To the Editors (Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher write):

In “Europe’s Troubles,” Sebastian Rosato argues that the high water mark of European integration has passed and that the fate of the European Union (EU) is increasingly uncertain.1 The European project, he claims, had a geostrategic imperative during the Cold War: unable to match Soviet power individually, the small and medium powers of Western Europe sought to balance the Soviet Union through economic integration. The Soviet collapse and the end of the Cold War removed the strategic rationale for preserving the community that European governments had built over many decades. At best, according to Rosato, Europe will continue to muddle along. At worst, the entire European project will collapse.

Rosato’s article is an important contribution to the debate on the origins and persistence of European integration. His argument that integration was motivated by Eurasian balance of power considerations, however, leads him to make a number of dubious theoretical and empirical claims. Theoretically, Rosato’s structural realist premises are indeterminate regarding the magnitude, scope, and direction of European integration. Empirically, Rosato is forced to overstate the scope and degree of European integration during the Cold War and to understate the achievements and advances af-

ter the Soviet collapse. In addition, Europe’s troubles today are not only different from what Rosato suggests, but also more severe.

STRUCTURAL REALISM AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Structural realism offers contradictory predictions and interpretations of post–Cold War European integration—especially in security and defense affairs. Contrary to Rosato, who predicts the EU fraying and fissuring in the absence of the Soviet Union, other structural realists have explained theoretically (especially as a reaction to American unipolarity) and documented empirically how the post–Cold War political landscape has led to greater European cooperation in security and defense, not less.2

Rosato’s exclusive focus on the balance of power largely ignores Western European threat perceptions. Perceptions of the Soviet threat rose and fell throughout the Cold War period. Some national leaders, such as French President Charles de Gaulle, did not view the Soviet Union as an implacable enemy, but instead, to the consternation of Washington, at times skillfully maneuvered between the two superpowers.

Moreover, if regional power imbalance is all that matters, one is left to wonder why the small and medium powers of North and Central America did not take similar steps to integrate to balance the United States. Absent any account of threat perceptions, domestic politics, and the preferences, goals, and interplay of the main actors, this failure makes little sense. Monocausal explanations such as Rosato’s have trouble explaining events as complex and contingent as European integration over extended spans of time. Eurasian geostrategic power considerations were at best one of several reasons that leaders in Western Europe pursued integration in the immediate postwar period.

OVERSTATING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION DURING THE COLD WAR

Rosato states that the emergence of the EU “is best understood as a response to the postwar distribution of power” (p. 47). “Given the Soviet Union’s massive power advantage,” he writes, “the Europeans understood that they could compete effectively only if they built a single regional economy governed by a central authority” (p. 62). Rosato’s interpretation of European Cold War history vastly overstates the breadth and depth of integration during this period, and misstates the main motivation behind it.

The 1951 Treaty of Paris, the first step toward what is today the European Union, formally established the European Coal and Steel Community, integrating the most important war industries of the time. The framers of the treaty—in the words of the 1950 Schuman Declaration—were more interested in making war between France and Germany “not merely unthinkable but materially impossible.”3 Sublimating the


3. Pascal Fontaine, Europe—A Fresh Start: The Schuman Declaration, 1950–1990 (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990), p. 44. On France and Germany’s pivotal role in European integration, see Ulrich Krotz and Joachim Schild, Shaping Europe: France,
Franco-German rivalry, not balancing the Soviet Union, was the key motive behind the early moves toward European integration following World War II.

In 1957 the “Six”—France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries—established the rudiments of a common market, including a customs union and the removal of internal barriers to trade in various economic areas. Although historically significant given Europe’s history of war and destruction, the first steps toward economic integration remained limited in scope: in addition to removing certain tariffs and trade quotas, they included a wide scheme of agricultural subsidies as part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

These measures, however, fell far short of full-scale economic integration, particularly compared to the level of integration achieved in the post–Cold War period. European economic integration certainly was not “governed by a central authority.” Instead, European governments integrated certain sectors of their economies. Other economic areas, especially the most costly ones or those closely linked to state sovereignty, remained at the national level: taxation and fiscal policy, everything related to the welfare state, and monetary policy. The EU budget was limited to little more than 1 percent of its members’ combined gross domestic product, and the biggest portion of this by far went to farm subsidies via CAP. Balancing the Soviet Union with coal, common market regulations, and cows? None of these constitute a serious attempt at matching Soviet power. Irrespective of whether a single market would have helped to balance the Soviet Union or not, the Single European Act (SEA) was signed only in 1986, the Cold War’s twilight.

Integration in the domains that would have been most able to shape a Western European counterweight to the Soviet Union—foreign policy, security, and defense—Rosato instantly has to explain away, because integration in these areas remained feeble or entirely absent throughout the Cold War. After the European Defense Community had failed decisively in 1954, NATO became the supreme security institution for Western Europe, with the Western European Union no more than a token organization. Rosato also ignores the EU’s many political and institutional crises during the Cold War period. There was a lack of political will to create a fully unified political entity. President de Gaulle decisively put an end to federalism (or, as Jean Monnet referred to it, “supranationalism”). From the Luxembourg crisis of 1966 to the mid-1980s, when the SEA was signed, the EU experienced a period of inertia and stagnation, which observers at times derisively referred to as “Eurostasis” or “Eurosclerosis.”

**UNDERSTATEING EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AFTER THE COLD WAR**

With the Soviet Union gone, Rosato sees the key motivating force behind the European project removed: “[T]he demise of the Soviet Union has deprived [Europeans] of a compelling geostrategic reason to pursue political or military integration or to preserve the integrated economy they built between 1950 and 1990” (p. 68). This claim forces Rosato to downplay the substantial advances in European integration since the end of the Cold War.

Contrary to Rosato’s analysis, not only did the EU survive the Soviet Union’s collapse, but it reached new heights in the first two decades of the post–Cold War period.

It embarked on a period of greater integration and significantly expanded its membership ("deepening" and "widening" in the Euro-lexicon). The 1991 Maastricht treaty formally gave birth to European Monetary Union (EMU) and the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) as well as a unitary currency, the euro. This marked an enormous pooling of sovereignty, yet had little to do with balancing the tottering Soviet Union.

