
Is the study of history a science? The question itself seems oddly old-fashioned in a postmodern era. Yet in this sophisticated dissection of historical method, Tucker not only confronts the question directly but answers it with a qualified “yes.” The answers come slowly, however, in a carefully developed argument that begins with an assessment of the modern discipline’s roots in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century philology, biblical criticism, and classical studies.

That discussion, rich with erudite examples, becomes the foundation for a complex and systematic analysis extended, step by step, throughout the book. These early, mainly German, scholars, Tucker argues, achieved a consensus that was revolutionary because it constituted historical knowledge. This argument, like the others that follow, is sustained with surprising precision, and the aesthetic pleasures of this book lie in its logic rather than its prose. Historical consensus is defined with the awkward clarity familiar to philosophers as an understanding achieved by “a uniquely heterogeneous, large, and uncoerced group of historians.” That standard, at the institutional center of the historical discipline, rejects “therapeutic” history (mythic accounts serving ideological and instrumental purposes) in favor of histories focused on evidence (39). From these practices, Leopold Ranke established modern historiography by dint of his emphasis on archival evidence. Scientific history, Tucker insists throughout, is the study not of the history of events but rather of the history of evidence. Hypotheses and evidence emerge reciprocally. Admittedly, connecting theory to evidence may often require pedantry, but “the achievements and success of scientific historiography are comparable to those of Darwinian biology in offering scientific knowledge of the past” (84).

Tucker assesses a wide-ranging array of historical work (from Ranke to the Annales school and current scholars) in order to explore how historians operate in practice, and he writes sympathetically of their predilection for common sense. He reinforces this analysis with valuable incisive criticisms of many major works on historical method (from Gianbattista Vico to R. G. Collingwood and Hayden White). Michel Foucault is not mentioned, and historical relativism of every sort is quietly but firmly dismissed. Tucker acknowledges that historians reflect the interests and methods of their own era, but that means only that the historical context within which a work was written must be taken into account, not that all history is relative. Tucker’s scalpel slices with equal sharpness at idealist and phenomenological philosophies of history, and his own position moves far from any simple positivism. He rejects as a misreading of scientific method the positivist insistence that propositions must have a covering law or that predictability is an essential test of theory, and he challenges assertions that the complexity of history prohibits engaging it scientifically.
Borrowing from linguistics and biology as well as historical studies, devoting a whole chapter to Bayesian logic (complete with its notation and formulae, which he concedes is unfamiliar to most historians), Tucker builds his independent case for proper historical method. After insisting on the importance of theory and historians’ application of it, he confronts a considerable limitation: Historical studies inherently tend to teeter between theories too vague to be tested and generalizations too narrowly specific to have broad theoretical application. Furthermore, historiography tends to fragment into competing schools of thought that emphasize particular factors and methods, and their penchant for giving the same words different meaning makes communication among historians difficult. Nonetheless, they do make use of each other’s work (provided that their loyalties to schools and ideologies are subordinate to their disciplinary commitment); historians have an infinite capacity to incorporate others’ insights, even when those emerge from approaches with which they disagree.

Although such constraints might appear to leave history a fairly faint science, cumulatively Tucker’s case is powerful, and the distinctions that he draws have lasting value. By systematically removing familiar barriers raised in conventional discussions of historical methods, he clears the way to an acceptance of historiography as a form of scientific knowledge. That achievement will undoubtedly be received by many historians as license to continue their normal practice, carving their comfortable compromises from among the theories and methods that connect to the evidence before them. Even so, they will find themselves thinking more clearly and working more confidently after a close reading of this impressive book.

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Fuglestad’s essay tackles a pivotal question confronting historians who study non-Western parts of the world—how to write histories of people who are not Westerners. He contends that “westernized” non-Western histories pose a critical epistemological problem since history is a singularly inappropiate science with which to understand how other peoples understand and interpret their own pasts. The reason, he argues, is that history is a “linear-evolutionary philosophy that incorporates an ideology of linear progress” (11) and is fundamentally intertwined with “Western civilization.” Whereas people of other civilizations have conceived of themselves and their pasts without history (if they are interested at all in their pasts), “[o]ne of the peculiarities of Western civilization,” according to Fugelstad, “is that it is built in part on the
transmission of historical experience, and . . . one of the foundations of that civilization was and is to believe in the lessons of the past” (16).

Fugelstad is careful to distinguish his argument from Trevor-Roper’s (in)famously dismissive claim that Africa had no history, only the “‘unrewarding gyrations of barbarian tribes’” (10).¹ In arguing that Africa and other non-Western civilizations did not understand their pasts as history, Fugelstad assiduously avoids the conclusion that Africa and other non-Western civilizations are lacking. Rather, he contends, something is deeply wrong with history itself.

Fugelstad begins his argument by tracing the emergence of historical thinking in the West, or what he characterizes as the development of “a progress-seeking view of the world . . . [that] does not allow for religion-centered peoples” (50). He then focuses on the origins of “westernized” non-Western history, arguing that its very premise was a form of cultural and ontological imperialism, closely linked with notions of “modernization” (60); he elaborates the non-linear, sacred character of precolonial non-Western societies. Fugelstad saves special censure for Africanists who, though they stubbornly resist Trevor-Roper’s claims, have unwittingly accepted his understanding of the past, thus forcing African pasts into “the conceptual framework and paradigms . . . devised for the comprehension of the past in the West” (70). Africanists have not done the necessary theoretical labor to extract themselves from this epistemological mess.

This work is not precisely interdisciplinary in its methodology, although its sources and methodological implications are. As a theoretical essay that excavates and critiques history’s project, Ambiguities draws from a wide range of regional subfields of history (including African, Asian, South Asian, Pacific, European), engages with philosophies of history, and mines historical and ethnographic works by anthropologists and other social scientists. It presents crucial methodological implications about how historians and other social scientists can engage with the past worlds of diverse peoples. Fugelstad demands that we approach these worlds ethnographically, “to perceive each and every period and each and every culture/civilization in its own light, to unearth . . . both the worlds we have lost and those we have not” (139).

Fugelstad presents a compelling case for arguing that many precolonial, pre-contact non-Western societies embraced nonlinear, circular notions of time, which differed substantially from history’s linearity. But he might have spent some time exploring the processes by which non-Western peoples’ understandings of time and past became historicized. In his focus on history as an imperialist imposition, Fugelstad does not explore how or why some non-Western people might appropriate (wholesale or selectively) history and its notions of linear time and improvement. Nevertheless, his essay opens up the possibility of further comparative research about such processes.

The Ambiguities of History is a provocative and valuable essay that merits wide readership, although it will surely raise the hackles of some historians. It challenges historians of diverse subfields to explore, re-think, and re-theorize how to write about other people’s pasts.

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Almost every new interpretation of the history of psychoanalysis claims from the outset that none of its predecessors has placed the subject within its accurate social, political, and cultural context. Yet each one of these histories, from Freud’s own through those of Schorske and Roudinesco, has crafted a distinctive way of traversing precisely this arena, as well as the seemingly irreconcilable contradictions between individual human behavior and the larger social environment.¹

Enter Zaretsky’s enviably researched study of psychoanalysis. According to Zaretsky who has written previously on modern cultural history of the family, capitalism, and psychoanalysis, no one has been able to grasp psychoanalysis in its entirety because an explicit sociocultural framework in which to understand its opposite—that is, ourselves as individuals distinct from family and society—has been missing. To fill this gap, Zaretsky proposes that psychoanalysis was “the first great theory and practice of ‘personal life.’” His definition reframes psychoanalysis and offers a postindustrial, deep sense of identity that resonates with the dawning of modernism (1880s–1920s). It is distinct from the family and totally individual; each person carries his or her own unconscious system of symbols and narratives “apparently devoid of socially shared meaning” (6). Attempting to show both the cause and the effect of this idea, the author sets Freud’s life and his writing against a kaleidoscopic backdrop of the psychoanalytic movement itself, the Enlightenment philosophers of Europe, the French surrealists, antisemitism, Jacques Lacan, New York jazz, fascism, the Cold War, and the 1960s.

The first chapters link Freud’s best-known themes with Zaretsky’s ideas on culture, self, and family (with nods to Schorske and Jencks, to name but two of the book’s repertoire of international idea makers) before becoming a sequence of good pieces of information—literary, theoretical, and cinematographic—that unfortunately do not cohere.²

² See, for example, Christopher Jencks, Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America (New York, 1972).
bits of information are appealing in themselves: for instance, Wyndham Lewis mocking Sherwood Anderson, Herbert Marcuse on Henry Ford, and Talcott Parsons joining Grete and Edward Bibring to study the ambiguous development of self-control in response to collapsing external authority. Nevertheless, the text falls short of a unified argument for Zaretsky’s theory about the emergence of a Freudian “post-family,” postmodernist (but not postmodern), and powerfully personal unconscious, or even for psychoanalysis as modernism.

Although a chapter on Ford tantalizes with hints that factory organization stimulates individual identity, Zaretsky generally disappoints in his attempts to present the depth of exchange between psychoanalytic and social considerations. Those who do not need to be persuaded will be satisfied with exactly what the book delivers. Alas, despite Zaretsky’s effort to be dispassionate and historiographically inclusive, this book is unlikely to settle the confrontation of nearly mythical proportions between those who try to explicate the history of psychoanalysis within a sociocultural dynamic and those who focus reverently on Freud as genius tout court.

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Riding the wave of his own deserved reputation, the popular author who wrote How to Lie With Maps (Chicago, 1991) has added yet another readable, humanizing tome to the corpus of technical literature about the science of maps and the history of mapmaking. Not to be mistaken for a biography of Gerard Mercator (see Crane’s recent attempt), Monmonier focuses his attention primarily on the merits and drawbacks of various techniques of map projection, the mathematical problems involved, and the technopolitical circumstances that have induced fashion changes in mapping conventions over time.¹

Mercator’s 1569 map of the world resolved a sixteenth-century problem in transoceanic navigation. Since distances measured along degrees of latitude vary from those measured along degrees of longitude, large scale maps based on the faulty assumption of equivalence were misleading for navigators. Only when traveling due east or west along a parallel of latitude could a sailor accurately guess a landfall location across open water. By elongating longitude lines as they recede away from the equator, Mercator’s projection made it possible for a map to predict landfall along any course heading. In other words, although Mercator’s

¹ Nicholas Crane, Mercator: The Man Who Mapped the Planet (New York, 2003).
projection distorted the bird’s-eye view of coastlines and sacrificed the consistency of territorial size from one part of the map to another, it promised that any straight “rhumb” line drawn across the map’s meridians would mirror any true compass bearing on the surface of the earth.

Monmonier’s narrative approach integrates his skills in the visual analysis of maps themselves with historical analyses of institutional decision making, such as the National Geographic Society’s signal adoptions of one global map projection or another (135–138, 160). Terse biographical sketches also highlight key technical achievements such as Nicholas August Tissot’s 1881 invention of the extremely useful distortion ellipse or indicatrix and John Parr Snyder’s 1976 amateur solution of the outstanding problems inherent in creating a Space Oblique Mercator projection (76–77, 116–120).

Political and rhetorical battles over map projections dominate the final part of Rhumb Lines and Map Wars. Monmonier subjects the pretensions of Arno Peters to a withering gaze. This German historian’s alternative world map was promoted since the 1970s as the “equal area” antidote to the Mercator projection’s alleged Eurocentric distortions. With the tools of history and mathematics in hand, Monmonier deftly tears these claims to shreds. No two-dimensional map can escape the necessity of distorting something; for example, area can be preserved only at the expense of shape distortion. Hence, Peters did not provide an improvement on Mercator in an absolute sense. Since cartographers have known about rectangular equal-area projections at least since J. H. Lambert’s 1772 map of the world, Peters was embarrassingly far from being original (150), and his claim to uniqueness fails in the face of the myriad possible choices for how to define a cylindrical equal-area projection mathematically (151).

Of greater interest is Monmonier’s ensuing analysis of the noisy debate about the politics of cartography: “I’m continually puzzled by assertions that the Peters projection promotes ‘fairness to all peoples.’ What does areal equivalence have to do with population, which varies widely in density throughout the developed and less developed worlds?” (162). Monmonier even chides Harley, a highly respected map historian, for his “endorsement” of Arno Peters’ efforts. Monmonier closes with a call for universal map literacy, trusting that few would be misled by the necessary distortions of any projection technique, if they understood better how and why maps are made in the first place (182–183).

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This collection of essays examines how families ensured the survival of their dependent members. The contributors, an international consortium, examine issues of property transmission from the late seventeenth century to the early twentieth century, mostly in a European context. Topics include headship succession and retirement, the role of migration in marriage formation, guardianship and women’s economic independence, and the Swedish Marriage Act of 1921, with a strong emphasis on questions about inheritance. In terms of methodology, the essays vary from microhistories and case studies of notable families, such as the Rockefellers, to data-oriented aggregate information based on family reconstitution and probate records.

As the title suggests, the essays are tied together with the theme of family welfare. The editors note that the group is expanding the habitual definition of welfare; rather than thinking about it as institutional aid for the poor, the authors define it as a means to social reproduction and familial continuation that embraces every social status. The goal of the book is to explore the role of the family as one form of welfare, while examining how it interacted with other more traditional forms of institutional assistance. It also aims to explore how gender fits into this scheme.

Most of the authors make a point to relate their essay to the greater issue of welfare and the role of kin. For example, Anne E. C. McCants’ essay on orphanages in eighteenth-century Amsterdam shows that relatives shared responsibility with the community in providing for orphans. Ann Ighe’s discussion of guardianship in nineteenth-century Sweden illustrates a shift in support based on family welfare to one based on public institutions. Others, such as Gérard Béaur in his discussion of partible and impartible inheritance, do not make much effort to appropriate this new definition of welfare; instead, they emphasize the gender component by stressing how women’s access to material assets was limited or reformed.

The broader idea of welfare is important. The authors stress that dependents from all strata of society relied on the support of family members in order to maintain their stations. Disparate topics are grouped under the catchy label of “welfare,” though the first half of the book is about inheritance and the second primarily about guardianship and women’s property rights. The expanded definition is still narrow, however, since it focuses solely on access to material assets. The book neglects other important roles that the family played in ensuring the survival of its members, such as emotional support, helping with household responsibilities, or providing education and training. The selection of essays is also curious. Seven out of the ten essays address early modern European family history, and all but one focus on Europe. Articles about
Looking Backward and Looking Forward: Perspectives on Social Science History. Edited by Harvey J. Graff, Leslie Page Moch, and Philip McMichael (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 2005) 237 pp. $65.00

It is slightly unnerving to review a book in which one appears amid the *dramatis personae*—not because of some historiographical discussion but because of involvement in an institution’s history. If one lives long enough, however, that is what one may have to expect. The institution in question is the Social Science History Association (ssha), founded in 1975. As one of its founding members, and an officer in its early days, I read *Looking Backward and Looking Forward* as if at a family gathering. The volume is a record of a conference held in 2000 to celebrate ssha’s twenty-fifth anniversary, and it begins, appropriately, with a set of reminiscences from some of its founding fathers and mothers. Not only are most of these scholars colleagues, with whom I have collaborated in various ways, but they have also been connected, from its early days, with this very journal, to which many of them have contributed over the years.

A natural instinct is, first, to add to the reminiscences. That, however, makes the reviewer merely a contributor, and I shall restrict myself to a single instance, because it does bear on a worry that the 2000 conferees expressed. Stated more than once in the volume is the feeling, now that the organization’s once-revolutionary interdisciplinary aims have gained wide acceptance, that the center of research may move from the United States, where the ssha began, to its newly founded European offshoot, the Social Science History Conference. Such a prediction must seem ironic in light of what happened in the late 1960s at a meeting of many who were to be involved in the ssha. It took place at the University of Michigan’s Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (icpsr), a research center that was the true seedbed of the ssha.

The topic under discussion was the possibility of expanding the range of materials gathered by the icpsr, part of its mission being to accumulate computer-readable quantitative historical data. Among the participants was Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, heir to the great *Annales* tradition of social history, and, to the astonishment of the Americans at the meeting, he dissented from the general view that an ever-wider gathering of data
would make the ICPSR an invaluable international repository of research materials. What he emphasized, instead, was that the data in French archives were a national treasure, not to be captured and transported overseas. In part because of SSHA, that world has changed beyond recognition.

Another instinct, for an eyewitness, is to correct. For example, it was announced at the conference in 2000, nearly six years prematurely, that I had retired from teaching; it was also asserted, notwithstanding the graduate course on quantitative history that I conducted at Princeton, and my chairmanship of the American Historical Association’s Committee on Quantitative Research in the 1970s and 1980s, that in the early years of the SSHA, the new methods made no appearance at the Ivy League. Moreover, my co-editor of this journal is described, probably as a result of a faulty recording transcription, as Bob Rydberg. One soon realizes, however, that history is made by those whose words are written down. The instinct to correct was far stronger when I read the study that is much cited in these pages—Novick’s 1988 history of the American historical profession, which I had witnessed unfold for the previous thirty years and which at times, in his telling, was unrecognizable. These have been sobering lessons—relevant to all who try to reconstruct the past—about the burden that we all share when we depend on texts that are usually partial in both senses of the word.

Yet there is little cause for dissent in this book’s evocation of the major contours of the history of the SSHA. Appropriately, the remarkable expansion of the Association, in both membership and subject matter, is tellingly revealed in a careful statistical analysis, adorned with tables and graphs. The moving recollections, often autobiographical, by those who have shepherded the organization through its first twenty-five years offer illuminating insights into the historical profession and the campaign to expand interdisciplinary connections. I have not been involved in the Association’s affairs for some time, but these contributions bring back sharp images of the people and ideas that gave the SSHA its mission. Two of the more detailed discussions, on literacy and racism, testify to the extraordinary influence of SSHA scholars, not only in transforming research agendas in recent decades but also in shaping the general perception of some our era’s most difficult social problems.

I express two concerns only because this is, by its very nature, a more personal review than is standard practice in a scholarly journal. First is the issue of language. Contrary to the usual expectations of those who have reservations about history joining the social sciences, these contributions are written with a clarity, and on occasion even a style, that belies the standard caricature of academic prose. But a long essay about conceptions of space and place takes us into thickets of language

that the social-scientific enterprise needs to avoid precisely because it often fails to achieve the impact that it deserves for that very reason.

Second is the connection between global perspectives and teaching, which is also treated at length. This is a fraught issue, bedeviled in this book by the use of “world” as a transitive verb. That neologism alone intensifies one’s hesitation about an argument that takes a high moral tone to those who organize introductory courses around Western Civilization, painting them as denigrators of “others” or as neoconservatives. They are rapped on the knuckles, too, for failing to grasp the broader theoretical understanding that makes for a global approach, though the case is advanced with an example of a misuse of illustrations that has nothing to do with the real problems of teaching world history.

A truly global approach may well work from around 1800, or even 1700, onward, but in earlier periods (and frequently after 1800, too) the different regions of the globe were in such fitful contact, and developed in such individual ways, that to blur boundaries is to do more harm than good. Equally troubling is the fact that the historical and social-science scholarship devoted to the West is so much more extensive and comprehensive than the equivalent research in other areas that, by minimizing Western history in our classes, we deprive our students of the opportunity to study in depth a whole gamut of subjects that are simply not as available for exploration in non-Western settings. That scenario may change, but it has a long way to go. Nor is it appropriate to ignore, in quest of theoretical purity, some of the major pedagogical reasons for teaching history to undergraduates: to offer perspective on the present by engaging with humanity’s different experiences over the centuries (in this regard a medieval king is no less “other” than a pre-industrialized farmer in rural Africa); to train minds to extract meaning from limited sources; and to give a sense of how the weight of tradition shapes our own lives.

By shifting the argument from those hard realities and needs to a somewhat preachy, normative discussion of the value of World History classes, the argument recalls the barely disguised disdain for more traditional forms that sometimes overtook the campaign for Social Science History in its early days. Sermons can be self-defeating, and it is a measure of the status and maturity that the SSHA has now achieved that, with few exceptions, its advocates no longer feel the need to struggle for their cause. Having revolutionized historical scholarship on many fronts, they can focus instead on ways of continuing and enlarging their major contribution to the advance of our knowledge of the past.

—T.K.R.

Reigns of Terror sets out a clear argument about genocides and crimes against humanity in the twentieth century and then works through eight cases that span the globe. The author aims to remedy what she sees as a misplaced emphasis on race and ethnicity in most explanations for mass atrocities. In her view, such events occur when states strive to maintain an existing hierarchy of inequality by violently acting against a subordinate group. Race and ethnicity are merely the cover arguments that states use to justify their repressive actions, which most often occur in situations of social turmoil. A capable armed force, often supplemented by paramilitaries, becomes the agent of rescuing or reshaping a paralyzed state via mass violence against targeted populations. Marchak sets out the explanation in the first half of the book and then proceeds to case studies on the Armenian genocide, the Ukrainian famine, the Holocaust, Burundi and Rwanda, Chile, Cambodia, Argentina, and Yugoslavia.

The clear explanation and the broad geographical reach of Reigns of Terror are noteworthy. Marchak’s contention that ethnicity or race in and of themselves do not provide adequate explanations for genocide and other crimes is certainly correct. Nonetheless, a good part of her overall argument is tautological and other parts insufficient. Genocide and other mass atrocities are undoubtedly ways of maintaining difference that invariably entail the expropriation of the assets of the targeted group. But to argue that “the ethnic dimension provides the excuse and the ideological rationale for the action” is insufficient (viii). Leaving aside the distinctions between race and ethnicity, which are often blurred in this book, race is a way of construing human difference and of structuring inequalities. Race provides people with a powerful and seductive sense of belonging, similar to, but even more dangerous than, nationalism. Marchak’s reduction of mass atrocities to an instrumental action by the state fails to capture the powerful dynamic of race and certainly cannot fully explain the mass mobilizations of perpetrators that so often accompanied genocides and ethnic cleansings in the twentieth century.

Moreover, race as a constructed form of identity is not so much about “people defining themselves and others by their ethnic roots” but about regimes imposing categorizations upon populations that, over time, come to be seen as natural (viii). Hence, ideology is far more than “the bridge between the perception of a group as potential enemies and the determination to eradicate them” (21). This perspective presumes the existence of ideology as a fixed entity that simply gets called into play by the regime in question when it is functional to do so. Yet ideologies are constantly being developed, are often in flux, and play multiple roles within a society. Marchak underplays historical contingencies and development of ideology in general and of race in particular.
Reigns of Terror also does not clearly distinguish between genocide and other forms of mass violence, although Marchak deploys the term “policide.” Scholars and public figures debate this point endlessly, and much of it turns on the definition encoded in 1948 in the United Nations Genocide Convention and since adopted as law by more than 130 countries. The Convention has serious insufficiencies, and many scholars challenge the applicability of a legal standard for social-science research. Nonetheless, it is still important to draw distinctions between genocide, the “crime of crimes,” and other mass violations of human rights. It matters, both historically and politically, whether a regime is seeking to annihilate an entire population group or is exercising more or less “normal,” albeit brutal, forms of repression.

