to authority made Japan's prewar militarism possible. Even though many Japanese were skeptical of the militarists' ambitions, they did little to try to rein them in.²⁷ Given their focus on Japanese society, controlling Japan's military organizations is of only secondary importance for antitraditionalists, who prioritize the need to transform Japan into a mature democracy.

These differences highlight the relative flexibility and pragmatism of Japan's antitraditionalists on security issues compared with its pacifists:²⁸ although Japanese pacifists consistently oppose all military initiatives by their country, antitraditionalists seek to constrain Japan's security policy under two conditions: (1) when the Japanese public believes that policymakers, in attempting to develop a more active security policy, are taking measures that could undermine Japan's democracy; and (2) when the public believes that policymakers who seek a more active security policy are traditionalists. Otherwise, antitraditionalist sentiment does not exert strong constraints on Japan's security policy.

FEAR OF ENTRAPMENT

The third element of the hybrid model is the fear of entrapment, a realist factor that reflects concerns of an alliance security dilemma.²⁹ Japanese international relations scholar Jitsuo Tsuchiyama argues that during the first half of the Cold War, the fear of entrapment significantly influenced Japan's behavior.³⁰ During

27. Masao Maruyama, "Gunkokushihaiha no Seishinkeitai" [Psychology of militarist leaders], and "Aru Jiyushugisha heno Tegami" [A letter to a liberal], in Maruyama, *Maruyama Masao Zenshu* [The complete works of Masao Maruyama], Vol. 4 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), pp. 140–141, 325–327, respectively. Maruyama cooperated with pacifists on security issues in the early Cold War period. By the mid-1950s, however, he began to diverge from them. Hiroshi Takeuchi, *Maruyama Masao no Jidai* [Masao Maruyama's era] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 2005), p. 119.

28. Maruyama writes, "I want to be highly pragmatic when it comes to making political judgments." He explains his tendency to side with leftists on political issues, arguing that a danger to democracy in postwar Japan is more likely to come from traditionalists' attempts to suppress them. Maruyama, "Aru Jiyushugisha heno Tegami," pp. 332–333.

29. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics"; and Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, pp. 181–183.

30. Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, "Araiansu Jirenma to Nihon no Domeigaiko" [Alliance dilemma and Japan's alliance diplomacy], *Leviathan*, No. 13 (1993), pp. 50–75; and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, "War Renunciation, Article 9, and Security Policy," in Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki, and Tsuchiyama, eds., *Japan in International Politics: The Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2007), pp. 59–60. See also Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand*

this period, Japan was more or less optimistic about its security, whereas the United States was deeply concerned about its security in East Asia. In addition, the Japanese considered U.S. policy toward the communist states as unnecessarily aggressive, fearing that it might trigger conflict with China or the Soviet Union.

The fear of entrapment has helped to constrain Japan from developing a more active security policy; that is, when the Japanese public experiences such fear, it seeks to pressure the Japanese government not to adopt an active security policy.³¹ For its part, the Japanese government may try to limit its alliance commitments to the United States. In contrast, when the fear of entrapment is low, the public is less inclined to oppose the government's pursuit of an active security policy.

Levels of the fear of entrapment vary depending on the prevailing conditions. For example, Japan's fear of entrapment was generally higher during the Cold War than after the demise of the Soviet Union, given the much greater risk of global nuclear war during the Cold War.³² Japan was particularly concerned with this risk because of the presence of U.S. military forces in the country (including the presumed existence of nuclear weapons), making it a potential target of Soviet nuclear attack. A state may also experience a heightened level of fear when its ally is involved in regional conflicts that could eventually entrap the former in an unwanted war. A state such as Japan that permits the U.S. military to use its bases invites hostilities. Moreover, a state may fear entrapment when it regards its ally as overly aggressive and its ally's adversary as on the defensive.

The fear of entrapment is mitigated when an ally is not involved in regional armed conflicts, or when an adversary is considered aggressive while its ally's actions are viewed as defensive or otherwise justifiable. Under these conditions, the Japanese government can move forward with an active security policy without strong opposition. It may even be that the government fears abandonment by its ally, spurring it to increase its commitments to its ally in the form of military contributions.³³

CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY

In the following sections, I examine four case studies to determine the ability of the hybrid model to explain Japan's postwar security policymaking. I se-

Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. 40, 176–181, 189–192; and Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a "Normal" Military Power*, p. 115.

31. Snyder argues that when a state fears entrapment, its standard response is to limit its commitments to the alliance. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, p. 185.

32. Tsuchiyama, "War Renunciation," p. 63.

33. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, pp. 181–185.

lected these cases using Jason Seawright and John Gerring's "diverse case method."³⁴ The first two cases, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty controversy in 1960 and the anti-Vietnam War movement in Japan, represent examples in which the Japanese government was severely constrained from pursuing an active security policy. Constructivists regard the first case, in particular, as critical to the development of Japanese antimilitarism, so it is reasonable to expect that the antimilitarist model can easily explain it.

The third and fourth cases, Japan's security policy during the 1970s and its security policy under Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, are deviant cases for the antimilitarist model because they are examples of Japan's pursuit of an active security policy implemented with limited opposition.³⁵ The former case is puzzling because external threats, which were relatively modest during the period of détente, cannot explain Japan's willingness to increase its military role in the U.S.-Japan alliance.³⁶ The latter case deviates most remarkably from the antimilitarist model.

In analyzing these cases, I use the process-tracing method and examine the contexts in which the three elements of the hybrid model—pacifism, antitraditionalism, and the fear of entrapment—influenced Japan's policy choices. Doing so can clarify whether the claims made by the antimilitarist model are valid or spurious, and whether the antimilitarist or the hybrid model better explains the outcomes in these cases.³⁷ In assessing the effect of the independent variables, I examined pacifist and antitraditionalist discourses that appeared in the Diet or in the Japanese press, and I used public opinion data to measure the level of Japan's fear of entrapment or abandonment. I also considered events that stimulated the pacifist/antitraditionalist norm or the fear of entrapment. Whether the Japanese government was able to pursue an active security policy without serious opposition or was severely constrained from doing so acts as the dependent variable. Additionally, I examined the development of two important institutional constraints on Japan's security policy: the interpretation of the Japanese constitution concerning the right of collective self-defense and the Three Nonnuclear Principles. Because these institutional constraints are supposed to offer hard evidence for the antimilitarist model, re-

34. Jason Seawright and John Gerring, "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options," *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 61, No. 2 (June 2008), pp. 300–301.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 302–303.

36. Japan's policy in the 1980s is also a deviant case for the antimilitarist model, as Japan further increased its military cooperation with the United States. This can be explained, however, by the increase in Soviet threats during the period. Shinkichi Goto and Yoshinobu Yamamoto, *Sogoanpo to Mirai no Sentaku* [Comprehensive security and future choices] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1991), p. 226.

37. For the importance of process tracing, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005), especially chap. 10.

vealing how they were developed influences my estimate of the performance of the two models.

Case 1: Revision of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960

On January 19, 1960, the U.S. and Japanese governments signed the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. On February 5, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi submitted the treaty to the Diet for ratification. The treaty met with strong opposition from the left and even from some members of the ruling party. Opposition to the new treaty spread and ultimately led to the largest protest in postwar Japan. Since then, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has deemphasized ideological issues, such as the revision of the Japanese constitution, focusing instead on economic development and maintenance of a low-profile security policy. Proponents of the antimilitarist model thus consider the year 1960 a turning point for Japanese antimilitarism.

THE LIMITED IMPACT OF PACIFISM

Although the popular perception is that the Japanese public strongly opposed the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, this was not necessarily true before November 1959, when the Diet began discussing the issue. According to a July 1959 survey by the Cabinet Office of Japan, although the majority of respondents had no clear position on the revised security treaty that was being negotiated, the percentage of those who supported it (15 percent) surpassed those who opposed it (10 percent). Furthermore, according to a *Yomiuri Shinbun* survey conducted in October 1959, 46 percent of the respondents believed that revising the original treaty was necessary, whereas only 12 percent considered it unnecessary.³⁸ The Japanese felt that the original treaty was unfair because it allowed the U.S. military to intervene in Japan to put down local riots, while the United States was not obliged to defend Japan in case of external attack. Hence, the Japanese generally supported revising the treaty to enhance its level of fairness.

As a result, Japan's leftists had difficulty garnering public support for their opposition to the revised treaty. Despite launching a nationwide campaign with the establishment of the People's Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty in March 1959, the leftists failed to energize the public; the phrase *Anpo ha omoi* (Security issues are hard to sell) became popular among Japan's pacifist activists.³⁹ Furthermore, in the Upper House election held in

38. Quoted in Takeuchi, *Maruyama Masao no Jidai*, p. 137.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 136–137; and Yoshihisa Hara, *Sengosi no Nakano Nihon Shakaito* [The Japan Socialist Party in postwar history] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 2000), pp. 163–166.