For the sake of his argument, Rosato makes monetary union and the arrival of the euro a Cold War legacy that carried over into the post–Cold War era. “Like the euro,” he says, “the ECB involved the evolution of an existing system, not a fundamental change of it” (p. 68). He is correct that plans for monetary union date back at least to the 1980s, and that German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President François Mitterrand had discussed the project. It was German unification, however—codefining the Cold War’s conclusion—that decisively sped up the execution of plans for monetary union. In other words, the end of the Cold War and the prospect of German unity decisively accelerated adoption of EMU, thus causing deepened integration—exactly the opposite of what Rosato suggests.

European countries have also made strides toward greater foreign policy and security cooperation since the end of the Cold War. Rosato overlooks this record because he adopts the straw man of formal political and military union—an unrealistic ambition that exceeds that of all but the most ardent federalists. European governments have sought a common foreign and security policy, not a single one. Political and military union has not emerged, nor is it on the horizon. As such, nothing is new. Nor is it clear why the appropriate benchmark should be full political and military integration when judging the success or failure of the EU in the post–Cold War period. If one drops Rosato’s idealistic criterion, the achievements are many and the overall record looks quite different.

EUROPE’S REAL TROUBLES TODAY
Europe today is in crisis, its future uncertain. It is not even one crisis but rather a confluence of several crises that strike at the core of the European project. The current eurozone crisis is a sovereign debt crisis as well as a competitiveness crisis of the economies at Europe’s periphery. It also is a crisis of institutional design, as the euro chains together economies with radically different performance levels, capital needs, and fiscal capacities, while abolishing their ability to conduct national monetary policy.

The European malaise is compounded by the long-term rise of diverse kinds of anti-Brussels sentiment: views that the EU scheme had become too economically liberal (from the left); too centralizing and bureaucratic (center-right); too aggressively undermining of national sovereignty and responsibility (right); and generally too intrusive, expansionist, and fraught with democratic legitimacy deficits (across the spectrum). Some further stress the community deficit crisis, the weakness or absence of true “we-

4. This is not to argue that monetary union was simply the price Germany had to pay for the acquiescence of other EU member states to unification. Some still purport this interpretation, which is historically and chronologically inaccurate.
feeling” among the EU’s 500 million citizens. In these times of integration fatigue, moreover, no unifying purpose or vision convinces, unites, or inspires Europeans to support the European project in ways comparable to the enthusiasm that the ideal of “no more war” generated following World War II.

Europe’s problems are not only different from what Rosato suggests, but also more numerous, complex, and severe. The Soviet Union’s collapse and the associated power shift in Eurasia explains little or nothing of the EU’s current calamities and challenges—and bears not at all on their future escalations or resolutions. The European project’s troubles, in brief, would be much less grave, and the EU and the state of European integration would be much better off, if the disappearance of the Soviet Union actually were its main problem.

—Ulrich Krotz
Cambridge, Massachusetts
—Richard Maher
Florence, Italy

To the Editors (David M. McCourt and Andrew Glencross write):

Sebastian Rosato’s article “Europe’s Troubles” is an important contribution to the debate on the European Union’s (EU’s) origins, history, and prospects. Rosato should be praised, in particular, for putting forward a specifically power political explanation for the EU’s development. Nonetheless, Rosato overstates the power of his theory against its principal competitors and lays out an overly restrictive view of integration history. Equating power politics with balancing alone neglects attempts by Britain and France since 1945 to continue to manage the international system—as great powers do. Looking beyond balancing, a “great power management” perspective offers starkly different, less pessimistic, conclusions regarding the future of Europe.


clare that by the late 1950s “balance of power calculations had pushed the Europeans to establish an integrated economy” capable of facing down the Soviet threat (p. 62).

Second, not all West European states were involved in integrating their economies during the early 1950s, even in this limited way. Britain, notably, initially refused to join the European project, acceding only in 1973 after French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed two previous attempts. Rosato does not address the British case, because it contradicts his central argument. Unless the stopping power of the English Channel was a reason to ignore Britain, either London was still a significant power—in which case a balancing coalition against the Soviet Union should have centered around it—or, as a non-great power similar to other European states, Britain should have joined its neighbors in their endeavors. Neither of these scenarios occurred, as Britain decided against integration.

British leaders made this choice because the Soviet threat was only one aspect of a complex postwar situation that led some West European nations but not others to choose integration. Consider the commonly accepted account of the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community that its aim was to bind German power by removing control of raw materials while facilitating French recovery. Although Rosato is correct that many French and German industrialists were against the plan (p. 79), a balancing explanation is only partial, because the plan was explicitly about limiting Germany’s capacity to rebuild its economy independent of supranational constraint. If balancing is involved, therefore, it is a curious form of balancing-Germany-through-integration by France. In fact, this form of balancing characterizes the Maastricht treaty of 1991, in which a newly reunified Germany was tightly bound to the EU to allay fears over an independent German foreign policy. Although Rosato argues that this took place before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and was explicable in terms of balancing, Maastricht was agreed after the end of the Cold War when the Soviet threat had disappeared, which cannot thereby be considered the main motivating factor.

GREAT POWER MANAGEMENT AND THE ORIGINS OF EUROPE
If balancing was not the only reason for “the Six” to integrate, without Britain, how else might one understand the power political origins of the EU? We suggest that the notion of “great power management” (GPM) is useful. Classic balance of power theorists Kenneth Waltz and Hedley Bull both stress that balancing is only one way in which great powers play the time-old game of power politics: driven by their relative size, capabilities, and histories, they are also driven to manage the international system. They do so by first maintaining a stable general balance of power internationally; second, by managing their relations with other great powers and preventing crises; third, by creating regional spheres of interest; and finally, by controlling their inferiors within those spheres. Balancing is then only one of the power political drivers of international affairs, as the EU demonstrates.

