The CIA’s TPBEDAMN Operation and the 1953 Coup in Iran

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Introduction

In March 1953, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to begin planning a coup d’état against Iran’s prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddeq, who was locked in a bitter struggle with Great Britain for control over Iran’s oil industry. CIA officials realized they would have to rely mainly on their existing intelligence operatives in Iran to implement the coup. The CIA was carrying out several intelligence operations in Iran at this time, all focused on the primary mission of combating the Soviet Union and its allies, including Iran’s Communist Tudeh Party. The largest of these operations was codenamed TPBEDAMN, an operation that employed a large network of Iranian agents and sub-agents to carry out propaganda and political action against the Soviet Union and the Tudeh. CIA officials decided to turn this network against Mosaddeq, using its propaganda capabilities to undermine popular support for him before and after the coup and redirecting its political-action personnel to help implement the coup itself. The TPBEDAMN network played an important role in the coup, which occurred on 19 August 1953, though various other actors were involved as well.1

Although TPBEDAMN has been mentioned briefly in several studies of the 1953 coup, including my own, a detailed account of the operation has never appeared publicly.2 This paper gives an overview of TPBEDAMN, explaining why it was launched, the activities carried out under its auspices, and

2. See ibid., pp. 235–236.
its role in the overthrow of Mosaddeq. This account is useful both in explaining some of the background and details of the 1953 coup and in fleshing out what sorts of activities the CIA was carrying out during the early years of its existence, at the height of the Cold War.

The CIA has never released any information about TPBEDAMN and is not likely to do so in the foreseeable future. No publicly available documents or other written sources provide much detail about the operation. The account presented here is based mainly on confidential interviews I conducted with nine retired CIA officers who worked on TPBEDAMN or were otherwise familiar with it at the time. I conducted most of these interviews in the mid-1980s, by which time my interviewees had forgotten some details. All of the interviewees have since died, preventing me from interviewing them again for this article. The compartmentalized nature of TPBEDAMN inevitably limited my interviewees’ understanding of it, and I was not able to speak with several key CIA officers who worked on the operation. I made extensive efforts to corroborate key information provided by each interviewee by cross-checking it with one or more of my other interviewees. These efforts gave me no reason to believe that any of my interviewees had embellished their accounts or otherwise tried to mislead me. Except where noted, I corroborated all major details presented here in this manner. Nevertheless, for the reasons I have outlined here, my account of TPBEDAMN remains somewhat sketchy and incomplete.

The Historical Context

Iran was an important venue in the global Cold War power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. British and Soviet forces had jointly invaded Iran in 1941 to establish a supply route to the Soviet Union during World War II. Soviet forces occupied northern Iran for the remainder of the war and refused to withdraw after the war ended. Instead, they fostered “autonomous republics” in Iran’s northwestern provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in late 1945 and early 1946 in an apparent effort to establish satellite states similar to those emerging in Eastern Europe and East Asia at this time. U.S. officials strongly opposed these actions and backed the Iranian government’s efforts to regain control over these provinces, which finally occurred in late 1946. The Tudeh Party supported the autonomous republics, demonstrating its allegiance to the Soviet Union. Although the party’s popularity fell sharply after the republics collapsed, it remained the most popular and best organized party in Iran in the following years. U.S. officials were
deeply concerned that the Tudeh, backed by the Soviet Union, would use a “popular front” strategy to seize power in Iran, as the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia had in 1948. Moreover, as the Cold War deepened in the late 1940s and the prospects for global war between the superpowers grew, U.S. officials became increasingly worried that Soviet forces might invade Iran. Their basic concern was that Soviet control over Iran, whether through a Tudeh takeover or an invasion, might deny the West access to Persian Gulf oil resources, which they considered “vital” to Western security interests.3

Despite these forebodings, U.S. involvement in Iran remained limited in the first few years after World War II, for two main reasons. First, U.S. officials were deeply preoccupied with conditions in Europe and East Asia, where the Soviet Union was extending its influence and many countries faced severe economic problems. By contrast, Iran seemed relatively stable after the crisis of 1945–1946. U.S. policymakers therefore did not include Iran in the Marshall Plan or other programs that provided extensive U.S. aid to many countries in Western Europe and East Asia.4

Second, the United States had pursued an isolationist foreign policy before World War II and was still developing the strategy and organizational infrastructure for its new internationalist posture after the war. In particular, the United States had not had a foreign intelligence service before the war and now was constructing one mainly from the remnants of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The OSS was replaced first by the Strategic Services Unit (SSU), then by the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), and finally by the CIA in September 1947. The CIG created the Office of Special Operations (OSO) to carry out covert intelligence-gathering activities abroad, and the CIA created the Special Procedures Group (SPG) to carry out covert political action activities, following guidelines enacted by the National Security Council (NSC) in December 1947. In late 1948, the SPG was replaced by the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), which was a branch of the CIA that operated autonomously and reported to the State and War Departments. The OPC initially was a small organization, with a budget of only $4.7 million and about 300 employees working through seven overseas stations in 1949, but it grew vastly during the next few years and by 1952 had a budget of $82 million and 2,812 employees working through 47 stations. The OSO and OPC were merged in August 1952, placing responsibility for covert intel-

ligence collection and political action under a single organization named the Directorate of Plans (later renamed the Directorate of Operations and now known as the National Clandestine Service) within the CIA.⁵

