The Cold War Politics of Soviet Federal Structures, 1945–1965

International Dimensions and Domestic Consequences

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Although both de-Stalinization and decolonization feature prominently in the general narrative of Cold War history, seldom have they been treated together in the field of international history. Historians have for many years been interested in the Soviet push into the Third World after Joseph Stalin’s death in March 1953.1 A rapidly growing body of scholarship has analyzed Moscow’s strategies to win the hearts and minds of the newly independent states of Asia and Africa. These studies emphasize how the “Soviet offensive” toward the postcolonial world moved beyond traditional power diplomacy to make the most out of the transnational possibilities of post-Stalinism through cultural, intellectual, and economic exchanges.2 Yet, this association remains an external rather than a structural one: the chronological coincidence of the two processes is still seldom taken as a sign that they were intrinsically connected.3

A quick glance at the two phenomena should reveal similarities in the parlance of law, rights, and freedom that characterized them on different levels. In the Soviet Union, criticism of the cult of personality was accompanied by considerable discussion around questions of nationalities, minorities, and language in the late 1950s. The violent unrest in Soviet Georgia in March 1956 mobilized a strongly nationalist argument that was also found in non-violent crises, such as the 1958 debate on the language of education in the republics and the attack against national Communists in Latvia a year later. The rhetoric of de-Stalinization, in its equivocal ambition to correct past wrongs, mirrored key slogans defended by actors who tried either to mend imperial systems or to precipitate their downfall. Thanks to scholars who look at the role of non-Slavic Soviet republics, notably in Central Asia and the Caucasus, progress has been made in comparing Communist policies with the postcolonial world in the 1950s–1970s. Artemy Kalinovsky argues that the peripheral status of the Central Asian republics increased the self-consciousness and assertiveness of their leaders who “certainly did not think of their republics as ‘colonies’ of Moscow or dream about political independence, [. . . but] did feel material and cultural inequality not only relative to Moscow but to each other.” He concludes that “the wave of decolonization occurring beyond the USSR’s borders provided the impetus to complete the ‘decolonization’ of the Central Asian republics within a Soviet framework.”


In Kalinovsky’s interpretation, this internal “decolonization” involves a shift from strictly agricultural economies to industrialization. This shift makes sense insofar as it echoes the rich literature on development in the Cold War and the way it played out in postcolonial countries. But the use of “decolonization” in this way is deliberately provocative because the term has come to be associated with national independence. How, then, can a process that did not lead to political independence for the Soviet Union’s constituent entities be compared to decolonization? The concept of decolonization is actually used for two other periods in Soviet history. For Soviet leaders and politicians, decolonization happened after the October 1917 revolution, when Bolshevism allowed for a radical overhaul of national and class relations across the former Tsarist empire. Much more recently, decolonization was used as a category to describe the fall of the Soviet Union, the “last Empire,” and the emancipation of the national republics from the late 1980s onward. The “potent and troublesome analogy of the ‘decolonization’ of the Soviet ‘Empire,’” as Todd Shepard has argued, has given birth to research comparing “post-Soviet” and “postcolonial” situations, notably in the case of the USSR’s southern republics, Ukraine, and the Baltic republics.

But what if decolonization is understood in a different manner, one that does not require independence and particularly not the independence of post-colonial nation-states? Historians of colonial and postcolonial history have been debating precisely this possibility in the wake of Frederick Cooper’s work on colonial Africa in the post-1945 period. Cooper argues that nation-states may not have been an *horizon indépassable* in the 1950s for colonial and anti-colonial actors, who were open to a wide array of political options, most notably federalism.¹⁵ Focused on French West Africa, Cooper’s work also draws on recent scholarship about imperial and colonial reform and the diversity of plans designed by reformers and anti-colonial activists alike in their attempts to reshape a global order.¹⁶ His work has, however, been criticized for overstating the case of federalism and alternatives to the nation-state without explaining sufficiently why federalist projects failed in the early 1960s.¹⁷ Samuel Moyn, Michael Goebel, and Richard Drayton are among the most vocal detractors of what Goebel calls a “revisionist wave” in the historiography of decolonization, lumping together Cooper and historians such as Todd Shepard and Gary Wilder.¹⁸ Although this criticism may shed light on weaknesses in Cooper’s argument, it is mostly a defense of the traditional conception of decolonization.

The respective merits of the competing theses can be investigated by assessing the global dimensions of the debate in order to test the idea that

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decolonization was not exclusively conceived as a transition to the nation-state and that this pluralism deserves attention. The Soviet Union in the 1950s combined seemingly incompatible elements: vociferous support for the independence of colonial territories, especially in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and an equally staunch assertion that decolonization was not necessarily coterminous with political independence, as demonstrated by the situation of the “sovereign” Soviet socialist republics within the USSR. Tania Raffass has highlighted this difficulty to account for the nature of the Soviet Union—that is, whether it should be considered a “federation” or an “empire”—in a book that goes beyond the image of “Potemkin federalism.”19 As my discussion here shows, many evolutions of late Stalinism and of the de-Stalinization period may be explained as part of an attempt to overcome this contradiction. The notion of de-Stalinization as decolonization is in line with Antony Hopkins’s attempt to “rethink decolonization” and track down its consequences in unexpected loci and events, in a manner similar to that used for the history of European integration and the civil rights movement in the United States.20 By the same token, it provides an opportunity to reconsider the theoretical boundaries of decolonization and its political imaginary in the ideological Cold War.21

In doing so this article relies on a combination of existing historiography on decolonization and de-Stalinization and archival material and published sources from several former Soviet republics, the United Kingdom, France, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The specific post-Soviet archives have been chosen deliberately to avoid being confined to what one could conceive as the “(post)colonial” republics of the Soviet Union in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The archives used here encompass a broader range of the Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia, Belorussia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Russia), to demonstrate that decolonization should not be confined to a