Britain’s refusal to enter the EU is explicable from a GPM perspective because, al-

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though exhausted, its leaders still believed Britain to be a great power in the period, and other powers treated it as such. As Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin told the House of Commons in 1947, “His Majesty’s Government does not accept the view . . . that we have ceased to be a great power.” Britain did not need to integrate, therefore, because it was a great power doing what great powers do. This included maintaining the general balance of power internationally by playing a crucial role in gaining U.S. security guarantees for Western Europe, requesting financial assistance leading to the Marshall Plan, and transferring the financing of Greece and Turkey to Washington in 1947. This great power mind-set changed only after the Suez crisis in 1956 confirmed Britain’s dependence on the United States, closely followed by an ignominious withdrawal from “East of Suez.” At this point, British leaders began to appreciate that Britain’s ability to retain a GPM role could only come through European integration.

By that time, however, a change had taken place in Paris that would prevent British membership to the EU for more than a decade. Again, France’s actions over integration are more explicable in terms of GPM than straight balancing against the Soviets. As Alan Milward has argued, the integration process was not about transcending the nation-state, but about preserving it, particularly for France, which had lost its great power status following German occupation. The notion of Europe as a “third force,” drawn upon extensively by Rosato (e.g., pp. 57, 60), was aimed not solely at the Soviets, but also at the emerging bipolar order, with its negative portents for France and French culture worldwide. By the time Britain first applied for membership in 1961, de Gaulle was in power and was convinced of the need to reassert France’s great power status through an independent—non-Anglo-Saxon—foreign policy. For him, Britain was a “Troyan horse” for Washington; only after he had left office would France allow Britain to join the EU.

From a German perspective, the initial phase of European integration was an instrumental precondition for reestablishing full sovereignty for the Federal Democratic Republic. Only through such self-binding could West Germany hope to normalize its postwar international relations, which was necessary to retain the possibility of influencing decisions over the future of Soviet-controlled East Germany. Indeed, German leaders were prepared to cement economic and political ties even further, through the Maastricht treaty establishing the euro and a common foreign policy, in return for Britain, France, Russia, and the United States acquiescing to reunification. Postreunification, Germany has been active in the development of an EU foreign policy: a means of further “normalizing” its international relations. The common strand, therefore, is the desire to manage Germany’s international engagements through supranational integration.

PREDICTING THE FUTURE
In addition to providing an important corrective to Rosato’s historical account, this wider power political explanation of integration leads to different conclusions regarding “Europe’s troubles.” The EU has always been a vehicle for the projection of the power of its principal member states. Where Rosato sees the likely dissolution of Europe, therefore, a GPM perspective expects the Union’s salience to depend on its use-
fulness for the former European great powers going forward. On trade and environmental governance, in particular, the EU is a force multiplier. Yet as the uncoordinated response to the Libya crisis demonstrates, a common foreign policy is dependent on the larger European countries’ ability to bring significant assets to the table as well as find shared ground. This will prove difficult as military budgets decline, and might explain the recent Anglo-French defense pact, signed in November 2010: a bilateral mechanism for pooling capacities that could also be used to support EU actions. In short, in areas of high politics, the EU retains a “capabilities-expectations gap” as well as a “consensus-expectations gap” that postdate the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Nonetheless, Europe’s negotiation of a cease-fire between Russia and Georgia in 2008 proves that great power management is not beyond the large European states. What matters for Europe’s future is how much consensus there is between them on using the EU for great power management, and hence what kinds of concrete benefits they think they can derive from it. This modified power political line of argumentation may well help provide an answer to the conundrum Rosato’s work poses about the incentive states have to preserve the EU in the post–Cold War era. The Soviet threat may be gone, but the large European states retain too great a stake in the international system to refuse a role in managing it, and the EU remains their best vehicle for doing so. Contra Rosato, European integration will thus matter to them more rather than less—unless great power management is left to the Americans and emerging powers. Europe could well opt for the latter, but as the result of the politics of GPM, not the absence of an external threat.

—David M. McCourt
Berkeley, California

—Andrew Glencross
Aberdeen, Scotland

To the Editors (Norrin M. Ripsman writes):

Sebastian Rosato’s article on the origins of the European Union makes a number of important observations about the reasons why the weakened states of Europe pursued their ambitious project of economic and, to a lesser extent, political integration after World War II. He is correct to point out that integration and security cooperation represented a logical choice for countries under threat from a Soviet Union with an overwhelming conventional forces advantage on the continent. Nonetheless, he underestimates the importance of the United States in making European cooperation possible. Moreover, he does not consider that, after the founding realist impetuses for


cooperation—the Soviet threat and active U.S. participation in the region—abated, cooperation intensified among the states of the region. Consequently, he underestimates the role that liberal factors, such as the democratization of West Germany and cooperative European institutions, had in transforming the nature of European international relations. I illustrate these arguments with reference to the crucial Franco-German dyad that formed the cornerstone of both West European antagonism before 1945 and regional stability after World War II.

There is no question that the Soviet threat served as the catalyst for European security cooperation after World War II. Although the French public and its leaders still feared Germany, which had conducted offensive operations on French soil three times in seventy-five years, French military and political leaders recognized as early as 1948 that the Soviet Union posed a more immediate and formidable threat. They judged that, divided and occupied, Germany represented only a medium- to long-term threat, while the Soviet conventional force imbalance that Rosato identifies posed a far more serious threat to France in the short term.

Nonetheless, until the United States and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain provided extensive security guarantees and committed their troops to the continent on a permanent basis, the French political leadership was unwilling to allow the German rearmament that French military leaders believed was essential to counter the Soviet threat. Consequently, France delayed an agreement on German rearmament and security cooperation until the autumn of 1954, more than six years after its military leaders judged it to be a critical necessity, until it secured a meaningful U.S. commitment. Although it is clear, as Rosato notes, that residual fears of American abandonment lingered, U.S. instigation, incentives, and long-term participation in the European defense framework served as the glue that made effective European security cooperation against the Soviet Union possible.

