

# Summaries

7–48

## Racism, Stereotypes, and War

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Racism systematically distorts policymakers' analyses of their allies' and adversaries' capabilities, interests, and resolve, potentially leading to costly choices regarding war and peace. When policymakers hold racist beliefs, as they did in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), their beliefs influence how they explain and predict their allies' and adversaries' behaviors. Reliance on racist stereotypes leads policymakers to inaccurate assessments. An analysis of the relationship between stereotypes, reputations, and bigotry indicates that reputations easily become stereotypes—which is discomfiting to anyone who bases policy decisions on another's reputation or encourages policymakers to do so. International security scholars have largely overlooked the role of racism, assuming rational choices on the part of policymakers. Research demonstrates that this assumption is wrong.

49–90

## The Meddler's Trap: McKinley, the Philippines, and the Difficulty of Letting Go

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From Vietnam to Afghanistan, U.S. leaders have had great difficulty disentangling the United States from faraway military interventions. William McKinley's 1898 decision to annex the Philippines reveals why, through a phenomenon called the "meddler's trap." The meddler's trap denotes a situation of self-entanglement, whereby a leader inadvertently creates a problem through military intervention, feels they can solve it, and values solving the new problem more because of the initial intervention. The inflated valuation is driven by a cognitive bias called the endowment effect, according to which individuals tend to overvalue goods they feel they own. A military intervention causes a feeling of ownership of the foreign territory, triggering the endowment effect. Following the U.S. victory in Manila during the War of 1898, McKinley doubted Filipino civilizational capacity to self-govern, believed that a U.S. departure from the Philippines would cause chaos and great power war, and believed that U.S. governance could forestall that outcome. Because

he had already deployed troops to the Philippines, McKinley also felt ownership over them, and this endowment effect inflated his valuation of the archipelago. Together, these mutually reinforcing beliefs produced the meddler's trap and the United States' largest annexation outside its hemisphere.

91–126

### Racialization and International Security

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Racialization—the processes that infuse social and political phenomena with racial identities and implications—is an assertion of power, a claim of purportedly inherent differences that has saturated modern diplomacy, order, and violence. Despite the field's consistent interest in power, international security studies in the United States largely omitted racial dynamics from decades of debates about international conflict and cooperation, nuclear proliferation, power transitions, unipolarity, civil wars, terrorism, international order, grand strategy, and other subjects. A new framework lays conceptual bedrock, links relevant literatures to major research agendas in international security, cultivates interdisciplinary dialogues, and charts promising paths to consider how overt and embedded racialization shape the study and practice of international security. A discussion of several research design challenges for integrating racialization into existing and new research agendas helps scholars reconsider how they approach questions of race and security. Beyond diversifying the professoriat itself, revealing and countering embedded biases are crucial to determine how alternative ideas have been marginalized, and, ultimately, to develop better theories.

127–163

### To Punish or Protect? Local Leaders and Economic Coercion in China

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During foreign policy disputes involving China and some of its most important economic partners, why do local leaders punish or protect foreign commercial actors? Understanding this variation is important because how local leaders treat foreign businesses can influence the overall effectiveness of the Chinese government's use of economic coercion against foreign states. Two variables help determine whether local leaders participate in economic retaliation: (1) whether they regard commercial ties to the targeted state as essential

to achieving the economic growth necessary for career advancement; and (2) whether they are politically vulnerable, either because they lack powerful patrons or because their locality recently experienced social unrest. Economic importance creates incentives to protect foreign commercial interests, and political vulnerability provides incentives for local leaders to demonstrate their patriotic credentials through economic retaliation. Drawing on interviews with Chinese, Korean, and Japanese sources, an examination of local leader behavior in Chinese cities illuminates why they responded differently during foreign policy disputes with Japan in 2012 and South Korea in 2017.

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“Wars without Gun Smoke”: Global Supply Chains, Power Transitions, and Economic Statecraft

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Conventional wisdom holds that conflict is highly likely during a power transition between declining and rising powers. The spread of global supply chains has provided new economic weapons for great powers waging these conflicts, but the businesses that constitute global supply chains can make it harder or easier for them to do so. A structural theory of business-state relations shows how power transitions affect a state’s ability to exercise economic statecraft. As a dominant power and a rising power approach parity, they face structural incentives to use economic statecraft to decouple their economies. The resulting threat to businesses’ profits changes business-state relations: high-value businesses within the dominant power tend to oppose their state’s use of economic statecraft, whereas low-value businesses within the rising power tend to cooperate with their state’s use of economic statecraft. The Anglo-German power transition from 1890 to 1914 and the U.S.–China power transition since 1990 illustrate the theory. The findings shift scholarly debates on the use of economic statecraft in modern great power competition and have policy implications for weaponizing supply chains against rising powers like China.

#### NOTE TO CONTRIBUTORS

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