When do national movements succeed? Specifically, when and why does the use of violence by armed groups within such movements help to achieve their strategic objectives, such as international recognition, territorial control, and the creation of new states? Two recent struggles shed light on the debate among policymakers and scholars.

Amid the ongoing civil war in Syria, the most common refrain heard among opposition supporters has been that Syrian rebel groups must unite to topple President Bashar al-Assad. In the fall of 2012, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared, “It is encouraging to see some progress toward greater opposition unity, but we all know there is more work to be done.”1 Subsequent unity talks in Doha, Madrid, and Istanbul have failed to unite a fragmented opposition, whose infighting is symbolized by the July 2013 killing of a commander of the Free Syrian Army by the group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, itself a sometime competitor of the jihadi group Jabhat al-Nusra. All three of these groups are tenuous allies, at best, and hostile adversaries, at worst, with the organization designed to unify the opposition movement: the Syrian National Coalition. A similar effort has absorbed the Palestinian national movement for decades, as foreign leaders and many of their own Palestinian supporters have tried to push Fatah and Hamas to unite within a single institutional framework to further the strategic progress of their movement. The leaders of both groups have publicly expressed support for the move, even if unity remains elusive.2

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2. “Fatah, Hamas in Calls for Palestinian Unity,” Agence France-Presse, December 9, 2012; and Pe-
These policy arguments rest on generations of scholarship that claim that united movements are the most successful in achieving their strategic objectives. As Bard O’Neill notes, “Few, if any, experts on and practitioners of insurgency have not stressed the importance of unity within insurgent ranks.” Wendy Pearlman makes a strong theoretical and empirical case that united movements exhibit greater cohesion among groups, centralized command to resolve disputes and direct a common strategy, and less of the infighting and spoiling that prevent strategic progress. In his landmark study of social movements, William Gamson agreed with the relative effectiveness of unity. As for the alternative, he argued, “The sorry reputation of factionalism is a deserved one.”

Nonetheless, a growing number of prominent scholars have suggested that “internally divided movements are more likely to get concessions from their host states,” and that therefore the Palestinians and the Syrian opposition might be best served by continued internal fragmentation. Kathleen Cunningham, Herbert Haines, Mark Lichbach, Desirée Nilsson, and Jesse Driscoll claim that movements with multiple factions can generate beneficial radical flank effects, reduce the principal-agent problem for the movement’s base of supporters, and provide flexibility in coalitions that helps to resolve conflict and offers incentives to the target state to make strategic concessions to moderate groups. These findings also have roots in earlier scholarship on social movements. As Luther Gerlach and Virginia Hine concluded, “When the

success of movements is reported as having occurred ‘because of’ rather than ‘in spite of’ organizational fission and lack of cohesion, we will have come to understand the nature of movement dynamics much more clearly.”

So, which type of national movement is the most successful? Neither. Although the united-divided distinction effectively incorporates fragmentation and institutions within movements that many scholars treat as unitary, it systematically discounts the most important factor that defines a movement’s structure: the distribution of power. By incorporating the distribution of power into a typology of movement structure, this study finds that united and fragmented movements exhibit more similarities than differences, because they both contain multiple significant groups and therefore internally competitive movement systems.

Hegemonic national movements with one significant group are more likely to be strategically successful. This movement structure provides incentives for the dominant group to cement its position in the movement hierarchy through strategic gains; reduces counterproductive violent mechanisms from within and foreign meddling from without; and improves the movement’s coherence in strategy, clarity in signaling, and credibility in threats and assurances. Power thus drives both actions and outcomes in national movements. If, however, the hierarchy of a movement shifts over time but the number of significant groups in the movement system remains the same, the groups are simply exchanging roles in a recurring play that is likely to have the same strategic finale.

Empirical analysis of this study’s power distribution theory of movements and its competitors involves comparative, longitudinal analysis of seventeen campaigns involving sixteen groups within the Palestinian and Algerian national movements. Both movements contained groups that shared the goal of a new nation-state while engaged in competition for movement leadership. The use of longitudinal analysis of a smaller number of campaigns within two movements allows for the process tracing of key causal mechanisms as well as improved isolation and assessment of the impact of movement structure on political actions and outcomes. The number and hierarchy of significant groups within each movement shifted significantly over time as they both experienced a mixed record of strategic success and failure. In sum, the number

of significant groups within the Palestinian and Algerian national movements drove the effectiveness of their campaigns, and the hierarchical position of their respective groups drove their behavior, with striking results.

This article consists of six main sections. The first three sections present the power distribution theory, including a typology of movements based on the internal distribution of power, the dependent variable of strategic success, and the hegemony and hierarchy hypotheses with their related causal mechanisms. The fourth and fifth sections conduct an empirical analysis of the effectiveness of the Palestinian and Algerian national movements. The final section identifies the implications of these arguments and findings for scholarship and policy.

A Typology of Movement Systems

The structure of the international system is driven by the number of great powers; the structure of party systems is driven by the number of effective parties; and the structure of movement systems is driven by the number of significant groups. This basic but overlooked fact suggests that the most neglected aspect of movement structure identified by Kristin Bakke, Kathleen Cunningham, and Lee Seymour—power—is also the most crucial.9

The structure of a national movement is first defined by the number of significant groups it contains, because the most powerful groups play the dominant role in campaign dynamics and outcomes.10 The structure of the international system is based on the United States and China, not Belize and Luxembourg; the structure of the American party system is based on the

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9. Kristin M. Bakke, Kathleen G. Cunningham, and Lee J.M. Seymour, “A Plague of Initials: Fragmentation, Cohesion, and Infighting in Civil Wars,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 2012), p. 267. Social movements—of which national movements are one type—are defined as “informal interaction networks between a plurality of individuals, groups, and/or organizations” with “a shared set of beliefs and a sense of belonging” that are “engaged in political and/or cultural conflicts, meant to promote or oppose social change.” Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 14–15.

10. I define organized groups as those units that have an autonomous leadership that possesses authority over group members, often identified through a general differentiation of roles among internal elements and a duplication of roles when compared to other organized groups. For example, Mia Bloom notes that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was divided by specialization into the Black Tigers, Sea Tigers, Baby Tigers, Air Tigers, and Women’s Military Units, and each possessed a differentiation of roles under a single leadership. On the other hand, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization was a different organized group as its units duplicated LTTE roles and had a different, autonomous leadership. Bloom, Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 58–62.
Republican Party and the Democratic Party, not the Modern Whig Party and the Socialist Party; and the structure of a national movement such as that of the Palestinians is based on Fatah and Hamas, not the Palestinian Arab Front and the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front. Even though some movements experience periods when the unorganized grassroots or weaker organizations may appear to be taking the lead—as in the Russian Revolution, the first intifada, or the recent uprisings in Egypt—strong organizations such as the Bolshevik Party, Fatah, and the Muslim Brotherhood, respectively, soon (re)gain control over the less organized masses and the movement itself.

For national movements, a significant group is either the strongest group in the movement or another strong group that has the capability to realistically challenge the strongest group for predominance in the foreseeable future. Because the strength of armed groups is far more volatile than that of states, this study considers a group significant if its membership size, economic wealth, or seat distribution in common political institutions is one-third as large as that of the strongest group.11 A group with one-third the recruits or funding of another can realistically overtake it within the foreseeable future, whereas such an outcome is unheard of among states.

A national movement with three significant groups may mean more potential rivals, but the key distinction is between those movements with one significant group and those with two or more or, in other words, between movements that contain a competitive and a noncompetitive internal environment. This distinction has precedent in party systems (hegemony vs. oligarchy) and economics (monopoly vs. oligopoly).12

A less important distinction in the structure of national movements that weakly mimics some aspects of the number of significant groups involves alliances among these groups.13 In an alliance, individuals are generally loyal to


their groups first, and individual group leadership maintains ultimate decisionmaking power, even if groups agree to try to coordinate certain actions. The power concentrated in a single alliance is therefore far less cohesive in organization, coherent in action, and stable in alignment than a single group. These factors make a movement with a unifying alliance somewhat different from a fragmented movement with no such ties, but even more distinct from a hegemonic movement with a single dominant group. In this study, national movements count as united if all significant groups are in a single alliance.

Based on the number of significant groups and their alliances, three types of movement systems emerge given their internal distribution of power: hegemonic, united, and fragmented (see figure 1).14

**The Strategic Success of a National Movement**

Although they may have different ideologies and additional goals, groups and individuals within the same social movement are bound together by the desire to achieve a shared strategic objective.15 To hold that objective constant across

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14. The bottom left quadrant is a null set because a movement with one significant group must have all significant groups united by definition.
15. For a more in-depth discussion of the distinction between strategic objectives—which are generally shared by a social movement and include ending military occupation and altering the nature of the ruling government—and organizational objectives—which benefit a single group and include increased recruits and funding—see Peter Krause, “The Political Effectiveness of Non-State Violence: A Two-Level Framework to Transform a Deceptive Debate,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (April/June 2013), pp. 259–294.
movements and best engage with the existing literature on effectiveness, this study focuses on national movements whose common strategic objective is the creation of a new state.

For national movements, a dichotomous measure of victory or defeat fails to capture substantial, accessible variation in movement progress. The achievement of a new state does not easily lend itself to continuous measurement either, however. Therefore, the dependent variable—campaign outcome—is assessed along a four-tiered ordinal scale, which has significant precedent in the literature on the effectiveness of nonstate violence and national movements. The achievement of a new state is coded as “total success.” Gaining sovereign control of territory for the future state or new protostate institutions is coded as “moderate success.” Recognition as a legitimate national movement by the United Nations is coded as “limited success.” A lack of any gains in territory, institutions, or recognition is coded as “failure.” Under what conditions are strategic success and failure more likely to occur?

**Power Distribution Theory: Hegemony and Hierarchy**

Power distribution theory makes three unique predictions that challenge existing scholarship. First, the hegemony hypothesis predicts that hegemonic national movements with one significant group are more likely to be strategically successful than united or fragmented national movements with two or more significant groups (see table 1). As summarized in figure 2, there are three key mechanisms that sustain the hegemony hypothesis.

Second, the hierarchy hypothesis predicts that a group’s position in the hierarchical structure of the movement—hegemon, leader, challenger, or subordinate—drives whether the group pursues strategic objectives and uses or restrains violence to do so (see table 1). In this study, the hierarchy hypothesis largely serves to support the hegemony hypothesis through its causal mechanisms.

