

section, Messenger reviews French policy toward Spain from 1946 to 1948, tracing the movement toward a normalization of Franco-Spanish relations, with an end to border closures and further unilateral French initiatives. By 1948, it was evident that any isolated attempts to weaken Franco's hold in Spain that were led by France without its allies would likely have the reverse effect of strengthening the Spanish regime and dividing the opposition. In formulating policy vis-à-vis Spain, France had clearly now become an ally with relatively little influence over its Western partners.

The scope of the book is broad, and inevitably some aspects of French domestic politics are given slightly less weight than one might have expected—for example, the impact of the dismissal of ministers affiliated with the French Communist Party (*Parti Communiste Français*) from the government in 1947. A sharper editorial eye might also have eliminated some of the occasional typographical mistakes and infelicities of expression.

These are, however, minor grouses. Messenger's achievements in the book are considerable. His transnational approach has generated rich material on such areas as French links with Spanish exile movements, consistent French intervention in political prisoner cases, and French support for anti-Franco opposition groups. His thesis that France should be regarded as a special case in the developing Western alliance is supported by a careful analysis of the mixed inheritance of the war for French-Spanish relations, the unusual nature of postwar French domestic politics, and what he rightly identifies as the specific rhetoric and images around Spain that influenced many of those involved in policymaking: "the context . . . was very different from that of [France's] allies. The real difference between French and Anglo-American anti-Franco activists was in the ability of French anti-Franco activists to draw upon images and themes unique to France" (p. 35).

Messenger's analysis of Franco-Spanish relations during this transitional period provides an interesting perspective on how and why, "as France moved towards its role within the western alliance, it did so awkwardly, with both the significance of Resistance rhetoric and imagery about an idealized new world competing with a realistic assessment of France's role as a member of the Alliance and European leader" (p. 141).



Joy Rohde, *Armed with Expertise: The Militarization of American Social Research during the Cold War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013. 224 pp. \$29.95.

Reviewed by Bruce Kuklick, University of Pennsylvania

This book adds to a library of material on social science and U.S. foreign policy after 1945. Joy Rohde examines the origins and growth of the Special Operations and Research Office (SORO) that the U.S. Army established in the mid-1950s. SORO was formally a social science institute of American University in Washington, DC,

but it did contract work for the military. The organization was of midrank among the proliferating groups of social scientists who served the national security interests of the United States during the Cold War. But Rohde effectively shows how SORO embodied the convictions, hopes, and tensions that many historians have found in the dominant trends of social science from 1945 to 1974. The experts of American University—SORO believed that their know-how could benefit the world and enhance free societies. To some extent, moreover, the armed forces took the researchers at their word. The men and women of SORO also often worried that the government could co-opt them, and they fretted about their moral responsibilities to their profession and to the state. These scholars tried to work out the cognitive status of their enterprise: to what extent, and how, was it related to the culture in which it had emerged? Finally, and not least, Rohde explores the supremacy of the army in this marriage; the essential message is that social science was “militarized.”

SORO was officially disbanded in 1966 after only ten years of doing business, when the radicalism of the Vietnam War began to shake up national politics. The erudite were embarrassed when activists publicized the connection of the generals to higher education, and SORO collapsed. In various guises, however, the institution survived into the 1980s, although it had fewer and fewer traceable ties to ordinary university life. Rohde tracks SORO’s successors in the 1970s before she offers a final chapter offering provisional ideas about the trajectory of social investigation, post-Cold War, in the interventions of the United States into the Middle East from the early 1990s on.

Rohde intimates that the 1960s triumphs of radicals in exposing the links between social science and the military were ambiguous at best. Not wanting to give up on the quest for operational information, the defense establishment funded other entities less coupled to the collegiate system. Social-scientifically trained PhDs were employed in ways that allowed the brass to avoid the scrutiny Americans associated with academic transparency. The victories of critics in the 1960s may have led, Rohde claims, to less oversight than existed when warriors’ social science was more ensconced in universities. She will get no argument from me with this observation. Nonetheless, she finishes up by saying that in the 21st century militarized social science has taken over and fosters the opposite of freedom in foreign policy. This conclusion speaks more to her own liberal politics than anything else.

Armed with Expertise is intelligently argued and fluently written, and its set of these is clearly stated. Yet it is, initially, only the story of SORO from 1956 to 1970, followed by 30 pages of informed speculation on the national security enterprise and social science from the 1980s through the Global War on Terror. Hence, the subtitle is more than misleading.

Rohde also exhibits the shared assumptions of intellectual historians of policymaking—assumptions that are questionable. Three of them are relevant here.

First, Rohde takes us down a one-way street. The social scientists and their projects are continually “militarized.” No thought is given to the notion that the thick, mal-educated, and non-reflective soldiers may have craved some aspects of the cerebral

prestige of the professoriate. The military may have been civilianized as much as the professoriate was militarized.

Second, Rohde truly thinks that the social scientists had something to teach the Army and that they advanced the aims of soldiers. At times she allows us to believe that specific research reports are blather but that overall the scholars produced useful “knowledge.” We have little consideration of the idea that, in general, what was manufactured may have been just some kind of informed verbiage. More important, the effusions of social science may have had little effect on U.S. foreign policy and little influence on what the military did. High-ranking military personnel may have simply gotten new names for old ways of thinking.

Finally, with a historian’s hindsight, Rohde is easily able to make out how affairs of state influenced Cold War social science. Yet she does not so clearly grasp that her own left-liberal ideas have swayed her thinking, especially her ideas about recent foreign policy. For her and those she has studied, scholarship is too often the carrying on of politics by other means.



Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones, *Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019. 337 pp.

Reviewed by John Prados, National Security Archive (Washington, DC)

Irrational leaders pose special problems for scholars. Some future historian will have to have a say. What would that be? About Donald Trump? About Boris Johnson? Until recently, the British prime minister most often placed in this category was Anthony Eden, who served as foreign minister from 1951 to 1954, then succeeded Winston Churchill in the top job when the latter stepped down in the fall of 1954. The reason for singling Eden out—as Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones rightly note—is the minister’s extraordinarily reckless behavior in 1956, when Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and Eden conspired with France and Israel to get it back. Eden’s comments about Nasser and general department were such that others feared for his sanity. Former Minister of State Anthony Nutting supplied chapter and verse in his book *No End of a Lesson*.

Ruane and Jones turn this image upside down in *Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis*. The crisis, for those not familiar, grew out of the battle of Dien Bien Phu, where French armies in Indochina strove to turn back a Vietnamese revolutionary tide that was headed to independence. The United States, having embarked on a crusade against Communism, considered whether to intervene on the French side in that battle, which would have embroiled U.S. troops in Vietnam years before that actually happened. President Dwight D. Eisenhower wavered on intervention and had a hard time resisting the pressure. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sought to create a political-military framework to enable intervention. Eden