Diseases and Human Evolution. By Ethne Barnes (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 2005) 484 pp. $29.95

This book draws together literature authored by medical scientists, anthropologists, historians, and geographers (among others) to address, in interdisciplinary fashion, the question of the synergistic evolution of humans and their pathogens. A major theme is that humans, by rearranging their environment, carry much of the blame for their own disease burden.

Barnes, a paleopathologist, begins with a crisp analysis of the agents of that burden—bacterial, viral, protozoal, rickettsial, and helminthic—(along with their vectors) and a discussion of how our immune systems work to ward them off. Next she introduces the first and most far-reaching of all the rearrangements, the Neolithic revolution, which saw the invention of agriculture, the domestication of animals, and the beginning of urban life, collectively unleashing diseases on humankind that would bedevil us for millennia to come.

Subsequent chapters maintain a rough chronological order, fitting these diseases into a historical as well as an evolutionary/medical discussion. Ailments that predated the Neolithic—such as malaria, schistosomiasis, and trypanosomiasis in the Old World, Chagas’ disease in the New, and leishmaniasis in both—are followed by those that came from domesticated animals—among them rabies, toxoplasmosis, brucellosis (Napoleon was a victim), anthrax, tuberculosis, and, perhaps, leprosy.

Other maladies that were probably donated by animals the author terms “hit and run” illnesses, some of which, like measles, mumps, rubella, whooping cough, diphtheria, and chickenpox, she discusses briefly before examining such major-league and controversial diseases as syphilis, smallpox, bubonic plague, and typhus. (Syphilis originated in the Old World; smallpox was probably a variant of African monkey pox; potential plague-carrying rats now stowaway on airplanes; and wild typhus reservoirs will never be eradicated.)

The Industrial Revolution brought another monumental rearrangement, which encouraged the globalization that permitted once-localized diseases like Asiatic cholera to sweep the planet in epidemics and yellow fever to extend from Africa to coastal cities of the Americas and some in Europe as well. The influenza of 1918, a classic case of a globe-trotting disease, killed tens of millions. The author threatens, “[I]t is not a matter of if, but when” the world will sustain an even more deadly pandemic (353).

She may be right, but, following a chapter entitled the “Diseases of Modern Civilization,” and then others tackling AIDS, Ebola, and a host of other viral infections, along with weapons of biological warfare, and Mad Cow disease, the threats (perhaps understandably) become more shrill. According to Barnes, the world is so overcrowded that nature will be called upon to redress the balance and a new disease—probably a
deadly strain of influenza—could do the job by killing more than half of the planets’ population.

These last-minute prescriptions and predictions mar an otherwise fine book that, although a little skimpy on history, provides a coherent and understandable anatomy of the myriad diseases that have plagued humankind for the past 10,000 years.

K. F. Kiple
Bowling Green State University


As Newman demonstrates in Promethean Ambitions, modern concerns about “Frankenfoods” and cloning have deep roots in medieval debates about the boundary between the natural and artificial. Newman uses alchemy as a window onto centuries of exploring the power and limits of human art (or, in modern terms, technology). This art/nature debate ranged widely, touching on everything from theologians’ considerations of the powers of witches to treatises on painting, pottery, and the experimental method. Alchemists especially, Newman contends, issued a powerful challenge to the conventional boundary between art and nature that “would feed the fires of the scientific revolution and provide a host of issues that confront humanity even today with a relentless urgency” (24).

Although Promethean Ambitions follows the art/nature debate from antiquity to the present, the core of the book is an analysis of learned treatises written between 1200 and 1700. Two opposing positions emerged in the Middle Ages, when Arabic and Latin philosophers first confronted alchemists’ bold claims that they could not only replicate nature, but even improve it by transmuting base metals into silver and gold. Thereafter, Newman argues, alchemy became a touchstone for discussions of the creative powers of art, whether by humans or demons. Renaissance artists like Leonardo da Vinci and Bernard Palissy saw alchemists as rivals and objected to the assertion that transmutation was superior to the merely imitative powers of visual artists.

Alchemists grew even more provocative in the sixteenth century when followers of Paracelsus claimed that they could create not only metals or lower life forms like insects but also an artificial human, or homunculus. Finally, in the seventeenth century, alchemists’ arguments in support of artifice found their way into the writings of the most famous spokesmen for the new science, Francis Bacon and Robert Boyle. In placing alchemy at the center of this long debate and crediting its practitioners with pushing the boundaries of technology, Newman
makes a strong claim for alchemy’s centrality to the development of modern science.

*Promethean Ambitions* demonstrates Newman’s mastery of the alchemical textual tradition; he is at his best when reconstructing the long afterlife of specific medieval arguments and showing how Renaissance artists and seventeenth-century natural philosophers alike engaged them even as they turned them to new ends. Scholars who have dismissed either alchemy or Aristotelianism as somehow inimical to modern science or experimentalism will have to reckon with Newman’s persuasive textual evidence to the contrary. Nevertheless, readers of this journal may be left wondering precisely where this learned debate fits in the larger context of early modern European natural knowledge. Recent scholarship, which has expanded its purview to emphasize the role of practice, material culture, European colonization projects, and visual culture in creating a new relationship between humans and nature, clearly shows that Bacon and his followers were influenced by more than the learned treatises that they read. The full impact of the art/nature debate beyond philosophy remains to be seen, but this erudite book is an important contribution to the intellectual history of art and nature in medieval and early modern Europe.

Tara E. Nummedal
Brown University

*Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics.* By K. J. Holsti (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004) 349 pp. $70.00 cloth $27.99 paper

Continuity and transformation in international history is both a central concern of international-relations theory and a subject that is often marginalized in the field. Indeed, international-relations scholars frequently engage work in disciplines that have interests and orientations distinct from those of political science. Although this tendency makes international change a wonderfully multidisciplinary exercise, it also contributes to conceptual fragmentation.