During World War II, the United States had made extensive use of “psychological warfare” operations—non-military and paramilitary activities aimed at influencing the perceptions and decision-making of certain actors. These activities included overt and covert propaganda and information operations, subversion, sabotage, guerrilla activity, and even economic warfare. As a new, internationalist U.S. posture emerged after the war, U.S. officials were eager to use these methods against the Soviet Union and its allies and began to do so even before the new institutional infrastructure was fully in place. Some of these activities were overt, such as those undertaken by the Voice of America and the Economic Cooperation Administration, the latter of which oversaw the Marshall Plan and similar aid programs. Others were covert and were carried out by the OSS’s various successors. These included “black” propaganda operations in which the source of information was deliberately misrepresented, “gray” propaganda for which the source was left ambiguous, and support for anti-Communist parties and guerrilla forces. Some of the most important U.S. covert operations of this era were the CIA’s secret funding of Radio Free Europe broadcasts, support for non-Communist parties in Italy’s 1948 election, and assistance to anti-Communist guerrillas in Albania and other East European countries. Many of these operations failed, some spectacularly. The Soviet Union, Britain, and other countries were carrying out similar covert operations in many countries, including Iran.⁶

The United States had first established a covert presence in Iran early in World War II, when the OSS hired two prominent scholars of Iran, Joseph Upton and Donald Wilber, and deployed them there during most of the war. At least three other OSS officers served in Iran for shorter periods during the war. Upton and Wilber filed hundreds of intelligence reports on domestic conditions in Iran and the Soviet presence in the north, complementing the overt reporting done by the U.S. embassy staff and military attachés. They remained in Iran after the war under the SSU and continued to report on Soviet and Tudeh activities, leaving shortly after Soviet troops departed in May 1946. Wilber then worked for the CIG and CIA on a part-time basis until


1969 but did not return to Iran until 1949. He specialized in propaganda activity and became known as a “master propagandist” inside the CIA.\(^7\)

In early 1947, OSO officer John Waller, who had served briefly in Iran in the OSS, was sent to Tehran to open a CIG station in the U.S. embassy. As an OSO officer, he was engaged in covert intelligence collection rather than political action. He worked against the Soviet Union and its allies, monitoring the activities of Soviet-bloc embassies and émigrés in Iran, handling occasional Soviet-bloc defectors, and sending agents across the border to collect intelligence inside the Soviet Union. Many of these cross-border agents were Soviet émigrés from the Caucasus region displaced during World War II. Apparently, most were arrested and executed by Soviet authorities soon after crossing the border. Waller also gathered intelligence on the Tudeh Party, recruiting the first of a series of U.S. informants inside the party. Another OSO officer and OSS veteran, Roger Goiran, was sent to Tehran in October 1948 to take over command of what was now a CIA station. In mid-1949 Waller was sent to Mashad in northeastern Iran to open a new U.S. consulate, which apparently served as a base for cross-border operations into Soviet Central Asia. Two other OSO officers arrived in Iran in early 1950 to work on these intelligence-collection activities.\(^8\)

In the late 1940s, U.S. foreign-service personnel and military attachés working in the Tehran embassy began to carry out two types of covert paramilitary operations in preparation for a possible Soviet invasion or Tudeh takeover of Iran. First, in the summer of 1948, a foreign-service officer named Gerald Dooher developed a plan to set up “stay-behind” networks in Iran to carry out guerrilla warfare and perhaps establish an anti-Communist provisional government in the event of a Soviet invasion or Tudeh takeover, much like the resistance forces in Europe and East Asia during World War II. Dooher had extensive contacts among Iran’s tribes and recommended that these stay-behind networks be established among the Qashqai tribes of south-central Iran. Several other foreign-service officers, a U.S. military attaché, Waller, and Iranian military personnel also contributed to this plan. Second, at some point in the late 1940s, one or more U.S. military attachés began de-


\(^8\) Interview with John Waller, 5 August 1984; and confidential interview with retired CIA officer, 19 August 1983. For the names and dates of arrival of all U.S. personnel working officially in U.S. embassies abroad, including intelligence personnel working undercover as embassy officials, see U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Service List* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, various years). I have used this source to identify the dates of arrival for most of the U.S. intelligence personnel mentioned here. A few did not have diplomatic cover and therefore are not listed in this source.
veloping plans for “escape-and-evasion” routes that could be used by U.S. Air Force personnel shot down over Iran or by other U.S. or allied personnel within Iran to escape to locations from which they could be rescued. Whether the foreign-service officers and military attachés began to implement these plans is unclear.9

As part of the vast increase in the OPC’s covert political action capabilities in 1949–1952, the CIA sent three officers specializing in paramilitary affairs to Iran in 1950 and early 1951 to take over these operations. They made arrangements with the Qashqai khans (tribal leaders) to base most or all of the stay-behind networks in the Qashqai region, beginning a close U.S. relationship with the Qashqai that lasted several decades. Under these arrangements, the OPC officers established secret caches of weapons, ammunition, gold, and other supplies for use by Qashqai tribesmen and perhaps other guerrilla forces in the event of war. They also identified locations where supplies could be air-dropped to guerrillas during a war. For the escape-and-evasion operation, OPC officers identified locations from which U.S. and allied personnel could be rescued, made maps showing routes to these locations, and established secret caches of supplies along the routes. The stay-behind and escape-and-evasion plans had been largely implemented by early 1953, when two of these paramilitary officers left Iran. Most of the caches of supplies and gold apparently were looted by Iranians who worked on the operations.10

The TPBEDAMN Operation

Much of the vast global increase in OPC activity from 1949 through 1952 consisted of covert psychological warfare activities aimed at weakening the Soviet Union and its allies, rather than paramilitary preparations for war. Although most of these operations were targeted at East European and East Asian countries, Iran’s proximity to the Soviet Union and the strength of the Tudeh Party made it an important focus of these operations as well. The OPC therefore established an anti-Soviet covert psychological warfare operation in Iran codenamed TPBEDAMN.11

