
*Reviewed by Warren F. Kimball, Rutgers University*

Whatever the shrill voices of believers in conspiracy, the Yalta Conference decisions have long been understood by historians as the logical, if unsatisfying, conclusion of military events and high politics during the Second World War. Did Franklin Roosevelt suddenly “sell out” Eastern Europe in mistaken efforts to create a long-term cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union? Did Winston Churchill fight in vain to save Eastern Europe from Soviet domination? Did Iosif Stalin pull the wool over the eyes of an ailing Roosevelt and his “loyal lieutenant”?

Plokhy’s study of the conference supplants Diane Shaver Clemens’s *Yalta*, published by Oxford University Press forty years ago. Others have skirted the edges with different interpretive conclusions, but none have approached Plokhy’s detailed retelling of both specifics and atmospherics. He brings more to the table than just detail. He captures the complex personal and political dynamic between the Big Three leaders. Using the snippets of new documentation coming out of the Presidential Archive (former Politburo Archive) in Moscow, he offers an intelligent and persuasive analysis of why Stalin acted. His analysis of Churchill’s and Roosevelt’s motives makes eminent sense.

Plokhy’s balanced and plausible portrait of Stalin is the book’s most important contribution. Stalin comes across as implacable in his quest to gain control in Eastern Europe, specifically Poland. How that would be done, and how that control would be exercised, were subsidiary issues. The security of the Soviet state, in Stalin’s view, depended on firm control—this was his absolute *sine qua non*. If Churchill’s federated Europe and Roosevelt’s great-power system depended on Poland’s being “free” in the sense of non-Soviet, then the Cold War was inevitable.

Plokhy writes well. The book is long and detailed, but a good read. He has a sharp eye for clever anecdotes. That praise earned, two cautions should be noted: First, no matter how many caveats Plokhy offers, and no matter how many times he denies accepting the great Yalta myth—that it was the definitive conference that created the postwar world—so tightly focused a study of the famous meeting does in fact tend to reinforce the myth. Although Plokhy summarizes the background for each of his thirty-odd chapters, those excursions stand alone, never pulled together to present a cohesive and comprehensive lead up to Yalta. This is not so much a criticism as a warning—a caveat lector. The book is so comprehensive about Yalta that you will
think it explains how the postwar world came about. It does not, and cannot. The Polish question is an example.

Conflicts over Polish boundaries and governance likely caused the outbreak of the Cold War. If a historian of that era needs to get anything correct and in context, it is the Polish question. Plokhy’s all-too sketchy discussions of the Teheran Conference (which was to Yalta as the Old Testament is to the New) does get right that Churchill proposed and Roosevelt agreed to move Poland westward. Yet in the two longer chapters on the Yalta talks about Poland, that foundational commitment seems nearly forgotten. From the evening when Churchill moved his matchsticks in what he called the parade maneuver “left close,” Poland’s borders were determined, regardless of the ancillary details about which branch of the Oder River. Nor could any Polish government win an election without repudiating those new eastern and western boundaries. End of story. Plokhy recognizes that Churchill and Roosevelt sought cosmetics—a “decent-looking agreement”—yet he still treats the meaningless discussions over Poland as if they were serious. Once again we end up with an image of Yalta as definitive, which it surely was not.

The second caution is that no book that touches on high policy during World War II should be published today without reference to the new findings coming out of Soviet-era documents in the Russian archives, particularly the Presidential Archive. Plokhy is a native speaker of Russian and seems to cite the most recent published documents and histories. But it is hard to tell. Viking/Penguin has published what purports to be a scholarly book without including a bibliography. That is a disgrace! There is no acceptable excuse, no matter the cost-savings.

In any event, references to “formerly secret Soviet documents” must mean “newly opened” documents. There is probably enough out there to allow Plokhy to expand our knowledge of Stalin’s perceptions and reactions to Anglo-American proposals and actions, but we know that we have a great deal more to learn from documents that are still not available. This is not meant as a criticism of Plokhy; the Presidential Archive has never been made accessible to researchers, whether Russian or foreign. No history is the final word, but Plokhy’s is probably as close as it gets—for now.

Plokhy (like Clemens) sees the Yalta discussions as a political board game, with the three leaders all bargaining and negotiating. The sides shifted—Churchill alone on Poland, Roosevelt isolated on colonialism and the United Nations, Stalin without an ally on reparations. But even those chips shifted to different piles. What never shifted were Stalin’s insistence on Soviet control over Poland, Roosevelt’s insistence on a great-power condominium after the war, and Churchill’s frustration that his Eurocentric center was not in fact the center at all.

The not-so-new school of Roosevelt-haters, motivated by current politics more than historical analysis, will be distressed by Plokhy’s depiction of Roosevelt as the most effective negotiator—the “judge” he called himself—perhaps because he had more room to maneuver. Roosevelt had early on dismissed U.S. involvement in the postwar governance of Europe, a stance that allowed him to concentrate on his deep conviction that only great-power cooperation could create an era of peace. For Stalin, great-power cooperation meant control of the Soviet Union’s “backyard.” For
Churchill, it meant that Britain’s place in the sun could be preserved. In a sense, the devil was never in the details. The details were merely the board pieces, the playthings, that the Big Three toyed with at Yalta. The “great men” were hamstrung by the realities created by Adolf Hitler, the Red Army, Imperial Japanese follies, U.S. economic strength, and our beloved muse—history.

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Reviewed by Douglas Little, Clark University

Few aspects of U.S. foreign policy have been more controversial than the series of covert actions approved by the White House and orchestrated by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on every continent except Antarctica in the decades after 1945. Thanks to the persistence of researchers like the National Security Archive’s John Prados, we have gained access to many important CIA records over the past twenty years that provide a relatively complete picture of the scale and scope of the agency’s “dirty work.” In this updated and expanded version of his 1987 classic Presidents Secret Wars, Prados offers compelling evidence that from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush, covert action has been consistently antithetical to one of America’s oft-stated diplomatic goals—to make the world “safe for democracy.”

Readers of Prados’s earlier work will find some of Safe for Democracy quite familiar. Shortly after V-J Day, Truman dismantled the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which Franklin D. Roosevelt had set up before Pearl Harbor to wage secret war against Germany and Japan. Truman saw the OSS as dangerous and unnecessary in peacetime. When the Cold War heated up during the summer of 1947, the president reversed himself and urged Congress to pass the National Security Act, which established both the CIA and the National Security Council (NSC). Because the new legislation did not specifically authorize covert action, however, the CIA received its marching orders from the executive branch in early 1948 when Truman signed NSC 10/2, which authorized the new agency secretly to undertake propaganda, sabotage, and subversion to support “indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world” (p. 41). A central feature of Prados’s panoramic story is the growing tension between those on Capitol Hill who sought to monitor the CIA and the Cold Warriors in the White House who insisted that covert action must be conducted in complete secrecy.

During the Truman years, the CIA’s clandestine operations were focused mainly on Europe. The agency sought to prevent Soviet inroads in the Free World by funneling dollars to the Christian Democrats in Italy and bankrolling an anti-Communist intelligence network filled with ex-Nazis. Much less successful were operations behind the Iron Curtain. Secret U.S. support for anti-Soviet forces in Ukraine and the Baltic states amounted to little more than spoiling operations, and a joint Anglo-American
effort to spark an uprising against Enver Hoxha's communist dictatorship in Albania was drowned in blood after the Soviet authorities obtained details from Kim Philby, a spy inside MI6, Britain's CIA.

By the 1950s, U.S. intelligence turned its attention from Europe to the Third World, where covert action became a favorite weapon in the Cold War arsenal of Dwight Eisenhower and the two Dulles brothers—Secretary of State John Foster and CIA Director Allen Welsh. Recapping episodes that Mark Gasiorowski and Richard Immerman have described elsewhere in exquisite detail, Prados reminds us that in Iran and Guatemala the Eisenhower administration helped make the Third World safe from democracy, not safe for democracy. In some splendid chapters on the late 1950s, Prados also covers less familiar territory, including abortive U.S. efforts to topple Sukarno’s neutralist regime in Indonesia and the CIA’s recruitment of Tibetan guerrillas to wage an unsuccessful secret war against the People’s Republic of China in the foothills of the Himalayas. In a 70-page section on the agency’s famously inept scheme to secure regime change in Cuba, Prados captures beautifully the “James Bond Meets the Three Stooges” aspect of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, for which both Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy shared responsibility.

Eisenhower’s policies paved the way for other infamous and brutal covert actions in the 1960s. Discounting rumors that ugly episodes like the relentless campaign to kill Fidel Castro or the use of assassination teams to root out the Viet Cong infrastructure were CIA “rogue operations,” Prados emphasizes that both “Mongoose” and “Phoenix” received White House approval, as did less well-known covert actions against left-wing radicals like Guyana’s Cheddi Jagan. Using recently declassified materials, he also describes how secret CIA funding flowed to pro-American dictators like Zaire’s Joseph Mobutu during Lyndon Johnson’s administration. Although Prados has scaled back his previous coverage of the CIA’s secret war in Laos in the mid-1960s, the agency’s eventual abandonment of the Hmong tribal militias, who disrupted the flow of North Vietnamese troops and supplies along the Ho Chi Minh trail, remains a cautionary tale for Iraqi Kurds and other ethnic minorities who later discovered that the United States really has no permanent friends in the Third World, only permanent interests.

The chapters on Richard Nixon’s and Gerald Ford’s administrations are a painful reminder of just how hollow the U.S. commitment to democracy was at the height of the Cold War. Prados makes excellent use of newly released documents on Chile to add fresh details to an old story—the cynical, ruthless efforts by Nixon and Henry Kissinger to reverse the outcome of the 1970 Chilean elections by encouraging a military coup against President Salvador Allende. Prados also shows how the Ford administration’s botched effort to prevent Soviet-backed revolutionaries from gaining power in newly independent Angola ultimately aligned the United States with right-wing thugs like Jonas Savimbi and with the white-minority regime in South Africa. Ironically, although top CIA officials had cautioned the White House against covert action in Chile and Angola, these two episodes helped spark a backlash against the agency in the mid-1970s, when Senator Frank Church argued that only strict Con-
gressional oversight from could prevent the executive branch from waging further se-
cret wars.

However, the new Senate and House intelligence committees were no match for
Ronald Reagan and his CIA director, William Casey, an OSS veteran who launched a
series of what Prados calls “overt covert actions” in the 1980s. The Reagan administra-
tion accelerated a not-so-secret war in Afghanistan (a venture that had begun during
the final year of the Carter administration). With help from Pakistani intelligence the
CIA provided the guns and missiles that mujahedeen guerrillas needed to withstand
the Soviet Army, a success despite disturbing signs of anti-American Islamic
“blowback.” Prados devotes two chapters to dissecting Reagan’s most embarrassing co-
vert action, the nasty war against left-wing revolutionaries in Central America that
eventually saw the White House fund Salvadoran death squads, defy a Congressional
ban on arming the Nicaraguan “contras,” and swap arms for hostages as part of a hare-
brained scheme to recycle clandestine payments from Iran to “freedom fighters” bat-
tling the Sandinista regime in Managua. In amazing detail, Prados confirms that the
Iran-Contra affair was not instigated by rogue agents at CIA headquarters in Langley
and was instead carefully planned by rogue NSC officials like John Poindexter and Ol-
iver North, who may have bamboozled the inattentive Reagan—or possibly not.

The final section of Safe for Democracy on CIA operations since the end of the
Cold War is a little disappointing. Prados takes a whirlwind tour of covert fiascos from
Somalia to Haiti and from Kurdistan to Bosnia, but by focusing on bureaucratic poli-
tics and petty personal rivalries inside the Beltway, he neglects larger questions like the
agency’s response to the rise of Islamic terrorism in the 1990s. To be sure, readers will
want to know why James Woolsey and John Deutch were such inept CIA directors
and how George Tenet managed to rebuild morale at Langley before being hung out
to dry by George W. Bush, but they will also want to know much more about the “vir-
tual” Alec Station, which the agency established in the late 1990s to wage a secret war
against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda. To say that the CIA’s “errors” preceding the
9/11 attacks or its “failure to conduct vigorous covert operations against terrorist
groups” after the fall of the twin towers “are stories for another day” (p. 622) will not
satisfy readers eager to know what went wrong with U.S. intelligence during the
Clinton and Bush administrations.