One of Holsti’s major contributions is his attempt to bring conceptual order to the study of international change. Holsti argues, after a lucid overview, that international institutions are the proper locus for the analysis of international continuity and transformation. He understands institutions in the sociological sense: as the “patterned (typical) actions and interactions of states, the norms, rules, and principles that guide (or fail to guide) them, and the major ideas and beliefs of a historical era” (18). These institutions, he argues, can be divided into the “foundational” ones that act and interact within international politics and the “procedural” ones that guide their conduct. Examples of the latter include “diplomacy, trade, colonialism, and war” (27).
The basic punchline of Holsti’s study is that the state system has undergone a variety of changes since its inception in early modern Europe, but that claims to radical transformation in the fundamental nature of the state system are premature. Sovereigns have “tamed themselves” through the construction of norms, rules, and formal institutions that point “in the direction of increased peaceful coexistence between distinct political communities” (318).

In fact, Holsti’s analysis is most trenchant when he tackles the general argument that the state is withering away or becoming obsolescent as a result of globalization from above, and identity-based fragmentation from below (62–69). His conceptual framework reminds us that change operates at different levels, in different domains, and at different speeds. We should not conflate changes in some domains, such as the conduct of international trade, with a broader shift away from the centrality of states.

The conceptual and historical breadth of Holsti’s study contributes to its limitations. Many scholars may find themselves perplexed by some of Holsti’s assertions, such as that the “Franks . . . are better known for their depredations than for political continuity and the creation of international institutions” or that nomads “do not create states” (29). The historical accounts often feel “potted,” and many of the interpretations on which Holsti relies are deeply controversial. Although such problems are probably inevitable given the scope of the work, they confirm that comparative-historical analysis usually requires more systematic study of the causes and consequence of change than is possible in macrohistorical accounts written by non-specialists. Nevertheless, Holsti’s book is an important addition to both the growing body of literature on the nature of international change and to the ongoing debate about the fate of the sovereign state.

Daniel Nexon
Georgetown University


In this well-written and intelligent book, Stedman Jones argues that at the end of the eighteenth century, republican thinkers raised a “new question: whether scientific and economic progress could abolish poverty” (1). The heroes of his account are Antoine-Nicholas de Condorcet and Thomas Paine, whom Stedman Jones sees as paddling in the wake of Adam Smith. Like other scholars in recent years, Stedman Jones wants to rescue Smith from the clutches of the neo-conservatives. He stresses that Smith’s conception of an expanding commercial society, freed of moralistic concerns about “luxury,” made a non-utopian society of universal
well-being plausible, contrary to defenders of conservative hierarchy as well as republican austerity. The other ingredients in Stedman Jones’ causal mix are developments in mathematics (probability) and statistics (collection of mortality data), which allowed the calculation of financially viable insurance schemes for retirement and death. In the belief that all citizens required economic and social security for democracy to flourish, Condorcet and Paine, in their different ways, called for combinations of redistributive taxation, universal insurance, and general education to lessen (but not abolish) economic inequalities and social insecurity.¹

Alas, the bad guys soon entered the scene, riding the waves of anti-Jacobin hysteria—Burke and Malthus. Whereas Burke backed the eradication of all vestiges of republicanism and social egalitarianism, Malthus began the process of taking the politics out of political economy.² By the mid-nineteenth century, economists were arguing that production, distribution, and consumption operated according to “scientific” laws unaffected by political changes. Moreover, moralizing crept back in, as freetraders contended that the market punished the undeserving. What put the brakes on triumphant laissez-faire was not a revival of enlightenment republicanism but the growth of conservative as well as radical-socialist opposition to industrialization, increasingly afflicted (pace Say and Ricardo) by global crises of over-production. Britain finally passed welfare legislation on the eve of World War I not because the members of Parliament had whipped out copies of Paine and Condorcet but because they wanted to increase the efficiency of British workers in the context of imperialist competition.

In terms of methodology, this book is clearly a work of intellectual history, and a fine one at that. But Stedman Jones’ desire for it to have policy implications as well is perplexing. He begins with the sentence, “This book employs history to illuminate questions of policy and politics which still have resonance now” (1). He concludes with the contention that the origins of social democracy lie not in the works of Eduard Bernstein, Ferdinand Lassalle, the Fabians, or even Louis Blanc but in the proposals of Condorcet and Paine. His assertion that “[s]ocial democracy preceded the genesis of nineteenth- or twentieth-century socialism” has an intriguingly ironic punch (234), rather like the contention of those who argue that postmodernism actually antedates modernism, but his belief that renewed attention to Paine and Condorcet can help to reinvigorate contemporary social democracy is forced. Even if they offered “what might be described as the first social democratic programme for the elimination of poverty and inequality” (234), seeking “to combine

¹ Stedman Jones refers primarily to Condorcet (trans. June Barraclough), Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind (Westport, 1979; orig. pub. 1795); Paine, Rights of Man (London, 1791), I; II (London, 1792); idem, Agrarian Justice (Baltimore, 1797).
the benefits of individual freedom and commercial society with a repub-
lican ideal of greater equality, inclusive citizenship and the public good”
(235), their specific proposals are too far removed from a postindustrial,
bureaucratized, globalized world to offer much for today’s social demo-
crats.

Though he advocated a national policy of social insurance, Paine
generally envisioned a free-market economy of vigorous small entrepre-
neurs, embedded in a polity marked by minimal government conducted
mainly at the local level. But is that policy not more a model for moder-
ate liberals than social democrats? Besides, in what corner of today’s in-
dustrial and postindustrial world would such a system be politically and
economically viable? Stedman Jones makes an eloquent case for his con-
tention that in their time, the proposals of Paine and Condorcet were
radical but practicable, but their relevance has been overtaken by devel-
opments of an extent and magnitude that they could not have foreseen.

Peter Jelavich
Johns Hopkins University

*Human-Built World: How to Think about Technology and Culture*. By
Thomas P. Hughes (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2004)
223 pp. $22.50

In this wonderful little book, Hughes draws upon a lifetime of learning
and scholarship to reflect upon technological change and its relationship
to other components of culture, most notably religion, values, politics,
and artistic expression.

