
Intuition or Counterintuition? The Science behind the Art of Negotiation

Daniel Druckman

This article celebrates the achievements made by the community of negotiation researchers. Looking back on what has been accomplished, the article addresses three questions: How have we thought about negotiation? How have we studied it? And what have we discovered through conducting research? Of particular interest are counterintuitive findings about processes at the negotiating table, around the table, and away from the table. Building on these contributions, the article looks forward by asking: What are some avenues for further research? The article concludes optimistically by noting that there will be even more to celebrate at the journal's fiftieth anniversary.

Key words: conflict resolution, context, counterintuitive findings, metaphors for negotiation, negotiation processes, research traditions.

Introduction

An anniversary offers the opportunity to reflect back and look forward. *Negotiation Journal* has accomplished the mission that founding editor Jeffrey Rubin articulated in the first issue: "to encourage, through open exchange and critical dialogue, the search for new and renewed ideas that

Daniel Druckman is a professor of public and international affairs at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia and scholar-in-residence at the Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland in Brisbane, Australia. His e-mail address is dandruckman@yahoo.com.

serve the management of conflict through negotiation.” Indeed, the journal is the quintessential pracademic journal. It reaches out to both the knowledge-generating scholarly and knowledge-using practitioner communities. It is unique in its regular coverage of cutting-edge research and theory, probing analyses of cases, innovative teaching approaches, and engaging review essays. Every volume accommodates these parts of the field. Unlike more specialized, technical journals on dispute and conflict resolution, *Negotiation Journal* articles are read, not only cited. Created during a period when studies of negotiation processes were exploding, the journal would become a bellwether for the state of the art and science. There is much to celebrate.

In this article, I look back at the way the field has developed by addressing three questions: How have we thought about negotiation? How have we studied it? What have we discovered through research? I then look forward by asking: What are some avenues for future research and practice?

Negotiation as Art and Science

The study and practice of negotiation is both art and science. It is an ever-present activity often taken for granted. While we may not be able to negotiate *everything*, as many of the popular books claim, we do negotiate many things. It is an art form in practice, in the sense that many negotiators prefer obfuscation and vagueness to precision. It is a science to the extent that analysts can explain many outcomes in causal terms, and a technical language for analyzing and modeling negotiation has developed. A rich metaphorical language used to describe negotiation highlights the art, as does its prominent role as a source of dramatic tension and character development in literature, theater, and film. Various approaches to learning about negotiation attempt to bridge the art and the science. They do this by using findings from research to better understand complex cases and to develop ideas for improving negotiating effectiveness.

What Is Negotiation?

Webster’s dictionary defines negotiation as “to (discuss) with a view to coming to terms; to confer regarding a basis for agreement.” This definition, like most found in dictionaries, is quite general and perhaps not very helpful. In fact, we know negotiation more in terms of its practice and forms. It is practiced face-to-face and at a distance; it occurs between two (bilateral), three (trilateral), or many (multilateral) parties; it is practiced in domestic, regional, international, and global contexts; it occurs over security, trade, environmental, and relational issues; it is more formal when representatives of governments deliberate, or when it occurs in institutional contexts, and it is less formal when individuals attempt to settle disagreements without implications for organizations or other constituencies. This variety in practice renders negotiation a multifaceted activity that cannot

be reduced to a single definition. The various forms, settings, and issues are considered as variables in research. They are factors regarded as influences on the negotiating decisions taken during the talks, on the agreements, and implementing the agreements. The research completed to date, and reported in published literature, sheds light on the impact of these and other influences as I will discuss. But first I will consider some of the ways that scholars and practitioners think about negotiation.

Metaphors for Negotiation

The varied forms taken by negotiation can be captured as metaphors. Similar to the activity itself, the research on negotiation has taken many forms. For some, negotiation is represented as a *game*, for others it is a *discourse*, and for yet others it is a *tool for managing organizations*. Each metaphor taps into the way a particular community of scholars regards this activity. I have identified ten metaphorical approaches to the study of negotiation, and I summarize seven of them here. (See Druckman 2007 for more detailed discussion of the metaphors.)

A familiar metaphor is of negotiation as a *puzzle* to be solved. Researchers working in this tradition emphasize those aspects of negotiation related to preferences and choices. Models of conflict are represented by games in which “players” choose usually between cooperating (compromise) and competing (winning). The most popular game structure is the “prisoner’s dilemma,” which highlights the role of trust. Other games have been designed to represent such conflicts as the Cuban Missile crisis, the Iran hostage crisis, the conflict over the Berlin Wall, the causes of World War I, and such everyday experiences as battles between the sexes or the game of bully (see Snyder and Diesing 1977).

A second familiar metaphor is the *bargaining contest*. Researchers working in this tradition emphasize those aspects of negotiation that involve exchanging offers and demands, concessions, and interests in the context of distributable, tangible issues. We know this as bargaining or, commonly, haggling in the marketplace. Conflict occurs because the size of the prize is limited and must be divided: each prefers more than the other. Often, the settlement is a compromise, which, like the equilibrium solution in the prisoner’s dilemma, means equal losses. We have observed this behavior repeatedly in a variety of board games and simulations. (See Rubin and Brown 1975 for an early review of these experiments.) The challenge for many theorists and practitioners is to reframe these games by allowing for the sort of win-win solution deemed optimal in the prisoner’s dilemma game. (Note the distinction between distributive and integrative bargaining introduced by Richard Walton and Robert McKersie [1965].)

