striking color image of a female athlete, rearing back and ready to hurl a javelin, in a packed stadium with flags flying around the top. But it shows a Soviet athlete. The black-and-white rendering also accompanies Lindsay Parks Pieper’s article on gender and sport, where it fits perfectly, but it is an odd choice for the cover of a book titled *Defending the American Way of Life*.

These complaints should not dissuade readers from this volume. It is an impressive and varied accomplishment and a significant contribution to the ongoing scholarly discussion of sport and politics during the Cold War.


 Reviewed by A. Ros Johnson, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

The Soviet Union established the Warsaw Treaty Organization (or Warsaw Pact) in May 1955 as an ostensible counterpart to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) founded by the United States, Canada, and ten West European countries in April 1949. An empty vessel or “cardboard castle” through the 1950s, the Warsaw Pact developed an institutional structure of councils, committees, and advisory bodies in the 1960s. This bureaucratic edifice was both consequence and facilitator of efforts by the smaller states in the Soviet bloc—Albania (initially), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania—to use the alliance structure to pursue autonomous foreign and security policy agendas. The seven non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states, as they came to be known, were ruled by Communist regimes imposed by Soviet occupation, subversion, and pressure (Albania was a partial exception) and, as demonstrated in 1989, remained existentially dependent on Soviet influence and ultimately Soviet military force for their survival (and, in the case of East Germany, the survival of the state).

Within these constraints—quite different from relationships within NATO—the NSWP states pursued differentiated international initiatives in the 1960s. Romania refused to back the USSR in the Sino-Soviet dispute and defied East Germany by establishing diplomatic relations with West Germany. Romania also developed a special relationship with the United States and other Western countries. The sweeping liberal reforms in Czechoslovakia during the 1968 Prague Spring threatened other Soviet-bloc regimes, spurring the Soviet Union to crush the Prague Spring with military force. Poland and East Germany espoused maximalist positions on West German issues in an unsuccessful effort to force final international legal recognition of Poland’s Western border (demarcated provisionally in the Potsdam Agreement) and East Germany’s right to exist as a separate state (in the absence of a German peace treaty). Hungary sought with some success to improve economic ties with the West and to limit conflict within the Warsaw Pact that might interfere with that objective. Albania,
being territorially separated from the Soviet bloc and aligned after 1960 with China, first boycotted and then in 1968 withdrew entirely from the Pact.

Relationships within the Soviet bloc after 1956 have long been well understood by scholars, intelligence analysts, and journalists focused on Eastern Europe. If early literature on the Cold War could reasonably characterize the NSWP states as Soviet “satellites” or “vassals” or “transmission belts,” such descriptions have long been outdated. Unity and Conflict was the subtitle of Zbigniew Brzezinski’s seminal 1961 book The Soviet Bloc (published in an updated edition in 1967), in which he traced (in chapter 17) the evolution of “Satellites into Junior Allies.” Brzezinski’s Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America’s Role in Europe, which he published in 1965, advocated a Western policy of peaceful engagement in Eastern Europe keyed to differentiation within the Soviet bloc. The NSWP states openly articulated their differentiated interests in the 1960s and beyond in their official media, and these were tracked by contemporaneous Western observers, especially analysts working for the research branches of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (of which I was one).

The evolution of Soviet satellites into junior allies is the subject of the volume under review. Laurien Crump devotes her attention to the differentiated impact in the 1960s on what Brzezinski called the “Soviet alliance system” of developments, including the Sino-Soviet split and Albania’s alliance with China, the German question and broader European security issues, Romania’s independent international course, and intrabloc ramifications of the Prague Spring. Her conclusions on these issues confirm previous studies and do not break new ground, despite Crump’s all-too-frequent claims that her arguments are “contrary to conventional wisdom” (p. 74) and “often... ignored in the historiography” (p. 48). This tilting at scholarly windmills detracts from the value of the book. Although Crump includes an extensive bibliography, greater use of cited works and other monographs on Eastern Europe would have enriched characterizations of the broader internal dynamics and external behavior of NSWP states that were the context for their maneuvering within Warsaw Pact structures. Examples of such neglected works are Charles Gati’s many publications, Karen Dawisha’s study of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet bloc in 1968, and Larry Watt’s comprehensive examination of Romania and the Warsaw Pact.

The merit of Crump’s book is not that it “rescues the Eastern Europe allies from oblivion” (p. 10) but that it offers a blow-by-blow account of how NSWP leaders promoted the development of Warsaw Pact structures and then used these bodies to advance their own agendas, sometimes challenging Soviet preferences. The book does not focus on military tactics or strategy. Drawing on pioneering research in Romanian archives, judicious use of East German and other archives, and mining of documentation compiled by the Parallel History Project and the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Crump provides valuable insights into intra-Pact negotiations. (She grants that more use of Polish archives would have enriched her study.) Although communications among the Soviet Union and its NSWP allies occurred through a variety of channels—Communist Party organs, foreign ministries, internal affairs ministries, defense ministries, intelligence services—Crump makes a
convincing case that the Pact's own structures provided an important forum for the articulation of differentiated interests by NSWP member-states after 1960 and that the alliance evolved from a mere Soviet instrument into "an instrument that the smaller allies could use to further their national interests." (p. 9)