Hughes is best known for his conception of technology as the his-
tory of expanding systems, a framework of analysis that currently domi-
nates the history of technology and played an important role in the rise
of social constructivism among historians. His systems approach is best
elaborated in his classic study, *Networks of Power* (Baltimore, 1983) and,
more recently, in *Rescuing Prometheus* (New York, 1998). In all of his
publications, Hughes seeks to disabuse those who view technology sim-
ply as “gadgets” and/or the engine of inevitable progress. For him,
“technology is messy and complex. It . . . is full of contradiction, laden
with human folly, saved by occasional benign deeds, and rich with unin-
tended consequences” (1). One of the most refreshing aspects of this
book is Hughes’ candor. Having pointed to “the Janus face of technol-
ogy,” he readily admits that “traces of my enthusiasm still come through
in my publications, especially this one” (5). Yet, when all is said and
done, there is a critical edge to this work that comes through loud and
clear, especially in his final chapter on the need to foster an “ecotech-
nological environment.”

In moving toward that end, Hughes develops three overarching
themes and places them in chronological context. The first, developed
in Chapter 2, is technology’s relationship to what Hughes refers to as “the Second Creation.” Echoing Merton, he probes the religious and cultural contexts of technological change in Western civilization from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, arguing that mastery over nature was a deeply held tenet of Christian religion, perhaps best expressed by “the Puritans of New England, [who] believed that the second creation of the New World would bring the millennium” (27). The second theme is the idea of “technology as machine” (Chapter 3), an exploration of the so-called electrical-mechanical age (c. 1900–1940), which was epitomized by the maturation of science-based industry, mass production, and the modern metropolis. The third and final theme is the idea of “technology as systems, controls, and information” (Chapter 4), which embraces the period since World War II and treats large-scale complexity as embodied in modern weapons systems, the military-industrial complex, the spread of the systems approach to the private sector, and the onset of the computer-driven information revolution.

In each of these three periods, Hughes points to the emergence of management practices aimed at coordinating and controlling new technologies. Equally important, each chapter contains a discussion not only of the proponents of technological progress but also skeptics who expressed doubts and criticisms about the impact of new technologies. What distinguishes Hughes’ analysis is his balanced assessment of inventors, developers, enthusiasts, and critics of technological change.

Upon providing an extremely revealing discussion of twentieth-century German and American art and architecture in a chapter entitled “Technology and Culture,” Hughes ends his reflection on the human-built world with an impassioned call for “Creating an Ecotechnological Environment” in which the natural and human-built worlds can intersect and overlap. He chides critics who point “accusatory fingers at developers, architects, engineers, and planners” for despoiling the environment, arguing instead that we, the people, have no one to blame but ourselves because “we commission, fund, and elect them to fulfill our goals” (154). The only way out of this predicament, in Hughes’ view, is for the public to become more technologically literate and engaged in negotiating the messy political, economic, social, and moral problems that arise with the introduction of new technologies.

Rather than applauding top-down “technological fixes,” which often prove problematical, Hughes calls for more activist “socially constructed” technology policies that involve a wide spectrum of organizations and individuals in making choices about “the characteristics of the technology they use and the effects that it will have upon them.” In the end, he argues that nothing but “a change in values and an activist stance toward technological change will be an effective response to these press-

ing problems.” Hughes warns, however, that such changes will not happen “unless technology is better understood” by the public (173).

A volume as broad-ranging and suggestive as this one is bound to suffer from omissions. For instance, those interested in avant-garde architecture might wonder why Hughes chose to exclude the work of Robert Maillart and other leading twentieth-century Swiss structural engineers from his discussion. Proponents of flexible specialization might question whether Hughes’ emphasis on large systems accurately reflects the thrust of technological change since the industrial revolution. Still others might wish that Hughes had provided footnotes. But these are minor quibbles given what Hughes has accomplished. Human-Built World is the best introduction that exists on the theme of technology and culture in the modern Western world. Readers from all backgrounds will profit from Hughes’ rich and instructive perspective.

Merritt Roe Smith
Massachusetts Institute of Technology


Smil has written prodigiously on an impressive range of topics, from energy to food to ecology. In one previous historical effort, he focused on the development in the early twentieth century of the processes for making artificial nitrogen fertilizers and its enormous consequences for world food supply. In a sense, the current work is an expansion of that study—an exploration of a host of inventions made in the four decades before World War I that Smil argues have been the foundations of, in his words, a “new civilization.”

The argument of Creating the Twentieth Century is simple: The period from 1867 to 1914 achieved “a profound technical singularity” due to “the introduction and rapid improvement and commercialization of fundamental innovations that defined a new era and influenced economic and social development for generations to come” (25). This “Age of Synergy” saw inventions in such number and of such significance that much of what followed in the twentieth century was simple elaboration and improvement, not fundamental change. Smil chose the year 1867 apparently because of the introduction of the first electric dynamos, the first open-hearth steel furnaces, and Alfred Nobel’s dynamite. The reason for the terminal date is less clear; it may represent Smil’s attempt to include the Haber-Bosch process ammonia synthesis (thus contributing to fertilizer and explosive manufacture), “perhaps the most important technical innovation of the modern era” (23).

Smil supports his argument for this “salutation” in human experience through detailed chapters on electric power generation and applications,
internal-combustion engines (and new forms of transport), new materials and manufacturing processes, and new communications techniques. These chapters are largely straightforward accounts of famous inventions, drawn from familiar sources, and with little or nothing new to them. Readers looking for a brief survey of the key inventions of the period could possibly find Smil’s version useful, although the breathless enthusiasm that he brings to his summaries can become wearying. Smil is diligent in making the point that these key inventions generally required a great deal of subsequent developmental effort before they achieved economic or social significance, and he provides plenty of details of this postinventive work.

Little of methodological interest occurs in Creating the Twentieth Century. The sheer range of technical elements described is impressive, though the sources—good monographic histories of technology supplemented by useful references to contemporary accounts and other documents, such as patents—are undistinguished. Smil understands his technologies, and he is able to translate technical details into accessible language. His grasp of historical elements, however, is less impressive. The social and economic contexts of his inventions are sometimes barely intimated, and their individual contributions to his “Age of Synergy” seem hardly to occur to him. Indeed, the foundation of this age—why it should take place in Europe and North America in just these decades—remain a mystery throughout the book. Smil hints at theories of historical cycles and revolutionary shifts but not as serious parts of the discussion.

