

prestige of the professoriate. The military may have been civilianized as much as the professoriate was militarized.

Second, Rohde truly thinks that the social scientists had something to teach the Army and that they advanced the aims of soldiers. At times she allows us to believe that specific research reports are blather but that overall the scholars produced useful “knowledge.” We have little consideration of the idea that, in general, what was manufactured may have been just some kind of informed verbiage. More important, the effusions of social science may have had little effect on U.S. foreign policy and little influence on what the military did. High-ranking military personnel may have simply gotten new names for old ways of thinking.

Finally, with a historian’s hindsight, Rohde is easily able to make out how affairs of state influenced Cold War social science. Yet she does not so clearly grasp that her own left-liberal ideas have swayed her thinking, especially her ideas about recent foreign policy. For her and those she has studied, scholarship is too often the carrying on of politics by other means.



Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones, *Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019. 337 pp.

Reviewed by John Prados, National Security Archive (Washington, DC)

Irrational leaders pose special problems for scholars. Some future historian will have to have a say. What would that be? About Donald Trump? About Boris Johnson? Until recently, the British prime minister most often placed in this category was Anthony Eden, who served as foreign minister from 1951 to 1954, then succeeded Winston Churchill in the top job when the latter stepped down in the fall of 1954. The reason for singling Eden out—as Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones rightly note—is the minister’s extraordinarily reckless behavior in 1956, when Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and Eden conspired with France and Israel to get it back. Eden’s comments about Nasser and general department were such that others feared for his sanity. Former Minister of State Anthony Nutting supplied chapter and verse in his book *No End of a Lesson*.

Ruane and Jones turn this image upside down in *Anthony Eden, Anglo-American Relations and the 1954 Indochina Crisis*. The crisis, for those not familiar, grew out of the battle of Dien Bien Phu, where French armies in Indochina strove to turn back a Vietnamese revolutionary tide that was headed to independence. The United States, having embarked on a crusade against Communism, considered whether to intervene on the French side in that battle, which would have embroiled U.S. troops in Vietnam years before that actually happened. President Dwight D. Eisenhower wavered on intervention and had a hard time resisting the pressure. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sought to create a political-military framework to enable intervention. Eden

played a heroic role in 1954, helping to organize and then co-chairing a conference in Geneva that ended the Indochina crisis without military intervention, by means of agreements that featured a ceasefire in the war and a set of accommodations between France and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Ruane and Jones reject as phony the claim that the United States never really intended to intervene in Indochina. The importance of this book (which might more manageably be titled just *Anthony Eden*) is that the authors have mined the record in depth to show how Eden's steadfast opposition to the U.S. intervention bid really did stop Eisenhower and Dulles from bullying their way into war. Ruane and Jones argue that Eden feared the Indochina crisis could lead to nuclear war, a fear that stoked his determination to foil U.S. plans to internationalize the conflict (p. 255). Along the way the authors present British policy—and its effects on Washington's enterprise—in exhaustive detail.

This is the most important treatment of the Dien Bien Phu crisis that has appeared in a very long time. Do not miss it.

Ruane and Jones do one better, though. They push ahead to Suez and actually attempt to contrast Eden in the annus mirabilis of 1954 with the year of disaster 1956. Interestingly enough, they dismiss claims of a linkage between the Dien Bien Phu and Suez crises. "It makes greater sense," the authors conclude, "to root Eden's Suez decision-making—including his mistakes and misjudgments—wholly in 1956" (p. 261). The authors also reject the idea that Dulles sought revenge in the Suez crisis for the U.S. failure at Dien Bien Phu. In Eden's memoir *Full Circle* he devotes more than a hundred pages to the Indochina war, including the full trajectory of the conflict, the conferences at Berlin and Geneva, and intervention. That public account, published in 1960, is ably confirmed in this book. Those who have constructed artificial visions that exalt Eisenhower and denigrate Eden now have an evidentiary mountain to climb.



Edwin E. Moïse, *Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War*, rev. ed. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2019. 362 pp. \$39.00.

Reviewed by Robert J. McMahan, Ohio State University (emeritus)

In 1996, Edwin E. Moïse published a landmark study of the Tonkin Gulf incidents of August 1964. Those incidents spurred President Lyndon B. Johnson to order the first set of aerial attacks on North Vietnam, thereby significantly escalating the ongoing Vietnam War and the involvement in it of the United States. The 1996 volume established beyond any reasonable doubt that, on 2 August 1964, three North Vietnamese torpedo boats attacked the *USS Maddox*, a naval destroyer engaged in a reconnaissance mission just off the North Vietnamese coast. The ship's mission, he emphasized, was directly connected to a highly classified operational plan known as