Western/non-Western relationship. Instead, it can also be applied to relations between the Soviet regime and its western republics, including the Slavic ones.\textsuperscript{22} Three main Soviet sources bolster this argument: first, the archives that illustrate the international activity of Soviet republics after the 1944 constitutional amendments gave them certain paths to conduct international relations;\textsuperscript{23} second, the archives of the central and republic Institutes for State and Law, which played a central role in the emergence of new legal concepts in the 1950s and 1960s;\textsuperscript{24} third, the archives of the constitutional committee established by Nikita Khrushchev on 15 June 1962, particularly the subcommittee on nationalities policy headed by Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan, which marked the apex (interrupted in October 1964) of de-Stalinization as decolonization.\textsuperscript{25} As for the Stalin constitution (1936) and the Brezhnev constitution (1977), the public debate that surrounded the constitutional work preceding the issuance of these documents presents a rare opportunity to observe Soviet approaches to federalism, nationhood, and law.\textsuperscript{26}

**Soviet Republics as Dominions**

Comparisons between constituent entities of the USSR and colonial territories would have been unacceptable in official Soviet discourse during the interwar period. The Bolshevik regime, fully devoted to its “indigenization” policy toward the nationalities of the Soviet Union, developed a rhetoric of national-cum-social emancipation that purported to put an end to exploitation in all

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its guises.27 The creation of nominally independent Soviet republics and their political union in the USSR from 1922 to 1924 was considered sufficient evidence in support of the idea that Soviet nationalities had gained independence after the October Revolution and had willingly recreated an aggregated structure to provide for defense and other common goals. The creation of new union republics in 1922, 1924, 1929, and 1936 contributed to the sense that national emancipation was an ongoing project to be pursued as socialism reached new heights.28 The declensions of the federal structure of the regime spread widely through the Soviet Union, notably via the promotion of national cadres and national cultures within a “state-sponsored evolutionism.”29 Early Soviet historians—in particular Mikhail Pokrovskii and his followers—supported the claims of the regime by contrasting Communism with Tsarist colonial oppression and Great Russian chauvinism. In the 1930s, numerous historiographical disputes arose as Stalinist repressions took a heavy toll on minorities and national republic elites, accompanied by the reintroduction of Russian nationalism as part of the official Soviet rhetoric.30

The assertion of Russian nationalism, however, did not exclude the possibility of official Soviet support for peripheral nationalisms, a fact amply demonstrated during the Second World War. As the war unfolded, the Soviet regime relied more and more on nationalist motives to mobilize the population. This was, in part, a return to the early Bolshevik strategy of using cross-border minorities to legitimize diplomatic and military gains, such as the conquest of “Western Ukraine” and “Western Belarus” at the end of 1939, as part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. These conquests were largely presented as the “reunification” of divided peoples and struck a nationalist chord in


the two republics. Of deeper immediate impact was the Axis powers’ use of anti-Soviet rhetoric of national emancipation that could exploit domestic discontent and appeal to nationalist émigré networks established during the interwar period. Such anti-imperialist rhetoric was widely used in the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Moldova, and also further afield in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Italian propagandists reused rhetoric developed in the 1930s during the Prométhée movement that depicted the USSR as a new “prison of peoples.” These overtures were hindered to some extent by divisions among Nazi officials about the best way to approach Soviet nationalities. Even so, the Nazi occupation of Eastern Europe, as with the Japanese occupation of Korea and other parts of Asia, fueled nationalist and anti-Bolshevist movements.

The restoration of Soviet rule in the occupied territories required the imposition of both Communist and national policies. In Ukraine, a national military order harking back to the seventeenth-century national hero Bohdan Khmelnytsky was approved in August 1943 and quickly inspired Communists in the Baltic republics to follow suit with similar proposals. Reunification was again propagated for the western republics of the USSR, and the rhetoric soon extended to non-European borderlands of the USSR. Soviet actions in Xinjiang, northern Iran, and eastern Turkey in 1944–1946 also were accompanied by the renewed use of an anti-imperialist rhetoric conducive to what would become decolonization. Of particular importance are Georgian


and Armenian attempts to reclaim eastern parts of Turkish Anatolia, reneging on the 1921 Moscow and Kars treaties. In a letter dated June 1945, Armenian Catholicos Kevork VI hailed Stalin as a liberator of nations and requested support for the reunification of Armenian territories, demands that the Armenian diaspora also supported. These territorial claims had roots in the republics themselves and mirrored the reunification propaganda in Ukraine and Belorussia; that is, when the claims went unfulfilled, discontent increased among republican leaders.

National emancipation is not necessarily coterminous with decolonization, but a strange convergence could be observed in early 1944, when measures taken to evince the supposed leeway enjoyed by Soviet republics led to a constitutional reform in January and February. The amendment to the 1936 constitution, defended in the Supreme Soviet by Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, entitled the USSR constituent republics to maintain external relations and set up their own commissariats for defense and foreign affairs. Molotov hailed this development as a new stage in the history of the Soviet Union; arguing that

the nationalities problem has been solved in the multinational Soviet State. . . . This transformation signifies a great expansion of the activities of the Union republics, which has become possible as a result of their political, economic and cultural growth, or, in other words, as a result of their national development.

A striking move, this reform startled foreign observers, especially diplomats from the United States and the British Empire. Commonwealth diplomats


were even more puzzled when several high-ranking Soviet officials mentioned that “the position of [the] constituent Republics was analogous to that of several units of [the] British Commonwealth of Nations.”

The comparison with British dominions may strike the contemporary reader as wildly off-base, but, as A. G. Hopkins points out, the story of the British colonies in 1945 was still as much a story of “continuing components of empire” as it was a story of “new nation states.” The colonies, Hopkins maintains, still “had to make the transition from one state to another.” Their exact position in the future international system was far from clear, and the explicit comparison of Soviet republics with British dominions was a ploy to extract as much international stature for them as the Commonwealth would get for its own territories. Even India had enjoyed a sui generis membership in the League of Nations since 1919, a status hotly disputed by Indian nationalists during the interwar period. Unsurprisingly, Stalin found in Winston Churchill a more amenable partner on this issue than Franklin D. Roosevelt, who, as the president of a federation of states that frequently challenged the federal government’s jurisdiction, was less enamored of the idea of multiple representation than was the prime minister of the largest imperial structure in the world. The 1944 Soviet constitutional reform was an attempt to cope with a rising tide of nationalism in the republics by demonstrating the promotion of Soviet nationalities in the wake of the war. By reasserting the “sovereignty” of the republics, the Moscow authorities could try to counter complaints about the forceful integration of the Baltic republics into the USSR, an annexation that was never formally recognized by Western governments, including the wartime Allies.