That said, this encyclopedic account of covert action from the first days of the
Cold War to last days of the old millennium should be must reading for all Americans
pondering how best to cope with the Islamic threat in the twenty-first century. “In all
the secret wars from 1947 to the present, no covert operation ever led to a vibrant de-
mocracy, and quite a few resulted in dictatorships,” Prados concludes (p. 647). Over
the years, presidents eager for foreign policy quick fixes have regularly turned to the
CIA, but “covert operations have been and are a weapon against the weak” that has fre-
quently backfired in places like Iran and Afghanistan, where the weak eventually be-
came strong (p. 632, emphasis in original). Prados rightly insists that the best anti-
dotes to the plague of clandestine failures detailed in his densely packed book are
greater public access to secret information and more effective congressional oversight
of the executive branch. To keep the United States safe for democracy, Americans would be well advised to worry a little less about rogue agents at the CIA or rogue dictators like Saddam Hussein and a little more about the rogue actions of certain U.S. presidents like George W. Bush and their advisers.


Reviewed by Mary Kathryn Barbier, Mississippi State University

In the vast literature on the Cold War, some topics garner more attention than others. Over the past decade, Soviet espionage during the Cold War, particularly that related to the development of the nuclear bomb, has been the subject of numerous monographs, including John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, *Early Cold War Spies: The Espionage Trials that Shaped American Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Giles Whittell, *Bridge of Spies: A True Story of the Cold War* (New York: Broadway Books, 2010); Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America—The Stalin Era* (New York: Random House, 1999) and Walter Schneir with Miriam Schneir, *Final Verdict: What Really Happened in the Rosenberg Case* (New York: Melville Books, 2010). Some works, such as Victor Cherkashin with Gregory Feifer, *Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer: The True Story of the Man Who Recruited Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames*, provide first-hand accounts. The list goes on and on, but the subject has not yet been exhausted. Throwing his hat into the ring, Allen M. Hornblum has now published *The Invisible Harry Gold: The Man Who Gave the Soviets the Atom Bomb*, a book that refutes the claims made by Walter and Miriam Schneir in their *Invitation to an Inquest: A New Look at the Rosenberg-Sobell Case*, which concluded that Harry Gold was a liar and that the Rosenbergs were innocent.

A journalist by trade, Hornblum has published several books, including *Sentenced to Science: One Black Man’s Story of Imprisonment in America* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007). For his project on Harry Gold, he conducted extensive research in several U.S. archives, court records, congressional hearings, and secondary sources. In addition, Hornblum interviewed dozens of people who were in some way connected to Gold, who died in 1972. The culmination of Hornblum’s efforts is an exhaustive analysis of Gold, his life, and his actions—his background, what kind of person he was, what motivated him, and his relationships with various people, including his family, his colleagues, his fellow spies, his fellow inmates, and his attorneys, who by all indications genuinely liked him.

Originally named Heinrich Golodnitsky, Harry Gold, the son of Russian immigrants, gained notoriety after his arrest, for working as a Soviet courier and helping to provide the Soviet Union with information about the nuclear bomb, and for subsequently testifying against several Soviet spies—Julius and Ethel Rosenberg among
others. Once he was apprehended, Gold cooperated fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and provided a wealth of information about his work for the Soviet Union and about various people, both Americans and foreigners, who were also in their employ and who were engaged in providing scientific intelligence to an enemy of the United States.

Born in Switzerland in 1910, Gold emigrated with his parents four years later to the United States, where he received a new “Americanized” name. After briefly living in Chicago and Norfolk, Virginia, the Gold family settled in Philadelphia. Hornblum does a great job of describing Gold’s early life—the difficulties that his father faced as he tried to earn enough money to support the family, how his mother added to the family’s income, the impact of the Great Depression on them, and Harry’s own efforts to help support his family while at the same time pursuing his dream of becoming a chemist—all factors, Hornblum argues, that contributed to Gold’s decision to become first a spy and then a courier for Soviet intelligence services.

Using Gold’s own words, as well as those of his attorneys, coworkers, and employers, Hornblum paints a sympathetic picture of an intelligent man who had few social skills or friends, was shy, and was manipulated into working for Moscow. Hornblum returns time and again to Gold’s assertions that he had not meant to hurt the United States, that he had made a mistake, that he was assuming responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty, and that he had to make restitution for his actions. Although Gold resisted joining the Communist Party, he became willing to consider helping the Soviet people because he came to believe that the “Soviet Union had become the first nation to make ‘anti-Semitism a crime against the state’” (p. 39). Gold had seen his father suffer from the anti-Semitic practices of his coworkers and employers, and it affected him deeply. Because Gold believed that the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, was willing to make anti-Semitism illegal, he began, despite doubts, to become favorably disposed toward the country and willing to help make life better for its citizens.

Gold started by stealing industrial secrets from his employer, Pennsylvania Sugar Company. After he had exhausted all avenues there, he became a courier for a series of Soviet agents, the most notorious of which was Klaus Fuchs, who worked on the Manhattan Project in Los Alamos. Although Gold ferried intelligence from agents such as Fuchs in exchange for funds provided by his Soviet contacts, Gold rejected offers of payment for himself. Eventually, however, because of the amount of travel that he did—regular trips to New York, as well as at least one trip to New Mexico—he accepted payments that helped to defray, but did not cover, the cost of his travel, which was occasionally partly funded with loans from friends. In fact, as Hornblum acknowledges, Gold and his Soviet contacts had a less than favorable opinion of those who worked for money, rather than for the cause alone. Gold later admitted that as time went on and he began to question Soviet policies, he had no idea how to extricate himself from his position as courier and as betrayer of his family, his employers, and his country.

Once the FBI caught Gold, however, he was vilified in the press by Americans.
who were horrified by his actions, and later by those who championed the Rosenbergs’ innocence, particularly Walter and Miriam Schneir. Accepting the contention that Gold was manipulated, that he was truly sorry for what he had done, that, by serving sixteen years of his 30-year sentence, he had made restitution, that he had made important contributions as a chemist working in both prison and the private sector and that his attorneys represented him for years without pay, Hornblum makes every effort to portray the Soviet spy/courier as a sympathetic character, who had paid his debt to society many times over. In the end, Hornblum argues that Gold was a good, caring, complex man, who would go out of his way to help people. Although Hornblum does not go so far as to excuse Gold’s actions, he does make every effort to explain, and even justify, why Gold made the decision to work for the Soviet Union.


Reviewed by Andrew Preston, Cambridge University

To the great boon of historians—but equally great misfortune of everyone else, except perhaps for defense contractors—the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have made new books on the Vietnam War timely, topical, and relevant to current affairs. Although this is true for almost any new book on Vietnam, few authors will hit this target as squarely as James M. Carter does. Written with admirable clarity, insight, and concision, his *Inventing Vietnam* examines the U.S. project to build a viable government and society for South Vietnam, a vast endeavor he refers to as “state-building.”

Carter’s main argument is that the United States tried to “invent” South Vietnam during the period from the collapse of French rule in 1954 and the tumultuous, pivotal events of 1968, when U.S. intervention peaked and Washington began its long, painful exit from Indochina. Carter is no post-modernist: When he argues that the United States sought to invent Vietnam, he means this literally, not as a theoretical construct of post-colonial imaginings. Because of the Cold War and its extension into Asia by 1950, Americans believed they needed to build a working state in Vietnam to compete with the rival high modernist solutions proposed by the Vietnamese Communists and their Soviet and Chinese patrons. All this will seem familiar to any student of the Cold War, let alone the Vietnam War, but Carter adds to this conventional view of nation-building by including U.S. military spending and training as part of a state-building process. Carter argues that the military component to state-building was not a rival program but an integral part of state-building. On this and related points, Carter is entirely persuasive.

However, there are other aspects of *Inventing Vietnam* that require greater elaboration or corroboration, either because Carter overstates his case or because he exaggerates existing historiographical failings. Sometimes he simply needs to be clearer about his own intentions. For example, his analysis could benefit from a discussion
that distinguishes between \textit{nation}-building, the traditional term used by historians, and \textit{state}-building, his preferred term. Surprisingly, Carter does not seem to have made use of Francis Fukuyama's book \textit{State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century} (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), which examines this distinction. Although Carter occasionally uses the term “nation-building,” he makes a deliberate point of referring to U.S. efforts at “state-building”—surely an enlightening choice, but what are the key differences between the two? He never says. The overwhelming majority of historians of the war have looked to some extent at the U.S. “nation-building” project, so what does the distinct concept of “state-building” add? Quite a bit, as it turns out, but this needs more explication from Carter, especially because it is his principal contribution to the existing literature. His failure to explore this fundamental difference leaves some intriguing questions hanging in the air. Does he believe that South Vietnam constituted a nation but lacked a state? From the tenor of his book, I assume the answer is an emphatic “no,” but on such important questions that get to the heart of his subject, Carter needs to explain the difference between the two concepts, in theory and in practice.

\textit{Inventing Vietnam} is oddly deficient in discussing political reform as a component of the “state-building” project—an odd omission given that it would be nearly impossible to build a state without focusing on the essentials of politics and government. We find here very little about civil society and almost nothing about governance. Even familiar episodes in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ chimerical drive for political reform are absent, such as the infamous 1967 constitution and elections (Dwight Eisenhower benefited from Saigon’s largely illusory stability in the 1950s and thus could be content with an authoritarian regime under Ngo Dinh Diem). Similarly, modernization/development theory receives only cursory discussion, and important state-building figures such as Walt Rostow and Robert Komer are treated only in passing.

The omissions of Fukuyama’s book and of Rostow and Komer reflect a wider gap in Carter’s use of secondary sources. By my count, his bibliography includes only three books published after 2003. One is a key work: Shawn McHale’s book about the emergence of Vietnamese nationalism, \textit{Print and Power: Confucianism, Communism, and Buddhism in the Making of Modern Vietnam} (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2004). But the two others are Odd Arne Westad’s \textit{Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) and Michael Adas’s \textit{Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America’s Civilizing Mission} (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006)—outstanding and important books, to be sure, but hardly the meat and potatoes of Vietnam War historiography. Many books and articles on the war have been published since 2003, a diverse but directly pertinent body of work that Carter should have addressed (to support, refute, or complicate). Even given the normal time-lag in book production, his bibliography could have included much more of this recent literature.

Nonetheless, \textit{Inventing Vietnam} is an excellent book that will surely become one of the standard works on U.S. nation- and state-building efforts in Vietnam. Although Carter’s claim that there has been a “near-total neglect of . . . state-building ef-

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forts” (p. 13) in the existing literature is exaggerated (partly because he never defines
the distinction between the two), Carter has written an original and compelling treat-
ment of an important topic. It will not be the last word on the subject, but it will cer-
tainly open new avenues of research on the Vietnam War.


Reviewed by Eric C. Schneider, University of Pennsylvania

In 1971, Congressmen Morgan Murphy and Robert Steele issued a report on drug use
among U.S. soldiers in Vietnam. They concluded that 10 to 15 percent of servicemen
were addicted to heroin and that even larger numbers were using heroin at least occasion-
ally. The news was the last thing President Richard Nixon wanted to hear inasmuch as it fused the two issues he had vowed to solve in his run for the presidency: the escalating domestic crime rate and the seemingly endless war in Vietnam.

The media, which had earlier picked up on the story of marijuana use in Viet-
am, supplied audiences with images of drugged-out soldiers unable to function in
combat and threatening to raise the crime rate even further when they came back
home. Domestic opponents of the war, seeking to arouse popular antipathy to contin-
ued involvement in Southeast Asia, played up the image of the addicted soldier and
reports of participation by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in drug trading. In
response, Nixon declared a war on drugs, created a special action office on drug abuse
prevention in the White House, increased federal involvement in local drug law en-
forcement, and ordered the Department of Defense to begin testing returning service-
men for drug use in order to prove that his administration was not asleep at the wheel,
as congressional Democrats had charged. He also encouraged the governments of
South Vietnam, Thailand, and Burma to clean up corruption and crack down on
drug trading, and he began the practice of supplying military aid for drug control pur-
poses. Such were the origins, Jeremy Kuzmarov argues, of the myth of the addicted
army and the modern war on drugs that it inspired.

In this generally well-written book, Kuzmarov is at his best tracing the political
uses of this myth. It created a narrative to explain the loss of the war in Vietnam, por-
traying U.S. servicemen as increasingly unwilling and unable to carry out their mis-
ion. In film, television, novels, and other media, the war’s destructive effects were nar-
rowed to the victimization of U.S. soldiers by drugs. The myth hid the true cost of the
war in Vietnamese lives lost and countryside destroyed, setting the stage for future im-
perial adventures. It also sustained the militarization of the war on drugs abroad. The
model of police training, military advising, covert actions, and chemical defoliation
that were pioneered in Southeast Asia spread to Latin America. In the United States
the emphasis on the foreign origins of drugs hid the problems of structural poverty


and inequality that better explained the appeal of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. Kuzmarov maintains that the entire foreign and domestic war on drugs to the present day is based on the pervasive myth of the addicted army.