9. Jernigan to Satterthwaite, 1 September 1948, in U.S. National Archives (NARA), College Park, MD, Record Group (RG) 59, Box 6980a; “United States Attitude toward formation of ‘Free Government’ in Iran,” 14 October 1948, in NARA, RG 59, Box 6980a; “Political Situation and Military Potentialities,” 19 November 1948, in NARA, RG 59, Box 6980a; “German-Qashqai Collaboration during World War II,” 20 November 1948, in NARA, RG 59, Box 6980a; and confidential interview with a retired U.S. military attaché, 8 August 1984.
10. Confidential interviews with one of the OPC paramilitary officers and another retired CIA officer, 10 August 1985 and 19 August 1983.
11. The “TP” prefix denoted a covert operation carried out in Iran. Similarly, the CIA operation to
Exactly when and by whom TPBEDAMN was first established is not clear. Two CIA officers who worked on TPBEDAMN in the early 1950s told me it had been established as early as 1948. However, given that OPC in 1949 was conducting operations in only seven foreign countries and still had a tiny budget, this seems unlikely. Moreover, OPC does not seem to have had any officers stationed under diplomatic cover in the Tehran embassy until the late summer of 1950, when one of the three paramilitary officers joined the embassy staff, becoming deputy station chief for OPC operations. This officer did not work on TPBEDAMN, according to one of the two CIA officers who did work on it. Although Wilber was a propaganda specialist and traveled to Iran in 1949, he did so apparently only to help inspect the stay-behind operations. Most likely, however, he headed TPBEDAMN operations in Washington at this time.\textsuperscript{12}

At some point in 1950, T. Cuyler Young, a professor of oriental studies at Princeton University, began to work in the Tehran embassy as a temporary contract employee of OPC, apparently without diplomatic cover. Young had lived extensively in Iran before World War II and had served there from late 1944 through early 1946 as an OSS officer, under cover as the U.S. embassy’s press attaché. It seems unlikely, in light of Young’s background, that he was involved in the stay-behind and escape-and-evasion operations. But because TPBEDAMN was the only other major operation OPC was conducting in Iran in the early 1950s, he may have been sent there to initiate it.\textsuperscript{13}

In any case, two Iranians named Ali Jalali and Farouq Kayvani approached Young in late 1950 and offered to work for the United States against the Tudeh Party. Young introduced them to station chief Goiran who, in turn, introduced them to Kermit Roosevelt, head of the OPC’s Near East operations division, during one of his visits to Iran. The two Iranians told Roosevelt they wanted to work against the Tudeh and had extensive contacts among Iranian journalists, in the Tehran bazaar, and in political and clerical circles. Roosevelt was impressed with them and suspected they had prior experience working for a foreign intelligence service, though they did not admit this. He offered to bring them to the United States to be vetted and trained. They traveled to the United States in late 1950.

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overthrow Prime Minister Mosaddeq in August 1953 was codenamed TPAJAX. Because “TP” was an acronym for the Tudeh Party (in English), “TPBEDAMN” aptly referred to activities aimed at damning, or condemning, the Tudeh.

\textsuperscript{12} Confidential interviews with two CIA officers, 19 August 1983 and 1 August 1984; and Wilber, \textit{Adventures in the Middle East}, p. 156.

eled to CIA headquarters sometime in 1951 and were examined carefully and judged to be reliable and promising. They were then hired to become the principal agents in TPBEDAMN and were given the codenames “Nerren” and “Cilley.” They returned to Iran at some point in 1951 to begin their activities. Wilber was sent to Iran to work with Jalali and Kayvani and learn about their contacts and capabilities during the first half of 1952. A regular OPC officer then was sent to Iran under diplomatic cover in mid-1952 to take over TPBEDAMN operations in Tehran from Wilber. The officer in charge of TPBEDAMN also soon became the new deputy station chief for OPC operations, indicating that the anti-Soviet psychological warfare activities carried out under TPBEDAMN were replacing paramilitary activities as the OPC’s main focus in Iran. Two other CIA officers also worked on TPBEDAMN in Tehran in 1952–1953.14

TPBEDAMN apparently had a budget of around $1 million per year at its peak in 1952–1953. This amounted to about one percent of OPC’s total budget for covert operations worldwide in 1952—a large amount, in light of OPC’s extensive operations in Eastern Europe and East Asia at this time. Of this total, about $600,000 apparently was given to Jalali and Kayvani to cover their own salaries; payments to the approximately 130 sub-agents in their network; payments to newspaper editors, publishers, and political activists of various types; and other operating expenses. The CIA officers running TPBEDAMN assumed Jalali and Kayvani and some of their sub-agents were keeping large amounts of this money, in addition to their salaries. The Soviet Union and Britain were running covert psychological warfare operations of comparable size in Iran during this period.15

TPBEDAMN was established mainly to carry out propaganda operations against the Soviet Union and its allies, especially the Tudeh Party. Jalali and Kayvani had extensive contacts among Iranian newspaper editors and journalists and paid some of them to publish articles or cartoons that would discredit the Soviet Union or the Tudeh. These editors and journalists thus became “subagents” in Jalali and Kayvani’s covert network of operatives, though many

14. Roosevelt, *Countercoup*, pp. 78–81; Interviews with Donald Wilber, 1 August 1984 and 14 June 1985; and confidential interviews with two retired CIA officers who worked on TPBEDAMN, 19 August 1983 and 25 July 1984. Roosevelt identifies Jalali and Kayvani as the “Boscoe brothers” in his book. He frequently confuses them with the Rashidian brothers, whom he identifies as “Nossey” and “Caffron.” As I discuss below, the Rashidians were British agents who carried out covert activities similar to those of Jalali and Kayvani and worked under Roosevelt in the coup against Mosaddeq, along with Jalali and Kayvani. In an interview on 5 June 1985, Roosevelt told me he thought Jalali and Kayvani had worked for West German intelligence. In a confidential interview on 9 May 1984, another retired CIA officer told me he thought they had worked for the British. Several of my interviewees told me TPBEDAMN had been in operation before Jalali and Kayvani became the principal agents.