Third, power distribution theory agrees with its united and fragmented competitors that movement structure drives movement outcome, at least in some form. This places power distribution theory at odds with the broader effectiveness literature that treats movements as unitary and movement structure as insignificant. This literature applies the well-developed concepts and

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Table 1. Predictions of the Power Distribution Theory of Movements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>Movement System</th>
<th>Movement Hierarchy</th>
<th>Predicted Group Actions</th>
<th>Predicted Movement Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Campaign 1</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. group A 2. group B 3. group C</td>
<td>Groups C and B use violence to pursue pure organizational goals. Group A initially attempts to restrain them and partially pursues strategic goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign 2</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. group C 2. group A 3. group B</td>
<td>Groups B and A use violence to pursue pure organizational goals. Group C initially attempts to restrain them and partially pursues strategic goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign 3</td>
<td>united</td>
<td>1. group C 2. group A 3. group B</td>
<td></td>
<td>Groups B and A use violence to pursue pure organizational goals. Group C initially attempts to restrain them and partially pursues strategic goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign 4</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. group C 2. group A</td>
<td>Group A uses violence to pursue pure organizational goals. Group C initially attempts to restrain it and partially pursues strategic goals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign 5</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td></td>
<td>1. group C</td>
<td>Group C pursues strategic goals and resists any attempts at outbidding, chain-ganging, or spoiling.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: This table frames the key predictions of the hegemony hypothesis, represented by the large arrow, and the hierarchy hypothesis, represented by the small arrow. The predicted movement outcomes should be understood as probabilistic predictions of relative success between movement system types. Note that this table and tables 2 and 3 present the hierarchy among significant groups—hegemons, leaders, and challengers—for the purposes of simplicity, but each movement is likely to have many less powerful subordinates ranked below these groups as well.

Theoretical frameworks of interstate bargaining and coercion to suggest that variation in the effectiveness of nonstate violence and national movements is driven by what the violence is meant to achieve (objective),\(^\text{17}\) how much power one has to achieve it (strength),\(^\text{18}\) who the power is directed against (regime


\(^{18}\) Charles Tilly, “From Interactions to Outcomes in Social Movements,” in Marco G. Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Tilly, eds., How Social Movements Matter (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
how one employs that power to achieve the desired goal (strategy), and how clear and credible one is in making threats to employ violence and assurances to stop it (credibility and signaling). Power distribution theory holds that many of the factors identified in these works—strategy, credibility, and signaling—are driven by movement structure, and they serve as intervening variables in the theory’s causal mechanisms. Nonetheless, theories that treat movements as unitary suggest no variation in strategic success across campaigns as movement system structure changes, ceteris paribus.

To sum up these three predictions, power distribution theory suggests that a hierarchical shift will change group actions but not movement outcome; a systemic shift will change both actions and outcome; and a shift in the distrib-

tion of power that does not alter the movement hierarchy or movement system is unlikely to lead to changes in either actions or outcome.

STRUCTURING INCENTIVES: MOVEMENT HIERARCHY AND STRATEGIC GOALS
The causal logic of power distribution theory starts with a basic yet overlooked claim: group actions drive strategic success, but groups are not driven primarily by strategic motivations. Power distribution theory assumes that groups in national movements, like most organizations, are concerned with ensuring their survival and maximizing their strength above all else. How then does strategic progress occur? Although the structure of a national movement cannot alter the preferences of armed groups, it can alter how they pursue and realize those preferences. To paraphrase Miles’ Law, the hierarchy hypothesis argues that where you stand on strategic success and the use of violence depends on where you sit in the movement hierarchy.22

The achievement of a new state includes a mix of public goods (ending an occupation), club goods (citizenship), and private goods (political office, wealth, and status). Pursuit of this strategic goal is costly, as it expends resources and makes a group a potential target of the ruling regime. Therefore, a group will pursue strategic goals (1) when these private and club goods are the best resources for a group to increase its power and (2) when the group is more likely to capture these private and club goods. A group’s position in the movement hierarchy drives both of these considerations.23

The dominant group in a hegemonic movement is no less self-interested than groups in fragmented or united movements; the difference is that the movement structure changes how the dominant group can best pursue its self-interest. The hegemon’s survival and position at the top of the movement are likely secure in the short term, as no viable internal rival exists to supplant it. The lack of internal competition in a hegemonic movement means that the biggest threat to the dominant group is the regime itself, which means that the group is more likely to focus its attention externally on strategic objectives and the associated state enemy.24

Achievement of the ultimate strategic goal of

23. A group’s position in the hierarchy is determined by whether the group is ahead or behind the others in more of the three categories that make up group strength. For example, if Group A has more members and seats on a common political body, but less funding than Group B, Group A would be ranked first.
statehood can cement the current movement hierarchy within a nascent govern-ment and capture the private benefits of office, wealth, and status for the hegemon. The dominant group in a hegemonic movement is therefore more likely to pursue strategic goals than any other type of group in any other type of movement system.

Like hegemons, the strongest group in a fragmented or united movement—the leader—will pursue the strategic goal of statehood to cement the current movement hierarchy and capture the associated private and club goods. Unlike hegemons, leaders face significant challengers who could supplant them in the short term, so they are more likely to pursue pure organizational goods such as recruits and funding as well. The fragility of alliances, the anarchical aspects of civil conflict, and the cumulative resources of state power greatly limit the ability of leaders to credibly commit to distribute the selective benefits of statehood with challengers. Challengers therefore have incentives to prevent strategic progress so as to deny the leader and preserve selective benefits for themselves (see table 1). Hegemonic movements are thus likely to have more resources working toward strategic success—and fewer working against it—than are united or fragmented movements.

COUNTERPRODUCTIVE DYNAMICS OF VIOLENCE IN COMPETITIVE MOVEMENTS
The problem with nonhegemonic movements is not simply that leaders and challengers often lack incentive to pursue strategic goals, but also that the dynamics of violence among multiple strong groups in a competitive movement frequently produce strategic failure, regardless of intent. Anarchical movements and their constituent groups therefore face a version of the security dilemma for nonstate actors: actions taken to make a group more secure often make the group’s movement—and at times the group itself—less secure and less strategically effective. Four counterproductive violent mechanisms are likely to yield strategic failure: outbidding, chain-ganging, spoiling, and infighting.

27. Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence,”
In a fragmented or united movement, groups can shift hierarchical positions quickly, making potential challenges via outbidding, chain-ganging, spoiling, or infighting both serious and common. Challengers dissatisfied with their position in the hierarchy are most likely to initiate escalatory outbidding violence against the state or infighting with other groups in attempts to improve their position. Attacks by a challenger may chain-gang the unprepared movement into an uncoordinated conflict with the state, which is likely to yield strategic failure. Outbidding or chain-ganging violence is particularly attractive to a challenger because it allows the challenger to reap the benefits while the leader pays the costs. Supportive movement members are more likely to know which group committed an attack and provide it with recruits or funding. On the other hand, the state often does not have good intelligence on weaker challengers and will therefore repress the leader, either because it thinks the leader committed the attack, or because the state simply wants to “do something” in response and so represses the group it knows better and perceives as a greater threat. Spoiling is also more likely to occur and succeed in a competitive movement system, given the presence of challengers with the incentive and capability to scuttle a deal.

Leaders and stronger challengers are likely to initially attempt to restrain such violence, but their position in a competitive movement means that (1) they will often lack the capability to do so, and (2) once escalatory outbidding or chain-ganging spirals get going, stronger challengers and then leaders will often employ violence to avoid losing their tenuous hold on their top positions. In any such movement, potential state sponsors with their own agendas have multiple significant groups as entry points, making the emergence of these mechanisms even more likely. Collectively, movements with two or more significant groups are therefore more likely to experience strategically counterproductive violent mechanisms and less likely to achieve strategic success.


In a noncompetitive hegemonic movement, nonsignificant subordinate groups are less likely to initiate outbidding, chain-ganging, spoiling, or infighting—and the hegemon has less need to respond—because such actions are unlikely to bring about any significant shifts in the movement hierarchy, pull the hegemon into a conflict, prevent an agreement with the state, or pose a serious threat via direct infighting. Hegemonic movements further provide potential state sponsors with only a single viable outlet for influence. In such a seller’s market, state sponsorship is more likely to further strategic progress and less likely to yield strategically counterproductive mechanisms. Given the preferences and power of the dominant group, hegemonic movements are also more likely to pursue an effective, cohesive strategy.

Starting and Stopping Violence: Credibility and Signaling

Any target of coercive violence will ask itself three key questions: What does the coercer want, how realistic is the threat, and can or will the coercer uphold any deal? Hegemonic movements are more likely to have coherent strategies that allow for clearer signaling to external audiences. In contrast, fragmented and united movements send more mixed signals about the objective, threats, and guarantees of a campaign.

The considerable power held by a dominant group increases the credibility of a hegemonic movement in its ability to deliver on commitments to start or stop violence. States further understand that spoilers are less likely to emerge or succeed within hegemonic movements, which provides greater certainty concerning the commitment problem that can emerge with fragmented or united movements. In sum, hegemonic movements are more likely to be clear, credible coercers with cohesive strategies of violence than are united or fragmented movements, and are therefore more likely to yield strategic success.

The Palestinian National Movement: Chronic Fragmentation

Comparative, longitudinal analysis of seventeen campaigns involving sixteen groups within the Palestinian and Algerian national movements provides initial empirical tests of the power distribution theory and its competitors. These are foundational most-likely cases for many rival theories, which predict either that there is no variation in outcome as movement structure changes or that the movement would be most successful when fragmented or united. Longitudinal analysis of numerous campaigns within each movement allows for de-
tailed process tracing of mechanisms across similar cases in which factors such as the state enemy, the state’s regime type, and the strategic objective are held constant, while movement system structure, movement hierarchy, and strategic outcome vary significantly over time.\(^\text{29}\)

As seen in table 2, empirical analysis of the Palestinian national movement lends strong initial support to the power distribution theory. Regardless of changes in time or space, the Palestinian national movement met with strategic failure when the movement was fragmented (1965–June 1967, July 1967–68, 1969–70, 1971–73, 1975–86, 1996–2000, 2000–06, and 2006–present), limited success when it was united (1974), and the greatest success when the movement was hegemonic (1986–96). As predicted by the hierarchy hypothesis, the position of an armed group in the hierarchy of the Palestinian national movement often played the dominant role in when, how, and why that group employed or worked to restrain escalatory violence.\(^\text{30}\)

Space limitations prevent analysis of each campaign period, but I examine four in depth: 1965–June 1967, July 1967–68, 1969–70, and 1986–96. These four campaigns present ideal variation for analysis, as the first two represent “most different” cases where the movement hierarchy and the movement system remained the same but many other relevant variables changed. The third campaign represents a significant change in movement hierarchy but no change in the movement system, and the fourth represents a change in the movement system. The power distribution theory predicts no change in group actions or outcomes between the first two campaigns, a change in group actions but not outcome in the third campaign, and a change in both action and outcome in the fourth campaign.