A third metaphor is negotiation as *organizational management*. Researchers working in this tradition emphasize those aspects of negotiation related to, or embedded in, organizations or bureaucracies. An

important related concept is the boundary role dilemma, which refers to the challenge of balancing demands made by constituents and by the opposing negotiating team. A good deal of this literature focuses on tactics that can be used to resolve this dilemma, especially in the contexts of labor-management talks and merger decisions. The tactics are often attempts to navigate between at least two sets of negotiations: those that occur *within* organizations and those that take place *between* organizations. (See Walton and McKersie's 1965 intraorganizational model; see also Burke and Biggert's 1997 discussion of interorganizational cooperation.)

A fourth metaphor is negotiation as *diplomacy politics*. Researchers in this tradition also pay particular attention to the larger setting in which negotiation occurs. With regard to the international setting, this includes salient events (such as a coup or election); the international atmosphere (more or less tense); institutional structures (as when democracies negotiate with autocracies); cultures (as when east meets west), national perspectives or worldviews; cooperative regimes in the areas of security, environment, or trade; and linkages to similar negotiations from the past or present. Negotiation is viewed as a microcosm of the larger game of international politics.

Three other metaphors are negotiation as *identity politics*, as *discourse analysis*, and as *social orders*. Although these metaphors have received less attention, they are gaining popularity as scholarly frameworks. The identity metaphor refers to negotiations that occur in the context of ethnic-group struggles for nationhood or autonomy but could refer to identity issues that arise in the workplace as well. The issues are intangible, emotional, ideological, and thus often regarded as being "nonnegotiable" (Zartman 2001).

The discourse metaphor refers to analyses of the communication process, rhetoric, and meaning transmitted and interpreted during the course of negotiation. Scholars working in this tradition emphasize the importance of the way meaning is constructed by the negotiators (Putnam 2005). The social-order metaphor focuses on the negotiation of cooperative arrangements that serve to regulate relations in such areas as trade, the environment, and security. Referred to as regimes, the emphasis is on the structures or institutions being created rather than on the interaction process (Strauss 1978; Krasner 1983). (It is similar in some ways to the diplomacy politics metaphor.)

Research Traditions

The metaphors capture a number of research traditions, which also differ in terms of how the research is conducted. Some studies depend on conducting *laboratory experiments* following the path-breaking work on levels of aspiration in bargaining undertaken by Sidney Siegel and Lawrence E. Fouraker (1960).

These studies include relatively simple games and more complex simulations. A variety of matrix games, such as the popular prisoner's dilemma, have been developed to investigate impacts of incentive structures on choices. Many games are played with a few poker chips — for example, “So Long Sucker” developed by Lloyd Shapley and his colleagues (1964) — that lend themselves to cross-national comparisons (e.g., Druckman et al. 1976; Hofstede and Murff 2009). These games are intended to capture essential features of any negotiation. In contrast, simulations are attempts to capture the detailed features of particular negotiations. Experiments embedded in real-life scenarios probe relationships between situations, processes, and outcomes. Examples of situations are collective bargaining, political decision making, and international peace talks (see Druckman 1994 for these and other examples). Comparisons between laboratory and field results reveal the extent to which the simulated setting resembled a real-world counterpart (Hopmann and Walcott 1977; Beriker and Druckman 1996).

Other studies *analyze cases* of actual negotiations, including both in-depth and comparative analyses on issues of trade, arms control, internal conflicts, and disputes over territories and borders. In-depth case studies produce valuable lessons, especially when they are collected in edited volumes organized around themes such as ripeness and formulae (Zartman 1995), peace versus justice (Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005), or escalation in negotiation (Zartman and Faure 2005). When a small number of matched cases are compared (Irmer and Druckman 2009), analytical precision is enhanced; when a large number of cases are compared, generality is enhanced as in, for example, my (Druckman 2001) study of turning points. Both types of studies address hypotheses: the former apply the logic of experimental controls for inferring causality, while the larger sample size feature of the latter permits statistical analysis.

Laboratory studies have provided knowledge about the impact of preparing, framing, problem solving, and bargaining exchanges as well as pressures produced by role demands. Case analyses have illuminated sequences of events in terms of stages and turning points, showing how certain contexts and processes create impasses while others provide the momentum needed to forge agreements.

Another negotiation research tradition is *questionnaire surveys*. This method is particularly useful for reaching professional populations whose members are generally unavailable to participate in experiments. They also provide data not found in archival case records. A number of survey studies have appeared in recent issues of this journal. These include analyses of responses provided by mediators, people served by ombudsmen, CEOs of portfolio companies, and adolescent students. A series of studies by Stephen Goldberg and his colleagues showed that mediators' inability to gain the confidence of disputants was a major reason for lack of success (Goldberg 2005; Goldberg and Shaw 2007; Goldberg, Shaw, and Brett 2009). (Reasonable

response rates from 380 [77 percent] and 254 [46 percent] attorneys in the two most recent studies bolster confidence in the generality of the results.)

In other recent articles, authors reported on the results of surveys measuring the satisfaction of clients using ombuds services (Van Roosbroek and Van de Walle 2008), the impact of positional bargaining in preinvestment negotiations in venture capital-backed firms (Erikson and Berg-Utby 2009), and the role of conflict perceptions on the attachment and coping styles of adolescents (Ben-Ari and Hirshberg 2009).

