complementarity was hard to come by. Ultimately, Sanchez-Sibony concludes, Soviet officials strove for the same arrangement that their Third World counterparts pursued: integration into the capitalist economy, if only incomplete and on unfavorable terms of trade.

Among the many insights of *Red Globalization* is the insistence that Soviet leaders reckoned with the capitalist economy as rational economic actors—ideological bluster notwithstanding. References to the advantages of the “international division of labor” emerged not just from University of Chicago economists but also from Soviet ministers (p. 98); wheeling and dealing in trade negotiations was the province of the Old Bolshevik Anastas Mikoyan (p. 107), not just the capitalists so frequently excoriated in Soviet public discourse.

Even more impressive is that this story is told using an archival source base that is broad but spotty and inconsistent. Using documents scattered in the records of the USSR’s State Planning Committee, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and elsewhere, Sanchez-Sibony finds telling evidence to support his major points. The sporadic nature of the records means that *Red Globalization* often shifts from one setting to another as it accumulates evidence. Thus, a single section might include brief vignettes of trade negotiations with three or four different countries, with some of the final results of the negotiations unknown. But Sanchez-Sibony’s extraordinary efforts at combing through, and making sense of, chaotic archival holdings pay off handsomely.

Sanchez-Sibony seems to take well-deserved pride in the book’s many insights and novel interpretations, and with good reason. Based on his prize-winning dissertation, *Red Globalization* offers an important and indeed sweeping reinterpretation of Soviet history. Yet the book’s frequent criticism of other scholars is distinctly unappealing. This tendency devolves into tendentiousness; for instance, in the passage (p. 4) that repeats the word “wrong” four times in three lines. But despite this occasional cantankerousness—not to mention the publisher’s decision to price the book out of reach for individual scholars—*Red Globalization* is an important, indeed essential, perspective on the role of foreign trade in Soviet history.


Reviewed by Roy Domenico, University of Scranton (Pennsylvania)

Alessandro Brogi’s *Confronting America* presents an exhaustively researched and masterful account of the two-way traffic between the United States and West European (Italian and French) Communism from the end of World War II until the 1980s. This is a work about anti-Americanism and soft diplomacy in which Brogi documents
U.S. efforts to fight French and Italian Communism and influence politics in both countries. His work is more complicated than traditional diplomatic histories in that he does not examine the dealings between two governments. Instead, he looks at the interactions between one government and two political parties that were, for the most part, not in power.

The struggle between the Western and Eastern alliances serves as the book’s tension, and Brogi devotes more attention to the dynamics of the Communist camp than to the Western. Washington’s alliance was more intricate than Moscow’s. U.S. allies, such as the Italian Christian Democrats and, above all, the French center-right and Gaullists, cooperated but did not march lock-step with the hegemon. The Communists, on the other hand, generally spoke with one voice, although this was more the case during the early Cold War than later. Despite great differences in outlooks, the French Communist Party (PCF) and the Italian Communist Party (PCI) acted more as instruments of Moscow and sounded more like cheering sections for the USSR than the Gaullists and Christian Democrats ever did for the United States. The Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956 modified the situation for the PCI and PCF somewhat, particularly for the Italians, but not fundamentally and not in their anti-Americanism.

The U.S. government’s anti-Communist crusade took different paths. The blunt style associated with the Truman administration gave way in the mid-1950s to Dwight Eisenhower’s slicker “New Look,” but Brogi contends that, as public diplomacy assumed greater importance, the “New Look” ultimately continued to give greater emphasis to propaganda than to cultural exchange. Although Washington’s subsidies, public and covert, created “an aura of pax Americana,” its cultural inferiority complex burdened its propaganda war in France and Italy as did the fact that most of the leading French and Italian artistic and intellectual figures identified with the Left. Cracking that wall led to projects that sometimes succeeded, such as the Fulbright Program and the Johns Hopkins Bologna Center, but that in other cases engendered new problems, such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom. Brogi concludes that the U.S. approach was remarkably flexible and tolerant.

Brogi also investigates the larger picture of the “American model of modernization” and myriad Communist reactions to it. The United States of the 1920s, symbolized by Henry Ford, had a great allure for Antonio Gramsci, the founder of the PCI and a leading Marxist thinker. For the “technological and societal experimentation” of the United States, Brogi writes, for its pragmatism and its technological prowess, Gramsci saw “an enemy, perhaps more insidious, but, for that reason, fascinating” (pp. 40–41). During the rise of European fascism in the 1930s the Left considered U.S. cinema and literature as liberating and attractive, in contrast to some of the clumsier U.S. efforts in the 1950s. Writers such as Ernest Hemmingway, whom Italo Calvino considered “a sort of God” (p. 42), challenged many Communist assumptions. Moreover, even though later U.S. government efforts often fell flat, U.S. popular culture continued to fascinate. As the British historian Stephen Gundle has also shown, Brogi
finds that even in the most vulgar characterizations, such as U.S. tabloids’ lurid crime tales and cheesecake, Communist journalists wondered “why not, if it boosts circulation?” and so they infused some of their own reviews with more glamor and gloss all’americana. Later, other developments in the United States, such as the Civil Rights movement, attracted Communist interest and further confused images of the Western superpower.

Nationalism also complicated the Cold War confrontation, particularly as Brogi’s story moves from the late 1950s into the 1960s and 1970s. Beyond Europe, the image of the United States benefitted from the Suez crisis and Algeria’s independence movement, whereas Vietnam was a U.S. propaganda disaster. Struggles in the Third World also caused splits among European Marxists, pitting more aggressive factions against pacifists and moderates, particularly in Italy. Brogi makes a good point in reminding us that the PCF considered itself, paradoxically, dogmatically Marxist but also nationalist, reacting adversely, for example, to U.S. support for German revival. Integrating Germany back into the European fabric was high on the U.S. agenda, but U.S. policymakers needed to tread lightly because Italian and French self-esteem also needed cultivation. The answer turned from “fostering self-reliant allies” toward a “commitment to interdependence” (p. 64). In downplaying nationalism and encouraging European cooperation, U.S. officials believed they could drive a wedge between Communists and moderate leftists such as Leon Blum and Giuseppe Saragat and their followers. French Communist suspicion of European integration was stubborn and fierce. “Traditions of nationalism and the nation-state,” Brogi states, “and even the nationalist belief that revolution had its roots in France, aggravated the PCF’s imperviousness to any transnational option” (p. 321). Suspicions eased somewhat in the 1960s after a PCI faction led by Giorgio Amendola began to preach a European “Third Way” as a way out of the Cold War vice. Such efforts and the experience of the Prague Spring in 1968 had some effect on the PCF.

Brogi contends that Communists faced their most “insidious, and for that reason insurmountable challenges” in consumerism and “the theories of alienation against the consumerist society that turned upside down the conventional socioeconomic Marxist understandings of revolution” (p. 285). Inspired by Herbert Marcuse and others who discussed “private desires over collective struggles,” these arguments wreaked havoc with the more orthodox French, whose rigid ideological positions were losing their appeal among rebellious youth. The economic slump and tight job market in the 1970s also worked against ideological fervor. Nevertheless, the Italians again seemed to handle things better than the French. Rossana Rossanda’s exciting tenure at the Gramsci Institute was controversial among the old hardliners, but was characterized by artistic experimentation and mending fences with old renegades such as Calvino and Elio Vittorini. If the U.S. approach was flexible and tolerant, the PCI certainly aided its success.