\(^{30}\) Power distribution theory’s emphasis on the tension between organizational and strategic objectives is particularly interesting because it runs counter to a central argument in what is unquestionably the best book on the armed struggle within the Palestinian national movement: Yezid Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997). Although I agree with Sayigh that the armed struggle did help construct or strengthen a Palestinian identity, a leadership elite, and some basic institutions, the coercive and constitutive aspects of violence were often at odds, as were the strategic and organizational objectives with which they were associated.
Table 2. Summary of Campaigns in the Palestinian National Movement, 1965–Present

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Movement System Structure</th>
<th>Hierarchy of Groups at Start of Campaign</th>
<th>Summary of Group Actions</th>
<th>Strategic Outcome of Campaign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965–June 1967</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td>1. PLO  2. ANM  3. JCP  4. Fatah</td>
<td>Fatah initiates violence, PLO and ANM initially restrain, ANM and PLO later use violence, this helps spark the disastrous Six-Day War</td>
<td>failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1967–68</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td>1. PLO  2. ANM/PFLP  3. JCP  4. Fatah</td>
<td>Fatah initiates violence, PLO and ANM initially restrain, ANM/PFLP and PLO later use violence, attempted uprising in the West Bank fails</td>
<td>failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969–70</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td>1. Fatah  2. Saiqa  3. PLF/PLA  4. PFLP</td>
<td>Fatah captures PLO, continues violence in Israel but restrains PFLP in Jordan, PFLP launches hijackings, sparks Black September defeat</td>
<td>failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971–73</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td>1. Fatah  2. Saiqa  3. PFLP</td>
<td>Fatah launches the Black September Organization, groups fight a losing insurgency in Gaza against Israel, relocate to Lebanon and Syria</td>
<td>failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>united</td>
<td>1. Fatah  2. Saiqa  3. PFLP</td>
<td>Groups agree to PLO Phased Program, subordinates and PFLP then launch spoiling attacks, Fatah follows suit</td>
<td>limited success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975–86</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td>1. Fatah  2. Saiqa  3. PFLP</td>
<td>PFLP uses violence in Lebanon, Fatah and Saiqa try to restrain but are pulled into civil war with extensive infighting</td>
<td>failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986–96</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>1. Fatah</td>
<td>Fatah able to control first intifada, limit violence, sign Oslo accords</td>
<td>moderate success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–06</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td>1. Fatah  2. Hamas</td>
<td>Hamas and Islamic Jihad initiate violence, Fatah later uses violence amid second intifada</td>
<td>failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006–present</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td>1. Fatah  2. Hamas</td>
<td>Fatah pursues negotiations and represses violence, Hamas continues to champion armed struggle</td>
<td>failure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: The four cases analyzed in this article in greater depth are shaded gray.  
ANM: Arab Nationalists Movement  
JCP: Jordanian Communist Party  
PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine  
PLF/PLA: Popular Liberation Forces/Palestine Liberation Army  
PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization
The mid-1960s to early 1970s were perhaps the most dynamic decade for the Palestinian national movement. During this period, Palestinian nationalism was (re)awakened; almost all of the key players for the next half century emerged; and there was a great deal of shifting among groups within the movement hierarchy. The movement remained fragmented and competitive, however, leading to ineffective violence and strategic failure across time and space.

There were four significant groups in the Palestinian national movement at the beginning of 1965: the Arab Nationalists Movement (ANM), the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP), the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah), and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Contrary to popular notions, at the time Fatah was both the weakest of the four groups and a major rival of the PLO, rather than its near synonymous ally of more recent years (see table 2). Fatah had a few hundred members led by Khalil al-Wazir, Yasser Arafat, and a small number of other Palestinian activists from Syria and Gaza. In comparison, the PLO became the leader in the movement soon after it was founded in mid-1964 with the help of Egypt and other Arab states. It included the foundations of tangible legislative, economic, and military institutions in the form of the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the Palestinian National Fund (PNF), and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). Led by Ahmad Shuqeiri, the Palestinian representative to the Arab League, the PLO had hundreds of official representatives, funding from Arab governments and taxes on Palestinian citizens, a growing military force (albeit under de facto Arab state control), and, most importantly, the sense that, as the strongest group, it was the Palestinian entity in waiting that would form the new government of Palestine once the homeland was reclaimed.

The groups all shared the strategic objective of a Palestinian state, despite

32. The ANM had been founded by Palestinian George Habash and Syrian Hani al-Hindi, both students at the American University of Beirut in the 1950s. By 1965, ANM and its Palestinian branch had grown from a few AUB students to a few thousand members dispersed across the Middle East. Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, pp. 108–111.
33. The JCP was based in Jordan and the West Bank and faced sporadic crackdowns by King Hussein. The majority of JCP members were Palestinian and the party sought a Palestinian state, although the desired shape of that state shifted over time.
somewhat different visions for what it would ultimately look like. The common desire to unite was apparent from the national charter adopted by the PLO as well as Fatah’s early strategic documents, which stated, “The armed revolution is required to work to unite the powers of the people and create a coalition, even one particular to this stage, between the different movements or national factions because the stage of fighting against direct colonialism dictates national unity to increase the effectiveness of the revolution and its ability to achieve the desired successes.” \(^{35}\) The PLO, the ANM, and Fatah each sought to unite the movement under its organization. These efforts all failed, however, because every group wanted unity on its own terms and no significant group wanted to lock itself into a subordinate position. Internal competition soon yielded counterproductive outbidding and chain-ganging.

With Fatah’s attempts at favorable unity unrealized, the weakest challenger in the movement looked for options to turn the tide of its organization’s fortunes. As the hierarchy hypothesis predicts, the group opted to launch attacks against Israel and in the process distinguish Fatah from its competitors as a group of action, as opposed to those groups whose tactic of choice was simply revolutionary rhetoric. Fatah noted in its early strategic documents, “There must be a period in which the armed revolutionary vanguard tries to embody its real struggle in front of the public so that it can attract them in the end.” \(^{36}\) In addition to the desire to employ outbidding, Fatah sought to chain-gang the rest of the movement and pull Arab states into war with Israel. As Khaled al-Hasan reiterated in two separate interviews, Fatah wanted to liberate Palestine “through action and reaction, action and reaction,” as “our military action provokes an Israeli reaction against our people, who then become involved [in the struggle] and are supported by the Arab masses.” \(^{37}\)

Fatah had not originally planned to use violence so soon, but after the emergence of the PLO, its leadership became concerned about the survival of the group, arguing that “intensifying the military bases and starting operations may limit the crumbling [of membership].” \(^{38}\) Therefore, Fatah decided to launch the “armed struggle” on January 1, 1965. Despite its relatively meager

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36. Ibid., pp. 11–12.
beginnings, which included a raid thwarted by the Lebanese and faulty explosive charges placed in the Israeli National Water Carrier, Fatah claimed more than eighty attacks against Israel in the first nine months of the campaign, which involved laying mines on roads, canals, and rail lines, as well as strikes against power stations and security outposts. The attacks somewhat increased Fatah’s organizational strength, as al-Hasan explained: “The real increase, the real support that comes from the people, and permanently, started in ’65 when we started our military action. Then the people realized that we were not just another movement, talking like the others.”

Leading Palestinian organizations immediately took notice and tried to restrain Fatah’s use of violence, as power distribution theory suggests. The ANM claimed that Fatah’s attacks were counterproductive and that Fatah “aims to entangle [Egyptian President Gamal Abdel] Nasser in a battle for which he is not prepared.” Indeed, the few Fatah members in attendance at the second PNC openly told the press that they wanted “[t]o entangle the Arab nations in a war with Israel.” The PLO denounced the raids by specifically referencing its own organizational leadership. Shuqeiri said, “Only the Palestinian Liberation Army can authorize any Palestinian military operation,” and he resolved with the PLO Executive Committee to stop Fatah’s attacks “whether through gentle words and promises or with threats.” Both methods failed.

The most interesting aspect of the initial responses of Fatah’s rivals to its attacks is not that they were nearly 100 percent correct, which they were, but that despite their accuracy, the ANM and PLO would in short order find themselves violently outbidding with Fatah and chain-ganged into the very conflict they claimed should be avoided just two years later. This outcome demonstrates the power of movement structure for group actions, as even foreknowledge of the pitfalls of fragmentation could not prevent groups from succumbing to its deleterious effects.

Despite their public denouncements, privately the ANM and others recognized the increased support given to Fatah and the stark contrast the attacks

41. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 108.
43. Quoted in ibid., pp. 63, 71.
created in comparison to their own inaction. The impact was palpable. Potential ANM recruits were joining Fatah, and current ANM members were defecting, as former ANM leader Abd al-Karim Hamad noted: “From 1965 onwards, we were explaining to our militants that we must wait, that we must train, and so on. Then we saw that our militants were joining Fatah. Because of the rightist leadership of the ANM [i.e., George Habash], we lost a historic opportunity.”44 It was not just fighters, but also funding that followed the violence. Donations were often explicitly tied to evidence of attacks, as was the case with Kuwaiti and Algerian donors before Fatah’s first attack.

The ANM itself came close to initiating violence with the 1964 emergence of the PLO, which threatened its position just as it threatened Fatah. A combination of its ties to Nasser and its position as the stronger challenger at the time, however, led the ANM to hold off, although an increasing number of its members called for attacks. Once Fatah started using violence and peeling away ANM recruits, however, the group could no longer remain on the sidelines.

In mid-1966, the ANM decided to form a commando group, Abtal al-Awda (Heroes of Return), in cooperation with a few anti-Shuqeiri members of the PLO, although the ANM largely controlled the group. Abtal al-Awda launched its first attack on October 19, 1966, followed by seven more from December 1966 to June 1967. Although still dwarfed by Fatah’s attacks, the ANM and PLO actions contributed to the ramping up of attacks by multiple organizations that preceded the Six-Day War of 1967. The JCP did not get involved this round, but smaller groups such as the Palestinian Liberation Front and the Palestinian National Liberation Front did, contributing to the upsurge in violent competition and revealing the lack of any dominant group or alliance to direct the action. The increase in violence even spurred Shuqeiri in mid-1967 to start claiming (falsely) that the PLO had been funding the Fatah attacks, and to note the PLO’s support for such violence, despite the group’s concerns about entanglement with Israel.

The increasing tempo of attacks brought harsh Israeli reprisals, which increased tensions between Israel and its Syrian, Jordanian, and Egyptian neighbors, especially as Nasser and the Syrians started to more openly support different Palestinian armed groups by 1967.45 Most important, Palestinian at-

45. Indicative of the earlier attacks were the April 29, 1966, Israeli raids on the Jordanian village of Qal’at and the village of Hirbet Rafa near Hebron, in which the Israelis destroyed twenty-eight houses and killed eleven Jordanian civilians. Ami Gluska, The Israeli Military and the Origins of the
tacks helped to spark the crisis that led to the Six-Day War: the April 1967 Israeli air raid against Syria, which included 171 sorties and the downing of six Syrian MiGs inside Syrian and Jordanian territory. The Six-Day War was a well-documented disaster for the Palestinians. The Israelis took control of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights; hundreds of thousands of Palestinians became refugees (some for the second time); the Arab armies were routed; and the Palestinian armed groups fared little better. The outcome cannot be understood as anything but a strategic failure—one to which the use of violence by Palestinian armed groups directly contributed.