Survey research can present methodological problems, however, such as small sample sizes or low response rates. The former can be addressed by defining the sample as the population. (See Birkhoff's 2001 survey of power perspectives used by all the trained mediators in SPIDR.) The latter problem can be addressed by changing the mode from mail surveys to face-to-face interviews but some samples can only be reached by mail, for example, the world's foreign ministers. (See Modelski 1970)

A fourth analytic tradition is *modeling*. Popular models used for negotiation analysis are those based on game-theoretic (Avenhaus and Zartman 2007) and decision-theoretic (Raiffa 1982) assumptions. Both are theories that aim to discover optimal (or equilibrium) solutions derived from negotiators' preferences. The concept of a bargaining frontier illustrates how different proposed agreement packages are evaluated for "optimality." It has been used as a problem-solving tool for several high-profile cases including the Panama Canal talks, trade talks in the context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades, and a variety of base-rights negotiations (Raiffa 1982). The usefulness of these tools does not depend on practitioners' understanding of the mathematics involved in generating solutions to their conflicting preferences.

Models have informed computer simulations of distributive and integrative bargaining (Bartos 1995), dynamics of small group decision making (Gabbay 2007), and impacts of full or incomplete information about the other's preferences (Guner and Druckman 2000). They have also been used to depict phase transitions that may occur during negotiation (Coleman 1973). Although many of these models have been illustrated with case material, few have been validated with large data sets. More often, the models have stimulated analyses of alternative futures.

These sorts of models can be used as tools to bridge the gap between researchers and negotiators. They are among several diagnostic approaches designed to assist negotiators in evaluating the available options in relation to their alternatives. Another type of collaboration occurs when scholars and professional diplomats work jointly to identify lessons from past negotiations that are valuable to future generations of negotiators (Bendahmane and McDonald 1986). In particular, the scholars have called attention to findings about the less tangible aspects of negotiation — the effects of emotions, values, and cultural factors. These and other findings from experiments, case studies, and surveys gain relevance when they are incorporated

into the development of training programs (Druckman 2006b). I turn now to a sampling of some of the findings with an emphasis on those that may be surprising.

Counterintuitive Findings

Perhaps the most interesting research products are unexpected findings. They challenge popular wisdom and illuminate the complexity of negotiating behavior. This complexity often requires holding onto contradictory ideas at the same time. This entails striking a balance between the positive (those that encourage agreement) and negative (those that discourage agreement) effects of a strategy or process. I have organized some of these findings according to the proverbial table metaphor: activities that occur *at* the table, *around* the table, and *away* from the table.

At the Table

Researchers have obtained interesting findings about the decision to continue negotiating, the dual effects of attractive alternatives, exchanging information about interests and needs, flexible bargaining, and the expression of emotions.

To Negotiate or Not. A continuous negotiation process can increase the chances of getting a settlement. It can also serve to perpetuate impasses. Knowing when to negotiate and when not to negotiate is important. Thus, research indicates that negotiators should continue talking if momentum is building toward agreement or if the process accomplishes valuable side effects such as stalling decisions or diverting attention away from the battle (Iklé 1964). They should stop talking, however, if new incompatibilities are discovered (serving to escalate the conflict further) or if a long-term resolution is desired. For the latter, they should seek a forum or format that is more conducive to exploring the sources of the conflict. (See the lessons learned from case studies in Druckman 1986.)

But, contrary to conventional wisdom, impasses can turn a frozen negotiation around. Case-study research has shown that impasses — particularly when they become crises — precipitate turning points that lead to agreements (Druckman 1986, 2001). The impasse is often a “wake up call” to negotiators. It can encourage a “time out” that provides the distance negotiators need to reframe issues or to develop new procedures that generate progress. In fact, negotiators may need impasses, particularly on complex issues. Without them, agreements — such as those negotiated between good friends — may be suboptimal (Halpern 1994).

On Alternatives. Analysts, following Roger Fisher and William Ury’s (1981) advice, typically assume that the more (and better) alternatives to negotiated outcomes that parties generate, the better are their chances of

getting a good agreement. But sometimes, developing negotiating alternatives can have negative effects that outweigh the “good” agreement. The process may actually produce a less empathic negotiator and lead to agreements that are ultimately suboptimal. Negotiators with attractive alternatives are less attuned to the exchanges, often ignoring strategic information that would lead them to reevaluate those alternatives and the offers on the table. (See the experimental findings reported by Pinkley, Neale, and Bennet 1994.)

On Information Exchange. In a similar reversal of accepted wisdom, exchanging too much information during negotiation can have the unforeseen consequence of revealing new incompatibilities that escalate the dispute further as David Johnson’s (1967) experiment shows and as Kimberlyn Leary’s (2004) analysis of the dispute in Indonesia over Aceh independence illustrates. Sometimes it may be better to explore available options or reframe the issues than to probe more deeply for information about the other’s interests and needs.

On Flexible Bargaining. Too much flexibility in concession making may have negative implications for group loyalty if the desire to achieve any agreement means the agreement is inconsistent with the values and interests of the group being represented (Druckman 2006a). Experiments have shown that quick concessions, even if mutual, often lead to suboptimal agreements (Ben-Yoav and Pruitt 1984; Halpern 1994), known also as a “winner’s curse” (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985).