What was the actual extent of heroin use in Vietnam? Kuzmarov provides evidence of heroin use, but he believes that the 10 to 15 percent estimate (which Murphy later repudiated) was too large, that military, political, and medical authorities were both unable and unwilling to distinguish between use and abuse, and that little drug use occurred on the front lines, where it could have harmed combat operations, contrary to the media and other portrayals of addicted troops. The soldiers who used drugs or alcohol (the latter of which was often a much more serious problem) did so in rear areas, away from combat zones, or upon return from missions as a way of coming down from the stress of war. Kuzmarov believes that for many soldiers using drugs was therapeutic, something that no one at the time, aside from a few counterculture theorists, would have argued. Only about 5 percent of those taking urine tests failed them, which Kuzmarov believes is a better estimate of actual abuse.

Does what we know about heroin in Vietnam sustain Kuzmarov’s thesis? Kuzmarov cites Lee Robbins’s influential epidemiological study that showed a remarkable remission rate among heroin users upon their return home from Vietnam, but he fundamentally mischaracterizes the findings. In Robbins’s sample of 495 returnees who had failed their urine tests in Vietnam, one-third used heroin in the United States, but only 7 percent were re-addicted. In a second sample of 470 randomly chosen returnees, 10 percent reported using heroin and 1 percent claimed to be addicted in the United States. But Robbins concluded that the Morgan-Steele report underestimated—not overestimated—the extent of heroin use in Vietnam. In her random sample of Vietnam returnees, more than 40 percent had tried heroin, opium, both, or another narcotic drug during their tour, and half of them claimed that they had become addicted. According to Robbins’s studies, the myth of the addicted army was no myth after all.

Kuzmarov is clearly right that the war on drugs emerged from reports of Vietnam-era heroin use and the embarrassing revelations of CIA involvement in opium trading. The media did sensationalize the problem of heroin use, especially among combat soldiers, and attention to heroin did gloss over U.S. responsibility for massive destruction in Southeast Asia and reversed the roles of victims and victimizers. Certainly a militarized war on drugs abroad has continued into our own time and has sapped resources that might be better geared toward reducing demand. But if the drug problem was as serious as Robbins’s study indicated, then the Nixon administration’s responses to it were not nearly as outrageous as Kuzmarov thinks. The modern war on drugs may be bankrupt, but the myth of the addicted army is not to blame.

*Reviewed by Simon Duke, European Institute of Public Administration (Maastricht)*

Nick McCamley specializes in writing books about “secret” underground places, including underground cities, underground disasters, underground protective sites for British art treasures during war, and the quarries around Avoncliff in Wiltshire. *Cold War Secret Nuclear Bunkers* complements the theme and was designed as a sequel to his book *Secret Underground Cities* (London: Pen & Sword Books, 1998), which details the United Kingdom’s underground architecture of the Second World War. The enthusiasm demonstrated in his previous work for all things secret and underground is carried forward into the Cold War setting, where the challenges of providing command and control, security, and some elements of survivability in the era of thermo-nuclear bombs became even more formidable.

McCamley’s book is engaging, but I should note that my interest in the subject stems from my own related research into Cold War history and my shared familiarity with the United Kingdom, which, curiously, also includes stumbling across interesting and occasionally odd sights while cycling through the countryside. For readers who did not grow up during the Cold War, or who may not be that familiar with Western strategic thinking during the Cold War, the book may be challenging. McCamley makes it clear that his objective is not to examine the strategic assumptions or doctrine underpinning the rationale for the nuclear bunkers, command-and-control centers, and civil defense sites, other than in a perfunctory manner. As such, this is not a book for the uninitiated reader.

McCamley’s book builds on previous work in the field, such as Duncan Campbell, *War Plan UK: The Truth about Civil Defence in Britain* (London: Burnett Books, 1982) and William Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse, *Nuclear Battlefields: Global Links in the Arms Race* (Pensacola: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985). McCamley’s book is limited to the passive defenses of the “Western World,” which means North America and the United Kingdom. He commences with the American “Big Bunkers,” most notably Raven Rock Mountain in Pennsylvania, which serves as the Alternate Joint Communications Center, and Mount Weather Emergency Operations Center in Virginia, the alternative seat of civil government in nuclear war. Greenbrier, which serves as the congressional bunker, and Mount Pony, as the Federal Reserve bunker, also make appearances. In each case the reader is treated to considerable, almost overwhelming, detail. The size of fuel tanks, the kilowattage of emergency generators, the thickness of blast-resistant doors, and the presence of front companies whose real job was to maintain certain facilities may occasionally distract the reader’s focus from the bigger picture.

The chapter on North American radars is particularly interesting. The ill-fated Texas Towers, located 100 miles offshore, illustrate a wider point about the often adverse climate that many facilities had to endure, compounded frequently by relatively
inaccessible and remote locations. The possibility of technical malfunctions, including one time when a simulated attack nearly triggered a real-world response at the Combat Operations Center of the North American Air Defense Command, also reminds the reader of the challenges (and perils) of the readiness for split-second responses—the “wargasm,” in Herman Kahn’s memorable phrase describing nuclear strategy in the 1950s. Even thought the development of sophisticated warning systems to defend the Western world absorbed considerable resources, many of the systems, once in situ, were very quickly moribund.

McCamley ties together the transatlantic aspects of the book nicely by using the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System and the Distant Early Warning lines as a way of introducing the reader to the important roles that Canada and the United Kingdom played in early warning for the United States and, by implication, in U.S. plans for the continuity of government. Canadian readers may be a little disappointed that cold war bunkers in Canada are addressed in only a single chapter, whereas different facets of the United Kingdom’s civil defense are covered in exhaustive, and sometimes exhausting, detail. McCamley is clearly more familiar with the United Kingdom, devoting nearly half the book to early warning, civil defense, and emergency war preparations in the UK. One entire chapter is devoted to a description of the three stages in the evolution of the UK’s ROTOR radar warning system which, although of considerable interest to me, may not be as riveting for readers in North America.

Readers may occasionally be annoyed by McCamley’s value judgments, such as when he refers to Jimmy “Carter’s woefully inept handling of nuclear affairs” (p. 21), which is interesting given Carter’s earlier service in the U.S. Navy and preparation to become an engineering officer on board the U.S. Navy’s first nuclear powered submarine. Similarly, McCamley writes that the Cuban Missile crisis caused the scales to fall from the eyes of “those who brought the world to the brink of annihilation” (p. 199), and he dismisses Margaret Thatcher’s government, as a “belligerent, bankrupt government that was prepared to renege all responsibilities to its people in pursuit of the capitalist ideal” (p. 281). Despite these irritating asides, Cold War Secret Nuclear Bunkers is well researched and written, with the danger that the reader can lose the wood for the trees.

Unfortunately, the book is of somewhat limited value to scholars who may wish to build on McCamley’s research. The book contains no footnotes or endnotes. In the foreword McCamley gives some useful information about his sources, but he comments that “a comprehensive bibliography would be of questionable value” (p. viii). This is a pity. Researchers with an interest in the United Kingdom could benefit from his extensive research in the Public Records Office. The sources he cites in the case of the United States and Canada are reputable, but do not permit the same level of detail from primary sources as in the case of the United Kingdom (this may be for perfectly understandable cost and logistical reasons).

Cold War Secret Nuclear Bunkers is a book that will undoubtedly appeal to the specialist reader or researcher, but with the caveats above in mind. Readers will be impressed by the sheer scale and expense of passive defenses. Few readers who lived through the Cold War, or are familiar with its history, will be surprised by the lack of
any mass civil defense preparation. The “continuity of government” networks are decaying, even though in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks some of those networks found a new lease on life.


Reviewed by Gordon S. Barrass, London School of Economics and Political Science

David Owen’s *Nuclear Papers* provides some formerly top secret documentary gems and shrewd insights into the agonizing decisions that Britain’s Labour government faced in the latter half of the 1970s as it struggled to maintain an independent strategic nuclear deterrent.

But first a little background information. In the late 1960s, the British Government was becoming increasingly concerned about the U.S. commitment to Europe, as more U.S. troops were withdrawn to fight in Vietnam and doubts grew about the U.S. government’s willingness to extend its “nuclear umbrella” to protect its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

British concerns were exacerbated by the development of the Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) system that threatened to reduce Britain’s ability to destroy Moscow, long the central requirement for the British nuclear deterrent. Although the United States had more than enough missiles to swamp Soviet ABM defenses, the British did not; they needed to enhance their Polaris submarine-launched warheads so that they could reach their targets. In 1973 the United States canceled the Super-Antelope project that was intended to do just that.

When the Conservative government of Edward Heath decided to go it alone, Defence Secretary Lord Carrington said that the project should have a new codename that was British or at least Imperial. Enquires with the London Zoo revealed that the only big antelope meeting that requirement was South African—and was called Chevaline. Lord Carrington was not put off by a name that was sometimes used by French establishments selling horsemeat.

Harold Wilson, who headed the minority Labour Government that came to power in 1974, decided to press ahead with the Chevaline project, with the support of a small group of ministers and senior officials. The intense secrecy surrounding the project stemmed not simply from fear that Moscow might learn about the doubts surrounding the viability of the British nuclear deterrent, but also because of strong opposition within the Labour Party to any further enhancement of British nuclear forces. A leak could have brought the government down.

The need for secrecy was all the greater after 1975 when the chief of the Defence Staff informed the defence secretary that the Moscow ABM was more effective than had earlier been thought. This meant that until Chevaline came into service seven years later, Britain “could have no assurance” of destroying Moscow (p. 6). This judg-
ment highlighted the question of how much damage the United Kingdom needed to inflict for its deterrent to be credible. Some argued that Britain should sidestep Moscow and concentrate on obliterating other major Soviet cities.

After becoming foreign secretary in 1977 Owen joined the “Chevaline Group” and the debate about deterrence. At a meeting with senior Foreign Office officials on 17 October 1977 he said the central question was not whether Britain could be 100 percent certain that in all circumstances its missiles could hit Moscow, but whether the Soviet leaders could be 100 percent confident that the missiles would not strike Moscow. Less than a 100 percent probability might still be adequate for deterrence purposes. He also believed that the Soviet leadership would be deterred if Britain had the capability to destroy other major cities.

For those officials responsible for nuclear policy, the driving formula on percentages was that there had to be only a 5 percent risk that Britain would use strategic nuclear weapons for the Soviet Union to be deterred—provided there was a 100 percent certainty that, if used, the weapons would inflict “unacceptable” damage.

Owen’s assessment of what would deter the Soviet Union led him to argue that Britain should consider switching from a “continuous at sea deterrent” based on submarine-launched ballistic missiles to one using cruise missiles that would also be armed with nuclear warheads. This idea gained little support among officials dealing with nuclear strategy. They argued that cruise missiles could not guarantee success; nor did a non-Moscow criterion that covered only a small number of cities. The other members of the inner circle agreed with this view and pressed ahead with Chevaline despite the enormous financial cost.

Doubts over the ability of Polaris to penetrate Moscow’s ABM defenses were kept from Denis Healey, the chancellor of the exchequer, for fear that he would cancel the project; meanwhile, the escalating costs of the program were secretly hidden away in the Ministry of Defence budget.

At times, Owen says, the deviousness of officials was reminiscent of the Yes, Minister television sitcoms. The good news was that Chevaline proved to be a technological triumph. The British were very confident that their new warheads could destroy Moscow; and U.S. officials were impressed.

We now know that Soviet leaders had grave doubts about the likely effectiveness of the Moscow ABM and were horrified by the prospect of nuclear war. If Britain and the United States had had reliable intelligence on these two points it might have been possible to make more headway in arms control negotiations, but there were many other issues that fueled the strategic rivalry during the Cold War.

Another fascinating story in Nuclear Papers is Owen’s account of his dogged efforts to secure the declassification of the above-mentioned papers to facilitate a proper debate on “the nature of a minimum deterrent for the twenty-first century” (p. 3) before negotiations began on the renewal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2010. Many papers were released, though some were heavily redacted by the Ministry of Defence on security grounds.

Owen’s personal contribution to the debate is a lengthy chapter that sets out the case for Britain to replace its Trident D-II missiles with submarine-launched cruise
missiles. Most experts in the field do not share his confidence in the ability of the current generation of cruise missiles to provide a convincing deterrent, either militarily or politically. Although, as Owen notes, work is being done in the United States to develop a long-range, hypersonic cruise missile, we are unlikely to know for another 10–15 years whether that will be a credible deterrent—and, if so, at what cost.  

*Nuclear Papers* is an appropriate title for this book, which skips across several different nuclear issues. Fortunately, what the book lacks in coherence is more than compensated for by Owen’s account of the Chevaline debates and what can be learned from them.