As befits a work in political science, Reigns of Terror has a clear, almost law-like explanatory structure. This approach has its benefits, but it drastically underestimates the role of historical contingencies in the unleashing of mass atrocities. Too much of Marchak’s writing presumes “plans” or “planning stages” (4–5, for example). The genocide of the Armenians began as a series of murderous actions by the Young Turk regime that escalated into genocide, but little evidence suggests that any kind of systematic plan existed before the onset of the actions in March and April 1915. The Nazis had no systematic plan for the Holocaust until seven months after it began, that is, until the Wannsee Conference at the end of January 1942. In both instances, a hostile and even murderous mindset existed among the rulers toward their subject populations. However, not until the contingent events of World War I and World War II were the regimes able to unleash their full fury against, respectively, the Armenian and Jewish populations. In wartime, both regimes were animated, at one and the same time, by the prospects of a utopian future and by dread fears of defeat, which propelled them to radicalize their policies and instigate genocides.

Marchak’s choice of the individual state as the unit of analysis makes a great deal of sense. In the twentieth century, it was primarily states that engaged in massive violations of human rights. Yet, the focus on discrete states shortchanges the learning process that might have linked states with one another and the global systems of domination of which they were a part. Marchak writes about international contexts in each of the cases, but, for example, the United States’ involvement in Latin America, including the training of death squads, must be located centrally in the analysis. Nor does her discussion capture the revolutionary quality of some of the states that committed the worst crimes of the twentieth century. Marchak argues that when states cannot reproduce a system of inequality among citizens, they “have a high probability of committing crimes against humanity.” But states also invent systems of inequality as a means of social transformation. The Nazis used the Nuremberg Laws to establish a biological-cultural definition of Jewishness that did not exist in legal terms prior to 1935. The Soviets imposed highly elastic terms like kulak (rich peasant) and lishentsy (asocial) that often had little con-
connection to social reality, but the terms were the means of a radical transformation of society.

Finally, some of the individual case studies reflect outdated scholarship and questionable assumptions. Marchak presumes that the horrible Ukrainian famine of 1932 was deliberately engineered by the Soviet state. Most scholars of Soviet history would disagree. The Soviet state engineered forced collectivization, which had catastrophic economic and human consequences. Nevertheless, whether the 6 million deaths in the Ukraine and North Caucasus were deliberately planned by the Soviet state is another matter entirely. Moreover, Marchak ignores the Great Terror and the ethnic and national purges that began in 1937, both of which come under investigation in some of the most recent and compelling historiography on the Soviet Union.¹

The dominant scholarship on Nazi Germany has certainly not contended that the Holocaust was a direct result of antisemitism. Instead, it has concentrated on the structure of the Nazi state and the course of the war in the Soviet Union for explaining how the population policies of Nazi Germany moved from systematic discrimination against Jews to their actual annihilation, by no means a simple or automatic process. Nor is it convincing to describe the Cambodian politicide as a peasant revolt against the urban bureaucratic class. This position ignores the role of the French- and Buddhist-educated elite of the Communist Party of Kampuchea and the Marxist-Leninist ideology that motivated it. Moreover, class was not the only criterion for the Khmer Rouge; they formulated policies also on the basis of a particular understanding of Khmer purity, which led to genocidal actions against a number of ethnic minorities in Cambodia.

The comparative approach that Marchak adopts is a welcome addition to the literature. Unfortunately, the explanatory framework is not always convincing.

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By Shaye J. D. Cohen (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005)
317 pp. $39.95

In his previous book, The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties (Berkeley, 1999), Cohen examined the emerging concept of Jewish identity in late antiquity. The new volume is a fitting sequel, tracing the role of circumcision in defining Jewishness from late antiquity to today. The question, as Cohen demonstrates, is not new. Yet, in developing his theme, “the challenge to the circumcision of Jewish men

¹ See, for example, Amir Weiner, Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton, 2001).
posed by the non-circumcision of Jewish women” (222), Cohen combines the ancient question with issues of identity construction, feminist concerns, and wide-ranging historical research, with a focus on the Jewish–Christian dialogue/polemics about this issue and its impact on Jewish redefinitions of the meaning of circumcision.

In his introductory chapters, Cohen presents a history of Jewish male circumcision from within the rabbinic tradition and follows it with an exploration of female circumcision and Jewish responses to it. He then turns to a history of the question embodied in his title, introducing the patristic challenges that compared Christian baptism of men and women to the Jewish exclusion of women from the ritual that ostensibly defined Jewishness. These challenges became of concern to Jews only in medieval Europe. Cohen devotes the heart of the book to an analysis of the various Jewish responses to them. He contextualizes his Jewish thinkers with the non-Jewish cultures with which they were in dialogue, as well as with the Christian polemical literature of which they were likely aware.

Cohen employs feminist approaches in his analysis of the medieval Jewish answers. He discusses four alternative medieval explanations for the restriction of circumcision to males: that it “bespeaks [women’s] secondary, anomalous, problematic place in the rabbinic hierarchy” (xiv); that circumcision is necessary for men to control their lust, or, in the Christian claims, to make them effeminate; that circumcision does not define Jewish identity or covenant and thus does not exclude women in any significant way; or that women’s observance of the laws of menstrual purity is their equivalent to circumcision in that it is also blood-oriented and covenantal. Each of them, to various degrees, was a topic of conversation among Jews and a point of polemical debate between Jews and Christians. As Cohen demonstrates, if not the emergence, then the application of these theories arose in answer to these external challenges. The interface with non-Jewish cultures forced and shaped the Jewish discourse around the role of circumcision in the construction of Jewishness.

Cohen’s final chapter moves to modernity and the challenges arising from the Jewish desire to fit into Western society and from the emerging demand for parity between men and women. As he reiterates throughout, however, equality was not a concern of the medievals, even though it subconsciously shapes our readings of their teachings (and Cohen’s interest in presenting them, although he succeeds, for the most part, in avoiding apologetics). Beyond the search for egalitarianism, Cohen concludes by pointing to looming contemporary challenges to celebrating circumcision raised by the Western rejection of Muslim and African female circumcision as mutilation. Is male circumcision also mutilation? Does it confer medical benefit?

The wide scope of this volume creates openings for occasional minor errors. For instance, Cohen cites the text of the *Seder Rav Amram Gaon* as that of medieval Babylonia (131, n. 70), though the liturgical
texts in this volume are almost certainly those of later European copyists. In wondering why the Bekhor Shor does not consider bridal defloration and circumcision to be analogous, he forgets that the infant is not an active partner in his own circumcision (204). But these are indeed minor quibbles on points that do not detract from the thought-provoking insights of this superb volume.

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_Beer in the Middle Ages and Renaissance._ By Richard W. Unger (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) 319 pp. $45.00

Entertainingly written and amply illustrated and referenced, Unger’s book on the beginnings of commercial brewing will be of interest to beer lovers; experts in economic, social, cultural, legal, medical, and food history; anthropologists; philologists; and feminists. Inspired by Peacock’s eight stages in the development of pottery production, the author traces the history of beer brewing from its beginnings to circa 1700. Given the enormous size and importance of the northern European beer industry, reflected in a wealth of diverse sources, Unger’s comprehensive study, the first of its kind, is primarily descriptive, but also analytical in its attempts to outline emerging patterns.

Following a brief introductory chapter, Chapter 2 deals with the evidence of beer brewing in ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Rome, until early medieval monasticism, and the beginnings of a tax on beer production through the control of _gruit_, a popular herb additive. Along with urbanization in Europe came the commercialization of brewing in the High Middle Ages, a process that Unger documents in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 treats the addition of hops, which made beer more durable, and as such a major commodity for trade and a source of tax revenue. The large-scale production of hopped beer for export in Bremen, Hamburg, and other towns of the Hanseatic League eventually led to the adoption of hopped beer and hopped-beer brewing across northern Europe, and as far south as Bavaria, and Austria. Chapter 5 reports that the northern Low Countries were first to import hopped beer from Germany and to adopt the technique and become exporters themselves. _Gruit_ tax became hop tax before it was replaced altogether by a tax on the production and trade of beer.

In Chapter 6, Unger follows the spread of hopped-beer brewing to the southern Low Countries, England, and Scandinavia. The author devotes ample space to England, where the introduction of hopped-beer brewing took a path slightly different from that in the rest of Europe. Since ale enjoyed the status of a national drink, and resistance to hopped

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beer came from the highest levels in England, the Dutch not only exported hopped beer to England but also were the first brewers of hopped beer in England.

According to Unger, by the late 1400s, hopped-beer brewing had become a mature industry with production in nucleated workshops and an extensive network of trading. Chapters 7 to 13 are dedicated to the “golden age of brewing” from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries, containing a number of fascinating tables. The levels of production and consumption are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8; Chapter 9 focuses on brewing technology as evident in early brewing literature and legislation. Chapter 10 deals with aspects of capital investment and innovation, including the ratio of capital to labor, raw materials, and growth in the scale of production. Modern readers inundated with beer advertising will find Chapter 11 on the naming and marketing of beers during the period particularly interesting. Chapter 12 focuses on taxation. Regulations ranging from who could enter the trade to how the casks had to be marked were strictly enforced by towns that frequently derived half or more of their tax revenue from the beer industry. Chapter 13 looks at the brewing profession, the formation of guilds, the training of brewery workers, the size of breweries, and the question of gender. Unlike in most other trades, women continued to play an important role in beer making, even after commercial brewing had replaced household production. Unger concludes his book with a brief discussion of the factors that led to the decline of brewing in Europe, among them the substitution of imports by local products and competition from wine, brandy, gin, coffee, tea, and cocoa.

Unger’s book contains a wealth of information, much of it meriting further in-depth study, such as the effects of the growing beer industry on the wine industry, the relationship between beer consumption and class, and the dynamic between bakers and brewers or between town and country as the brewing industry matured. When the author ventures into such fields as cooking and medicine, his documentation is sometimes tantalizingly scarce, as in the use of beer in cooking or the dating of the medical work *Regimen sanitatis Salernitanum* (130, 70). Minor quibbles aside, this study succeeds admirably in conveying the central role that hopped beer played in early modern Europe.

Melitta Weiss Adamson
University of Western Ontario

*The Church in Anglo-Saxon Society.* By John Blair (New York, Oxford University Press, 2005) 624 pp. $55.00

This ambitious book masterfully fulfills the expectations that it raises. Drawing upon many years of historical and archaeological research, Blair has produced a comprehensive history of the Anglo-Saxon church that
presents a significantly fresh perspective that aims, above all, to focus on local and typical conditions, and to chart “what local churches and local communities meant to each other” (7). In essence, Blair offers a history of the rise and transformation of the network of minsters first established in England during the course of the seventh century, discovering in late Anglo-Saxon developments the roots of the small local parishes to which the minster system finally gave way. The minsters—the term refers to churches that were served not by a single priest but by religious communities that were often, though not always, fully monastic—gave the Anglo-Saxon church its special character, distinguishing it from the Italian and Gallic model of ecclesiastical development on the one hand and the Irish and British on the other. They also proved to be engines of social and economic development, playing a key role in the gradual urbanization of the English landscape: Practicing productive estate management, minsters attracted craftsmen and trade. It is no coincidence that so many English market towns developed out of settlements first established around the minsters.

As Blair shows, the Italian missionaries who arrived in England in 597 had initially intended to create an ecclesiastical system resembling the continental one with which they were familiar—that is, a system based on large urban episcopal churches dominating a subordinate network of baptismal churches and private oratories. Prevailing conditions in Anglo-Saxon England, however—notably the absence of Roman-style civitates and the existence of all-embracing kindred structures—encouraged in the various Anglo-Saxon kingdoms the foundation of minsters that in most cases sprang up under royal or aristocratic patronage and were often ruled by relatives of their founders.

The first five of the book’s eight chapters explore the development of this system until 850, noting the emergence of minsters as “central places” in their local landscapes, assessing the impact of Christianity upon pagan beliefs and practices, delineating the relationship of mutual interdependence that grew up between minsters and their local communities, and charting the ever-increasing hold that local magnates were able to exert upon the minsters’ economic and material assets. The last three chapters document the gradual erosion of the minsters’ autonomy between 850 and 1000; the progressive appropriation of their estates and sites for a variety of defensive, administrative, and tenurial purposes; and the construction, from the later tenth century, of a multiplicity of small manorial, village, and urban churches upon which twelfth-century bishops established the network of parishes that was to persist essentially unchanged in England until the twentieth century. The year 850, the turning point in Blair’s narrative, also marked the intensification of Viking attacks upon England, which Blair sees as having played a merely contributory rather than a defining role in the process that he describes.

Blair views the works of the major Anglo-Saxon ecclesiastical writers (Bede, Aldhelm, Ælfric, Wulfstan, Byrhtferth) as frequently narrow in focus and prescriptive, presenting ideals rather than norms. His major
achievement is his successful integration of a mass of topographical and archaeological evidence with the documentary and literary material. He incorporates the findings of important recent excavations, and, more surprising for those familiar with his previous work, draws substantially upon the literature of comparative anthropology and ethnography. His premise is that a comparative approach offers the most fruitful possibilities for illustrating “what can happen when an alien and highly organized socio-religious culture, based upon elite ceremonial centres, implants itself into a relatively primitive society with fluid economic and settlement structures” (6).

The result of this approach is a series of arresting comparisons sprinkled throughout the book. Blair gauges the transforming impact that minsters had upon the religious and social life of their local communities through a comparison with eighth- and ninth-century Tibet (77). He illuminates his discussion of the Anglo-Saxons’ integration of Christianity and persistent folk beliefs by citing evidence from colonial Mesoamerica (169–170, 178–179, 472–473). In noting how many Anglo-Saxon minsters were sited with open ground and water to the southeast and rising ground to the northwest, he detects a form of sacred geomancy, akin to feng-shui (191). To illustrate the attachment of Christianized Anglo-Saxons to traditional burial sites and practices, he provides parallel examples from late-converted territories of the Baltic region, particularly Estonia (229, 245, 474). He argues for the coexistence of “parish solidarity” along with other varieties of civic and social solidarity in late Anglo-Saxon England by quoting recent research on nucleated communities in northern Spain (502–503). Such comparisons could be facile; in Blair’s hands they are illuminating and persuasive.

The book has minor errors and inaccuracies that hardly mar its total impact. Blair has succeeded in producing a comprehensive and arresting fresh account of the Anglo-Saxon church with a firm focus on developments at the local level. His should remain the definitive study for many years to come.

Timothy Graham
University of New Mexico


Those who might expect from its title that this book is about the experience and social history of children in Britain and the United States in the early-modern period will be disappointed. Aside from a few interesting vignettes, this book does not focus on the experiences of children but rather on how ideas about children fit into the changing intellectual and ideological theories of the time. Within that framework, the author does
a masterful job of relating debates about children’s abilities and status to the transition from a society based on birth status to one of consent and contract.

Although many intellectual and legal historians have probed this transition, Brewer brings new insights to it by examining in detail how legal and social philosophers perceived the role of children; she also incorporates actual legal practice into her analysis, thus strengthening her argument. Brewer ranges widely with chapters on patriarchy, the relation between religion and political theory, the problem of legitimate consent to governmental authority and changes in common law regarding children, and the role of parental custody. Brewer claims that the arguments about children’s roles in all of these areas reveal a much larger pattern of fundamental change in ideas about human nature and the sources of authority. She insists that until the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the social status of children was much more important than their age in every aspect of life, including acting as witnesses or jurors, exercising political authority, making contracts, and serving in the military. That is, children of high status could participate in these activities in ways that those of lower status could not. Brewer wisely rejects the discredited interpretation of Ariès that children were simply seen as miniature adults or that parents did not love their children. Throughout the book she presents evidence, largely from legal records, that provide proof that children’s social status was much more significant that their age.

Brewer carefully documents the ways in which the Protestant Reformation’s challenge to Catholicism was the precursor to political debates about the doctrine of consent as a basis for government. She relies on Locke’s work to show that informed consent and the development of understanding or reason came to be seen as the only legitimate source of authority in English society as well as in the American colonies. This fundamental notion of authority may have led to democratic-republican governments, but it also led to exclusionary practices. Because children could not give consent, their fathers gained more authority over them; the importance of parental custody, along with family patriarchy, increased in the eighteenth century.

By extension, as Brewer points out in the last chapter, the belief that reasoning ability was crucial to participation in the political process served as justification for the exclusion of groups defined as lacking reason. In the early nineteenth century, the perception of women, slaves, and Indians, among others, as childlike and irrational rendered them ineligible to participate in politics or even decisions about their own lives. Ironically, the transition from authoritarian to democratic states, while eroding the privileges of rank and birth status, also led to exclusionary policies based on age, gender, race, and ethnicity. Brewer’s argument is

2 See, for example, John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (London, 1690).
that the debate about children’s reasoning abilities was the foundation of claims that social groups defined as childlike could not claim the right to act as autonomous members of society.

This book will be useful for intellectual historians, legal scholars, and even social historians who wish to integrate the philosophical and legal debates about children into the fields of family and childhood history.

Altina Waller
University of Connecticut


Coffeehouses are central to much of the contemporary historiography of early-modern public life, especially to studies that emphasize the public sphere as a defining feature of “bourgeois” or protoliberal society. Cowen exploits a vast array of sources about coffeehouses and coffee in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain to provide a detailed, comprehensive picture that corrects some of the generalizations that abound in the literature. He makes two major points in reference to the public sphere. First, coffeehouse culture was not a creation of a bourgeoisie seeking an accessible space in which to form public opinion outside the ambit of aristocratic or court society, but rather a construct of the “virtuosi,” the genteel accumulators of knowledge and exotic experience who have recently become a focus of historical attention as contributors to the formation of modernity. Cowan argues that coffee itself initially became popular in the seventeenth century because of its adoption by the virtuosi, whose example produced a fashion that was more widely adopted by a bourgeoisie in the process of developing a cultural persona.

Second, Cowan shows that, contrary to Habermas’ view, coffeehouses were not places separated from the competition and interests of everyday political and economic life where dispassionate discussion of public matters could take place.¹ The fact that they were intimately connected to a wide range of commercial, social, and political networks was the major reason for their importance as public spaces. Writers such as Joseph Addison proposed a model of dispassionate rationality for coffeehouse behavior, but the reality was much more varied, partisan, and, at times, passionate. Both the model and the reality contributed to the creation of the modern public, but in much more complicated ways than Habermas and others have suggested.

This is a rich book, both in the depth of the material that Cowan has assembled about early modern British coffeehouses and in the range of interpretive issues that he is able to address through the material. For

example, he explains the growth in the consumption of products such as coffee not as a result of a “consumer revolution” derived from an expanding bourgeoisie but as an outcome of the confluence of many factors, especially the invention of a new form of social distinction by the virtuosi. Although the overall point about consumption is not new, Cowan shows in great and convincing detail how the process worked.

The approach taken in this book is one that has found increasing favor with early-modern historians—to collect evidence relevant to a particular institution or event from as many sources and as many perspectives as possible and to employ it to criticize standard interpretations, both narrow and broad. Cowan uses this approach to good advantage, although he might have pursued the question of the bourgeoisie more vigorously. What he is describing is not really the bourgeoisie as an extant category taking a practice (coffee drinking) and an institution (the coffeehouse) from the virtuosi so much as a bourgeoisie actually constructing itself around cultural patterns connected with coffee consumption. This point aside, Cowan has made a major contribution to the historiography of the public sphere, of consumption, and of early-modern society in general.

Woodruff D. Smith
University of Massachusetts, Boston


Four actresses—English players Betty Boutell (fl. 1667–1692) and Charlotte Clarke (1713–1760), trans-Atlantic burlesque star Lydia Thompson (1838–1908), and American dramatist and performer of stage and film Mae West (1893–1980)—constitute the chief case studies for this examination of reputation, along with the Irish madam Margaret Leeson (1727–1797) and a dozen sex workers in Madison, Wisconsin, during the 1990s. Leeson and the actresses are studied via memoirs, repertoire, and anecdotal evidence, and the Madison call girls are interviewed in a backstage view that fashionably goes by the designation of ethnography. The actresses were all undistinguished as artists but notorious for portraying cross-dressed (or in West’s case, merely sexually charged) characters who, in their various genres and cultural contexts, stimulated anxieties about contamination of the collective moral and social body through their scandalous private conduct and because of erotic responses to their stage work.

West’s maxim, “keep a diary, and someday it’ll keep you,” may have been anticipated by Leeson, who, in her late sixties and on the skids, produced a penitential memoir—construing her rise from abandoned lover to affluent cathouse keeper—as proof of her sexual self-
determination.  Pullen links this contestation of victimhood to the rights activism of modern prostitutes, such as those in COYOTE, and, in turn, to modern prostitutes’ view of themselves as actresses. Claiming kinship across history, Pullen legitimizes sex work through a sisterhood of gender transgressors. By this logic, the imputation of stage actresses as whores—unchaste and lewd to make a living and fornicating for pure pleasure—which was fully justified in the English Restoration and in France through the Second Empire, is turned about in recent years by the self-direction inherent in role play and deliberately bounded identities within sex work and private life.

As McKenzie argues, performance is now such a widespread ascription that it accounts for the measurement, management, or assessment of machines, practices, or objects in engineering, business, or product testing as much as the mimetic pretense of stage acting.  Pullen is seduced by this powerful trend. In the modern parlance of work effectiveness, the term “performance evaluation” describes quality, efficiency, and economy among people or systems in any job milieu. Pullen assumes that the neutralization of more than two millennia of prejudice about performance coincides with the eradication of suspicion about actresses’ chastity. When sex workers in Madison describe how they “feign passion, simulate desire, represent sexuality, and impersonate a fantasy lover” (152), the smoke and mirrors of such an illusion calls upon the glamor of film acting. Pullen conflates the cachet of cinema with metaphors of theater, one of her many inconsistencies. More troubling, however, is that she makes too much of sex workers’ preference for acting and make-believe as a workplace strategy and psychic valve. Nowadays who does not perform, and in what walk of life are theatrical metaphors not part of the common lexicon? Pullen insufficiently particularizes the associative claims about theater in order to tarnish “anti-porn” feminism—a term that she renders synonymous with anti-sex—and counters Marxist-infected feminist ascriptions of false consciousness with female sex workers’ claims to find their work liberating and freely chosen.

The material conditions and discursive constructs of acting and prostitution were certainly entangled in the seventeenth century, as they were in the twentieth. Pullen implies, however, that the stigma against actresses is a thing of the past—except, perhaps, among the straw figures of anti-porn feminists—and that self-fashioning can be accomplished through acting techniques as well by invoking actresses’ milieu. Though figure-revealing actresses of the 1860s were, in some circles, as unnatural and monstrous as Bloomers and cross-dressed prostitutes, Pullen views West’s pro-sex and pro-homosexuality stances as the neutralization of

1 From *Every Day’s a Holiday*, Paramount Pictures (1937), directed by A. Edward Sutherland and written by Mae West.
prejudice among the public and the eradication of false consciousness among practitioners; what was formerly degrading, and even morally contagious, is now universally understood as citational hyper-femininity. The implication is that in what Pullen terms our age of “millennial prostitution” (proliferating sex on television, film, and the internet), nothing counts any more as an unruly gender impersonation by women directed toward heterosexual male witnesses, consumers, or clients. To perceive otherwise is to impose the standards of Victorian reformers.