15. Confidential Interview with a CIA officer who worked on TPBEDAMN, 28 May 1985.
were unaware that the payments they received originated with the U.S. government. The articles and cartoons disseminated in this way were written or drawn by Wilber and other CIA propaganda specialists in Washington and translated into Persian by Iranians hired for this purpose. They were sent to the Tehran embassy by diplomatic pouch and given to Jalali and Kayvani by their CIA case officers for placement in appropriate newspapers. Most of this material was intended to discredit the Soviet Union and the Tudeh or ex-tol the West by describing the poor living conditions that prevailed in the Soviet Union, Soviet domination over Eastern Europe, the Tudeh’s loyal support for the USSR, the Tudeh’s popular-front strategy, the benefits of U.S. economic aid to Western Europe, and the comfortable living conditions in the United States. Though covertly provided by the CIA, most of this material was accurate. It complemented overt propaganda activities with similar content carried out by Voice of America radio broadcasts, the press attaché’s office in the U.S. embassy, and other U.S. government bodies. Many of these overt propaganda activities were taken over by the U.S. Information Agency after it was created in 1953.16

In addition to placing material in Iranian newspapers, CIA officers carried out other types of propaganda and informational activities under TPBEDAMN. They printed and distributed leaflets featuring content that would discredit the Soviet Union and the Tudeh Party. They spread rumors of this sort as well. They also published books in Iran intended to discredit the Soviet bloc and the Tudeh, using a publishing house in Tehran apparently controlled or perhaps even owned by the CIA through TPBEDAMN and run independently of Jalali and Kayvani. Some of these were books that had been published in English and now were translated into Persian, such as a highly critical book about the plight of Muslims in the Soviet Union. Others were written by CIA propaganda specialists and translated into Persian under TPBEDAMN. These included a sham autobiography of the well-known Iranian poet and socialist activist Abol Qasem Lahouti, written by Wilber, which portrayed Lahouti’s life in the Soviet Union (where he had lived since 1922) in very bleak terms. Another was a book, designed to resemble a Tudeh publication, accusing the Shi’a clergy of practicing witchcraft. These latter books were examples of “black” propaganda, published fictitiously in the name of a person or organization that would be discredited by the offensive nature of the material.17

16. This account is based on my confidential interviews with several retired CIA officers who worked on TPBEDAMN or otherwise were knowledgeable about it. For a general overview of U.S. propaganda activities in this period, see Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945–1961 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997).

17. This account is based on my confidential interview on 3 September 1983 with a retired CIA
Although TPBEDAMN was mainly a covert propaganda operation, it also encompassed other types of covert political action activities aimed at undermining the Soviet Union and the Tudeh. The CIA officers who ran TPBEDAMN developed a relationship with the small, ultra-nationalist Pan-Iranist Party, through which they hired Pan-Iranist mobs to attack Tudeh demonstrations and rallies. They also apparently paid the small, fascist National Socialist Workers of Iran (Hezb-e Socialist-e Melli-ye Kargaran-e Iran, or SOMKA) Party and larger Toilers (Zahmatkeshan) Party to attack the Tudeh, though they seem to have relied primarily on the Pan-Iranists for this. In addition, Jalali and Kayvani sometimes organized “black” Tudeh demonstrations by hiring crowds from poor neighborhoods in south Tehran to march through the city pretending to be Tudeh members and acting provocatively, hoping to catalyze actions that would discredit the Tudeh. In one such case, they organized a violent “Tudeh” protest against a visit by U.S. special envoy W. Averell Harriman to Tehran in July 1951, apparently before they had been hired by the CIA. Yet another covert operation carried out by Jalali and Kayvani was an effort to provide financial support to the popular Shi’a cleric Sheikh Mohammad Taqi Falsafi, who often made speeches attacking the Tudeh and the Soviet Union. As with the editors and journalists paid by Jalali and Kayvani, Falsafi and these party leaders and hired demonstrators generally were unaware that the payments they received originated with the U.S. government.

The CIA had established TPBEDAMN to carry out psychological warfare activities against the Soviet Union and its allies. Top officials in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations knew Prime Minister Mosaddeq was not a Communist or a Soviet ally and did not think a Tudeh takeover was imminent in Iran. Some even thought Mosaddeq offered the best hope for averting a Tudeh takeover. Moreover, before March 1953, both Truman and Eisenhower expressed support for Mosaddeq and worked to resolve the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute diplomatically.

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Nevertheless, in 1952 and early 1953, CIA officers were using the TPBEDAMN operation and other capabilities in ways that undermined Mosaddeq and his National Front organization, a loose alliance of politicians and political parties united behind the goal of nationalizing the British-controlled oil industry. The main focus of this activity seems to have been Ayatollah Abolghasem Kashani, a populist Shi’a cleric and key National Front leader. CIA officers published articles and cartoons in Iranian newspapers through TPBEDAMN that attacked Kashani and tried to create tension between him and Mosaddeq. Some of this material apparently was quite crude, such as a cartoon implying that Mosaddeq was sexually molesting Kashani. The CIA’s financial support for Sheikh Falsaﬁ, who was a critic of Mosaddeq and rival of Kashani, also was intended partly to undermine clerical and popular support for the National Front. Independently of TPBEDAMN, the CIA sent an officer to Tehran in the fall of 1952 to meet with Mozaffar Baqa’i, who headed the Toilers Party and also was a key National Front leader. This officer encouraged Baqa’i to break with Mosaddeq and gave him money. CIA officers also approached National Front leader Hossein Makki and Ayatollah Mohammad Behbehani directly or indirectly and may have given them money. Kashani, Baqa’i, and Makki all broke with Mosaddeq and began to work against him in late 1952 or early 1953, seriously undermining his ability to mobilize popular support.20