Reviewed by Akira Iriye, Harvard University

From its abstract title, many readers of the *Journal of Cold War Studies* might get the impression that this book is not for them. It is indeed filled with references to literary theory, post-colonial studies, and other formulations that do not make easily recognizable contributions to the study of the Cold War. (There are no new revelations from hitherto unexplored archives, for instance.) However, at a deeper level, if one gets past Kuan-Hsing Chen’s theoretical discussions, the bulk of which is a recitation of other scholars’ writings and speeches, one will find much that is interesting and important, particularly concerning the impact of the Cold War on Taiwan, where Chen lives and teaches, and by implication on other Asian countries.

“[The] cold war is still alive within us,” he states (p. 118). It is not entirely clear whom he is referring to by “us,” but at the least the book provides a penetrating analysis of the intellectual, emotional, and psychological impact of the Cold War on people living in Taiwan. They—both the mainland Chinese who fled to the island after 1949 and those who had lived in Taiwan under Japan’s colonial rule, as well as their respective descendants—continue to suffer from the Cold War trauma, a fundamental aspect of which, Chen argues, has been the overwhelming presence of the United States in Taiwan and in Asia as a whole. From this perspective, the Cold War meant, more than anything else, the expansion and durability of U.S. power and influence, which amounts to U.S. “imperialism.” Because Japanese imperialism was followed by U.S. imperialism almost instantaneously, Asians, in particular the people of Taiwan, have never been truly “independent,” an adjective that recurs frequently in the book in juxtaposition to imperialism. Instead, their habits, their ideas, and even their languages have been penetrated by U.S. influence.

The fact that postwar Japan has also been overwhelmingly influenced by the United States has made matters worse for Taiwan and other Asian countries, the book suggests. Because the United States chose Japan to be its principal Cold War ally, the Japanese never gained their “independence” or had an opportunity to reflect on their
own imperialist past. Instead, they impressed other Asians as having betrayed them, not merely politically but also intellectually. If independence is to be achieved, then, Chen believes, the overwhelming presence of U.S. power in the region, including Japan, must end.

There is some logic to such an argument, but how concepts like “imperialism” and “independence” work in the age of globalization—and globalization is an overarching framework for the book—is far from clear. Globalization may be another term for imperialism, as Chen implies here and there, but he does not specify the precise relationship between the Cold War and globalization, unless we simply accept that in both phenomena the United States played the key role. But although Chen rejects imperialism, he does not seem to believe that globalization must also be repudiated. He recognizes that, after all, globalization means transnational networks and connections, making it possible for him to speak of “us” so confidently. But in the age of globalization, what does it mean for a country, or for any other entity, to be “independent”? Chen states that he is not looking to turn history backward and have the world return to the age dominated by nation-states (and empires). If so, can there really be “independent” nations?

More fundamentally, what does Chen mean by the United States or by America? As he himself notes, there are huge numbers of Chinese, both from Taiwan and from the mainland, in U.S. cities, particularly Los Angeles. China is very much part of America, and Chinese part of Americans. It makes little sense to speak of “American” imperialism or Taiwan’s “independence” in such circumstances. This demographic transformation of American society began in the 1970s, long before the formal ending of the Cold War, but even if we accept Chen’s assertion that the Cold War “is still with us,” that has not prevented relentless social transformations all over the world, characterized by transnational movements of people, goods, and technology that undermine the solid framework of independent nations. In such a situation, to speak of “true independence” as a goal is anachronistic. One should instead seek a world of “true interdependence.”

“Asia as method,” the title of the book, suggests that Chen is calling on all Asians—although he never defines what “Asia” means—to liberate themselves from American cultural imperialism and Eurocentric ideas about the world’s past and present. He insists that he is not being anti-Western. He says he is willing to take “fragments” from the West and put them together with “fragments” from other areas to construct a whole view of humanity. That is a plausible proposal, but we may note that numerous historians have been carrying out such an enterprise for ten or twenty years now. They have been writing about the modern world, about human rights, about the environment, and about the Cold War in a global framework in which nations lose their centrality as an analytical framework, and interactions across borders provide the key to the past. To paraphrase the book’s argument, if Asian countries became truly interdependent, they would be in a position to explore cultural and intellectual exchangers with people in other parts of the world so that not just Asia but the whole globe would come to provide a new “method” of analysis.

Reviewed by Robert Jervis, Columbia University

Derek Leebaert’s study resembles the picture he presents of U.S. foreign policy since World War II: exuberant, overconfident, often superficial, falling into traps, but getting some things right.

The title, at first puzzling, accurately describes the book’s thesis. U.S. foreign policy is characterized by delusions and magical thinking, and this recurrent pattern has led the country to seek impossibly grandiose goals and to fight unnecessary wars. All problems have their solutions, and the United States can find and implement them, Americans believe. Although this can-do spirit has led to amazing achievements at home and some successes abroad, more often it has produced mayhem as the United States has overreached from Korea to Afghanistan. In the former case, the refusal to be content with repelling the North Korean invasion and instead striking north toward the Yalu led to disaster; in the latter, as in many other cases, the belief that the United States could modernize, democratize, and transform other societies has brought endless pain to all concerned.

All too often, Americans indulge in “magical thinking” rather than carefully weighing means and ends. Although other countries sometimes fall into this trap, the United States is particularly prone to do so because its history and political culture encourage blind faith in management and shallow understanding of history, ills that are compounded by a form of government that places less power in the hands of permanent civil servants and more into those of political appointees. As many other commentators have noted, this makes the U.S. system particularly permeable to outside ideas and perhaps to fads. What Leebaert stresses is that this also leads to a large role for what he calls “emergency men.” Because they serve only a few years, political appointees are in a great hurry to make their mark, and to get appointed in the first place they have to call attention to themselves by their sweeping ideas. The result is that the U.S. government is populated by people who are full of plans and energy. They are prone to see situations as emergencies and quick to reach for dramatic instruments where restraint and patience would serve the country and the world better.

This diagnosis is non-ideological. Although much of what Leebaert says resonates with the left, the scorn he heaps on the American faith in transforming societies fits with traditional conservatism. He also argues that liberals underestimated Soviet strength and hostility, and he includes détente in his list of illusions. He also sees Dwight Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan as unusual for their ability to resist the fears and projects being peddled by emergency men.

This argument has quite a bit of appeal, especially in light of the apparent failures of the Bush and Obama administrations. The U.S. foreign policy establishment has produced and promoted a fair number of zealots, U.S. political culture is saturated
with optimism and the belief that renewal and transformation are possible, and the political system is ill-designed for patience and long-run endeavors. But Leebaert’s position is not developed as well as it might be, and the evidence is thin. He alludes to why the problems are greater with foreign than domestic policy and are more pronounced in the United States than in other countries, but does not probe these questions as deeply as would be needed to make his claims more convincing. Similarly, he too casually puts aside foreign policy successes. By starting his chronology with the Korean War, he can skip the transformation of German and Japanese societies, policies whose success was by no means guaranteed. His coverage of relevant Cold War history is skimpy and one-sided. Readers may agree with his judgment if they are so inclined, but they are unlikely to be persuaded if they started the book with different views. He also never clearly explains why the emergency men who arrive at a particular time all see the world the same way and so are able to capture government policy rather than representing conflicting enthusiasms that cancel themselves out. Indeed, conventional wisdom argues that the U.S. system is particularly prone to deadlock because power is more disbursed in the United States than in most countries. It would have been worthwhile if Leebaert had met this view head-on, but he simply ignores it.

Despite these flaws, his analysis is provocative and leads to some interesting insights and interpretations. I found his brief discussion of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger interesting (pp. 58–61, 102–105) and see a good deal of merit in his explanation of why, despite the depth of the knowledge in this country, the United States consistently misunderstands much of the world (pp. 172–179).

To hold Magic and Mayhem to strict scholarly standards may be unfair because it is designed for a broader audience. But it does not compare well with Peter Beinart’s The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris (New York: Harper Collins, 2010) or Dominic Tierney’s How We Fight: Crusades, Quagmires, and the American Way of War (New York: Little, Brown, 2010), other recent books in this category. Leebaert’s study remains of interest for its general argument, but like much of U.S. foreign policy its enthusiasm outruns its execution.

Aviva Weingarten, Jewish Organisations’ Response to Communism and to Senator McCarthy. London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2008. 164 pp. $75.00 cloth, $35.00 paper.

Reviewed by Stephen J. Whitfield, Brandeis University

Do the math: Only a tiny minority of American Jews ever belonged to the Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA). But they were disproportionately implicated in the Communist movement, from its feral origins to its sputtering end. In the 1950s such conspicuous involvement posed a serious problem for the Jewish defense agencies and other communal organizations. They were eager to brandish the patriotism of a minority that so often had been accused of divided loyalty. At a time when the threat from the Soviet Union and its cadres inside the United States seemed
to threaten the very existence of the republic, the temptation to emphasize the full participation of American Jews in the national struggle against Communism must have been close to irresistible. Their historical experience had taught them, however, the value of constitutional rights as a protection against the fanaticism of majorities and had made Jews especially sensitive to violations of civil liberties.

Aviva Weingarten’s monograph, which was initially a dissertation at Israel’s Bar-Ilan University, is the first book to calibrate the political dilemma that representative Jewish organizations faced in the first phase of the Cold War. Pro-McCarthyite groupuscules such as Rabbi Benjamin Schultz’s American Jewish League Against Communism were formed. But the evidence is overwhelming that Jewish organizations sought to reconcile an unambiguous anti-Communism with a preference for weapons that were antithetical to the modus operandi of the junior senator from Wisconsin. An overture from the American Legion to join forces against the menace of subversion was spurned, for example. By examining the archives of Jewish agencies as well as published sources on Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Weingarten conclusively shows how distant the Jewish community and its spokesmen were from a senator who, as late as January 1954, enjoyed the approval of half of the citizenry.

In buttressing her argument, Weingarten presents several episodes, including one involving Roy Cohn (though she fails to date it). Cohn, who had helped to prosecute and convict Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, tried to join the national board of directors of the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) of the B’nai B’rith. Backing him up was Judge Irving Kaufman, who had presided over the trial of the Rosenbergs. But because Cohn bore such visible responsibility for McCarthyism, the ADL regarded him as damaged goods and warned him that, were a formal vote taken, the board of directors would unanimously reject his candidacy. The two other major defense agencies, the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and the American Jewish Congress, were as forthright in their opposition to Cohn’s boss and instead promoted the alternative of liberal anti-Communism.

The emphatic communal repudiation of McCarthyism is even more striking because the eponymous senator was no anti-Semite. Jews such as Anna Rosenberg, whom the Truman administration named an assistant secretary of defense, and Irving Peress, an Army dentist who took the Fifth Amendment and was given an honorable discharge, found themselves within McCarthy’s crosshairs. But he never tapped the vein of anti-Semitism that was waiting to be mobilized among his supporters, and thus he differed from earlier right-wing demagogues who had stirred up religious or racial bigotry. That this incarnation of political conformism was remarkably bereft of any hostility to Jews struck observers as early as Richard H. Rovere, yet Weingarten makes the same argument (repetitively), as though no one before her had advanced it.

Despite the brevity of this book, its text is padded, as is its bibliography, which lists books that bear little if any relation to the author’s major themes. Nor can an obligation be shirked to report how disgraceful is the proofreading for this volume, which has been translated from the Hebrew. The staff director of McCarthy’s subcommittee, J. B. Matthews, is identified as “G. B. Matheus” (p. 130). The name of Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., labeled the “US ambassador to the United States” (the United Nations is
meant), is misspelled as “Lodg” not only in the table of contents but in two appendices as well. Someone named “Aron Raymond” is supposed to have written *The Imperial Republic* (p. 158), the book by Raymond Aron. Instead of James Rorty, “James Rotary” co-authored *McCarthy and the Communists*. A gossip columnist is called “Winchell Walter” (p. 129), and the surname of the political journalist Eugene Lyons is lionized (p. 129). Gerald L. K. Smith, a Disciples of Christ pastor, is identified as an “evangelist priest” (p. 113). Such errors inevitably raise doubts about the author’s full command of her material.

 Entirely missing from the book is a curious historical link that would have nasty consequences. Weingarten mentions that the Communist Party scorned two of the defense organizations, the AJC and the ADL, but “treated the American Jewish Congress differently” (p. 25). Founded in 1918 as a democratic rival, the congress was generally more progressive. A key figure in the American Jewish Congress was Stanley Levison, who slips entirely through Weingarten’s fingers. Not only was he very, very close to the CPUSA; he also became the most trusted counselor to Martin Luther King, Jr. Such a curriculum vitae aroused the concern of the FBI, which tapped both Levison and King and thus learned how frequently the most charismatic of civil rights leaders was violating the Seventh Commandment. Because of Levison, King thus became vulnerable to moral attacks emanating from the FBI and its allies, had his own freedom of maneuver limited, and risked discrediting the very movement for racial justice to which both the Communists and the Jewish agencies had so notably contributed.