Creating the Twentieth Century will reinforce the conviction of those believing that great inventions make history and will dismay others seeking for a more nuanced and complex way of understanding the relations between technological and social change. It will also dismay those who appreciate competent and thorough copyediting; Smil has been ill-served in this work.

Robert Friedel
University of Maryland

Bursting the Limits of Time: The Reconstruction of Geohistory in the Age of Revolution. By Martin Rudwick (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005) 708 pp. $45.00

This magnificent book, the product of Rudwick’s long and illustrious career in what can only be called “extreme” scholarship and innovative insight, will forever alter the way that the history of the science of geology—if not history itself—is perceived and written. The chief agents of his mastery, other than his background in paleontology and intensive thought about the origins of geology, are a familiarity with virtually all of the primary literature from France, Britain, Italy, Germany,
and the Netherlands, as well as a deep knowledge of the political and social interactions between those and other countries. The first five chapters are a synchronic view around the time of Horace Bénédict de Saussure’s ascent of Mont blanc in 1787. The following five chapters are a diachronic trip through the thoughts and theories of approximately the next forty years.

The science known as geology is conceded to have emerged as a discipline in its own right during that time. Rudwick identified its predecessors as the descriptive and classificatory study of the natural history disciplines of mineralogy (which included fossils), physical geography, and geognosy, as well as the causal investigations that Rudwick calls earth physics. He categorized mineralogy as an “indoor” activity, which included the use of museum and other collections. The outdoor, or field, studies were physical geography, concerned with mountains and large-scale features, and geognosy, the study of three-dimensional structures. The causal investigations of earth physics are in the realm of natural philosophy. Rudwick follows the use of the word geology from its beginning late in the eighteenth century through an evolving consensus that ended in the current understanding of the term. The study of geology is distinguished from the many theories of the earth, geotheories, which it replaced. Due to the methods of geology, the reality of extinction is inescapable, drawing together the human and the former world. In Rudwick’s words, “The central thesis of this book is that the sciences of the earth became historical by borrowing ideas, concepts, and methods from human historiography” (181). By the end of the eighteenth century, recognition that the earth was far older than had been previously thought was on the rise. Geotheories to explain the earth abounded. Rudwick looks at them on their own terms, chronicling both the best known and the unwisely neglected, such as those of Georges Cuvier and Jean André de Luc. The great insight was that the earth and its artifacts spoke more eloquently than the fruits of unaided human imagination. Rudwick uses all of the usual tools of the historian—papers, addresses, and institutional and official records—as well as evidence from the investigations of Ferdinand de Saussure, de Luc, Richard Kirwan, Sir James Hall, Abraham Gottlob Werner, James Hutton (not so admired here), Jean Claude de la Métherie, Alberto Fortis, Déodat de Dolomieu, William Buckland and many others. Also incorporated are truths gained from mapping, the placement of erratics, observations of volcanic eruptions and earthquakes, and the study of mines. Above all, Rudwick brings to bear revelations from the study of fossils, from early marine to later land quadrupeds, in situ, in collections, and by the “proxy specimens” of images, many reproduced in the book.

Rudwick tells the story of the discovery of Deep Time, chronicling “the change from regarding human history as almost coextensive with cosmic history, to treating it as just the most recent phase in a far longer and highly eventful story, almost all of it prehuman” (2). Rudwick has
promised a further volume taking his story through the next decades of the nineteenth century, when currently held views about the history of the earth became apparent.

Sally Newcomb
Geological Society of America

*The Economics of World War I*. Edited by Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) 345 pp. $80.00

World War I marked the end of an era. Three great empires collapsed in the East: the Austro-Hungarian, the Russian, and the Ottoman. The spirit of conflict never died in the West, leading to World War II after twenty years. This book surveys the economics of the war. It is the sequel to a similar book on the later conflict, and it looks forward to World War II for parallels rather than looking back to see the end of an era.\(^1\)

A great strength of this survey is that it extends from the usual suspects in Western Europe and America to the collapsing empires in the East, offering essays on the war economy in Austria-Hungary (by Max-Stephan Sculze), the Ottoman Empire (by Sevket Pamuk), and Russia (by Peter Gatrell). These essays collectively offer a portrait of agrarian societies caught up in industrial conflict. It is not a pretty picture; poor military efforts produced great costs to domestic society. The pretension of these countries’ leaders that they could play in the league of the industrial countries may well have led to their demise.

All nine of the country essays report the progress of GDP, trade, government finances, and (where observable) income distribution, during the war. They also attempt to measure the cost of the war for each country as well as possible. The heavy hand of the editors is evident in the introductory paragraphs of each essay that list the topics considered. The essays on Germany (by Albrecht Ritschl) argues that Germans started during the war to shift their imperialist aims from extra-European colonies to Eastern Europe. The essay on the United States (by Hugh Rockoff) explores the institutional innovations of the war, also examining a legacy of the war more complex than its cost.

The editors make three synthetic points in their introduction. First, the Germany hope for a quick victory was clearly a political aim as much as a military one; the defeated countries had to collapse or at least acknowledge defeat for it to be fulfilled. Despite Germany’s military prowess, the political conditions did not suffice. Harrison made the same claim in the survey of World War II. Perhaps all wars are started in the hope of quick victory.

Second, economics mattered for the outcome of the war of attrition that followed the absence of a quick victory. The Allies in both world

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\(^1\) Mark Harrison (ed.), *The Economics of World War II* (New York, 1998).
wars had the greater resources, and they eventually won. (The advantage appears to have come chiefly because of the participation of the United States, although the data do not make this reasoning easy to discern.) A sense of economic inevitability haunts this conclusion, although wars are never so predictable. As Overy has demonstrated for World War II, economics is only one aspect of a complex historical process, albeit an important one.²

Third, whereas aggregate resources mattered for victory, resources per capita mattered for military mobilization. Poor countries were largely agrarian, and they had trouble recruiting or drafting soldiers. Stripping the countryside led to urban famines and discontent. Leaning on the peasantry led to resistance and food consumed on the farm instead of being sent to the cities. This sort of economic contradiction produced political chaos in the East.