If power political factors brought about security cooperation and the economic and political integration that characterized the European Community, however, they cannot be credited with its deepening. After all, the Soviet threat to Western Europe declined


considerably after the mid-1950s, yet European cooperation intensified, with security cooperation engendering economic cooperation and eventually broader political integration. Moreover, as I indicate below, European institutions brought about changing societal attitudes in Europe, which is another aspect of deepening cooperation. The intensification of European cooperation in the face of détente and the reduced threat perception during Mikhail Gorbachev’s presidency belie the insufficiency of power politics as an explanation for European cooperation.

Rosato attempts to skirt this problem by evaluating threat levels based merely on the relative conventional power tables of the Soviet Union versus the six original European powers (p. 65). This is misleading for three reasons. First, his evaluation does not factor in the significant contributions of Britain and the United States, which would alter relative power ratios considerably in Europe’s favor. Second, it downplays the importance of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, as well as the British and French nuclear forces, which diminished the utility and value of Soviet conventional forces. Finally, it ignores the degree of threat perception, which was significantly reduced under détente and during Gorbachev’s leadership. Therefore, maintaining that the Soviet threat to Europe was constant from 1950 to 1990 is highly inaccurate.

More strikingly, the ability of European cooperation to endure and even deepen after the collapse of the Soviet Union, rather than descend into the kind of competition and conflict that John Mearsheimer predicted, presents a considerable puzzle for Rosato’s thesis that the European project was and is merely a reflection of power politics. Nor can deepening cooperation be pinned solely on U.S. hegemonic engagement on the continent, after the rebuilding of the European conventional forces, the development of British and French nuclear forces, and U.S. pressure for burden sharing decreased the relative level of U.S. participation in Europe, especially after the Soviet threat retreated.

If power politics cannot explain the deepening of Europe, what can? As I argue elsewhere, whereas European security cooperation initially was merely a statist bargain among West European states and the United States, with no societal buy-in, by the late 1980s regional democratization, the creation of European political and economic institutions, and, to a lesser extent, economic integration brought European societies on board, ultimately transforming regional relations. Witness, for example, the dramatic transformation of French public opinion toward Germany. While security cooperation was initially being negotiated in the early 1950s, the majority of the French public (55 percent of decided respondents) believed that France should not have even “cordial” relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). On the eve of the 1954 agreements paving the way for German rearmament and NATO entry, the vast majority of the French public (66 percent of decided respondents) feared German rearmament in any form, while an additional 28 percent believed that it could be benign only with adequate safeguards. Shortly after these agreements, in 1956, almost three in four Frenchmen surveyed reported a negative opinion of the FRG. Yet by 1964, a large majority of

6. Ripsman, “Two Stages of Transition from a Region of War to a Region of Peace.”
respondents reported a positive opinion of the FRG (58 percent compared with only 11 percent reporting a negative opinion). By 1972, attitudes had further improved, with more than 85 percent of decided French respondents opining that Germany no longer represented a threat to France. As a result, when the issue of German reunification was broached in the autumn of 1989, a public opinion poll indicated that 80 percent of Frenchmen favored German unification within the confines of European institutions. Clearly, societal attitudes had altered since the security arrangements of 1954. Cooperation was no longer simply dictated by realist, balance of power considerations; it was now more firmly grounded at the societal level.

Furthermore, Rosato overstates the importance of the Soviet threat in bringing about economic integration in Europe. A key factor motivating Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman to propose the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community and, subsequently, the Treaty of Rome was the fear that the German economic recovery that Washington was pushing (through the elimination of industrial restrictions and the scale-back of the industrial dismantling program) would eventually allow Germany to threaten France again in the future. Consequently, they conceived a plan to integrate the German economy within a broader European framework to minimize the future threat. Of course, this is indirectly attributable to the Soviet threat, given that the United States was eager to restore the German economy as part of a broader plan to contain the spread of communism. Nonetheless, this is hardly the direct causal path that Rosato asserts, which oversimplifies the history of European integration.

Finally, the crises in contemporary Europe that Rosato identifies, though not trivial, belie the extent to which Europe still remains closer to what Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett call a “pluralistic security community” rather than a region of competition and war. After all, although economic integration has been shaken by the recent global economic crisis, and although the prospect of a common European Union foreign and security policy remains a chimera, the prospects of war between EU members in the foreseeable future are virtually zero. As Benjamin Miller puts it, war between regional participants is “unthinkable,” if not impossible. Thus, Rosato overstates the degree of disintegration in Europe and the extent to which the demise of the common Soviet threat has led to the return of politics as usual in Europe.

Overall, Rosato’s argument is overstated and ignores the qualitative changes in inter-European relations in the last fifty years. A more careful analysis would lead one to be-

To the Editors (Mark S. Sheetz and Jean-Yves Haine write):

Standard realist explanations of European integration took a beating after the Cold War.\(^1\) They could not explain why (1) the European security community did not collapse or (2) why integration intensified after the end of the Soviet threat with the Maastricht treaty, the European Union (EU), and a common currency. Sebastian Rosato presents a classic realist argument, but he attempts to revive the basic realist case by finessing these questions.\(^2\) He conveniently ignores the successes and instead focuses on the failures, portraying a community that has all but collapsed and a European Union that has stalled.

The failures, such as the French, Dutch, and Irish rejection of the European constitution, a potential unraveling of the Schengen accord, and the Greek debt crisis, do indicate that a realist explanation has merit. Indeed, Rosato’s focus on balance of power theory as an explanation for European integration is a much needed corrective to alternative explanations that employ liberal institutional theory, democratic peace theory, or constructivist theory. His contribution is a welcome reminder that European states remain sensitive to power considerations and that, then as now, the European project is best understood through the prism of power politics. Rosato’s narrative, however, suffers from three major flaws.

THREE PROBLEMS

The first problem is Rosato’s claim that Europeans responded to a security threat not by means of political or military integration, but by economic integration. If Europeans were faced with a compelling security threat and had to balance against the Soviet Union (pp. 47, 59, 85), why did they seek only economic cooperation in the European Economic Community (EEC)? Why did the negotiations to establish a European common market start in 1955, not in 1948, when perception of the Soviet threat among European countries was at its peak? Why did Europeans create a monetary union and a common security and defense policy only after the Soviet threat had disappeared? This is not what realist theory predicts.