June 1959, the JSP was defeated while the LDP performed well. Moderate socialists, who attributed the JSP's defeat to the party's position on the treaty issue, split from the party and established the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP).⁴⁰ In contrast, Prime Minister Kishi boasted to Douglas MacArthur II, the United States' ambassador to Japan, that because the security treaty issue had been on the LDP's electoral agenda, the party's victory was an affirmation of the need to revise the treaty.⁴¹

THE FEAR OF ENTRAPMENT AND STRENGTHENED OPPOSITION

Two political developments triggered entrapment fears among the Japanese public and changed the situation dramatically. First, the pacifists succeeded in calling the public's attention to the so-called Far East clause in the revised treaty. The clause stipulated that the United States could use its military in Japan to "maintain stability in the Far East." Japanese socialists propagated the idea that the clause would increase the risk of entrapping Japan into unwanted military conflicts and repeatedly asked for clarification of the definition of the Far East in the Diet. Socialists such as Seiichi Katsumata, Tomomi Narita, and Setsuo Yokomichi forcefully questioned government officials, who often contradicted one another, and succeeded in gaining public attention, including from the media.⁴² On November 10, 1959, socialists' questioning led Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama to comment that the Far East would include parts of China and Siberia, allowing the socialists to claim that this interpretation would permit the United States to use its bases in Japan to attack China or the Soviet Union.⁴³ On February 10, 1960, Kishi himself erred in responding to questions by Yokomichi and other socialists, saying that the Far East would include the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Taiwan Strait. Kishi's comment allowed the socialists to point out that the U.S. and Chinese militaries had nearly clashed over these islands in 1954 and 1958.⁴⁴ The socialists' tactics

40. Koji Nakakita, "Shakaito no Bunretsu" [The split of the Japan Socialist Party], in Jiro Yamaguchi and Masumi Ishikawa, eds., *Nihon Shakaito: Sengo Kakushin no Shiso to Kodo* [The Japan Socialist Party: Postwar progressives' thoughts and behavior] (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 2003), pp. 51–52, 61–65; and Takeuchi, *Maruyama Masao no Jidai*, p. 137.

41. Hideki Kan, "Reisen to Nichibeianpo Taisei" [The Cold War and the U.S.-Japan security system], *Hikaku Shakai Bunka*, No. 9 (March 2003), p. 77.

42. See, for example, Yokomichi's questioning of Foreign Minister Fujiyama on the definition of the Far East in the Lower House Budget Committee on February 8, 1960, in the *Lower House Budget Committee Proceedings*, Japan's Diet Library database, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/cgi-bin/KENSAKU/>; and Hara, *Sengosi no nakano Nihon Shakaito*, p. 151. In the Japanese Diet, most of important debates are conducted in the Budget Committee.

43. *Lower House Plenary Session Proceedings*, November 10, 1959.

44. For Kishi's answer on Quemoy and Matsu, see *Lower House Budget Committee Proceedings*, February 10, 1960. For the socialists' attack against Kishi on this point, see, for example, *Upper House Plenary Session Proceedings*, February 10, 1960; and George R. Packard III, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 199.

succeeded in strengthening the public perception that the Japanese government was ill prepared to restrain U.S. actions that might entrap Japan in a military conflict. According to an *Asahi Shinbun* poll conducted in January 1960, 38 percent of the respondents agreed that the revised treaty increased the possibility of Japan becoming involved in a war, while 27 percent did not.⁴⁵ Another poll shows that the percentage of Japanese who had become concerned about the risk of entrapment stemming from the U.S.-Japan alliance jumped from 15 percent in 1959 to 38 percent in 1960.⁴⁶

The second development that triggered entrapment fears involved the shooting down of a U-2 reconnaissance airplane by the Soviet military in early May 1960 and was equally damaging to Kishi. This incident provided a golden opportunity for the socialists to once again raise entrapment fears among the Japanese people. They pointed out that U-2 reconnaissance airplanes were deployed at Atsugi air base near Tokyo and that the U.S. authorities had not informed the Japanese government of their presence in the country.⁴⁷ When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev warned U.S. allies not to allow the U.S. military to conduct reconnaissance activities against the Soviet Union, the socialists argued that the new treaty would endanger Japan. Their attempt to link the downing of the U-2 to the debate on the revised security treaty led moderate socialists in the DSP to oppose the new security treaty.⁴⁸

The socialists strengthened their argument by calling Haruhiko Nishi, a former senior diplomat at the ministry of foreign affairs, as a witness at the Diet's May 14 treaty deliberations.⁴⁹ Nishi had publicly expressed his opposition to the revised treaty given his concerns over the risk of entrapment, and he repeated his opposition in the Diet to the embarrassment of Prime Minister Kishi. Nishi later summarized his position as follows: "I believe that the revisions to the security treaty pose a grave danger of worsening relations with China and the Soviet Union. . . . For instance, if the Taiwan crisis were to erupt, as has happened in the past, or if relations between North and South Korea were to deteriorate, prompting U.S. military action including the mobilization of its troops in U.S. bases in Japan, Japan could not avoid joint responsibility for U.S. actions and becoming a target of China or the Soviet Union."⁵⁰ Nishi

45. *Asahi Shinbun Yoronchosashitsu, Mini Yonjunen no Nagare* [Forty years of public opinion] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1986), p. 112.

46. NHK Hoso Yoron Chosasho, ed., *Zusetu Sengo Yoronshi* [Graphic explanations of postwar public opinion], 2d ed. (Tokyo: NHK Shuppan, 1982), p. 169.

47. See, for example, Asukata's questions on U-2s at the U.S. Atsugi air base, in *Lower House Special Committee on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Proceedings*, May 9, 1960.

48. Hara, *Sengosi no Nakano Nihon Shakaito*, p. 157.

49. *Lower House Special Committee on the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty Proceedings*, May 14, 1960; and Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, pp. 218–219.

50. Haruhiko Nishi, *Kaiso no Nihongaiko* [Recollection of Japanese diplomacy] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1979), pp. 184–185.

accused Kishi of paying insufficient attention to the risk of entrapment included in the revised security treaty and suggested that parliament maintain the original treaty instead. This episode indicates that the fear of entrapment was widely shared not only by pacifists but also by moderate conservatives.⁵¹

It was in this political context that Prime Minister Kishi articulated one of Japan's most important institutional constraints on its security policy. On February 10, 1960, Kishi commented in the Diet on his cabinet's interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution. He asserted that although Japan possessed the right of collective self-defense, Article 9 did not allow the government to exercise it. The director-general of the JDA and other top officials confirmed that Japan could not send its forces outside Japan to join an ally in battle.⁵² Kishi was not the first to offer this interpretation, but following his comments, it became widely known and accepted by subsequent Japanese cabinets. In publicizing this interpretation, Kishi sought to alleviate the rising fear of entrapment among the public.

ANTITRADITIONALISM AND ESCALATION OF THE CONTROVERSY

Although the fear of entrapment fueled opposition to the revised security treaty, it was Japan's antitraditionalist sentiment that galvanized the anti-Kishi demonstrations. On May 19, the Kishi cabinet decided to force the ratification of the revised treaty in the Diet by ordering the police to block opposition party members who were trying to prolong the Diet deliberations in the hopes of preventing ratification. When Kishi's order prompted public demonstrations, the prime minister considered using the SDF to quell them. The authoritarian measures that Kishi relied on to secure ratification of the revised treaty angered Japanese citizens, many of whom joined by far the largest demonstration in postwar Japan. One estimate indicates that as many as 330,000 people participated in a demonstration around the Diet on June 18, the day before the treaty took effect.⁵³ Despite having achieved ratification of the revised treaty, Kishi took responsibility for creating the turmoil and resigned.

Triggering the anti-Kishi mass demonstrations was the prime minister's reactionary attitude toward those who opposed him; the public feared that Kishi was reversing the trend toward democratization in Japan. That Kishi had been a war criminal contributed to his image of trying to undermine Japan's fledgling democracy. Rokuro Hidaka, a liberal sociologist at the University of Tokyo,

51. Nishi's view was widely shared within the ministry of foreign affairs. Narahiko Toyoshita, *Shudanteki Jieiken toha Nanika* [What is the right of collective self-defense?] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2007), p. 63.

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 80–82.

53. Masumi Ishikawa, *Sengo Seijishi* [Postwar political history] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1995), p. 93.

called May 19 “the day when a political surprise attack was launched on Japan’s democracy.” Masao Maruyama asserted that “whether or not to approve the revised security treaty is no longer a main issue, but the defense of democracy is.”⁵⁴ Masataka Kosaka, a renowned scholar of international politics, noted that Japanese postwar pacifism alone hardly explains the spread of the demonstrations, and that the most important factor was the Japanese people’s opposition to what appeared to be Kishi’s attempt to undermine postwar democracy.⁵⁵ Overall, the antitraditionalists were satisfied with the Japanese public’s strong response to Kishi’s reactionary methods and regarded the scale of the protests as evidence of Japan’s maturing democracy.

The pacifists expressed frustration with the antitraditionalist intellectuals, however. Ikutaro Shimizu, a staunch pacifist actively involved in social movements opposing the presence of U.S. bases in Japan, claimed bitterly that “the security treaty controversy began with the agenda for peace and ended with democracy.”⁵⁶ Shimizu severely criticized antitraditionalist intellectuals such as Maruyama for shifting the focus of the security treaty controversy. He lamented the loss of the great opportunity to prevent ratification of the revised security treaty. This episode shows that although both Japan’s pacifists and antitraditionalists contributed to the spread of Japanese opposition, they did not necessarily share the same goal.⁵⁷

After Kishi’s resignation on July 15, 1960, the LDP began to downplay Japan’s ideological and military agendas. As this case study shows, however, what constrained the LDP was not so much the antimilitarist norm as a combination of Japanese pacifism, antitraditionalism, and the fear of entrapment.