  


Reviewed by Mark Carson, Tulane University

“In nearly every field of historical inquiry,” writes Paul Boyer in the preface of this collection of essay, “the past generation has seen a broadening of perspective, a movement beyond the narrow occupation of earlier times” (p. xv). It is encouraging that the field of diplomatic history is now experiencing such a change. This book in its totality gains its strength through several important themes: the unintended consequences of Cold War decisions on many parts of the world, the complexity of the changes that localities experienced, and the efforts by local areas to manage the economic, social, and political changes that occurred. What results is a more complex and nuanced interpretation of Cold War policy “from the bottom up.”

 Chapters by Jeremi Suri, Thomas Borstelmann, Alan P. Dobson and Charlie Whitham, Arvid Nelson, and Catherine McNicol Stock focus on the unintended local consequences of Cold War policies. Suri’s “The Cultural Contradictions of Cold War Education: West Berlin and the Youth Revolt of the 1960s,” discusses the student revolts at the Free University, a Cold War–created educational institution. Suri expands
sociologist Daniel Bell’s thesis on the “cultural contradictions of capitalism” within the Cold War context that “framed the development of capitalist institutions after 1945” (p. 57) and brings the underpinnings of the youth revolt in West Berlin into clearer focus. Borstelmann’s “The Cold War and the American South” expands on his thesis in *The Cold War and the Color Line* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), which linked the changes in the American South after 1945, both economically and racially, to the international context of the Cold War, which in part created the Sun Belt and forced southern whites to confront the “meaning of ‘freedom.’” (p. 91).

In “Project Lamachus: The Cold War Comes to Scotland—The Holy Loch U.S. Nuclear Base and Its Impact on Scotland, 1959–1974,” Dobson and Whitham describe the economic, social, and environmental impact of Whitehall policy, backed by the Scottish Office, of allowing the United States to have a nuclear submarine base at Holy Loch in Scotland, which had several unintended consequences, including a rise in political awareness among the residents, in the form of Scottish nationalism and antinuclear protests. Nelson’s “Landscape Change in Central Europe and Stalin's Post-war Strategy 1945–1949” vividly documents Iosif Stalin’s “war on the countryside” land reform policy as it was adopted in eastern Germany immediately after World War II, all but destroying the area’s diverse economy and producing irreversible environmental damage. Stock’s “Nuclear Country: The Militarization of the Northern Plains, 1954–1975” outlines the impact of the building of sites for long-range nuclear missiles in the Dakotas. Despite a long history of anti-statism, local leaders initially welcomed the project as an economic opportunity, but the long-term effects of militarization included the decline of the rural economy; the dearth of well-paying jobs for local workers; the secret, sometimes seemingly authoritarian policies of the federal government; and the eventual depopulation of the region when the government destroyed some of the sites for the missiles.

Other chapters in the book focus on the collaboration between national and local officials in shaping Cold War domestic policies and the transformative effects these policies have on local communities and regions. Hiroshi Kitamura’s “Exhibition and Entertainment: Hollywood and the Reconstruction of Defeated Japan” shows how Hollywood became a “vital instrument” in the consolidation of U.S. power in post-war Japan through the collaboration of U.S. officials, Hollywood, and Japanese film exhibitors to gain a foothold in the market and to marginalize left-wing cinema. These efforts “reinforced American power by drawing Japan into its American orbit” (p. 51).

The three chapters on the military-industrial complex—Richard S. Kirkendall’s “The Impact of the Early Cold War on the American City: The Aerospace Industry in Seattle,” Michel Oden’s “When the Movie’s Over: The Post–Cold War Restructuring of Los Angeles,” and Anita Seth’s “Cold War Frontier: Building the Defense Complex in Novosibirsk” all discuss the local transformative effects of Cold War military spending. Kirkendall outlines the growth of Boeing in Seattle, a trend that made that city one of the economic winners during World War II and the Cold War. The author asserts that Boeing’s growth changed the “size, the shape, the politics and the image of the region” (p. 114), mostly in a positive way. Oden presents a chronological history
of the influence of the Cold War on Los Angeles, the foundations being built by local and regional leaders and sustained by significant military spending. In the 1990s the decline of military spending and the resulting loss of middle-class manufacturing jobs brought about significant political and social changes. Seth’s chapter examines the creation of the defense complex in Siberia’s capital. Along the way it empowered, to a degree, local voices upon whom Moscow came to rely in this developing “frontier” city. These three chapters provide a valuable and heretofore unexamined local perspective that greatly adds to the understanding and complexity of the military-industrial complex.

The final two chapters present interesting but more traditional revisionist histories of the disastrous and deadly impact, particularly for the natives, of U.S. and Soviet Cold War policies in Angola and East Timor. Despite the more straightforward interpretation, these chapters shed light on U.S. and Soviet policies regarding countries about which most Cold War historians know little.

All in all, this collection of essays represents an important contribution to a fuller understanding of the Cold War. To make the connection between the decisions of those in power and the ordinary people the decisions affect is a worthy and valuable direction for the future of diplomatic history. As more local studies delve into the specific, our perspectives on this tumultuous period will be broadened. And although the lives and decisions of the powerful still hold importance and fascination, studies “from the bottom up” offer diplomatic history something that will make it increasingly interesting for scholars—room to grow and change.


Reviewed by Harvey Klehr, Emory University

*Johnny: A Spy’s Life* is an occasionally interesting but deeply flawed account of the amazing career of Johann Heinrich Amadeus de Graaf, a Communist militant who went from German party member to Soviet agent to British double-agent. Based largely on interviews with its subject conducted by one of the authors in the 1970s, and on de Graaf’s files in British, Canadian, and U.S. records, the book is supplemented by documents from Russian archives and interviews with surviving members of his family and some of his handlers.

The authors’ foraging for sources has yielded an impressively detailed account of the activities of de Graaf, whose activities ranged around the world. From Germany to the USSR, from Romania to Berlin, from Britain to Prague, from Manchuria and China to Argentina and Brazil, he participated in an incredible variety of activities and assignments for the Comintern and the Fourth Department of the Red Army, or Soviet Military Intelligence. Becoming disillusioned with Communism and the Soviet Union, he offered his services to Great Britain in 1933 and for six years worked as a
double-agent for MI6. He spent most of World War II in Canada, infiltrating pro-Nazi groups for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, posing as a German intelligence officer and participating in a double-cross operation feeding German intelligence false information from a captured spy.

The most irritating and troublesome aspect of the book is the authors’ penchant for liberally quoting exact conversations based on recollections made dozens of years after the fact. Not only are many of the conversations implausible and cartoonish, they consistently make de Graaf appear as a fount of wisdom and sagacity dealing with fools and buffoons. Although the authors acknowledge some of his personality flaws, his anti-Semitism, and the probability that he murdered his second wife, they also tell his story from his perspective, rarely acknowledging that his interpretation might be partial, deeply flawed, or simply made up out of whole cloth.

To cite just a few examples that they accept as true:

• De Graaf claimed that while working undercover in England, he charged into a government office to protest pay cuts directed at sailors, an act no sane agent would ever undertake.

• Just before Adolf Hitler became chancellor, de Graaf was shocked to hear a German Communist leader explain that after Hitler it would be the Communists’ turn. If so, he must have slept through the entire “Third Period,” during which “After Hitler, us,” was the slogan of German Communists.

• They have de Graaf checking over and correcting the battle plan devised by Manfred Stern, the Soviet representative to Mao’s Chinese Communist forces. Stern then allegedly told de Graaf that he, de Graaf, should be the general and Mao should serve under him.

• After a mission in Romania, de Graaf supposedly denounces Béla Kun at a Communist International gathering, accusing him of bribery and corruption. The authors hint that Kun’s subsequent execution for collaboration with the Hungarian secret police substantiates de Graaf’s story.

• On a visit to Moscow in 1934, de Graaf supposedly spits at the markers honoring fallen German Communists in Red Square and tells a sentry—who agrees with him—that they were “swine,” “rats,” and “skunks.”

Such tall tales, claims of prescience, and inflation of accomplishments and toughness are all the more unfortunate because de Graaf’s story is both fascinating and rich enough to tell without embellishment and fictionalization. Johnny de Graaf, later known as de Graff, born into a dysfunctional German family in 1894, ran away from home to work as a merchant seaman at the age of fourteen. Attracted to radicalism by his opposition to World War I, he was imprisoned for organizing a mutiny. He eventually wound up as a coal miner in Ahlen, where he joined the German Communist Party and participated in the Ruhr uprising of 1920. Over the next several years, he supplied weapons to militants (including the assassins of Horst Wessel), was arrested numerous times, served prison sentences, and was sent in 1930 to Moscow to study at the Lenin School.

According to de Graaf’s own account, his disillusionment with Communism be-
gan in the Soviet Union, and he avidly pursued foreign assignments so that he could defect. He undertook intelligence missions in Romania and England—where he worked with seamen. In Germany he helped comrades flee the victorious Nazis. He attempted to defect but was rebuffed by the U.S. embassy. The British, however, recruited him and persuaded him to remain an agent in place. He taught guerrilla warfare tactics to Chinese Communist forces. In 1935 he was part of a team that went to Brazil with Louis Carlos Prestes to organize a Communist uprising. After it failed, in part because he had told the British and Brazilians about the plans, he returned to Moscow in 1937, but not before murdering his wife in Buenos Aires.

De Graaf survived the postmortems of the failed Brazil coup in Moscow and returned to Brazil in 1938, where he supposedly supervised a Soviet espionage ring while actually directing a British surveillance network monitoring the coast for German ships. The authors never make entirely clear what the USSR thought de Graaf was up to on this mission nor why Brazilian authorities arrested and tortured him for a month in late 1939. Released, he returned to Britain and lost contact with Soviet officials, who apparently concluded that he had been killed. De Graaf's anti-Nazi work in Canada largely ended his intelligence career. An unhappy stint working with Occupation Forces in Germany led to his resignation from MI6 in 1946.

Moving back to Canada, de Graaf went public about some of his exploits in 1950, giving speeches across the country about the Communist menace as “Captain Johnny X,” wildly exaggerating the number of Communists in the country—he claimed half a million—and offering to tell the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation everything he knew. For a brief period the bureau and Harry Gold believed that de Graaf had once been Gold’s superior in the United States. De Graaf operated a tourist lodge in Ontario until his death in 1980.


*Review by John Earl Haynes, Library of Congress*

*Tripex* is the sort of book one does not expect to see these days: a book of transcriptions of original archival documents. This sort of thing is today more likely to be published electronically on the Internet than in hard copy. Although online publication has its advantages—quick electronic searching and the convenience of cutting and pasting quotations for citing—hard copy, too, has advantages; namely, for ease of reading and comprehension.

*Tripex* includes transcriptions of four sets of documents from the archives of the Soviet state security organs. The first three sets consist of five documents stolen from the British MI5 counterintelligence service and sent to Moscow by Anthony Blunt, 25 reports furnished to Soviet intelligence by Kim Philby from British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) records, and four reports sent to Moscow by John Cairncross from sev-
eral British agencies. The final set of documents comprises six Soviet intelligence reports reviewing or analyzing SIS and MI5 structure and operations. Most of the documents are from the early 1940s and deal with World War II operations. The longest, at 78 pages, is an internal history of MI5. The editors note that this history was later released by the Public Record Office in London and published in book form but that a comparison of the two reveals deletions of sensitive material in the version released to the public. In Triplex one can read the unsanitized version.

There is no central theme to these documents. At one place we read an MI5 survey of suspected Japanese sources in Britain in 1941, and in another place we find a list of internal communications designators for SIS offices and activities in 1947. Depending on one's area of concern, some documents will be of great interest and others irrelevant. In addition to documenting various aspects of SIS and MI5 history, the reports in Triplex underscore something else: the Soviet foreign intelligence service had very, very good sources.


Reviewed by Susan M. Hartmann, Ohio State University

Although the Cold War figures into many of the themes of *America Transformed*, readers should not expect new interpretations of that conflict, nor much about the Cold War beyond Vietnam. Instead, Richard Adams, who has taught history at the University of California at Berkeley since the 1960s, has chosen to focus on eight developments in the United States from 1941 to 2001 which, he argues, constituted change of such magnitude and pace as to be called revolutionary. More provocatively, he argues that elites propelled most of these changes and that the top-down nature of the changes accounted for the counterrevolutions that emerged in the 1970s.