On Emotional Expressions. In spite of our usual emphasis on rational dialogue with only moderate emotion, displays of anger can be helpful when they reveal strongly felt values or interests and are directed at the task rather than at the other person(s). Strong expressions can serve to define or anchor a bargaining range if they are regarded as authentic signals rather than distracting “noise.” (See the case study by Daly 1991 and the experiment by Jehn 1994.)

Just as anger can be helpful, so too firm stances can be effective. Standing firm on principles *early* in a negotiation but showing flexibility on positions *later* can elicit more concessions than either unwavering firmness or flexibility (Pruitt and Lewis 1977; Pruitt 1981). Cooperative postures in the context of earlier competitiveness — known also as the “reformed sinner” strategy — have been shown in repeated experiments to produce good agreements. (For a review of these experiments, see Pruitt and Kimmel 1977 and Pruitt 1981.)

Compliments can be “overdone.” While creating a friendly atmosphere, flattering comments can be viewed as ingratiating, inauthentic, or

manipulative. These perceptions can reduce flexibility, leading to unfavorable outcomes (Johnson 1971; Baron 1990).

Around the Table

Negotiating roles and conditions have been popular topics for research. We have learned much about the dilemmas of representation and third-party involvement as well as the effects of publicity and time pressure on risk perceptions. With the advent of new computer technologies, negotiation researchers have explored impacts of various features of negotiation support systems. But, more to the point, exploratory work on furniture configurations in the negotiating room has addressed directly the meaning of “around the table.”

On the Role of the Representative. Negotiating representatives (also known as agents) are generally inflexible. They are particularly loathe to make concessions when their principals or constituents are involved in the negotiating process (e.g., Hermann and Kogan 1968; Benton and Druckman 1973). The challenge for them is to hold the principals at a distance while keeping them informed of progress. They must balance the advantages of involvement with those of distance: involvement makes it easier to sell the agreement to their principals; distance facilitates actually achieving an agreement. (This tactic was described by Richard Walton and Robert McKersie 1965.)

On Risk Perceptions. Two conditions that influence the perception of risk are the publicity surrounding a negotiation and the time pressures felt by negotiators. Public talks play into the hands of hardened constituencies and other parties with interests in the outcome. Negotiators are inclined to play it safe, which often means adhering to publicly stated positions (Druckman 1993). On the other hand, the risks of impasse are heightened if concessions are not made. Private venues allow for exploratory discussions that could improve the chances to carve out an agreement. But, then again, agreements reached in private are hard to sell to supporters kept at a distance from the process; rejection of the agreement is a risk because of limited information about trade-offs that ensued and reduced confidence in the representative.

Time pressures increase the negotiator's perception of risk in two ways: by speeding the process and by forcing a decision. The former reduces the opportunities to probe for important information that would help reduce risk. The latter, known as a decision dilemma, increases the attractiveness of alternatives to the terms on the table. But time pressure can also be beneficial if it helps to seal a good agreement by reducing the likelihood of impasses. Thus, time pressure can either increase, if the

terms are unacceptable, or decrease, if the terms are acceptable, the perception of risk.

On the Medium. Negotiation over the Internet, referred to as e-negotiation, is often more effective than when parties interact over the same issues face-to-face, although this seems more likely when negotiations are task specific, dealing largely with work-team projects rather than with relationships. (See Koeszegi, Srnka, and Pesendorfer 2006 for a review of more than a dozen studies on this comparison.) The efficiencies gained by electronic exchanges would seem to be offset by losses in empathy incurred by eliminating face-to-face interactions (see Bui and Shakun 2006). Electronic negotiations are also less likely to be effective in more high-context cultures, such as in many Asian countries, where there is a strong emphasis on developing and maintaining relationships. (See Kersten, Koeszegi, and Vetschera 2002 for findings on the impact of culture on electronic negotiations. Also see Kopelman and Rossette 2008 for impacts on bargaining of cultural emphases on harmony versus directness.)

Similar findings have been obtained in work on electronic mediation. Although the computer mediator was efficient in getting agreements on difficult international issues and the negotiators were generally satisfied with the agreements, they much preferred to be advised by a person (Druckman, Druckman, and Arai 2004). Similar to physical exercise, the electronic mediator is effective but not particularly enjoyed.

On the Configuration of Furniture. Furniture can be surprisingly important. From experiments conducted on the configuration of furniture in the negotiating room, researchers have obtained different results in simulation and field settings. Simulation role players achieved significantly more agreements when they negotiated in chairs without tables than when they talked behind tables. Disputants participating in mediation sessions in the Washington, DC small claims court, however, were not responsive to this difference or to other situational cues manipulated in the experiment. An explanation for these findings — which is the basis for further experiments — is that the higher emotion of the real-world disputants made them less responsive than the role players to visual cues in the setting. This is referred to as “emotional flooding” — it may reduce attention to cues and moves made by the other in a manner similar to being overloaded with information. (See Pruitt 2006 for a discussion of these findings.)

