

## Editor's Note

This issue begins with an article by Michael D. Stevenson discussing the crisis that engulfed U.S.-Canadian relations in the early 1960s in connection with the proposed transfer of nuclear-armed BOMARC air defense missiles to Canadian jurisdiction. President John F. Kennedy and his advisers became increasingly frustrated with Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker because of his reluctance to permit nuclear munitions to be stored on Canadian territory in peacetime. The administration worried that Diefenbaker's leering of embracing U.S. proposals for nuclear weapons custody would leave crucial air defense systems unable to respond in a timely manner to incoming Soviet long-range bombers. In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, which created new opportunities for the Kennedy administration to press the issue, Diefenbaker moved closer to the U.S. position, but senior officials in Washington eventually lost patience and abruptly suspended the negotiations. Subsequently, in a rambling speech to the Canadian parliament in late January 1963, Diefenbaker publicly disclosed that secret negotiations on the matter had been taking place, and he defended the positions he had taken. U.S. officials, irritated at the breach of confidentiality, issued a press release condemning Diefenbaker, whose government fell in elections held later that year, much to the Kennedy administration's relief. The new government, headed by Prime Minister Lester Pearson, proved far more willing to accommodate U.S. concerns on the nuclear weapons issue.

The next article, by Olav Riste, sheds new light on the so-called Stay Behind networks that were secretly created by West European governments to be ready to deal with a possible Soviet invasion and occupation of their countries. The ongoing release of formerly secret information about these units in numerous countries over the past two decades has undermined the sensationalist claims put forth by the Swiss historian Daniele Ganser, who in a book published in 2005 asserted that Stay Behind was a creation of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British Special Intelligence Service (SIS) and was foisted on the West European countries. Ganser further alleged that the Stay Behind networks repeatedly interfered in the West European countries' domestic affairs and were implicated in right-wing terrorist attacks. Riste shows that every aspect of Ganser's depiction is fanciful. Far from being creations of the CIA and SIS, the Stay Behind units were formed by indigenous actors acting on the basis of intense local fears of the expansionist threat posed by the Soviet Army in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The volunteers who served in these units did so for patriotic reasons, not because they had been enlisted by sinister external forces. Moreover, Ganser's conspiratorial depiction of the Stay Behind as "NATO's secret armies" is contravened by archival evidence from more than a dozen European countries showing that the

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networks were never under the command of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and were always overseen exclusively by local intelligence services.

The next article, by Evan McCormick, explores the debates within the Reagan administration in the early 1980s about policy toward Latin America. After Ronald Reagan came to office in January 1981 he did what other U.S. presidents have done when they succeed a president from the opposing political party—namely, they reject (at least rhetorically) everything associated with their predecessor. Reagan pledged to undo the policies of Jimmy Carter, including Carter's policy toward Latin America, but this effort to be “not Carter” left considerable leeway for the new administration to shape a concrete policy in the region. McCormick shows that some officials such as Alexander Haig and Jeane Kirkpatrick wanted to pursue a hard line against Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba and against Marxist guerrillas in Central America, but other officials wanted to avoid getting bogged down in Central America, for fear that it would divert attention, resources, and political capital from higher-priority efforts, especially proposals for tax cuts and increases in military budgets. Although Reagan did eventually embrace the “Reagan Doctrine” in Central America (a term coined by Charles Krauthammer) and provided military aid to insurgents fighting against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, the president also increasingly came to support democracy promotion as a fundamental U.S. goal in Central America. U.S. policy in the region under Reagan thus reflected both power and values.