After a brief introductory section, Adams devotes separate chapters to each of his eight revolutions: the rise of an affluent society; the ascendance to global dominance; the militarization of the nation; the concentration of corporate power; the transformation of race relations; the transformation of gender roles; the embrace of sexual permissiveness; and the weakening of privacy. Then, departing from his thematic organization, Adams examines liberalism and conservatism over the 60-year period, as he seeks to explain the backlash against the revolutions in antipoverty policy, race relations, gender roles, and sexual behavior. An acknowledged liberal, Adams in general presents the first half of his period in positive terms; thereafter he highlights a decline in the country’s commitment to the poor and disadvantaged, to equality for all groups, and to the moral high ground in foreign policy.

Adams’s discussion of affluence demonstrates the importance of the government’s hand in the postwar economic boom; explains Lyndon Johnson’s war on poverty in generally laudatory terms; describes the succeeding turn against taxes and government
provision and the growth of income inequality; and points out that the attack on the welfare state ignored the welfare that government bestowed on corporations and agribusiness. In exploring the revolution that occurred in business, Adams looks not at new industries and technologies— though he acknowledges the importance of technology—but at the spread of multinational organizations and the conglomerate movement that intensified the tremendous power of megacorporations.

While acknowledging military and paramilitary interventions in other countries under Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson, Adams presents liberal internationalism as a positive force in the world—until the misjudgments, deceptions, and brutalities of the Vietnam War. Beyond Vietnam, the book is largely silent on foreign policy except for a stinging critique of the current war in Iraq. The book’s brief chapter on militarization discusses the rise of the military-industrial-academic complex and how the shift to an all-volunteer army in 1973 supposedly increased the influence of the military in the country.

Adams views more positively the revolutions in race relations, gender roles, and sexuality. Although he acknowledges the utter necessity of the black freedom struggle, his top-down framework of change leads him to concentrate on the courts rather than on the movement itself or on the civil rights legislation of 1964, 1965, and 1968. Adams documents the soaring labor-force participation of women in the postwar period, but he sees feminism primarily as a movement of upper- and middle-class women and does not mention the labor union women who raised sex discrimination issues in the 1950s and actively participated in the women’s movement itself. To illustrate the elite nature of forces behind the sexual revolution, Adams examines the work of Alfred Kinsey and the team of William Masters and Virginia Johnson, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions on pornography and obscene speech. Parallel with his discussions of minority rights and women’s rights, Adams claims that the courts were often out in front of public opinion with regard to homosexuals’ rights.

The revolution in Americans’ regard for privacy is perhaps the most unexpected of Adams’s choices. In one of the freshest chapters, he documents the expansion of privacy rights under the Supreme Court headed by Earl Warren and the erosion of privacy in the last decades of the century. That attrition resulted from new technologies, heightened concern for order and security, more conservative justices, and the willingness of Americans generally to abandon shame and engage in exhibitionism on television shows, the Internet, and elsewhere. Adams argues that by 2001, Americans had fewer protections against invasion of their privacy than they had a century before.

In the last third of the book, Adams examines the achievements of liberalism—which he deems “little short of sensational” (p. 218)—and the reasons for its demise and the attendant conservative ascendancy. His explanation is multicausal, while tending to emphasize the elite-driven nature of new policies and the influence of the economy. Postwar liberalism’s reforms were accepted in a climate of affluence, but when the economy fell into what seemed a zero-sum game, the liberal coalition fractured and many of the reforms came to be seen as failures. By emphasizing the place of business interests in the conservative coalition, Adams also provides a welcome coun-
terpoint to the tendency to see post-1960s political conflicts as culture wars over social issues.

It is all too easy to criticize omissions in a book of this scope, yet the consequences of the 1965 immigration legislation have surely been transforming the country in ways worthy of attention. Also, Adams could have noted and explained the extension of liberal reform well into the Nixon administration and to have paid some attention to minority groups other than African Americans. Finally, readers seeking a chronological, systematic study of the period will be frustrated by the book’s somewhat idiosyncratic organization, uneven chapters, and tendency to spread discussion of a topic among more than one chapter. At the same time, readers can dip into most chapters as separate essays, and those who do will be richly rewarded by the author’s sprightly style and thought-provoking insights.


Reviewed by David Goldsworthy, Monash University

Andrea Benvenuti’s book deals with a decade of “drastic change” (p. 2) in the relationship between Britain and Australia. Benvenuti recounts how this unusually close, indeed familial, relationship evolved into one in which the two countries related to each other as, in effect, foreign countries—still good friends, but pursuing different interests and interacting in essentially instrumentalist ways.

The principal changes discussed in the book flowed from the decisions and actions of the major power, Britain. The role of Australia, as the minor power, was to react. The British took the initiative in both the economic and the strategic realms. By the early 1960s policymakers in London had become convinced that Britain’s economic interest would be better served by building closer trade and investment links with its industrialized neighbors in Europe even if this meant reducing its historically determined trade and investment links with the agrarian south, a category that at that time still included Australia along with most other Commonwealth countries. Matters came to a head in 1961 when Britain applied for membership in the increasingly dynamic European Economic Community (EEC). Faced with losing preferential access to the British market, Australia protested, invoked kith and kin, and sought special dispensations for its farm exports, but to no great avail. In the strategic realm, change was driven largely by Britain’s growing unwillingness to maintain a colossally expensive world security role. The key decisions to withdraw militarily from east of Suez came in 1967–1968. Again the Australians protested. Although Australia’s main strategic ally by this point was the United States, Canberra saw Britain as important, too, chiefly because it had a substantial military presence at its Singapore base in the heart of the emergent—and politically turbulent—Southeast Asian region. Once again pro-
tests achieved little, although Britain’s and Australia’s accession to the Five Power Defence Arrangements, negotiated in 1971, did offer Canberra a minor consolation.

Meticulously researched and lucidly written, this book provides by far the most comprehensive account yet published of these developments in Anglo-Australian affairs. The general story is familiar enough, but Benvenuti brings a welcome dose of fresh thinking. For example, he takes Stuart Ward to task for pinpointing Britain’s first application to join Europe in 1961 as the event that signaled “the end of the affair” between Britain and Australia (p. 185). Benvenuti argues for a larger picture in which change is seen as the cumulative consequence of four distinct crises; namely, three EEC applications (1961–1963, 1967, and 1971–1972) and one set of decisions to withdraw British military forces (1967–1968). His argument is plausible and well documented, but the two views are arguably reconcilable. To say that after 1961 “nothing could be quite the same again” is quite compatible with pointing to the compounding effect of subsequent crises.

Noting the tendency among earlier writers to focus on either the economic issue or the strategic issue, Benvenuti seeks to bring the two into a single analytical framework. He raises the question of how far the two British initiatives were seen and treated by policymakers as linked. If researchers were to rely purely on the archival record, he notes, they might conclude that London dealt with the two initiatives as distinct rather than interlinked issues. Arguably this illustrates the point that official documents do not always or necessarily reveal the full story of policymaking. At any rate Benvenuti makes good use of interviews, memoirs, and other such sources to help support his argument that each set of issues formed part of the policy context within which the other set of issues was treated. Both were aspects of the much larger narrative of Britain’s adjustment to post-imperial life. For their part, as he amply demonstrates, the Australians did believe that linkage existed and that it compounded their problems as they struggled to minimize the harm to their interests.

In addition, Benvenuti keeps in view the international influences and pressures that affected both countries’ policies. The United States in particular had interests, especially security interests, that cut across the Anglo-Australian dialogue. On one hand the United States supported Britain’s turn to Europe as a way of strengthening the anti-Communist forces there; on the other it opposed Britain’s plans for military withdrawal from east of Suez, for fear that Communist forces would benefit. Faced with these conflicting tendencies, a much-pressured Australia sought to preserve both of its major alliances and in doing so found itself paying the high price of becoming engaged in two local wars at once—fighting alongside Britain in the Konfrontasi episode in Indonesia and alongside the United States in Vietnam.

Given such difficulties, it is worth noting that the pain Australia expected to suffer from Britain’s economic turn to Europe and the British military withdrawal from Australia’s neighborhood was much ameliorated by other developments. The loss of preferential access to the British market was more than outweighed in the trade ledger by an industrializing East Asia’s enormous demand for Australia’s mineral resources, and the departure of the British military from Australia’s region ultimately came to

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seem of relatively little moment. Once the Vietnam war was over and the United States and China had achieved a rapprochement, the geostrategic environment in East Asia became considerably more stable and less threatening.

Benvenuti’s analysis of these events and issues is consistently thoughtful and well argued. Overall, his study deserves a respected place in its field. The job it does will not need doing again.

ジョン・Y ングの『20世紀の外交: 英国の実践 1963−1976』


レビューはリチャード・デーヴィス、St Antony's College, Oxford University

外交の実践は、外交の問題に直面している間に学ばれてきた。ジョン・Y ングは異なるアプローチをとる。彼は「外交の実践は、その形態を変えるものではなく、事件が進行する過程の一部である」と書いている（p. 228）。これは最も基本的な事実といえども、彼は外交の原則と機関、そしてそれらが現代世界でどのように変化したか（もしくは変化していない、彼の引用に根据して）に更に詳しく考察した。

Y ングは、1963から1976年の間の英国の外交を一つの期間に選んだ。これは英国が残る帝国主義的承諾からユーロ圏に参加への迅速な調整の間であった。この本は、居民代理大使、二国間サミット、多国間外交、そして認可の基準をテーマに構成されている。これは一部の追跡の観点を含んでいるが、これは外交の実践の方法論を検討する本で、事件を受け持った外交の方法論を評価するのではなく、それによって成立した事件を研究するのを含んでいる。

英国の外務省は、その数年間で、牛津やカムブ里ッジの最高卒業生から選ばれたエリート集団であった。彼らは銀行家に対する収入の競争力を持つまでに、外交を最初に見せることが多くなかった。外交官たちは海外で高い評価を受け、米国国家安全保障担当副大臣ヘンリー・キッスンジャーは、イギリスの一次交渉官、サー・トーマス・ブリメロウを秘密に雇い入れたことさえある。

しかし、外交官たちは常に国内で批評に見舞われた。「絵柄のズボパンと黒のジャケットが私には読まないものだが…それこそ私は、心の中のズボパンを愛されるように思っているものである」と（p. 24）と彼らは言っている。
tomically puzzling, verdict of George Brown, a controversial Labour foreign secretary from 1966 to 1968.

More serious threats to traditional diplomacy came from financial stringency, reviews by outside bodies, the growing influence of political advisors, easier air travel by political leaders, and a rapid increase in the number of independent states and international organizations. Young examines summit meetings of all kinds, their successes, failures, perils, and limitations. He argues that “special envoys, bilateral summits and multilateral conferences could all grow in number and still leave plenty of room for more traditional forms of diplomatic contact to flourish. They were not competitors but mutual winners in the expansion of diplomatic activity” (p. 227). Some marginalized ambassadors disagreed, but it is clearly right to emphasise the continuing importance of the basic skills and machinery of diplomacy.

Young investigates how this machinery evolved in structure and function in Britain during the period under review, with the gradual and sometimes painful merger of the Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office into today’s single Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). He also deals well with the three main reports that were intended to modernize the diplomatic service: Plowden in 1964, Duncan in 1969, and Berrill in 1977. The last of these, which put forward nearly 300 recommendations, was so radical that it was largely ignored, having offended many people with, among many other things, the unfortunate remark that too much work was being done “to an unjustifiably high standard” (p. 51).

Of continuing interest is the section on the principles of diplomatic recognition, an issue on which Britain and the United States have often differed. For instance, London recognized Communist China in 1950, whereas Washington did not do so until 1979, and (not mentioned by Young) Britain has had unbroken relations with Cuba since 1902. An FCO paper of 1974 summed up British practice: “Our criteria for recognition are that the regime should have effective control of much of the greater part of the national territory and should enjoy the obedience of the mass of the population, with a reasonable prospect of permanence” (p. 199). In other words, recognize those in power regardless of whether we or their subjects like them. The United States, as Young observes, has “generally been more subjective, more likely to be swung by moral considerations” (p. 202). He might have added that domestic political pressures play a greater role in the United States than in Britain.

But Britain’s realist approach did not provide ready answers to every situation. Problems arose over the independence of Bangladesh in 1972 and military coups in Chile, Greece, and Ethiopia. Allies often applied pressure: Britain could not recognize East Germany until West Germany did so, and diplomatic relations with the Communist regime in Hanoi were not established until 1973. On the other hand, Britain’s consulate in Hanoi, which had survived since the days of French colonial rule, remained in operation throughout the Vietnam War, feeding useful information to Washington. Other countries, mainly in the Middle East and Africa, often broke off relations in protest against one or other of Britain’s many misdemeanours, but relations could often be maintained by other means, such as interest sections. When Egypt severed relations with West Germany in 1965 in protest against the recognition
of Israel, 22 West German staff remained in Egypt under Italian protection. Later the same year, for different reasons, Egypt broke ties with Britain, but British diplomats continued to function as members of the Canadian embassy in Cairo. In this way governments could enjoy the moral luxury of severing relations while paying almost no practical price.