The competitive, fragmented national movement played a clear, dominant role in the use and effectiveness of violence by Palestinian armed groups. As a weaker challenger in the movement hierarchy, Fatah used violence in response to the emergence of the PLO at a time when it was not prepared or planning to do so in an attempt to outbid its rival. As predicted, the ANM and the PLO first tried to restrain Fatah’s attacks and, when those efforts failed, later launched some of their own, with the ANM leading the way. These contradictory actions make little sense from a strategic perspective, but they are directly in line with the power distribution theory’s predictions concerning the impact of movement structure on group actions. The fragmented Palestinian national movement further allowed competing Arab states entry to play out their own rivalries within the movement, as Syrian-backed Fatah faced off against the Egyptian-backed PLO and ANM in another layer of competition that had anything but the Palestinians’ collective strategic interests at its heart. A textbook case of outbidding and chain-ganging resulted, against the wishes of the vast majority of the actors, which led to a strategically unsuccessful campaign.

THE MORE THINGS CHANGE . . . : ARMED STRUGGLE IN A POST–1967 WORLD

Those who suspect that the 1965–June 1967 campaign was a unique case in which a specific time or space played the key role should note that the struct-


47. Nasser and King Hussein themselves nominated most of the original delegates to the PNC, who represented the Palestinian “old guard.” Fatah’s struggle with the PLO therefore represented a simultaneous fight over the leadership of the Palestinian national movement with Arab regimes, which for so long had sought to control, appropriate, and exploit the Palestinian cause to their own ends.
ture of the Palestinian national movement remained the same as the dust settled after the Six-Day War, even though pretty much everything else—territory held, enemy and supporting state strength, base population geographical distribution, and campaign location—changed dramatically. The post-1967 campaign thus represents a “most different” comparison with the pre-1967 campaign. So much of the political landscape had changed, but the movement system and group positions in the hierarchy of the Palestinian national movement stayed the same. As predicted by the power distribution theory, the same groups initiated violence; the same groups attempted to restrain it; and the campaign resulted in strategic failure—all in strikingly similar fashion.

Having experienced the problems that result from the uncoordinated use of violence within a fragmented movement, the ANM met with Fatah in mid-July 1967 to ensure that the postwar period would not be a repeat of the prewar period. The two groups came to an agreement on this issue, supported by the PLO, with all consenting to hold off on attacks for the next one to five months so the groups could rebuild their organizations. In a shining example of “the tragedy of fragmented national movements,” the best of intentions were thwarted by the inherently competitive movement system. As before, Fatah jumped the gun, in part to get an organizational upper hand. As before, the ANM and PLO were forced to revise their plans and employ violence earlier than desired to prevent the loss of their positions in the hierarchy. As before, strategic concerns did not drive the use of violence, nor did it produce strategic success.

Yasser Arafat infiltrated the West Bank with a number of Fatah cadres in mid-June, and the organization launched its first attacks at the end of August, followed by fifty more over the next four months. Fatah’s early launch was driven in part by its organizational desire to prevent a deal between Israel and Arab regimes, the PLO, or West Bank Palestinians that would establish a Palestinian state on part of the territory in the aftermath of the war. Fatah did this not simply because it did not like the deal, but also because it would be cut out of it. Fatah thus desired to simultaneously outbid other Palestinian armed groups and spoil initiatives by local Palestinians to benefit its organizational ends.

50. In this regard, it is also instructive that the Palestinians whom Fatah targeted for death during this period were West Bank leaders who called for a separate Palestinian state. Yaari, Strike Terror, p. 148.
Fatah’s position as a challenger meant that others could not easily stop or ignore its use of violence. Soon after Fatah’s first attack, ANM leaders came to the realization that they were losing both recruits and funding to their rival. In November 1967, Ahmad Khalifa, a member of the ANM’s central command, summed it up by saying, “The battle might start without us. . . . Fatah and [Palestinian Liberation Front leader Ahmad] Jibril will be the only ones to reap the credit . . . and that will finish us.”51 The ANM leadership instructed its cadres to initiate attacks despite their lack of adequate preparation.52 The first attack, a failed operation against Ben Gurion Airport on December 11, came the same day as the ANM announced the formation of a new organization that was to serve as Fatah’s main rival for the next two decades: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Unfortunately for the ANM/PFLP, Fatah, and other Palestinian groups, the lack of preparation and coordination doomed the attempt to launch a “popular struggle” in the West Bank to a swift, costly end. Fighters’ cursory training, inadequate weapons, and lack of experience with proper operational security allowed the Israelis to quickly roll up Palestinian networks. Forced to admit that the campaign was a strategic failure by the beginning of 1968, the groups moved their headquarters across the border to Jordan.

Fatah again led the way with cross-border attacks against the Israelis, eventually joined by the PLO, which announced the creation of its own guerrilla branch in early March 1968: the Popular Liberation Forces (PLF/PLA). After the Palestinian armed groups launched thirty-six attacks in March, Israel decided to launch a massive reprisal raid on March 21, 1968, to knock out the guerrillas’ headquarters at the village of Karamah and send a message to Jordan’s King Hussein, whose country was serving as a wary but ultimately willing host.53 While the PFLP followed classic guerrilla strategy of withdrawing in the face of a superior, massed foe, Fatah decided to stand and fight. Although the Israelis won a clear military victory—destroying the village and returning to Israel hours later after killing 100 guerrillas and capturing more than 100 others—the defenders had exacted a significant price. The Israeli press reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) suffered twenty killed

51. Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 166.
and ninety wounded, as well as the loss of four tanks, two armored cars, and one airplane.

Although the Israelis achieved their tactical objectives, their significant losses and withdrawal under fire created an image of determined, powerful Palestinian fedayeen that were willing to stand up and bloody the noses of the supposedly invincible IDF. One Palestinian teenager described his reaction as follows: “When the news of Karameh came over the radio, all of the students and teachers ran out and celebrated in the streets for the rest of the afternoon. We were all proud to be Palestinians that day, and we were proud of the fedayeen who had done what the Arab armies could not do less than a year earlier against the Israelis.” Soon after, this teenager, Jibril Rajoub, joined Fatah, and would decades later become Arafat’s head of security in the West Bank.54

Fatah’s stand at Karameh led to a tidal wave of recruits, funding, and popular support for the Palestinian armed groups. Disproportionate amounts of each went to Fatah, demonstrating that violence could indeed be organizationally effective under certain conditions. Even the JCP, the last holdout, decided to form a guerrilla group the year after Karameh in response to its fading organizational fortunes.55 Fatah became the most powerful group in the movement, and even came to control the PLO after Arafat was elected chairman in February 1969.56 Nonetheless, although Fatah’s ascendance brought hierarchical change, the movement remained fragmented as a result of the continued presence of the PFLP and the emergence of two new factions: the Syrian-sponsored Saiqa organization and the most influential subordinate group, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which split from the PFLP in 1969.57 Therefore, although Palestinian groups’ roles would

54. Author interview with Jibril Rajoub, July 2009.
55. Thus, the group that had argued most vociferously that violence was futile and counterproductive introduced Quwwat al-Ansar (Partisan Forces) in early 1970 after seeing its size and influence shrink relative to other groups. Author interview with Ghassan Khatib, former JCP member, June 2013; and author interview with Hanna Amireh, former JCP member, June 2013. This suggests the need for a reexamination of the conditions under which outbidding occurs. See Morgan L. Kaplan, “How Civilian Perceptions Affect Patterns of Violence and Competition in Multi-Party Insurgencies,” University of Chicago, 2013.
56. Financial contributions “poured in from Palestinian circles,” and 5,000 Palestinians attempted to join Fatah within forty-eight hours after Karameh. By May, Fatah claimed that it had been approached by 20,000 would-be recruits in Egypt and 1,500 per week in Iraq. Although Fatah could not accommodate even close to these numbers, the group nonetheless tripled in size by June, with the surge further revealing the extensive popular support for the now public organization. Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, pp. 179; and Sayigh, Armed Struggle and the Search for State, p. 181.
57. Fatah had around 3,500 fighters in Jordan by the summer of 1969. The PFLP and Saiqa each
change in the years after Karameh, the strategic outcome would remain the same yet again.

NEW ROLES, SAME OUTCOME: FATAH AND THE PFLP IN JORDAN, 1967–70
As the power distribution theory predicts, Fatah’s and the PFLP’s changed positions in the hierarchy led the two to swap approaches to escalatory violence, even though their ideology, leadership, and strategic goals remained the same. Although still clearly a significant group, the PFLP leadership recognized by 1968–69 that its organization was trending downward relative to its rivals, and was now third or fourth in the movement hierarchy. Recognizing that, because of the ongoing violence, it could not paint a quantitative contrast the way Fatah had with its first cross-border attacks, the PFLP opted for a qualitative outbid, deploying tactics that it hoped would allow it to retain its current supporters and gain new ones in its drive for influence.

In the months after the fighting at Karameh, the PFLP decided to embark on what it labeled “external operations,” including the hijacking of civilian airplanes, bombing of stores in London, and grenade attacks on Israeli embassies.58 The PFLP was aiming not only to outbid Fatah, but also to chain-gang the Palestinian national movement into a direct conflict with King Hussein for control of Jordan. The PFLP and later the DFLP launched provocative verbal and violent attacks against the monarch, including the public claim of “no authority over the authority of the [Palestinian] resistance” in mid-1970, which was a direct challenge to Hussein’s rule.59

In striking evidence of the hierarchy hypothesis at work, William Quandt describes the strategy of the DFLP during this period as follows: “The DFLP during 1969 and early 1970 seemed to believe that direct clashes with the Jordanian army might lead to Hussein’s overthrow, but that Fatah, not the DFLP, would come to power as a nonrevolutionary movement. Fatah would then be likely to turn against the PFLP and DFLP to maintain its domi-

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nant position. Thus, until the revolutionary forces held the balance of power, the DFLP favored the avoidance of a showdown with any Arab regime. The PFLP’s decision to carry out “external operations” inside Jordan subsequently put the movement on the verge of war with its hosts and, soon after, plunged it into one.