The Madison sex workers—who utilize what Pullen classifies as theater metaphors and acting techniques to produce erotic verisimilitude; cloak their livelihood from family, friends, and lovers; and maintain the psychic separation between sex work and personal relationships—claim solidarity with actresses. Their duplicity may not be false consciousness, but it does suggest a historical fallacy, because actresses have not wholly escaped their own negative reputation as whores. What the consequences may be for actresses as a class of workers does not impinge on Pullen’s brief, nor does the legitimization that it lends to johns’ behavior. Actresses and sex workers may pretend for their living, but are not their reasons for doing so sufficiently distinct?

Tracy C. Davis
Northwestern University


In this impressive and erudite book, the product of a quarter-century of research, Roberts clearly succeeds in his three broad goals: to establish a detailed chronology of organized moral-reform efforts in England across a century when such efforts were particularly conspicuous; to place these efforts in an appropriately rich political, cultural, and administrative context; and to synthesize the study of the many significant moral-reform projects of this era—anti-slavery, social purity, temperance, and the like—“into a study of moral reform as a diverse but distinctive mode of thought and action” (viii). The result is the first detailed analysis of moral-reform efforts as a whole during this long era. Its significance and usefulness will be immediately obvious to any serious student of the late-Georgian and Victorian eras.

Roberts’ chronological account is divided into six chapters. The first focuses on the mid-1780s, which he sees as the pivotal moment in the making of a moral-reform agenda. The last is devoted to the late-Victorian and Edwardian decades, which witnessed the erosion of moral-reform voluntarism by the combined forces of social and scientific “causalism,” which challenged the notion of autonomous moral agency, and “national efficiency,” which at a time of deepening international
competition turned Britain’s physical and moral fitness into a state responsibility. Throughout, Roberts’ methodology is that of a traditional historian chiefly interested in placing in a broader setting the voluntary societies that he examines. Massively researched, his monograph makes extensive use of a broad range of manuscript collections, official publications issued by voluntary societies and parliamentary committees, and newspapers and pamphlets.

Although resolutely a work of history, this book will be put to good use by the broad range of social scientists who are preoccupied with the analysis of social-stabilizing mechanisms and the evolution of civil society and its relationship with the state. Roberts identifies three master narratives of volunteer moral reform from the literature: one that emphasizes the imposition of labor discipline in the development of capitalist industrial society (à la Edward P. Thompson), one that emphasizes the emergence of social stability through the growth of consensual social values, cross-class cooperation, and civic improvement (à la Brian Harrison), and one that highlights the development of a bourgeois public sphere that facilitated social stability by helping “professional and commercial elites . . . to convince significant numbers of their own and other classes to see the world in a particular—hierarchical yet community-seeking—way” (298, à la Jürgen Habermas). He is sympathetic to the second and particularly the third.

Although Roberts’ broader arguments are persuasive, his account features too much consensus and too little contestation. Plebeian agency is by no means entirely absent from his book, but he might well have devoted greater attention to the various ways in which the largely working-class targets of moral reform sought to, and frequently were able to, stymie such reform efforts or redefine them on their own terms.

Philip Harling
University of Kentucky


The past three decades have seen a remarkable expansion in social and cultural studies of death in both historical and contemporary contexts. Notable within this genre have been those focused on the culture of mourning in nineteenth-century Britain and on the impact of World War I. Almost exclusively, this literature has explored bereavement among the well-to-do; consideration of working-class deaths has occurred principally in relation to the shameful associations of the pauper grave. As Strange points out, this juxtaposition of the respectable and the shameful has led to oversimplification. Working-class cultures of death encompassed far more than the pauper funeral. Strange’s study is the first
to explore these cultures, and is notable both for its critique of the existing literature of death, and for its innovative methodology.

Strange describes her project as a history of emotion, but this methodologically complex work meshes an empirical account of the rituals of working-class death and mourning with interpretations derived from textual analysis and informed by a variety of disciplines. Perspectives from anthropology, medicine, and social, cultural, political, and religious history are deployed to develop the concept of fluidity as an analytical tool for the interpretation of historical experience. The crucial Victorian ideal of respectability is thus depicted not as a fixed cultural standard but as “a movable point within a broad, flexible and colourful landscape of death” (21). Diversity, not conformity, characterized the working-class culture—or cultures—of death. Strange’s account illuminates that diversity with both sobriety and sensitivity.

Death’s landscape determined the structure of the book. Beginning with an essay on historiography and methodology, it moves to sickness and the event of death. Then ensue details relating to the rituals of caring for the corpse (laying out and viewing the body, wakes, and postmortems), the funeral, a reassessment of the pauper burial (as distinct from the public burial), remembrance and the cemetery (religion and identity, public space and private loss, the neglected grave, etc.), loss, memory, and the management of complex feelings. Children’s deaths merit a separate chapter, and an epilogue tackles the issue of death, grief and the changes associated with World War I.

Strange draws from a broad range of empirical sources—burial-board minutes, correspondence, and personal testimonies—to construct an account that is at once factually and emotionally informative. Readers may learn more than they ever wanted about the physical consequences of death, but the personal testimonies that elaborate the notions of fluidity and diversity are intriguing. The pauper burial itself was not a solid symbolic construct of humiliation but one that evoked differing responses and could be manipulated by families to their own emotional advantage. Far from being avoided at all costs, it was often used as an option that permitted necessary expenditure on other, emotionally important, components of mourning—such as dark clothing, funeral alcoholic libations, and baked meats. Being “buried with ham” was, for example, a significant social indicator. In developing the notion of fluidity as an important quality of human cultural responses to death, Strange also enriches our understanding of working-class life.

Anne Hardy
University College London
“Why did men in such households not seek to maximize their productivity by spinning in their spare time?” (113). Thus does Gray formulate her main criticism about the common use of a family-strategy approach to explain decision making in protoindustrial households in rural Ireland (113). Her book is a concise study of the role of gender in the development of the Irish linen industry during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The evidence that she presents leads her to reject the family-strategies approach and to propose a new concept that she calls “gender contracts.” Her idea, which is based on Sen’s use of bargaining theory in household decision making, incorporates both cooperation and conflict as elements of gender differences.¹

Building on her own earlier work, she elegantly combines historical sources with modern scholarship on Ireland as well as on general economic, historical, and sociological concepts. These primary sources can be categorized in three different groups—contemporary reports about the conditions in Ireland, census and land valuation data, and literary sources (predominantly popular poetry by rural folk artists). She balances the various sources and methodological approaches well throughout the coherent and logical structure of her narrative.

Her introduction sets the stage for her analysis by reviewing various strands of scholarship on historical capitalism. She then discusses the market and production structure of the linen industry in Ireland and the changes occurring during the prefactory era. The next step is a conceptual discussion of proto-industry and an analysis of its applicability in Ireland. She chooses County Cavan, the southernmost county in the province of Ulster, as the site of her case study. The choice of Cavan is driven largely by the availability of the data needed for her extensive statistical investigation. She explores the relation between regional-development patterns and household structure, as well as the role of gender, eventually to note the shortcomings of the family-strategies approach and to introduce gender contracts. She explores the macrolevel implications in a comparative analysis involving Ireland, Flanders, and Scotland.

Applying a world-system theory approach, Gray envisions gender as an independent axis of social organization, crosscutting households and regions. The analysis shows the organizational divisions within the protoindustrial Irish linen industry along gender lines and how these differences are driven by household decisions. The final chapter stresses the importance of gender for industrial transition in its effect on household decisions influencing labor mobilization. Notwithstanding her clear ar-

arguments about the importance of gender, the use of gender as an organizational principle requires more justification than showing it to be just one angle to frame household decisions.

Gray’s book connects the various levels of analysis well. However, the transition from the national level to the particular regional analysis of County Cavan is abrupt; some space should have been given to characterize the representativeness of this county. The chapter uses descriptive statistics and a “qualitative comparative analysis,” which utilizes Boolean truth tables to find a set of configurations associated with a particular outcome. But the argument might have profited from more thorough statistical techniques.

With an impressive combination of approaches from various disciplines Gray manages to provide a fresh and comprehensive take on the important role of gender within households in proto-industrial Ireland and its transition toward the Industrial Revolution.

Florian Ploeckl
Yale University


The best micro-histories manage to convey the texture of a vanished culture and to define and amplify the basic issues, concerns, and imperatives that infused the society in which the highlighted events unfolded. Farr’s engrossing study, A Tale of Two Murders, delivers those insights in spades. The book examines a horrific double murder that took place in Dijon in 1638. The event shocked contemporaries because of its unexpectedness and brutality, but also because of the status of the victims and of the suspected perpetrator. Both the alleged killer, Philippe Giroux, and the primary target of the crime, Pierre Baillet, came from the highest reaches of Burgundy’s robe nobility. Giroux was a président in the parlement at Dijon (one of only eight such high courts in all of France), and Baillet was a président in the Chambre des Comptes, a distinguished “sovereign” court devoted to royal finances. Accompanied by his valet, Philibert Neugot, Baillet visited the home of his cousin Giroux on the evening of 6 September; both men then disappeared. The weight of the evidence collected in the months and years following their disappearance strongly suggests that Giroux—assisted by two of his servants—planned and executed the assassination of his kinsman.

Farr unpacks the details of this fascinating case—the hostilities between Baillet and Giroux, the act of murder and its subsequent cover-up, the investigation into the crime, the amazing sequence of twists and turns that affected both the witnesses’ testimony, and the eventual ver-
dict of the trial judges (who had known Giroux as an esteemed colleague and major power broker). Farr’s point is “to show the reader how power worked” in seventeenth-century France (ix). Students of the seventeenth century will learn much from Farr’s sensitive analysis of the social, political, and institutional relationships that influenced, defined, and—to twenty-first century eyes—largely explain the manner in which the entire event unfolded from 1638 to the mid-1640s. By exposing the intricate interplay of honor, patronage, passion, and politics in this strange but exemplary case, Farr skillfully demonstrates how “the law became a public tool for family vengeance and private interest” in the age of Louis XIII (201).

Specialists will appreciate the depictions of power in a society still lacking a clear distinction between public and private, but this book should also appeal to a wide audience of non-specialists. Farr’s examination of the sordid underbelly of elite culture is oddly resonant for any observer of contemporary American politics, and the seemingly organic connections between power, privilege, and corruption that he reveals will suggest new approaches to the study of elites in other times and places. The bizarre and sinister world shown to be percolating beneath the surface of Dijon’s polite society—involving adulterous passions, infanticide, poisoning, mass perjury, widespread disregard for the law, and the machinations of a likely serial killer—is worthy of a David Lynch film, and the dark atmosphere that the book evokes raises intriguing and disturbing questions about the relationships between power, status, and morality.

The lurid details and the unexpected twists hold one’s attention, but Farr also adopts a narrative style, and displays a methodological temperament, that adds to the pleasure of the reading experience. Like any good narrator, Farr tries to let the story speak for itself, but the story involves so many layers of double dealing and deception, and introduces so many sources of uncertainty, that Farr ultimately uses the competing narratives surrounding this case to call into question the very possibility of ascertaining historical “truth.” Without becoming overtly theoretical, he connects the “management of perceptions” that characterized the exercise of influence and authority in seventeenth-century France to the epistemological challenges represented by postmodernism (3, 200). Farr’s admission of his own uncertainty about Giroux’s guilt or innocence is as sobering as it is unusual, but his expert handling of the available evidence actually restores faith in the historian’s ability to navigate the treacherous waters of relativism.

Jay M. Smith
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Heuer has carved out an extremely demanding topic, which is to trace shifts in law and practice concerning women’s and men’s rights and obligations as members of families and as citizens from the end of the Old Regime through the Revolution to the Restoration. Heuer theorizes that early revolutionaries used the “nation as family” in a metaphorical sense and began to construct increasingly equal citizenship and nationality rights for men and women out of precedents left from the Old Regime. During the radical phase of the Revolution, legislation and discourse emphasized citizenship obligations of women as well as men. Beginning with Thermidor, however, central-government policy shifted. It reworked the nation as family metaphor into one that suggested that families, and not individual citizens, were the foundational units of the nation. With these changes, women were transformed in ideological and legal terms from citizens to dependents of citizens; citizenship became increasingly identified as inhering only to men.

The problem of emigration and emigrants looms large in the study, both as a problem facing radical revolutionaries during the Republic and for the legacies that it left in French laws on citizenship and nationality. Laws regarding citizenship and naturalization were deeply marked by revolutionaries’ determination to use absence from the patrie and the status of “ex-noble” as tantamount to a rejection of granted citizenship rights. Revolutionaries in the Convention, in particular, seemed bent on treating women who accompanied their émigré husbands as culpable, holding them to the same obligations to the nation as their husbands, and punishing them for what they perceived as women’s greater loyalty to husband than nation.

Discussing the evolution of law, Heuer’s text becomes involved in extremely intricate dissections of cases involving contests over individuals’ status as émigrés—often when French nationals had wed foreigners during the Revolution—as well as contentions concerning rights of property inheritance in France, reserved for French nationals and those actively seeking naturalization. Heuer’s narratives of these cases enliven the more technical discussions of legal history, but they can also lead to some frustration as well. Cases often went through successive levels of litigation and appeal, and although their resolution is sometimes traceable, the practical consequences of litigation over revolutionary law are difficult to interpret.

Heuer’s discussion of the impacts of the formidable Napoleonic Civil Code (1804) on French family practices provides insight into tensions between French core and periphery in the march of ideas and legal policy. At a number of points, laws enacted and cases adjudicated in central courts seem to have been ignored in practice wherever distinctive local mentalities concerning marriage and citizenship prevailed. Since
the practical consequences of laws on family, citizenship, and naturalization often bore their greatest consequences on the borders of France, Heuer has chosen, at the end of the study, to focus on one such region—Alsace—which was an area of high immigration across the Rhine.

Post-1814 efforts in Alsace to enforce terms of the Civil Code, which assigned French women who married foreigners the nationality of their husbands, met with keen resistance from workers dwelling there and from local authorities. Evidence suggests that the foreign male workers who migrated into France and the French women whom they married had a different notion of citizenship than the one promulgated by the Civil Code. Perhaps they had learned their more egalitarian revolutionary lessons regarding nationality and citizenship too well, believing that women did have citizenship rights that could confer French nationality on their husbands. For their part, weary Alsatian authorities, faced with the proliferation of common-law unions and illegitimate children among these couples, tried to facilitate marriages that would not, however, remove French citizenship rights from the wife.

Heuer’s interesting and insightful book stands at the intersection of several fields: the history of revolutionary law, the history of gender and the family, and the political history of the modern nation state. The text would have been strengthened by a systematic discussion of the many sources used and how the author selected the illustrative cases that she discusses at some length to support her arguments. Even for those familiar with the Revolution, an appendix with a summary of the numerous pieces of legislation that Heuer explores would have helped, since the book will also profit those concerned with nationality and citizenship in other modern nation-states.

Katherine A. Lynch
Carnegie Mellon University


Pedersen’s study of French family legislation and politics during the first half of the Third Republic is fascinating interdisciplinary history. Examining the intersections between parliamentary politics, feminist activism, and theater from 1870 to 1920, Pedersen draws on the archives of state and culture, employing the sources and approaches of both traditional historical and literary studies. Revisiting three crucial pieces of legislation familiar to historians of gender and the family in France—the 1884 Naquet law on divorce, the 1912 Rivet Law on paternity suits, and the 1920 Ignace Law on contraception—Pedersen traces “the ways in which appeals to conflicting forms of national identity, imperial identity, and
republican citizenship” worked to determine the nature and forms of debate over family legislation in the Third Republic (3).

Throughout the book, Pedersen uses the analysis of “social theatre” to show how culture and politics intersected during the period. Pedersen pays particular attention to playwrights, including Emile Augier, a man of letters whose controversial “plea for divorce in the guise of a play, Madame Cavarlet [1876],” became the subject of parliamentary debates over adultery and the legalization of divorce in France (13). According to Pedersen, plays mattered; playwrights and audiences participated together in a politically charged world of spectacle, dramatizing the social questions of the day, expressing and working to shape French public opinion. Reading critical responses to plays in the theatrical and popular press, as well as censorship of controversial productions, Pedersen’s analysis moves beyond an anecdotal use of literary texts, developing a historical reading of the important and political role that the theater played in the Third Republic.

Pedersen’s work draws attention to contests over definitions of French nationhood that included perceptions of a variety of foreign threats and influences, from German military (and demographic) strength, to external models of the family (legal divorce in England and Scandinavian social legislation) inappropriate for a “Latin” country such as France (42). Pedersen’s discussion of Henrik Ibsen’s A Doll’s House (1879) and the negative reactions to his oeuvre in France is another example of her argument that theater was a privileged site for the expression of French national anxieties about social roles and welfare. This reading might have been even more compelling had Pedersen linked the perception of Ibsen’s work to how the French perceived social-welfare legislation and “maternalist” policies in Scandinavia during the period.

Pedersen’s study also includes the analysis of the colonial context in these debates about divorce, paternity, and contraception in France. Exploring these questions in the French “West Indies” and Africa, Pedersen traces the ways in which metropolitan perspectives on the family, sexuality, and reproduction impacted French policy in the colonies. In the imperial context, issues of assimilation and association complicated debates about the application of legislation from metropolitan France. The uneven adoption of certain policies throughout the empire also reflected particular anxieties about racial and cultural difference in these contexts. Although Pedersen does not linger on these questions, her work points to exciting possibilities for future research on the family that understands France in more global terms.

Legislating the French Family makes an important contribution to the histories of the welfare state, gender, and citizenship in modern France. It is also an excellent study of the ways in which cultural and political issues, as well as historical and literary ones, must be considered as mutually constitutive rather than mutually exclusive.

Roxanne Panchasi
Simon Fraser University
The appearance of a volume in English about the early-modern history of the Republic of Genoa, nearly ten years after Epstein’s treatment of the medieval period, is reason to rejoice, particularly in this case. Kirk tackles the economic history of Genoa in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, spanning the period famously described by Braudel as the “Century of the Genoese” and so far neglected by the historiography in English.

Kirk provides a kind of cultural history of Genoa’s political economy during this period by concentrating on the various projects that were proposed as solutions to its perceived economic crisis. His central argument is that these projects were “rhetorical exercises made to demonstrate a given political position” (187), and are “more easily understood if viewed as a genre in political discourse” (191). This interpretive angle is a new and interesting spin on the well-established tenet of the history and historiography of Genoa that views the relationship between the Republic and the sea as the central axis of its identity. The interesting paradox running through the “Century of the Genoese” is that part of Genoese society perceived the successes of its finançiers as promoting “private interests to the detriment of public good” and damaging the Genoese economy by draining capital away from trade (63). The Genoese involvement in the field of international finance was therefore considered a sort of betrayal of the original vocation of the Republic. Kirk convincingly argues for an internal division within the ruling class of the Republic—united in a “single order” since the events of 1528—between “the nobili vecchi, increasingly involved in finance, and the nobili nuovi, involved primarily in manufacturing and trade” (47), acting as a stimulus for economic planning and activity. He is not equally convincing in his underplaying of the role played by the close relationship between Genoa and Spain during the period; despite their undeniable interdependence, the dominant partner was never in doubt.

Kirk declares Jauss’ “reception theory” a useful analytical tool for investigating the Republic’s governmental agencies’ reaction to these proposals for economic reform. However, because he does not fully weave his influences into the narrative, certain potentially interesting considerations like “‘horizons of expectations’ as a political equivalent to the interpretative ‘horizon of reading’” receive only brief mention in a footnote, interdisciplinary opportunities are lost. Nonetheless, the book

1 Steven A. Epstein, Genoa and the Genoese, 958–1528 (Chapel Hill, 1996).
3 Hans Robert Jauss, Toward an Aesthetic of Reception (Minneapolis, 1982).
provides plenty of food for thought regarding early-modern Italy and hopefully will stimulate more research into how the Italian states confronted their relative political and economic decline.

Maria Fusaro
University of Chicago

Maps, Myths, and Men: The Story of the Vinland Map. By Kirsten A. Seaver (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004) 480 pp. $65.00 cloth $24.95 paper

Few artifacts are as controversial as the Vinland Map (vm), a late medieval world map, which, if genuine, would contain the earliest known graphic representation of America. Today, the majority of experts views the map as a modern fake. The vm is named after its most unique feature, “Vinlanda insula,” in the northwestern Atlantic, supposedly depicting the tenth- and eleventh-century discoveries of the Norse west of Greenland, as told in Icelandic Sagas and other sources. In 1959, Yale purchased the vm bound with a genuine medieval manuscript—“The Tartar Relation,” a short treatise discussing the Mongols. The vm was kept secret until 1965, when Yale announced its existence and published a lavish volume of reproductions and learned essays, The Vinland Map and the Tartar Relation (vmtr).¹ The vm, so the experts argued, was created c. 1440, probably during the Council of Basel, and was a merging of long-preserved Icelandic geographical knowledge and contemporary European world maps.

The vm’s authenticity immediately came under attack from scholars and scientists, and the lively, often acerbic, debate that developed continues. In Maps, Myths and Men, Seaver soberly presents the case against the vm, based on her extensive research and on four decades of scholarship. Seaver, the vm’s most thorough and outspoken critic in recent years, painstakingly examines the literary, cartographic, codicological, palaeographic, and chemical evidence, challenging one by one the assumptions and conclusions that brought Yale and the authors of vmtr to view the map as authentic.

Following a rather clipped introductory chapter, Seaver presents an overview of Norse history, with emphasis on medieval life in the Greenland settlements and its mysterious decline. This overview is a condensed version of Seaver’s The Frozen Echo (Stanford, 1996), albeit not condensed enough; the discussion is bogged by archaeological disputes of which the relevance to the vm is not always clear. Regarding Norse voyages and mapping Seaver convincingly argues that the Norse did not

communicate their experiential knowledge and were not known to have drawn maps themselves.

The following chapters (3 through 5), arguably the best of the nine, describe the shady provenance (that is, none) of the VM and the even shadier process that led to its authentication and purchase by Yale. Seaver presents a prosopographical study of dealers, curators, and experts, on both sides of the Atlantic, based on her findings in internal British Library files, and, remarkably, on interviews with some of the people involved. Seaver then discusses the VM’s physical attributes, unavoidably considering the VM’s ink in microscopic detail.

Chapters 7 through 8 provide a cartographic and literary analysis of the VM, driven primarily by a negation of VMTR arguments rather than by a positive reconstruction of sources and traditions. Seaver’s major line of attack is to demonstrate the various inconsistencies of the VM with her understanding of the Norse worldview, thereby eliminating the merging of genuine geographical traditions in Basel as a possibility. Seaver shows that one slip on the VM—the joint, rather than separate, sailing of Leif and Bjarni to Vinland—is traceable to a 1765 treatise, which in her view proves “beyond any doubt” the map’s modern origin. Yet doubt remains, because even if claims in VMTR about the flow of Norse knowledge to Europe are overstretched, the idea that the VM was a fifteenth-century misunderstanding of this knowledge—an option that Seaver does not consider—cannot be ruled out. Although Seaver shows no mercy to historians who pronounce on the basis of scant evidence, she forgets this useful maxim in the final chapter, in which she proposes Joseph Fischer, S.J. (1858–1944), as the VM’s creator. Fischer, Seaver argues, created the VM to display the global reach of the Church and its crucial part in audacious Norse navigations as scholarly protest against Nazi adoration of the Norse and hostility to the Catholic Church. Seaver is to be commended for providing a short biography of the renowned historian of cartography, but, overall, the constant heaping of one tenuous hypothesis over another shaky piece of evidence is not in line with the author’s normal sharpness.

