Third, the political problems of the ISS are remarkably reflective of broader post–Cold War phenomena. Both countries have substantial elements of their military industries left over from the Cold War. The ISS and the billions of dollars of commercial space cooperation it has generated have turned the tide, slowly but surely, against lingering resistance to cooperation. Both bureaucracies have had to fight top-down to inculcate new mores.

Fourth, if we are to have a human space program, it is going to be multilateral. The ongoing ambivalence about this cooperation and about the U.S.-Russia relationship more generally continues to hamper and increase the program’s costs both financially and diplomatically. The United States successfully directed the ISS design so that neither side can continue without the other. Multibillion dollar pieces of hardware, like institutions, are “sticky.” Oberg finds patriotism and multilateral pride mutually exclusive, but with the Cold War over, the space race has been irreversibly transformed into an ambitious exercise in cooperation.


Reviewed by Dmitry P. Gorenburg, CNA Corporation

Walter Kemp sets out in this book to explain “how communist theorists and practitioners tried to cope with nationalism” (p. xv). He argues that Communist policies toward nationalism underwent a cyclical pattern that oscillated between repression and conciliation of nationalist thought and behavior. The Communists, he contends, gradually strengthened nationalism while weakening Communism, leading eventually to the disintegration of the Communist bloc and the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Kemp’s ability to combine analysis of Marxist theory and the practical implementation of Communism is one of the strengths of his book. He ably shows how the difficulties and delusions of Communist political thinkers when dealing with nationalism helped prevent Soviet and East European leaders from formulating policies that could defuse nationalist tensions and maintain Communist rule. At the same time, Kemp demonstrates that the inability of Communism to control nationalism was the crucial factor that connected the collapse of Communist rule in East European states in 1989 with the disintegration of the Soviet Union two years later.

Kemp succeeds in offering a clearly written survey of the changes in Communist thought on nationalism and the impact these changes had on the practice of dealing with nationalism in states ruled by Communist parties. But the ambitious chronological and geographic scope of the book makes it less successful as an in-depth analysis of the effect of nationalism on Communist rule in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In trying to cover 150 years of political thought and seventy-five years of political history in nine countries, Kemp is forced to deal only superficially with key events such as the 1956 Hungarian revolution and even the collapse of Communism in the late...
1980s. One is left wishing that Kemp had been able to bring to the entire book the deep knowledge and attention to detail that he devotes to the Lithuanian and Czechoslovak case studies. As it is, the book cries out for greater use of archival materials (limited to the Lithuanian case), especially in his analysis of the Communist takeover of Eastern Europe and the efforts of East European Communist leaders to counter the strikes and revolts that periodically threatened their hold on power. With the collapse of Communism, such archival material has become widely available and has been extensively analyzed in Western scholarly writing, including articles in the *Journal of Cold War Studies*. Kemp’s reliance on the published speeches of Communist leaders and on secondary sources published before the collapse of Communism makes his argument less convincing. So do his occasional factual errors, such as his claim that the newly founded Russian Communist Party was a key proponent of a market economy in the summer of 1990 (p. 199).

Beyond the sometimes superficial analysis, there are two major problems with Kemp’s treatment of nationalism. The first is his tendency to treat national identity and its political expression as unchanging characteristics of a society. Although Kemp argues that nationalism does not have primordial origins (p. 12), he fails to acknowledge that national identity can change over time. His excellent and sophisticated account of how Communism became the antithesis of itself under the pressures of national culture is not matched by a similar account of the effect of Communism on national culture. For Kemp, national culture is an unyielding rock upon which pure Communism could do nothing but break. This static notion jibes poorly with his account of the means by which Communist leaders were able to change the strength of national identity in the territories under their control, although the change was not in the direction they expected. It seems highly unlikely that Communist political institutions and policies would have strengthened national identities while having no effect at all on the content of those identities.