The most surprising role reversal—especially for theories that point to the role of ideology or other internal group characteristics to explain group action—may not have been the PFLP’s attempts to violently outbid and chain-gang, but rather Fatah’s efforts to restrain them. The formerly weaker group, which just a few years earlier was launching and relaunching the armed struggle in campaigns to outbid and chain-gang, was now the leader in the movement, looking to prevent conflict that could threaten its position and associated benefits. As power distribution theory suggests and as J. Gaspard noted at the time, “The small groups have nothing to lose and much to gain from revolutionary chaos in the host countries. Fatah has much to lose: the subsidies from the ‘moderate’ Arab states; its pool of heavy arms and more or less trained military formations that might get broken up in a revolutionary free for all; an established diplomatic and political position in the Arab world and in certain international circles; offices in many Arab countries which are small centers of local government; and a fairly well-oiled propaganda machine.”

Fatah understood what the PFLP was trying to do, having done the same in previous campaigns. As Fatah leader Salah Khalaf noted, “Other small organizations are engaged in leftist overbids which are altogether unrealistic.” In June 1970, the PFLP took sixty Westerners hostage in two hotels in Amman in a challenge to King Hussein. Fatah stepped in and negotiated a cease-fire that brought the crisis to an end, in yet another example of its newfound role. In early September 1970, Fatah and the movement were not so lucky, as the PFLP hijacked three airplanes with more than 300 Western civilians and held them hostage on a desert airstrip a few miles from Amman. As captured hijacker

63. This was not the first time that Fatah’s leadership had to mediate. In February 1970, clashes between the guerrillas and Jordanians broke out while Arafat was in Moscow, and he had to rush home to negotiate a cease-fire. Quandt, Jabber, and Lesch, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, p. 120.
64. Another PFLP-hijacked plane was flown to Cairo and destroyed after its passengers were re-
Leila Khaled later noted, "We had a number of objectives in that operation, including not only raising the issue of the Palestinian people to the world, but also challenging the Jordanian regime." 65

Outraged at the PFLP’s attempts to chain-gang the movement to war, Fatah pushed the PFLP to return the airplanes. The PFLP blew them up instead. Fatah then brokered a cease-fire. The PFLP rejected it. Fatah’s leading position in the hierarchy gave it an interest in maintaining the status quo, but the group was not powerful enough to stop the PFLP’s actions, just as the PLO and ANM had been unable to restrain Fatah a few years earlier. Even though Fatah had noted its desire to avoid a war for months, the Jordanian army shelling of Palestinian guerrilla positions and refugee camps around Amman helped to convince Fatah that it could no longer hold back. Unfortunately for the PFLP, Fatah, and the rest of the Palestinian national movement, the campaign was a total failure. The Jordanian army routed the divided guerrillas in what became known as Black September, killing thousands and beginning the process of expelling all Palestinian armed groups from the country, which was completed the following year. This strategic setback would haunt the Palestinians for decades, because they would not find as favorable a political and geographical situation again.

A hegemonic movement would have been more likely to have avoided the competitive outbidding and provocative tactics that sparked the ill-advised war, to have reached a better deal with King Hussein short of expulsion, or to have avoided alienating the local populace and some of its Arab allies, thus making military victory either unnecessary or far more likely. 66 As Abu Iyad of Fatah noted, however, “Even in historic and critical decisions, the leadership of the various groups used to put hierarchical gain before the general good.” 67

leased. The third of the three planes held in Jordan was hijacked after El Al security thwarted another planned hijacking, leading to the capture of PFLP operative Leila Khaled.


66. Khaled al-Hassan of Fatah argued as much: “Had the resistance movement not been divided and full of contradictions, it would have been able, with the support of the masses, to overcome the conspiracies of the [Jordanian] government.” “Khalid al-Hassan, Fatah,” in Clovis Maksoud, ed., Palestine Lives: Interviews with Leaders of the Resistance (Beirut: Palestine Research Center and Kuwaiti Teachers Association, 1973), pp. 28–29. Adnan Abu Odeh, a Palestinian who is a former Jordanian minister and adviser to King Hussein, argued: “Fatah’s toleration of the leftists was its biggest mistake. The leftists alienated the people and shifted the image of the guerrillas from those who want to liberate to those who want to rule.” Author interview with Adnan Abu Odeh, September 2009.

67. “Abu Iyad [Salah Khalaf], Fatah,” in Maksoud, Palestine Lives, p. 44. Even when the Palestinian movement achieved a brief moment of unity in 1974 and initial UN recognition, the alliance quickly faltered as a result of resistance from those who had less power and therefore accrued
The solution, though, was not a new spirit of altruism or fresh alliances among Palestinian groups, but a change in the movement system structure. After subsequent united and fragmented failures in campaigns in Lebanon and beyond over the next fifteen years, the movement finally reached its lone hegemonic moment.68

**THE HEGEMONIC MOMENT: FATAH’S DOMINANCE YIELDS GAINS, 1986–96**

For most observers, the conditions in 1987 could not have been worse for the Palestinian national movement. The Palestinians were pushed to the bottom of the Arab League summit agenda; they had been fighting costly conflicts in Lebanon for more than a decade; their leadership was languishing in faraway Tunis; and millions of their people were marking twenty years or more in squalid refugee camps or under Israeli military control. These factors pointed to likely strategic failure, yet structurally the Palestinian national movement had never been in a better position for success according to the power distribution theory. By 1986–87, a confluence of factors had made the movement hegemonic for the first and only time in modern history. The Lebanese civil war had decimated Fatah’s rivals;69 Fatah gained control of Arab state funding offered in the wake of the Camp David accords;70 and Fatah defeated a significant splinter group that had risen to challenge its leadership after the de-

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68. Despite the clear strategic problems resulting from the PFLP’s “external operations,” the strength of violent competition amid fragmentation was demonstrated yet again when Fatah itself engaged in such operations under its auxiliary Black September Organization (BSO), formed in late 1971 and named after the Jordan debacle. The PFLP and Fatah had thus reversed roles from 1965 to 1967, when Fatah started launching what the PFLP considered foolhardy attacks, only to have the PFLP later follow suit. The group’s operations, including the attack on Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972, initially captivated world attention and drove some recruits to the BSO. Fatah was quick to disband the BSO, however, once it became clear that its operations hurt Fatah’s standing both internationally and with large portions of the Palestinian public, putting larger organizational gains at risk.

69. Leftist groups such as the PFLP and the DFLP were significantly weakened in the struggle into which they had helped pull the movement. Saiqa, formerly the second strongest group, suffered from mass Palestinian defections in 1976 when its leadership forced the group to fight PLO factions in support of the Syrians. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, not one of these represented a significant group that could seriously challenge Fatah. Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization*, pp. 78–79.

70. In the Arab League summit in Baghdad in 1978, Arab governments agreed to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to the Palestinians as a result of the Camp David accords, including $150 million annually to be distributed by the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza and another $250 million paid directly to the PLO. The factions fought over distribution of the funds, with Fatah ultimately receiving two-thirds, compared to one-third for all other groups combined. See also Sayigh, *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*, pp. 437, 441, 479–481.
feat in Lebanon. In short, “[Fatah had] more fighters, more money, and a broader range of support among Palestinians, Arab states, and the international community than all the other PLO groups combined.” Internal dissent remained, but Fatah became so powerful politically, military, and economically that no other group could realistically unseat it for the foreseeable future. The movement’s first taste of hegemony led to the most significant strategic gains in forty years.

Fatah did not start the first intifada in December 1987, but the group’s overwhelming power soon allowed it to gain considerable control of what began as a grassroots uprising in response to the two-decade-old Israeli military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. By January 1988, Fatah and the PLO had set up a Unified National Command (UNC), which gave Palestinian civilians in the West Bank and Gaza guidelines for resistance and coordinated action. The UNC helped to organize many of the activities of civil resistance that defined the first intifada, including strikes by Palestinian workers, refusal to pay taxes, boycotts on Israeli goods, and mass protest marches. The symbol of the first intifada—the Palestinian youth (shabab) throwing rocks at Israeli soldiers—was not entirely unorganized either. Fatah had previously developed youth organizations such as the Shabiba, which claimed tens of thousands of members and led many of these demonstrations. Fatah’s dominance thus helped to ensure a cohesive strategy of coercion that was lacking in previous (and future) campaigns amid fragmentation.

The coercive tactics of the movement were largely nonlethal, if not nonviolent. From the start of the intifada until 1993, fewer than 100 Israelis were killed in the territories, and fewer than 100 were killed in Israel as a result of the uprising, numbers that would later be dwarfed by the fragmented second intifada. Conversely, Israeli security forces killed more than 1,000 Palestinians during this period; these lopsided casualty figures and contrasting tactics helped to boost popular support for the Palestinian national movement across the globe. Even when the intifada became more militarized in 1989, partly in response to the Israelis relaxing their rules of fire and increasing the use of plastic bul-

71. Ibid., pp. 596–601.
73. Author interview with Sari Nusseibeh, Fatah strategist with the UNC, December 2009.
74. Khalil al-Wazir, known as Abu Jihad, was a founding Fatah leader who had been building the group’s networks in the West Bank and Gaza since the early 1980s using the grassroots model of the PCP. Author interviews with Shabiba leaders, June 2013.
lets, the movement did not devolve into major spirals of violent outbidding. Weaker groups did not have the power to threaten Fatah’s leadership, and Fatah’s dominance meant that it did not need to outbid violently to maintain its position. Instead, Fatah saw that the best way to increase its strength was through strategic gains, by pressuring the Israelis and negotiating with Israel and the United States over the future of Palestine, thus cementing the group’s position within a new state.

With no major organized challengers on the horizon and the momentum of the intifada at his back, Arafat announced the founding of the Palestinian state at the nineteenth PNC in November 1988. The timing of the move was driven in part by Jordan’s recent announcement that it was giving up its claim to the West Bank (an organizational and strategic success in and of itself), as Fatah feared Israeli annexation. Eighty-four countries offered full recognition of the Palestinian state and twenty offered qualified recognition within two months of the declaration. This was a diplomatic coup for Fatah and Arafat, who also secured PNC acceptance of United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338, clearing the way for Palestinian negotiations with the United States and Israel over the final status of Israel and Palestine.

Allied insignificant groups that disagreed with some of these steps, including the PFLP, nonetheless remained in the PLO and did not engage in spoiling attacks. Subordinates outside of the PLO, such as the PFLP–General Command and Islamic Jihad, launched a few attacks against Israeli and American targets. Rather than chain-gang the movement or drive Fatah to outbid, Fatah’s strength and position allowed it stay the strategic course even if, predictably, it did so largely for organizational reasons. The continued dominance of Fatah prevented subsequent violent spoiling attempts by a relatively weak Hamas from derailing strategic progress in the early 1990s, which began in earnest with the signing of the Declaration of Principles on the White House lawn in September 1993.