The passions aroused in the West by World War I produced depression, fascism, and the Holocaust. The antagonisms finally were laid to rest in 1945. The chaos produced in the East generated brutal repression for many people; we are still (or again) engaged in dealing with the shards of the old empires today. This book records one important aspect of the conflict that unsettled the Victorian Age. The editors’ introduction is a valuable summary, and the country chapters provide consistent data for comparisons and analysis.

Peter Temin
Massachusetts Institute of Technology


This remarkable book repays attention from scholars and policymakers alike. It builds on two or more generations of careful scholarship, but literally takes that work to another level—in this case, another level of analysis. The book is concerned to account for temporal and cross-national variation in aggregate electoral turnout. Although it starts of necessity with research on individual differences, it shows how those differences do not translate by themselves into propositions about aggregates.

Two bodies of existing work are mobilized to mutually supportive effect. One set of propositions is social-psychological, hearkening back to the first generation of survey-based electoral research. The other propositions originate in the rational-choice school. The synthesis of these perspectives is little short of brilliant. The deployment of data is resourceful, ranging from critical single-country cases through a six-country merged-survey analysis to a twenty-two-country aggregate

² Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York, 1996).
analysis. The translation of findings from more confined analysis to parameters in the more expansive analyses is occasionally heroic but always carefully thought out.

Traditionally, most citizens learn in early adulthood to become regular participants in the election process. But those citizens whose first political decade is marked by consistent non-participation are also likely to continue as they began. As non-voters continue to age, they never attain the turnout levels typical of generations who spent their twenties in a more participative mode. Since the late 1960s, circumstances have taught increasing numbers of citizens to abstain from voting. The lowering of the voting age, for instance, has forced citizens to embark on political learning at the worst possible stage in their development. Franklin argues that the damage is permanent and, indeed, has yet to express its full effect.

The peculiar susceptibility of young voters to participative or nonparticipative learning also interacts with the key aggregate component of turnout variation—the importance of citizens’ electoral choice to the larger political order, which has two potentially contradictory components. One is the extent to which an election decides the makeup of the government. In this respect, the relatively defractionalized results of majoritarian systems help turnout. But the other component, which also pertains to majoritarian systems, concerns the extent to which local elections are vulnerable to being noncompetitive. On both counts, and for more than just majoritarian systems, recent decades have seen elections become less compelling events.

The book has its weaknesses. The style is frustratingly allusive. The copyediting is weak, especially on surnames and dates of publication. The integration of individual and cross-level effects is uncomfortably reliant on data from one country, Germany. The denominator in the aggregate turnout calculations is murky; for a book on turnout, this is a critical quantity.

These quibbles should not detract from the main point, however. The book is a welcome relief from cultural explanations that shade into, at best, tedious moralizing and, at worst, millennial despair. Franklin concentrates instead on structural factors that may be manipulable. But he also warns that there is a generational story, born out of the interaction between abiding life-cycle phenomena and historically specific competitive conditions. We have created a political generation that has learned not to participate. Even if we reverse the aggregate trends that are the ultimate cause of turnout decline, restoration of the participative status quo ante will take more than our lifetimes.

Richard Johnston
University of Pennsylvania

The neoclassical orthodoxy in political economy equates state intervention in developing economies with rent seeking, trade distortions, and welfare losses.1 “Statist” scholars have challenged this orthodoxy by showing the crucial role of “developmental states,” and the nature of state-society coalitions, in the successful cases of development.2 Situated squarely in the statist camp, Kohli’s book goes beyond the success stories to ask why certain “late-late” developing countries industrialize more rapidly and successfully than others. This puzzle leads the author to trace the historical origins of the organization of state power. Kohli’s provocative work is both empirically rich and historically engaged.

Kohli identifies three historical patterns of state organization and intervention in the global periphery that are consequential for the rate and pattern of industrialization. His first ideal-type is the growth-advancing “cohesive capitalist state”—for example, South Korea or Brazil under military rule—which wields centralized and penetrating coercive authority, an alliance of profit with the private sector, and the repressive disciplining of labor in a single-minded pursuit of growth. On the other end of the spectrum is state-directed development in such corrupt, neopatrimonial states as Nigeria, where elites routinely appropriate public resources for personal gain. Between these extremes lie the middling performers, the “fragmented, multi-class states,” such as postcolonial India and Brazil under democratic rule, where state authority is fragmented, and the power to pursue economic development is trumped by populist concerns.

Where does the variation in the organization of state power come from? In Kohli’s comparative-historical framework, colonial legacies exert powerful, almost determining, effects on state construction. Simply put, the distinct nature and scope of colonial encounters create the institutional foundations for the paths of economic development pursued by the “late-late industrializers.” Kohli also makes the counterintuitive claim that the more brutal and penetrating the colonial state, the more likely it is to jolt a country out of its premodern straitjacket, or as Moore would say, to find a “final solution” to the problem of traditional social and political organization.3 A country like South Korea, colonized by a “transformative” colonizing power like Japan, is likely to inherit a rational-authoritarian state that allies itself with the dominant capitalist classes.

and demobilizes the lower classes (18). In contrast, a country like Nigeria, where the British “ruled on the cheap” while maintaining the “traditional” social order, is likely to become a “personalistic” and “patrimonial” state (18). In short, state power to direct economic development is constrained by inherited institutional structures that thrust different countries along different trajectories beyond the manipulative control of state and party elites.

Kohli’s attempt to show that the state can be an effective agent of development is generally persuasive despite competing arguments about the state’s inability to withstand the pressures of globalization. But Kohli’s state is repressive. His “cohesive-capitalist state” as the economic agent of choice is empirically problematical because his main success story—South Korea—merely suggests that given certain historical pre-conditions, right wing, growth-obsessed states are better able to stimulate and direct industrialization than soft democratic ones. What it fails to convey is that both economic and political development can go awry under authoritarian rule, Pakistan being a case in point. Pakistan registered rapid growth in the early 1960s, often surpassing South Korea. But by the late 1960s, the neo-fascist military state imploded in a civil war which culminated in the creation of Bangladesh.