The second problem is that Rosato bases his argument on the distribution of power. According to his logic, the distribution of power—the alleged explanatory variable—does not explain European integration. When faced with an existential threat during

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the Cold War, Europeans did not seek political or military cooperation (pp. 68–69, 70–71). When the distribution of power changes and the threat disappears after the Cold War, Europeans no longer have an incentive to seek political or military integration (pp. 47, 68, 84). So according to Rosato’s argument, no matter what the distribution of power is, Europeans have no incentive to seek political and military integration. This means that the independent variable changes—threat/no threat—but the dependent variable (integration) does not. Moreover, European integration advances in fits and starts. It varies, yet the Soviet threat remains constant. Again, the correlation between independent and dependent variable is missing.

If anything, the Maastricht treaty and the euro demonstrate a move toward even greater integration after the Cold War. If Europeans could not integrate politically or militarily in the presence of the Soviet threat, then why would integration advance in the absence of that threat? If the demise of the Soviet Union deprived Europeans of a compelling reason to pursue integration (p. 68), then why did they seek greater integration at Maastricht with the creation of the European Union after the Soviet collapse and a change in the distribution of power? This was the most significant push for integration since 1957. The explanation given by Rosato for this seeming theoretical anomaly—path dependence—is unconvincing (p. 73). It appears to be an attempt to explain away inconvenient anomalies with auxiliary hypotheses.3

The third problem is that, while taking account of the global balance of power, Rosato fails to consider the balance of power within Europe. The intra-European balance of power dynamic offers a much better tool to explain the rise of the EEC, the attempt to contain German power at Maastricht, and the current crisis of the eurozone. Realists have emphasized the role of relative gains as an obstacle to cooperation. The relative gains issue was a crucial dimension of the European integration process during and after the Cold War. In other words, the internal balance of power dynamics is crucially missing in Rosato’s account of European integration. That states should be concerned by the respective power of their neighbors as much, if not more than, the global distribution of power should come as no surprise for realists. Two episodes illustrate this dynamic, the failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) and the Maastricht treaty.

THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY

When U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson told the NATO allies in September 1950 that a German contribution to the defense of Europe was necessary, the prospect came as a shock to French politicians and public alike. In October 1950, only five years after the end of World War II, some 51 percent of Frenchmen were against the inclusion of German units into a European army, with a mere 21 percent in favor.4 The French fear of the Soviet threat did not imply support for a German army. The EDC saga, from the Pleven Plan in October 1950 until its demise by a vote of the French national assembly in August 1954, illustrates the prevalence of relative gains logic among Europeans, especially when the role of the United States was still uncertain.

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A strictly European solution to the conundrum of relative gains between France and Germany was illusory for two reasons. First, a defense community limited to Europe was not enough to balance the Soviet Union. Contrary to Rosato’s argument, a military coalition of the original six founders of the EU could not have balanced the Soviet Union in any meaningful way. Second, the very success of the EDC could have triggered what Europeans, including the French and Germans, feared the most: an early departure of the United States. Indeed, as Rosato rightly points out, the U.S. commitment to European security during the early 1950s seemed hesitant, minimal, and temporary.

The NATO minimal commitment signed in April 1949 seemed for some Americans already exorbitant. For President Dwight Eisenhower, U.S. troops could be withdrawn within four to eight years, and even NATO would not be needed “for longer than ten to twenty years.” Washington underestimated, however, the prevalence of the relative gains conundrum for France. The process of the EDC increased the French perception that the United States was about to leave. For Paris, a successful EDC could have ultimately left France with actual German rearmament, an enduring Soviet threat, and a U.S. withdrawal.

The Maastricht Treaty

The second episode involves the Maastricht treaty and the deepening of European integration after the Cold War. For Rosato, “The collapse of the Soviet Union has meant that the Europeans no longer need to consider integration” (p. 69). And yet, as the Maastricht treaty illustrates, Europeans chose to deepen their cooperation when the Soviet threat disappeared. Rosato introduces an economic argument to justify this development. This again overlooks the internal balance of power dynamics among Europeans and their attempts to overcome the new European balance triggered by the reunification of Germany. It was a change in the European balance, not the global distribution of power, that triggered the relaunching of European integration in 1991.

Paris considered the unification of Germany as the reopening of the Yalta settlement. For France, the prospect of a united Germany was deeply unsettling, recalling François Mauriac’s remark that “I love Germany so much I am glad there are two of them.” Yet, the attempted solution to manage the new European balance was to further integrate Europe. Rosato argues that “Europe kept moving toward monetary union despite the end of the Cold War because of prosperous economic conditions” (p. 73), but the main impetus behind the euro was the reunification of Germany.

The EDC failure and the Maastricht treaty illustrate that the logic of relative gains was and is a permanent concern for states creating and managing institutions. During


7. Harvey Sicherman writes, “When the Berlin Wall was opened the Americans looked through the breach and saw the future while the Europeans looked through the breach and saw the past.” Sicherman, “NATO Germany and Pragmatism’s Finest Hour,” *Orbis*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (Fall 1997), p. 619.
and after the Cold War, this realist constraint of relative power remains the most relevant variable to understand the evolution of European integration.

A DIFFERENT REALISM
To the chagrin of standard realist theory, the Soviet threat was not so compelling as to suppress relative gains among European states. Europeans were sensitive to relative gains; and relations among France, Germany, and Britain in particular were driven by such considerations. That is why France opposed postwar German reconstruction in all its aspects, whether economic, political, or military. It is why France rejected German entry into NATO in September 1950 and, when German rearmament could no longer be avoided, why France made the decision to build an atomic bomb in December 1954. It is why the smaller powers rejected the Fouchet Plan in April 1962, why France vetoed British entry into the Common Market in January 1963, and why everyone rejected a nuclear-armed Germany.