Maps, Myths, and Men suffers from a few structural and stylistic problems, such as confusing repetitions and oblique statements whose meaning is fully explained only later in the text. Most importantly, Seaver consistently refrains from wrapping the discussion in a way that evaluates her numerous refutations according to their relative importance. In such a highly technical and complex study, which, so it seems, aims to stand as definitive, these are regrettable faults.

Defenders of the VM will now need to work extremely hard to repel Seaver’s mighty and sophisticated attack on its authenticity. Even if the last word has yet to be said—parchment DNA testing, computer analysis of scripts, and archival findings possibly shedding more light on this debate—the large cluster of oddities around this fading manuscript is troubling. Seaver has produced, on the one hand, an exemplary interdisciplinary study, ranging over extraordinarily diverse periods and cultures,
as well as methods and areas of expertise. As such, it will stand for a long time as the principal source of information on the VM and the history of the debate. On the other hand, some readers may be disappointed by the book’s narrow focus on the question of authenticity, with no real attempt to reflect more broadly on the Western tradition of forgery, on documentary culture, on the mesmerizing power of maps in the construction of national myths, and on modern American quests for origins. It is perhaps another sign that, alas, the quarrel over the Vinland Map needs to mature even longer.

Zur Shalev
University of Haifa


This book is strongly interdisciplinary, combining elements of traditional documentary history, oral history, literary theory, and even art history. It focuses on how the Crimean Tatars have constructed collective transgenerational memories of their homeland, their forced removal from it, and their struggle to return to it. Uehling examines how the Crimean Tatars have fashioned and used these memories as instruments to maintain their national cohesion in exile and mobilize politically in both Uzbekistan and Crimea. Comprised of both personal reminiscences and stories heard from older relatives, these memories take the form of oral narratives that have been honed into their current forms by many retellings. Uehling interrogates these oral narratives of the Crimean Tatars to determine how these intertwined strands of perception have informed the views and actions of this nationality in modern times.

The introduction is heavy on anthropological jargon, making reference to a large number of theorists. This attempt to fit the work into the larger field of anthropology obscures what are fairly simple concepts, the most important of which is that collective memories are constructed to serve particular political ends. Anybody with even minimal exposure to such terminology and theories would have difficulty making much sense out of it. Fortunately, the subsequent chapters of the book are both much clearer and much more substantial.

The first chapter, based upon secondary sources, is an exemplary concise history of the Crimean Tatars from their origins to the present day. It covers all of the important issues of Crimean Tatar history in a straight historical narrative. But the following chapters really shine. Uehling makes extensive use of oral accounts by Crimean Tatars of their recent history, a definitely underexploited resource in regard to Eurasia.

Although, her main aim is to demonstrate how these narratives are constructed and shape Crimean Tatar views, she also provides much textured detail about everyday life not available in Soviet archival sources.

The book might have been even better had Uehling used the interviews to explore some of the still unanswered gaps in recent Crimean Tatar history, in particular, the relationship between the exiled Crimean Tatars and the local Uzbeks during the 1940s and 1950s. The standard Crimean Tatar version is that it was hostile until the Uzbeks found out that the Crimean Tatars were fellow Muslims and not demons, monsters, or cannibals. At this point in the narrative, the Uzbeks become much more hospitable toward the Crimean Tatars. Yet, Uehling leaves when and how this transformation took place a mystery. Despite such missed opportunities, the book succeeds wonderfully at accomplishing its main goal of dissecting how Crimean Tatar narratives have been created, recreated, and circulated for the last half century.

J. Otto Pohl
Arivaca, Arizona


Zhuk’s detailed account of peasant evangelical religion in southern Russia draws on a rich array of archival and contemporary sources, which he analyzes with the tools of comparative cultural anthropology. The type of nonconformity that he examines emerges as deeply contradictory. On the one hand, the various local communities shared a common set of practices and beliefs: ecstatic worship rituals, influence of charismatic prophets, and anticipation of the Second Coming or Last Judgment. On the other hand, they were unable to maintain stable boundaries, continuously fragmenting in the wake of new leaders. Their sobriety and discipline promoted industriousness and respectability, but their millenarian expectations led some to embrace radical political ideas. The authorities were convinced that they were both alien and subversive.

In the effort to counteract the image of traditional Russian religious culture as prone to irrational, mystical forms, and thus inimical to “modernity,” Zhuk asserts the direct link between this type of peasant sectarianism and radical popular Protestantism as it evolved in German lands and was imported into Russia by German colonists. This Protestant evangelical strain, he maintains, merged in the southern provinces with native sectarian tendencies, offshoots of Orthodox mysticism such as the Khlysty and Skoptsy. Groups such as the so-called Stundists and Shalaputs combined a millenarian outlook, expecting heaven on earth, with a practical attitude toward worldly endeavors.

Zhuk characterizes the Stundists and Shalaputs as people of the book and bearers of the Weberian “Protestant ethic,” in Russian (or
But the prejudices of historians and officials—whether loyal Orthodox or Soviet atheists—may not entirely explain why the history of these groups has been “lost.” Their closest models are not the Calvinists and Lutherans, who exerted a major influence on European culture and politics, but the Albigensians and Mennonites, who were marginal in their own context. In Russia, despite the odd upper-class convert, the new beliefs were confined to the geographical as well as social fringe—the minimally literate masses of the southern frontier. Zhuk shows how the sectarians’ sobriety, discipline, nonviolence, and productivity distinguished them from Orthodox peasants. Yet, in arguing for their importance, he contends that their dreams of a better world articulated a discontent shared by their more conventional neighbors.

In Zhuk’s view, the Protestant-style mystics of the Ukraine had many virtues: They were (usually) tolerant of Jews; they preached and also practiced the equality of men and women; and they manifested not only a talent for productive economic activity but also the same respect for the individual that characterized the Reformation in the West. They were, in short, enlightened modernizers, who, by virtue of their visionary expectations, at the same time inclined the local peasant culture to embrace the promise of social transfiguration when it arrived in Bolshevik form. One may remain skeptical of the claim that evangelicals were either natural radicals or dedicated individualists; one may wonder whether any peasant community, however pious, could have demonstrated such consistent highmindedness. But readers will find Zhuk’s interpretation of south Russian or Ukrainian peasant culture to be worth consideration and his careful description of popular beliefs and religious syncretism of compelling interest.

Laura Engelstein  
Yale University

The Times and Trials of Anne Hutchinson: Puritans Divided. By Michael P. Winship (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2005) 184 pp. $35.00 cloth $14.95 paper

Winship’s study of the trials of the Antinomian (or “free grace”) controversy in early Massachusetts is an engaging narrative perfectly suited to a general readership. Winship is thoroughly versed in the intricacies of Puritan thought and practice. He brings to his account a keen analysis of the issues surrounding the first major crisis for the fledgling “city on a hill.” The account is eminently readable, admirably re-creating the mindset of those “precise” Protestants that sought to rebuild a Christian commonwealth in New England. Indeed, the book could easily replace such classics as Edmund Morgan’s The Puritan Dilemma: The Story of John

Winthrop (Boston, 1958) as an introduction to early American history. Assessing its interdisciplinary status, however, is a complicated matter.

At first glance, Winship’s book bears little, if any, imprint of interdisciplinary focus. In large part culled from his earlier Making Heretics: Militant Protestants and Free Grace in Massachusetts, 1636–1641 (Princeton, 2002), he offers hardly any new research. In fact, aside from a brief bibliographical essay, the book lists no reference material at all. Explicit theorization is entirely absent, as is any attempt to integrate such ancillary disciplines as the sociology of religion or political theory. Nor does Winship make any attempt to draw on insights from social or legal history, both of which have figured largely in previous accounts of the Hutchinson controversy. Even issues of gender are treated rather lightly, despite the Hutchinson’s trial’s enduring fascination for historians of gender in early America. Winship’s book is, in the classic sense of the term, a pure narrative of religious history. The focus of the book as a whole, as well as of each chapter, is chronological. The actors are introduced, the stage is set, and the story marches along its timeline, albeit with great verve and grace. The characters of the central figures, especially Thomas Shepard, John Cotton, and Hutchinson are vividly drawn but without any allusion to psychological theorization or social context. On first glance, this book might well seem not to be interdisciplinary at all.

That conclusion, however, would be erroneous. Winship draws together the disparate disciplines of legal, political, and religious history, arguing that Hutchinson’s two trials were “an attempt to use the law to protect the unity of Massachusetts’s Christian society,” an attempt that ironically “almost tore the society apart” (3). Rather than borrowing the technical idioms of legal and political history, however, Winship’s interpretation is presented in the terms and vocabulary of seventeenth-century Puritan casuists. Implicit in this analysis are the contextualist assumptions associated with the works of Pocock and Skinner—namely, that the actions of historical agents can be understood only in terms of their beliefs, described in language that they would recognize and endorse.¹ Such an approach is subject to a range of criticisms, but it does have the virtue of presenting what was once called the Antinomian Controversy in a light that is internally coherent and recognizable to those conversant with the religious culture of Puritan Massachusetts and England. That it also makes for a well-told and engaging narrative suggests that it is possible to practice history in an interdisciplinary fashion without the technical idioms that often alienate general readers.

Darren Staloff
City College of New York

Pursuing the American Dream stands in a tradition of works that have attempted to capture the essence of American political culture, conspicuously including Louis Hartz’s classic The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955), Rogers M. Smith’s Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (New Haven, 1997), and Eric Foner’s The Story of American Freedom (New York, 1998). Hartz put Lockean liberalism at the heart of his analysis. Smith posits a never-ending conflict among “multiple traditions,” particularly the principles of atomizing Lockean individualism, communitarian civic republicanism, and an exclusionary emphasis on ascriptive characteristics. Foner reads the American political past as a halting and sometimes contradictory effort to define and apply the concept of freedom.

Jillson bids to take his place in this distinguished company with his claim that the principal animating force of American history has been the pursuit of the “American Dream,” a term that he rescues from potential vapidity by defining it as the aspiration for “a fair chance to succeed in open competition with fellow citizens for the good things of life” (xi). As the argument proceeds, the key word turns out to be “competition.” Jillson’s American dreamers are an invidious, relentlessly striving lot, familiar to readers of Tocqueville and Veblen, not to mention Hartz.¹

Jillson focuses on several discrete moments in the American past, beginning with the colonial era and advancing through the Revolutionary and Constitutional periods, the age of Jackson and the Civil War, the Gilded Age, the Progressive era and the New Deal, the long liberal ascendency of the post–World War II decades, and the resurgence of conservatism in the last quarter-century. In each of those epochs, he examines, in order, the social landscape as it appeared to contemporaries; the particular version of the Dream that they articulated; its embodiment in institutions, laws, and policy; and the fate of those denied full access to the Dream—especially blacks, women, and Native Americans.

This organizational scheme makes for an admirable synthesis of the copious literatures on social, intellectual, political, and minority history that have emerged in the last several decades. Unfortunately, it also yields a series of potted studies of the successive eras discussed, giving the general account something of the flavor of a textbook. Of the valuable information and cogent argument in this book, little of it will be unfamiliar to specialists.

Jillson cites Benjamin Franklin, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Abraham Lincoln, and Horatio Alger as authentic voices of the American Dream,

as well as both Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton. His own ideological posture is somewhere between the last two, probably closer to Clinton, whom he likens to Lincoln and both Theodore and Franklin D. Roosevelt as believers in Herbert Croly’s famous advice in *The Promise of American Life* (New York, 1909) to employ the Hamiltonian means of an active state to secure the Jeffersonian ends of individual liberty and happiness. His chapter on the years from Harry Truman to Lyndon Johnson carries the subtitle “Opportunity to Entitlement,” a development that he clearly disdains. The subtitle of the succeeding chapter, on Reagan and Clinton, is “Entitlement to Responsibility,” a progression that he cheers, but with reservations about the extent to which widening gaps in wealth and income, lack of universal health care, and educational inequalities might today be jeopardizing the Dream that defines his America.

David M. Kennedy
Stanford University


If ever a book earned the much-abused term “relevant,” Kramer’s history of how people in the United States (and its British colonial antecedents) conceived of their “constitution” is it. Written in the aftermath of the contested 2000 presidential election in which nobody, it seems, questioned the undisputed right of the Supreme Court to be sole and final arbiter of what the law was and what the Constitution meant, Kramer presents a historical case to show the utter novelty—ironically, the radical and utterly anticonservative stance of a Court supporting an administration both of which have been mislabeled conservative—of this idea. Until the 1960s and 1970s, “popular constitutionalism” held sway; the Supreme Court was considered an important, but by no means the final and only, judge of which laws conformed to the Constitution. The change came—another irony here—when liberals pleased by the activism of the Warren court argued that the Supreme Court could trump states’ rights, laws, and customs in furthering human rights. What they did not realize is that they would be hoisted with their own petard if the Court became conservative.

Kramer begins with a thorough account of how colonial and revolutionary Americans envisioned multiple components and interpreters of an amorphous Constitution. British statute and custom, colonial statute and custom, and certain “fundamental” edicts such as the Magna Carta were all part of a Constitution in which true Britons gloried because—almost uniquely in the world—it preserved liberty. Theoretically speaking, the American Revolution was a reaction against the Mother Coun-
try’s new idea—advanced by Blackstone—that Parliament was both the supreme legislator of something called an “empire” and the supreme interpreter and enforcer of its laws.\(^1\)

The idea that judges, rather than legislators or “the people themselves,” were the supreme legal interpreters arrived circuitously. From the 1790s until President Franklin Roosevelt denounced the Supreme Court for declaring New Deal legislation unconstitutional, it was generally accepted that “the people” and their representatives held a responsibility and expertise for interpreting the Constitution at least equal to those of the Court. Unpopular decisions (Chief Justice John Marshall’s Court protecting the Cherokees from removal by the State of Georgia in the 1830s, or Dred Scott nullifying the Missouri Compromise and legalizing the movement of slaves into free states) were overruled by President Jackson and an enraged northern populace, respectively.

The notion of judicial supremacy emerged gradually. Some of the Founding Fathers tentatively broached the notion when challenged by their adversaries to determine the final arbiter of the law, but even they insisted that the people had the right to change the structure of the courts via their legislators if they chose. (Unfortunately, constitutional niceties are rarely priority issues, although they seem to have been when the Federalists who passed the Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798 to restrict freedom of speech were overwhelmingly repudiated at the polls in the next election.) Rather, the legal profession, with its casebooks that regarded law as the shedding of irrelevant decisions and concentrating on supposedly crucial ones—institutionalized in law schools that trained most of the judges—offered an elite alternative to popular constitutionalism which is now so widely believed that almost no one questions that “the law is what the judges say it is.”

Kramer does question this point, and brilliantly so, from a historical perspective. He encourages us to think deeply about what the United States Constitution really is, and why a supposed democracy has surrendered ultimate power to nine politically appointed individuals. By showing that history, rather than the Founders or the Constitution itself has shaped such a process, he should earn the gratitude of all concerned citizens and glory in the wrath of the Supreme Court and its champions.

William Pencak
Pennsylvania State University

*Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers in the Age of Sail.* By Daniel Vickers with Vince Walsh (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2005) 336 pp. $35.00

Vickers has written a wonderful book that provides a detailed history of Salem as a maritime community from its early colonial beginnings to the

opening decades of the nineteenth century. Three things stand out about this book—Vickers’ incredible depth of research, his lucid prose, and his argument, which challenges the traditional view of American maritime culture.

Vickers, with Walsh’s help, amassed a huge database to create more than a community study; the book is also a survey of the life course of thousands of individuals. Using a Paradox 8 database program, Vickers and Walsh traced 10,451 man voyages between 1641 and 1850. They created a sample of 2,620 individuals and compiled information from a wide array of sources. They culled legal records, town histories, account books, customs records, vital statistics, ship registers, provincial documents, tax assessments, and other sources. Fortunately for them, Salem is an exceptionally well-documented place, especially with the James Duncan Phillips Library of the Peabody Essex Museum in town. The notes do not do justice to the ordeal that Vickers, Walsh, and several research assistants underwent. Vickers and Walsh, however, provide a further explanation of the methodology in the appendixes, which also include a number of graphs, tables, and charts packed with the results of their number crunching. It is hard to imagine that anyone could mine such a rich cache of material in any other maritime community.

Despite the plethora of material used, and the social-scientific method to generate numbers and handle the data, Vickers has written an elegant book that is simply a pleasure to read. (Vickers states in the acknowledgments that he wrote the book, “but in every other respect, the line at which his [Walsh’s] contributions end and mine [Vickers’] begin is impossible to tell” [xiii]). Vickers integrates personal stories with hard data to provide an informal, intimate, and mature portrait of Salem as a maritime community with real people who lived real and complicated lives. For example, in discussing how easily youths turned to the sea in Salem, Vickers first cautions, “The reality of childhood—not as observed or remembered by adults but as encountered by children themselves—is one of the history’s shadowy corners” (136).

The outcome of this research and writing is a book that other maritime scholars will not be able take lightly. Vickers argues that there was no major gap between Salem the land-based community and Salem the maritime community. In the seventeenth and eighteenth century, going to sea was a normal activity of most young men in Salem. Some of these mariners continued their careers at sea, and the majority of them eventually became officers and captains. For most Salemites, going to sea represented a phase of life before they turned to more shore-bound activities in their late twenties and early thirties. For both groups of men, the boundary between life at sea and life ashore was not hard and fast. Moreover, Vickers advises against categorizing maritime labor as one thing or another: “Any attempt to classify sailors as adventure-seeking youths, old salts, shipmasters on the make, saltwater mechanics, proletarians, or...
lumpenproletarians runs into this obstacle: that in the course of their lives most seafaring men fell into several of these roles” (4).

This argument challenges the work of Marcus Rediker, the dominant interpretation of eighteenth-century Anglo-American seafarers, which posits that mariners were a class-conscious workforce separate and distinct from land-based communities. Vickers’ position also runs counter to my own study of sailors, which explores a distinct maritime culture along all of the American waterfront. Vickers himself cautions that the situation that he describes for a smaller port like Salem is different from what might be found along the London docks. He also traces significant changes in Salem during the early nineteenth century that reflect a transformation in shipping and the recruitment of labor. Whether or not all of Vickers’ conclusions are secure, his research, his writing, and his achievement are beyond question.

Paul A. Gilje
University of Oklahoma


What connects egg-and-brandy varnishes; an aged woman’s distress at her “ugly likeness” as captured by Peale, the portrait artist; braided hair lying under a small plate of glass in a woman’s brooch; handwriting as bloodletting; and eighteenth-century concepts of phenomenology is, according to Stabile, women. More specifically, Stabile argues that all of these elements combine with many others to constitute a “memory palace” constructed piece by piece by five white American women (Elizabeth Fergusson, Hannah Griffitts, Deborah Logan, Annis Stockton, and Susanna Wright) in Revolutionary America.

This book is an ambitious undertaking that combines cultural studies, literary analysis, material–culture studies, visual–art studies, architectural studies, and feminist theory in an attempt to, as Stabile states, “re recuperate the house—the place of feminine and familial experience—as a site of memory, history, and knowledge” (12). The result is a book most unique and engaging, although certain limitations may frustrate more general readers of American history.

The book is divided into two parts. The first part, which deals with memory, argues that unlike the white, elite men of the Revolutionary period who were intent upon construction of a national identity—a shared history—their female counterparts were busy creating “personalized memory palaces” at home. Stabile’s use of vernacular architecture and domestic furnishings is effective, although she does not deal with the problematical issues surrounding responsibility for architecture. For example, the given structure of a vernacular house is a material representa-
tion of a shared history in which women’s participation is unclear at best. Stabile then examines the act of handwriting as an expression of women’s sensibilities. She not only discusses the bodily act of writing (similar to Thornton’s work on handwriting) but the physical entities of paper, ink, and pen.1

The second part of the book explores various memorial objects owned by the five women mentioned above. Stabile uses portraits, furniture, mirrors, fans, and silhouettes to illustrate the way that women constructed knowledge through these nominally private artifacts. She ends her book with women’s role in mourning and various feminine paraphernalia of memorializing death. She argues that the practice of commemorating the dead—a seemingly private affair—was actually a collective interaction.

Stabile is particularly adept in relating the architectural motifs found in eighteenth-century concepts of memory, ideas of gender, and the structure of knowledge itself to the domestic architecture of the time. She imaginatively traces the experiences of her coterie of women through their own homes. Stabile’s ability to convey the experiential dimension of architecture and landscape allows her to make intriguing connections between various arenas of eighteenth-century intellectual thought and women’s domestic practices. Scholars often employ material culture and visual culture to illustrate historical arguments; Stabile convincingly argues that history is located in the objects themselves.

The book’s minor weaknesses do not outweigh its contribution. Although Stabile suggests that the lives of the five women are interrelated, she does not fully discuss the matter. Nor does she explore issues of class and privilege. She deals with gender obliquely, relying upon her reconstruction of a “feminine” sensibility without aggressively analyzing the larger structure of gender in these women’s lives. But Stabile’s interdisciplinary interpretation successfully integrates a wide array of historical evidence and vividly reconstructs the world in which these five women lived.

Helen Sheumaker
Miami University


The Planting of New Virginia resembles Edmund Morgan’s American Slavery, American Freedom (New York, 1975) in style (narrative without meta-, drama without melo-) as well as significance, building its persuasive momentum smoothly, gradually leading to lofty vistas. From the Blue Ridge crest, Hofstra first peers east beyond the hazy piedmont set-

tlement frontier toward Morganian Virginia circa 1730, a land of dispersed tobacco planters who were linked vitally to Europe by Chesapeake waterways and to ordinary white folk by a shared racial identity. From there arose a paradoxical but victorious revolutionary political culture fusing freedom and slavery.

Around 1730, a different Virginia began unfolding to the west and north of Morganian Virginia. Hofstra’s New Virginia physically encompassed the Shenandoah River Valley as well as the Upper James River Valley, watersheds delimited dramatically by the Blue Ridge and the North Mountain. Within those broad bounds ran an evolutionary process driven by personal, familial, social, and imperial quests for security. Out of many motives grew a unified landscape, dubbed town and country.

Small towns—Hofstra focuses on Winchester—anchored one end of “a functional continuum of surrounding villages, hamlets, and open-country neighborhoods” (12). This town-and-country end state was a product of economic forces that Hofstra interprets in part via “central-place, staple, functionalist, and long-distance trade theories,” leaning especially toward the latter two. Hofstra “also looks at the more conventional historical fare—land policy, imperial relations, local and colonial government, war, capitalism, and consumerism” (15). Actually, Hofstra’s “conventional historical fare” fuels most of his work’s raw explanatory horsepower. In any event, the resulting Valley of Virginia landscape included a more differentiated clustering of habitation than did the geography of Tidewater planters. By 1800, “town and country landscapes [prevailed] throughout the Shenandoah Valley and the broad swath of the North American interior for which the Valley served as fore country well into the nineteenth century” (13).