42. Hopkins, “Globalisation and Decolonisation,” p. 734.


The Soviet regime’s attempts to compare the USSR with the British empire created even greater confusion in the Soviet Union and colonial empires. But confusion could be conducive to new comparisons and inspirations. In the United Kingdom, left-leaning colonial reformers and anti-imperialist thinkers grew markedly more interested in the Soviet experiment. Former colonial civil servant and leftwing Labour Party adviser Leonard Barnes published in 1944 a widely circulated Penguin Special titled *Soviet Light on the Colonies*. The imaginary trip of a Soviet citizen to British African colonies was the pretext for a general comparison of British and Soviet policies, much to the advantage of the latter. Barnes was committed to reconstructing the British empire as “a higher level human association” and therefore emphasized the need to pay attention “to what has been happening during the last two decades in the one country which has reached a definitive solution of its colonial problem.” The book featured a visually striking map comparing the size of Soviet Central Asia and colonial Africa. In 1946, former British Communist Party member George Padmore published *How Russia Transformed Her Colonial Empires*. Although Padmore had been critical of many aspects of Stalinism, he emphasized that “the transformation of this vast ramshackle Empire into a socialized commonwealth was one of [Vladimir] Lenin’s greatest achievements.” But comparisons work both ways, and the British were quick to reuse them in the Russian-language newspaper they edited in the Soviet Union, the *British Ally* (*Britanskii Soyuznik*), which aroused discontent among Soviet authorities in 1946–1947 for “making demagogic comparisons and confrontations, designed to cast unfavorable light on Soviet nationalities policies.” At the end of the 1940s, therefore, a parallel existed between the

49. Ibid., p. 79.
Soviet republics and some British dependencies as a result of the circumstances that prevailed at the end of the war and Stalin’s political gambits.

Decolonizing Moods after Stalin

Late Stalinism did not live up to the political expectations created both in the Soviet Union and abroad by the USSR’s 1944 constitutional reform. Molotov did not respond to British requests to establish an embassy in Kyiv. This did not prevent the connection from surviving. Union republics remained at the forefront of Soviet policies in the first crises of decolonization. Ukraine was particularly active at the United Nations (UN) during the Indonesian crisis. In early 1946, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Manuils’kyi spoke before the UN Security Council about the situation in Southeast Asia, and the topic came up again in 1948, when Ukraine was elected a non-permanent member of the Security Council. These speeches were widely republished in Ukrainian- and Russian-language newspapers and even inspired propagandistic literary works, such as Oleksij Kundzich’s *Lysty z mlyna* (1951), in which Ukrainian peasants discuss such speeches in the evening by the fireside. The potential influence of foreign policy on domestic politics was emphasized by émigré writers such as lawyer Vsevolod Holub, who suggested that “the more Ukraine will intervene in the UN in defense of colonized peoples, the more the Ukrainian people will become conscious of their own colonial situation.” Thus, at least some observers, despite being aware of the limits Stalinism posed to the republics’ autonomy, were considering longer-term and unwanted potential impacts of the political manipulation of the trappings of statehood and nationhood in the early Cold War.

Stalin’s death confirmed the evolutionary nature of Soviet federalism. One of the officials striving to succeed Stalin in the spring of 1953, Lavrentii Beria, embraced proposals for new arrangements between the central government and the republics. In a series of sweeping and controversial measures, Beria curtailed earlier Russification policies and dismantled the heavy-handed control institutions in the western borderlands that had been annexed in 1944-1945. This change was particularly notable in the Baltic republics,

54. Ibid., p. 67.
which had been submitted to harsh treatment under the special Bureaus of the Communist Party’s Central Committee (CC) since November–December 1944.\textsuperscript{55} However, Beria’s downfall in late June 1953 was followed by accusations against him for (among other things) supposedly stirring up interethnic antagonism.\textsuperscript{56} Although clearly intended to defuse the tense situation that existed in many western borderlands of the USSR, the reforms that were enacted in the spring of 1953 did produce unexcepted and, from the point of view of Soviet hierarchs, undesirable effects. Reports of the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs quoted average citizens who were convinced that “no Russian will remain in Lithuania, and Lithuanians will fill all positions in organizations and institutions where they will do as they please,” and even that Lithuania would “establish an independent state.”\textsuperscript{57} More generally, the early post-Stalin “Thaw” saw a recrudescence of national rights claims, most notably with the Chechens and Crimean Tatars. Demands for cultural and economic rights were voiced by national minorities throughout the USSR, and nationalist feelings were fueled by regional crises especially the 1956 unrest in Central Europe.\textsuperscript{58}

That the attempt was short-lived did not prevent the new Soviet leaders from pursuing a similar, although more cautious, policy of “widening the rights of the republics”—a phrase that became quite well-known by the mid-1950s. The phrase itself gives a clue to the importance of law in this process. Although “socialist legality” became a popular slogan of post-Stalinism, historians have only recently started to reassess the importance of “rights talks” in Communist societies—a trend facilitated by the burgeoning literature on human rights.\textsuperscript{59}


process are obvious examples, but non-dissenters also used legal arguments from the 1950s onward, and on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{60} As far as the rights of the republics were concerned, socialist legality was not confined to individual rights. Discussion of collective rights, in the form of the “rights of the republics,” quickly emerged, offering an interesting parallel with the competition between individual and collective rights during decolonization, a point emphasized in the historiography of transnational human rights.\textsuperscript{61} In the spring of 1955, important reforms in central planning and investment were adopted to the benefit of the republics.\textsuperscript{62} Khrushchev’s anti-ministerialist campaign in 1955–1957 led to the disbandment of several federal ministries and reform of the \textit{nomenklatura} system in a combined effort to thwart political enemies and relieve republican and regional administrations that were overwhelmed by paperwork, as the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) had noted in January 1954.\textsuperscript{63} This trend culminated in the creation of the \textit{sovnarkhoz} system in May–June 1957, which increased the clout of the republics by territorializing the management of the economy.\textsuperscript{64}

