

Editor's Note

This issue begins with an article by Mark J. Gasiorowski discussing Operation TPBEDAMN, a covert action launched by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Iran at the beginning of the 1950s. Although the CIA was pursuing several operations in Iran at that time, TPBEDAMN was the largest and most ambitious. The dense network of operatives that had coalesced through TPBEDAMN became exceedingly useful for U.S. policy in the early 1950s after the new left-of-center prime minister in Iran, Mohammad Mosaddeq, vowed to assert national control over Iran's oil industry, which had long been run by the British. The U.S. government under both Harry Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower initially sought to mediate the dispute between Iran and Great Britain, but over time U.S. officials became increasingly concerned about Mossadeq's intentions and apparent willingness to cooperate with the USSR. After Eisenhower authorized the CIA in March 1953 to overthrow Mossadeq, the TPBEDAMN network spearheaded the successful coup d'état against the Iranian prime minister in August 1953. The CIA has never officially released any information about TPBEDAMN, but Gasiorowski is able to provide a detailed account of the operation—the first such account to appear—by relying on interviews with officials who took part in the covert action and on archival research.

The next article, by Nikos Marantzidis, draws on declassified sources from several East European countries to document the crucial military assistance provided by the Soviet bloc to the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) during the Greek Civil War in the latter half of the 1940s. Until recently, scholars had almost no reliable evidence about the weaponry and other assistance given to the KKE and Democratic Army of Greece (DAG) guerrillas by the Soviet Union and its East European allies. Newly available archival sources from Eastern Europe underscore how important the Communist states' military supplies were. If this external support had not been forthcoming, the KKE and DAG would have been incapable of mounting an insurgency.

The next article, by Michael H. Creswell and Dieter H. Kollmer, considers whether any of the three major theories of international relations (IR)—realism, liberalism, and constructivism—can adequately explain states' weapons procurement strategies during the Cold War. Creswell and Kollmer present a case study of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) from the time of its admission into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1955 through the early 1970s and the inception of East-West détente. The authors seek to determine whether the key variable associated with each theory—power (realism), preferences (liberalism), or ideas (constructivism)—is best suited to explain the FRG's armaments strategy. They find that all three theories shed valuable light on certain aspects of West German defense procurement, but none of

Journal of Cold War Studies

Vol. 15, No. 4, Fall 2013, pp. 1–3, doi:10.1162/JCWS_e_00392

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the three is adequate on its own. Hence, Creswell and Kollmer call for greater eclecticism with competing IR theories rather than settling for just a single framework.

The fourth article, by Robert Brier, builds on literature that posits a “Helsinki effect” associated with the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) signed in August 1975 by the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, and 32 European countries. Scholars who subscribe to this notion claim that CSCE facilitated the end of the Cold War by establishing human rights norms and a review process that constrained the actions and policies of repressive Communist regimes in the Soviet bloc. Proponents of the “Helsinki effect” thesis vary in the causal mechanisms they highlight. To help clarify the argument, Brier focuses on the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR) in Poland, which was formed after unrest in June 1976 induced the Polish government to rescind price increases for food and other staples. Tracing the impact of KOR both inside and outside Poland, Brier maintains that the interactions KOR had with Western leftwing activists and politicians were especially important. In the past, leftist elements in the West had been willing to downplay or overlook human rights abuses in the Soviet bloc, but as a result of the contacts that emerged after CSCE was signed, the Western activists and politicians became far more inclined to demand greater respect for human rights in Communist countries. According to Brier, this change of position mitigated the Communist regimes’ ability to maintain highly repressive systems.

The fifth article, by Loch K. Johnson, is based partly on first-hand experience and partly on archival research and interviews. In 1975 the U.S. Senate created a special committee under Senator Frank Church to investigate the activities of the CIA. Johnson, who was the chief aide to Church on the committee staff, was responsible for analyzing the views, actions, and motives of the CIA’s long-time chief of counterintelligence, James Jesus Angleton, who had served in that post from 1954 until he was abruptly fired by CIA Director William Colby in 1974. To carry out this task, Johnson interviewed Angleton and had lunch with him on numerous occasions. Those conversations as well as primary and secondary sources enable Johnson to produce a vivid portrait of Angleton and his relationship with the Church Committee. Even though Angleton despised both Colby and the Church Committee, Johnson developed a reasonably cordial relationship with him and was able to gain useful insights into the CIA’s counterintelligence division and the pernicious impact Angleton often had on the agency’s work.

The sixth item is a review essay I wrote about a book by Stephen Kotkin, *Uncivil Society*, which appeared on the twentieth anniversary of the demise of East European Communism. Kotkin’s book has been both applauded and reviled. Much of the criticism mischaracterizes Kotkin’s rich, thoughtful analysis. Although the book is not flawless, it presents a nuanced, convincing explanation of why the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe collapsed.

These initial six items are followed by a forum of nine commentaries on John Lewis Gaddis’s highly acclaimed biography of George F. Kennan, published in 2011. Kennan gained renown among historians after publishing the pseudonymous “X” article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” in the July 1947 issue of *Foreign Affairs* when

he was serving as head of the U.S. State Department's newly created Policy Planning Staff. Kennan is often described as the "father of containment," but archival evidence that has emerged over the past twenty years indicates that he might be better described as the "father of rollback." Kennan lived to be 101, and during his long life he often expressed views that contradicted what he had said earlier, making him a complex subject for any biographer. We chose scholars from several countries who could deal with many aspects of Kennan's career and of Gaddis's book. The nine commentators vary in their assessments of Gaddis's portrait of Kennan. Some warmly praise the biography, whereas others, particularly Barton J. Bernstein and Anders Stephanson, are harshly critical. Gaddis offers a reply to the commentaries.

As the journal was going to press, I learned about the death of Pauline Maier, a distinguished historian at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology whom I had known for twenty years. Pauline was a kind, affable person and a great scholar of the American Revolutionary period. Her books about the Declaration of Independence, the ratification of the Constitution, and other topics from that period are of immense value to experts but are also accessible to a wider audience. Pauline lived with her husband, Charlie (an eminent scholar of European and U.S. history who is a long-time friend and colleague of mine at Harvard), right near my house in Cambridge. I would often see her when I was out running, and she would always yell some amusing comment. I will deeply miss her humor, intellect, and amiability.