Arguably, such cases of failed cohesive capitalism weaken Kohli’s state-centered analysis and point to the importance of social structures in strategies of development. The choices of state elites are not shaped just by pre-ordained state power or nationalist ethos of development. In India, the choice to practice democracy within a federal framework to deal with ethnic demands for autonomy might have hampered the state’s economic capacity, but it also averted the disasters that often plague a divisive society.

Lastly, in accord with Kohli’s stress on colonial inheritance as a catalyst for the formation of effective states, Nigeria, Kohli’s neopatrimonial basket case, probably would be more like South Korea today if Japan had colonized it. The depressing lesson for developing countries, even though Kohli maintains that his is an explanatory, not a prescriptive, study, is that countries without the proper colonial past and military present face economic doom.

Aqil Shah
Columbia University

_Disease and Democracy: The Industrialized World Faces AIDS_. By Peter Baldwin (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005) 478 pp. $44.95

Today AIDS is taken for granted in the developing world. It is viewed as just one of many endemic, chronic conditions that cause great pain and loss of life, yet garner little public attention. Twenty-five years ago, however, AIDS was the plague. A new, deadly, sexually transmitted dis-
ease that disproportionately affected gay men and other socially marginalized communities, AIDS posed myriad challenges to the health care, public health, and legal systems in each of the nations in which it appeared.

In *Disease and Democracy*, Baldwin examines how five Western nations, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Sweden, responded to AIDS. Looking at each nation’s approach to a variety of questions raised by the epidemic, such as the confidentiality of HIV tests, or whether to protect employees with HIV from discrimination, Baldwin demonstrates both the similarities of the debates and the differences in policies ultimately adopted. As Baldwin sees it, certain countries typically viewed as tolerant on matters of individual behavior, such as the United States and Sweden, actually adopted more restrictive and coercive approaches to the disease than did other countries, such as France or Germany (with the exception of the state of Bavaria), often considered less libertarian. Employing path-dependency analysis, Baldwin argues, not altogether persuasively, that the different policies implemented had more to do with the different approaches that each nation adopted in the nineteenth century in response to infectious diseases like cholera than to HIV-specific debates. Old infection-control policies, he contends, placed each nation on a different infectious-disease-control path that helped to determine the policies adopted when HIV arrived.

The strengths of this book are its comparative emphasis and its comprehensiveness. Although the literature on the early years of the epidemic is vast, Baldwin does an enormous service in covering many different facets of HIV policy and shedding light on the debates in smaller nations, such as Sweden, that are often overlooked, at least by U.S. scholars. Moreover, by emphasizing the heritage of prior infectious-disease laws, Baldwin helps to dispel the myth that HIV and the debates that it spurred were unique. As Baldwin makes clear, arguments whether to adopt infectious-disease policies that emphasize the limitation of individual liberty or those that rely more on voluntary approaches pre-date HIV by centuries.

Paradoxically, the very comprehensiveness of *Disease and Democracy* weakens its persuasiveness. Baldwin does such a good job of showing the muddled and ever-changing nature of AIDS policy that his thesis about the legacy of infectious-disease laws is not always convincing. For example, because, as Baldwin shows, it is difficult to draw any simple characterizations other than “inconsistent” about the U.S. approach to AIDS, it is difficult to trace U.S. AIDS policy to a prior approach (as if there were one). Moreover, as Baldwin demonstrates, each nation came to HIV with a host of other, significant experiences (such as Nazism in the case of Germany) that shaped its choices. To say that infectious-disease policy was the dominant, path-determining variable is too simplistic.

Baldwin has a tendency to raise rhetorical questions implying answers that cannot be sustained. He also resorts frequently to overgeneralizations and broad characterizations, many of which are dis-
proved by other passages in the book. Yet, although all the conclusions do not always hold up to close scrutiny, Disease and Democracy brings great insight and learning to its subject.

Wendy E. Parmet
Northeastern University

*History and Memory in the Carolingian World.* By Rosamond McKitterick (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004) 354 pp. $70.00 cloth $27.99 paper

In this book, McKitterick seeks to add another dimension to, and in some ways completely recast, our understanding of historical writing in the Carolingian period. She starts from the premise that history helps social groups to forge and maintain their identity. The group that particularly interests her is the conglomeration of European aristocrats that over the course of the eighth and ninth centuries, she argues, came to understand itself as the *gens Francorum*—that is, a Frankish people united by their relationship to the Carolingian kings.

McKitterick observes that the eighth and ninth centuries saw a burst of historical writing that cast the Franks as a people whose roots lay in Roman history and whose career was bound up with the progress of Christianity. Their story culminated in the triumph of the Carolingian house. Carolingian historiography, therefore, is not just about the Carolingians, McKitterick suggests, but also about the lay and ecclesiastical magnates on whom Carolingian rule depended. It creates an image of consensus, of a world in which the magnates worked with the ruling dynasty to uphold Frankish supremacy.

McKitterick makes her case by looking not only at historical texts but also at their manuscript transmission. She sees different manuscript versions of her texts not as faithful or deviant with respect to some hypothetical original but rather as witnesses to the deliberate deployment of a text to serve a particular purpose. Her flagship example (albeit one among many) is provided by the Royal Frankish Annals (*rfa*). She views the *rfa*, in all of their recensions and with all of their borrowings from earlier sources, as a collaborative piece of image making constructed during the ninth century. The widespread propagation of these annals testifies to their impact.

McKitterick makes specific points that are often challenging. For example, she sees the famous story of the pope sanctioning the Carolingian usurpation of the Frankish royal title in 751 as myth making (Chapter 6). Most provocatively, she argues that annals as a historiographical genre did not develop from the practice of making historical notes in Easter tables but were a new genre creating during the Carolingian period to anchor the Franks in a Christianized flow of time.