There is a realist theory that explains European integration during the Cold War and the persistence of the European Union thereafter. It has to do with sovereignty and autonomy, and with the fear of becoming a Soviet satellite or a U.S. protectorate. The EU can survive after the collapse of the Soviet threat because, individually, European states do not rise to the level of great powers and lack influence in global politics. EU states are no longer great powers individually, but together they may be able to act like one.

—Mark S. Sheetz
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Sebastian Rosato Replies:

I appreciate the opportunity to respond to the thoughtful critiques of my recent article “Europe’s Troubles.” I begin with a restatement of my core argument and then address the three most important issues raised by my critics.

EUROPE’S TROUBLES
The questions I pose are straightforward: Why has the European integration project run into trouble? And where is it headed? To answer these questions, one needs a theory of


institutions that can account for a number of developments. First, it must explain why the Europeans formed an economic community—the European Community (EC)—in the 1950s. This task is fundamental because the EC is an exceptional institution, one that involves integration rather than cooperation. The Europeans did not simply agree to coordinate their efforts when they established the Community; they also gave up part of their sovereignty—the right to make policy autonomously—to a central actor. Second, the theory must account for the Europeans’ maintenance of the EC from 1960 to 1990. Third, it must shed light on developments since the end of the Cold War; specifically, it must explain why the economic community endured through the 1990s, but has been fraying over the past decade. Finally, the theory must explain why the Europeans have preferred to engage in political and military cooperation rather than integration since World War II.

My theory holds that institutions largely reflect the balance of power. States confronting a powerful adversary can cooperate or integrate. Usually they cooperate, but if their adversary is especially powerful, they seek to organize their balancing coalition as efficiently as possible and consider integration. Once they have decided whether to cooperate or integrate, they establish institutions to ensure that their joint endeavors run as smoothly as possible. It follows that as long as the distribution of power that generated a particular set of institutions endures, so, too, do those institutions. Likewise, it takes an alteration in the power architecture that gave rise to a set of institutions for them to change in a meaningful way.

The integration project can be understood as a response to the European balance of power. Consider developments in the 1950s: the Europeans confronted a formidable threat in the shape of the Soviet Union and feared that the United States would eventually withdraw from the continent. Therefore, they established the EC. Their thinking went as follows: because economic power was the basis of military might, they had to build an economic coalition; and because the Soviet Union was so powerful, the coalition had to take the form of a single regionwide economy governed by a central authority. Similar thinking prompted them to consider building an integrated military as well. Ultimately, however, they chose to retain their military sovereignty and wait to form a military community in the event the United States actually withdrew its forces and left them to contain the Soviet Union on their own.

Because there were no major changes in the European power architecture from 1960 to 1990, the Europeans did not alter the arrangements of the 1950s in meaningful ways. They did not take real steps toward political or military integration, and although the EC evolved considerably, it was not fundamentally transformed.

The collapse of the Soviet Union radically altered the balance of power. Since 1991, the countries of Europe have not confronted an existential threat, a fact that has had profound implications for the European project. It has meant that the Europeans have not attempted political or military integration. At the same time, it has meant that they no longer have a compelling reason to preserve their economic community. The effects of this structural change did not manifest themselves in the 1990s because these were years of great prosperity, but the economic situation has worsened since the turn of the century and, predictably, the EC has begun to show unmistakable signs of strain.

What does this mean for the future? As long as there are no further changes in the balance of power, the Europeans will not take significant steps toward political or military integration. They will also continue to have no compelling reason to preserve their economic community. As a result, further economic crises are likely to lead to more
fraying of the Community. At best, the economic situation will improve, and the EC will continue to muddle along.

THE ROLE OF SOVIET POWER
My critics argue that a close look at developments in Europe since 1945 shows that European integration cannot be understood as an attempt to balance against Soviet power. I address their criticisms in chronological order.

David McCourt and Andrew Glencross assert that European integration cannot have originated as a response to Soviet power because the Europeans did not integrate their economies fully in the 1950s. If the Soviet threat was so compelling, they argue, then surely the Europeans should have gone further. As Ulrich Krotz and Richard Maher put it, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC) did not “constitute a serious attempt at matching Soviet power.”

I agree that the Europeans did not achieve full economic integration in the 1950s. Nevertheless, their fear of the Soviet Union had two important effects: it caused them to take the unprecedented decision to integrate their economies; and it led them to build unique institutions designed to facilitate integration. Moreover, although they did not achieve full integration, the Europeans went a long way toward creating an integrated economy that would enable them to balance the economic power of the Soviet Union. Take, for example, Krotz and Maher’s observation that the ECSC integrated “the most important war industries of the time.” In addition, the EEC agreement established a “common market,” thereby enabling the Europeans to benefit from the economies of scale and technological innovations that go with large markets. The European Monetary Agreement, a fixed exchange rate system that was functionally equivalent to a common currency, buttressed both arrangements.

McCourt and Glencross also suggest that Britain’s refusal to join the EC in the 1950s is a problem for my argument. If fear of the Soviet Union was the driving force behind the EC, then Britain should have joined because the six founding members—France, Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries—did not have enough economic power to balance against Moscow effectively. This is an important point that I deal with elsewhere and should have addressed in my article. A simple balance of power argument explains Britain’s refusal to join: the six continental states could balance against the Soviets without British help, and therefore Britain was free to pursue a buck-passing strategy toward the continent. From 1950 to 1960, the combined economic power of the Six was roughly equal to that of the Soviet Union (p. 55). As a result, Britain, which was less endangered than its European allies because it was separated from the continent by the English Channel, buck-passed the balancing burden—a burden that involved integration and therefore an unacceptable surrender of sovereignty—to the Six.

Mark Sheetz and Jean-Yves Haine claim that balance of power calculations cannot explain the timing of early integration efforts: the Europeans waited until 1955 to begin negotiations on a common market rather than embarking on the process in 1948, when the Soviet threat was at its peak. This criticism misses the important fact that integration began in 1950 with the creation of the ECSC. Because coal and steel were key determinants of military power, the timing makes a great deal of sense from a balance of

power perspective. Moreover, the historical record indicates that the Europeans began to consider economic integration in sectors other than coal and steel in the late 1940s, not the mid-1950s. Finally, Sheetz and Haine are wrong to argue that the Soviet threat was at its peak in the late 1940s and declined thereafter: the Soviet Union had a greater power advantage over Western Europe in 1955 than it did in 1948 when it was still recovering from the damaging effects of World War II (p. 55).