It is not entirely clear why these activities were directed against Mosaddeq and the National Front rather than the Soviet Union and its allies—the intended targets of TPBEDAMN—and who in the U.S. government authorized the shift. The OPC had inherited a “maverick operational culture” from the OSS and received little strategic guidance and little oversight from top U.S. policymakers. Although this began to change after OPC was brought into the CIA’s Directorate of Plans in August 1952, the change did not occur quickly. Wisner, who headed OPC and then the Directorate of Plans during this period, epitomized the independent-mindedness of these organizations and might well have authorized the efforts to undermine Mosaddeq and the National Front. Roosevelt and Wilber also were very independent-minded, and they increasingly saw both Mosaddeq and Kashani as irrational demagogues who might align themselves with the Tudeh—an alarming prospect at this time, with the Cold War at its peak. Consequently, it seems likely that Roosevelt, Wilber, and probably also Wisner for these reasons decided to turn TPBEDAMN against Mosaddeq and the National Front.21

21. Corke, U.S. Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy, esp. pp. 44–51; Conﬁdential Interviews with
How much of an effect TPBEDAMN had either in undermining the Tudeh Party and the Soviet position in Iran or in destabilizing Mosaddeq and the National Front is unclear. No public opinion surveys were conducted in Iran at this time, and no reliable estimates exist of changing party membership, crowd size at political rallies, or other useful indicators. The parliamentary election and the referendum on closing parliament that occurred during Mosaddeq's tenure were seriously flawed, making them inadequate gauges of public opinion. The Tudeh Party was divided into moderate and hard-line factions during the Mosaddeq era, but there is no reason to believe TPBEDAMN significantly influenced this. The National Front also became increasingly factionalized during this period, as Kashani, Baqa'i, Makki, and others broke with Mosaddeq and turned against him. These defections from the National Front seriously weakened Mosaddeq, especially because Kashani and Baqa'i initially had played key roles in organizing large crowds to support him but were no longer doing so by early 1953. Kashani, Baqa'i, and Makki were ambitious, opportunistic politicians and had their own reasons to break with Mosaddeq. Consequently, although the CIA's activities may have had some adverse impact on popular support for the Tudeh and Mosaddeq and on the decisions of these politicians to break with Mosaddeq, it is impossible to say with any certainty how much impact they had.

TPBEDAMN and the Coup against Mosaddeq

In March 1953, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to begin planning a coup against Mosaddeq. CIA officials assigned Wilber to work with British intelligence officers in developing a plan for the coup, which was given the codename TPAJAX. Roosevelt was asked to head the coup operation in Tehran, and Waller oversaw preparations in Washington. U.S. and British officials chose a retired army general named Fazlollah Zahedi to be the nominal head of the coup and successor to Mosaddeq. Wilber traveled to Cyprus in mid-May and met with Norman Darbyshire, a British intelligence officer who had recently served in Iran, to develop the coup plan. Wilber knew the coup operation would have to rely heavily on political action capabilities of the sort

Jalali and Kayvani had developed for TPBEDAMN. He therefore told Darbyshire about TPBEDAMN’s capabilities, though he did not reveal the names of its principal agents, Jalali and Kayvani. Darbyshire told Wilber about the main British covert political action network in Iran, which was headed by the Rashidian brothers and had propaganda and political action capabilities similar to those of TPBEDAMN. Wilber and Darbyshire then developed a plan for the coup and presented it to their superiors, who modified it in minor ways. The final version of the plan was completed in late June.23

The coup plan called for the TPBEDAMN and Rashidian networks to carry out a “massive propaganda campaign against Mosaddeq” to undermine popular support for him, thereby facilitating the coup. Although the main thrust of the campaign occurred a week or two before the coup itself, Wilber and Darbyshire decided in May that it should begin immediately at a lower level, and the Tehran CIA station was instructed to do so. Wilber was put in charge of the campaign in Washington, working under Waller. He oversaw the development of a large amount of black and gray propaganda material whose main themes were that Mosaddeq was an enemy of Islam and an ally of the Tudeh Party and the Soviet Union; that he had been corrupted by power and misled by unscrupulous advisers; and that he was deliberately destroying the morale of the armed forces, leading the country to economic collapse, and fostering regional separatist movements, partly to enable the Soviet Union to take over Azerbaijan and Kurdistan. This material was translated into Persian and disseminated in Iran through the TPBEDAMN network in the form of newspaper articles, leaflets, and pamphlets. The Toilers Party also was to be involved somehow in this propaganda campaign.24

The coup plan relied on TPBEDAMN’s capabilities in several other ways as well. The Tehran CIA station was to approach certain clerical leaders and bazaar merchants to enlist their support against Mosaddeq, perhaps through Jalali and Kayvani, who were well-connected in those circles. To initiate the coup itself, the CIA station was to stage attacks against religious leaders to foster the impression that Mosaddeq could not maintain order. These attacks presumably were to be carried out through the TPBEDAMN network, which provided the station’s only significant political action capabilities. In conjunction with these attacks, the TPBEDAMN propaganda apparatus would dis-