The new role of law was accompanied by a reassessment of history made possible by the early dynamics of post-Stalinism. A flurry of works were published that reconsidered the first years of the regime. Historians and lawyers discussed the links between the Soviet republics before the creation of the Soviet Union, describing them as purely diplomatic, confederal, or

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\textsuperscript{62} M. L. Kogan, \textit{Byudzhetnye prava soyuaznykh republik} (Moscow: Gosizdatel’stvo Juridicheskoj Literatury, 1960), pp. 81–82.
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proto-federal. A consensus soon emerged to reassert the contractual character of the documents signed in connection with the creation of the Soviet Union, supposedly based on the voluntary and sovereign will of the republics. David Zlatopolskii, a prominent lawyer from Moscow State University, played a key role in this process through several major publications. In 1954, he published *The Creation and Development of USSR as a Federal State*, an attempt to explain and justify the Bolshevist conversion to multinational federalism. Stalin was implicitly criticized in this approach, as demonstrated by the simultaneous publication of documents that recalled Vladimir Lenin’s opposition to Stalin’s infamous “autonomization plan” and the initial uncertainties about the forms of Soviet federalism. New access to the archives was a central support for this reexamination of early Soviet history, and Anna Pankratova and the journal *Voprosy istorii* (Questions of History) were the major sponsors. Historical and legal scholarship therefore legitimized the ongoing decentralization of the Soviet Union, and the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution presented an opportunity to publish new texts that not only explored the rights of the Soviet republics but were aligned with Khrushchev’s political orientation.

This renewed emphasis on the contractual origins of federalism dovetailed both with the promotion of law as an intermediary between public institutions and, more generally, with the larger place of legalism in public affairs. The creation after 1956 of juridical committees to serve as advisory bodies to the federal and republic governments replaced the ministries of justice and


sought to improve the legal quality of official texts. Legal institutions developed at a rapid pace in the republics to provide training for the cadres needed in all branches of law. While only Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev had hosted major law institutes, the 1950s marked the creation of institutes dedicated to legal studies at each republic’s Academy of Sciences. Of central concern for all these institutions was the drafting of Codes of Laws in criminal and civil matters, a responsibility transferred to the union republics in 1956–1957. During this debate, two contradictory trends could be observed: on the one hand, some participants argued in support of more law-making leeway for the republics, as part of political devolution; on the other hand, legal harmonization, in particular in criminal law, was frequently demanded as a way to liquidate the heritage of a time when some republics were considered underdeveloped and to accelerate the modernization of Soviet law. For the first time, questions of harmonization and diversity were discussed at numerous levels, including interrepublic forums, local meetings of lawyers, and expert conferences. Simultaneously, a debate developed on questions of public law, in particular the federal constitution, whose chronic instability since 1936 had undermined its “authority” because political voluntarism often bypassed the official procedure for constitutional revisions and strained the republics.

74. Minutes of the scientific committee of the Department of Law, Belorussian Academy of Sciences, 5 May 1958, in Tsentral’nyi Nauchnyi Arhiv Akademii Nauk Belorusssii (Central Scientific Archive of the Academy of Sciences of Belarus, TsNA ANB), Minsk, F. 4, D. 2, Ll. 138ff.
Transnational Debates over Federalism

The incipient debate over Soviet federalism found two major points of reference and comparison in the international context of the 1950s: North America and the (post)colonial world. Desegregation and decolonization have recently been the objects of much comparative work insisting on the parallels between the two processes. By the mid-1950s, comparisons of the situations of black Americans and colonial peoples were routinely made, although they were sometimes rejected by black activists themselves, such as James Ivy of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), who declared in September 1956 at the Congress of Black Writers and Artists (Paris) that “the problem of integration [was] not a colonial problem.”

A key aspect of the possible comparison and mutual influence between desegregation, decolonization, and de-Stalinization has to do with federalism. In each case, federalism was part of the political situation that unfolded: as a structural constraint for desegregation, as a potential solution for decolonization, and as a work-in-progress for de-Stalinization. This simultaneity helps explain why constitutional issues and federalism could be seen as part of the “peaceful competition” between East and West; more globally, it was an answer to challenges that did not necessarily fit into the Cold War straitjacket and revealed latent fears about cultural, racial, and religious antagonisms.

As a result, Soviet leaders and intellectuals in the 1950s increasingly heeded foreign perceptions of federalism in the USSR.

In a striking parallel with the “rights of the republics” in the USSR, the civil rights movement in the United States and the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka case prompted those in the U.S. South who favored racial segregation to champion “states’ rights.” In a spirit reminiscent of the early nineteenth-century nullification crises, several U.S. states created special organs seeking to prevent encroachments from the federal government. Mississippi took the lead in 1956 by setting up a “State


Sovereignty Commission,” whose archives nowadays afford valuable insights into the crisis of American federalism at that time.\(^{80}\) When speaking to foreign audiences about the persistence of segregation in the South, U.S. diplomats regularly alluded to a state-centered federalist conception that hindered attempts to desegregate the country, but they often met with skepticism in the late 1950s.\(^{81}\)

The Soviet bloc’s denunciation of U.S. racism—long a staple part of Soviet propaganda—was now combined with hefty criticism of the U.S. federal system.\(^{82}\) If states were strong enough to hinder desegregation, the argument went, federalism played into the hands of reactionary forces and checked whatever progressive measures could be adopted in Washington. The argument encompassed not only segregation but also welfare and labor laws.\(^{83}\) Soviet observers, however, often made contradictory claims. They would reproach the U.S. federal government for imposing its decisions on the states, arguing that this meant federalism in the United States was but an illusion. This line of argument drew from earlier Soviet and U.S. scholarship that emphasized the rise of the U.S. federal government in the years following passage of the New Deal and the start of the Second World War.\(^{84}\)

The Cold War conflict between the two systems was waged at the transnational level in part through the question of racial and national policies, which related the conflict to the ongoing issue of decolonization. Most notable was the way this rivalry from the mid-1950s was staged in UNESCO, whose mission to promote mutual understanding and cross-cultural contacts included a program on racial equality. The UN organization put out a series of publications on the topic, including Claude Lévi-Strauss’s *Race and...*  