New Virginia emerged from Old Virginia’s misconceptions. By about 1730, colonial leaders convinced themselves that French legions and French-allied Indian hordes menaced Old Virginia from just beyond the Blue Ridge. This early and essential error forms a major chord in one of Hofstra’s recurring themes—that imperial misperceptions about colonial reality resulted in new imperial policy, which in turn led to new misperceptions. Most importantly, Virginia authorities came to believe that French forces were actively encircling Britain’s coastal North American colonies; that French troops would foster Indian militancy; that Indian militants would encourage Virginia’s fugitive slaves to form maroon communities in Appalachian strongholds; and that an alliance of Catholics, Indians, and former slaves would storm Old Virginia.

Old Virginians therefore recruited foreign Protestants to establish buffer settlements west of the Blue Ridge for protection of the colonial core: Enter the Germans, followed by the Scotch Irish, fresh from Pennsylvania farms or Philadelphia’s port of entry. Creating “a geography of private property” (107), the newcomers settled themselves energetically, albeit not always martially. Rather than gathering for security, the immigrants dispersed across the lower (northern) Shenandoah Valley in order
“to achieve economic competency within the limits and opportunities of an exchange economy” (16). Despite the newcomers’ disinclination to settle as village or town garrisons, Old Virginians in 1738 handed to imperfect strangers the reins of western-county governments. Hofstra’s carefully researched analytical narrative is the new benchmark account of that fateful step (160–169).

New Virginia’s initial inhabitants had other objectives, however; they diffused through the lower Valley without regard for Old Virginia’s imperial concerns. Hofstra argues from initial settlement patterns that settlers cared mostly about comfortable subsistence, secondarily about market development, and minimally about a centralized defense. Towns therefore emerged first as garrisons sponsored by Old Virginia (especially Winchester during the Seven Years’ War), then as government centers (Winchester again, plus Staunton, Lexington, Harrisonburg, and Martinsburg), and ultimately, during the relatively peaceful last decade before the American Revolution, as markets for a new staple crop, wheat. The tale of this transformation endures still, writ in Shenandoah Valley landscapes.

Landscape thus serves as evidence, subject, and safety valve, too; it enables Hofstra to sidestep essential questions about the lower Valley’s economic tectonics. He substitutes thick description of business for quantitative analysis of economy, and covers the legerdemain by poetically connecting double-entry bookkeeping to Newtonian physics: If Newtonian commerce (across space and time) did not rely on villages and towns—which were imperial, not economic, artifacts—then we need no numbers.

Therein lies a problem. Hofstra’s thorough narrative of Winchester’s imperial genesis during the Seven Years’ War persuasively depicts war’s transforming power. Why does he pay so little attention to the American Revolution? There are limits to landscape’s explanatory capacity: A war of empire both devastated and enhanced New Virginia, and in the process clearly shaped that region’s late-colonial landscape. But a subsequent war of revolution arguably had just as momentous an overall effect, even though its western consequences can be reconstructed most clearly via economic rather than artifactual evidence.

Like Morgan, Hofstra has crafted an exceedingly well-turned analytical narrative of Virginia origins. The Planting of New Virginia is a worthy sequel to American Slavery, American Freedom, and an essential text in its own right. Questions about New Virginia that only quantitative assessment can answer still remain, but the context for those questions is much clearer from Hofstra’s vista.

Turk McCleskey
Virginia Military Institute

Billingsley wants kinship to be treated as a category of analysis in historical studies in the same way that race, class, and gender are. Her goal is to expand the contextualization of events within history to include the contextualization of individuals within their families; applying anthropology’s symbolic definition of kinship to the world of southerners thereby demonstrates the pivotal role of family in southern life (153). Billingsley makes good use of her genealogical and historical records (censuses, maps, probate and land records, oral history, etc.) to trace one branch of the Keesee family from the early nineteenth century to the early postbellum period and from Alabama to Arkansas to Texas, and sometimes back again in ever-changing subsets of a fluid kin structure. Billingsley concludes that “the overwhelming majority [of southerners] migrated in family groups,” that kinship remained the organizing principle and provided social capital for southern migrants, and that genealogical methods are necessary to achieve these insights.

Billingsley has assumed a sizable task by attempting to combine a humanities discipline, a social-science discipline, and a nonacademic pursuit that she clearly feels to lack appreciation. Her use of genealogical methods is nearly flawless. However, she understates the use of genealogical methods by anthropologists and historians, for example in constructing kin networks and in reconstructing families. Kinship has always been at the heart of such studies, not as an end in itself, as it is in genealogy, but as a pivot to understanding relations of power. Moreover, longitudinal studies that have not been able to use family reconstruction methods—particularly the reconstruction of marriage and in-law ties—have also demonstrated that people migrate in family groups and that kinship provides structure and social capital.

Billingsley takes from anthropology the idea that relatedness is fluid, important, universal, and useful. Family membership does not necessarily rely on blood, and blood is not always thicker than fiction. The study of kinship in anthropology, however, entails a search for causal models and, as such, requires functional relationships. Kinship theory developed in the study of people for whom kinship was the basis of social organization, in contrast to those for whom law (or the social contract) formed that basis. The United States clearly falls into the latter category. Kinship is one attribute through which individuals interact with the social contract; so is gender, race, place of origin, and other characteristics loosely, and wrongly, called “categories of analysis.”

Billingsley uses kinship as a category of description but not of analysis. Relatedness describes what the Keesees do, not why they do it. Relatedness itself is assumed to be sufficient cause. How the kin role “son-in-law” results in a man moving himself and his family to an unknown place is not elucidated in Billingsley’s work. Lastly, what she describes is
a frontier, not a southern, phenomenon. The social processes discussed in *Communities of Kinship* also played out on the wheat frontier of the Great Plains, the industrial frontier of Massachusetts, and the frontiers that persons displaced by colonialism encountered—the subjects of much anthropological kinship theorizing.

No matter. *Communities of Kinship* does not particularly advance theory or interdisciplinarity. Billingsley’s work is an interesting case study reminding us that kinship is important as it contributes to the scholarly literature on family and frontier migration.

Susan Hautaniemi Leonard
University of Michigan

*Honoring the Civil War Dead: Commemoration and the Problem of Reconciliation*. By John Neff (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2005) 328 pp. $34.95

This informative monograph concentrates on one of the most important ways in which Americans remembered the Civil War, their disposition of the dead bodies that the war left in its wake. Neff’s approach to the topic provides a useful perspective on the sectional dynamics of Civil War commemoration and identifies valuable opportunities for examining other transformations wrought by the war.

Neff focuses on the Civil War dead as a political and administrative problem. His fine introductory survey of death and interment during the war observes that the war “challenged fundamentally the social rituals and mores associated with death” (11), but his elaboration of that argument centers on the extent to which individual deaths became a foundation for national identity. His chapter on the spectacular, often-studied example of the Lincoln obsequies is indicative of his emphasis. Ably analyzing a wide range of sources—including popular prints, the prose and poetry of Walt Whitman, and especially commemorative sermons—Neff highlights the collective effort to unite the North and seal its claim to define the United States. Though alert to the religious strategies of this initiative, he is not particularly interested in the meanings of the new nationhood, or other implications of Civil War death, for American religious life. Neither in this chapter nor in his later assertions that the deaths of Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis were pivotal to the rise of the Lost Cause does he seek to engage social-science scholarship on the structures of nineteenth-century nationalism. The same is true of his more original examinations of the federal military-cemetery system and its Confederate counterparts that occupy most of the rest of the book. Neff does not dwell on the military cemetery as a milestone in postwar state formation or the place of that institution in the trajectory of late nineteenth-century cemetery development. His concern is primarily with treatment of the dead as a venue of sectional relations.
Neff understandably frames his main conclusion around David W. Blight’s *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001), one of the most acclaimed recent works on American history. Contrary to Blight’s account of Union commemoration as a long, contested retreat from the egalitarian promise of the war, Neff acknowledges that federal military cemeteries were relatively progressive in their racial integration but declares that, on the whole, northern policies for the war dead “had no very advanced position from which to retreat” in the treatment of African Americans (214). He also reports that federal burial policies showed less willingness to honor the Confederacy than Blight found elsewhere in the postwar North, which white southerners answered with more resistance to reconciliation than historians have noted. Whatever the corrective value of these claims, they tend to limit the book to a narrower importance than it deserves. Blight powerfully suggests that America might recover the momentum for racial justice embedded in the immediate memory of the war, but Neff responds that the conflation of the Union and the nation inhibited the achievement of “nonsectional nationalism” (241). That theme will stir little excitement in the United States today.

When Neff escapes from the historiographical shadow of Blight and reflects on the pervasive, profound challenge of death in the Civil War—a challenge that extended across the sections as much as it divided them—he points toward a vital line for future exploration. Scholars who follow that line through literature, religion, political science, and other fields will benefit from his thoughtful and assiduous research.

Thomas J. Brown
University of South Carolina


The author contends that previous scholarship erroneously argued that the late nineteenth-century drive toward imperialism by the United States—as evidenced in Hawaii, the Philippines, etc.—was motivated by the desire to assume the “white man’s burden,” to uplift the supposed benighted indigenes. The author contends that racism certainly was implicated in this process but not in the way that scholars once maintained. For example, Hawaii was seized by the United States not because of an urge toward “benevolent assimilation” or the like but because of “white racial brotherhood” (xvii).

In referring to President Grant’s efforts to annex Santo Domingo, Love writes that this president, “like those before him and after, justified empire not for the benefit and uplift of people of color but rather for the advancement of the nation, specifically a white [emphasis—original] na-
tion in which African Americans were reduced to a source of ‘anxiety’, a word that directly reflects the period’s obsession with the so-called Negro problem” (71).

About a period marked by Jim Crow, lynching, Chinese exclusion, and immigration restriction, Love suggests that no pragmatic politician wanted to place “peoples of color” at the center of an already controversial project. Similarly, he asks readers to “set aside assumptions, implicit in much recent work, that any past exercise of American imperial power abroad was morally wrong” (11).

In that light, though “questioning the inhumanity of the Philippine-American war,” Love maintains that “regardless of what the United States did, the predatory maneuverings of rivals Germany and France, Britain, Japan and Russia would have collided with the desires of the Filipinos. Here was an impressible conflict. The only thing worse we can imagine than the calamity of the two-sided war that did occur would have been the three-, four-, five-, six-, or seven-sided conflict that annexation almost certainly prevented” (14). This notion is highly speculative. Such conjecture would have benefited from a closer engagement with the scholarship of generations of Filipino historians whose writings are not necessarily in accord with the author’s hypothesis.

Engagingly written and deftly argued, this book relies heavily on a rich corpus of materials that long has invigorated the field of diplomatic history. In addition to records of the U.S. Department of State, Love utilizes memoirs, manuscript collections of key figures—for example, the Henry Cabot Lodge Papers, the Grover Cleveland Papers, and the Carl Schurz Papers—and numerous books and articles that have addressed these pressing issues.

This book concerns a significant issue—the origins of modern U.S. foreign policy—and its focus on “racism” at a time when this powerful word has been supplanted by the misleading and unscientific term “race” is a healthy corrective. Indeed, it would have been useful if the author in his enlightening epilogue had sought to update his insights to shed light on the current dispensation, which involves a quagmire in Iraq no less distressful than the conflict in the Philippines that energized a generation of anti-imperialists more than a century ago. Nonetheless, this brief book is indispensable for those seeking to understand and influence the contours of U.S. foreign policy.

Gerald Horne
University of Houston
The Racketeer’s Progress uncovers a shadowy world of extralegal market governance and from its history constructs an alternative view of the early twentieth century. From the 1890s onward, Chicago workers and employers in the construction, material manufacturing, teaming, baking, barbering, and other labor-intensive industries with low barriers to entry, resisted both corporate control and excessive competition and established their own form of market control. Usually instigated by strong unions, what Cohen calls “craft governance” enabled trade agreements to flourish because they were entrenched in cartels designed to control competition and set prices, wages, and work rules.

Cohen’s narrative is unique because rather than embed this craft governance in the history of capital–labor conflict, the labor movement, or party politics, he portrays it as part of the history of a “radical middle class” defying modernity, an interpretation of the Progressive Era recently advanced by Johnston. Cohen shows that the set of practices engaged in primarily by labor unions to maintain craft governance—such as strikes, fines, and violence against non-employer association contractors, payoffs to avoid strikes, the slugging of non-union workmen, and alliances with local politicians—were condemned by public opinion. After the period from 1903 to 1905, these practices became the subject of a concerted attack by the courts and open-shop employers, but when the smoke had cleared, they had succeeded only in preventing craft governance from spreading outside its enclave. Progressive reformers argued that incorporating unions and legalizing collective bargaining would eliminate the corruption and violence involved in craft–labor relations, but they too were mistaken, as the results of the New Deal showed.

During the “New Era” 1920s, craft unions, according to Cohen, far from being quiescent, were active in resisting the inroads of mass consumption, as well as blacks and women, into their exclusive preserves. Desperately seeking to maintain the status quo, they increasingly resorted to violence, making them susceptible to gangster takeover. In the last of three great attempts to “clean up” the construction industry, leading employers united to force the open-shop on both contractors and unions, but public opinion supported collective bargaining, and the attempt failed.

In a new perspective on the New Deal, Cohen argues that the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) was based on, and legitimated, existing craft governance practices exemplified in Chicago industries. Moreover, court decisions ending the NIRA turned on issues emanating from these industries. The courts also ratified the New Deal’s redefini-
tion of racketeering to mean the penetration of legitimate associations and unions by gangsters, thus severing the old identity of racketeering with conspiracy and antitrust.

The strength of The Racketeers Progress is its extensive use of data from court records to establish the ubiquity and persistence of extralegal practices of market governance in the local economy of Chicago and, by implication, other large cities in this era. In doing so, it raises new questions and suggests fruitful avenues for further research. But labor historians will question Cohen’s deeply unflattering depiction of craft unions’ racketeering, in part because this assessment relies largely on court evidence. Moreover, Cohen’s claim that the struggle over the legitimacy of craft governance amounts to a viable new interpretation of the Progressive Era is controversial at best. The book presents a caricature of pre-1920s corporate leaders by asserting that they defended free competition and were “predatory,” and of the corporate liberal interpretation by claiming that it depicts a consensus achieved without conflict. Cohen also exaggerates the novelty of his arguments, slighting, for example, the many historians who have demonstrated that unions, politicians, and businessmen often cooperated in regulating competition among small-scale urban industries during this era. That said, this provocative book is an admirable contribution to the developing literature of this era’s labor, business, and legal history.

Richard Schneirov
Indiana State University

Recasting the Machine Age: Henry Ford’s Village Industries. By Howard P. Segal (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 2005) 244 pp. $34.95

With good reason, Henry Ford and the early Ford Motor Company are remembered as among the world’s leading practitioners of centralized industrial production. In the mid-1920s, Ford’s vertically integrated River Rouge plant employed 75,000 people and turned out 4,000 cars a day. But there was more to Ford than the Rouge. As this book demonstrates, Ford was a long-time advocate of industrial decentralization. Between 1920 and 1944, Ford opened nineteen so-called village industries, relatively small plants located within sixty miles of the company headquarters in Dearborn, Michigan. As Segal argues, the history of these village industries should be of interest to students of business history, labor history, and the history of technology. Although the available evidence turns out to be disappointingly thin, parts of this book are rewarding, thanks to the author’s creative, interdisciplinary approach to the subject.

Among the book’s strongest parts is a short chapter dedicated to labor history, in which Segal draws upon his own interviews with former employees of the village industries. Many of those interviewed fondly
recalled a “family” dynamic at the smaller factories, a far cry from the situation at the Rouge. Segal is careful, however, to point out that some workers actually sought to be transferred to larger Ford plants, which provided more opportunities for advancement in a less paternalistic atmosphere.

As business history, the book is intriguing but disappointing. Segal points out that the village industries have been overlooked by many standard studies of Ford, including the semi–official company histories by Nevins and Hill, and Brinkley.1 Certainly, the small plants were extraordinarily important for their surrounding communities, especially in the Depression years, and available evidence suggests that they were critical links in the Ford production chain: During the 1930s, the village industries provided the company with all, or most, of several essential auto parts, including starters and lamps. Yet, their broader significance remains unclear, in part because Segal was unable to locate a substantial set of relevant business records—a legacy of Ford’s notorious inattention to recordkeeping during those years. Hence, the book is unable to trace the small plants’ interactions with their larger sisters, or to locate them in the larger context of Ford’s supply network, which by the early 1930s involved 5,300 firms. In the end, there is little reason to question the views of many company executives, who regarded the small plants as the inefficient pets of Henry Ford. Soon after Ford’s death in 1947, most of the village industries were scrapped.

Like Ford’s leading biographers, including Lewis and Watts, Segal is intrigued by Ford’s apparently contradictory intellect, which seemed simultaneously to embrace modernity, nostalgia, openmindedness, and bigotry.2 This book suggests that the contradictions are often overblown. Segal shows that Ford’s advocacy of decentralization, like similar ideas expressed by many of his contemporaries, was less nostalgic than forward-looking. Although the village industries themselves may not have succeeded in creating the economically viable synthesis of farm and factory that Ford initially imagined, this book indicates that the well-known champion of centralized mass production foresaw, to his credit, a more flexible future.

Mark R. Wilson
University of North Carolina, Charlotte

Sky as Frontier: Adventure, Aviation, and Empire. By David T. Courtwright (College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 2005) 284 pp. $60.00

Courtwright surveys American aerospace developments and their global consequences throughout the last century. He argues that the “sky,” by which he means activities in the atmosphere and in outer space, has constituted a frontier similar to the one that Turner first described more than a century ago. Although Courtwright does not pursue his frontier thesis consistently or wholly persuasively, he has written an engaging and smart book that will appeal to many.

The frontier analogy works most effectively in “The Age of the Pioneers,” the first section of the book, where Courtwright treats the history of flight through Charles Lindbergh’s crossing of the Atlantic in 1927. Contemporaries hailed aviators as “pioneers,” referred to the “conquest” of the air, and talked of the aerial “frontier.” Courtwright deems such “frontier as metaphor” rhetoric largely “superficial” and “a cliché of progress” (7). Like Turner before him, he is more interested in the changing demographic, spatial, and temporal aspects of aerospace frontiers. Invoking the distinction that western historians have made between frontiers devoted to agricultural production, “Type I,” and frontiers engaged primarily in mining or extractive industries, “Type II,” Courtwright suggests that early aviation and spaceflight were, in effect, Type II frontiers. All of these frontiers shared populations that have been mostly young, male, unmarried, and nomadic; their inhabitants have all willingly assumed considerable risks and often met with violent deaths.

The second section of Courtwright’s book, “The Age of Mass Experience,” sparkles with insights. His major theme is how, starting slowly in the 1930s and becoming obvious by the 1960s, flying shed its risky, frontier qualities to become routine and almost universal. Passengers who fly in commercial planes no longer present a frontier demographic; they are young and old, black and white, rich and poor—in short, just like people in the country at large. Although Courtwright does not see the aerial frontier as “closed”—“frontier niches” survive even today—he deftly explicates the complex technological changes, business innovations, and regulatory shifts that, by vastly increasing the supply of inexpensive airline seats, conquered the sky (169). Nor does he ignore the increasing demand for air travel. The expansion of higher education in the 1960s, for instance, by adding courses in Western civilization and art to college curricula, developed student appetites for foreign travel. Courtwright rightly observes that “the art history survey was plainly Pan Am’s friend” (131).

The book’s third and final section, “The Significance of Air and Space in American History,” paraphrases the title of Turner’s famous 1893 essay. Courtwright notes that conquering the “sky” despoiled the

1 See Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in America History (New York, 1921).
earth, as now virtually no environment on the planet is beyond the reach of flying tourists. Moreover, given its air bases in forty-four countries and satellites in outer space to command and control its land, sea, and air forces, the United States has become a global “empire” of unprecedented power. One way this aerial empire has contributed to the American way of life, Courtwright observes, is that “the automobility Americans enjoyed in the late twentieth century depended on their airmobility” (208). This timely observation is but one of many provocative ideas that Courtwright presents in this worthwhile volume.

Joseph J. Corn
Stanford University


Landscapes of Conflict continues the narrative that Robbins began in Landscapes of Promise: The Oregon Story, 1800–1940 (Seattle, 1997), and the new book is a worthy successor to the first volume. The “Foreword” by William Cronon defines the two books as “environmental history,” but they are equally studies in economic history. Landscapes of Conflict is organized around the major industrial uses of Oregon’s natural resources: dam-building for hydroelectric power and navigation, agriculture, forestry, industrial and domestic uses of flowing water, and farmland preservation through land-use regulation. Each discussion begins with development enthusiasts who promoted more intensive resource exploitation before moving to the responses of public officials and examining the emergence of alternative “environmentalist” views. The two most prominent individuals are Richard Neuberger, a journalist and senator who consistently advocated public power and federal resource development, and Tom McCall, a two-term governor who pushed and presided over significant environmental legislation. Close behind is Douglas McKay, businessman, governor, and secretary of the interior for President Eisenhower.

One of Robbins’ overarching themes is the ideology of modernism and its weaknesses. The period from 1940 to 1970 in the Pacific Northwest was the climax of the modernist project of scientifically based landscape control, which tried to overcome limits to production through “the notion that scientific expertise and greater technical efficiency can resolve agricultural and environmental problems” (112). More recent decades have witnessed cumulative doubt about whether the modernist approach has delivered its full promise. The result has been increasing interest in “setting boundaries to human practices” (112), notably through the state’s land-use planning system adopted in the early 1970s.

The second theme, familiar from Robbins’ earlier Colony and Empire: The Capitalist Transformation of the American West (Lawrence, 1994),
is the influence of national and global markets, national corporate decisions, and flows of investment capital on the development of the Pacific Northwest. Oregon is no isolated Eden but rather an economic hinterland controlled by larger economic forces. As Oregonians relearn at every economic downturn, the state is often a tail wagged by the big dog of California.

This latter theme raises an important theoretical question: How useful and valid are state boundaries for delimiting the topics of economic-environmental history? Oregon, after all, shares all of its major physical provinces with adjacent states. As Robbins makes clear, however, states as sovereign entities have significant capacity to reshape and channel national influences through legislation, administrative agencies, and political culture. The state’s tourist promotion slogan of the 1990s—“Oregon: Things Look Different Here”—met considerable local derision, but it had an element of truth. Because of political leadership and policy innovation, Oregon does look different from, say, Idaho.

This book is not a testing ground for new methodologies. Rather, it makes telling use of standard documentary resources. Readers interested in Oregon as a physical place will find it interesting to read Landscapes of Conflict in conjunction with the sumptuously prepared maps in William G. Loy et al., Atlas of Oregon (Eugene, 2003). Those interested in pursuing the development of Oregon’s environmental reputation and practice can also consult Richard W. Judd and Christopher S. Beach, Natural States: The Environmental Imagination in Maine, Oregon, and the Nation (Washington, D.C., 2003). However, scholars, environmental activists, and Oregon’s citizens should all start with Robbins’ wide-ranging and insightful overview of “The Oregon Story.”

Carl Abbott
Portland State University

The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush. By Dale R. Herspring (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2005) 512 pp. $45.00

As Herspring notes in the introduction, this important work is one of the few serious studies of civil-military relations from the latter’s “vantage point of the ‘controlled’” (xii). The chief findings that this approach yields is that the military increasingly operates as a bureaucratic interest group and that presidents need to understand and work with the particular cultures of the service branches or, increasingly, with a more general military culture.