Case 2: The Three-Arrow Plan, Okinawa, and Escalation of the Vietnam War

During the second half of the 1960s, two events occurred in Japan that strongly support the antimilitarist model. The first was the disclosure of the Three-Arrow Plan, the JDA’s secret table exercise for U.S.-Japan military cooperation in the event of a war on the Korean Peninsula, and the opposition it produced

54. Both statements are quoted in Ken Yonehara, *Nihon Seijishiso* [Japan’s political thoughts] (Kyoto: Minerva, 2007), p. 263.

55. Masataka Kosaka, *Kosaka Masataka Chosakushu* [The collection of writings by Masataka Kosaka], Vol. 4 (Tokyo: Toshi Shuppan, 1999), pp. 544–545.

56. Ikutaro Shimizu, *Shimizu Ikutaro Chosakushu* [The collection of writings by Ikutaro Shimizu], Vol. 10 (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1992), p. 201.

57. For details of the disputes between pacifist and antitraditionalist intellectuals, see Tsutomu Tsuzuki, *Sengo Nihon no Chishikijin* [Intellectuals in postwar Japan] (Tokyo: Seiri Shobo, 1995), pp. 354–378.

domestically. Haruo Okada, a left-wing socialist, revealed the plan in the Diet on February 10, 1965. The plan became so controversial that it subsequently constrained the JDA's contingency planning.⁵⁸ The second event was Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's announcement of the Three Nonnuclear Principles in 1967. Responding to a question from socialist Tomomi Narita in the Lower House Budget Committee meeting on December 11, Sato declared that Japan would never possess, produce, or allow the introduction of nuclear weapons on its territory.⁵⁹

ISSUE FRAMING AND THE THREE-ARROW PLAN CONTROVERSY

Opposition to the Three-Arrow Plan was stimulated by both Japanese pacifism and antitraditionalism. In revealing the plan, Okada effectively framed it not only as a challenge to pacifism but also as a danger to democracy, arguing that the plan symbolized the inadequacy of civilian control over the SDF and the latter's disrespect for postwar Japanese democracy. Okada noted that according to the table exercise, in the event of war, the SDF would suppress Japanese leftists and the government would take total control of the economy, transportation, media, and so forth. The plan even referred to Japan's July 1941 policy guidance statement, the implementation of which was a prelude to absolute state control in Japan during the Pacific War, as the most useful model of social control.⁶⁰ Okada argued that the "SDF's action resembled those actions of the Imperial military that led to the February 26 Affair," a coup attempt by Japan's Imperial Army officers that undermined Japan's fragile prewar democracy in 1936. He claimed, "It is perilous that this kind of militarist system is being prepared by uniformed military officers."⁶¹ Okada succeeded in creating the impression that the SDF had embraced Japan's prewar militarist culture, reviving the public's latent fear that the civilian leadership might lose control of the military. A variety of publications as well as leftist periodicals featured stories on the controversy swirling around the plan, underscoring its tremendous significance to the Japanese people.⁶²

The fear of entrapment, triggered by the escalation of the Vietnam War, also

58. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, pp. 105–106.

59. *Lower House Budget Committee Proceedings*, December 11, 1967.

60. Yoshibumi Wakamiya, *Wasurerarenai Kokkaironsen* [Unforgettable debates in the Diet] (Tokyo: Chuokoron, 1994), pp. 127–141; and Tetsuo Maeda, *Jieitai no Rekishi* [History of the Self-Defense Forces] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo, 1994), p. 183.

61. *Lower House Budget Committee Proceedings*, February 10, 1965.

62. *Chuo Koron*, for example, published the complete record of the Diet proceedings of the Lower House Budget Committee meeting on February 10, 1965. It is highly unusual for such mainstream publications to do so. See "Sanya Kenkyu Kokkai Gijiroku Zenbun" [The complete record of the Diet discussions on the Three-Arrow Study], *Chuo Koron*, Vol. 80, No. 4 (April 1965), pp. 155–182.

magnified the impact of the controversy. It was on February 10, 1965, just after the United States intensified its bombing in North Vietnam, that the Three-Arrow Plan was revealed. Japan's socialists effectively linked the plan to the war in Vietnam, arguing that it could entrap Japan in an unnecessary fight with the communist bloc. In fact, before discussing the Three-Arrow Plan, Okada persistently questioned the Japanese government's stance on the U.S. bombings in North Vietnam, trying to frame the issue as an entrapment risk for Japan. He argued, "Japan was in the midst of rising tensions in East Asia due to the U.S. bombings in North Vietnam," and warned that communists might "attack Yokosuka, where the U.S. Seventh Fleet departed for Vietnam, as retaliation for U.S. airplane attacks against North Vietnam."⁶³

Indeed, beginning in February 1965, the U.S. military increasingly used its bases and other facilities in Japan to conduct the war in Vietnam. As many as 100,000 U.S. servicemen may have made their way to Vietnam via Haneda Airport near Tokyo in 1965 alone.⁶⁴ Other facilities near Tokyo, such as the Atsugi air base and Camp Zama, served as logistics and repair centers for combat operations in Vietnam. U.S. bases in Okinawa played an indispensable role in such operations. For instance, three-quarters of the war materials and food supplies flown to Vietnam were sent from Okinawa, and as many as 9,000 Green Berets trained in the jungles around Okinawa.⁶⁵ In July 1965, B-52 bombers deployed in Guam flew to the Kadena air base in Okinawa and then immediately continued on to Vietnam for combat missions, causing a furor in Japan.⁶⁶ The increase in U.S. military activities in Japan alarmed the Japanese public and intensified its fear of entrapment. According to an August 1965 poll by *Asahi Shinbun*, as many as 60 percent of the respondents agreed that Japan might become entrapped in the Vietnam War if it continued to escalate.⁶⁷ Another survey shows that the number of Japanese who said that Japan might become entrapped in the war increased dramatically in 1965.⁶⁸ These data show that a heightened fear of entrapment among the Japanese public provided the background for the Three-Arrow Plan controversy.

63. Lower House Budget Committee Proceedings, February 10, 1965.

64. Thomas Havens, *Fire across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), p. 159.

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 84–88.

66. *Ibid.*, pp. 103–104; and Hidetoshi Sotooka, Masaru Honda, and Toshiaki Miura, *Nichibeï Domei Hanseiki* [A half-century history of the U.S.-Japan alliance] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 2001), pp. 241, 243.

67. *Asahi Shinbun Yoronchosashitsu*, *Mini Yonjunen no Nagare*, p. 160.

68. *NHK Hoso Yoron Chosasho*, *Zusetu Sengo Yoronshi*, p. 165.

ENTRAPMENT FEARS, OKINAWA, AND THE THREE NONNUCLEAR PRINCIPLES

After World War II, U.S. forces continued to occupy Okinawa, but with the escalation of the Vietnam War, Japanese voices demanding return of the island grew louder. During the same period, left-leaning pacifists organized antiwar demonstrations across Japan. Japan's largest labor union, Sohyo, organized an anti-Vietnam War strike on October 21, 1966.⁶⁹ Also remarkable was the rise of non-leftist pacifist groups organized by Japanese citizens, such as the Citizens' Federation for Peace in Vietnam. Led by Minoru Oda since March 1965, the group held anti-Vietnam War rallies across Japan.

Evidence that antitraditionalism influenced the spread of Japan's anti-Vietnam War movement is difficult to find, as there was no significant incident that would indicate the revival of traditionalism. In contrast, growing fears of entrapment contributed to the antiwar movement. A public opinion poll shows that the number of respondents who thought that the U.S.-Japan security treaty would endanger Japan exceeded the number of those who believed that it would protect Japan by more than 15 and 30 percent in 1968 and 1969, respectively.⁷⁰ Edwin Reischauer, the U.S. ambassador to Japan at the time, understood the nature of Japan's opposition to the Vietnam War and repeatedly warned Washington of the war's potential implications for Japan. In a memo dated July 14, 1965, Reischauer wrote that before the war had escalated, the Japanese pacifists' opposition to the automatic renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which would occur in 1970, had been ineffective. He continued, however, that the war had motivated even Japanese conservatives to join the pacifists in opposing the United States and that the United States could no longer assume the treaty would have an easy path to renewal.⁷¹

It was in this context that the issue of Okinawa and the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on the island gained salience.⁷² When Eisaku Sato became prime minister, he pledged to reclaim Japanese sovereignty of Okinawa. Underscoring his determination to achieve this goal, Sato visited Okinawa in August 1965. In November 1967, he and President Lyndon Johnson met in Washington, D.C., where they agreed to negotiate the return of administrative authority over Okinawa to Japan within three years.⁷³

The agreement, however, did not quell anti-U.S. sentiment among the

69. Kenichi Miyamoto, *Showa no Rekishi* [History of the Showa period], Vol. 10 (Tokyo: Shogakkan, 1989), pp. 247–248.

70. NHK Hoso Yoron Chosasho, *Zusetu Sengo Yoronshi*, p. 169.

71. Sotooka, Honda, and Miura, *Nichibei Domei Hanseiki*, p. 242.

72. It was widely understood that the U.S. military maintained nuclear warheads in its facility on Okinawa, which was still under U.S. administrative authority.