The book, which covers narrative historiography as well as the dif-
ferent kind of historical memory represented by cartularies and memorial books, shows McKitterick’s profound mastery of the sources. She is as comfortable with the big picture as she is with the details; she moves easily from broad discussions of source genres to dense discussions of specific texts, in which manuscript catalog numbers and script variants flow freely.

Given her goals, McKitterick has little choice but to present her arguments with as much support as possible. Her somewhat dense presentation will, however, limit her audience. Nevertheless, this book will surely appeal to her fellow early medievalists, as well as to graduate students, and shake up the field. It’s thorough and provocative look at cherished conventional wisdoms will force students of the period to place the context, construction, and manuscript traditions of their sources at the forefront of any effort to understand them.

Warren Brown
California Institute of Technology

Home and Homelessness in the Medieval and Renaissance World. Edited by Nicholas Howe (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 2004) 170 pp. $40.00 cloth $20.00 paper

One of the leading features of medieval and Renaissance historiography in the current generation has been the inclination to select topics from contemporary discussions, seeking analogies and analogues of the present in the past. Undoubtedly scholars have always done so, but until relatively recently, they maintained claims of positivism or engagement in mega-debates, thus positing distance from their subjects. Now they are forthright in their presentism, and quicker to bring current issues to the historical debate. The topical approach can run the risk of passing anachronistic judgment upon the past, but equally offers the reward of a scholarship that is fresh, engaged, and responsive to urgent concerns.

The authors of the five essays in this rewarding collection are deeply sensitive to the varieties of meaning attached to the home, then and now, “as a place of habitation and a source of identity” (1), as source of security and refuge, as a site of defiance to hegemonic cultures outside, as a badge of honor or disgrace, as a locus for struggles for power and mastery, and as simple dwelling or entire homeland. They are equally sensitive to the appalling misery, shame, and/or vulnerability of homelessness, whether the result of endemic poverty, misdeeds, or conquest. Moreover, since houses and homes are usually found in groupings, these essays explore the many ways in which different cultures define what it is to live in community.

The subject matter is rich; so, too, are the sources and methodologies deployed. Indeed, although the volume is slim, it constitutes something of a primer on the rapidly expanding ranges of historical inquiry.
and exposition. Patricia Fortini Brown (on Renaissance Venice) explores housing typologies, charity, and approaches to the housing of minority groups. Mary Elizabeth Perry (on sixteenth-century Spain) uses law and physical evidence to examine the ways in which the closed-off house might constitute a “site of resistance” for Jews forced to convert to Christianity (70). Sabine MacCormack (on early modern Spain and Peru) uses legal and literary sources to chart starkly contrasting attitudes and policies toward the poor and the conquered. William Ian Miller (on medieval Iceland) works from legal codes and poetry to look at the fiercely held, often (to the modern reader) exotic beliefs regarding the home in the “Middle of Nowhere.” The poetry and archaeology that inform Nicholas Howe’s essay on Anglo-Saxon England seem to suggest a less passionate sense of place than had the Icelanders; in compensation, the Anglo-Saxons offer a language rich in meanings.

Throughout, as is characteristic of recent scholarship, considerable attention is paid to out-groups—Jews, Moriscos, immigrants, the disposed, and criminals. The book even pays attention to the meanings of home and homelessness beyond the purely human realm, treating spirits, ghosts, and other ethereal dwellers (Miller), as well as the Christian contrast between the heavenly home and the transient earthly existence (Howe). Adding to the variety and attraction of the collection, the essays differ greatly in their poignance. Fortini Brown and Perry are largely concerned with the physical dwelling; MacCormack, with the absence of fixed habitation; and Miller and Howe, with ideologies. Most of the contributions respect traditional norms of narrative and documentation, but Miller’s offers postmodernist virtuosity (the presence of Wayne Gretsky, the hockey player, was both fun and telling). This book is a fine microcosm of contemporary studies.

James S. Grubb
University of Maryland, Baltimore County

*Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University.* By William Clark (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006) 662 pp. $45.00

*Academic Charisma and the Origins of the Research University* is a brilliantly conceived and astonishingly erudite book. Clark deploys two large sociological concepts—charisma and cameralism—to frame the path from the late medieval university to the emergence of the German research university. He looks closely at change in material practices or, one might otherwise say, the everyday practices of university life, to tease out the pattern of change over a long period of time. One cannot but notice the early emergence of both defining characteristics and odd ticks of the contemporary academy. Because neither of Clark’s controlling concepts is sharply defined, however, the strong logic underlying the project is too often lost in a mass of details. It could have been a much better and
shorter book had Clark exercised more rigor in blending historical materials and social theory and more discipline in the writing. It would also have benefited from less abstract language and jargon. The significance of the seminar, one of the key developments that he tracks, is phrased thus: “The German research seminar was an institutionalized technique for the formation of normalized but individualized academic personae” (181).

In short, this book is heavy going, but it is also rewarding. In great detail, Clark shows a series of cumulatively transformative shifts. Broadly speaking, he describes the evolution of a medieval juridical/ecclesiastical institution to a modern political-economic one. As this terminology suggests, he integrates the emergence of the modern university into the story of capitalism (or the particular quasi-administered form denoted “cameralism”) and bureaucratization. Moreover, “like modern capitalism,” he writes, “the research university” cultivated “charismatic figures within a broader sphere of rationalization” (14). More particularly, he shows how examinations evolved from disputation to more informal and spontaneous (compared to medieval, not to our, standards) intellectual exchange, how academic communication moved from orality to writing and ultimately to dissertations, and how formal grading and ranking (responding, in his view, to bureaucratic imperative) came to shape academic life. He also examines at chapter length changes in or the emergence of the lecture catalog, disputation, examinations, the seminar, the Ph.D., the appointment of professors, and the library catalog.

One of the particular strengths of the book derives from the comparisons that Clark makes between the Protestant German system; the English “collegiate” system, which did not evolve into the research university until the twentieth century; and the Jesuit system, which remains collegiate but achieves a meritocratic and bureaucratic efficiency not matched by either of the other two. These comparisons usefully complicate the absolute linearity in too many traditional to modern stories. Since Clark does not propose total transformation, the modern university seems to carry some of its past. It is not wholly modernized or routinized; it is a mixed institution, making it (fortunately) impossible to manage fully, whether by market mechanisms or bureaucracy.