The introductory chapter provides a good overview of the argument as well as a useful literature review. The main body of the work is appropriately structured with individual chapters on each president from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to George W. Bush. Each chapter begins
with an analysis of presidential leadership style and then proceeds to a number of case studies on civilian-military relations in each administration. The writing is lively and informative, and the analysis is thorough, although Herspring relies chiefly on secondary sources. Although archival research might have provided a more nuanced analysis in some cases, the work is enriched by Herspring’s own extensive experience as a naval officer, member of the foreign service (including two stints in the Pentagon), as well as a professional political scientist.

Throughout the book, and particularly in the concluding chapter, Herspring’s approach allows him to focus on the degree of conflict generated by the president’s handling of the military, and it yields important empirical observations. But Herspring’s military vantage point, though valuable, is not without limits when moving from the empirical to the normative consideration of effective policy decisions, which this study invites. Paying attention to military culture “will minimize conflict and improve [a president’s] relationship with the Chiefs” (426). But should presidents, from their leadership perspective, embrace such deference? Is low conflict and deference a guarantor not just of good relations but of good policy? Herspring does not fully answer these questions although hints are provided in his case studies.

Herspring is most convincing about the difficulties encountered by “high conflict” presidents (Richard Nixon, Lyndon Baines Johnson, and Bill Clinton). But differentiating the effectiveness of “moderate conflict” presidents (Harry Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, and George W. Bush) from that of “minimal conflict” presidents (Roosevelt, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush) is harder to do. Kennedy erred in not understanding that military acquiescence to the CIA’s Bay of Pigs plans signaled reservations rather than support. But was Truman really ill-advised by pressing for unification, desegregating the army, or canceling the Navy’s super carrier while funding the Air Force’s B-36 bomber? Likewise, was the conflict generated by Eisenhower’s budgetary concerns and New Look strategy not worth the cost? Despite the Joint Chiefs’ opposition, Eisenhower held the line on military spending, achieved budget surpluses, and got “more bang for the buck” without having to use nuclear weapons or significantly expand conventional forces.

Presidents who pay due respect to military culture may avoid conflict and make the military happy, but that strategy is no guarantee—or, in some cases, not even a condition of—effective presidential national-security leadership, much less wise policy decisions and outcomes.

John P. Burke
University of Vermont
Social Security: History and Politics from the New Deal. By Daniel Béland (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2005) 255 pp. $29.95

In the debate over Social Security, ideology often postures as fact while partisan rhetoric displaces analysis. A subject so crucial to the future of the nation and every one of its citizens demands better treatment. Béland provides it in his remarkably clear, concise, and reliable history of Social Security.

Béland draws on both the remarkable recent scholarship on the history of the American welfare state and his own research in primary sources to write a history of Social Security from its origins through the privatization battles during the administration of President George W. Bush. He also attempts to refine theoretical discussions of public-policy formation. His particular contribution is to add an emphasis on the role of ideas to new institutionalist theory; concentration on political and state structures and officials has tended to minimize their importance.

Throughout the book, Béland draws instructive parallels between policy history in the United States and other nations, some of which will be familiar to U.S. readers—for instance, the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century adoption of social insurance in Germany and Britain. Others will be less well known, but no less pertinent—like the implications of more centralized policymaking in Canada or the greater role of private business in European policy formation. Overall, this book conveys a sharpened sense of what is distinctive about the U.S. experience, especially American-style federalism, which, Béland shows, has powerfully influenced the history of Social Security and other branches of the welfare state.

Béland’s most controversial claim is that race had little impact on the origins and early history of Social Security. He argues that the reasons for the exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers from the 1935 Economic Security Act, which created Social Security, reflected fiscal and administrative concerns rather than the influence of racist Southern members of Congress. Every other old-age social-insurance system, except for Sweden’s, also has excluded them, he points out. Gender, however, exerted a powerful influence on legislation through conventional ideas about women’s roles in the family and economy. In When Affirmative Action Was White (New York, 2005), Ira Katznelson, using the same body of recent scholarship as Béland, comes to exactly the opposite conclusion—namely, that for reasons having to do with race, Southern members of Congress demanded and won the exclusion of agricultural and domestic workers from Social Security’s founding legislation. Both of these scholars are at least partly right because their explanations are not mutually exclusive. Administrative-fiscal and racial motivations were likely both at work, although this debate will surely continue.

Béland describes and evaluates the arguments of both Social Security privatizers (a not wholly accurate term, he shows) and their oppo-
nents. Nonetheless, some surprising omissions remain. He does not discuss the evidence pointing to the severe problems with Social Security privatization in Chile or consider the argument that, in the United States, a continued modest rise in productivity could wipe out the program’s alleged demographically induced fiscal crisis. Nor, despite his emphasis on the role of private-sector benefits, does he deal with the politics and implications of IRAs and 401(k) or (b) plans. It is, moreover, disappointing that Béland is so relentlessly even-handed after so lucid and fair an analysis. He resolutely refuses to take sides. But the abrupt and slightly evasive conclusion to his book is more a frustration with, than a criticism of, a work that offers much of value.

Michael B. Katz
University of Pennsylvania

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Devlin argues that in the postwar United States, a sexually charged father–daughter relationship was hardly a matter for concern. A father could express his love for his daughter by paying the bills and giving approval to her purchases. He could show admiration for her sexual maturation through admiring looks, even wolf whistles, and providing his arm as he walked the bride down the aisle. Fathers were encouraged to take on largely symbolic but not time-consuming acts to help control a daughter’s sexual maturation. Fathers were assumed to be breadwinners without much time for the daily routines of home management. Situated in the context of a postwar eroticized relationship, Vladimir Nabokov’s Lolita (1955) stands not as a sophisticated European comic novel but as a slightly exaggerated, but unfailingly accurate, portrayal of the relationship between step-fathers and step-daughters in American fiction of the 1950s.

In this highly imaginative reading of a wholly neglected feature of family life, Devlin provides a fresh vantage point for understanding teen culture, the sexualized nature of the 1950s’ family, and the limited, and even troubling, style of fathers’ involvement in that decade. She does not seek to refute the idea of the emergence of a separate peer culture but instead shows that teen daughters were dependent on paternal approval and highly curious about their fathers’ extramarital romantic inclinations.

Devlin attributes the interest in and writing about the father–daughter relationship to psychoanalytic practice during World War II. Followers of Sigmund Freud prior to the war had been largely interested in the Oedipus complex with regard to young children, a stage of development completed by boys and girls by the age of five. Analysts during
World War II formulated new ideas about a second stage of Oedipal conflict in adolescence based on clinical experience with truant adolescent girls. Because these girls, the analysts argued, had failed to develop a proper Oedipal relationship with their fathers, they were prone to antisocial behavior. Helene Deutsch, *Psychology of Women* (New York, 1944) suggested that the second stage of the Oedipal complex in adolescence was experienced much more strongly among girls than boys.

Although Devlin sees wartime sexual revolution and postwar affluence as important causes for greater interest in the father–daughter relationship, she is largely interested in representation and in its “cultural meaning.” With insight and imagination, she investigates elite and mass-cultural materials from psychoanalytic treatises to hit Broadway plays, films, and articles in *Seventeen* magazine. Black magazines, she argues, did not play up the eroticized father–daughter relationship because they were intent on demonstrating black sexual respectability and refuting racial stereotypes of African Americans as hypersexual. Devlin chooses a cultural approach to this topic because she finds that playwrights and novelists had more to say about eroticized father–daughter relations than social investigators or the psychoanalytic studies of father–daughter incest. Given her interest in cultural materials, however, the absence of a discussion of rock and roll is surprising. This new kind of popular music provoked paternal ire for its effect on adolescent girls and was part of the separate teen culture, not something shared by fathers and daughters.

Devlin shows that the eroticized father–daughter relationship was not as harmless and innocent as portrayed in such plays as Jerome Chodorov and Joseph Fields’ “Junior Miss” (1957). Nonetheless, psychoanalysts not only approved of “normal” eroticized behavior between fathers and daughters but regarded actual cases of father–daughter incest as relatively benign, placing the blame for it on mother–daughter conflict.

Elizabeth H. Pleck
University of Illinois, Urbana/Champaign

*Structuring the Information Age: Life Insurance and Technology in the Twentieth Century.* By JoAnne Yates (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005) 351 pp. $49.95

Historians have long focused more on how goods and services are made and marketed than on how they are used once they enter the marketplace. Scholars of “consumer culture” focus on end users, but they tend to define them as men or women on the street, who individually wield relatively little influence whenever they venture into a restaurant or department store. *Structuring the Information Age* examines the history of information technology in the United States by shifting focus away from the producers of that technology and toward a kind of end user that has
heretofore received little attention—large-scale corporations, which easily rank among the leading information-technology (IT) consumers. All but a tiny fraction of IT use prior to 1980 was by business and government clients; even today, a quarter of a century into the personal-computing revolution, those sectors account for more than 80 percent of all IT sales.

Although Yates focuses only on a single type of business client, the life-insurance industry, this sector supplies her with several interesting contrasts. Some insurers mass-marketed small policies to working-class customers; others comparable in size processed fewer policies; and still others were much smaller regional firms. Since scale and scope have everything to do with a company's data-processing needs, these two variables were key to determining what motivated insurers to purchase IT and when to switch from one type to another. What united these companies was that IT costs comprised a uniquely large slice of their budgets—20 percent, second only to the securities industry—and that they were usually conservative in their adoption of new systems. This later trait (corresponding as it did to considerable brand loyalty) was IBM's salvation, since it enabled that notoriously conservative organization to survive the rocky transition from card tabulators to electronic computers.

The one variable that Yates denies much weight in her account is managerial strategy. She refuses to apply the orthodox manager-centered approach, pioneered by Chandler, to explain how corporate clients implemented the machines that they bought. Instead, she cleverly shows that widely divergent strategies typically had minimal effects on outcomes. The best example of this situation is her contrast between how the Equitable and the Prudential used the IBM 705 model (which worked with either punched cards or magnetic tape) in moving from tabulators to computers during the 1960s. Equitable executives treated the 705 as a powerful tabulator, only gradually feeding the more efficient tape into the new machine. Prudential executives tried to move to tape immediately but vastly underestimated the time needed to write programming for the new applications and to convert their far-flung branch offices to the new regime. The result was that both firms took roughly the same amount of time to computerize, at roughly the same cost.

Despite its many virtues, this book serves historians of technology and organizational theorists far better than it does historians of insurance. Most of the important company and trade association history that does not directly relate to IT is drawn from secondary sources. Also, the primary payoffs that Yates describes relate to operational features like payroll and customer service, which are common to nearly all large-scale IT users. Lurking in the background is an interesting twist, which Yates introduces but spends little time unraveling: The industry’s actuarial side,

which might be assumed to be most in need of “mechanical brains,” did not come close to generating the volume of data-processing work that would have justified buying expensive tabulators and computers. Although actuaries led the way in pushing the companies to renovate their IT capacity, the machines were nearly always used to keep track of workers or customers in a more efficient manner. It would be interesting to discover whether Yates’ story is also the story of IT use by utilities, universities, and other organizations with comparable paperwork demands, or whether IT’s impact on the corner of the market detailed in this book was unique.

Timothy Alborn
City University of New York

_America in the Seventies_. Edited by Beth Bailey and David Farber (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2004) 246 pp. $35.00 cloth $16.95 paper

The cover of this collection of nine essays includes images of Archie and Edith Bunker from _All in the Family_, John Travolta strutting on the disco floor in _Saturday Night Fever_, and Farah Fawcett Majors of _Charlie’s Angels_ riding on a skateboard. Each of the contributing authors draws heavily on popular culture to illustrate political and economic transformations during an era that the editors label “our strangest decade”—still eclipsed by the drama and mythology of the 1960s, lacking “impassioned champions even among those who quite enjoyed coming of age” in 1970s America (1). Bailey and Farber’s addition to the burgeoning subfield of the 1970s is representative of the extent to which the disciplines of History and American studies have become thoroughly intertwined, their boundaries almost completely blurred in much of the recent scholarship on the modern United States. In addition to making the now–expected connections between political/social history and cultural studies, the contributors also anchor the political crises and the cultural anxieties of the 1970s in the context of economic decline and capitalist restructuring, the volume’s most significant contribution.

This “Age of Limits”—marked by military defeat in Vietnam, three consecutive failed presidencies, zero-sum clashes over race and gender politics, energy shortages, and economic malaise—saw the collapse of the middle-class social contract and jeopardized the broader ideology of American Exceptionalism (30). A quarter-century after Jimmy Carter’s disastrous experiment in truth telling, the authors likewise diagnose an existential crisis of American identity, stretching from the national to the personal, as the defining feature of 1970s political culture. The decade theory of history is an artificial methodological trope, as much a convenient hook as a compelling framework, but the consistently high quality of the essays makes this collection an enjoyable read and a valuable re-
source. The first half of the book is more synthetic than innovative, including chapters on political trends, racial conflict, and changing gender roles. A high point is Jefferson Cowie’s incisive essay on working-class identity politics, which accords equal weight to white backlash and workplace radicalism during an era of economic scarcity that exposed the “failures of the liberal consensus” (77).

The four chapters that conclude the book are the most provocative and original. Peter Braunstein offers a superb essay on the sexual remapping of public spaces in New York City, including the technological growth of the pornography industry and the linked emergence of the gay-rights movement and the disco subculture. William Graebner portrays the existential crisis of the 1970s as the consequence of the “decline of heroism and the heroic,” a role abandoned by political leaders and filled with mixed success by pop culture “survivors” such as John Travolta and Bruce Springsteen (158). Michael Nevin Willard’s analysis of the “do-it-yourself” ethos of skateboarding and punk rock captures the creativity of youth subcultures that established new grassroots antiheroes in California’s postindustrial suburban wastelands. Timothy Moy’s account of the young architects of the computer revolution, launching corporations such as Apple and Microsoft from their suburban basements and garages, details the breakthroughs that turned even techno-geeks such as Bill Gates into cultural icons.

The parallel rise of President Reagan, another product of the postindustrial Sunbelt, provides the narrative closure for a majority of these essays about the Age of Limits. Reagan resurrected the heroic and repudiated the existential crisis, embodying the ultimate synthesis of politics and culture.

Matthew D. Lassiter
University of Michigan


Peters, author of the excellent Judging Jehovah’s Witnesses (Lawrence, 2000) has written a short and readable study of the landmark case Wisconsin v. Yoder, which was decided by the Supreme Court in 1972. The case pitted Old Order Amish farmers Jonas Yoder, Wallace Miller, and Adin Yutzy against Wisconsin’s requirement that all children attend school until age sixteen. The farmers wanted their children to leave school at fourteen, claiming that formal education beyond that age would undermine the children’s upbringing in their faith and ultimately endanger the Amish tradition. The Court ruled in their favor, emphasizing that Amish children were trained by their community to be productive and hardworking members of society. The self-sufficiency and simple way of life
integral to Amish faith, stressed Chief Justice Warren Burger’s opinion for the Court, would be compromised by exposure of Amish children to high school.

The *Yoder* case expanded the protection available to plaintiffs in religious freedom cases, at least in theory. In practice, the case did not prove a particularly fertile source of new doctrine, or provide a safe haven for embattled religious minorities. Indeed, the sweep of *Yoder* was sharply limited by a 1990 case that relegated it to a holding based on parents’ rights as much as religion, a “hybrid” rather than a tower of religious freedom.

If this much is well known, why bother studying a case that is something of a vestige? Part of the answer is provided by Peters’ detective work and capacity to describe often isolated and embattled religious groups with sympathy as well as insight. He traces the migration of Amish farmers into Wisconsin as well as their long-standing conflict with officials in Iowa and other states over their children’s education. As Peters carefully constructs the Amish community and its dealings with a ham-fisted state bureaucracy, he also reveals his own conviction that the Amish tradition was substantially threatened by states that insisted that children be trained in modern ways.

He also documents the involvement of other groups with the Amish, especially lawyers keen to promote governmental funding for parochial schools. In the 1960s, a series of cases holding that the establishment clause prohibited funding programs—including provision of teachers’ salaries, certain supplies, tutoring, and others—meant that Catholic schools were hard-pressed. William Ball, who for years had argued that parochial as well as public schools should be funded by the state, believed that the Amish situation provided a new window for argument about the religious rights of parents. He and other sympathizers formed the National Committee for Amish Religious Freedom, which litigated the *Yoder* case and created a substantial record of expert testimony supporting the Amish claims.

As Peters tells the story, the victory came at a price. First, Ball and his colleagues had an agenda at odds with their clients’: The very decision to “go to law” compromised Amish principles of separation from the world and non-resistance (61). Second, the community itself suffered: By the late 1970s, nearly two-thirds of the Amish had left the town where the suit began. Although most of them explained that they were leaving to find “better, flatter land,” some Amish maintained that a split between more conservative and progressive members was the source of discord (169). One reporter speculated that the case itself, which was “designed to preserve a community[,] had actually torn it apart” (171).

None of these conclusions are surprising to those familiar with the social costs of litigation, especially at the Supreme Court. Moreover, Peters’ analysis would have benefited from a more sophisticated approach to the complex relationship between Amish communities and the gov-
ernments that enable such separatism, as well as to the substantial interest of the state in educating all of its children. Yet his ability to tell the story in simple and sympathetic terms is an achievement in itself, making this book a valuable addition to the literature.

Sarah Barringer Gordon
University of Pennsylvania


Thanks to the publication of this path-breaking, interdisciplinary collection, scholarly research into various aspects of Ronald Reagan’s presidency has come of age. Historians, political scientists, and economists, employing fresh materials from the Reagan Library, examine Reagan’s conservative rhetoric, analyze the policies that he pursued as president, and explore the meaning and significance of his legacy. More specifically, they focus on taxes, foreign policy, the environment, and welfare policy, along with other topics.

From a variety of perspectives, contributors to this rich and balanced collection agree that Reagan’s election in 1980 raised conservative expectations, but several essayists suggest that Reagan was not the hardline, unyielding politician that his rhetoric often suggested. Gareth B. Davies writes that Reagan “had the fixity of belief of the true believer but not the attitude toward political compromise that typically accompanies such intensity” (225). Reagan might have pushed the public agenda to the right, but he was prepared, in some cases, to settle for less than maximum success in order to obtain results that he could justify as progress. As a pragmatic conservative, he recognized that politics generally remained the art of the possible, especially since the Democrats controlled the House of Representatives throughout his years in office, and the Senate after 1986.

Reagan was largely uninterested in some aspects of the conservative social agenda of his day, including calls for civil-rights reform and demands for significant changes to the immigration laws. He was most intent on achieving massive tax cuts and changes in tax rates. Contrary to his earlier rhetoric, he earnestly sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union after 1984, which quickly angered some conservatives. Thus arises the question, Was there a Reagan revolution, given the partial nature of Reagan’s accomplishments and successes? Ted V. McAllister speaks for many when he notes that Reagan created a paradigm shift in how public-policy matters were framed, which surely affected Bill

Clinton’s candidacy for president in 1992. David M. O’Brien states that Reagan’s court appointments moved the federal judiciary “in a decidedly conservative direction” (350). Other contributors point to a less positive answer, none more directly than James Patterson. Patterson finds the argument on behalf of a Reagan Revolution excessive. He notes, for example, that welfare spending was higher in 1989 than in 1981 and that the number of federal employees increased more rapidly under Reagan than Jimmy Carter. Social Security and Medicare remained intact, and federal-government spending “as a percentage of the gross domestic product was slightly higher under Reagan than it was to become under Bill Clinton” (368). Also, deficits swelled and economic growth was no better than in Carter’s worse years. However, Patterson also observes that Reagan’s legacies on the issues that meant the most to him, such as tax rates and Soviet–American relations, “have been durable as well as significant” (371). All in all, concludes Patterson, Reagan’s shadow remains “large” (371).

William C. Berman
University of Toronto

Polling to Govern: Public Opinion and Presidential Leadership. By Diane J. Heith (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004) 194 pp. $50.00 cloth
$19.95 paper

Pollsters are the Rodney Dangerfields of the American political process; they get no respect. Americans demand perfection. Even minor errors loom large while successes are taken for granted. Americans seem annoyed when polls fail to predict the future. Moreover, despite polls’ centrality to modern campaigning and governing, the stench of illegitimacy wafts around them, as if the act of divining public opinion in a democracy compromises a leader’s integrity.

Heith deftly deploys various methods to assess how modern presidents use polling. Employing superb historical instincts and considerable research skills, she has produced a nuanced evaluation of “the permanent campaign,” the seemingly constant presidential search for high approval ratings. Heith has mined the impressive resources available in various presidential libraries to see not only what polls revealed but how presidential aides applied that information. Transcending the often excessively compartmentalized disciplines, Heith has achieved an interdisciplinary coup, applying the theories and research methods of the political scientist to the historian’s treasure trove of memoranda and letters available in the Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George Herbert Walker Bush collections.

Heith challenges the conventional wisdom that the modern White House’s persistent polling reflects a compulsive search for approval. “In an age of continuous poll taking and mediocre leadership. . . ,” she
writes archly, “it seems rather ridiculous that political parties would spend millions of dollars annually on behalf of their president merely to provide a monitoring mechanism” (xiii). Heith suggests two correctives. First, she offers some balance. Yes, “campaign tools exist in the White House,” she argues, but “the permanent campaign does not dominate decision making” (134). It is one of many arrows in the modern presidential quiver. Furthermore, polling is more than a presidential ego trip. Especially as the term progresses, presidents and their aides use polling for “agenda building and mapping through the legislative battles with Congress” (135).

Heith ranges widely, from Watergate to Monica-gate, from George Herbert Walker Bush’s benign push to plant trees as the “environmental president” to George Bush’s tougher War on Terror. Heith resists the temptation to exaggerate the centrality of her research subject or indulge in the breast beating about the republic’s fate that her subject often invites. Her conclusion, which continues to demonstrate the narrative starchiness of a political scientist, emphasizes that “the poll apparatus does provide some semblance of the public’s voice for an institution distanced from its audience. The combination of the polling apparatus and election imperatives moderates fears of direction and followership and produces a modicum of responsiveness for the public” (145).

The pressing question that Heith implicitly raises—but refuses to tackle—remains, Why the ambivalence? It is striking that in a nation so committed to consent of the governed, the modern mechanism for assessing the people’s will seems so threatening. Clearly, the Founders’ paradoxical message—to value the people but fear the mob—continues to resonate widely in America, two centuries after the drafting of the constitution.

Gil Troy
McGill University


In _Wealth of Nations_ (London, 1776), Adam Smith argued for the relative efficiency of wage labor before tucking away into a single sentence shortly thereafter the jarring acknowledgment that Britain’s slave-based sugar plantations in the West Indies were generating higher profits than any other type of agriculture in the transatlantic world. Addictive sweetness derived from the juice of a pithy, perennial grass indigenous to tropical Asia had, in Smith’s time, become a burgeoning want, satisfied by enslaved African labor on American plantations. Although the story of sugar cane’s migration from the eastern Mediterranean to the Americas has received scholarly attention, this anthology explores the role of sugar
in various sectors of the Atlantic economy during a grayish, preparatory period (1450–1680), when the transformative power of sugar was not as clear-cut.