73. Sotooka, Honda, and Miura, *Nichibei Domei Hanseiki*, pp. 249–250.

Japanese public, as the socialists intensified their attacks against Sato by raising the fear of entrapment.⁷⁴ In particular, as Sato began his initiative to reclaim Okinawa, the socialists focused on the danger that U.S. nuclear weapons on Okinawa might pose to Japan. On December 7, 1967, JSP leader Seiichi Katsumata argued that Sato's meetings with U.S. leaders "betrayed modest expectations among Japanese." He accused the prime minister of "entrapping Japan further into a large U.S. military strategy in the Far East" by having expressed Japan's support for U.S. actions in Vietnam. Katsumata went on to assert that "[t]he overwhelming majority in Okinawa concluded that military bases [there] were not for peace and security but the causes of getting themselves involved in war." He urged Sato to explain how he would deal with the supposed presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on the island.⁷⁵ In the Diet, socialists and moderates, including members of the Komei Party, continued to raise the issue of nuclear weapons on Okinawa, warning that they exposed Japan to the danger of nuclear attack from other states.⁷⁶

The pacifists' tactics of linking U.S. nuclear weapons on Okinawa with fears of entrapment significantly influenced the Japanese public. According to an *Asahi Shinbun* poll conducted in September 1967, 67 percent of the respondents agreed that Japan should not allow the United States to introduce nuclear weapons to Okinawa when the island was returned to Japan. The largest percentage of those who shared this belief (19 percent) stated that they opposed bringing nuclear weapons to Japan in principle. Almost the same percentage (17 percent), however, said that they opposed the idea because it would expose Japan to the risk of war.⁷⁷ These figures show that among respondents who wanted the return of a nuclear-free Okinawa, the fear of entrapment was as important as Japan's pacifist norm. Although technically the danger of entrapment in a nuclear war existed for Japan regardless of the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory, the public regarded the issue as symbolic of the entrapment risk.

The above analysis describes the political context in which Prime Minister Sato announced the Three Nonnuclear Principles. It shows that both the pacifist norm and the fear of entrapment influenced his announcement of the principles.

74. See, for example, *Upper House Budget Committee Proceedings*, July 21, 1966.

75. *Lower House Plenary Session Proceedings*, December 7, 1967.

76. For example, Ichiro Watanabe of the Komei Party repeatedly raised questions concerning nuclear weapons on Okinawa. *Lower House Budget Committee Proceedings*, December 15, 1967.

77. *Asahi Shinbun Yoron Chosashitsu, Mini Yonjunen no Nagare*, p. 299.

Case 3: Increases in U.S.-Japan Military Cooperation during *Détente*

On July 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon announced the Nixon Doctrine calling for U.S. allies to assume primary responsibility for their defense. The announcement spurred debate in Japan on whether or not it should adopt a more active security policy. Fueling this debate was the appointment of Yasuhiro Nakasone as the director-general of the JDA in January 1970. Laying out his notion of “autonomous defense” as the guiding principle of Japan’s security policy, Nakasone proposed several initiatives to reduce Japan’s security dependence on the United States and to develop more indigenous military capabilities.⁷⁸ The autonomous defense concept met with strong opposition, however, causing Nakasone to be replaced only a year and half later and leaving most of his initiatives unfulfilled. The antimilitarist model views Nakasone’s fall as evidence of Japan’s strong antimilitarist norm.⁷⁹

After Nakasone’s departure from his JDA post, however, Japan began to formulate a more active defense strategy and to assume more military roles within the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Many scholars therefore consider this period a turning point in Japan’s defense policymaking.⁸⁰ Japan’s shift to a more active security policy is particularly puzzling from an antimilitarist viewpoint, given the country’s improved external security environment as a result of *détente* between the United States and the communist bloc.

THE RISE AND FALL OF NAKASONE’S AUTONOMOUS DEFENSE CONCEPT

A defense hawk and staunch traditionalist, Nakasone had publicly advocated the revision of Japan’s constitution and the adoption of an assertive defense policy. Even before becoming the JDA director-general, he had espoused a need for Japan’s autonomous defense. In 1969 he stated repeatedly that Japan should increase its defense capabilities so that it could assume primary responsibility for its defense, while the U.S. role should be reduced.⁸¹ Upon becoming the JDA director-general, he proposed revising the 1957 Basic Policy

78. Takuma Nakajima, “Sengo Nihon no ‘Jishuboei’ ron” [Discourse on postwar Japan’s “autonomous defense”], *Hosei Kenkyu*, Vol. 71, No. 4 (March 2005), pp. 505–535; and Sotooka, Honda, and Miura, *Nichibei Domei Hanseiki*, pp. 318–321.

79. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, p. 98.

80. Goto and Yamamoto, *Sogoanpo to Mirai no Sentaku*, p. 224; and Hideki Uemura, *Jieitai ha Darenomonoka* [To whom does the Self-Defense Forces belong?] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2002), p. 127; and Takeshi Fukuda, “Nichibei Boeikyoryoku niokeru Mittsu no Tenki” [Three turning points of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation], *Reference*, June 2006, pp. 144–157.

81. Takuma Nakajima, “Nakasone Yasuhiro Boeichokan no Anzenhosho Koso” [The JDA Director-General Yasuhiro Nakasone’s conception of security policy], *Kyushu Hogaku*, No. 84 (September 2002), pp. 114–115.

of National Defense to clarify Japan's primary role in defense of the nation while seeking to reduce the number of U.S. base facilities in Japan.⁸²

Initially, the pacifists' attacks against Nakasone were ineffective. Although socialists questioned him on the concept of autonomous defense in Diet meetings beginning in February 1970, their questioning lacked the sharp edge that proved so effective against Kishi a decade ago. The socialists had difficulty opposing the concept partly because Nakasone's ideas, if implemented, would have led to a reduction in the number of U.S. military facilities in Japan. In addition, some scholars attribute the weakness of the socialists' attack against the government to their miserable defeat in the 1969 general election, during which they had emphasized their pacifist positions.⁸³ *Sekai*, the popular pacifist journal, lamented that the weakness of the pacifists' opposition enabled the LDP to pursue a more assertive military agenda.⁸⁴

Helping the socialists to become more assertive was a bizarre incident that stimulated antitraditionalist sentiments among the Japanese. On November 25, 1970, the novelist Yukio Mishima and his followers trespassed into the Eastern Command headquarters of the SDF and tried to instigate a coup by SDF officers. Although their attempt ended in failure, Mishima's extreme traditionalist agenda and his subsequent samurai-style suicide shocked the Japanese public. The socialists tried to link Mishima's right-wing group, Tate no Kai (the Shield Society), to the SDF and Nakasone himself. In a Lower House Cabinet Committee meeting on December 9, Shun Oide and other socialists noted that Nakasone had personal connections with Mishima and that the SDF had given favorable treatment to Mishima's group, which had participated frequently in SDF activities and training sessions. They argued that Nakasone and the SDF were sympathetic toward right-wing groups such as Mishima's and accused Nakasone of bearing personal responsibility for the incident.⁸⁵ Although these accusations seemed to exaggerate Nakasone's ties with Mishima, LDP leaders became reluctant to endorse the director-general's initiatives in an effort to avoid further controversy.⁸⁶

Even before the Mishima incident, the fate of Nakasone's initiatives were doomed because of a growing concern within the Japanese government that

82. *Ibid.*, p. 109; and Yasuhiro Nakasone, *Tenchi Yujo: Gojumen no Sengo Seiji wo Kataru* [Heaven, earth, and heart: Discussing fifty years of postwar politics] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1996), p. 255.

83. Ichiro Okada, *Nihon Shakaito: Sono Soshiki to Suibo no Rekisi* [The Japan Socialist Party: Its organization and history of its decline] (Tokyo: Shinjidaisha, 2005), pp. 132–135.

84. "Nihon no Ushio" [Currents in Japan], *Sekai*, No. 293 (April 1970), pp. 158–161.

85. *Lower House Cabinet Committee Proceedings*, December 9, 1970.

86. Nakajima, "Nakasone Yasuhiro Boeichokan no Anzenhosho Koso," p. 134; and Nakasone, *Tenchi Yujo*, p. 255.

the United States might abandon its ally.⁸⁷ As the Nixon administration made clear its intention to end the Vietnam War, Japan's fear of entrapment had begun to subside. In its place came growing concerns within the Japanese government about the scale and pace of U.S. disengagement from Vietnam. In January 1970, Prime Minister Sato told a U.S. senator visiting Japan that a rapid withdrawal from Vietnam would be undesirable for Japan and other U.S. allies in Asia.⁸⁸ In addition, an announcement in July 1970 that the United States would partially withdraw U.S. troops stationed in South Korea alarmed Japanese leaders. Soon after the announcement, Prime Minister Sato expressed his apprehension about the withdrawal plan to U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers. Numerous Japanese diplomats also voiced grave concern that a South Korean loss in confidence in its defense capability would be undesirable for Japan.⁸⁹

Given these circumstances, conservative Japanese politicians and government officials realized that emphasizing Nakasone's concept of autonomous defense might further encourage U.S. disengagement from Asia and even Japan. In meetings on July 23 and 24, 1970, the LDP leaders and cabinet ministers, including those who had supported the autonomous defense concept, disagreed with Nakasone's proposal to revise Japan's Basic Policy of National Defense. They argued that emphasizing autonomous defense would wrongly signal to Washington that Japan no longer needed a strong U.S. commitment to defend it.⁹⁰

The fear of U.S. abandonment was so strong that Nakasone himself had to downplay the autonomous defense concept when confronted with the possibility of drastic U.S. disengagement. In November 1970, the U.S. government proposed a bold U.S. base realignment plan that would have reduced the number of U.S. troops stationed in Japan from 36,000 to about 24,000 and returned many facilities to Japan, including those at Yokosuka base, which were being used by the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet. This plan spurred heated debate within the JDA; those concerned about U.S. disengagement argued that some aspects

87. Shingo Yoshida, "Detanto no Seiritsu to Nichibei Domei" [The formation of détente and the U.S.-Japan alliance], *Kokusai Anzenhoshō*, Vol. 36, No. 9 (March 2009), pp. 24–27. For the impact of abandonment fears within the Japanese government, see Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: U.S.-South Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999).

