peoples and domestic minorities during an unprecedented period of progressive social transformation. Yet, as Burke demonstrates so well, they were not just retrograde reactionaries pining for a lost world. Rightwing paramilitary movements with international connections became a vital force in many parts of the world. They revitalized their strategies to meet new challenges and laid the groundwork for a no-holds-barred form of capitalism to flourish in the post–Cold War era, a perverse “victory” that Burke could have explored in more depth.

By the end of the Cold War, however, this disparate group of spies, mercenaries, wealthy fundraisers, retired military and intelligence officers, and adventurers lost its purpose. The U.S. far-right had never acknowledged the complexity of the social struggles in the Third World, interpreting deeply rooted regional and national grievances through the lens of Communist subversion. Consequently, once that phenomenon was no longer a threat, the glue that held the anti-Communist international together dissolved. The far Right had cohered around what it opposed, not what it supported. The global vision that inspired men like Singlaub ceased to exist, giving way to a more inwardly focused concern with domestic problems and the use of militias and militarized police forces to combat them. Yet the impetus that inspired anti-Communist paramilitaries—the outsourcing of war to the private sector—has continued. Burke notes how the rise of private military contractors such as Blackwater, Dyncorp, Military Professionals International, and others represents the legitimation and institutionalization of paramilitarism. These sanitized and dressed-up mercenaries are, he insists, a product of the Cold War. They represent a victory for privatized power and the claim that private contractors are better than the state in waging war.

*Revolutionaries of the Right* is an important book that contributes to a growing body of scholarship on the transnational dimensions of the far right. Its careful analysis of anti-Communist activism, from propaganda to paramilitarism, is relevant for anyone seeking a better understanding of the Cold War and insights into contemporary politics.

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*Reviewed by Alonzo Hamby, Ohio University*

This ambitious book effectively blends military, diplomatic, political, and economic history in its account of the U.S. revival of the international economy after World War II. The dust jacket features Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur, who provided essential support for the project. The activists who developed and carried the task through were led by General Lucius D. Clay and industrialist Joseph
Dodge. Grant Madsen, identifying himself with the “American Political Development” interpretive school, persuasively argues that the development of a relatively open and prosperous international trading system was less the outcome of a grand imperial design than the pragmatic response of U.S. occupation authorities coping with the challenges of poverty and hunger in defeated and ravaged countries.

MacArthur was himself a child of the U.S. empire, which originated with the Spanish-American war. His father, General Arthur MacArthur, commanded U.S. occupation forces in the Philippines in a somewhat uneasy association with Governor (and later President) William Howard Taft and Taft’s successors. Douglas MacArthur, following in his father’s career path, was an outstanding West Point cadet and an acclaimed division commander in World War I. After the war, he was assigned to command U.S. forces in the Philippines, which had been promised independence. Building a Philippine army, he worked with local leaders, became acutely aware of Japanese designs on the islands, and established himself as an influential outsider. Recalled to the United States in 1930, he was appointed chief of staff of the Army.

Eisenhower spent the First World War stateside. Assigned to training schools in tank warfare, he acquired expertise in a weapon that transformed ground fighting. After the war, he and his close friend George Patton were among the Army’s most avid enthusiasts of armored mobility. More broadly, Eisenhower had arrived at the understanding that “military success depended upon economic might and technological innovation” (p. 34). Assigned to the Panama Canal Zone, he found a mentor in General Fox Conner, who introduced him to the classics of Western military literature.

In Washington after the war, Eisenhower worked on industrial planning for future wars in association with Bernard Baruch, who convinced him that strong government could manage the economy in wartime by mobilizing existing management and imposing price controls. He was generally supportive of the early New Deal because its effort to organize the economy seemed in the spirit of Baruch’s War Industries Board.

MacArthur as Army chief of staff, however, had to endure steep military cuts and found himself at odds with President Franklin Roosevelt. He was assigned to the Philippines, which was scheduled for independence in 1944, with the mission of developing a defense force for the new country. Both Eisenhower and Clay also had stints in the Philippines. Eisenhower’s relationship with MacArthur was especially unsatisfactory. Clay supervised some public works, and he and Eisenhower were back in the United States for the beginning of World War II in Europe.

With U.S. involvement in the war, Eisenhower became the supreme commander in the European theater, with Clay as a trusted subordinate. The ideas of postwar planners in Washington like Henry Morgenthau, who thought in terms of deindustrializing postwar Germany, were rejected by Clay. Advised by Joseph Dodge, Clay maintained that deindustrialization would be disastrous for both Germany and the larger European economy. The United States, he argued, must restart a demilitarized western German economy.

MacArthur, given control of postwar Japan partly to keep him away from Washington, presided over a remarkable economic and political transformation in which
Dodge also had an important role. Despite high taxes and a balanced budget, the Japanese economy prospered and received a boost from the outbreak of the Korean War.

Korea also brought MacArthur back to prominence as the apparent mastermind of a military effort that had turned an apparent defeat into a smashing victory—until Communist China intervened. President Harry Truman sought to stabilize the fighting along the prewar boundary between North and South Korea. MacArthur, declaring there was no substitute for victory, openly disagreed. The president replaced him with General Matthew Ridgway, effectively bringing MacArthur’s military career to an end.

This otherwise fine book underplays the impact of MacArthur’s firing. He returned to the United States a living legend and traveled from one ticker-tape parade to another across the country. Delivering an emotional address to Congress—the Democrats controlled both houses but dared not prevent him from speaking—MacArthur declared there was no substitute for victory. Most Republicans adopted him as a hero but not as a presidential candidate. The beneficiary of a country ready for an alternative to twenty years of Democratic presidents was Eisenhower.

Eisenhower’s presidency, though more conservative than that of Roosevelt and Truman, functioned within the broad parameters of the New Deal consensus at home and generally continued the foreign policies of its Democratic predecessors. What it and its successors—Democratic and Republican—could not do, Madsen suggests, was establish continuous peace and stability in a turbulent world.


Reviewed by Devin Pendas, Boston College

The events of 1989 ended the Cold War, but the many issues left unresolved in Europe gave rise to new problems. For the countries of the former Soviet bloc, the problems loomed especially large as they sought to establish new political and economic systems, to forge new international alliances, and to gain entry into multilateral institutions (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union). For Western countries, the post–Cold War era was marked above all by a shift in attention away from Eastern Europe toward the Middle East, especially after September 2001. Yet one Western country confronted the problems of post-socialist transition not just in its backyard but in its living room: Germany. The reunification of Germany (some critics prefer to speak of annexation) meant that the challenges of structural adjustment and political transformation were handled mainly via the export of existing West German institutions and structures into the newly incorporated East.