On Third-Party Inputs. Third parties may be more effective if they are seen as being fair. They can do this by showing what a compromise (equal concessions from both or all sides) would look like but then move the parties away from agreeing on that solution in favor of an information

search toward a better (more integrative) agreement (Conlon, Carnevale, and Ross 1994). The mediator's challenge is to balance fairness against optimality, to persuade the parties that compromise is not the best outcome: the puzzle is how to do this without jeopardizing an agreement and escalating the dispute further. Further, it may be more important to avoid being perceived as being biased than to be regarded as fair. A recent survey study by Jean Poitras (2009) showed that positive behavior had a smaller impact on negotiation than negative actions or intentions. A lesson suggested for the mediator is to, first, avoid the appearance of bias. Later attempts to demonstrate fairness may be compromised by first impressions.

Away from the Table

Negotiation is embedded in a context. The process is shaped by and influences the surrounding environment. The source and intensity of the broader conflict have been shown to affect the process as well as the durability of any agreements reached. Research on other important features of the context has included the relative power of the parties and their identities.

With regard to sources of conflict, researchers have found it useful to distinguish between interests, values, and needs. Results from numerous studies have documented the difficulties of negotiating a solution when parties have conflicting underlying values or ideologies. The negotiations between the new government of President Corazon Aquino in the Philippines and the communist insurgency known as the National Democratic Front offer one example. Early progress on power-sharing proposals, spearheaded by moderates on both sides, gave way to stalled talks when ideological extremists effectively polarized the issues. The result was retreat from an agreed cease-fire and conflict escalation (Druckman and Green 1995). Shared interest in power-sharing arrangements devolved into irreconcilable differences in ideology with implications for identities. This pattern is often evident in attempts to negotiate agreements to end civil wars (Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousins 2002). At issue are the distinctions between getting disputing parties to the table, keeping them there until an agreement is reached, and sustaining the agreement through time.

In many inter- and intranational conflicts, the parties come to the table to negotiate their way out of a painful war. Mutual pain in the form of either financial or battlefield losses is often effective — and more effective than mediators — in getting parties to the table (see the review of evidence in Zartman 2000). But these circumstances may be more effective in producing a settlement, such as a cease-fire, than a lasting agreement or a resolution of the sources of conflict. Resolutions have been shown to depend on processes that incorporate problem-solving procedures (Kressel et al. 1994) or generate forward-looking outcomes (Zartman and Kremenyuk 2005). Power balances or imbalances can also be important. Mild discrepancies in

power put negotiators at cross-purposes — low-power parties fight for equal treatment and resist the lower status imposed on them by the high-power party. The latter then responds with escalating tactics that often causes stalemates. Contentious tactics and escalation are found to be more common in conditions of mild power asymmetry (Vitz and Kite 1970). In fact, low-power negotiators have been found to make more threats than high-power negotiators in conditions in which there was a small discrepancy in power (Hornstein 1965). This dynamic was evident during the long Cold War period of arms control talks between the Soviet Union and the United States. Agreements became more frequent after the Soviets achieved military parity with the United States (Jensen 1988).

Equality has been shown in recent research to play an important role in the durability of agreements. Analyses of sixteen peace agreements negotiated in the 1990s indicated that the most durable agreements were those in which the principle of equality was central to the terms of the agreement. This justice principle reduced the negative effects of high-conflict environments and increased the positive effects of relatively low conflict between the parties (Druckman and Albin forthcoming). It was also the key to relationships between procedural justice (fair processes) and durability as well as between forward- and backward-looking (FL/BL) outcomes and durability. In technical terms, the equality principle mediated the relationships between (1) the conflict environment, (2) procedural justice, and (3) FL/BL outcomes and the durability of the agreement. These results highlight the importance of equality for achieving lasting agreements and corroborate the earlier finding reviewed above on power differences.

As with many of the findings described earlier, equality can be a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it can increase the chances that the parties leave the table believing that they will move forward as equal partners, a conclusion bolstered by Morton Deutsch's (1985) laboratory findings. He explained the prevalence of equal outcomes in terms of the importance of interdependence and aspirations for cooperation or solidarity. The case studies show that such understanding contributes to the durability of the agreement. Durability depends as well on the extent to which the principles are adhered to in practice, away from the table during the implementation period.

On the other hand, the quest for equality can be a source of contention. The struggles between near-equal negotiating opponents are evident on a larger scale between the groups they represent. Experimental findings on the conflict-inducing effects of intergroup similarity (Brown and Adams 1986) are congruent with Jon Elster's interpretation of Alexis de Tocqueville's writing. He observed that "a given difference appears as more intolerable the more equal conditions are in society as a whole" (Elster 1994: 108). The flames of instability are fueled by equality: the former rebels become less tolerable of small differences between the groups. Agreements

based on equality are fragile when former rebels realize that they are on the short side of privileges.

Looking Ahead

The research findings I have reviewed in this article raise a number of compelling questions for further exploration.

At the Table

The two-edged sword feature of the findings about negotiating processes will be a theme for future research. Impasses can harden a negotiator's resolve to stay the course until the other party comes around. When this happens, tensions rise and the process takes the form of mutual incriminations with no reconciliation in sight. Impasses also provide opportunities for settlement, however. They can lead to a reframing of the issues that turns the talks in the direction of agreement. The trajectory — as either escalation or de-escalation — may depend on such contextual factors as prior relationship or experiences and on the level of trust or distrust between the parties. These factors may be the intervening variables between impasses during the process and outcomes, and this remains a research issue.