The form that integration took in the 1950s also puzzles Sheetz and Haine. If the Europeans faced a significant security threat and had to balance against the Soviet Union, why did they not integrate their militaries? Although I address the question at some length in my article, this is a crucial issue and it is worth restating my original argument. As my theory predicts, the Europeans considered military integration in the early 1950s and went so far as to sign the European Defense Community (EDC) treaty, which, had it gone into effect, would have established an integrated European military. The problem with this arrangement was that France would have had to surrender military sovereignty, something it was loath to do. Therefore, the French refused to ratify the EDC treaty and instead endorsed the preexisting North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), an arrangement that did not require them to give up sovereignty and had the added benefit of keeping the United States in Europe to help contain the Soviet Union. This is not to say that France was entirely comfortable with the NATO option; there was a real fear that the United States might one day withdraw from the continent, at which point the Europeans would have to fend for themselves. Therefore, the French proposed the Western European Union, a purely European organization that could quickly be converted into an integrated military force capable of containing the Soviet Union, in the event of a U.S. withdrawal. Until the United States actually pulled out, however, France would retain its military sovereignty and continue to cooperate with the other Western powers within the NATO framework (pp. 62–65).

Norrin Ripsman agrees with me that power political factors largely explain the origins of European integration, but he questions the link between Soviet power and the maintenance of the EC from 1960 to 1990. As he puts it, “[T]he Soviet threat to Western Europe declined considerably after the mid-1950s, yet European cooperation intensified, with security cooperation engendering economic cooperation and eventually broader political integration.” On close inspection, however, it is clear that the Soviet threat did not decline during this period. With regard to military and economic power, the Soviet Union held a roughly two to one advantage over the Six throughout the Cold War (p. 55). Ripsman claims that my power measure is too crude because it focuses only on European capabilities and ignores the contribution of the United States. The key point, however, is that the Europeans worried that the United States might abandon Europe, thereby forcing them to deal with the Soviet Union on their own (pp. 65–66). Thus, the EC–Soviet Union power comparison is appropriate if scholars want to understand how the Europeans viewed the Soviet threat.

Moreover, contrary to Ripsman’s assertions, the Europeans made no serious moves toward political or military integration during this period. Indeed, the 1961 Fouchet Plan and what came to be called “European political cooperation” were not even serious attempts at cooperation. As for economic affairs, several commentators have noted

3. Ibid., pp. 176–183.
that the Single European Act and the European Monetary System constituted an evolution rather than a transformation of the EC system (pp. 66–67).

Moving to more recent history, all of my critics suggest that the European balance of power cannot account for the events of the past two decades. Specifically, the Soviet Union collapsed, but the EC “reached new heights” with the creation of a monetary union and a common security and defense policy. If this is true, Soviet power cannot be regarded as the key driver of the European integration project after 1990. I hope my views on this issue are clear by now, but in case they are not, I briefly restate them. Turning first to the military realm, there has clearly been a considerable amount of activity in Europe since 1991, but experts agree that the major initiatives—the Maastricht treaty and the European Security and Defense Policy—are examples of cooperation, not integration. In other words, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Europeans have done what my theory maintains states do in the absence of an existential threat: they have cooperated, but they have not integrated (pp. 70–72).

Developments in the economic realm since 1991 can also be understood within the context of the balance of power. The crucial point is that the collapse of the Soviet Union removed the core rationale for maintaining the EC. This does not mean that it gave the Europeans a reason to dismantle the Community—only that it removed their incentive to preserve it. Once this point is established, the EC’s recent history can be easily explained. Plans for monetary union, as Krotz and Maher acknowledge, “date back at least to the 1980s.” The Europeans followed through on their plans despite the demise of the Soviet Union for several reasons. One obvious reason is that the Soviet Union did not break up until 1991 and Russian forces were not fully withdrawn from Germany until 1994. So the change in the balance of power occasioned by the end of the Cold War was not immediately apparent. It is also worth noting that structural changes rarely have an immediate impact. The most important reason that the Europeans kept moving toward monetary union in the 1990s, however, was that these were years of great prosperity. Thus they may not have had a strategic rationale for preserving the Community, but they also had no incentive to kill it. As soon as the goose stopped laying golden eggs at the turn of the millennium, however, the EC started to fray. For example, France and Germany began routinely violating the rules underpinning the single market and the single currency in 2000, and they have increasingly thought and acted in national rather than community terms (pp. 72–77).

Finally, Ripsman claims that it is hard to square the situation in Europe today with my balance of power argument. The Soviet Union is no more, but cooperation continues: “Europe still remains closer to . . . a ‘pluralistic security community’ rather than a region of competition and war.” This obscures my point. I do not suggest at any point that Europe has become a war-prone region. My claim is simply that the collapse of the Soviet Union has led to “the fraying of the economic community.” Indeed, my prediction “is not . . . that the Europeans will stop cooperating with one another,” but that the “slow fraying of the Community . . . will probably continue” (pp. 72, 86).

ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS
My critics claim that there are better explanations for European integration than mine. The first alternative holds that integration was designed to balance against Germany, not the Soviet Union. The second asserts that the creation of the EC can be explained as a function of great power management rather than balance of power politics. The third focuses on the maintenance of the EC between 1960 and 1990 and claims that it is best
understood as a consequence of societal changes in the major European states, which were in turn the product of democratization and the creation of European institutions.

Although their arguments are not identical, all of my critics agree that European integration was mainly a French attempt to balance German power. The argument is made most forcefully by Sheetz and Haine, who argue that the “intra-European balance of power dynamic offers a much better tool to explain the rise of the EEC, the attempt to contain German power at Maastricht, and the current crisis of the eurozone.” Elsewhere they employ relative gains rhetoric to make the same argument: “The relative gains issue was a crucial dimension of the European integration process during and after the Cold War. In other words, the internal balance of power dynamics is crucially missing in Rosato’s account of European integration.” Such considerations, they argue, drove the French decision to establish the ECSC and embrace the Maastricht treaty.

