for any kind of didactic or propagandistic purposes” (p. 207). After Khrushchev, the leaders of the Communist Party sought to put the lid back on this Pandora’s Box, but the damage had already been done. Not until the late 1980s under Mikhail Gorbachev did the Stalin period again come under extensive public scrutiny, and the Soviet Union collapsed soon thereafter.

The book is short on international context, except for the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. This is perhaps the only serious shortcoming. Cultural and ideological warfare and Western cultural influences on Soviet readers were considerable factors and are worthy of being addressed. Even if the debates around Nový mir were at the time overwhelmingly “domestic,” that cultural “isolationism” needs to be problematized. This concern aside, The Readers is of great value. The book explains why Soviet society, and now Russian society, has remained so defensive and vulnerable to the issues of state violence and human rights.

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Reviewed by Nikolay Valkov, Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University

Nadia Boyadjieva has produced an excellent, in-depth study of relations between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the impact on the security environment in Europe after the end of the Cold War. This is the first book by a Bulgarian scholar to focus on that particular aspect of international relations. Boyadjieva makes an important contribution by highlighting the influence of the Cold War and its legacy in understanding the security milieu during the period under investigation. Another significant merit of her research is the special attention she pays to official and unofficial Russian perspectives on security relations, drawing on archival documents, academic literature, mass-media publications, and interviews.

The eight chapters of the book follow the chronology of the events that took place during the decade immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The first chapter provides an introductory framework for the rest of the book. Boyadjieva traces how a bipolar system of international relations emerged and congealed after the peace treaties that ended World War II.

The next chapter deals with the dramatic changes in the Soviet Union and in Soviet foreign policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev’s wide-ranging political and economic reforms, which transformed and ultimately destabilized the Soviet state and Communist Party. Boyadjieva astutely explains the reasons for the changes and offers an insightful analysis of the consequences of the reforms. When discussing the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of the Russian Federation,
she meticulously explores the debates among political leaders, military experts, and intellectuals in Russia about the country’s new security priorities.

Chapter three turns to the new security environment in Central and Eastern Europe immediately after the disintegration of the bipolar international system. The security vacuum in which these countries found themselves spurred them to pursue contacts with NATO as relentlessly as possible in the hope of eventually gaining admission into the alliance. Boyadjieva rightly devotes special attention to Russia’s relations with the Baltic states and the Russian government’s position regarding the dramatic conflicts in the western Balkans.

Chapter four recounts the formulation of the Russian government’s new National Security Concept, which, as Boyadjieva demonstrates, was shaped by the nuclear legacy of the ex-USSR and the continuing negotiations between Moscow and Washington about the practical application of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine agreed to establish itself as a non–nuclear weapons state and to facilitate the removal of all nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory—weapons that had been left over from the USSR. The debates among Russian military experts regarding the new military doctrine played a crucial role in the elaboration of the overall national security concept, as Boyadjieva shows.

The following chapter analyzes the efforts by President Boris Yeltsin and his foreign policy and military advisers to devise a foreign policy strategy suitable for the post–Cold War world. Boyadjieva also examines how the Russian political elite gradually changed their views about NATO, a process spurred on by NATO enlargement in the latter half of the 1990s and especially by NATO’s 1999 war against Serbia over Kosovo.

Chapter six documents the new course of action undertaken by NATO, which also had to adapt to the geopolitical and geostrategic realities after the end of the bipolar Cold War system. Initially, the NATO governments were unwilling to bring in new members, but in late 1993 and 1994 the U.S. administration under President Bill Clinton changed the alliance’s position. The doctrine of eastward expansion adopted by NATO in the mid-1990s provoked sharp reactions among Russian political elites, Russian journalists and commentators, Russian military commanders, and the Russian public.

The subsequent chapter critically analyzes the NATO-Russia Founding Act from 1997 and the creation of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Boyadjieva devotes particular attention to the negotiation process and NATO’s attempts to build a special relationship with the Russian Federation, including a joint declaration in which the two governments asserted that they no longer perceived each other as enemies. The NATO governments and the Russian authorities each regarded such a pledge as a sine qua non for their mutual cooperation.

The eighth and final chapter focuses on NATO, Russia, and regional security in the Balkans, a topic about which Boyadjieva has written extensively in the past. The chapter summarizes the main stages of cooperation among Russia, the United States, and the European Union (EU) in resolving the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and their less successful efforts to deal with the crisis in Kosovo. Only NATO, not the
European Union, proved able to deal with the violence in Bosnia and bring an end to the fighting there. Kosovo provoked a deep split between NATO and Russia—a split that continues to cast a pall on the relationship today. Although the two sides did eventually cooperate on some of the postwar tasks, Kosovo permanently disrupted the relationship.

Boyadjieva has accomplished her goal of demonstrating that in the 1990s NATO and Russia were able to lay the foundations of cooperation that would have been inconceivable during the Cold War. To that extent, the two sides made extraordinary progress in getting beyond the Cold War. At the same time, the book also concludes that the NATO-Russia relationship was plagued by bilateral tension and incessant mutual suspicion. Ultimately, neither NATO nor Russia was able to make a full break with the Cold War patterns and mindsets and to establish a fundamentally new international order based on the rule of law. This explains why a full-fledged rapprochement between NATO and Russia was so difficult to achieve and ultimately proved elusive.

Boyadjieva convincingly shows that in order to understand the contemporary security environment, we need to understand the legacy of the Cold War. If her second volume, which will cover the years under Vladimir Putin, is as good as this initial volume, readers will eagerly await it.

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Reviewed by Mark Sheetz, Williams College

The thrust of this book is indicated in its title and subtitle. Aurélie Gfeller argues that circumstances surrounding the 1973 oil crisis allowed Europeans to break through previous obstacles and create a common political identity. The book is meticulously documented with a wealth of primary sources but is ultimately unconvincing.

The book’s central claim is that Europeans developed a common political identity largely as a result of doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees following the 1973 Arab oil embargo. But concern about the reliability of the United States as an ally was not new. Fears of U.S. isolationism were a motivating factor in European, and especially French, policy from the end of World War II. Charles de Gaulle thought that U.S. assurances offered little solace because, as he remarked to U.S. Ambassador Jefferson Caffery just after the war, “you are far away and your soldiers will not stay long in Europe ... it is a matter of life and death for us; for you, one interesting question among many” (quoted from Caffery to SecState, 3 November 1945, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945*, Vol. 3, pp. 890–891.) Likewise, the British government sought to develop its own nuclear deterrent in 1947 because it feared the United States might leave Europeans high and dry to cope with the Soviet threat on their own. Prime Minister Clement Atlee explained: “We couldn’t