84. A favorite of Soviet authors was G. Findlay Shirras, Federal Finances in Peace and War (London: MacMillan, 1944).
In 1954, UNESCO published *Racial Equality and the Law*, an essay on “the role of law in the reduction of discrimination in the United States,” that in effect tried to give an optimistic assessment of desegregation. Two similar projects were commissioned from Soviet scholars after the USSR joined UNESCO in 1954. Mikhail Kammari, an ethnic Finn and specialist in Marxism-Leninism and nationalities policy, was commissioned to write a primer about the Marxist perspective on racism. Soon afterward, two Soviet scholars, I. Tsameryan and S. Ronin, were solicited to write a text on the Soviet experience in fighting racial discrimination. The first version of their manuscript, received in August 1958 by the department of social sciences, glorified the Soviet approach to nationalities policy, which was not distinguished from racial questions, with significant attention devoted to the formal aspects of Soviet federalism. Upon receiving it, Alfred Métraux, an anthropologist and key figure in the department, wrote to T. H. Marshall, head of the department, that “the whole book is a long and dull recital of the Soviet achievements in developing and industrializing the Federal Republics of the Soviet Union. The dullness of the enumeration is almost unbearable.”

Whatever the merits of the comparison between Soviet federalism and U.S. federalism, a second strand of debate had to do with the purported uses of federalism in the colonial context of the 1950s. Here, the ambiguities of the Soviet experience resurfaced. Building on a debate begun by Cooper, one could say that Soviet specialists were trapped between two positions. On the one hand, they did not consider the possibility that colonized peoples could genuinely desire revamped federal unions with their metropoles. Consequently, the federal projects of the 1950s were discarded as neocolonialism and mere window-dressing aimed at dividing national liberation

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87. Alfred Métraux to Aleksandr Topchiev (scientific secretary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences), 12 October 1956, in UNESCO Archives, File 3 A 31 “Equality of Rights between Races and Nationalities in the USSR.”


movements. This claim was based on the example of the Central African Federation (CAF), a caricature of a federalist state that was an amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland. The CAF was created in 1953 by British colonial authorities to ease tensions with white settlers, notably the Labour government of Roy Welensky in Northern Rhodesia, and to counterbalance the influence of apartheid South Africa. The Federation of Malay, created in February 1948 against a backdrop of national tensions and rising insurgency, was also frequently mentioned in critiques of colonial federalism.

On the other hand, as soon as former colonial territories became independent, the Soviet doctrine on federal experiments proved to have significant limitations. When the February 1958 establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR) was widely opposed by Arab Communist parties in light of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s repression of Communists, Soviet perceptions of the project were at best ambivalent, despite the UAR’s avowed anti-imperialism. More generally, Pan-Arabist projects were perceived as hostile to the Soviet Union, an idea notably promoted by the highly influential Iraqi Communist Party. The authors and supporters of these projects were more often than not inspired by the United States, as demonstrated by Sati’ al Husri’s Defence of Arabism (Difa’ an al-’Uruba, 1956) and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz’s Unitary State and Federal State (Al-dawla al-muwahhida wa al-dawla al-ittihadiya, 1960). Al-Bazzaz had toured the United States and, despite being critical of racial segregation, considered U.S. federalism more genuine than its Soviet counterpart. In the USSR, he argued, “all military, political, economic, and industrial powers are in the hands of the federal government.” A few years

later, Soviet officials exercised prudence after the creation of the short-lived Mali Federation (1960), which failed mainly because of Western—particularly French—plots hostile to African unity.96

A similar ambiguity can be observed in the exportation of the Soviet federal model to other left-leaning states. As late as April–June 1945, the Seventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party had proclaimed China a “federated republic” (liánbāng gònghéguó). Soviet leaders were initially willing to share their experience in nationalities policy with China in the 1950s and contributed to a series of wide-ranging projects involving minority languages and cultures, territorial autonomy, and so on.97 Cooperative ventures were established between Soviet republics and Chinese institutions to foster direct exchanges about nationalities policy.98 But Soviet experts and diplomats understood that the Chinese were reluctant to “learn from the USSR” or replicate the Soviet model when it came to defining “nationalities” and establishing a federalist state structure.99 Disquiet over Xinjiang, Tibet, and other minority regions that were harshly suppressed under Communist rule was foremost among the PRC’s reasons for delaying the adoption of meaningful federalism. A backlash against national elites followed a seminar on nationalities issues held in Qingdao in mid-1957, where local leaders were accused of “local nationalism.”100 Only after the Sino-Soviet rift at the end of the 1950s could China’s nationalities policy be attacked officially in the USSR and the superiority of the Soviet federal model be asserted.

98. Central School of Political and Legal Cadres (Zhōngyāng zhèngfā gānbù xuéxiào) to E. Tikhonova, 27 July 1956, and Korets’kyi to the Foreign Department of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, 9 August 1957, both in IDP ANU, Op. 1, D. 134, Ll. 28–29 and 49, respectively.
The International Politics of Khrushchev’s Constitutional Reform

After Khrushchev announced the creation of a constitutional committee to replace the 1936 constitution, the legacy of a decade of transnational debates about national self-determination, racial equality, and alternatives to colonial empires was felt particularly strongly in the subcommittee that dealt with nationalities policy. Its chairman, Mikoyan, was a veteran of Soviet politics who had survived the pitfalls of Stalinism as commissar and then minister for foreign trade. In February 1955 he became First Deputy Prime Minister, a position he held until 1964. When he retired from politics in December 1965, foreign newspapers hailed him as the “Talleyrand” of Soviet politics and the “survivor of the Kremlin.”

Throughout Khrushchev’s time in power, Mikoyan was one of his closest associates and a lead figure in de-Stalinization, delivering the opening speech at the CPSU’s Twentieth Congress. During this period, two aspects were particularly noticeable. He was a major asset for Khrushchev’s foreign policy, thanks to years of interactions with the West, the Eastern Bloc, and, increasingly, the Third World. Having become chair of the fifth subcommittee (i.e., the one responsible for the nationalities question), he was keenly aware of foreign opinions about the Soviet Union. At the same time, he had become the authoritative arbiter of controversies involving the national question, being one of the only non-Slavs on the CPSU Presidium.