24. Donald N. Wilber, Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran: November 1952–August 1953 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1954), p. 9 and Appendix B. This document was the first of three or four classified histories of the coup written by the CIA. It was leaked in 2000 to The New York Times, which published a redacted version at http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html. Another version that reinstated many of the redactions was later published at http://cryptome.org/cia-iran-all.htm. Appendix B of this document gives the final coup plan.
seminate fabricated “black” documents indicating that Mosaddeq had made a secret agreement with Tudeh leaders under which they would attack religious authorities and army and police units with “all their forces.” The TPBEDAMN and Rashidian networks and their clerical allies then would foment anti-Mosaddeq demonstrations to create an atmosphere of chaos in Tehran, providing a pretext for anti-Mosaddeq military units organized by the CIA to carry out a wave of arrests and for members of parliament who had been “purchased” with CIA money to vote to dismiss Mosaddeq. The Pan-Iranist Party, SOMKA Party, and Toilers Party were to contribute to these events, presumably by helping to foment the demonstrations. After Mosaddeq had been dismissed, the CIA officers running TPBEDAMN would work with the new head of Iran’s press and propaganda bureau to carry out a propaganda campaign aimed at strengthening the new Zahedi government.25

Following this plan, the TPBEDAMN network increased its attacks against Mosaddeq in June and July. The attacks grew sharply after 19 July, when Wilber’s team in Washington sent a large quantity of anti-Mosaddeq propaganda material to Tehran. CIA officers disseminated this material through the TPBEDAMN and Rashidian networks into some twenty newspapers, including some in Azerbaijan Province, and through other channels as well. This material included “black” leaflets threatening clerical leaders with “savage punishment,” which ostensibly had been written by the Tudeh, and “gray” propaganda that sought to defame Mosaddeq by claiming he was Jewish. When Mosaddeq rigged a referendum in early August to close parliament—many of whose members had been “purchased” by the Rashidians to vote against Mosaddeq—the TPBEDAMN propaganda apparatus attacked him “relentlessly” for this. CIA officers even planted articles criticizing Mosaddeq in the U.S. press. An analysis conducted after the coup stated that this propaganda campaign had reached “a very large audience” in Iran and influenced this audience “in a most positive way.”26

TPBEDAMN’s other political action capabilities were directed against Mosaddeq during this period as well. Members of the TPBEDAMN network made threatening telephone calls to clerical leaders, pretending to be Tudeh members. They also carried out a “sham bombing” at the home of a clerical leader and set off “stink bombs” in one or more mosques, using explosives provided by CIA headquarters. When the stink bombs did not work well, they used dynamite blasting caps instead. Members of the TPBEDAMN network may have carried out other covert political action activities during this period to create the impression that the Tudeh Party was becoming increas-

25. Wilber, *Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq*, Appendix B.
26. Ibid., pp. 26–27, 31–32, 37, 92; and Interviews with Wilber.
ingly aggressive and that Mosaddeq was unable to control it. The aim was to persuade the Iranian public and armed forces that he should be removed from power.27

While these efforts were underway, other elements of the coup plan began to go awry. Mosaddeq’s decision to hold the referendum that led to the closure of parliament made it impossible for the “purchased” members of parliament to vote to dismiss him, as planned. In addition, certain clerical leaders who were expected to lead demonstrations against Mosaddeq to trigger the coup failed to cooperate. As a result, Roosevelt, who had arrived in Tehran in mid-July, decided to implement the coup plan’s backup strategy, which called for anti-Mosaddeq military units organized by the CIA to seize power. Accordingly, on the night of 15 August, an Imperial Guard unit drove to Mosaddeq’s home to deliver a royal decree dismissing him, and other army units prepared to seize key locations in Tehran. Mosaddeq had been warned of the plot and had his own forces arrest the unit delivering the decree. Other loyalist army units then fanned out across Tehran and began arresting participants in the plot, stopping the coup attempt. At dawn, Radio Tehran broadcast news that a coup attempt had occurred and had failed.28

With the coup plot collapsing, Roosevelt and his team began to improvise a new strategy on the morning of 16 August, drawing heavily on the TPBEDAMN network and other capabilities that had figured in the original coup plan. They ordered Jalali and Kayvani and other operatives to copy and circulate the royal decrees dismissing Mosaddeq and appointing Zahedi as his successor, publicizing the fact that the attempt to dismiss Mosaddeq had a legal basis. Jalali and Kayvani disseminated other material aimed at discrediting Mosaddeq as well. That evening, a CIA officer gave Jalali and Kayvani $50,000 to finance whatever anti-Mosaddeq activity they could arrange. Using their contacts among crowd organizers and probably also among the Pan-Iranists and other parties, they organized demonstrations in central Tehran on the following days by crowds posing as Tudeh members. Agents provocateurs among the demonstrators worked to create chaos by encouraging the crowds to tear down statues of the shah and his father, vandalizing mosques and party offices, looting shops, clashing with Mosaddeq supporters, and even assaulting several Americans. Some genuine Tudeh members apparently thought these demonstrations had been authorized by the party and joined

27. Wilber, Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq, p. 37; and confidential interview with a retired CIA officer who participated in these activities, 24 June 2000. The retired officer, who participated in the covert political action activities, told me that CIA headquarters had planned to send plastic explosives to Tehran for use in the bombings, but they did not arrive in time.

them. The Tudeh leadership issued statements calling for the abolition of the monarchy and creation of a democratic republic. Like previous TPBEDAMN covert operations, these “black” Tudeh demonstrations were intended to reinforce the CIA’s long-standing theme that the Tudeh was becoming increasingly aggressive and Mosaddeq was incapable of controlling it. As before, the goals were to discredit the Tudeh and persuade civilians and military personnel that Mosaddeq should be removed from office.29