There are good reasons to doubt the claim that France proposed the ECSC primarily to balance against Germany. If the overriding French goal was to contain Germany in the immediate postwar period, there were other options available—including a punitive treaty or multinational control of Germany’s industrial heartland—that would not have required France to cooperate with Germany let alone integrate and surrender its sovereignty. The ECSC must therefore have originated elsewhere, and in my article, I show that it is clear from the available evidence that Soviet power was the prime determinant of French decisionmaking.4 This is not to say the German threat was irrelevant. Each time the French chose to integrate, they worked hard to ensure that Paris and Bonn would have an equal say in the management of the Community in the belief that this would enable them to establish and maintain a roughly even balance of power between them and their erstwhile rival. In short, the German threat had a profound impact on the shape of the agreement—itself an important issue—but it did not cause the French to choose integration in the first place (p. 60, n. 51).5

It is also hard to make the argument that the Maastricht treaty was part of a plan to contain Germany. Most observers maintain that the decision to “relaunch” integration was taken during the Cold War when the Soviet Union still presented a formidable threat and well before German reunification upset the intra-European balance of power. Krotz and Maher tacitly acknowledge the point, declaring that German reunification merely “accelerated adoption of EMU [Economic and Monetary Union].”

There are other problems with the intra-European balance of power argument. Logically, it cannot explain why France would opt for integration in some cases but not others. If integration was an effective tool “to contain German power,” then why did the French reject the EDC? Sheetz and Haine could argue that the EDC was different from other integration agreements because it was the only one that involved military affairs, but they describe themselves as realists, and the realist position is that fears of relative gains are just as acute in the economic as they are in the military sphere, mainly because economic might is the basis of military might.6 Empirically, Sheetz and Haine claim that concerns about relative gains led France to oppose postwar German recon-

5. For an extended discussion of this point, see Rosato, Europe United, pp. 31–33, 63–71, 130–142, 187–197.
struction, reject German entry into NATO in 1950, build an atomic bomb in 1954, and reject a nuclear-armed Germany from day one. They may be right, but this is beside the point because none of these examples involve integration.

McCourt and Glencross argue that British, French, and German actions in the first two decades of the Cold War were driven not by balancing alone, as I argue, but by a desire to “manage the international system—as great powers do.” This is a description rather than an explanation of the origins of integration because every conceivable behavior appears to fall under the rubric of great power management. Even more damaging for their argument, Britain, France, and Germany were not great powers, and they did not manage international politics in any meaningful way during the period in question. The United States and the Soviet Union dominated global politics at the time. Indeed, McCourt and Glencross provide good evidence of this when they describe a subservient Britain seeking U.S. military and financial assistance and a weakened France desperate to reassert its great power status.

Ripsman broadly agrees with my analysis of the origins of integration but offers a different take on the maintenance of the Community, claiming that liberal factors such as democratization and institutionalization “brought European societies on board” with the European project, which in turn engendered greater cooperation and, ultimately, “political integration.” Ripsman’s claim that “[c]ooperation . . . [became] more firmly grounded at the societal level” in the latter part of the Cold War is consistent with my argument. I agree that once institutions have been created for balance of power reasons, other factors help to account for their evolution. We part ways, however, over his claim that liberal factors pushed the Europeans from mere cooperation to political integration between 1960 and 1990, thereby transforming the EC. The reason for our disagreement is simple: Europe did not move toward political integration during that time. My theory can explain this: as long as there are no changes in the balance of power—as was the case between 1960 and 1990—revolutionary institutional developments are unlikely (pp. 65–68).

PREDICTIONS

My critics claim that my predictions about the future of the European project are either too optimistic or too pessimistic. Our differences, however, are more apparent than real. It is not clear to me why Krotz and Maher dispute my analysis of Europe’s future. I argue that the absence of a major league adversary akin to the Soviet Union means that the Europeans no longer have a reason to preserve their economic community. To be clear, this does not mean that they will seek to disband it; only that they will not be committed to maintaining it if it runs into trouble. In essence, this means that the EC’s future depends on the health of the European economy. If the economic situation improves, the EC will muddle along. If the economic situation does not improve—and I argue that there are good reasons to think this is the most likely scenario—the Community will continue to fray, perhaps to the point where it becomes a community in name only (pp. 83–85). Krotz and Maher appear to share my pessimism when they declare that “Europe’s problems are . . . more numerous, complex, and severe” than even I suggest. Their secondary criticism is that the collapse of the Soviet Union “explains little or nothing of the EU’s current calamities.” This claim does not contradict my argument, as I do not draw a direct causal link between the demise of the Soviet Union and the current crisis.
McCourt and Glencross and Sheetz and Haine have a more positive outlook. The future is not as grim as I say because the European Union (EU) can provide a vehicle for its members to exert an influence in global politics and, perhaps, to manage the international system for their benefit. What matters according to McCourt and Glencross is “how much consensus there is between them on using the EU for great power management, and hence what kinds of concrete benefits they think they can derive from it.” Sheetz and Haine are less explicit but effectively make the same argument: “EU states are no longer great powers individually, but together they may be able to act like one.”

My critics are right, but this kind of activity is best described as cooperation, not integration. Consensus decisionmaking, cost-benefit calculations, and acting together when interests coincide are the hallmarks of cooperation; they are not what the members of a supranational community do. What my critics are saying, then, is that the Europeans are likely to cooperate in the same way as any other group of like-minded states. In that case, there will be nothing distinctive about the European project, as has been the case over the past six decades, when there was real integration. Indeed, this is precisely my point: “This is not to say that the Europeans will stop cooperating with one another. . . . [T]here are plenty of reasons for them to continue working together. The current distribution of power, however, means that it is unlikely the EC will continue to survive in its current form. As time passes, it is likely to look more like other international institutions and less like the exceptional case that it seemed to be for so long” (p. 86).

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