At the end of July 1962, Mikoyan invited to his office a small group of experts on the legal and political aspects of Soviet federalism. Among them were David Zlatopol’skii of Moscow State University; two leading constitutional lawyers from the Institute for State and Law of the All-Union Academy of Sciences (Petr Romashkin, and Viktor Kotok); Mikoyan’s brother-in-law Anushavan Arzumanyan, who was head of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations and a highly influential figure in the reformist


milieu of the time; and the editor of Pravda, Atyk Azizjan. 104 The panel also included two familiar figures from the Institute of Philosophy, Mikhail Kamari and Ivan Tsameryan, the latter of whom was embroiled in an international controversy about the merits of Soviet nationalities policy thanks to attacks organized by Western governments and media against his UNESCO-sponsored brochure. 105 Taking advantage of the informal context, the participants spoke their minds and criticized the functioning of the Soviet system. Speaking at length, Zlatopol’skii was outspoken about the defects of the Soviet system. “Lawyers cannot reach agreement,” he said, on whether the “Union” (soyu z or soyu znoe gosudarstvo) was the same as a “federation” (federatsiya), an ambiguity recently brought to light by “the famous English professor Carr in a recently published book” (a reference to E. H. Carr’s multivolume History of Soviet Russia). 106 Zlatopol’skii made his argument clearer by alluding to Lenin’s well-known quotation about “fictitious constitutions.” Although “the socialist constitution has never been a fiction, some stipulations of our constitution do have a fictitious character,” he cautiously added. 107 He specifically cited the possibility of holding referendums and the existence of republic defense ministries, as well as contradictions between the programmatic texts of the party and the state, something that other leading Soviet officials frequently noted in internal reports. 108

Mikoyan closely heeded these remarks. At the end of the meeting, he asked Romashkin, as head of the Institute for State and Law, to prepare a confidential study of foreign criticism of Soviet nationalities policy, with particular attention to legal and political issues. He had to “be straightforward in collecting all existing statements and summarize them, in particular our weak

108. Minutes of a meeting between Mikoyan and jurists, 28 July 1962, L. 53.
109. See, for example, the internal reports in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyy Arkhiv Novei Shei Istorii (Russian State Archive of Recent History, RGANI), Moscow, Russia, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 441, Ll. 18-23; and Aleksandr Pyzhikov, Khrushchevskaya “Ottepel’” 1953–1964 gg. (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2002), p. 98.
points, without hiding anything from the most vicious attacks.” Based essentially on West European and North American literature, the report amply fulfilled Mikoyan’s wishes by drawing a dark portrait of the USSR as a pseudo-federalist and neocolonialist state. This argument, though categorically rejected in Soviet public discourse, was thoroughly synthesized in the report, which quoted at length harsh criticism of the regime, including excerpts from a lecture given in Munich by Walter Kolarz, author of *Russia and Her Colonies* (1952), who contended that “the Soviet nationalities policy towards Muslims as well as towards Belarus and Ukraine smacked of classical colonialism.”

The lecture had been delivered at the Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR, an organization that frequently attacked Soviet nationalities policies. (The institute, operating from 1950 to 1971, was secretly funded by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, unbeknownst to most of its affiliates.) By the time Romashkin wrote his 1962 report, the international context that had informed Kolarz’s writings in the early 1950s had changed. With colonial territories now independent, the USSR’s union-republic structure had lost most of its appeal.

This loss of attraction could be offset on multiple levels. The fetish for political “independence,” which camouflaged the persistence of Western imperialist interests, could be criticized. The level of economic development attained by the Soviet republics could be flatteringly compared to the levels achieved by many of the newly independent countries, and foreign diplomats and delegations were regularly invited to the USSR to admire the achievements of the republics, as well as the concrete signs of their sovereignty: their parliaments, governments, and ministries of foreign affairs. A more political response was still needed, however, insofar as some Western actors were keen to exploit the

110. Minutes of a meeting between Mikoyan and jurists, 28 July 1962, Ll. 51.


more jaundiced perceptions of Soviet federalism and sought to make use of the League for the Liberation of the Peoples of the USSR and numerous other émigré lobbies and organizations that had come into being, which explicitly used an anti-colonial framing of their fight against Communism.¹¹⁵ On 26 September 1960, during the UN General Assembly, Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker launched a salvo of accusations against Soviet policies and actions in Eastern Europe, including the domination of “captive peoples” and the incorporation of the Baltic states and Ukraine into the USSR.¹¹⁶ The declaration was all the more provocative as it was made in front of the First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Nikolai Podgorny. A legacy of the 1944 constitutional reform, Ukraine’s (and Belorussia’s) presence in the UN posed a risk for the USSR if Western powers decided to attack the Ukrainian SSR’s credentials. In 1960–1962, the Ukrainian and Belorussian delegations to the UN grew alarmed whenever “Soviet colonialism” was mentioned, and some feared the Western powers would ask that the two republics be excluded from the UN.¹¹⁷ However, the impact of Diefenbaker’s attack was mitigated by disagreement among the Western countries about the relevance of his campaign, with British diplomats particularly reluctant to support his comments.¹¹⁸

The structure of the Soviet public sphere and the censorship of information meant that the impact of such attacks on the Soviet regime was less than the impact in the United States of international coverage of the civil rights crisis in the U.S. South. However, altercations at the UN and elsewhere did have an impact on domestic developments in the USSR. Soviet legal experts

¹¹⁵. For a presentation on one such group, the League for the Liberation of the Peoples of the USSR (formed in March 1953), see the first issue of the journal Problems of the Peoples of the USSR, No. 1 (1958); and Pierre du Bois, “Cold War, Culture and Propaganda, 1953 to 1975,” in Wilfried Loth and Georges Henri-Soutou, eds., The Making of Détente: Eastern and Western Europe in the Cold War, 1965–1975 (Abingdon-on-Thames, UK: Routledge, 2008), p. 18.