Roosevelt’s team met on the evening of 17 August and decided to initiate several actions. First, returning to a key theme in the coup plan, they decided to ask certain clerical leaders to press Iran’s leading Shi’a cleric of the time, Ayatollah Mohammad Hossein Borujerdi, to issue a religious decree denouncing Communism, which would help swing public opinion against Mosaddeq. It is not clear what became of this initiative, but Borujerdi did not issue such a decree. Second, they sent envoys to the army garrisons in Kermanshah, Isfahan, and perhaps other locations to try to persuade them to turn against Mosaddeq. The Kermanshah commander agreed to cooperate, but the Isfahan commander refused. Third, they decided to organize anti-Mosaddeq demonstrations on the morning of 19 August in the hope this would trigger a coup, loosely following another key element of the original coup plan. They planned to do this through the TPBEDAMN and Rashidian networks, which would work with contacts among crowd organizers, clerical leaders, and party leaders to organize crowds.30

On the morning of 19 August, anti-Mosaddeq crowds did indeed begin to gather in the bazaar area of south Tehran. Who organized these crowds is not entirely clear. Several sources state that the CIA team paid Ayatollah Behbehani to organize them. Two CIA participants in the coup independently told me they gave $10,000 to an intermediary linked to the Rashidians to give to Ayatollah Kashani to organize the crowds, though they were not certain Kashani actually received this money. A British intelligence officer involved in these events told me the Rashidians had organized the crowds. Roosevelt told me Jalali and Kayvani helped organize the crowds, which included

29. Gasiorowski, “The 1953 Coup d’État against Mosaddeq,” pp. 251–253. One of the CIA officers working with Jalali and Kayvani at this time told me in a confidential interview on 24 June 2000 that on the morning of 17 August 1953 they feared arrest and refused to cooperate further. Roosevelt then instructed this officer to tell them he would kill them if they did not cooperate. After this, they continued to cooperate.

members of the Pan-Iranist and SOMKA Parties. An official CIA history of
the coup says that Jalali and Kayvani were in the bazaar area that morning
and helped lead the crowds. Consequently, it seems likely that both the Rashidians
and Jalali and Kayvani helped to organize the crowds, working through vari-
ous channels. Another possibility is that opponents of Mosaddeq not linked
to the CIA team helped organize the crowds independently.31

The crowds began to march north from the bazaar area early on 19 Au-
gust and were joined by onlookers who had been influenced by the CIA
team’s propaganda and political action campaigns or otherwise had come to
oppose Mosaddeq. The growing crowds attacked pro-Mosaddeq and pro-
Tudeh newspaper offices and the headquarters of the pro-Mosaddeq Iran
Party and burned down a theater linked to the Tudeh. Jalali led part of
the crowd first to the parliament building and then to military police headquar-
ters, where it gained the release of two key participants in the earlier, failed
coup attempt. Trucks and buses brought tribesmen and others from outlying
areas to join these crowds, presumably arranged through the TPBEDAMN or
Rashidian networks. Roosevelt’s team sent word to the Rashidians and Jalali
and Kayvani to have the crowds encourage military personnel to join them
and to seize Radio Tehran’s broadcasting facilities. Anti-Mosaddeq army units
inspired by the crowds did begin to act and seized all of the main squares in
Tehran. Army units and civilian crowds then seized the telegraph office, the
press and propaganda bureau, police and army headquarters, the foreign min-
istry, and Mosaddeq’s home, which they ransacked. Bloody clashes occurred
at Mosaddeq’s home and other locations, leaving hundreds dead. In the late
afternoon, Zahedi broadcast a statement over Radio Tehran saying he was the
legal prime minister and his forces now controlled the city. Mosaddeq es-
caped the assault on his home but surrendered to Zahedi’s forces the next day.
Anti-Mosaddeq forces in several other cities carried out similar actions.
TPBEDAMN sub-agents in Tabriz and perhaps elsewhere played an impor-
tant role in these actions.32

TPBEDAMN after the Coup

In the months after the coup, CIA officers continued to use the TPBEDAMN
network to carry out propaganda activities aimed at strengthening the new,
post-Mosaddeq regime. These activities emphasized themes such as the con-

throw of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran, pp. 65–66.
of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran, pp. 67–75.
tinuing danger posed by the Tudeh Party, alleged links between Mosaddeq and the Tudeh, the virtues of the monarchy, and the benefits Iran would receive from the new oil agreement then being negotiated. Some of these propaganda activities were carried out in coordination with the new head of Iran's press and propaganda bureau, Esfandiar Bozorgmehr, as called for in the CIA's plan to overthrow Mosaddeq. The Tehran CIA station also carried out a few ad-hoc covert political action operations during this period that may have involved the TBPEDAMN network in some way, such as an effort to suppress lingering pro-Mosaddeq sentiment in the Tehran bazaar and activities aimed at securing the victory of pro-Zahedi candidates in the February 1954 parliamentary elections. However, with Mosaddeq now in prison, along with most of his close collaborators and thousands of National Front and Tudeh supporters, these actions may have been unnecessary.33

As the post-Mosaddeq era unfolded, the CIA ended or scaled back all of its covert operations aimed at domestic targets in Iran, including both TBPEDAMN and the ad-hoc operations undertaken by CIA personnel in the months after the coup. Instead, U.S. intelligence officials sought to build or strengthen the capacity of the Iranian government to carry out these sorts of activities by itself. This involved two main Iranian government bodies. First, the CIA sent a U.S. Army colonel to Iran several weeks after the coup to work with the military governor of Tehran, General Teymur Bakhtiar, to set up and train a new, modern intelligence agency. The unit evolved into the notorious State Information and Security Organization, created in late 1956 and known by its Persian acronym SAVAK. Second, CIA officers continued to work with Bozorgmehr's press and propaganda bureau to improve its ability to carry out informational activities to strengthen the new regime. These initiatives paralleled various activities undertaken in Iran by the U.S. Department of Defense, the predecessors to the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other U.S. government agencies in the mid-1950s, all aimed at strengthening the Iranian government's capacity to maintain stability. The CIA continued to carry out covert operations in Iran, but the main focus of these operations shifted back to the Soviet Union and its allies, as it had been before Mosaddeq's premiership.34

As this transition played out, the TBPEDAMN operation became less

33. Confidential Interviews with four retired CIA officers who were directly involved in these activities. On Bozorgmehr's later ties with U.S. officials, see Mark J. Gasiorowski, “The Qarani Affair and Iranian Politics,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (November 1993), pp. 625–644.