The power distribution theory does not attempt to explain all of the ins and outs of the Madrid and Oslo negotiations, on which numerous valuable works already exist. More broadly, however, the theory helps to reveal that the in-

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77. Hamas was founded at the start of the first intifada, but it had little support outside the territories, did not even form an armed wing until the early 1990s, and was not a significant group that could potentially challenge Fatah’s leadership until the mid-to-late 1990s.
creased focus on strategic objectives, the decrease in strategically counterproductive violence and foreign meddling, the cohesiveness of the first intifada, the increased credibility of the movement, and the acceptance of a political program that made these negotiations possible were all a direct result of the hegemony of the Palestinian national movement. The Oslo accords are far less popular today than they were at the time, but they nonetheless represent the most significant strategic success of the Palestinian national movement either before or since. They led to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and major cities in the West Bank, the creation of a Palestinian Authority with varying degrees of control in these areas, the return of thousands of refugees into the territories, and the prospect of a resolution to the conflict creating a Palestinian state within a significant part of the West Bank and all of Gaza.

Ultimately, the Oslo negotiations and their critics highlight some of the great strengths and weaknesses of the power distribution theory. The theory is correct that the Palestinian movement was more strategically effective during periods of hegemony than in periods of unity or fragmentation, but it does not necessarily define precisely how much more. The mechanisms of the theory suggest that groups will pursue strategic gains as far as these gains are likely to benefit the groups themselves. In this case, the gains of Oslo definitely benefited Fatah, and in the process did secure some strategic progress that benefited the larger movement. Was Fatah selfish in this? Absolutely. It was no less selfish than other groups that took positions in the newly formed Palestinian Authority, however, or arguably those such as Hamas, which launched attacks in part because it was excluded from the deal. In fact, Fatah’s actions in this regard confirm the predictions of the hierarchy hypothesis, as Fatah accepted strategic gains that it had castigated and killed others for even suggesting two decades earlier, in no small part because its new position in the hierarchy allowed it to enjoy the selective benefits of the formation of the Palestinian Authority. Could further strategic gains have been achieved? Per-


79. The Oslo accords did not give the Palestinians any control over Jerusalem; they left the vast majority of refugees outside of Palestine; they made no agreement on the final borders of a Palestinian state; and they did nothing to stop or dismantle Israeli settlements.

80. Indeed, organizational objectives were the reason why Fatah had initiated the secret Oslo negotiations in the first place. Arafat was concerned that the ongoing negotiations in Madrid under the auspices of the United States, which Fatah was partially controlling on the Palestinian side but not directly participating in, could revive the local elites in the territories to form an organized significant group and eventually challenge Fatah for leadership.
haps, but any answer must acknowledge the three prior decades and two subsequent decades that experienced fragmented and united movements with much less to show for it.81 The strategic gains at Oslo were not everything the Palestinians desired, but they were far more than previous or subsequent campaigns have achieved.

The Algerian National Movement: Struggling to Hegemony

The Palestinians in the 1960s were perhaps most inspired by the Algerian national movement, which had ties to the broader Arab nationalist movement and found success just a few years before the founding of the PLO and Fatah’s launch of the armed struggle. Like the Palestinian national movement, the Algerian national movement was strategically successful during its one period of hegemony (1958–62) and largely unsuccessful during periods of fragmentation (1946–51, 1952–54, 1954–56, 1956–57) and unity (1944–45, 1951) (see table 3). Whereas the fragmented and united periods were marked by mixed strategies and signals, greater efforts expended on internal fights than external ones, and failed attempts at side deals, the movement under the Front de Libération Nationale’s (FLN’s) dominance yielded clear, consistent signals; a massive, concerted strategic effort at expelling the French; and a single, credible negotiator with limited potential for spoiling or sellout given the lack of an internal challenger, which ultimately spelled strategic success.

United or Fragmented: The Failure of Divided Power, 1944–54

The Algerian national movement contained multiple significant groups during the first few decades of its existence. Early on, political organizations such as the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA), the Algerian Association of Ulama (AAU), and Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté (AML) competed and allied in failed bids to achieve Algerian independence.82 Although the Algerian national movement was nonviolent until the mid-1940s, the multiple significant groups in the movement nonetheless inhibited progress through their associated lack of cohesive effort, mixed signaling, and internal struggles for power.

81. The second intifada saw Fatah get dragged into strategically counterproductive violence yet again given the fragmented structure brought about by Hamas’s rise from subordinate to challenger. See Bloom, Dying to Kill.
82. The concept of Algerian nationalism did not develop until a century after the French invasion in 1830, although this potentially unifying ideology failed to unite the competing groups.
The movement was first united in 1944 under AML leader Ferhat Abbas, who issued the “Manifesto of the Algerian People” and brought his group into an alliance with the AAU and PPA—led by Messali Hadj—to win independence from France. Some Algerians argued that this represented the greatest period of unity among the political factions and the people, more so than during

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Movement Structure</th>
<th>Hierarchy of Groups at Start of Campaign</th>
<th>Summary of Group Actions</th>
<th>Strategic Outcome of Campaign</th>
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<tr>
<td>1944–45</td>
<td>united</td>
<td>1. AML 2. PPA 3. AAU</td>
<td>Groups unite initially, but PPA helps launch violence at Sétif and after, AML tries to restrain</td>
<td>failure</td>
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<td>1946–51</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td>1. UDMA (AML) 2. MTLD (PPA)</td>
<td>UDMA and MTLD contest elections, avoid violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>united#</td>
<td>1. MTLD 2. UDMA</td>
<td>Groups unite briefly after 1951 electoral fraud by French, each largely avoids violence</td>
<td>failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952–54</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td>1. MTLD 2. UDMA</td>
<td>NAC splits from MTLD, infighting begins between them, no large-scale violence against French</td>
<td>failure</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954–56</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td>1. MTLD/MNA 2. UDMA 3. NAC 4. FLN</td>
<td>FLN uses violence to initiate a revolution against France, other groups first denounce and try to restrain it, MNA later uses violence</td>
<td>failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956–57</td>
<td>fragmented</td>
<td>1. FLN 2. MNA</td>
<td>FLN becomes strongest group, absorbs UDMA, NAC, and others, FLN and MNA use violence against the French and (mostly) each other</td>
<td>failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958–62</td>
<td>hegemonic</td>
<td>1. FLN</td>
<td>FLN largely destroys armed wings of MNA, continues war against France, negotiates for Algerian independence</td>
<td>total success</td>
</tr>
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#Although not significant groups by this time, the AAU and Algerian Communist Party also joined this alliance.

AAU: Algerian Association of Ulama
MTLD: Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques
AML: Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté
NAC: National Algerien Congress
FLN: Front de Libération Nationale
PPA: Parti du Peuple Algérien
MNA: Mouvement National Algérien
UDMA: Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien
the later dominance of the FLN.83 Despite these developments, power in the movement remained divided among multiple significant groups, even if they were united. As such, the autonomous factions continued to compete for power internally, which led to strategically counterproductive dynamics. Although he had agreed to unite with the AML, Messali had maintained the PPA as a separate entity in part because he believed his group should lead the movement. In 1945 Messali took two steps that reflected this desire for organizational power and spelled the end of the alliance. First, at the AML Congress in March 1945, which was designed to strengthen movement unity, Messali’s followers attempted to gain control of movement policy. They then passed a motion naming Messali “the incontestable leader of the Algerian people,” a clear challenge to Abbas and his organization.84 Although these steps did not bring the collapse of the alliance, the PPA’s subsequent move to violence did.

With the Allies’ triumph over Germany in World War II, many Algerians believed that significant political reforms were (or should be) in the offing. On May 8, 1945 (VE Day), Algerians turned out for marches across the country, including in Sétif, a major town in the northeast. Some of the marchers displayed banners in support of Messali and Algerian independence. When police stepped in, shots were fired; it was unclear by which side. Nonetheless, what is clear is that soon after, the marchers—some of whom were armed and prepared for a fight—overwhelmed the mere twenty policemen in the town. The Algerians then began attacking the colons in Sétif and the surrounding areas.85 Over the next four days, 103 colons were killed and another 100 were wounded, with many victims having been mutilated or raped. The French military responded by killing 500–600 Algerian civilians, and the colons organized vigilante groups that killed many thousands more. The police ultimately arrested thousands of nationalists of all stripes, and the short-lived uprising was put down.

As Alistair Horne relates, “To this day, Abbas believes that Messali, in collusion with the colonial police, instigated [Sétif] with the aim of destroying the

83. This provides further evidence of the importance of hegemony as compared to unity, given that the latter yielded failure at its peak despite even greater grassroots support. William B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954–1968 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1969), p. 50.
84. Ibid.
85. By this time, colons included significant proportions of Italians and Greeks, among others, in addition to French.
unity achieved by his Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté created the previous year.” Messali and the PPA had partially organized the massacre and publicly called for insurrection thereafter, while Abbas and the AML had not been involved and denounced the attacks. Nonetheless, the AML and PPA were both dissolved and their members arrested, while any hope of strategic success for the movement fizzled. Each of these aspects of Sétif—the challenger launching attacks to change campaign dynamics and rise to the top, the leader attempting to restrain violence, competition yielding strategic defeat—are consistent with the power distribution theory.

In direct reference to his 1943 manifesto, Abbas founded the Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA) after the dissolution of the AML. The group aimed to consolidate its top position and pursue independ- ence in part through electoral means. Jail did not prevent Messali from reorganizing, as he remained president of his group, the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD), which emerged from the ashes of the PPA. The UDMA and MTLD contested numerous elections in the coming years amid their nationalist struggle, even unifying again briefly in 1951, but significant French concessions were not forthcoming. Increasing numbers of Algerians were convinced that the electoral path would not lead to independence, as the French committed increasing electoral fraud that undermined any supposed concessions to the Algerians. The continued fragmentation of the movement created incentives for challengers to strike out with riskier, more violent tactics. One such group soon did just that, and it was to change the shape of the Algerian national movement and, subsequently, the future of its homeland.


Rather than turn away from the violence that had damaged the movement after Sétif, the MTLD—still the weaker group in 1947—prepared for another uprising. The organization hoped that this time the use of violence would result

87. In mid-1946, the UDMA won eleven of thirteen seats for nationalist parties in the French Constituent Assembly elections. Although this helped confirm the UDMA’s strength, the margin resulted in part from the absence of Messali and many of his followers, who were in prison. The MTLD performed better in the 1947 municipal elections, garnering 31 percent of the vote compared with 27 percent for the UDMA among Muslim electors. See Alf Andrew Heggoy, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972), p. 31; and Horne, *A Savage War of Peace*, p. 70.
in mass support, the predominance of the MTLD, and French withdrawal. In this spirit, the MTLD had formed a secret paramilitary branch in 1947, which helped the MTLD to become the strongest nationalist group. The MTLD remained the leader after a French crackdown, but two smaller challengers split off in the early 1950s: the National Algerian Congress (NAC), which engaged in reciprocal violent attacks with their former cohorts, and the FLN.88

The FLN—the weakest challenger at the time—met in July 1954 and voted unanimously to initiate a long-term, nationalist revolt against France until its withdrawal from Algeria. The hierarchy hypothesis explains variation in the reactions of the other groups to the FLN’s launch of the revolution, which began with the sabotage of communications systems, the burning of stores, and attacks on police barracks on November 1, 1954. The leading MTLD, which had 60,000 supporters in Paris at the time in addition to tens of thousands more in Algeria, had previously assaulted members of the FLN leadership. Messali was outraged at the outbreak of violence and denounced it as ill advised, although to reap popular support he allowed rumors to percolate that it was his group that had launched the attacks.89 Ironically, if predictably according to the power distribution theory, the MTLD was now playing the role of its old rival from Sétif, the UDMA, while the FLN had assumed the MTLD’s historic role as a weaker challenger looking to shift campaign dynamics using violence. For their part, the UDMA and NAC initially denounced the FLN’s attacks and warned their supporters away from the group.