and officials pinpointed the negative impact of Article 14 of the 1936 constitution, which limited the sovereignty of Soviet republics. The point was debated in Mikoyan’s subcommittee, and a suggestion was made to erase this section of the article. Moreover, Mikoyan proposed that the right of secession each republic enjoyed should be codified in more solidly in the future constitution.119 The international activity of Soviet republics was also perceived as a way to bolster claims about their sovereignty. Lawyers made suggestions that were more technical. From the late 1950s onward, experts often suggested that the treaty-making capacity and international legal powers of the Soviet republics should be clarified. Article 18-a of the constitution had to be amended to allow republics to conclude “treaties,” not just “agreements.”120 In June 1962 at the beginning of the constitutional process, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Luka Palamarchuk wrote to Podgornyi to insist on this point and to emphasize that the right of each republic to “ratify” and “denounce” treaties should be made explicit. He noted that foreign diplomats had been asking about the treaty-making capacity of the Ukrainian SSR: “At the International Labor Organization doubts have been expressed for many years about the legal capacity of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Presidium to ratify international labor conventions.”121 Internationalization thus had a concrete impact on political actors in the USSR, and the debate over Khrushchev’s constitution reveals that Soviet citizens themselves had not forgotten this issue. In a letter to the Supreme Soviet in January 1963, a certain S. Zibrev demanded that all republics be admitted into the UN: “Why are all British dominions members of the UN, while they were until recently colonies or half-colonies? Why are colonies and territories dependent upon the U.S. members of the UN?”122

**The Cold War and Soviet Inflationary Federalism**

Khrushchev’s ouster in October 1964 ended the constitutional reform effort. (When the issue of reform was revived in the 1970s, it moved forward

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without any of the innovative aspects proposed a decade earlier.) This aborted constitutional process was nonetheless important in entrenching the federal character of the Soviet Union. In 1961, the passages of the party program that mentioned the “decreasing significance of borders between the Soviet republics” were much commented on and disputed. Far from promoting such a decline, the early 1960s confirmed the centrality of the union’s republics. This centrality was illustrated by Khrushchev’s failed attempt to create regional authorities as replacements for the CPSU’s Central Asian Bureau (December 1962) and Transcaucasia Bureau (January–February 1963) in order to improve economic coordination and planning. The creation of such structures was not Khrushchev’s only misguided effort on the matter. Letters were also sent to the constitutional committee advocating the reestablishment of internal federations within the Soviet Union, in the Baltics, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. These structures, however, were but pale copies of their namesakes in the 1920s and 1930s and in no way forestalled direct subordination of the republics to Moscow. They were disbanded in late October 1964 at the request of republic leaders. A similar fate awaited other regional structures, such as the Baltic Planning Commission (1963–1966). The elimination of these organs helped stimulate economic nationalism in the republics, as demonstrated by Saulius Grybkauskas and other scholars.

The Cold War debate over Soviet federalism actually strengthened the political constraints of Communist ideology. Although Communism initially heralded the end of national differences—and nominally held to that idea until the end—Soviet federalism created an inverse trajectory whereby all nationalities strove to attain the rank of union republic. The correlation between the status of the territory assigned to each nationality created a series of hierarchies that culminated in the hierarchy of the union republics. The equation of union republic status with national “maturity” and full development was already strong in the mid-1930s, prompting Stalin to criticize the idea of an automatic transfer from one category to another during deliberations about the new constitution. “The Tatar republic,” he stated on 25 November 1936, “may remain an autonomous republic, whereas Kazakhstan becomes a Union


125. See, for example, Saulius Grybkauskas, Sovietinė nomenklatura ir pramonė Lietuvoje 1965–1985 (Vilnius: LII leidykla, 2011).

republic, but this does not mean that the latter is more culturally and economically developed than the former. The reverse is true.”¹²⁷ In an apparent attempt to check the perceived superiority of union republics, he mentioned three minimal criteria for obtaining union status: a geographical location on the periphery of the USSR (to make feasible the secession right); a “more or less compact” demographic majority; and a population equal to at least one million people.¹²⁸

De-Stalinization was an opportunity to criticize Stalin’s theses about union status. The Mikoyan subcommittee emphasized that Stalin’s criteria were obsolete. Romashkin remarked that Ukraine, Belorussia, and Moldova were no longer border republics after the creation of the “people’s democracies” in East-Central Europe.¹²⁹ Moreover, human migration in the USSR had transformed the demographic balance of many republics, notably in Central Asia and the Baltic region.¹³⁰ Kazakhstan at that point was only 28 percent ethnic Kazakh as a result of Stalin-era mass deportations of minorities to Central Asia and influxes of Slavs during the “Virgin Lands” campaign. However, path dependence was illustrated by the subcommittee’s aversion to downgrading a union republic. Dinmukhamed Kunaev, who at the time was prime minister of Kazakhstan and a member of the subcommittee, wrote to Mikoyan that the demographic majority requirement was inappropriate and that there was no justification for a demotion.¹³¹ Demotion after World War II had happened only once, in July 1956, when the Karelo-Finnish SSR was transformed into an autonomous republic within Russia.¹³² At that time, Kazakhstan’s northern region was threatening to establish itself as a separate entity, and its leader, T. I. Sokolov, was proposing to create a union republic for the Virgin Lands.¹³³

By the early 1960s, Stalin’s criteria were being criticized for “preventing autonomous republics from gaining union status.” A 1963 textbook of the

¹²⁸ Ibid., pp. 140–141.
¹²⁹ Minutes of a meeting between Mikoyan and jurists, 28 July 1962, Ll. 48.
Higher Party School even deemed them a “leftover of the erroneous autonomization policy.” Union status was therefore restored as a legitimate aspiration for nationalities across the Soviet Union, creating expectations for a legally authorized process of long-term national realization. Each national group could strive for a higher level of statehood: smaller groups such as Assyrians and Kurds could petition Armenian and Azeri authorities to obtain a form of national autonomy. In each of these local situations, a discourse of Soviet citizenship could be turned against the supremacy of titular ethnic groups in the republic while simultaneously embracing ethnicity to argue for similar rights. The tension was particularly acute in the autonomous republics. The Institute for State and Law suggested in the late 1950s that their prerogatives be augmented and cemented constitutionally. But the subcommittee proposed that, unlike the union republics, the autonomous republics would not be deemed “sovereign,” an outcome that fueled conflicts in some areas, especially Abkhazia, an autonomous republic within Georgia that had enjoyed the ad hoc status of a “treaty republic” from 1921 to 1931.