34. Confidential Interviews with the U.S. army colonel, 28 March 1984, and with two retired CIA officers, 19 August 1983 and 14 June 1985. See also Gasiorowski, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah, pp. 90–129.
useful and eventually was terminated, although the CIA apparently did continue to carry out some propaganda activities in Iran through other channels. Jalali emigrated to California at some point, having become wealthy enough to do so, while Kayvani apparently remained in Iran. Their role in the 1953 coup remained secret until Roosevelt revealed it to Farhad Diba, the author of a 1986 biography of Mosaddeq, and their names appeared in a CIA history of the coup that was leaked to *The New York Times* in 2000. Both were still alive in 1984, and Jalali apparently had returned to Iran, at least temporarily. I have not been able to determine what happened to them subsequently.35

**Conclusion**

TPBDEAMN was the CIA’s main ongoing covert operation in Iran in the early 1950s. It was a psychological warfare operation aimed at weakening the position of the Soviet Union and its allies, especially the Tudeh Party, in Iran. As such, it was an integral component of the CIA’s global effort during this period—at the peak of the Cold War—to combat Soviet influence, especially in regions bordering the USSR. TPBDEAMN also played a central role in the CIA-engineered coup that overthrew Prime Minister Mosaddeq on 19 August 1953.

The overview of TPBDEAMN presented here contributes to our understanding of the 1953 coup in two important ways. First, it clarifies the nature of one of the main organizational apparatuses the CIA relied on to overthrow Mosaddeq: the TPBDEAMN network of Iranian agents and sub-agents, run by CIA officers based in Tehran and Washington. The CIA had developed this network in the years before the coup to carry out two types of psychological warfare activity inside Iran: black and gray propaganda; and covert political action initiatives such as efforts to organize anti-Tudeh crowds and turn clerics or other actors against the Tudeh. Both types of activity were used extensively to undermine Mosaddeq before, during, and after the coup, though it is difficult to say how much of an effect they had. Propaganda and political action activities of this sort require highly specialized, preexisting organizational infrastructure, including skilled writers, cartoonists, translators, and covert operatives, as well as secure, established contacts with editors, publishers, political leaders, and crowd organizers. Without the TPBDEAMN network, it would have been difficult or impossible for the CIA to undertake these ac-


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**Gasiorowski**

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tivities against Mosaddeq. Although the TPBEDAMN network was not the only organizational apparatus the CIA used in the coup—the Rashidian network and an ad-hoc group of Iranian military officers organized by CIA operatives also played important roles—it was probably crucial to the coup’s success.

Second, TPBEDAMN helps link the coup to the broader context within which it occurred, in several ways. The CIA was a new organization at the time, growing very rapidly and undergoing extensive organizational change, and its activities in Iran, including both TPBEDAMN and the coup against Mosaddeq, were part of this rapid growth. Like any other new, rapidly growing organization, the CIA relied mainly on personnel with little or no experience in Iran and necessarily gave them considerable autonomy—which helped to create a “maverick operational culture”—in carrying out their activities. As a result, much of what the CIA was doing in Iran in the Mosaddeq era now seems to have been ill-informed, amateurish, and even contradictory.

More importantly, U.S. officials for years had been deeply concerned about the Soviet Union’s efforts to expand its influence in Iran, initially by fostering autonomous republics in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and then by strengthening and assisting the Tudeh Party. This intense Cold War context spurred the CIA to create the TPBEDAMN organizational apparatus, which then was available for use in the coup against Mosaddeq. U.S. officials remained deeply concerned about Soviet influence in Iran during the Mosaddeq era. These concerns were relatively muted during Mosaddeq’s first year in office but grew considerably after July 1952, when large, violent demonstrations rocked Iran. Although the Truman administration continued to support Mosaddeq after these events, the Eisenhower administration, which entered office in January 1953, initially took a much more aggressive posture toward its adversaries—much like the Reagan administration in 1981 and the Bush administration in 2001. Although no dramatic change had occurred in Iran since July 1952, the new administration quickly concluded that Mosaddeq was not a strong enough bulwark against Soviet influence and decided to overthrow him, working through the TPBEDAMN apparatus and other capabilities. As Mosaddeq’s successors dismantled the Tudeh Party and established a strong authoritarian regime, U.S. officials ended TPBEDAMN and became less concerned about Soviet influence in Iran.

Finally, TPBEDAMN provides insight into the strategy U.S. officials adopted in seeking to overthrow Mosaddeq. As discussed above, TPBEDAMN was a psychological warfare operation aimed at influencing the perceptions and decision-making of various actors through covert propaganda and political action. Psychological warfare had been used extensively during World War II and was still widely practiced by the CIA and other intelligence ser-
vices in the early 1950s, before falling out of favor in subsequent decades. Much of the initial plan for overthrowing Mosaddeq consisted of psychological warfare activities. Although some of these activities were abandoned as the coup got underway, others were fully implemented or were adapted for use in other ways as the coup played out. The CIA’s strategy for overthrowing Mosaddeq therefore very much reflected both the capabilities of the TPBEDAMN operation and the enthusiasm U.S. officials still felt for psychological warfare at the time.