Contingent hypotheses are also suggested by the findings on alternatives, information exchange, and emotional expressions. Attractive alternatives can be used to slow the process, encouraging integrative bargaining. They can also be used to pressure an opponent into accepting undesirable terms. A key mediating variable may be negotiating orientation — whether alternatives are used to advance rewards jointly or for just one party. But the integrative bargaining may backfire: too much information exchanged can reveal new sources of incompatibility. This would seem to depend on the type of relationship between bargainers: empathic bargainers can more easily weather the storms of new revelations. Again, the role played by orientations and relationships presents fertile ground for new research.

Similarly, the display of emotions during negotiation can have opposite effects on the process. Genuine expressions of anger provide important information about a bargainer's commitment. When displayed in concert with a firm but flexible approach, they can elicit concessions from an opponent. Tactical anger (or flattery) used to put pressure on the other often elicits a response in kind, escalating the talks. Impacts are likely to depend on orientation: a strategic bargainer uses information conveyed by the expression to move the talks along; a reactive bargainer interprets the expression as an attack or a manipulation and reciprocates with anger (Van Kleef et al. 2008). We have much yet to learn about this distinction. Questions for further research include: what factors in the bargaining situation or bargainers trigger one or the other orientation? How do orientations change during the course of negotiation? And how

might these orientations be related to the fundamental attribution error, namely, attributing reasons for moves to the person rather than the situation?

Around the Table

The findings described earlier in this article call attention to the way features of the negotiating environment influence processes and constrain or expand the range of possible outcomes. These impacts depend on the extent to which bargainers respond to their surroundings. Emotional issues, antagonistic relationships, uncertain consequences of agreements, and complex bundles of issues divert attention from the situation to the opponent's demands. The narrowed focus can also prevent parties from listening to advice given by principals and third parties. The research challenge is to disentangle the various influences on negotiator responsiveness, distinguishing between reactions to the other party's statements and to the surrounding situation.

One way to reduce the intense emotions elicited in face-to-face negotiations between disputants is to change the medium. Findings from experiments conducted to date show that agreements occur more frequently in electronic than face-to-face negotiations; they also occur more frequently when the mediator functions of diagnosis, analysis, and advice are provided by the computer. There is more to this story, however. Effectiveness is contingent on the type of issues being negotiated and the culture of the negotiators. The challenge of repairing fractured relations — as in negotiations to end civil wars — benefits from face-to-face talks. Relationships are central also in negotiations involving citizens from high-context cultures. The electronic medium may be more of a hindrance than a facilitator for these negotiators. Three-variable factorial design experiments — medium, type of issue, type of culture — would go some way toward providing clarification for these suggested impacts. So too would field studies that include these types of variables.

Away from the Table

The diplomacy politics metaphor introduced earlier captures the interplay between context and negotiation, depicting that interplay as bidirectional, having mutual effects. The intensity and sources of conflict, power balances, and justice issues have been shown to influence the course of negotiation, its outcome, and the durability of agreements. They are also influenced by the negotiation process and outcome. These factors also provide fertile ground for research.

Three issues in particular are ripe for exploration. One is the relationship between conflict intensity, negotiation outcomes, and durability. Considerations of justice have been shown to reduce the negative effects of intense conflicts on negotiation. A related question is: how are principles of justice negotiated in different types of disputes?

Another issue concerns the role of equality in negotiation. Questions yet to be answered are: what are the theoretical mechanisms driving the link between equality and negotiation outcomes, and their durability? Does the role of equality vary with different types of negotiating issues?

A third issue turns on the distinction between settlements and resolutions. An old question is: when is a conflict ripe for resolution? We know something about the conditions for conflict management. We know less about how contextual factors, such as the source of conflict, interact with processes, such as integrative bargaining, to produce lasting peace. More generally, the way that conflict cycles (away from the table) influence calculations of negotiating (or agreeing) remains to be understood. Settlements may be more likely during periods of high (or low) conflict intensity. Resolutions are more likely when the agreement addresses root causes of the conflict. This distinction has been largely confined to the domain of international conflict management. Its relevance to other types of conflict remains to be explored.

Conclusion

Negotiation and conflict management are among those rare subjects that generate research in each of the social sciences. Related panels appear on the programs of annual meetings held by scholars in nearly every discipline. Articles in the key negotiation journals are written by scholars and practitioners across the disciplinary spectrum. Like the study of conflict more generally, the study of negotiation brings together a wide variety of analysts and teachers.

Nowhere is this mix more apparent than in the pages of *Negotiation Journal*. During the past twenty-five years, the journal has been a forum for the diverse perspectives and traditions that define the field. In this article, I have attempted to capture some of these perspectives, construed as metaphors and research traditions, as well as to emphasize some of the surprises that researchers have discovered about what may be expected at, around, and away from the proverbial negotiating table. Together, the three “locations” suggest a broadened framework for understanding the links between processes, conditions, and contexts. They also generate an array of interesting questions to be addressed by our colleagues across the generations and disciplines, including those concerned with the theory-practice nexus. Indeed, there is much to celebrate at twenty-five, and even more to look forward to celebrating at fifty.

REFERENCES

- Avenhaus, R. and I. W. Zartman (eds). 2007. *Diplomacy games: Formal models and international negotiations*. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer.
- Baron, R. A. 1990. Environmentally induced positive affect: Its impact on self-efficacy, task performance, negotiation, and conflict. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 20(5): 368-384.