This is a very useful book for anyone seeking a close focus on a period of British diplomacy or trawling for examples from which to draw general conclusions on the practices and principles of diplomacy. It is a pity that the new edition of Satow’s Diplomatic Practice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), a classic text now updated with new material, appeared just too late to be included in Young’s otherwise extensive bibliography.


Reviewed by John Ramsden, Queen Mary University of London

Douglas MacArthur remarked in 1942 about Winston Churchill’s intercontinental travels that “a flight of 10,000 miles through hostile and foreign skies may be the duty of young pilots, but for a Statesman burdened with the world’s cares it is an act of inspiring gallantry and valour.” For Churchill’s staff, aware of his declining physical powers, such restless travels verged on the irresponsible, for they understood well how the loss of Churchill would have damaged the British war effort: General Henry Maitland (“Jumbo”) Wilson thought that flying Churchill to Gibraltar in a primitive flying boat in 1942—so primitive that engine noise prevented any conversation between the passengers—was “a feckless way of sending him over the world when he is approaching his seventieth birthday.” It was a great relief when the liberation of France in 1944 meant that British officials now had to fly only 11,000 miles to reach the Soviet Union, rather than the 17,000 miles of 1942.

Among Churchill’s neologisms was the word “summit,” as applied to diplomacy. Although he did not use the phrase “a parley at the summit” until 1950, he had practiced the idea incessantly during the Second World War—in Newfoundland, Casablanca, Quebec, Washington, Cairo, Tehran, Moscow, Yalta, and Potsdam, with lesser meetings in Bermuda, Paris, Athens (amid a civil war at Christmastime 1944), and other European cities. Franklin Roosevelt attended most of these meetings but used the terms of the U.S. Constitution as a defense against having to travel more often. The paranoid Iosif Stalin made it only to meetings held in the USSR and at nearby Tehran. But Churchill took part in every one. He traveled by far the furthest of the three in 1941–1945 and was often the first to suggest the necessity of another meeting of the “Big Three.” When the experiment of involving Charles de Gaulle at Casablanca proved counterproductive, important meetings were thereafter kept ruthlessly to the British, U.S., and Soviet leaders. They even held two meetings in Canada from
which the Canadian prime minister was excluded, lest Canada’s inclusion encourage more peripheral allies such as China and Brazil to claim a seat at the top table and hence dilute a hard-bargaining forum into a mere talking shop.

Wartime summits are hardly a new subject in historical writing, and the naval historian Brian Lavery, author of the invaluable *Churchill’s Navy* (London: Conway, 2006), eschews serious analysis of what took place in the actual meetings. Some of his accounts have, therefore, a “mint-with-a-hole” feel to them because his extended accounts of the great man’s travels there and back are interrupted by only a few paragraphs describing what happened when he got there. The advantage is that Lavery is able to concentrate more than any previous writer on the logistics, staff preparations, and actual travel conditions than any previous writer has attempted, a process that sheds a fascinating light both on the conferences and on Churchill’s approach to them. Combining well-known published accounts by the Churchill entourage (diary-based accounts of Viscount Alanbrooke, Alexander Cadogan, Lord Moran, and Sir John Colville, as well as the memoirs of Hastings “Pug” Ismay) with unpublished private sources such as the Ian Jacob papers and official British archival records, Lavery offers a persuasive narrative from which significant truths emerge.

Lavery notices how Churchill’s invariable habit of surrounding himself when abroad with senior service officers and patrician diplomats gave U.S. and Soviet officials a skewed idea of Britain as it fought the “People’s War.” Churchill was not reluctant to take armies of workers—typists, valets, cooks, signalers, marines for personal protection, and air force ground staff to facilitate his travel. But although Labour contributed a large part of his government, no Labour minister came on these jaunts until Clement Attlee went to Potsdam, and by then the European war was over, Labour had left the Churchill government, and Attlee was there only as a courtesy during a British general election. Attlee had the last laugh when he won that election and returned to Potsdam in his own right—without Churchill.

Lavery points out, too, how the diplomatic-military Churchill team was increasingly out of its depth when in 1944–1945 discussions shifted to postwar European planning, areas in which the team had no expertise. The more politically-minded generals of the United States and the USSR coped with that change of emphasis with no great difficulty.

Churchill’s health is another subject on which much ink has been spilled, but again Lavery has much to offer that is new. Churchill’s medical condition, especially after the pneumonia that almost carried him off in 1943, was a constant worry to his traveling doctor and to his staff. Flying, which by then was the favored means for most of Churchill’s travels, involved the danger that high altitudes in unpressurized planes would threaten his life. In-flight oxygen was made available so that fewer detours around mountain ranges would be necessary in southeastern Europe, but this was not always an unmixed blessing. One of Churchill’s most dangerous moments was the when he fell asleep with a lit cigar in his hand and his oxygen mask slipped off, emptying oxygen into the compartment. The entire Churchill team might have gone up in a puff of smoke. Flying in wartime was inherently a dangerous mode of travel: the plane carrying the actor Leslie Howard was shot down by the Luftwaffe in the Bay of Biscay.
in 1942, probably because Churchill was about to travel home from North Africa. One of the planes carrying his staff to Yalta made a forced landing at sea in 1944, killing an air commodore and one of Alanbrooke’s closest aides; and the Ascalon, a flying boat often used by Churchill, was lost over the Atlantic in 1945. Churchill, when frequently given a chance to fly the airplane himself (under careful if unobtrusive supervision, though he had held a pilot’s license before the Great War), was often panicky about the possibilities of navigational error. However, Lavery lays to rest the myth that Churchill’s pilot almost flew him into Nazi airspace over Brest during an eastbound transatlantic flight in 1942. Although Churchill could requisition a battleship or transatlantic liner as a taxi whenever he needed it (they were actually far safer than airplanes because their speed was so much greater than any submarine), the romance, drama, and actual danger of flight appealed to Churchill. His entourage noticed that on the special train bearing him to a seaport or airbase for onward departure, he was like a schoolboy at the end of term. His extensive travel in wartime may have been courageous, but a contributory motive was to have a little fun, to enjoy himself in luxurious surroundings so unlike austere wartime Britain, and to indulge in the drama of settling the world’s affairs at the top table. One minor theme here is Churchill’s sheer self-indulgence and how little those around him generally objected to it.

Lavery may sometimes tell readers more than they ever thought possible to know about logistics and flight-paths, but he also tells us much that is well worth our knowing.


Reviewed by Andrew Thorpe, University of Exeter

Fueled by the copious records available at The National Archives in London, the history of the Labour government led by Harold Wilson in the 1960s continues to excite considerable scholarly interest. This phenomenon has been especially marked in the areas of economics and external policy. It is not surprising that this should be so. In the declinist teleology, which until recently held a strong grip over much of the writing on Britain after 1945, the Wilson government had a central role. Its “failure” to restructure the economy—symbolized in some way by the devaluation of sterling in November 1967—was seen as a key moment in the supposed ineptitude of postwar British governments. Abroad, this was seen as the government that more or less completed decolonization but then failed to cement the Commonwealth as a meaningful bloc and achieve entry into the European Community. Such perspectives dominated the political and scholarly lives of many historians who, like the present reviewer, were born in or around the Wilson years. Yet they seem today to be old-fashioned. Whatever the state of British national finances, one would be hard pressed to argue that
Britain has sustained a permanent economic decline. Similarly, in world councils few states punch so far above their weight as the United Kingdom. One is led back to reflecting on A. J. P. Taylor’s quip that British academics started talking about decline after the war because they finally had to do their own washing up.

The decline of the declinist paradigm has allowed new and more interesting lines of research into various aspects of the performance of British postwar governments to flourish. In this new volume in the Royal Historical Society’s excellent “Studies in History” series, Geraint Hughes adapts his Ph.D. thesis to offer a clear, focused analysis of the place of East-West relations in the work of the 1964–1970 government. Hughes argues that because relations with the Soviet bloc had significantly thawed in the aftermath of the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, Wilson came to office in propitious circumstances for East-West détente. The Cold War was still a reality, though, and the Labour government had to deal with that reality. As Hughes shows, Wilson came to office with “a consistent interest in Anglo-Soviet relations” (p. 6) and had explicitly indicated, on his election in October 1964, that he wanted to see an improvement in those relations. However, the context was difficult. Taking their toll on the situation were the intensification of Sino-Soviet rivalry, the escalation of events in Vietnam, the development of U.S.-Soviet conflicts over arms control, discord between the United States and Western Europe (especially France), and pressures for reform in Eastern Europe that culminated in the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The new Soviet leaders who emerged in 1964 were not easy to deal with. Aleksei Kosygin and Leonid Brezhnev knew relatively little about foreign policy, but they knew plenty about political survival. They realized that, in part at least, their predecessor, Nikita Khrushchev, had fallen because of his foreign policy miscues. In addition, the period also saw the French and the West Germans developing their own distinctive lines of approach toward the Soviet Union. All of this constrained British policymaking, and Hughes effectively shows, through a series of well-researched and closely argued chapters, how frustrated Wilson and his colleagues became. The overall story of the book is how Britain moved from the high hopes of October 1964 to the position whereby, when Labour and Wilson left office in 1970, Britain was regarded within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as “the Cassandra of the Western Alliance” (p. 10): the least receptive of its members toward détente and the most suspicious of Soviet intentions.

The book is extremely well researched, based heavily in the archives, but also situated within a careful reading of the extant secondary literature. Hughes is not afraid to make strong judgments, and he has an air of clear authority. His great strength is his understanding of government and a clear sense of how policy was made. His discussion of Wilson and Vietnam is superb and really gets to grips with the sheer complexity of Wilson’s motivations in the matter. If one criticism can be voiced, it is that the Labour Party side of things does not always adequately come through. This reflects the fact that the book is focused on government and based on National Archives sources. But the party side might have been given more treatment as a factor in the policy decisions made—or not made—by the government. In addition, the genesis of Labour’s anti-Communism might have been discussed at greater length, particularly because Wilson, among Labour leaders, held a somewhat odd position on the matter.
Overall, however, this is an extremely strong book and makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the Wilson governments and of Cold War politics more generally. Whatever else may or may not have declined, the RHS’s Studies in History series appears to go from strength to strength.

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Martin Stuart-Fox, *University of Queensland (Australia)*

It is difficult nowadays to imagine how important Laos once was in the deliberations of the great powers. When Dwight Eisenhower handed the U.S. presidency over to John Kennedy, he warned that this newly independent, impoverished state of just three million people was potentially the most dangerous flashpoint of the Cold War in Asia.

Laurent Cesari’s extensively researched and carefully argued study covers the period from the 1954 Geneva agreements, which brought the First Indochina War to an end, through the formation and breakdown of the first coalition government in Laos and the tortuous negotiations leading up to the 1962 Geneva conference on Lao neutrality, and on to the subsequent collapse of the second coalition government as Laos was inevitably drawn into the Second Indochina War. Over the following decade Laos had the dubious distinction of becoming the most heavily bombed country, per head of population, in the history of warfare.

The core of the story Cesari tells is covered in the five (out of eight) chapters devoted to the period from the collapse of the first Lao coalition government to the outcome of the 1962 Geneva agreement. The primary focus is on the shift in U.S. policy from opposition to Lao neutrality to grudging support of it. Four factors swayed U.S. policymakers. Least influential were the views of its principal allies in the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Britain and France, which both preferred the neutrality option. Britain wanted to avoid war with China, which British leaders feared would lead to nuclear escalation. France preferred neutrality because Charles de Gaulle was convinced that military victory in Indochina would prove impossible.

The second factor was the situation on the ground in Laos, where General Phoumi Nosavan, the military strongman favored by the United States, proved to be a weak reed, and the Royal Lao army no match for the combined Neutralist and Pathet Lao forces. The only effective opposition came from the Hmong “secret army,” which the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency was then busily recruiting. So a political solution was the only alternative, though it took time for this to sink in—and longer still for the U.S. government to overcome its suspicion of the Neutralist leader, Prince Souvanna Phouma, the only acceptable candidate for prime minister in a new coalition government.

Both these factors have been noted in previous accounts. So, too, has the third,
the regional equation; in particular, how what happened in Laos would be likely to affect the situation in South Vietnam. But Cesari sheds fresh light on the debate at the highest levels in Washington about whether to commit U.S. ground forces in Laos and whether to divide the country in two at the seventeenth parallel. Both options were seriously considered but rejected on the grounds that the expansion of Communism could be better contained in Vietnam, where both terrain and allies were thought to offer better prospects of success.