Six of the eight essays in this volume focus on sugar production in specific regions and contain valuable quantitative data. Schwartz, who conceived the project and contributed an able introduction to the book as well as one of its better essays, encouraged most of the authors to respond to a set of questions on the financing, ownership, organization, and management of the sugar business; on the profitability and productivity of sugar plantations; and on the forms of labor that were used to grow and process cane.

William Phillips discusses the Islamic origin of Iberian sugar-cane cultivation and its subsequent embrace, typically on a small scale using peasant laborers, by Christian landlords during the late Middle Ages. Albert Vieira, while underscoring the centrality of Madeira and the Canaries to the transferral of sugar culture to the Americas, explores the conspicuous separation of cane growers from mill owners in Madeira and the minority presence of enslaved Africans in the mixed labor forces of both places.

Historians have neglected Hispaniola’s brief sugar boom during the first half of the sixteenth century. Planters there, as Genaro Rodríguez Morel points out, benefited from royal largesse in their construction of dozens of sizable estates, which, unlike those on the Atlantic Islands, frequently employed hundreds of slaves. Sugar had a notable presence in Cuba long before its nineteenth-century sugar boom. Alejandro de la Fuente’s fresh research documents the rise and fall of sugar production on the island during the seventeenth–eighteenth century.

Brazil led the world in sugar production from 1550 to 1670. In examining multiple aspects of that history, Schwartz stresses a gradual shift in the cane fields to enslaved African labor and the central role—influenced, it seems, by the Madeiran model—of lavradores de cana (cane farmers) in supplying cut cane to a much smaller number of mill owners. Only after 1600, says Herbert Klein, in a synthesis of previously published material, did the fortunes of the early Atlantic slave trade become closely bound to the production of sugar.

Eddy Stols explores Antwerp’s involvement in the sugar industry and the cultural and symbolic significance of sugar consumption in Western Europe from 1500 to 1650. He insists that the sugar trade and sugar refining had a far greater impact on stimulating the Western European economy during this period than historians have previously believed.

John McCusker and Russell Menard close the volume by reexamining the dynamic process that brought a fully integrated sugar plantation system to Barbados in the 1680s. They credit English merchants and planters, not visiting Dutch traders, with the decisive entrepreneurship that turned Barbados, for a time, into the world’s leading producer of sugar. Moreover, the crop’s large-scale cultivation did not suddenly re-
verse economic decline in the island but rather “sped up and intensified a process of experimentation and diversification already underway” with other crops (306).

This volume will not persuade many historians to abandon the term “sugar revolution” in their explanations about the making of the modern world. The authors succeed, however, in raising questions about the term’s precise meaning and its usefulness as an analytic concept accounting for change in certain European colonies where sugar was grown.

Robert L. Paquette
Hamilton College


In his latest book, Nutini turns his attention to the history and expressive culture of Mexico City’s most elite inhabitants. The author’s larger project is ambitiously interdisciplinary. The Mexican Aristocracy is, in fact, a sequel to Nutini’s The Wages of Conquest (Ann Arbor, 1995), a book charting the expressive history of Mexico’s ultra-elite from the 1600s to the 1900s. Together these volumes promise an anthropologically grounded, diachronic examination of aristocratic culture. The book under review, however, proves a disappointment, falling into a common interdisciplinary trap—the unwillingness to fully engage fields outside the author’s discipline. In this case, Nutini fails to ground his ethnographic analysis in a thorough assessment of Mexican historiography. Hence, his larger claims concerning the Mexican aristocracy’s historical evolution and bleak future rest on shaky foundations.

Nutini’s description of aristocratic culture during the work’s “ethnographic present” (1990–2000) represents the best portion of The Mexican Aristocracy. Rooted in extended discussions with a dozen informants and 157 additional interviews, the author provides an incisive discussion of how aristocrats interact; manipulate notions of race, status, and beauty; practice religion, and engage the larger social world. His analysis of shrine-like patrician homes as heirloom installations palliating aristocratic status insecurities is particularly interesting. In these passages, Nutini also forwards his central claim that the Mexican aristocracy has entered a terminal phase of its existence as an identifiable cultural group. The author suggests that present-day aristocrats, overtaken economically by a new culturally independent plutocracy and a general democratization of Mexican society, face a stark choice: Either they must embrace “embourgeoisement” and assimilation within the parvenu elite, or confront cultural disintegration and downward social mobility. According to Nutini, in either case, their unique expressive culture and social organization verges on extinction.

Whereas Nutini engagingly describes aristocratic behaviors stem-
ming from unease vis-à-vis Mexico’s *nouveau riche* and striving upper-middle class, his informants’ idealized interpretation of Mexican society in the past skews his analysis. This misapprehension is most evident in the author’s conception of the hacienda as the quasifeudal foundation of aristocratic preeminence, and his overestimation of the aristocracy’s past cultural dominance and the social distance between plutocrats and aristocrats throughout Mexico’s history. Neither *The Mexican Aristocracy* nor its predecessor satisfactorily engages the last twenty-five years of historical scholarship. Nutini’s assertion that post-Revolutionary land reform initiated the aristocracy’s denouement simply contradicts a raft of studies on haciendas, mining, commerce, and elites during the colonial and national periods.

Nutini highlights three periods of aristocratic “renewal” (the 1630s, the late eighteenth century, and late nineteenth century), but argues that social climbers from these periods entering the aristocracy experienced thorough patrician acculturation. Status, wealth, and hacienda ownership, however, has never been as stable as he suggests. Successful elite lineages have always depended on periodic infusions of fresh blood and new wealth from the upwardly mobile. Nutini himself notes considerable late twentieth-century intermarriage between old and new elites, but identifies it as a symptom of collapse rather than renovation. If we could return to these renewal phases and conduct ethnographic research, we would probably find déclassé aristocrats criticizing arriviste cultural pollution, lamenting lineage degradation, engaging in behaviors inspired by their fading status, and bemoaning the collapse of the “true” aristocracy. In short, what Nutini may be documenting is yet another period of elite social transition with its concomitant expressive representations.

Edward Wright-Ríos
Vanderbilt University

*Juan Soldado: Rapist, Murderer, Martyr, Saint.* By Paul J. Vanderwood (Durham, Duke University Press, 2004) 352 pp. $79.95 cloth $22.95 paper

*Juan Soldado* narrates the unlikely saga of a Mexican army soldier who was executed in 1938 for raping and murdering an eight-year-old girl in Tijuana but who has been venerated as a saint ever since. The story is as fascinating as it is gripping, and Vanderwood recounts it with great historical rigor and literary skill. The book’s first section describes the girl’s death and the arrest of twenty-four-year-old soldier Juan Castillo Morales for the crime. The townspeople of Tijuana worried that the army would cover up the incident and rioted overnight, destroying public buildings and forcing federal authorities to perform a bizarre military execution in the local cemetery. The second section surveys the history
of Tijuana and explains the sort of social tensions that gripped the town by 1938. The third and final section provides an ethnographic discussion of how the historical Juan Castillo Morales became the popular (that is, not canonized) saint, Juan Soldado (Juan the Soldier), as well as a brief overview of other borderlands saints.

Juan Soldado continues Vanderwood’s journey into narrative history. It has no theoretical apparatus or pretense of analyzing the historiography on riot, popular religion, or postrevolutionary Mexico. Instead, Vanderwood brings the skills of a professional historian to the telling of a remarkable drama in three acts. The result is both liberating and frustrating. It is liberating, because the rich texture of historical detail, combined with Vanderwood’s skill as a writer and his willingness to speculate modestly about his subjects’ motivations and mental states, offers a vision of borderlands life and religion that is both finegrained and compelling. How many historical monographs can keep historians (and their students) turning pages deep into the night?

In some places, though, the book’s freeform style of using historical association in lieu of academic exposition is frustrating. Vanderwood does an exemplary job of providing the historical background of Tijuana that helps to contextualize the riots and, to some extent, the willingness of townspeople to consider Castillo Morales a saint. In some places, however, the book draws comparisons between the expression of religious faith in Tijuana and other parts of the world that bear little resemblance to each other. In the space of three pages, for example, the book contemplates the nature of religious suffering by discussing Corpus Cristi celebrations in present-day Guatemala, the popular use of the term Calvario (calvary) in Oaxaca, and Franciscan monks’ self-flagellation in colonial Mexico (186–188). A dozen pages later, Vanderwood introduces the idea of popular sainthood via Andrić’s fictional account of the torture and death of a heroic and soon-to-be-venerated Slav in sixteenth-century Bosnia (200–204).1 The relationship between these cases and the Mexican border in the first half of the twentieth century is tenuous at best. These leaps contrast with the historical specificity and well-honed sense of place that characterizes most of the book, seemingly implying that popular religiosity does not vary in any meaningful way over time or across space.

Such universality does not seem to be Vanderwood’s message, though readers might have various ideas of what exactly his message is. Those interested in historiography may interpret the book as an ideal example of the (resurgent?) power of narrative history. Students of Mexican and religious history will learn of the interrelationship among Tijuana’s urban history, the borderlands, and popular religion. The faithful may understand it as an exploration of redemption and the

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power of faith. What is particularly remarkable about the book is that it can convey all of these ideas in a respectful and, in some cases, tender way, without diminishing the others.

Christopher R. Boyer
University of Illinois, Chicago


Stern’s book on contentious memory in Chile could hardly be more timely. In late 2004, the Chilean government released a detailed report on torture committed by the military government (1973–1990) of General Augusto Pinochet, which reignited a long simmering public debate about how to interpret and judge the past.

Stern combines oral history with political history to weave together his theoretical analysis, and he is careful to examine a wide range of viewpoints, using the image of a “giant, collectively built memory box” for the country (xxvii). Within this memory box are different views of the past, or “emblematic memories.” Stern identifies four main memory frameworks: memory as salvation (those who view the military as saving the country), memory as unresolved rupture (those who experienced state violence and remain haunted), memory as persecution and awakening (similar to rupture, but involving greater self-discovery as a result), and memory as a closed box (those who believe the past should no longer be brought up and that human–rights abuses are exaggerated).

One of many valuable insights is the analysis of civilian supporters of the military government. The victims of human–rights abuses and the military protagonists who committed them have received considerable scholarly attention, but the fascinating complexity of “memory as salvation” is less often explored. For example, one interviewee, who argued that the coup saved the country from the Socialists, neatly sidestepped the human–rights issue by affirming that more people would have been killed had the military not intervened: “How many deaths there would have been, what would have happened to the country if these people [emphasis added] end up continuing in power?” (29). Although, as Stern himself admits, memory as salvation can be offensive when it masks persecution, it still remains an important part of memory lore.

A drawback to an otherwise excellent book is the decision to introduce the human stories before the theory, which is woven into later chapters. At the very least, it would have been useful to explain more clearly the different types of memory in the introduction. Instead, it can be difficult when reading the initial stories to see clearly how they form part of the theoretical whole. The introduction of memory “knots,” or contentious issues that society is forced to address, is not made explicit.
until Chapter 4, even though they represent a critical aspect of collective Chilean memory and, as such, are another contribution of the book.

Stern also argues that six criteria influence the ability of those who share a particular part of the memory box to convince others of its validity: historicity, authenticity, capaciousness and flexibility, projection into public or semipublic places, embodiment in a convincing social referent, and effective carriers or spokespersons. These criteria are discussed in only a few pages toward the end of the book, even though they constitute one of the most important parts of the overall analysis. Public debate over memory in Chile is so prevalent that the question of how (or whether) advocates of one emblematic memory advance their own version of history deserves greater attention. To be fair, this book is only the first in a trilogy. The other two books, which will address the dictatorship and post-dictatorship eras, should flesh out the many ideas presented in the first installment.

Gregory Weeks  
University of North Carolina, Charlotte

The Lost Land of Lemuria: Fabulous Geographies, Catastrophic Histories. By Sumathi Ramaswamy (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004) 334 pp. $60.00 cloth $21.95 paper

It was achingly ironic to read this book as news of December 2004’s tsunami captured print and electronic headlines across the globe. Just such a deluge is claimed by some to have submerged the fabled “lost continent” of Lemuria in aeons past. The history of such imaginings during the last century and a half in Europe, North America, and southern India is what Ramaswamy tracks in The Lost Land of Lemuria. The book supplements existing historiography of the natural sciences with its attention to how and why paleoscientists invented Lemuria and presents new materials about its afterlife as a cultural symbol among occultists and south Indian nationalists, among both of whom Lemuria continues to anchor discourses of memory, identity, and futurity.

The author’s agenda is ambitious; she examines how loss—of places and ways of life—is marshaled by and for modernity in the canons of historiography and in the subjugated knowledges that constitute what she glosses as “eccentric” and “off-modern” ways of constructing and grappling with the past. She suggests that the desires for such lost worlds, of which Lemuria is but one example, appear to fly in the face of modernity but are, in actuality, its progeny: Disenchantment, the price of technocratic mastery, triggers desires for the very magic that rationalism has banished.

Ramaswamy’s account begins in the mid-nineteenth century, with the invention of Lemuria by Euro-American paleoscientists who speculated that Madagascar, Africa, and India were once part of a single land-
mass (Chapter 2). Though scientists shortly abandoned this claim, others enthusiastically embraced it. Chapter 3 introduces the Theosophists, and their latter-day progeny, explaining how they incorporated Lemuria into a knowledge system that borrowed Victorian evolutionist principles but re-organized them into a racialist system of spiritual evolution. Chapters 4 and 5 describe the appropriation, by Tamil nationalists, of paleoscientific notions about Lemuria to yield a genealogy of Tamil nationhood. These thinkers developed an elaborate discourse on Lemuria’s status as a submerged Tamil homeland, initially in nationalist tracts, but later in government-issued textbooks and in a state-sponsored video. Chapter 6 provides a brief history of cartographic representations of Lemuria, noting the extraordinary richness of such representations among its Tamil proponents.

Ramaswamy’s work is interdisciplinary, albeit to different degrees, in its selection of primary source materials, in its methods of analysis, and in its exposition. Like most cultural histories, it relies on an eclectic array of primary sources, including visual images but mainly text-based sources. The methods of analysis employed are conventional. Ramaswamy approaches visual materials via straightforward content analysis, devoting less attention to such aesthetic dimensions as composition, tone, perspective, or, in the case of video, to matters of cinematic production. Although Ramaswamy alludes occasionally to interviews with present-day “Lemuria-philes,” interview data do not contribute significantly to her interpretation.

The work’s interdisciplinarity is most evident in its exposition. Chapters are organized to follow the transcultural career of Lemuria, itself, from its European birth to its Tamil re-invention. By presenting her materials in a way that mimics the path taken by this cultural artifact over time, Ramaswamy moves outside the space-time compartments by which disciplinary history is organized, thus pointing toward a more globalized practice of historical inquiry. She offers a useful model for historiography that takes on the challenge of global history by retaining a sharp and rigorous focus on the specific artifacts and media by which global connections are forged.

The book concludes on a normative note at which scholars may bristle. According to Ramaswamy, Lemuria is a “fabulous” phenomenon that has failed empirical tests of validity but represents a laudable form of history making that, by re-enchanting the world, engenders utopic possibilities worth pursuing. This argument, predicated on Boym’s notion that nostalgia can be prospective as well as retrospective, intimates a metahistorical commentary that places Ramaswamy in conversation with literary critics, art historians, and anthropologists, making this book engrossing and provocative.¹

Mary Hancock
University of California, Santa Barbara

Concubines and Power: Five Hundred Years in a Northern Nigerian Palace. By Heidi Nast (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2005) 288 pp. $68.95 cloth $22.95 paper

Nast’s *Concubines and Power* presents a historical-geographical account of royal concubinage by focusing on (1) human geographical methods, premised on (2) an agrarian based state in which reproduction moves history, and (3) presenting new empirical findings in the process (xviii–xix). Nast discusses specific areas of socioeconomic change brought about by concubines within the confines of the Kano royal palace since its origins circa 1500. In five chapters, she examines concubines’ roles in the context of grain processing and indigo dyeing, the nineteenth-century Fulani takeover, and pre- and postcolonial activity.

This study is unique in its attempt to explain how women were involved in state formation, concluding that royal concubines were central to the rise of the Kano state by virtue of their ethnic and political connections, as well as by their management of grain proceeds and marketing. Nast lays out clearly the manner in which concubines’ roles supported both extensive social networks and economic viability. Establishing political ties with the regions from which the slave-status concubines came, their presence in the palace created a network of political affiliations that could be used to solidify alliances. Of particular interest is her explanation of royal children as currency, like grain: The “womb functioned symbolically... as a source wherein the state’s primary currency was created: children” (167). Since the children of concubines were of royal status, increasing the emir’s political base through blood ties, women were valued for their reproductive capabilities, as well as for their productivity in controlling grain prices and indigo markets.

The most refreshing methodological aspect of this study is Nast’s reliance on such unusual sources as aerial maps and data concerning grain taxation; the social maps that she creates offer innovative historical perspectives on concubine activity. This kind of material is especially important considering the dearth of historical documents that predate the jihad, and the questionable veracity of oral traditions. Furthermore, Nast’s extensive input from individuals in the Kano palace is valuable for the insights that it provides. Nast does well to provide the background information necessary to set her personal contacts in context and to explain the disagreements among them on certain points. It would have been helpful to know whether she spoke to individuals in Hausa or used a translator, and how or whether she transcribed interviews. In contrast to the innovative methodology, the historical basis of the work derives directly from established historical, anthropological, and political studies of Hausa culture and comparisons to royal conditions elsewhere in Africa, as nearby as Yoruba and Benin and as far away as Darfur, without accounting for the extent of their differences in Islamic and ethnic influence.
Concubines and Power offers a detailed sociospatial geographical history of the residences, activities, and value of concubines in the Kano palace. It brings together a wealth of information on the lives of women who populate the harem, the heart of the palace, and lends insight into how women contributed to Kano politics and culture during the past 500 years. It will surely inspire further research on Hausa women and their vital roles in the culture.

Beverly B. Mack
University of Kansas

How Societies Are Born: Governance in West Central Africa Before 1600. By Jan Vansina (Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 2004) 325 pp. $45.00 cloth $24.50 paper

This book is a major contribution to the now-growing body of African historical works that systematically marshal nonwritten documentation in recovering the African longue durée.¹ These works apply the long-established techniques for using the comparative method of historical linguistics in conjunction with ethnography to reveal the ideas, culture, and material lives of peoples of earlier times.² Anthropologists and Indo-Europeanists have long utilized the techniques piecemeal or with limited goals in mind. Africanist historians have re-adapted the methods of linguistic and ethnographic reconstruction to build up complex regional histories and anchor these findings chronologically by identifying their points of conjunction with the available archaeology, oral tradition, and written documentation. Vansina is one of the major movers in this kind of history.

Despite its title, How Societies Are Born is not primarily a work of theory or comparative history. It is a first foray into reconstructing the broad sweep of the pre-1600 eras of history across southwestern Central Africa, from the upper Zambezi River areas on the east to the Atlantic coast at the west, and from northern Angola on the north to the Kalahari and northern Namibia on the south. Vansina builds a story of how the particular societies present in these regions by the seventeenth century came into being.

The story begins around 2000 years ago with the arrival of the first


² Edward Sapir, Time Perspective in Aboriginal American Culture (1916), is considered the classic early text on method. Ehret, “Linguistic Evidence and Its Correlation with Archaeology,” World Archaeology, VIII (1976), 5–18, presents a simplified overview of the processes of correlating linguistic and archaeological stratigraphies.
farming communities, coming from the rainforests to the north. These first farmers spoke the proto-Njila language, which other scholars in previous works have called the proto-Western Savanna Bantu language. As the proto-Njila communities scattered across West-Central Africa into environments suited to their farming, their linguistic commonality broke down, and the original proto-Njila tongue evolved into a variety of distinct Njila languages.

Vansina views the Njila of the first millennium C.E. as comprising a low-density scattering of communities, in which earlier indigenous foragers were still the primary occupants of a large proportion of the land. Particularly in the more southerly regions, the Njila faced great challenges in coping with their new dry environments. The crucial development for the Njila farmers was the spread from the east of savanna agricultural crops, such as sorghum. Cattle diffused from the east during the same eras, and in the farthest southern areas of Njila settlement, in the Okavango and the middle and lower Kunene River regions, the adoption of cows encouraged the establishment of strongly pastoralist economies in the driest climatic zone of all. The additional spread from the east of ironworking to all of West Central Africa completed the technological and economic transformations of the first millennium C.E. Pfouts subsequently placed these developments in the first half of the first millennium C.E., earlier than Vansina implies.

Vansina identifies the close of the first millennium as a crucial period of rapid transition to larger scales of sociopolitical cooperation in several distinct parts of the wider region. When denser concentrations of Njila communities began to emerge, especially in areas with access to varied productive environments, Njila peoples began to create a variety of new institutions of wider cooperation. Across the western and southern regions, the emergence of territorial chiefdoms and principalities led to the rise of at least one major early state in the twelfth to thirteenth centuries and, by the fourteenth or fifteenth century, to a number of kingdoms in the highlands of what is today western Angola.

In the eastern regions, local clusters of villages initially joined in cooperative groups (sodalities) for administering rites of passage. A sort of oligarchic republican rule took shape in these multi-village polities. Particularly in the northeast parts of West Central Africa, this kind of governance lasted into recent centuries.

3. Ehret, *An African Classical Age*; idem, “Subclassifying Bantu: The Evidence of Stem Morpheme Innovation,” in Larry M. Hyman and Jean-Marie Hombert (ed.), *Bantu Historical Linguistics: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives* (Stanford, 1999), 43–147. The name Njila comes from the unique word for bird. In choosing this kind of name for an ancestral society in the absence of the original, Vansina follows a well-established precedent in African early historical studies. This procedure has the virtues of invoking something uniquely characteristic of the language and its descendants, while avoiding names with potentially invidious connections to particular recent societies or with misleading geographical implications about the origins of the group as a whole.

In the southeastern areas, in contrast, two historically successive layers of further institutional change rest atop this foundation. The first layer was the addition of chieftaincy. Vansina is surely right in his dating of the restructuring of the southeastern multi-village polities into territorial chieftaincies at no later than the fourteenth or fifteenth century. By the seventeenth century, as a multiplicity of oral traditions reveals, a new kind of polity of even wider scope was widely taking shape across those areas, which Vansina aptly characterizes as “dynastic webs” or “federated kingdoms.” He views the rise of the more unitary Rund (Lunda) state and the associated Rund Commonwealth of kingdoms in the middle of the eastern areas during the same time period as constituting a marked departure from these patterns, precipitated by the intrusion of outside ideas and pressures from the Luba of the central savanna regions still farther east.

*How Societies Are Born* rectifies certain problematical features of Vansina’s previous works—for instance, the inapplicable and troubling depiction of polygynous wives as members of a big man’s harem in *Paths in the Rainforest*, which does not appear in this book. Moreover, women now emerge as legitimate successors to ruling positions, as often happened in West Central Africa, and as primary producers both of farm products and of the early key manufactured goods, ceramics.