88. Shingo Yoshida, "Beikoku no Gunji Purezensu Shukusho wo Meguru Nihon no Anzenhoshō Seisaku" [Japan's security policy concerning the reduction in the U.S. military presence], *Kokusai Anzenhoshō*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (September 2007), pp. 101–102.

89. *Ibid.*, pp. 101–104.

90. "Zenmen Kaitei ni Tsuyoi Nanshoku" [Strong reservation to overall revision], *Asahi Shinbun*, July 24, 1970; and "Kokubo no Kihon Hoshin Kaitei" [The revision of the Basic Policy of National Defense], *Asahi Shinbun*, July 25, 1970.

of the U.S. plan—the return of Yokosuka base, in particular—would seriously undermine Japan’s security. Others welcomed the U.S. plan to promote Japan’s autonomous defense. Ironically, Nakasone sided with those worried about the potential negative consequences of the plan. He emphasized the importance of the U.S. presence in Japan, arguing that “it was necessary to send a warning signal [to Washington] in order to keep U.S. forces or to encourage their comeback.”⁹¹

After learning of Tokyo’s position on the future of the Yokosuka base, the U.S. government informed the Japanese government in March 1971 that it would cancel plans to return it.⁹² The Japanese government welcomed the decision, even though the return of the base had been a goal of the pacifists. Stating that there was nothing more important for Japan than the Seventh Fleet, Prime Minister Sato asked the United States “not to reduce U.S. forces [in Japan.]”⁹³ In December 1972, Tokyo and Washington agreed to make the Yokosuka base the home port of the Seventh Fleet Aircraft Carrier Task Force.

INCREASES IN U.S.-JAPAN MILITARY COOPERATION UNDER THE MIKI CABINET

Despite the rejection of Nakasone’s autonomous defense concept, the Japanese government began to focus its efforts on formulating a military strategy and clarifying its role in the U.S.-Japan alliance. Two developments illustrate Japan’s efforts to enhance its military profile. First, in 1972 the Japanese government began to conduct research on the desired level of Japan’s defense capabilities during the *détente* period. This research ultimately led to the creation of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline, Japan’s first national defense strategy since World War II. Second, in August 1975 JDA Director-General Michita Sakata and U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger agreed to create a U.S.-Japan task force to discuss U.S.-Japan joint military operations. This agreement resulted in the adoption of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (hereafter the Defense Guidelines) in November 1978.

Berger regards these developments as confirmation of Japan’s decision to continue the Yoshida Doctrine,⁹⁴ but such an interpretation is a mischaracterization of what occurred at the time. First, the NDPO was not a mere con-

91. Quoted in Yoshida, “Beikoku no Gunji Purezensu Shukusho wo Meguru Nihon no Anzenhoshō,” pp. 107–108. In 1969 alone, the United States returned twenty-three facilities to Japan. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, p. 71.

92. Shingo Yoshida, “Fear of Abandonment, Strategies for Entrapment: Institutionalization of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the *Détente* Era,” paper presented at the Twentieth Asian Studies Conference, Tokyo, Japan, June 22, 2008, pp. 26–27.

93. Yoshida, “Beikoku no Gunji Purezensu Shukusho wo Meguru Nihon no Anzenhoshō,” p. 109.

94. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, p. 103.

firmation of the Yoshida Doctrine; according to Takuya Kubo, the architect of the NDPO, “[T]he core idea of the NDPO was . . . to enhance Japan’s indigenous defense capability.”⁹⁵ He argued that the NDPO represented an attempt by Japan to articulate a military role for itself and to develop indigenous capabilities as a way to maintain and enhance the credibility of the U.S.-Japan alliance.⁹⁶ Second, the Defense Guidelines went even further than the NDPO in enhancing Japan’s military profile. They detailed the division of roles and missions between the U.S. military and the SDF, reflecting an unprecedented degree of operational coordination. For instance, the guidelines included SDF missions, such as joint protection of sea-lanes of communication, that had not been envisioned in the NDPO. Moreover, uniform SDF officers formally participated in developing the guidelines, and the number of U.S.-Japan joint military exercises increased dramatically after the guidelines’ adoption.⁹⁷ Pacifist Japanese scholars lamented that the Defense Guidelines specified operational details that had been unimaginable since the Three-Arrow Plan controversy.⁹⁸

In short, the NDPO and the Defense Guidelines were more in line with Nakasone’s autonomous defense concept than with the Yoshida Doctrine.⁹⁹ This raises the following question: Why did these developments not trigger antimilitarist sentiment in Japan, especially given that external threats, which would have justified an enhanced military profile, were relatively low during this period? There are two answers to this question. First, unlike Kishi or Nakasone earlier, the Japanese public did not suspect the leaders who undertook these initiatives of trying to challenge the legitimacy of Japan’s postwar democracy. Takeo Miki, who was prime minister when the NDPO was adopted, was a moderate conservative who even leftists believed had respect for the Japanese constitution.¹⁰⁰ He also stood out as a man of discipline who refused to halt the prosecution of former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka on charges of bribery, despite strong pressure from the LDP.

JDA Director-General Michita Sakata, a moderate like Miki and hardly a defense expert like Nakasone, played an equally important role. As the head of the JDA, he advocated improving civilian control of Japan’s defense policy-

95. Quoted in Akihiro Sado, *Sengo Seiji to Jieitai* [Postwar politics and the Self-Defense Forces] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2006), p. 127.

96. *Ibid.*

97. Akihiro Sado, *Sengo Nihon no Boei to Seiji* [Postwar Japan’s defense and politics] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2003), pp. 294–299, 302; Fukuda, “Nichibei Boeikyoryoku,” p. 153; and Goto and Yamamoto, *Sogoanpo to Mirai no Sentaku*, p. 257.

98. See, for example, Maeda, *Jieitai no Rekishi*, pp. 259–260.

99. Sado, *Sengo Nihon no Boei to Seiji*, pp. 260–272, 288–291; and Yoshida, “Beikoku no Gunji Purezensu Shukusho wo Meguru Nihon no Anzenhosho,” pp. 109–111.

100. The maintenance of close relations between Masao Maruyama and Miki suggests their ideological similarity. Yonehara, *Nihon Seijishiso*, p. 266.

making. Indeed, he framed the creation of the Defense Guidelines in the context of civilian control. In response to criticism from Tetsu Ueda, a communist who spoke of the resurgence of militarism within the SDF in the Upper House Budget Committee on April 1, 1975, Sakata argued that creating a formal process between the U.S. and Japanese militaries would ensure that coordination would be conducted under civilian political leadership. He then announced his expectation that the process would lead to agreement on the roles and missions of the U.S. and Japanese militaries.¹⁰¹ Sakata effectively took advantage of pacifist criticism against the SDF to justify the need for enhanced U.S.-Japan military cooperation. Just as the conservative Nixon did not need to worry about domestic criticism of appeasing China in his historic visit to that country, neither Miki nor Sakata needed to worry about antitraditionalist opposition.

The second reason why the NDPO and the Defense Guidelines did not trigger antimilitarist sentiment and instead allowed the Miki cabinet to seek more military cooperation with the United States was the weakening of the fear of entrapment among the Japanese public. As Figure 1 shows, the percentage of Japanese who feared that the risk of war had shrunk and remained low during the second half of the 1970s. One reason for this decline was the end of the Vietnam War. Equally important was the rapprochement between China and Japan in 1972. When they normalized relations later that year, the Chinese government formally supported the U.S.-Japan alliance, viewing it as a counterweight against the Soviet Union. China's support for the alliance, in turn, undercut Japanese leftists' claim that U.S.-Japan military cooperation would escalate conflict with China and prove dangerous to Japan.¹⁰²

The Japanese people's reduced fear of entrapment allowed the government to enhance Japan's military cooperation with the United States without stirring up opposition. An examination of comments by Japan's policymakers shows that maintaining U.S. security commitments was on their minds during this period. Kubo, for instance, argued the best way "to make sure that the U.S. military would come to Japan's rescue" was "to strengthen military cooperation" with the United States and "to develop Japan's indigenous defense capability."¹⁰³ Sakata recalled that the fall of South Vietnam in April 1975 heightened Japan's fear of U.S. abandonment.¹⁰⁴ Japanese leaders were further


101. *Upper House Budget Committee Proceedings*, April 2, 1975; and Sotooka, Honda, and Miura, *Nichibei Domei Hanseiki*, pp. 339–340, 342.

102. Goto and Yamamoto, *Sogoampo to Mirai no Sentaku*, pp. 216–222; and Hara, *Sengoshi no Nakano Nihon Shakaito*, pp. 236–238.