Even the nature of the autonomous republics as “states” was disputed. Many Soviet lawyers limited this category to the union republics. This restriction was important given the exaltation of the statehood of union republics since the late 1950s. Combined with the notion of sovereignty, use of the term “statehood” was a practical way to enter a postcolonial era without addressing the issue of independence. Statehood emphasized the existence of political, administrative, economic, and cultural institutions in union republics. Although it was used in propaganda abroad concerning the achievements of Soviet federalism, especially the international activity of Soviet republics, it was also important for domestic propaganda, serving as the only

legitimate and ideologically acceptable form of expressing nationalism in the Soviet Union. This explains the extraordinary rise of the concept as a staple of civic education. For example, each union republic developed textbooks and brochures on the “State and Law of Republic X” to be circulated to a wide audience. Such efforts were particularly important in the Baltic republics, Armenia, and Ukraine, which had to deal with strong émigré communities. In Latvia, Soviet lawyers conceived their *History of State and Law of the Latvian SSR (1917 to 1967)* for “all citizens interested in the history of the legal and state development of our republic.”

The stabilization of republic leaders under Leonid Brezhnev allowed for a routine exaltation of “our republic,” to the point that Ukraine’s long-time leader, Petro Shelest, compared Ukraine’s achievements to those of West European countries. The border between orthodoxy and sedition was thin, however, and Shelest’s political opponents used the opportunity to denounce his claims for supposedly creating a “sense of economic self-sufficiency” that was bound to “lead to politically harmful consequences.”

Adversaries of the regime were all too alert to ways they could use the official rhetoric on the nationalities issue. Starting in the 1950s, Ukrainian émigrés had argued that the best strategy to fight the Soviet regime was not to deny the international personality of the Soviet republics. On the contrary, as early as 1953 Holub considered that Ukrainian SSR membership in the UN could foster nationalist feelings in the republic and, in the long run, political independence.

As a lawyer, he rejected the claim made by some émigrés that Ukraine was a “stateless nation,” suggesting instead that émigrés ask whether the Ukrainian state was really “sovereign” and “independent.” In the Soviet Union itself, dissidents also used the national trappings of the regime to push their demands. Whereas human rights activists could shield themselves behind the provisions of the Helsinki agreement, the right of secession was invoked by many nationalists after the March 1956 unrest in Georgia.

In the 1960s, a series of trials involved “Ukrainian lawyers” who wanted

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143. Ibid., p. 44.
144. On 9 March 1956, Georgian First Secretary Vasil Mzhavanadze received an anonymous letter urging him to summon a special session of the Georgian Supreme Soviet to exercise Georgia’s right to
the Ukrainian SSR to exercise its right to secession under Article 14 of its constitution.

“Should Article 14 of the Constitution of the Ukrainian SSR be put into effect, the political order in Ukraine would remain Soviet, and the economic order would remain socialist. As a socialist state Ukraine would remain within the commonwealth of socialist countries,” Stepan Virun wrote from his deportation camp in Mordovia. In a letter sent to the chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet in May 1967, one of the “Ukrainian lawyers” emphasized that the Ukrainian SSR had signed in December 1960 the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.” In the 1960s, the apparent consolidation of Communist regimes gave traction to such internal and constitutionalist dissent. Among émigré communities, mavericks embraced curious projects that turned the Soviet constitution against its creators, while claiming to work for peace and stability. Among these was a project devised by a few U.S.-based Estonians, led by a young engineer-cum-political scientist, Rein Taagepera, who sent to Soviet and Western leaders in 1964–1966 a memorandum advocating a policy change toward the Baltic republics. The group suggested that the West abandon the non-recognition policy and that the Soviet Union agree to convert the Baltic republics into “people’s democracies” like those in Eastern Europe, based on what the group’s members perceived to be internal trends in the Baltic republics themselves and the opportunities of détente. Such a proposal illustrates a juncture between domestic and transnational spheres of debate. Although the idea was already perceived as outlandish in the 1960s and generated barbed criticism from later Estonian anti-Soviet activists, it was submitted at a time when the existence of a nationalist underground was revealed by clandestine publications and manifests smuggled out of the Soviet Union.
Conclusion

In October 1980 an international conference was held in Erevan on the “resolution of the national question” in the USSR and its relevance for developing countries in Asia and Africa.149 The conference tried to demonstrate that the USSR’s nationalities policy and federal structure could be useful, but African and Asian delegates confined themselves to broad, noncommittal declarations. By this date, Soviet federalism had clearly lost its appeal and was no longer a major reference. Nonetheless, Soviet federalism was part of the transnational debate on the future of composite polities and thus was emblematic of new political currents in the Cold War confrontation. This indicates that the debates of the 1950s were more complex than usually assumed and that issues such as imperial reform, civil rights, and de-Stalinization need to be linked. But whether Cooper’s thesis about the diversity of paths that could have been taken is valid is another matter. Soviet official propaganda did showcase union republics as models for newly independent states in the Third World but never clarified the exact meaning of the comparison. At a time when U.S. federalism was in trouble and colonial empires, facing the prospect of a hasty end, were looking for a path to renewal, Soviet federalism could potentially have had appeal for Third World leaders. However, in longing for the demise of colonial empires, the Communists never supported federal reforms that would have been most similar to the Soviet example. Although the display of sovereign union republics and their achievements might have been useful during the transition period from empire to independence, the political message conveyed by the USSR was not in favor of multinational federations.

This point highlights the relevance of the Cold War. The new visibility of the Soviet republics in international propaganda and Western attacks on “Red Colonialism” did not necessarily change the overall structure of Soviet federalism, but the impact of the negative comments was still felt at multiple levels. First, they definitively cemented the republic-based structure of the country and the proclamation of republican sovereignty, as revealed by the debates of the Mikoyan subcommittee in 1962–1964. As Soviet diplomatic correspondence makes clear, foreign criticism of nationalities policy and federal mechanisms in the USSR did not go unheeded by Soviet leaders. Second, leaders in the republics grew accustomed to using international arguments when seeking to extract concessions from the central government. Kalinovsky’s argument

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about Central Asia can thus be extended to all republics of the USSR. Finally, the Soviet evolutionary approach to national identity and statehood, as well as routine mentions of the sovereignty of the republics and their international relations and recognition, fostered grassroots expectations well into the 1980s and provided nationalist activists with tools they readily seized during perestroika.

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