In part because of this lack of support from other competing factions, in the winter of 1954 the FLN was down to 350 rebels in the eastern region of the Aurès Mountains, which was the hub of the revolt. Against such odds, it appears difficult to label the FLN “self-interested,” given that its members put themselves at great individual risk. Their own statements, however, make it clear that national liberation was not all that was on the organization’s mind. As FLN leader Ahmed Ben Bella later recounted, “We knew that, if the situation became really serious, the French government would not fail to dissolve the MTLD and to imprison its leaders. To our unspeakable relief, this was ex-

88. The FLN was originally named the Comité Révolutionnaire d’Unité et d’Action (Revolutionary Committee for Unity and Action or CRUA). When it quickly became clear that maintaining unity among the factions was impossible—and, perhaps more important, CRUA itself began to lose members to the NAC—CRUA pushed for a hegemonic movement under the auspices of its own organization, which it renamed the FLN. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership, pp. 90–91.
actly what happened. The government thereby relieved us of the presence of a lot of political meddlers who were assumed to be our accomplices but who, in fact, were a terrible hindrance to our movement because of the confusion which they created in the mind of the public. Thanks to the enemy, [the FLN] became the only political force in Algeria.” 90 Although the FLN would eventually become the only significant group in the national movement years later, the initial French crackdown on the MTLD was helpful, but far from sufficient for such a smashing organizational success. Nonetheless, Ben Bella confirmed that organizational position played a significant role in the FLN decision to initiate violence and anticipate repression of a rival, as the power distribution theory predicts.

The key problem for the FLN was that the movement was still fragmented, and so its violent attacks continued to inspire internal condemnation and competition, which inhibited strategic progress. The pitfalls of division were on full display on the first day of the uprising, as a French ethnologist thwarted an FLN attack on the town of Arris by playing one pro-FLN Auresian tribe off a non-FLN tribe. 91 Indeed, the FLN expended far greater efforts killing fellow Muslims than they did the French army or the colons. The FLN focused much of its striking power on Messali’s group, renamed the Mouvement National Algérien (MNA) soon after the FLN launched the revolt. The MNA, which was unhappy with the uprising initially, had proceeded to form a new armed wing to compete, which included a contingent of 500 fighters in Kabylia. The FLN massacred this unit in the summer of 1955. It killed 6,352 Muslim civilians in the first two years of the revolt, against only 1,035 Europeans civilians and far fewer French soldiers. 92 The discrepancy was not just quantitative. Many of the FLN’s worst atrocities were against internal enemies, which often hurt domestic and international support while destroying potential movement resources.

Ultimately, this organizational violence helped to bog down the revolt in the first few years. By 1956 the FLN (and the movement) had not achieved the desired popular insurrection against France; a negotiated end to the conflict was not on the horizon; and most conventional accounts argue that the French had

reclaimed the initiative militarily. Despite these seemingly dark signs, the FLN’s strategy finally began to bear fruit internally. The structure of the national movement began to shift significantly toward hegemony for the first time, putting it—and the FLN—in position for strategic success.

**FIGHTING TO HEGEMONY: THE FLN AND MOVEMENT TRIUMPHANT, 1958–62**

The FLN managed to survive despite increasingly harsh French repression in 1954–56, which allowed the group to augment its forces with those of its competitors. In general, the FLN struck a wise balance, working to integrate Algerians of all ethnicities, religions, and ideologies—as long as they were nationalist—who agreed to be absorbed into the FLN as individuals, not as allied groups. By mid-1956, the FLN had absorbed and removed from the field three of the four other significant Algerian groups in existence since the 1930s—the UDMA, the NAC, and the AAU—not to mention some smaller groups such as the Algerian Communist Party (PCA), with which the FLN’s ruthless but shrewd push for hegemony was on full display. The movement was nearly hegemonic; the only remaining rival was a weakening but defiant MNA.

Starting in 1956, the renewed presence of MNA forces alongside those of the FLN meant that “the Aurès lapsed back substantially into fratricidal warfare, contributing little to the common cause.” The FLN massacred MNA units and supporting populations in Melouza, generating press coverage that led to significant popular backlash against the FLN both domestically and internationally. The group tried to claim that this massacre was a French attack, but to no avail. This use of violence was certainly strategically counterproductive at the time, and had it continued in a similar pattern, it could have led to the downfall of the revolt. Unlike the Palestinians, however, who had relied on outbidding and limited feuds, the FLN was able to escape this cycle of infighting by destroying its rival through continued direct assaults. By 1958, the FLN had eliminated the MNA as a significant threat to its leadership of the na-
tional movement, and so created the hegemony that made strategic success far more likely.96 From 1958 to 1959, the MNA suffered significant defections from its leadership and remaining fighters to the FLN and the French, owing in part to the perception that the FLN’s dominance meant that the MNA was no longer a significant actor in the conflict.97

Internationally, the hegemony of the FLN ensured that the movement spoke with one voice and created a seller’s market for potential state support. An Arab summit of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Jordan declared total support for the Algerian cause after the rise of the FLN in 1957. Furthermore, the FLN made contacts with the Soviet Union and China, and convinced the United States to begin to abstain from rather than veto United Nations Security Council resolutions concerning French actions in Algeria. These diplomatic gains were enabled by the lack of a significant foreign contingent of UDMA, NAC, or MNA emissaries.

Budding hegemony also allowed the FLN to shift its focus from Algerian to French enemies. The hegemonic structure helped shift incentives, centralize decisionmaking, and ensure better strategic coordination, but these changes alone did not guarantee immediate strategic success. One of the first operations launched amid the FLN’s growing dominance—the Battle of Algiers against the heart of French control and the colon population—ended in defeat.98 The internal dominance of the FLN did not ensure that it could not commit tactical mistakes—such as the call for a weeklong general strike that could not be realized—but it did mean that the FLN could survive such errors.

FLN’s rise. This diaspora population contributed crucial funds to the FLN, totaling 600 million francs per year by 1958. Ibid., p. 237.
96. Horne trumpets the impact of hegemony, albeit not in so many words: “To the Muslim masses of Algeria the mere appearance of this seemingly unruffled, undivided, and unrelenting façade was immeasurably heartening and encouraging, and probably did more to keep the flame of the revolution alight than a steady flow of dozens of fresh katibas across the Morice Line would have done.” Fortunately for the FLN, the hegemonic movement also helped provide dozens of fresh katibas (battalions) to the dominant faction, as there simply was no substantial alternative force within the Algerian national movement, the MNA having lost its last significant armed wing in July 1958. By that time, the FLN had 30,000 regulars and 30,000 irregulars in its Armée de Libération Nationale (National Liberation Army or ALN). See Ibid., pp. 255, 258, 408; and Martha Crenshaw, “The Effectiveness of Terrorism in the Algerian War,” in Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in Context (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), p. 477.
98. The bombings against civilians and general strikes initiated by the FLN were designed to make Algiers ungovernable and to coerce the French to withdraw. Intensive counterinsurgency tactics, however, rolled up what had been an FLN network of 1,400 members by March 1957.
self-evaluate, and strategically adjust its strategy without fear of losing its position. Had the movement been fragmented or united in late 1957 to early 1958, the fallout from the Battle of Algiers could have been marked by extensive outbidding and infighting, as competing significant groups smelled opportunity and the FLN felt the need to demonstrate its continued vitality in strategically counterproductive ways. Instead, despite some squabbling by top leaders in the aftermath of the setback, FLN leader Benyoucef Benkhedda noted, “The base of the pyramid held firm.”99 The FLN had the breathing room to learn and implement the right lessons from the Battle of Algiers—that it could not face French forces directly in the cities and instead should wear them down in the countryside, while ensuring that it remained the only Algerian force with the capability to negotiate a resolution to the conflict.

After the French leadership and civilians began to resign themselves to a withdrawal from Algeria in response to a combination of rising economic and human costs spurred by the FLN, international pressure, and a growing distaste with the conduct of the conflict, they looked to find a suitable compromise with a desirable Algerian counterpart. Unfortunately for the French, their wish to end the conflict by granting as few strategic concessions as possible was thwarted by the total lack of an alternative Algerian force to the FLN, which had maintained its same demands since its first declaration on November 1, 1954: full French withdrawal, full independence for Algeria, and no dual citizenship for colonos who remained.100

The writing was on the wall by the time of French Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle’s speech on September 16, 1959, in which he called for self-determination for Algeria. Given the demographics, this plan all but ensured Muslim rule. Nonetheless, de Gaulle kept looking for a Muslim “third force” with which to negotiate, but, finding none, he continued to move closer to dealing with the FLN and giving in to its demands as the only option. The ability of the FLN to foresee this very development drove its uncompromising destruction and absorption of internal rivals, as it had instructed its units to “liquidate all personalities who want to play the role of interlocuteur valable,” or legitimate negotiator.101 Hegemony thus ensured that the FLN signals were

100. French attempts to prop up an alternative nationalist group failed, as MNA dissident Mohammed Bellounis and his Armée Nationale Populaire Algérienne both met their end in 1958 after having fought the FLN over the course of the previous year.
clear; it was the only group with which to negotiate; and the French knew the
FLN could credibly threaten to continue the war and credibly guarantee an end to violence.\textsuperscript{102}

When the French finally turned to the FLN to negotiate their departure, the
hegemony of the Algerian national movement helped to ensure that the deal
would be consummated. After French intentions to grant Algerian independence became clear with the holding of a 1961 referendum in France that approved self-determination for the territory, a number of \textit{colons} formed an armed group of their own to spoil the peace, the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS). The OAS launched attacks against French soldiers and Muslim civilians alike in attempts to drive the parties apart and prevent a deal. As FLN leader Benkhedda described, “Our greatest danger was that, because of the OAS, anybody treating with the French might be regarded as a traitor by his own side.”\textsuperscript{103}

Had the movement contained multiple significant groups, OAS violence would have made it less likely that the FLN could have negotiated with the French, because the FLN would have been worried that a loss of legitimacy would lead to its rival’s ascendance. Given that the movement was hegemonic, however, the FLN knew that there was no viable alternative to benefit from any loss of face, so it proceeded with the negotiations amid the attacks. The two sides agreed to the Evian accords, which called for a cease-fire on March 18, 1962, to be verified by referenda in France and Algeria in June and July. In response to increased OAS attempts to violently spoil the deal, the FLN held off from retaliating for months. Employing logic that fits perfectly with the power distribution theory, Horne explains why: “Up to this point the FLN in Algiers—secure in the knowledge it was about to inherit the earth—had shown remarkable discipline and restraint.”\textsuperscript{104} The FLN’s eventual retaliation in May remained limited, even though the OAS had killed three times as many civilians in the Algiers area during the first six months of 1962 as the FLN had from 1956 to 1962 combined, including the Battle of Algiers. Nonetheless, the FLN resisted \textit{colon} spoiling and even negotiated a truce with the OAS in June.