The second problem with Kemp’s treatment of nationalism becomes apparent in the concluding chapter, where he discusses how the international system was affected by Communism’s failure to control nationalism. His discussion here makes clear that he views nationalism as an inherently negative force. No doubt, there are many people who would agree with him. But before making such a judgment, we should be clear about what it is that we are condemning. Kemp defines nationalism as “a social and political movement and/or ideology . . . that seeks to achieve and protect the autonomy, unity and identity of the said nation . . . and realize its national will” (p. 8). There is nothing in this definition that is inherently negative. In fact, according to his definition, Americans, French, Norwegians, and other national groups that are usually thought of as supporting rather than undermining the international system should also be considered nationalist. Why should we “seek palliatives” (p. 215) for a nation’s efforts to protect its own autonomy, unity, or identity as long as such efforts do not undermine the autonomy, unity, or identity of other nations? If Kemp had sought to distinguish between healthy patriotism and ugly chauvinism (nationalism that seeks to strengthen the nation at the expense of its neighbors), his conclusions about the need to depoliticize nationalism would be more plausible.
Because of these limitations, *Nationalism and Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* is valuable primarily for its discussion of the effect of national culture on Communist thought about nationalism and the implementation of this thought in practice, especially during the Cold War. It is far less useful as an explanation of the collapse of the Communist system.

itizen of 1980s, Mikhail Gorbachev, F. W. de Klerk, Achille Ochetta, Wojciech Jaruzelski, Neil Kinnock, and Adolfo Suarez—appear, at first glance, to be a rather heterogeneous group. Almost all readers will have at least some familiarity with the men who introduced perestroika in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, who imposed martial law in Poland in 1981, and who helped dismantle apartheid in South Africa beginning in 1990. The same cannot be said about Kinnock, the British Labour Party leader who, starting in 1987, began to move his party away from its obstreperous, union-dominated left toward the center, thus paving the way for the success a decade later of Tony Blair’s “New Labour.” Nor is Suarez a widely known figure, even though he initiated one of the first transitions, in 1976, when he began to navigate Spain out of the Francoist morass and toward a constitutional monarchy anchored in pluralism and a firm com-


Reviewed by Lee Blackwood, New York University Law School

The collapse of Communist rule in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union spawned an outpouring of “transition” literature in the social sciences. This reviewer was bewildered more than once by transitological jargon. The greatest weakness of transition studies is the presumption that universally valid models exist that can be applied to any situation, be it in Latin America, Southeast Asia, Iberia, or Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. More often than not, efforts at generalization across geographical and historical contexts are banal at best, and the most accessible—and sensible—analyses of transition tend to resemble studies in contemporary history more than anything else. To cite but one example, the entry of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and their pending admission into the European Union (EU) surely render their transitions very different from those of, say, nearby Belarus and Moldova. The specificities of these cases can be adequately grasped only through a historical approach. Transition “theory” has virtually nothing to offer here.

Despite the title of this book, the biographical sketches it contains do a good job of avoiding the facile analysis one usually encounters in transition studies. All of the contributions are lucidly written, and they eschew overreaching generalizations for the sake of tightly argued analyses. The focus on the role of individual leaders at critical junctures creates a cogent point of comparison, which in turn facilitates broader arguments about the phenomenon of political leadership. The leaders covered in the book—Mikhail Gorbachev, F. W. de Klerk, Achille Ochetta, Wojciech Jaruzelski, Neil Kinnock, and Adolfo Suarez—appear, at first glance, to be a rather heterogeneous group. Almost all readers will have at least some familiarity with the men who introduced perestroika in the Soviet Union in the 1980s, who imposed martial law in Poland in 1981, and who helped dismantle apartheid in South Africa beginning in 1990. The same cannot be said about Kinnock, the British Labour Party leader who, starting in 1987, began to move his party away from its obstreperous, union-dominated left toward the center, thus paving the way for the success a decade later of Tony Blair’s “New Labour.” Nor is Suarez a widely known figure, even though he initiated one of the first transitions, in 1976, when he began to navigate Spain out of the Francoist morass and toward a constitutional monarchy anchored in pluralism and a firm com-