Yet, the role of the Pact's structure should not be overstated. Differentiation would have occurred absent Warsaw Pact forums, and the significance of some intra-Pact maneuvering traced by Crump seems overstated. Intra-Pact criticism of Romania did not slow Nicolae Ceaușescu’s autonomous course, and no additional Warsaw Pact support for East Germany could have brought it international recognition. Different views within the Pact on nuclear nonproliferation did not affect the final wording of the U.S.-Soviet agreed document that was the basis for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Moreover, the book’s focus on tactical maneuvering by NSWP states within the alliance structures sometimes neglects the reality of Soviet hegemony. Parallels between the Warsaw Pact and NATO are overstated in the book. Romania was not France, and Poland was not Belgium, in terms of their weight within their respective alliances. Unlike the United States with regard to NATO, the Soviet Union forced key alliance decisions (including the 1968 military intervention in Czechoslovakia) outside the Warsaw Pact framework, and Soviet-bloc multilateralism did not extend to operational military affairs, which remained a Soviet prerogative. Drawing that conclusion, Crump nonetheless ascribes to NSWP leaders a voice on the issue of stationing nuclear warheads integral to Soviet forces in NSWP countries (a voice they did not in fact have). East Germany and Poland, with provisional borders, did not need “the WP as a safeguard for their national security” (p. 297); rather, they relied on Soviet power and specifically the presence of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and the Northern Group of Forces in Poland. No Soviet leader prior to Mikhail Gorbachev was willing to envisage the demise of Communist rule in Eastern Europe. The Brezhnev Doctrine existed before and after the label became fashionable in 1968 (and the fact that the USSR did not have to use its military forces directly in Poland to suppress Solidarity by no means signifies that it would have refrained from doing so in 1982 had Polish martial law failed).

Unclear wording and repetition of Soviet-bloc phraseology (and minor typographical errors) also detract from the merit of the book. A hypothetical role for West Germany in a NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force is described as “nuclearization of the Federal Republic of Germany” (p. 98). The purpose of the Warsaw Pact is defined as “a diplomatic instrument to safeguard European security” (p. 23). Nikita Khrushchev’s motivation for the second Berlin crisis is described as “a means to prevent the Americans from facilitating West German nuclear ambitions.” Soviet deployments of nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe are described as “obviously directed against a potential attack from Western Europe” (p. 135). Romania is described as cautious “in condemning the American aggression in Vietnam” (p. 192). France is said to have withdrawn from “the integrated structures of NATO” (p. 203); in reality it withdrew only from the military structures, not the political councils. The stationing of Soviet
The origin of the Soviet biological warfare (BW) program was fear. With *Stalin’s Secret Weapon*, Anthony Rimmington casts a revealing light onto one of the Soviet Union’s most closely guarded secrets—the existence of a program (initially multiple efforts) to develop biological weapons and defenses against such weapons. Rimmington maintains that Soviet leaders’ interest in BW was a direct “response to, and extension of” German operations during the First World War. He contends that the research program of the Soviet Central Veterinary Bacteriological Laboratory “closely resembled” that of the military bacteriological laboratory in Berlin. Fear also played a significant and recurring role in hindering Soviet BW research, notably during the Great Terror under Iosif Stalin. Many notable and talented scientists were suspected, surveilled, and arrested, some escaping back to relative safety while others were executed or died in captivity (pp. 3, 17, 19).

The role of Stalin himself is an aspect of this history that Rimmington considers important and insufficiently addressed by the existing literature. Rimmington seeks with this book to fill a “significant gap” in the military and scientific history of the Soviet Union, as well as to provide a “deeper understanding” of the global development of BW, supported by newly available source material from the British Secret Intelligence Service and Russian archives. In addition to shedding new light on Stalin’s role in Soviet BW development, Rimmington also believes that the study of the Soviet program can illuminate how modern states might pursue clandestine BW programs, that the Soviet program may have played a role in deterring German use of biological weapons during World War II, and that the Soviet program may have been “much more extensive than previously believed, easily outstripping that of the major Western powers.” Finally, Rimmington wants to present a more “nuanced and balanced” consideration of Ivan Mikahilovich Velikanov, the lead scientist of the Soviet BW program for many years (pp. 1–12, 17–20).

Rimmington achieves his goals for the book. He follows through on his promise to examine the Soviet BW program in considerable detail, with chapters devoted to the origins of the effort, the transition from a defensive focus to research exploring the offensive application of BW, various research facilities that came online during the period of focus, Ivan Velikanov, and—although the book focuses mainly on the


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military forces in Czechoslovakia after 1968 is described as filling a gap “in safeguarding the security of the Eastern European border with Western Europe” (p. 246); in fact, the new Central Group of Forces filled a gap in Soviet war plans that by the late 1960s assumed that Soviet forces would constitute the first echelon of rapid offensive operations into Western Europe.