103. Kubo, "Boeiriyoku Seibi no Kangaekata"; and Yoshida, "Beikoku no Gunji Purezensu Shukusho wo Meguru Nihon no Anzenhoshō," p. 108.

104. Havens, *Fire across the Sea*, p. 238. Through various channels, Prime Minister Miki, Foreign

Figure 1. Japanese Perceptions of the Risk of War Involving Japan



SOURCE: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, “Jieitai, Boei ni kansuru Chosa” [Survey on the Self-Defense Forces and Defense], <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/>.

shocked by President Jimmy Carter’s plan to withdraw U.S. forces from South Korea. The JDA, the ministry of foreign affairs, and various LDP leaders opposed the plan. During his visit to Washington, D.C., in March 1978, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda cautioned President Carter not to disturb the military balance on the Korean Peninsula.¹⁰⁵ Japan’s decision in 1978—the same year the Defense Guidelines were adopted—to pay host-nation support to cover the costs of maintaining U.S. facilities in Japan indicates the degree to which Japan tried to preserve U.S. security commitments.

Miki’s and Sakata’s reputations as moderates and the lowered fear of entrapment made it difficult for Japanese pacifists to link their cause to either antitraditionalism or the fear of entrapment. In August 1975, Japan’s pacifist parties intensified their attacks against the Miki cabinet and criticized it for pursuing a militarist policy.¹⁰⁶ In a House Budget Committee meeting on October 21, 1975, Haruo Okada, the originator of the Three-Arrow Plan contro-

Minister Kiichi Miyazawa, and other LDP members expressed grave concerns about weakening U.S. security commitments in Asia. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, pp. 148–149.

105. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism*, p. 153; and Koji Murata, *Daitoryo no Zassetsu: Kata Seiken no Zaikan Beigun Tetta Keikaku* [Failure of the U.S. president: The Carter administration’s plan to withdraw U.S. forces in South Korea] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1998), p. 172.

106. “Hanpatsu Tsuyomeru Yato” [Opposition parties hardened their opposition], *Asahi Shinbun*, August 7, 1975; “Shato Taiketsu Tsuyomeru” [The Socialist Party strengthens its confrontational attitude], *Asahi Shinbun*, August 8, 1975; and “Shakomin Kyoto wo Kakunin” [Socialist, Komei, and Communist Parties confirm a joint struggle], *Asahi Shinbun*, August 30, 1975.

versy, again revealed secret government documents—this time indicating that U.S.-Japan contingency planning had already been systematized without the knowledge of civilian leaders. Okada claimed that this act symbolized the SDF's disregard for the Japanese constitution and the resurgence of militarism.¹⁰⁷ In subsequent committee meetings, other pacifists, including Shun Oide, a socialist, and Seiji Masamori, a communist, argued that an announcement by Prime Minister Miki that Japan's security was significantly linked to Korea's would increase Japan's risks of entrapment.¹⁰⁸ Ultimately, these attempts failed to stir public opposition to the government's policy. A public opinion survey conducted in 1975 shows that the majority of respondents (54.3 percent) approved of both Japan's existing defense policy, with its enhanced role for the SDF, and the U.S.-Japan alliance.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, *Asahi Shinbun* reported on December 18, 1978, soon after the announcement of the Defense Guidelines, that a public opinion poll showed that as many as 70 percent of the respondents desired the continuation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.¹¹⁰

Case 4: Security Policy Activism during the Koizumi Era

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Japan embarked on an unprecedented level of military cooperation with the United States. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Japanese government dispatched the MSDF to handle refueling and other rear-area support missions for the U.S. military in the Indian Ocean, Japan's first overseas military action during a combat operation since its independence in 1952. In December 2002, Japan ordered its Aegis Fleet to the Indian Ocean, despite concern that doing so might violate the government's interpretation of the right of collective self-defense as contained in the Japanese constitution.¹¹¹

In addition, sometime around November 2002—even before the Iraq War had commenced—Japan began to draft a bill that would allow the SDF to be

107. *Lower House Budget Committee Proceedings*, October 21, 1975.

108. See, for example, *Lower House Budget Committee Proceedings*, October 23 and 28, 1975.

109. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, "Jieitai Boei nikansuru Chosa" [Survey on the Self-Defense Forces and defense], conducted in October 1975, <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/s50/s50-10-50-15.html>.

110. "Anpo Hantai Tokunari nikeri" [Fading opposition to the security treaty], *Asahi Shinbun*, December 18, 1978.

111. Masahiko Hisae, *9.11 to Nihongaiko* [September 11 and Japanese diplomacy] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2002), pp. 67–70. The computer system installed in Japan's Aegis fleet is linked to that of the U.S. Aegis fleet; some constitutional scholars have argued that the latter's use of force based on information obtained by Japan's Aegis fleet could be considered a use of Japan's right of collective self-defense. Prime Minister Koizumi simply argued that the SDF's actions were permitted under the government's extant interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution.

dispatched to postwar Iraq.¹¹² Following the end of major combat operations, the Japanese government decided to send the SDF to Iraq in December 2003; and in the next month, the GSDF was dispatched to the southern Iraqi city of Samawah.¹¹³ The ASDF also provided transportation for U.S. forces from December 2003 to December 2008. Arguably, this mission was as dangerous as the GSDF's mission in Samawah, as its C-130 airplanes, which often carried U.S. soldiers between Kuwait and Iraqi cities, were under frequent attack from missiles launched by anti-U.S. groups.¹¹⁴ This was the first time that the SDF had been dispatched to a war zone, although the Japanese government refused to admit it. These actions are clear outliers from the antimilitarist model.

The above actions were possible for two reasons. The first was the dramatic reduction in the fear of entrapment among the Japanese public. For Japan, the end of the Cold War was followed by a deteriorating external security environment, marked by the rise of China and the development of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities by North Korea. This deterioration led to a heightened threat perception among the Japanese public.¹¹⁵ Figure 1 shows that the percentage of survey participants who said that Japan faced a risk of war had been increasing since the mid-1990s; in 2003, 43 percent of the respondents said that such a risk was real, the second highest percentage ever. (The highest was in 2006.) This heightened threat perception reduced the Japanese people's fear of U.S. entrapment, leading to their changed view of the U.S.-Japan alliance: in the same survey in 2003, 41.7 percent of the respondents who believed that Japan would not become involved in a war attributed this belief to the U.S.-Japan alliance. In contrast, among those who felt that Japan could go to war, only 18.3 percent attributed this risk to the alliance, and 79.5 percent attributed it to international tension (e.g., threats from North Korea and the proliferation of nuclear weapons).¹¹⁶ In addition, after the September 11 attacks, the Japanese public considered the United States a victim and its actions against the Taliban in Afghanistan justifiable.¹¹⁷ As a result, 70 percent of the

112. Hideo Otake, *Koizumi Junichiro Popyurizumu no Kenkyu* [Study on Junichiro Koizumi's populism] (Tokyo: Toyo Keizai, 2006), pp. 182–183; and Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu, *Gaiko wo Kenkanishita Otoko* [The man who transformed diplomacy into a fight] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha, 2006), pp. 155–157.

113. Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu, *Gaiko wo Kenkanishita Otoko*, p. 156; and Shigeru Handa, *Senchi Haken* [Dispatched to battlefield] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2009), pp. 67–68.

114. Handa, *Senchi Haken*, pp. 125–136.

115. Michael J. Green, *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), pp. 86–87, 124–125, 244–248.

116. Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, "Jieitai Boei nikansuru Chosa" [Survey on the Self-Defense Forces and defense], conducted in January 2003, <http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h14/h14-bouei/index.html>.

117. Paul Midford, "Japanese Mass Opinion toward the War on Terrorism," in Robert D. Eldridge

survey's respondents supported Koizumi's announcement of the government's plan to assist the U.S. military.¹¹⁸ Fifty-one percent also supported enactment of Japan's Antiterrorism Special Act, which allowed dispatch of the MSDF to the Indian Ocean.¹¹⁹

In the case of the Iraq War, although the majority of the Japanese public felt that U.S. military action was unjustified, many believed that Japan should still support the United States or risk abandonment.¹²⁰ According to a *Yomiuri Shinbun* poll on March 25, 2003, 76 percent of respondents approved of Koizumi's support for U.S. actions, with 63 percent agreeing that Japan had no other choice. The same poll shows that more than 90 percent felt threatened by North Korea, with 60 percent saying they felt it was a serious threat.¹²¹ What emerges from these data is that many Japanese considered their country's support for the United States undesirable but inevitable if Japan was to avoid U.S. abandonment on other issues such as North Korea.

The second reason why Koizumi could initiate unprecedented Japanese military action was because he avoided stirring up antitraditionalist sentiment. This is partly because his rise to power symbolized the advancement of Japan's democracy; Koizumi has probably been the most democratically elected prime minister in postwar Japan.¹²² In the past, the prime minister was selected through LDP factional politics; under Japan's parliamentary system, citizens could only vote to decide the ruling party. According to this practice, Ryutaro Hashimoto, a former prime minister and the leader of the largest LDP faction, should have become prime minister. Fed up with Japan's economic and political stagnation, however, many Japanese viewed Hashimoto as a

and Midford, eds., *Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 15–18.

118. A *Nihon Keizai Shinbun* poll conducted on September 21 and 22, 2001, quoted in Shinoda, *Kantei Gaiko*, p. 57.

119. "Koizumi Naikaku no Shiji" [Approval of the Koizumi cabinet], *Asahi Shinbun*, October 16, 2001.