- Bartos, O. J. 1995. Modeling distributive and integrative negotiations. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 542: 48-60.
- Ben-Ari, R. and I. Hirshberg. 2009. Attachment styles, conflict perception, and adolescents' strategies of coping with interpersonal conflict. *Negotiation Journal* 25(1): 59-82.
- Bendahanne, D. B. and J. W. McDonald, Jr. (eds). 1986. *Perspectives on negotiation: Four case studies and interpretations*. Washington, DC: Foreign Service Institute.
- Benton, A. and D. Druckman. 1973. Salient solutions and the bargaining behavior of representatives and non-representatives. *International Journal of Group Tensions* 3(1-2): 28-39.
- Ben-Yoav, O. and D. G. Pruitt. 1984. Accountability to constituents: A two-edged sword. *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance* 34(3): 283-295.
- Beriker, N. and D. Druckman. 1996. Simulating the Lausanne peace negotiations, 1922-23: Power asymmetries in bargaining. *Simulation & Gaming* 27(2): 162-183.
- Birkhoff, J. 2001. Mediators' perspectives on power: A window into a profession? Unpublished doctoral dissertation, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA.
- Brown, R. and D. Adams. 1986. The effects of intergroup similarity and goal interdependence on intergroup attitudes and task performance. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 22(1): 78-92.
- Bui, T. and M. Shakun (eds). 2006. Special issue on hot topics in negotiation support systems. *Group Decision and Negotiation* 15(5): 425-528.
- Burke, W. and N. Biggert. 1997. Inter-organizational cooperation. In *Enhancing organizational performance*, edited by D. Druckman, J. E. Singer, and H. Van Cott. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- Coleman, J. S. 1973. *The mathematics of collective action*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Conlon, D. E., P. Carnevale, and W. H. Ross. 1994. The influence of third-party power and suggestions on negotiation. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 24(12): 1084-1113.
- Daly, J. P. 1991. The effects of anger on negotiations over mergers and acquisitions. *Negotiation Journal* 7(1): 31-39.
- Deutsch, M. 1985. *Distributive justice: A social-psychological analysis*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Druckman, D. 1986. Stages, turning points, and crises: Negotiating military base rights, Spain and the United States. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 30(2): 327-360.
- — —. 1993. The situational levers of negotiating flexibility. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(2): 236-276.
- — —. 1994. Tools for discovery: Experimenting with simulations. *Simulation & Gaming* 25(4): 446-455.
- — —. 2001. Turning points in international negotiation: A comparative analysis. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(4): 519-544.
- — —. 2006a. Group attachments in negotiation and collective action. *International Negotiation* 11(2): 229-252.
- — —. 2006b. Uses of a marathon exercise. In *The negotiator's fieldbook*, edited by A. Schneider and C. Honeyman. Washington, DC: American Bar Association Books.
- — —. 2007. Negotiating in the international context. In *Peacemaking in international conflict*, edited by I. W. Zartman. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Druckman, D. and C. Albin. Forthcoming. Distributive justice and the durability of peace agreements. *Review of International Studies*.
- Druckman, D., A. A. Benton, F. Ali, and J. S. Bagur. 1976. Cultural differences in bargaining behavior: India, Argentina, and the United States. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 20(3): 413-452.
- Druckman, D., J. N. Druckman, and T. Arai. 2004. e Mediation: Impacts of an electronic mediator on negotiating behaviour. *Group Decision and Negotiation* 13(6): 481-511.
- Druckman, D. and J. Green. 1995. Playing two games: Internal negotiations in the Philippines. In *Elusive peace: Negotiating an end to civil wars*, edited by I. W. Zartman. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- Elster, J. 1994. The psychology of democracy in America. In *The great ideas today*, edited by M. J. Adler. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica.
- Erikson, T. and T. Berg-Utby. 2009. Preinvestment negotiation characteristics and dismissal in venture capital-backed firms. *Negotiation Journal* 25(1): 41-57.
- Fisher, R. and W. Ury. 1981. *Getting to yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