Vansina continues, however, to project bilateral kinship as the earliest pattern among Bantu-speaking peoples, including the proto-Njila. He treats the prevalent matrilineal patterns of descent and social organization among the descendant Njila peoples as multiple secondary developments rather than, as other scholars argue, a shared inheritance. His own evidence throws his solution into doubt. About the cattle-herding Njila societies of far southern West Central Africa, in which men owned the cattle, he writes, “Once the inhabitants became agropastoralists and because cattle were to be inherited in the matrilineal line, they organized themselves into exogamic matrilineages” (139, emphasis added). This curious wording begs the question, not answered in the book, of why in the first place cattle “were to be inherited” matrilineally. Surely the answer to that question is that matrilineal institutions of descent and inheritance among Njila peoples were already well entrenched before the acquisition of cattle. Comparative linguistic and ethnographic evidence overwhelmingly shows that the Khoekhoe, whose lands adjoin those of the Njila pastoralists on the south, before cattle raising, had bilateral kinship with no clans or lineages. After adopting cattle, the Khoekhoe shifted from a bilateral to a strongly patrilineal clan and lineage basis in their society.

Vansina draws on the only chronologically well-situated archaeol-

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5 See, for example, Klieman, “The Pygmies Were Our Compass”; Ehret, *An African Classical Age*, among others.

6 A history of how the replacement of the original and otherwise universal bilateral Khoisan kinship by patrilineage and patriclan organization of Khoekhoe society might have arisen is proposed in Ehret, *An African Classical Age*, 219–220.
ogy for the region, from the southernmost fringes of West-Central Africa, in placing the transition to larger-scale political, economic, and social institutions in the late first millennium C.E. But this evidence comes from an environmentally marginal region, unlikely to be representative of the timing of similar developments farther north where better rainfall and soils could well have permitted such changes several centuries earlier. It is disconcerting that Vansina proceeds as if the datings from the margins had general applicability, without mentioning this alternative possibility.

This book shows a frustrating tendency to short-circuit the link between inference and substantiation in its arguments or, in some cases, to omit substantiation altogether. Vansina remarks, for instance, on the creation of an “exuberant cattle color” terminology—a powerful indicator of the early emergence of intensive cattle herding—among the agric-pastoralist southern Njila peoples (158). Such terminology does in fact exist, but where is the footnote or other reference establishing this claim? Other cases present only a verisimilitude of substantiation: A footnote following a claim in the text might add to the assertions of the text or offer tangential information but fail to cite sources that actually ground them (for example, 236, n. 83 and n. 85).

Such instances might create the suspicion that Vansina lacked the evidence to support his position. In general, that suspicion would be wrong. Vansina processed a large body of disparate evidence in building his history of the western savanna. Generally, he at least adverts to the evidence, even if not transparently presenting it, and usually argues at least minimally (and at times subtly and deftly) from evidence.

Christopher Ehret
University of California, Los Angeles


Heeding the clarion call of David Livingstone, Anglican missionaries of the new Universities’ Mission to Central Africa (UMCA) laboriously made their way to what are modern Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia in the nineteenth century. Although intent on evangelizing heathen, UMCA missionaries soon realized that they were also in the vanguard of an assault of Westernization. They were direct diffusers of technology and British educational notions and standards. They also were responsible for introducing Western medicine to broad areas long reliant on traditional healers, spirits, and local herbs.

This thorough and deeply researched book examines the accomplishments of the UMCA around the shores of Lake Malawi, including sections of what are now central Malawi and northern Malawi, north-
western Mozambique, and southwestern Tanzania. Good focuses primarily on the medical aspect of the UMCA endeavor, from the late nineteenth century through about 1965. Given the historic poverty of Malawians, the impecuniousness of the British colonial government of Nyasaland (now Malawi), and the reduced circumstances of the missionary endeavor itself, UMCA physicians and nurses were more ambitious than successful, more earnest than effective. The UMCA’s medical missions were chronically underfunded and understaffed. They expended too little effort on building local capacities. Further, the UMCA itself was always less efficient, less organized, and less clear about its medical goals than were the Presbyterian missions elsewhere around Lake Malawi. The Presbyterian missions were practical about what they could and could not do, better supported from home, and far better led.

Good shows exactly how Western medicine was introduced and perceived, and how the UMCA in Malawi focused for too long on curative rather than preventive efforts. Even in an era when, and in an area where, the practice of medicine was primitive, the treatment available to Africans in UMCA’s hospitals and clinics, short of trained personnel as they always were, was rudimentary.

Good is also obsessed with the geographical and physical barriers to missionary success. Most of the UMCA’s mission stations were situated at or near harbors around the lake or on large islands within it. The original plan was to reach potential converts by steaming around the lake, stopping at villages and settlements, and reinforcing and communicating with hospitals and clinics. Unfortunately, this method of missionary action depended upon the UMCA’s tiny fleet of wood-burning ships, which were often in dry dock, awaiting repairs to their boilers or their hulls. Good knows an enormous amount about the fleet, the mission ships, and the UMCA’s many strategic errors.

The UMCA was too high-church, too establishment-oriented, and too racist, both consciously and unconsciously, in its relations with Africans—even the indigenous priests whom it had recruited and trained—to have had a major transformative impact on the emerging Malawi. Furthermore, unlike the two Presbyterian mission groups and the competitive Roman Catholics, the UMCA operated on Malawi’s rural periphery. Until too late, it did not follow its own converts to the cities. It never rose above the mediocre in its supply of medical services. As Good shows, it clung to the lake and to its hopeless steamer service.

Yet, as deficient as the UMCA was at delivering quality medicine to the people of Malawi, it trained a remarkable number of early indigenous preachers. It also fostered the likes of Masauko Chipembere, the son of a UMCA archdeacon and Malawi’s leading nationalist in the 1950s.

Steamer Parish is not explicitly interdisciplinary, despite the author’s claim, his technical background, and his careful and well-informed critique of the history of medicine in Malawi and in the mission. Nor does the author’s deep knowledge of the lake steamer trade make this book interdisciplinary in method. Nevertheless, Good has made a major con-
Mobilizing the Masses: Gender, Ethnicity, and Class in the Nationalist Movement in Guinea, 1939–1958. By Elizabeth Schmidt (Portsmouth, N.H., Heinemann, 2005) 293 pp. $99.95 cloth $27.95 paper

Guinea’s singular affront to France—preferring immediate independence to President Charles de Gaulle’s offer of “Community”—is generally attributed to the audacity of Ahmed Sékou Touré, trade-union activist, national party leader, and Guinea’s first president. Schmidt challenges this dominant perception with her remarkable study of Guinea’s grassroots nationalist movement. She contends that although Sékou Touré and other African Democratic Rally (RDA) leaders skillfully harnessed anticolonial sentiments among the masses to achieve early electoral success against rival parties, the masses were, in fact, responsible later for compelling the RDA leadership into the radical demand of immediate independence.

To support this contention, Schmidt culled an impressive array of existing literature in French and English, bringing to Anglophone audiences the insights of Guinean scholars in particular, hitherto largely hidden behind the language barrier. More significantly, she sought out and interviewed twenty-six Guinean participants in the early nationalist movement. Finally, she checked and corroborated those written and oral sources with meticulous use of archival evidence, consulting police and administrator reports, correspondence, and party documents in the archives of Guinea, Senegal, and France.

A sometimes uncommon companion to such thoroughness is Schmidt’s exceptionally clear and captivating prose. After an initial chapter that lays her foundational argument, she organizes the book around the four main groups in which she locates the motor of nationalist activism: military veterans, trade unionists, rural peasants, and women. A sixth chapter highlights divisions that arose within these groups over time—tensions about female emancipation, ethnic exclusiveness, and the use of violence. The final chapter builds to the climax of Guinea’s historic vote for independence in 1958.

As she weaves her compelling account, Schmidt makes three valuable contributions. First, she differentiates the “masses” throughout the work, carefully demonstrating the cleavages that persisted despite leaders’ efforts to meld a unified movement, as well as divisions that developed specifically as the movement grew. Second, she reveals the central role of women in this struggle. Her chapter on women’s activism is her most original and colorful, largely because of its source. Whereas other chap-
ters sprinkle a handful of interviews among archival and secondary sources, half of the notes in this chapter refer to oral interviews with participants. Third, Schmidt methodically (yet creatively) details the mechanisms of mass mobilization—from targeted speeches by leaders to clandestine communication between market-women—providing the rich microfoundations to theories of nationalist movements that more often remain assumed.

Although Schmidt does not claim to provide a general theory of mass mobilization, her insistence that the masses, rather than the leadership, pushed Guinea’s historic “no” vote may require more comparison than she provides. She shows impeccably well the reasons for the RDA’s early success in relation to its rivals within Guinea. But if the strength of the masses was decisive for Guinea’s “no” vote, comparable grassroots sentiment must not have been present in other territories that voted “yes.” The entire book is devoted to elaborating the elements that strengthened Guinea’s nationalism, but they are presented as a mounting stack of evidence, rather than weighed for their relative contribution. Crucial factors to Guinea—extreme wartime deprivation, unusual union strength, exceptional women’s activism, unique severing of chieffy power—would persuade even more if contrasted explicitly with their weakness or absence in other territories.

In her care not to elevate Touré to mythical centrality in Guinea’s “no” vote, she underplays the strategic skills that she attributes convincingly to him a decade earlier. The extraordinary cunning and foresight that served to mobilize various sectors of Guinea’s population (particularly women) in the early years were replaced by a reactive, indecisive leader in 1958. Certainly, Touré’s experience with power enticed him toward conservatism. But between early ideals and later collaboration a space may have remained for continued strategic action on his part, and he might have used the radical stance of the masses purposely to tie his own hands as he negotiated with France to the end. Nonetheless, Schmidt wholly persuades that only the strength of the masses allowed the possibility for such an option.

Ericka A. Albaugh
Duke University

The Great Syrian Revolt and the Rise of Syrian Nationalism. By Michael Provence (Austin, University of Texas Press, 2005) 240 pp. $50.00 cloth $21.95 paper

The Great Syrian Revolt against the French mandate took place from 1925 to 1927. It was brutally crushed by the French. Provence celebrates the Revolt as an early anticolonial movement, an early expression of
Arab nationalism, and a formative influence on the shaping of modern Syria.

The actual fighting was the work of numerous and scattered bands. Provence repeatedly emphasizes that the revolt was led by subalterns, primarily Druze shaykhs from the Hawran region in alliance with the grain merchants of the Damascus Maydan quarter, Damascus village and quarter chieftains, townsmen of Hama, junior military officers, journalists, and writers. The Damascus landowning elites, who figure in other accounts of the development of Syrian nationalism, collaborated with French rule.

The revolt was clearly an anti-French movement in defense of local interests; it might even be called, an anti-imperialist resistance. But was it really a “nationalist” movement? The leadership was fragmented, and the bands of resisters had little connection with each other. Most of the population was not actively involved, and many minority groups and tribes fought on the side of the French. Sectarian conflicts took place among Druze and Kurds, and the Muslims and Christians. The revolt also involved battles for supremacy among local chieftains, plunder and pillage, banditry and extortion. Factionalism reigned. The manifestos issued during the revolt imply not only pan-Syrian Arab nationalism, but Druze autonomy, the liberation of Arabdom, and jihad for the glory of Islam. It is doubtful that nationalism had reached the masses.

According to Provence, however, “A central goal of this study has been to show that a collective national identity can exist without a unitary elite-guided notion of what such membership means.” Insurgents “did not hold identical conceptions of their national identity... it was the common notion of membership that was important” (152). But how, from such disparate statements and uncoordinated actions, do we know that such a common notion existed?

Was the Great Revolt important in the later formation of Syrian nationalism and the Syrian national state? Surely it was important as a mythic ancestor. It was also, in part, an early contest for power between the old landowning elites, and the sons of rural notables educated in Ottoman and French military academies. This struggle ended in the 1960s with the victory of Alawi and other minority officers. Their victory, however, did not stem from the Great Revolt, nor from rural resistance to the central state, but rather from military coups. Syria as a nation-state is not a descendant of the Great Revolt but of the French colonial state.

“The Great Revolt” is a deeply researched and well-told story, but it seems over-committed to a populist vision of history that calls for more rigorous analytical judgments.

Ira M. Lapidus
University of California, Berkeley
This ambitious and interesting book establishes a model of competing logics of domination and balance to compare the way in which state formation emerged from warfare in ancient China, from the origins of the Warring States system in 656 B.C.E. to unification under the first Qin emperors, and in early modern Europe from the 1495 “onset of the early modern European system” to the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 (112). The author finds that initially similar processes in ancient China and early modern Europe managed to produce opposite outcomes. In both times and places, she finds comparable “citizenship rights,” namely state–society bargains of material welfare, legal protection, and freedom of expression. The key difference lay in the more effective “self-strengthening” of the Qin state versus the “self-weakening” legacy of ancient regime France with which Napoleon—Qin rulers’ nearest kin in early modern Europe—had to contend, despite his efforts at self-strengthening.

By “self-strengthening,” Hui, following Waltz, refers to boosting military power by building national armies, increasing economic capability by rationalizing national taxation, and developing clever strategies by establishing meritocratic administration, all of which Qin effectively accomplished (30). Qin aggression—untrammeled by the requirement to wage war “justly”—along with skillful planning, defused potential balancing mechanisms of rising costs and the need to balance power with competing states, which it played off against one another piece-meal. Early-modern Europe, by contrast, used costly and less reliable mercenary armies to increase military strength, and its states were more vulnerable because, unlike Qin, they relied on alliances. Europe increased economic capabilities by contracting loans and selling public offices, which weakened it. These traits acted to counterbalance attempts to achieve domination. Finally, Europeans were simply less ruthless than the Qin. The argument “highlights the contingency of both historical trajectories.” It contradicts both the teleological sinocentric view that the Qin unification was inevitable and the Eurocentric assumption that the balance of power in early modern Europe, with everything that followed, likewise was a foregone conclusion (230).

Hui’s political-science model and its application to ancient China and early modern Europe are persuasive within the parameters established. The model is necessarily couched in historical terms, however, and despite detailed historical analysis, it is weakened by less than full historical contextualization. For example, consideration of ancient China requires much more detailed attention to such ideological “checks and balances” as the Mandate of Heaven theory, and consider—

ation of early modern Europe requires attention to the roles played by religion and by burgeoning global capitalism. Several sweeping comparisons also give one pause, such as the comment, “the Hundred Schools of Thought” [in ancient China] “[were] akin to the Enlightenment [in Europe]” (226). Nonetheless, this thought-provoking work will repay close consideration by both political scientists and historians.

Joanna Waley-Cohen
New York University


Chow’s rich, meticulously researched, and theoretically informed study investigates how a stable print technology—nonmechanized woodblock printing—brought about significant changes in social, cultural, and political practice in early-modern (sixteenth- and seventeenth-century) China. He focuses on the repressed history of a specific social group, the shishang (literati merchant-businessmen), whose economic status, political influence, and intellectual habits—if not their habitus—were transformed through the growth of commercial publishing in this period.

Chow lays the study’s theoretical groundwork in the introduction, and proceeds with chapters about the economics of book production; publishing in the early-modern period, the commodification of materials used to prepare for the civil-service examinations, the rising importance of paratextual elements in enhancing a text’s value, and the shishang’s expanding public authority within political culture. The conclusion highlights meaningful comparisons between the worlds of print in China and Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, untainted by assumptions of Western superiority.

This Sino-Western matrix is one of Chow’s central theoretical concerns. He opens the book with a critique of what he terms the “sinologisitic mode” of writing non-Western history using narrative schemes from three related Western discursive systems—historicism, Eurocentrism, and modernism. His primary objective is to liberate the history of early-modern Chinese printing from these schemes, which reduce the multiple temporalities of non-Western histories to chronicles of failures and absences.

Chow does, nonetheless, invoke the work of an interdisciplinary array of fields from sociology to literary theory and cultural history. Reminiscent of Pierre Bourdieu, he considers theory usable when it “is not undertaken in any historicist and European schemes” (191).

Bourdieu’s work is particularly illuminating for Chow’s analysis of the shishang class.¹ He views the shishang as the product of both the his-

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tory of their position as literary professionals and of their dispositions as scholarly and official aspirants (100)—the latter occluding the former. He further uses Bourdieu’s theorization of the field of cultural production to highlight the unique relationship between print and power in early-modern China where commercial publishing, which was subject to less state control than in Europe, weakened government authority over literary standards.

Some of Chow’s more sustained engagement with Western theory concerns cultural historians. In examining the Chinese civil-service examination system, he agrees with de Certeau’s critique of Foucault’s overestimation of the power of the state but critiques de Certeau’s underestimation of the “constraining effects of reading protocols” on the reader.² Chow further uses a range of literary theory to unlock the meaning of specific texts, reflect on the establishment of literary value in early-modern China, and examine the function of the paratext in the context of social relations.

Chow’s multidisciplinary approach to Chinese print culture in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is one of the book’s greatest strengths. It enables him to relate the social, technological, economic, cultural, and political elements of this story to one another, and, more fundamentally, to convey the intricate nature of cultural development and the complexity of historical change.

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The seemingly precise fit between the Chinese civil-service examination system and Bourdieu and Passeron’s notion of social reproduction has meant that few have seen in Chinese examinations anything more than the creation of a governing elite loyal to Chinese tradition and the ruling dynasty.¹ In The Class of 1761, a careful examination of those who took and passed the highest Chinese civil examination, in the spring of 1761, Mancheong shows that the story had much more to it. In particular, she argues that the examination represented a “performative re-enactment” of loyalties on the part of the Chinese elite, a moment when those members of the current generation accepted their responsibilities as leaders of the Qing bureaucracy. She also shows how connections long-formed


and just being forged, and intellectual commitments made and immanent among the members of the class, shaped appointments and policies for the remainder of the candidates’ political lives.

Mancheong’s view of the examination process may derive, in part, from the elements of the system that she studies. The Palace Examination was one that almost no one failed; it concerned placement and prestige more than academic accomplishment. Nonetheless, she makes an important point, and her close study of the 217 who passed makes a signal contribution to the literature on Chinese examinations. In successive chapters, she studies the backgrounds of those who sat for the examinations; the questions that they were required to answer and how the three top candidates answered them, a remarkable case in which the Emperor personally changed the rankings of the top candidates; and the subsequent careers of all who passed.

In the densest chapter, Chapter 3, Mancheong looks at the questions on the exams and the top candidates’ answers. First, Mancheong reconstructs the logic behind the questions, arguing that the 1761 examination called for an analytical grasp of the entire Chinese classical tradition, rather than an ability to explicate one text alone. Second, she seeks to present a template for each question, what an ideal answer to each question would be. Third, she tries to assess the differences between the answers that the three top candidates gave to the questions.

Mancheong attributes some of the differences to candidates’ fealty to the Han and Song learning traditions, but she is at some pains to argue—justifiably—that these partisan traditions do not account for all the divergences. The sharp disputes between Han and Song learning did not begin until about a decade after the exam, although she has to explain certain answers by implausibly comparing the recipients of the best classical education in eighteenth-century China to today’s undergraduates, who seek to gloss, or simply ignore, the difficult parts of a question. All of the analytical thrusts of Chapter 3 are useful, but they tend to get tangled in an exposition that rests on paraphrases of answers. Yet, reading eighteenth-century essays with the red pen of an imperial examiner is a valuable experience in reconstructing the meaning of the testing process.

The strongest part of the book is its discussion of what happened to the various candidates after the examination. Statistical accounts constitute a part of this discussion, but even more valuable are discussions of individual lives. Mancheong seems to give away too much when she writes that biographies are “of somewhat limited use for modern China scholars” (109). Although Chinese biographies are epitaphs mostly written after the death of their subjects, thus providing little insight into thought or attitudes, they are indispensable in tracing political careers, patterns of association, and the policy initiative most closely identified with their subjects. In fact, the strongest sections of this book draw on biographical materials. Biographical materials permit Mancheong to show how the examination class of 1761, not noticeably more militaris-
tic than any other class, became drawn into the wars of conquest that the eighteenth-century Chinese state characteristically undertook. Her memorable portraits of Sun Shiyi and Qin Cheng’en, graduates who were attracted to, and subsequently dismissed from, the dynasty’s military endeavors effectively illustrate how the connections and commitments generated in the examination process shaped individual careers and political histories.

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Political Mobilization and Identity in Western India, 1934–47. By Shri Krishnan (New Delhi, Sage Publications, 2005) 281 pp. $21.95

Analyzing the complexity of why and how diverse rural groups in India engaged in politics, Krishan unearths detailed evidence about the numerous protests and demands, both peaceful and violent, that marked popular activism in the countryside of the Bombay Presidency during the tumultuous fourteen years prior to Indian independence. He also evokes a wide array of linguistic, psychological, and historical models. Political Mobilization thus comprises a micro-study of one rural region that tests the assertions of numerous interdisciplinary macro-theories against his specific evidence.

Political Mobilization advances a progressive approach that takes seriously the diversity of political activism based not just on class but also on “kinship, ethnic, communal, and national identities,” each shaped by specific historical contexts (251). Rural collectivities emerge through complex processes, not just through violence. Krishan argues, “The task of a historian is to delineate real historical collectivities or aggregates according to their real historical significance” (92). He therefore explicitly and extensively critiques the early work of the Subaltern Studies Collective for misreading both Karl Marx and Antonio Gramsci and the later postmodernist work of this Collective in which “the distinction between the ‘historical’ and the ‘fictional’ has been vilified, berated, and censured” (181). In particular, Krishan refutes the works of Hardiman, as well as those of Breman and Omvedt, scholars who have also written extensively about this region during this time period.1

Rather than synthesize a single historical narrative, Krishan deploys three concurrent central chapters, considering, respectively, peasants, tribals, and dalits (formerly called “untouchables”). Each chapter reveals complex congeries of incidents, protests, demonstrations, and acts of violence by diverse individuals and groups. To complicate the political

1 See, for examples, David Hardiman, Feeding the Baniya: Peasants and Usurers in Western India (New York, 1996); Jan Breman, Beyond Patronage and Exploitation: Changing Agrarian Relations in South Gujarat (New York, 1993); Gail Omvedt, Reinventing Revolution: New Social Movements and the Socialist Tradition in India (Armonk, N.Y., 1993).
context further, from 1937 to 1939, the Indian National Congress nomi-
nally governed the province, although the British Raj administered it. Hence, supporters of the Congress and rival leaders and activists had conflicting interests with respect to popular agitation. Krishan’s final chapter studies “Crowd Vigour and Social Identity” during the Con-
gress-initiated Quit India Movement (1942–1944) and subsequent rural activism. In this chapter, Krishan analyzes how crowds—in particular and in general—form, mobilize, and act. Throughout his book, he inter-
sperses brief evocations of theoretical insights by numerous Euro-
American and Indian thinkers.

*Political Mobilization* offers much to scholars interested in the rich
details of popular politics in this region and period, in broad theoretical
models drawn from several disciplines, or in the intersections among
them. Krishan’s deep research into official records, newspapers, tran-
scribed oral accounts by prominent figures, and other sources in India
enables him to read “against the grain” and so excavate the motivations
and actions of a range of rural men and women. But to appreciate fully
Krishan’s assertions and conclusions may require some knowledge of the
larger arguments of the many thinkers that he evokes as well as of the
broader political, social, cultural, and economic contexts of India as a
whole, and this region in particular, on the eve of Independence.

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