120. Midford, "Japanese Mass Opinion toward the War on Terrorism," pp. 15–18.

121. "Iraku Senso to Nihon: Kita no Kyoiki Kikikan Shinto" [The Iraq War and Japan: Threats and danger from North Korea permeated], *Yomiuri Shinbun*, March 25, 2003. *Asahi Shinbun* similarly reported that 67 percent of the respondents considered the North Korea factor in their evaluation of Koizumi's support for the Iraq War. "Asahi Shinbunsha Kinkyu Yoron Chosa" [Special public opinion survey by Asahi newspaper corporation], *Asahi Shinbun*, March 23, 2003.

122. Koizumi's rise to power is described as "the quasi-national referendum type election of a prime minister" or "quasi-presidential election." Hideo Otake, *Nihongata Populism* [Japanese-style populism] (Tokyo: Chuokoronsha, 2004), p. 76. For details of Koizumi's victory, see Otake, *Nihongata Populism*, chap. 2; Yu Uchiyama, *Koizumi Naikaku* [The Koizumi cabinet] (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha, 2007), chap. 1; Tadahiro Asakawa, *Koizumi Junichiro toha Nanimonodattanoka* [Who was Junichiro Koizumi?] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2006), chap. 1; and Chao-Chi Lin, "How Koizumi Won," in Steven R. Reed, Kenneth Mori McElwain, and Kay Shimizu, eds., *Political Change in Japan: Electoral Behavior, Party Realignment, and the Koizumi Reform* (Stanford, Calif.: Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University, 2009), pp. 109–131.

symbol of the status quo and their country's old politics. In contrast, they held a favorable view of Koizumi, who positioned himself as a lone wolf challenging the LDP establishment. As a result, the LDP's local chapters and Diet members voted overwhelmingly for him, fearing that the party would be ousted from power if Hashimoto were elected. Excited that their voices had influenced the choice of their country's leadership, Japan's citizens gave Koizumi a higher than 80 percent approval rating when he became prime minister. As the people's choice, Koizumi was given latitude to pursue an active security policy without raising antitraditionalists' hackles. Taku Yamazaki, a former LDP senior leader and strong advocate of amending Article 9, complained, "Although the public looks at me skeptically when I discuss amending the constitution, it applauds Koizumi when he does the same."¹²³

In addition, Koizumi did not stir Japan's antitraditionalist sentiment because, after all, he was not a traditionalist. Koizumi did not share the traditionalists' values, and he distanced himself from the traditionalists by pursuing policies that angered them. In December 2002, for instance, Koizumi's cabinet allowed the commission under the cabinet's chief secretary to issue a report that recommended the building of a nonreligious national memorial to honor Japan's war dead, despite opposition from traditionalists who have imbued the Yasukuni Shrine, a Shinto shrine where the country's war dead have been memorialized, with tremendous symbolism.¹²⁴ Koizumi did make frequent visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, but he probably did so to burnish his image among the public as a strong leader unyielding to pressure from China or South Korea.¹²⁵ In fact, Japanese traditionalists criticized his visits as "mere performance."¹²⁶ Koizumi also explored the possibility of reforming the Imperial House to allow a female member of the imperial family to become emperor, considered a taboo among Japan's traditionalists.¹²⁷

Meanwhile, Japan's pacifists had difficulty linking their cause to either the fear of entrapment or to antitraditionalism. In the Diet, pacifists attempted to argue that sending the SDF to Afghanistan or Iraq would violate the consti-

123. Quoted in Hirotsada Asakawa, *Ningen Koizumi Junichiro* [Junichiro Koizumi's personality] (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2001), pp. 98–99.

124. *Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu, Gaiko wo Kenkanishita Otoko*, p. 248.

125. *Ibid.*, pp. 259–260. China and South Korea opposed the Japanese prime minister's visit to the shrine, where "Class-A" war criminals are enshrined.

126. Kanji Nishio, *Kyoki no Shusho de Nihon ha Daijobuka* [Is Japan all right with a crazy prime minister?] (Tokyo: PHP Shuppan, 2005), pp. 225–226. In justifying his Yasukuni visits, Koizumi argued that even a war criminal becomes *hotoke*, a purified spirit of the deceased, when he dies. But this is a Buddhist idea, and Yasukuni is a Shinto shrine. Traditionalists were dismayed at Koizumi's ignorance.

127. Koizumi also forced the traditionalist Nakasone to retire by strictly implementing the LDP guidelines on retirement.

tution. One of the most common pacifist arguments was voiced by Ota Masahide, a Social Democratic Party (SDP) member and former governor of Okinawa, who asserted that Japan's rear-area support for the U.S. military would unnecessarily endanger both Okinawa and Japan more generally.¹²⁸ The SDP was outmaneuvered by the LDP-led government, however, which played on Japanese fears of abandonment. In March 2003, the LDP and its coalition partners established a policy coordination body that emphasized the need to support the United States on Iraq to ensure U.S. support for Japan on North Korean issues.¹²⁹ Immediately after U.S. forces began their operations against Iraq, Koizumi referred to concerns among the Japanese people about North Korea's aggressive behavior, indicating that Japan needed to act as a reliable ally to maintain the U.S.-Japan alliance.¹³⁰ These attempts may have influenced the Japanese public, as the aforementioned public opinion polls suggest.

Summary of the Case Studies

Table 1 shows the results of the four case studies examined in this article. Overall, they demonstrate that the hybrid model offers a more convincing explanation for the degree of variance in case outcomes than does the antimilitarist model. In addition, the hybrid model provides more detailed accounts of these cases. For instance, it better captures how the U.S.-Japan security treaty controversy developed (case 1), by showing how pacifism, antitraditionalism, and the fear of entrapment influenced events at different stages.

Assuming the validity of the hybrid model, one might ask: What is the causal significance of each of the three factors? First, the case studies make clear that pacifism alone was hardly sufficient to explain variance in the outcomes. In case 1, for instance, Japanese pacifists initially had difficulty in stirring up antitreaty opposition, which grew only after the other two factors came into play. In cases 3 and 4—Japanese security policy in the 1970s and the Junichiro Koizumi era—constraints on Japan's security policy were hardly sufficient to stop the government from pushing through its preferred policy. This does not necessarily mean that pacifism was insignificant, however;

128. *Upper House Foreign Relations-Defense Committee Proceedings*, July 25, 2003.

129. Kyoichi Marukusu, "Koizumi Seiken no Taiogaiko" [The Koizumi cabinet's reactive diplomacy], in Taizo Sakurada and Go Ito, eds., *Hikaku Gaiko Seisaku: Iraku Senso heno Taiogaiko* [Comparative foreign policy: Diplomacy in response to the Iraq War] (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2004), pp. 52, 57, 61; and Shinoda, *Kantei Gaiko*, pp. 73, 103–104.

130. "Koizumi Shusho ga shibushibu Kitta 'Chosen Kado' no Imi" [The meaning of the "North Korea card" that Prime Minister Koizumi hesitantly played], *Shukan Asahi*, April 4, 2003, p. 34.

Table 1. Summary of the Case Studies

Cases	Issues	Pacifism	Antitraditionalism	Fear of Entrapment	Policy Constrained?
Case 1: 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty controversy	Right of collective self-defense	yes	no	yes	yes
	Spread of antitreaty demonstrations	yes	yes	yes	yes
Case 2: Anti-Vietnam War period	Three-Arrow Plan controversy	yes	yes	yes	yes
	Three Nonnuclear Principles	yes	no	yes	yes
Case 3: Security policy in the 1970s	Autonomous defense concept	yes	yes, but possibly spurious	yes	yes
	NDPO and U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines	yes	no	no	no
Case 4: Security policy under Junichiro Koizumi	SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean and Iraq	yes	no	no	no

given that it was a factor in cases 1 and 2 (the anti-Vietnam War movement), the possibility that pacifism was a necessary condition for constraining the government's conduct of security policy cannot be ruled out.¹³¹ Moreover, process-tracing evidence suggests that pacifism's significance may lie in its ability to stimulate antitraditionalist sentiment and the fear of entrapment. For instance, by framing the security treaty issue in terms of entrapment risks, the pacifists succeeded in strengthening public opposition to its revision. Similarly, controversy swirling around the Three-Arrow Plan stemmed in part from the ability of the pacifists to frame it both as an issue of postwar democracy and as an entrapment risk. Although the pacifists' issue-framing tactics had their limits, as shown in cases 3 and 4, it is fair to say that pacifism contributed to the outcomes in a way not quantitatively measurable.

Second, antitraditionalism explains the variance in outcomes better than pacifism does. Process-tracing evidence also suggests that antitraditionalism can strongly influence security policy. For instance, it contributed to the dramatic expansion of the anti-Kishi demonstrations and to the intensity of the Three-Arrow Plan controversy. Some evidence suggests, however, that antitraditionalism was not necessary for the strong constraints on Japan's security policy. For instance, it was a nonfactor during the late 1960s, when the Three Nonnuclear Principles were introduced. It is also possible that Prime Minister Nakasone's autonomous defense concept would have failed even without the presence of antitraditionalism because of the reluctance among other LDP leaders to endorse the concept given the increase in fears of U.S. abandonment by July 1970, well before the Mishima incident.