- Gabbay, M. 2007. A dynamical systems model for forecasting outcomes of negotiations on interstate conflicts. In *Diplomacy games: Formal models and international negotiations*, edited by R. Avenhaus and I. W. Zartman. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer.
- Goldberg, S. 2005. The secrets of successful mediators. *Negotiation Journal* 21(3): 365–376.
- Goldberg, S. and M. L. Shaw. 2007. The secrets of successful (and unsuccessful) mediators continued: Studies two and three. *Negotiation Journal* 23(4): 393–418.
- Goldberg, S. B., M. L. Shaw, and J. M. Brett. 2009. What difference a robe make? Comparing mediators with and without prior judicial experience. *Negotiation Journal* 25(3): 277–305.
- Guner, S. S. and D. Druckman. 2000. Identification of a princess under incomplete information: An Amarna story. *Theory and Decision* 48(4): 383–407.
- Halpern, J. 1994. The effects of friendship on personal business transactions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(4): 647–664.
- Hermann, M. G. and N. Kogan. 1968. Negotiation in leader and delegate groups. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 12(3): 332–344.
- Hofstede, G. J. and E. J. T. Murff. 2009. Unwritten rules changing the game: Re-purposing an old game for an international world. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Simulation and Gaming Association Singapore, June 29–July 3.
- Hopmann, P. T. and C. Walcott. 1977. The impact of external stresses and tensions on negotiation. In *Negotiations: Social-psychological perspectives*, edited by D. Druckman. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Hornstein, H. 1965. The effects of different magnitudes of threat upon interpersonal bargaining. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 1(3): 282–293.
- Iklé, F. C. 1964. *How nations negotiate*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Irmer, C. G. and D. Druckman. 2009. Explaining negotiation outcomes: Process or context? *Negotiation and Conflict Management Research* 2(3): 209–235.
- Jehn, K. A. 1994. Enhancing effectiveness: An investigation of advantages and disadvantages of value-based intergroup conflict. *International Journal of Conflict Management* 5(3): 223–238.
- Jensen, L. 1988. *Bargaining for national security: The post-war disarmament negotiations*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Johnson, D. W. 1967. The use of role reversal in intergroup competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 7(2): 135–142.
- — —. 1971. Effects of warmth of interaction, accuracy of understanding, and the proposal of compromise on listener's behaviour. *Journal of Counseling Psychology* 18(3): 207–216.
- Kersten, G. E., S. T. Koeszegi, and R. Vetschera. 2002. The effects of culture in anonymous negotiations: Experiments in four countries. *Proceedings of the 35th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences*, 418–427.
- Koeszegi, S. T., K. J. Srnka, and E.-M. Pesendorfer. 2006. Electronic negotiations — A comparison of different support systems. *Die Betriebswirtschaft* 66(4): 441–463.
- Kopelman, S. and A. S. Rosette. 2008. Cultural variation in response to strategic emotions in negotiation. *Group Decision and Negotiation* 17(1): 63–77.
- Krasner, S. D. (ed). 1983. *International regimes*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Kressel, K., E. A. Frontera, S. Forlenza, F. Butler, and L. Fish. 1994. The settlement orientation versus the problem-solving style in custody mediation. *Journal of Social Issues* 50(1): 67–84.
- Leary, K. 2004. Critical moments as relational moments: The centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and the conflict in Aceh, Indonesia. *Negotiation Journal* 20(2): 311–338.
- Modelski, G. 1970. The world's foreign ministers: A political elite. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 14(2): 135–175.
- Pinkley, R. L., M. A. Neale, and R. J. Bennet. 1994. The impact of alternatives to settlement in dyadic negotiations. *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance* 57(1): 97–116.
- Poitras, J. 2009. What makes parties trust a mediator? *Negotiation Journal* 25(3): 307–326.
- Pruitt, D. G. 1981. *Negotiation behavior*. New York: Academic Press.
- — —. 2006. Field experiments in social conflict. *International Negotiation* 10(1): 33–50.
- Pruitt, D. G. and M. J. Kimmel. 1977. Twenty years of experimental gaming: Critique, synthesis, and suggestions for the future. *Annual Review of Psychology* 28: 363–392.
- Pruitt, D. G. and S. A. Lewis. 1977. The psychology of integrative bargaining. In *Negotiations: Social-psychological perspectives*, edited by D. Druckman. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Putnam, L. 2005. Discourse analysis: Mucking around with negotiation data. *International Negotiation* 10(1): 17–32.

-
- Raiffa, H. 1982. *The art and science of negotiation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Rubin, J. Z. and B. Brown. 1975. *The social psychology of bargaining and negotiation*. New York: Academic Press.
- Samuelson, W. F. and M. H. Bazerman. 1985. The winner's curse in bilateral negotiations. In *Research in experimental economics*, Vol. 3, edited by V. Smith. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Shapley, L. S., J. F. Nash, M. Hausner, and M. Shubik. 1964. "So long sucker," a four-person game. In *Game theory and related approaches to social behavior*, edited by M. Shubik. New York: John Wiley.
- Siegel, S. and L. E. Fouraker. 1960. *Bargaining and group decision making: Experiments in bilateral monopoly*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Snyder, G. and P. Diesing. 1977. *Conflict among nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Stedman, S., D. Rothchild, and E. Cousins (eds). 2002. *Ending civil wars: The implementation of peace agreements*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Strauss, A. 1978. *Negotiations: Varieties, contexts, processes, and social order*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Van Kleef, G. A., E. van Dijk, W. Steinel, F. Harinck, and I. Van Beest. 2008. Anger in social conflict: Cross-situational comparisons and suggestions for the future. *Group Decision and Negotiation* 17(1): 13-30.
- Van Roosbroek, S. and S. Van de Walle. 2008. The relationship between ombudsman, government, and citizens: A survey analysis. *Negotiation Journal* 24(3): 287-302.
- Vitz, P. C. and W. R. Kite. 1970. Factors affecting conflict and negotiation within an alliance. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 5(2): 233-247.
- Walton, R. E. and R. B. McKersie. 1965. *A behavioral theory of labor negotiations: An analysis of a social interaction system*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Zartman, I. W. (ed). 1995. *Evasive peace: Negotiating an end to civil wars*. Washington, DC: Brookings.
- — —. 2000. Ripeness: The hurting stalemate and beyond. In *International conflict resolution after the cold war*, edited by P. C. Stern and D. Druckman. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
- — —. 2001. Negotiating identity: From metaphor to process. *International Negotiation* 6(2): 137-140.
- Zartman, I. W. and G. O. Faure (eds). 2005. *Escalation and negotiation in international conflicts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zartman, I. W. and V. Kremenyuk (eds). 2005. *Peace versus justice: Negotiating forward and backward-looking outcomes*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.