Assuming that readers of this journal will be predominantly interested in the book’s first section (“Historical Contexts”), this review has focused on Anders’s political activities and writings. As far as these hitherto neglected or forgotten issues are concerned, the book provides valuable, well-written, and thoroughly researched contributions that properly describe the wide range of Anders’s life-long attempts to come to terms with the shocking experiences of his time: the Holocaust and the threat of nuclear apocalypse during the Cold War period.

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Reviewed by Jeremy Kuzmarov, University of Tulsa

On 1 May 2013, Bolivian President Evo Morales expelled the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), declaring that “the times have passed” when the United States could use “charity as a fig leaf for manipulation, . . . domination, . . . [and] subjugation.” Thomas Field’s book provides strong historical grounding for Morales’s action. Field focuses on how the Kennedy administration used development aid to prop up the repressive government of Victor Paz Estenssoro. USAID sent $100,000 worth of military hardware to equip an Indian peasant militia charged with “eliminating” two left-wing union leaders depicted by development economists as “obstacles” to Bolivian modernization.

Based on multiarchival research and interviews with key policymakers and Bolivian labor leaders, Field’s study provides an important critical perspective on the Alliance for Progress (AFP), a large-scale aid program whose underlying goal was to prevent the growth of worker-peasant socialism. Advancing a top-down vision of social change centered on the growth of the middle class, the AFP promoted harsh labor reforms breeding inevitable resistance, which the Kennedy administration helped to suppress through the strengthening of internal security forces. The AFP in turn set the groundwork for an era of coup d’etats and military rule, when the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) cultivated close ties with General René Barrientos, who gained infamy for ordering the assassination of Ernesto “Che” Guevara after Guevara came from Cuba to lead a renewed peasant revolt. (On Guevara’s assassination, see Michael Ratner and Michael S. Smith, Who Killed Che: How the CIA Got Away with Murder, New York: Orbis Books, 2011.)

From Development to Dictatorship fits with a growing body of scholarship—for example, Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), and Stephen G. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999)—that challenges triumphalist interpretations of the Cold War and points to the violent consequences of the Cold War in Latin America. The repression in Bolivia is less known than in
places like Guatemala and Chile, and so the study is greatly welcome. Field quotes CIA Station Chief Larry Sternfield referring to Paz Estenssoro as a “Nazi” whose inner coterie included ex-Nazis (rescued under the CIA’s Operation Paperclip). The secret police chief, Claudio San Román, ran torture chambers with “skin, blood, arms, legs and blood on the wall” (p. 168).

The Paz regime was so hated it ignited revolt not only among tin miners, whose motives were obscured in stereotyped media depictions, but also right-wing ranchers in Santa Cruz, whom the State Department and media erroneously characterized as “crypto-communists.” These guerillas shot and paralyzed a Green Beret working under the cover of the USAID’s Office of Public Safety.

Estenssoro’s staunchest supporters were liberals such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., the Harvard historian and aide to President John F. Kennedy; Teodoro Moscoso, chief AFP administrator; and Ambassador Ben Stephansky. All were also strong advocates of economic austerity measures that led to large-scale job loss and the deterioration of already poor working conditions. Rather than considering these reforms “anti-labor,” they were seen to restore “balance against excessive and anarchical influence” in the unions and to help “get rid of the commies.” Quoting a Bolivian historian, Field writes that Stephansky “liked to fancy himself as an unbiased liberal, and perhaps deep down he was. Between smiles and handshakes, he did more damage than all his boorish predecessors; Texans who smelled like cattle, screwballs who collected lighters and unimaginative bureaucrats” (p. 196).

This depiction brings to mind Alden Pyle’s character in Graham Greene’s novel *The Quiet American* and forgotten critiques of “corporate” liberalism by the Students for a Democratic Society. Field might have discussed this latter phenomenon in greater depth, using the Bolivian case as a jumping-off point. He should have provided more details about U.S. investment in Bolivia and Latin America, elaborating on how “vital center” ideology helped to advance corporate power. Guevara considered the AFP a policy to bring Latin American economies in line with the interests of “the monopolies,” allowing for the cheaper extraction of raw materials through the building of road infrastructure and keeping labor costs down, while “lessening internal discontent in each Latin American country by making minor concessions to the people . . . on conditions that these countries surrender their interests completely and renounce their own development” (quoted from “Ché Guevara Exposes US Alliance for Progress,” *The Militant*, 20 January 2003, p. 1). Whatever one thinks of Guevara’s embrace of guerrilla warfare, Field’s study essentially confirms Guevara’s view, though the book could do more on the side of political economy. I would like to know more about what Wall Street bankers thought of the political situation in Bolivia and of the AFP and who profited most from economic austerity. What role did the World Bank and International Monetary Fund play in all this?

Overall, Field’s book is an outstanding addition to the literature on U.S. foreign policy in Latin America and the Cold War. Sensitive to the Bolivian perspective, Field provides sharp insights on the political imperatives underlying foreign aid programs and their link to the growth of state repression. Bolivia is still living with the
damage bred by the Kennedy liberals and their successors, though under resolute leadership it is finally starting to assert its autonomy and to experience greater equity of income.


Reviewed by Benita Blessing, Oregon State University

Dolores Augustine’s study of the scientific community in the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ, 1945–1949) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) is a significant and much-needed contribution to the historical literature about the role of science in a socialist country. To say that Augustine has left no stone unturned in this tour de force is no exaggeration. *Red Prometheus* is more than an exhaustive history based on several years of research using multiple methodologies; it is and will remain an authoritative work on a complex tale of political intrigue, human ethical dilemmas, and romantic fantasies of a utopian, modern world. Augustine’s point of departure is the question of how dictatorship and science interacted in East Germany (p. xi). The journey this investigation takes her on uncovers a socialist world, incredible in its attempts to use science as the vehicle to trump the West in creating the better modern society. It is easy to forget that one is reading history and not a page-turning, nail-biting genre of novel about outlandish Cold War schemes. Therein lies the strength of this book: Augustine balances her rich narrative with a sharp analysis that is as accessible for a general public as it is revealing for a highly specialized, scholarly audience—whether students, scientists, or historians.

Augustine begins the study with the immediate post–World War II period of the SBZ, the four years before the official founding of the GDR that historians are realizing as more than an unimportant preview of what was to come. In the case of scientists who had been employed during the Nazi regime, the end of the war marked a scramble to turn themselves in to the occupying powers—hoping, correctly, that this voluntary surrender would allow for a more lenient treatment by the military administrations. These former Nazi scientists, whether employed in the United States, the Soviet zone/GDR, or in the Soviet Union, became a cohort of Cold War intellectual soldiers racing against time and one another to develop military technology and to complete research on the Nazi nuclear program. Less well-known is that a site parallel to the secret Anglo-American “Alsos” program existed in the Soviet Union. Whether part of a voluntary group of German scientists who emigrated to the USSR as part of the labor-as-reparations policy or part of the 1946 “Osoaviakhim” program of enforced deportation of German scientists to the USSR, thousands of scientists and their families (along with factories, laboratories, pets, and house plants) became part of