Third, the fear of entrapment is the most congruent with all four outcomes, although further research is needed to assess whether it is a necessary or sufficient condition for constraining a more active Japanese security policy. The rising fear of entrapment was a turning point in the anti-security treaty movement in case 1. It also contributed to the Three-Arrow Plan controversy and the development of the Three Nonnuclear Principles in case 2. In cases 3 and 4, on the other hand, the low fear of entrapment created a permissive environment for the Japanese government to seek a more active security policy. Further, the ability of the Japanese government to push through active security measures in cases 3 and 4, because of the fear of abandonment, suggests that the causal effects of an alliance security dilemma were greater than those of pacifism.¹³² This result confirms pacifist scholar Yoshikazu Sakamoto's argu-

131. Even a cause with limited causal effects may be a necessary condition for certain outcomes. George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, p. 27.

132. In these two cases, pacifism and the fear of abandonment exerted opposite effects on the gov-

ment that the influence of Japanese pacifism derives from Japanese citizens' desire to avoid being entrapped in an unwanted war that might be triggered by the United States.¹³³

In addition, the case studies demonstrate that controlling the Japanese public's entrapment fears was an important reason for the government to create institutional constraints on Japan's security policy. Prime Minister Kishi, for instance, emphasized the unique interpretation of Article 9 to ease the fear of entrapment. Prime Minister Sato's announcement of the Three Nonnuclear Principles was also partly designed to allay concerns that the presence of nuclear weapons at U.S. bases on Okinawa would expose Japan to a possible attack from U.S. adversaries. These are all important findings, given that scholars have traditionally considered institutional constraints on Japan's security policy the product of its antimilitarist norm.

In sum, the case studies indicate that the combination of pacifism and either antitraditionalism or the fear of entrapment may be sufficient to constrain a more active Japanese security policy. This is, of course, a tentative assessment; given that the main task of this study is to evaluate the efficacy of the hybrid model compared to that of the antimilitarist model, more research is needed to confirm this assessment and to verify the overall validity of the hybrid model. If future research finds that only pacifism has sufficiently constrained Japan's active security policy, then the hybrid model should be modified or falsified.

Conclusion

Observing Japan's recent security policy decisions, one might conclude that antimilitarism in the country is in decline and ask why Japan's security norm has been changing. This study has taken a different approach to addressing this issue. It began by questioning the adequacy of the antimilitarist model and explored the constituent elements of Japanese antimilitarism. It then presented the hybrid model to explain past Japanese security policy as well as its recent trajectory. The results indicate that the hybrid model more accurately captures the dynamics of Japanese security policy decisionmaking than does the antimilitarist model.

Assuming that the hybrid model is superior to the antimilitarist model, what are some of the possible policy implications? As a general trend, Japan is

ernment; antitraditionalism was not a factor. Therefore, it is possible to compare the relative causal effects of the two factors here.

133. Yoshikazu Sakomoto, *Kakuujidai no Kokusaiseiji* [International politics of the nuclear age] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1982), pp. 3–29.

likely to continue to pursue a more active security policy under the government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), even though the DPJ is deemed more dovish than the LDP on issues of foreign policy. This is because the DPJ-led government faces the same external and internal situations that the LDP did. Externally, threats from North Korea, with its nuclear and missile capabilities, and the rise of China are likely to persist. As a result, Japan will continue to experience the fear of abandonment rather than that of entrapment, making it feel the need to do more to maintain U.S. security assurance. The constraining effect of antitraditionalism on Japan's security policy is also likely to weaken as the Japanese people's confidence in their postwar democracy grows. Koizumi's victory in the 2001 LDP leadership election and the change of government in 2009 have transformed the dynamics of Japanese politics, symbolizing the coming of "normal" democracy, in which citizens can exert influence over the selection of their leaders by ballot and by voice. Under these circumstances, the Japanese people believe that a return to Japan's prewar-style of authoritarianism is an increasingly remote possibility. As a result, the divide between Japanese pacifists and antitraditionalists will widen, making it harder for the former to frame issues to mobilize the latter.

At the same time, factors constraining Japanese security policy will remain, although they will not exert as much influence as they did during the Cold War. Pacifism will continue to be a factor. The fear of entrapment will not completely disappear because it is structurally inherent in all alliances. In addition, the emergence of a traditionalist leader may make it easier for pacifists to stir up antitraditionalist sentiment. Therefore, although Japan is likely to continue playing a more active military role than it did during the Cold War period, it is unlikely to become the "Britain of the Far East," a state that does not hesitate to conduct combat operations jointly with the United States or even independently.¹³⁴

This study also has broader theoretical implications. First, it demonstrates the fruitfulness of the eclectic approach, which cuts across different paradigms in international relations theory. The hybrid model comprises both realist and constructivist factors, and the case analyses shows that it can provide a powerful, more detailed explanation for Japanese security policy than either a purely realist or constructivist explanation. Some may question the complementarity of the philosophical foundations upon which different factors are based. As Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil argue, however, different factors and their

134. For use of this term, see Institute for National Strategic Studies, "The United States and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature Partnership," INSS Special Report (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, October 11, 2000).

causal mechanisms “can be meaningfully grouped in terms of the implications of their substantive claims, in spite of significant differences in their philosophical or methodological foundations.”¹³⁵ In fact, even within one paradigm, considerable differences exist among substantive explanations, which is why it is worthwhile to attempt to combine explanations that share similar predictions across paradigms.¹³⁶

More specifically, an eclectic approach shows that the fear of entrapment, a realist factor, played an important role in constraining Japan’s security policy. The empirical findings of this study show that the existence or the absence of factors contributing to this fear helped to determine opposition to a more active security policy. In particular, the finding that Japan’s institutional constraints are at least partially the products of the fear of entrapment is intriguing, as they are often regarded as evidence of a strong normative influence.

At the same time, this study highlights the relevance of normative factors in security policy. It demonstrates that not only security norms but also nonsecurity norms can influence a state’s external behavior. As discussed, antitraditionalism is a norm primarily about Japan’s domestic politics, but it can nonetheless exert significant influence on its security policy. Existing constructivist research focuses mainly on states’ external behavioral norms, and the underlying assumption seems to be that norms that influence states’ security policy must be security norms. My research demonstrates, however, that this is not always true, thus opening up a new horizon for research on the relationship between types of norms and states’ behavior.

A second broader theoretical implication of this study is that it shows the fruitfulness of treating a seemingly monolithic political culture as a coalition of ideas. This is partly a reason why a nonsecurity norm can influence state behavior. Moreover, one of the challenges to research on ideas and norms is the need to account for the variation in their effects despite the supposed consistency of such effects.¹³⁷ Recognizing that political cultures are made up of different elements makes it possible to explain why these cultures have varying degrees of influence on actors’ behavior. Indeed, an idea is influential precisely because it can appeal to a coalition of groups with different interests or value systems. For instance, Manfred Jonas demonstrates empirically that pre-World

135. Katzenstein and Sil, “Rethinking Asian Security,” p. 263.

136. *Ibid.*, p. 262. For an example that shows how different factors attributed to the same paradigm may generate differing predictions about state behavior, see Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 7–45.

137. Paul Kowert and Jeffrey Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise,” in Katzenstein, *The Culture of National Security*, p. 485.

War II isolationism was particularly strong in the United States because it appealed to various ideological and interest groups.¹³⁸ Similarly, contemporary conservatism in the United States consists of partially overlapping ideologies, such as Christian fundamentalism, hawkish nationalism, libertarianism, and neoconservatism.¹³⁹ These examples show that a coalition approach to analyzing ideational factors is underutilized but offers great promise for researchers.

Additionally, this approach calls attention to the role of normative agents in mobilizing ideational coalitions. In the case of Japan, pacifists used issue-framing strategies to stir up fears of entrapment and antitraditionalist sentiment. This finding sheds light on the strategic behavior of normative agents. That is, while extant research points out that rational actors sometimes use norms strategically to achieve their goals, this research shows that normative agents use realist factors strategically to maximize their influence.¹⁴⁰ This finding validates the claim by James Fearon and Alexander Wendt that “the most interesting research is likely to be work that . . . cuts across the rationalist/constructivist boundary.”¹⁴¹

Only by adopting an approach based on analytical eclecticism was I able to reach the findings presented in this article. Indeed, my research demonstrates that advancement in theoretical knowledge using this approach is possible despite what some critics have written.¹⁴² This is not to deny the value of paradigm-driven research, but it should be recognized that analytical eclecticism can be a powerful tool to make sense of international politics, which is almost always influenced by multiple material and normative factors.

138. Manfred Jonas, *Isolationism in America, 1935–1941* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967).

139. For a concise collection of conservative writings in the United States, see Gregory L. Schneider, ed., *Conservatism in America since 1930* (New York: New York University Press, 2003).

140. Kowert and Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits,” pp. 492–494; Ian Hurd, “The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the U.N. Sanctions, 1992–2003,” *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 495–526; and Frank Schimmelfennich, “Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe,” *International Organization*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Fall 2005), pp. 827–860.

141. James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, eds., *Handbook of International Relations* (London: Sage, 2002), p. 52.

142. Stephen K. Sanderson, “Eclecticism and Its Alternatives,” *Current Perspectives in Social Theory*, Vol. 8 (June 1987), pp. 313–345; and James Johnson, “How Conceptual Problems Migrate: Rational Choice, Interpretation, and the Hazards of Pluralism,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 5 (June 2002), pp. 223–248.