\textsuperscript{102} At this point, the greatest rivalry in the national movement was inside the FLN, rather than with competing groups. Local FLN \textit{wilaya} commanders squabbled with each other and the FLN leadership outside of Algeria over strategy and control of the organization. Nonetheless, no faction formed its own separate, significant group that could challenge the FLN for leadership in the movement or negotiate with the French.

\textsuperscript{103} Quoted in Horne, \textit{A Savage War of Peace}, p. 508.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., p. 530.
The FLN celebrated Algeria’s independence with the rest of the movement on July 5, 1962, its organizational and strategic goals achieved after the movement structure had shifted to hegemony for the first time in its history.

**Alternative Explanations and Comparisons across Movements**

Existing theories that suggest that united or fragmented national movements are more successful in achieving their strategic objectives fare relatively poorly in the Palestinian and Algerian cases at first glance. From the Revolutionary Command Council for the Liberation of Palestine to the Unified Command of the Palestinian Resistance, from Algerian alliances in the mid-1940s to the early 1950s, unity of all shapes and sizes met strategic failure again and again. Hamas was not a part of unifying institutions during either the first or second intifada; the key difference was the increase in the group’s relative strength in the interim and the impact this had on movement dynamics (more counterproductive violence) and outcomes (less strategic success). Institutions matter, but only when considered alongside the distribution of power.105 Further research on nonstate organizations—including clearly defining and differentiating factions, groups, alliances, fronts, and the like—is necessary to tap the full potential of the synergy between power and institutions in movements.

Periods of fragmentation consistently yielded campaigns of strategic failure in both the Palestinian and the Algerian national movements. That said, analysis of these two movements suggests that the dynamic of states seeking more moderate groups to negotiate with is a real and powerful one, as demonstrated by the actions of President de Gaulle (who sought a moderate alternative to the FLN) and the Israelis (who made concessions to Fatah when Hamas was weaker, but are more hesitant to do so now that Hamas has the potential to inherit leadership of the movement). Power distribution theory may provide a key scope condition to this mechanism: states will make concessions to more moderate factions, but are more likely to do so with hegemonic movements than with fragmented or united movements. States certainly seek to head off extremist groups, but they are also wary of providing concessions to a moder-

105. There is potential common ground with Pearlman’s work concerning when and why groups choose to unify and form collaborative institutions. This study suggests that alliances will be more likely between strong and weak groups than among roughly equal significant groups. This may explain why stronger, centralized institutions that included the vast majority of Palestinian groups emerged under a Fatah organization that was without strong, organized rivals in the late 1980s, but not amid the significant fragmentation of the 1960s and 1970s.
ate group that may soon lose its place in the hierarchy, leaving an extremist leader to operate from a newly strengthened position.\textsuperscript{106}

On a related note, why did hegemony for the Algerians yield greater strategic success than for the Palestinians? Factors beyond movement structure certainly play a role in strategic outcomes. As previously noted, the state, its regime type, and the strategic objective are largely constant within each movement (and the latter two across movements).\textsuperscript{107} Potential state supporters certainly matter, especially in the Palestinian national movement. Regardless of whether the Palestinian national movement was hegemonic, the broader Arab national movement that engaged with Israel and the Palestinians generally was not. Syria, Jordan, and Egypt in particular have had major roles to play in claiming and controlling territory, populations, and negotiations with Israel, although as noted in power distribution theory, these states were more able to hinder or influence the Palestinian national movement when it was nonhegemonic. At times, these states competed with Palestinian groups for movement leadership or were able to help create proxy groups that became significant players in the movement, or both. These either faded in influence over time (Saiqa) or were captured by autonomous Palestinian groups (the PLO), but they nonetheless demonstrate how states can influence the structure of a national movement.

This finding helps to address another potential concern—namely, that strategic success and failure drive movement structure, rather than the other way around. In addition to external state actions, exogenous factors that shape movement structure include the geographic, ethnic, religious, and economic distribution of the popular base, the presence of natural resources, personal clashes, and ideological differences. Hegemony preceded the greatest strategic successes in both the Palestinian and the Algerian national movements, but strategic successes preceded hegemony, fragmentation, and attempts at unity, whereas strategic failures preceded hegemony, fragmentation, and unity in both movements. It was also not the case that hegemony came about because the movement or its base thought that victory was just around the corner.\textsuperscript{108}

\textsuperscript{106} It is also possible, as Cunningham suggests, that fragmented movements may generate a number of smaller concessions offered from states seeking to buy off parts of the opposition, while hegemonic movements are more likely to yield concessions that are larger but perhaps less frequent. Cunningham, “Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede.”


\textsuperscript{108} Hegemony may help movements succeed, but it necessitates the significant weakening of all
Fatah’s hegemony was established during some of the darkest days for the Palestinian national movement, and FLN hegemony was achieved while the French were winning militarily and French leaders were still claiming that Algeria was part of France. We know what did not drive movement structure in these cases (strategic success), but more research is necessary to pinpoint what actually did.\\footnote{One fruitful area for synergistic research on the origins of movement structure lies with studies of group splitting. See Paul Staniland, “Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia,” *International Security*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Summer 2012), pp. 142–177; and Victor Asal, Mitchell Brown, and Angela Dalton, “Why Split? Organizational Splits among Ethnic-political Organizations in the Middle East,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 56, No. 1 (February 2012), pp. 94–117.}

\textit{Conclusion}

Amid an extended discussion of the history of the Palestinian national movement, one member of the DFLP summed up the feelings of most groups when he said: “I care not only about the size of the pie, but also what size slice I am going to get.”\\footnote{Author interview with former DFLP member, 2010.} His observation exposes the tension between strategic and organizational goals that is at the foundation of national movements. All members of a movement share a strategic goal such as statehood, but member groups seek to ensure their survival and maximize their strength above all else. In hegemonic movements, the hegemon’s desire to cement its dominant position will push the hegemon to achieve strategic success, and it is more likely to do so as a credible coercer. In united or fragmented movements, groups will focus on fighting with others via outbidding, chain-ganging, spoiling, and infighting to better position themselves for organizational gains, making strategic failure more likely. Hierarchical change may switch groups’ roles, but if a movement continues to contain multiple significant groups, such organizational successes and failures resemble a shifting of the deck chairs on the proverbial strategic Titanic.

Power distribution theory makes five main contributions to the study of national movements. First, it makes the counterintuitive argument that alliances seemingly pursued in the spirit of solidarity are not the best option for national movements seeking strategic success, but rather that the distribution of power is the key factor in both the actions of groups and the effectiveness
of their movements. Second, the theory provides a simple but powerful typology of national movements that builds on the impressive efforts of previous scholarship, accounting for group numbers and alliances while adding the distribution of power overlooked by previous theories. Third, it helps identify the conditions for prominent mechanisms in related literatures, suggesting that outbidding spirals are more likely to emerge in nonhegemonic movements and that radical flanks are likely to have positive and negative effects when their movement is hegemonic and nonhegemonic, respectively. Fourth, the theory demonstrates how the currently disconnected unitary and non-unitary approaches to the political effectiveness of nonstate violence can be integrated to capitalize on their respective strengths by incorporating traditional variables such as objective, strategy, signaling, and credibility into disaggregated movement frameworks. Finally, power distribution theory asks and addresses questions often ignored in studies of the effectiveness of nonstate violence, such as when and why groups use violence to pursue strategic goals in the first place and what is the relationship between organizational and strategic objectives.

There are several key policy implications of this study. Those policymakers, participants, and supporters seeking to help national movements achieve strategic success should avoid trying to make groups altruistic allies and instead work to change the movement power structure. Those trying to counter violent national movements should recognize the tension between preventing violence and preventing strategic progress. If a state wants to prevent violent attacks, then it should push for a hegemonic movement adversary. If a state wants to prevent the strategic progress of a movement, then it should push for a fragmented movement adversary. Current thinking among scholars and policymakers often addresses counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategy without appreciating these dual objectives and the inherent tension in their achievement. For the Palestinian national movement and Syrian insurgency today, this study suggests that unity deals between Fatah and Hamas or various Syrian factions will probably not be consummated among all significant groups, and they are far less relevant to the strategic success of the movements than a change in the internal distribution of power.

Finally, this study raises two additional questions for future research. First, how are campaigns linked within movements over time? Can some of the short-term "counterproductive" mechanisms in one campaign actually lay the foundation for strategic effectiveness in future campaigns, as appeared to be the case with the FLN’s infighting? Power distribution theory identifies the
conditions under which such mechanisms can aid strategic effectiveness in the long term—when they make the movement hegemonic—but the theory does not explain when and why such a systemic shift in power does or does not occur. This represents a potential bridge to competing theories, as movements may benefit from periods of both fragmentation and hegemony, as the former creates a competitive environment in which weaker challengers are selected out, followed by a hegemon carrying the movement to victory. Such evolution would fit with the concept of stages that was central to the thinking of the most prominent practitioners and theorists of nonstate violence, including Mao Zedong, Che Guevara, Carlos Marighella, Vo Nguen Giap, and Abu Bakr Naji.

Second, does the power distribution theory apply to nonnational or nonviolent movements? Although certain aspects are specific to violent, national movements, many of the key mechanisms of the theory concerning the pursuit of organizational and strategic objectives, counterproductive infighting and external meddling, as well as credibility and signaling should be applicable to nonnational and nonviolent social movements. The movements in this study suggest as much, as the Algerians and Palestinians were most strategically successful when hegemonic, but the former was very violent and the latter was more nonviolent than it had generally been at the time of its success. Longitudinal analysis of other movements—national and nonnational, violent and nonviolent—can help to determine the scope of the theory. In any case, it is hoped that this study helps to further a growing subfield with significant potential at the nexus of nonstate violence, national movements, and political outcomes.