The fourth factor was international. Laos was a bargaining chip in the global contest for advantage between the United States and the USSR—in particular, as Cesari shows, in negotiations over Berlin. U.S. officials made support for Lao neutrality a quid pro quo for agreement on a German settlement, but they expected that the Soviet Union would enforce Laos’s neutrality. This expectation presupposed that the USSR wielded as much influence over the Chinese and North Vietnamese as it did over the East European states, something that was simply not true. In any case, interests did not sufficiently coincide. For the United States, Indochina formed part of its strategy to contain China, whereas for Moscow it was an arena for Sino-Soviet competition.

U.S. expectations of what neutralization would achieve also proved a miscalculation. Kennedy wanted “a Laos anti-communist but truly neutral” (p. 176). But this was a contradiction in terms. Souvanna Phouma was a scion of the royal house of Luang Prabang, which at one time had paid tribute simultaneously to Siam, Vietnam, and China. For Souvanna, neutrality meant accommodating the interests of opposing powers in order to be free of their interference—even if this required turning a blind eye, as Prince Sihanouk did in Cambodia, to the infiltration of North Vietnamese forces through Lao territory into South Vietnam. In return Souvanna expected North Vietnam to drop its support for the Pathet Lao. Lao neutrality, therefore, was always unlikely to close off the Ho Chi Minh trail.

Moreover, as Cesari shows, the United States, through its determination to ensure that the political right in Laos continued to enjoy a degree of autonomy within the coalition government and to exercise what amounted to veto powers via the unanimity principle over key ministries it did not control, guaranteed that the same would apply to the Lao Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its dealings with the International Control Commission (ICC) responsible for verifying Lao neutrality. This allowed the Pathet Lao effectively to prevent the ICC from investigating the presence of Vietnamese forces in “liberated” areas. Cesari argues that the constraints on the ICC, rather than the failure to divide Laos at the seventeenth parallel, as Norman Hannah contends in *The Key to Failure: Laos and the Vietnam War* (Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1987), is what kept open the Ho Chi Minh trail and led eventually to the loss of the war in South Vietnam. What the United States did not foresee in 1962 was that the trickle of Communist cadres down the trail would later become a flood of regular North Vietnamese forces that aerial bombardment would be unable to stanch.

Even while agreeing to Lao neutrality, however, the Kennedy administration retained a profound distrust of any form of neutralism, which it saw as the thin end of a wedge that would open the way to a Communist seizure of power. Kennedy backed
Lao neutrality only because he was convinced that committing U.S. combat forces in Laos was a worse option. But he chose the Lao neutrality option only because South Vietnam provided a preferable alternative. Kennedy no more intended to abandon support of the right in Laos than the North Vietnamese considered abandoning the Pathet Lao. Genuine neutrality was doomed from the start. The irony is that the interests of major players on both sides would have best been served by preserving the façade of Lao neutrality even after the second coalition had irrevocably broken down, not only because this would have hidden their respective violations of the agreement they had reached, but also because South Vietnam was the preferred theater of war for both North Vietnam and the United States.

This is an excellent book. Errors are few: Garfield Barwick was the Australian minister of foreign affairs (not secretary of state); the Communist party in Laos was the Lao People’s Party (it changed its name to the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party only at its second congress in 1972). Cesari makes good use of U.S., French, and British sources and of published work drawing on the Soviet archives. What is missing are Chinese and Vietnamese voices. But until the Communist parties of both countries open their archives, this will remain the definitive work.


*Reviewed by Patricio Silva, Leiden University, The Netherlands*

For nearly 40 years, the figure of General Augusto Pinochet has divided the Chilean people. Many Chileans still consider him a patriotic military man who prevented the consolidation of Communism on Chilean soil and who laid the foundations for a prosperous, modern country. For many other Chileans, however, Pinochet is the man who destroyed a long-standing democracy and set up one of the cruelest authoritarian regimes Latin America has ever experienced. When the general was arrested in London in October 1998, some Chileans euphorically celebrated the event whereas others angrily repudiated the British action. His death in December 2006 again exposed the sharp division among Chileans. News of his death was greeted with spontaneous street celebrations, but just a few days later, impressively long queues of people in Santiago waited patiently for hours to pay their last respects to the former dictator.

This division has also been visible within Chilean academic circles. Until now well-balanced studies of Pinochet and his regime have been extremely rare. Even moderate scholars have tended to lose their objectivity when discussing the general. For many years historians have assumed that the first authoritative work on the Pinochet regime would have to come from a North American or European scholar who could maintain his or her emotional and personal distance from this most controversial period of recent Chilean history.

Chilean political scientist Carlos Huneeus’s *The Pinochet Regime* is thus a very
welcome surprise; it provides a profound and extremely well-documented analysis of the structures of power, the policies, and the reasons for the longevity of the Pinochet regime. Huneeus starts his analysis by identifying the many distinctive features of the Pinochet regime and by comparing them to other authoritarian experiences in the South American region. Chile remained a police state throughout Pinochet’s seventeen years in power. Whereas in other South American countries repression was concentrated in the first years of military rule, the Pinochet regime used systematic violence against its opponents for the duration of its rule. Another important difference in the Chilean case was the enormous personalization of power in the figure of General Pinochet, unlike military regimes elsewhere in South America that were more collective in structure, with the armed forces governing as an institution. But the most distinctive feature of the Pinochet regime was the profound reforms he introduced in the Chilean economy following the adoption of an orthodox neoliberal model of free market economics.

As Huneeus correctly points out, the relative success Pinochet achieved in reacting the Chilean economy and in modernizing the country helps to explain how his government was able to obtain the support of the country’s entrepreneurs and its large middle class. Instead of democracy and citizenship Pinochet offered Chilean citizens the benefits of the market and unrestricted consumerism of foreign goods. As the consumption of foreign goods expanded, it became an effective instrument in legitimizing Pinochet’s rule.

Pinochet’s legitimation strategy was also based on the adoption of a series of constitutional measures (including the formation of a council of state and the promulgation of the 1980 constitution) in an attempt to provide the regime with a legal basis and to ensure its long-term existence. In a detailed analysis, Huneeus demonstrates that the political and economic course the new authorities followed was unclear in the early years after the military coup. At the beginning, the military regime was influenced by the ideas and projects of the so-called gremialista movement, an ultra-conservative Catholic movement led by Jaime Guzmán. The gremialistas provided the main ideological arguments used in justifying the coup, as well as the new order the military sought to follow. They also offered the legal and technical assistance needed to reform the legal system and to manage a series of specialized state agencies. However, the gremialistas had no specific economic plan to tackle the profound economic and financial crisis that had severely affected the country since the days of Salvador Allende’s government.

In a fascinating chapter, Huneeus describes the ascendancy of the so-called Chicago Boys, a group of young neoliberal economists who took control of the economic policies of the regime in mid-1975. These technocrats radically transformed the Chilean economy by adopting a free-market economic model based on the entrepreneurial skills of the private sector and oriented toward the expansion of Chilean exports to the rest of the world. After some difficult transitional years, the Chilean economy began to show a vigorous recuperation, and the Chicago Boys managed to expand their influence to other policy fields such as health, education, and labor legislation. This
In the final part of the book, Huneeus provides a vivid account of the final years of the Pinochet regime. Although Pinochet failed in his attempt to remain in power until the end of the 1990s, the economic system he introduced in the mid-1970s and part of the legal system he formulated during his rule have survived into the democratic era inaugurated in 1990. The democratic Concertación governments that succeeded Pinochet have viewed high rates of economic growth and financial stability as preconditions for political stability and the consolidation of democratic rule in the country. The democratic forces have had to show the population that they can implement the policies needed to maintain and even increase Chile’s economic prosperity.

This book makes clear that after democratic restoration in 1990 Pinochet continued to exert a considerable amount of power. For many years he retained control of the Chilean armed forces, and he later became a “senator for life.” For a long while, he could count on the firm support of right-wing politicians, who were well represented in parliament and could thus block the executive’s attempts to remove Pinochet from the armed forces and to bring to justice former and active officers who had been connected to human rights abuses during the authoritarian regime. Pinochet’s sudden arrest in London in 1998 marked the beginning of the end of his presence in Chilean politics. Following his return to Chile in early 2000, Pinochet never regained his former influence and had to face several trials in Chilean courts. The discovery in 2005 of secret bank accounts in several U.S. banks dealt a severe blow to his remaining supporters, who had always stressed the honesty of their leader. Huneeus has produced an excellent book on the Pinochet era, one that shows the complexities of his regime and gives the reader the needed space to formulate his or her own opinion about one of the most controversial figures in recent Latin American history.


Reviewed by Zachary Kagan-Guthrie, Princeton University

This book, the latest in Routledge’s Cold War History series, offers a range of contributions explicating the role of the Cold War in influencing political change in southern Africa. Sue Onslow’s introduction offers a convincing rationale for the Cold War’s importance in guiding political transformations in ways that continue to affect contemporary political structures and possibilities within the region. In the field of Cold War studies, the contributors offer important perspectives that successfully complicate overly glib interpretations of the Cold War’s role in regional political change.

The first section of the book is primarily focused on politics within southern Africa. Two of the initial chapters, from John Daniel and Donal Lowry, analyze the relationship between racism and anti-Communism within the political philosophies of
the white minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. Lowry’s argument aims to establish that anti-Communism was not a peripheral concern to the Rhodesian regime, although he does not consider how this political posture was related to more visceral concerns of economic, social, and racial control. In contrast, Daniel’s chapter more carefully studies the interplay between these factors. Onslow’s chapter also remains firmly grounded within regional political dynamics, offering a detailed account of South African foreign policy toward the ongoing conflict in Rhodesia. The chapter presents important insights into Pretoria’s broader regional aims and the impact Robert Mugabe’s unexpected election victory had on South Africa’s future approach to regional affairs.

Later chapters are more concerned with relations between southern Africa and the Cold War’s main combatants, the Soviet Union and the United States. Anna-Mart van Wyk’s narrative traces, in considerable detail, the role the United States played in assisting South Africa’s nuclear weapons program during its initial stages of development. Vladimir Shubin offers a similar wealth of information regarding the Soviet presence in southern Africa and Moscow’s links to regional liberation movements. The argument presented in Shubin’s contribution is somewhat vague. In addition to forceful corrections of the mangled information offered by Western analysts writing in the 1980s, he offers a range of small insights into the particulars of Soviet involvement but not necessarily the larger picture. Andy DeRoche provides a different and welcome perspective by investigating the relationship between the United States and Zambia during Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, thus expanding the book’s perspective beyond the view from Salisbury, Pretoria, Washington, and Moscow. Nancy Mitchell’s chapter is a fascinating account of Jimmy Carter’s rejection of the flawed Rhodesian elections won by the Western-friendly Bishop Abel Muzorewa. Accepting this outcome would have been the most expedient decision from the perspective of domestic politics, but Carter refused to do so, a decision that Mitchell persuasively argues was grounded in views on U.S. race relations that he had developed during his formative years. This is followed by a correspondingly thought-provoking exploration of the policy implications that could result from the use of American race relations as an imperfect lens through which to analyze political transformation in southern Africa.

The final two chapters, by Piero Gleijeses and Chris Saunders, concern the enduringly controversial process that brought a simultaneous end to the South African occupation of Namibia and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. The sharp military clashes between Cuban and South African troops that immediately preceded the final stage of the protracted negotiations have produced a wide range of analyses regarding the role that Cuban pressure played in producing the outcome. Gleijeses’s chapter, based on work in the Cuban archives, offers an essential perspective to this historiography, which future scholars will have to consider even if they disagree with aspects of his interpretations. Saunders offers a similarly valuable retelling of this history, one that reaches more nuanced but equally well-taken conclusions about the importance of Cuban intervention.

Onslow’s introduction and conclusion do an excellent job of synthesizing the individual contributions and placing their importance within wider historiographical
registers. The contributions are well chosen in their coalescence around a discernible set of political and historical issues. If the book has flaws, they lie in the paths not taken. The minority regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa attract substantial and perhaps disproportionate attention. As Onslow recognizes in the introduction, Angola and Mozambique played important roles in this history and suffered far-greater human and material damage from its conflicts, but they are here viewed almost entirely from the perspective of their Anglophone neighbors (although Gleijeses and Shubin offer episodic considerations of Angolan politics as reflected by the light of Cuban and Soviet policies). Similarly, although the interaction between international policies pursued in the shadow of the Cold War and the social and political changes unfolding within these countries is discussed in Onslow’s introduction and touched on by several of the authors, these essays are primarily focused on high politics and diplomacy. Further work will be needed to trace how the impact of the Cold War was transmitted through domestic social and political circuits. Those caveats aside, this book succeeds in introducing more complex analyses of the Cold War’s political reverberations within the crises that marked the transition to majority rule in southern Africa and will be highly useful for scholars interested in studying this history.