The fourth article, by Christian Henrich-Franke, covers a topic that has rarely been discussed in the historiography of the Cold War: international efforts to regulate the allocation of radio frequencies. Henrich-Franke focuses on the work of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) before and during the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979 (WARC-79), which was convened to undertake a major reallocation of the frequency spectrum. Henrich-Franke shows that industrialized countries on both sides of the East-West Cold War divide shared an interest in fending off the efforts of Third World governments to reorient the allocation of radio frequencies in ways that would be much more favorable to developing countries. Despite a surge of East-West tensions in the late 1970s, engineers and other specialists from postal, telegraph, and telecommunications (PTT) organizations on both sides of the Iron Curtain cooperated at preliminary meetings and in working groups that shaped the agenda of WARC-79 even before it got under way. By the time the conference began its sessions in September 1979, many of the key issues had already been resolved by the PTT organizations, giving scant opportunity to Third World governments to try to divert the proceedings to their proclaimed goal of fashioning a New International Information Order. The ten-week-long WARC-79 resulted in a thorough reworking of the ITU's Radio Regulations, reflecting the advent of new technologies and approaches. Henrich-Franke emphasizes the importance of the East-West professional cooperation that preceded the conference and largely determined its outcome. The conference showed that even at a time of deepening tension, East-West technical cooperation on an issue of mutual interest was both feasible and highly successful.

The next article, by Zhihua Shen and Xia Yafeng, discusses how the treatment of ethnic Koreans who lived near the Chinese border with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) was influenced by Mao Zedong's interest in preserving Pyongyang's support after the Sino-Soviet split emerged in the 1960s. Because the North Korean authorities were desperately seeking greater numbers of workers to cope with a wide range of domestic tasks in the aftermath of the Korean War, they urged their Chinese Communist allies to permit Koreans in the People's Republic of China (PRC) to move to the DPRK. Although this preferential treatment was unusual for the PRC, the Chinese authorities accepted largely free migration by ethnic Koreans from China into North Korea. The aim was to facilitate North Korea's economic development and to solidify China's political ties with the DPRK. China's conciliatory posture on migration was accompanied by a willingness to make territorial adjustments favoring North Korea.

The sixth article, by Nathan J. Citino, examines U.S.-sponsored economic development projects in the Third World and their role in the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union. Focusing on the East Ghor Canal project in Jordan in the 1960s, Citino argues that when U.S. officials sought to transfer notions of democracy and protection of small farmers to Middle Eastern countries that had long been dominated by a small number of wealthy landowners, the impact on the recipient societies often diverged markedly from what was intended. U.S. diplomats and development experts relied on the U.S. experience with economic modernization when they put together specific programs for the Middle East, but in the local context of the Jordan Valley, development schemes designed on U.S. patterns were apt to be of minimal relevance. The East Ghor Canal project, Citino argues, sheds broader light on the way U.S. economic development programs in the Middle East affected, and were constrained by, local circumstances. Although Citino takes account of the impact of the Cold War on U.S. economic development policies and programs, he highlights the importance of probing into local history, politics, and culture when seeking to understand the varying outcomes of U.S. development projects in the Third World.

The final article, by Meredith Oyen, examines the way refugees were absorbed in Hong Kong in the 1950s after they fled the newly installed Communist regime in the PRC. Some of these refugees initially had gone to Taiwan but were then evacuated from there to Hong Kong, which was still a British crown colony. Oyen is particularly interested in the way the U.S. government, especially the U.S. Refugee Relief Program (RPP) sponsored by the State Department, worked with private volunteer organizations (PVOs) to absorb refugees in Hong Kong and prevent Communist infiltration. Oyen looks specifically at the relationship between the RRP and the leading PVO that dealt with this issue, Aid Refugee Chinese Intellectuals (ARCI), which was formed in 1952 and initially sought to relocate Chinese refugees to Taiwan. Starting in 1954, however, ARCI shifted focus to Hong Kong, and the work it did over the next several years served the U.S. State Department's interest in presenting the United States as concerned about the safety and well-being of Asian (as well as European) intellectuals fleeing Communist oppression. Over time, the effectiveness and relevance of the ARCI in refugee policy

dwindled, but the State Department continued to fund the organization. Not until 1970 was the ARCI formally disbanded (though its resettlement operations had come to an end a decade earlier). The mutually supportive relationship that evolved between the RRP and ARCI regarding refugees in Hong Kong illustrates how the political benefits of government-PVO cooperation during the Cold War could at times eclipse the substance.

The issue concludes with 32 book reviews.