Though a long book, there are many things that Clark declines to address, at some cost. For all of his theoretical sophistication, he seems not interested in theories of causal explanation; the account is descriptive—and richly so—with little attention to the why question. Not unrelated, the story is entirely internal. The social, political, or intellectual contexts beyond the university and state educational bureaucracy do not find a place in this story.

The book raises a final question about method that other books have raised as well. In the past few years, several major interdisciplinary books have dealt with the development in of new genres (novel) or the production of knowledge (natural and social) in the early modern period. Though obviously historical, they are not works of card-carrying
historians; they are in a broad sense historical sociology. The strength in all cases is a powerful theoretical idea, with questions more inventive than those asked by narrative historians. The weakness is the proliferation of facts, stories, episodes too many of which are not—or cannot be—effectively deployed to enrich or verify the theoretical framing. The problem is not the lack of relevant evidence, but rather that its indiscriminate proliferation makes tying it to theory too complex to carry out. Oddly, historians turn out to be more parsimonious than the social scientists. Although historians might do well with more theoretical ambition, historical sociologists might use more self-restraint and rigor to develop a narrative strategy that can strengthen their theoretical claims.

Thomas Bender
New York University

Languages and Communities in Early Modern Europe. By Peter Burke (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004) 210 pp. $70.00 cloth $24.99 paper

Continuing to encourage more scholarly interaction between history and linguistics, Burke has recently explored the dynamic relationship between language and community in the early modern world. He argues that historians should pay more attention to language because it is a powerful and sensitive indicator of cultural change. He considers linguistic developments in various European communities between the rise of print culture and the French Revolution. His series of linked essays—originally presented as lectures—demonstrates how Europe transformed from a medieval system of nonclassical Latin and regional spoken dialects to one of national, written vernaculars by 1750. Burke seeks to debunk any generalizing narratives of linear progress or decline, such as the “rise of vernaculars” or the triumph of French. Instead, he argues for “the constant conflict between centripetal and centrifugal forces, convergence and divergence, assimilation and resistance, discipline and freedom, unity and diversity” in the history of language (13).

Burke begins by demonstrating how, amidst the persistence of Latin, which bound together various communities, such as the Catholic church and the humanist “Republic of Letters,” early modern Europeans began to find merit in the vernacular. This development resulted in “competitions” between various vernaculars as legitimate rivals to Latin or Greek and the slow infiltration of vernaculars into academic and political life. In these battles, some languages and dialects, such as French, became internationally prominent; whereas others such as Occitan and Breton declined. Despite the standardization of vernaculars—encouraged by the development of language academies, dictionaries, and grammars—contacts between languages naturally encouraged linguistic borrowing—for instance, the entrance of African, Arabic, and
American words into European languages. This mixing eventually produced an intense backlash against polyglot culture, resulting in movements toward linguistic purity by the end of the eighteenth century. Certain writers expressed profound anxieties about the “Italianization” of French or the “Frenchification” of Italian. Such resistance to heteroglossia, Burke argues, would eventually form the basis for the nationalization of language in the nineteenth century.

Burke frames his study at the outset with the theoretical apparatus of sociolinguistics, defining such ideas as language culture, speech community, and diglossia that are intended to shape his history of language. These concepts, however, play only a small role in his study; sociolinguistic theories inform Burke’s history or influence his conclusions surprisingly little. In addition, although Burke is the first to acknowledge the problematical nature of the concept of community as it implies homogeneity in a world of continual conflict (5–7), the communities of languages that Burke explores are dizzyingly diverse in time and space, as he moves freely between the worlds of Erasmus and Saint-Simon, Philip II and Colbert. Indeed, the sweeping breadth of this text is both its greatest strength and weakness, appearing at once masterfully researched and, at times, anecdotal. Burke states that his study is not meant to be definitive in any way but rather suggestive of outlines. His greatest contribution might be the seemingly infinite array of potential research topics that he offers for future students and scholars of the social history of language.

Liz Horodowich
New Mexico State University

*Working Women in English Society, 1300–1620.* By Marjorie Keniston McIntosh (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003) 291 pp. $75.00 cloth $32.99 paper

*Working Women in English Society* is a comprehensive account of women’s contributions to the market economy from the fourteenth to the early seventeenth century. In addition to using the standard sources on the subject, McIntosh, an authority on the social and economic history of the period, has broken new ground by exploiting the records of the equity courts to create a more detailed, nuanced picture of her subjects’ lives. She has also looked closely at five well-documented market towns in different regions of England, a strategy that adds the experience of women in these understudied smaller economies to those of the working women in London and in other better-known larger cities such as York, Exeter, and Norwich.

The organization of *Working Women* supports McIntosh’s analysis of women’s work patterns. She discussed their participation in the service
sector of the economy, covering both domestic and financial services, first and their involvement in the skilled crafts last. The majority of working women almost certainly participated in service work at some point in their lives, if not throughout them. McIntosh’s use of equity-court records provides the kind of detail that makes the past come alive.

In her appropriately shorter treatment of women in the skilled crafts, she emphasizes that the few women involved in this sector of the economy were always in precarious, restricted positions. She underscored the small number of female apprentices throughout the period, noting that even these numbers declined by the later sixteenth century. Furthermore, by the latter period, most female apprenticeships no longer filled their original purpose. Instead of teaching women skills, they functioned as a mechanism for taking care of the dependent poor at little cost to the responsible authorities and enabling employers to secure unpaid domestic and agricultural labor.

In addition to providing a full account of women’s work during the late medieval and early modern periods, McIntosh deploys her material to enter the historiographical debates at the center of premodern women’s history. She incorporates both sides of the current controversy about continuity and change into her interpretation, emphasizing continuity in the long durée and change (both improvement and deterioration) in the shorter term. The author clearly agrees with Bennett that patriarchal institutions systematically subordinated women’s work outside their households to their domestic roles, relegating them to poorly paid, insecure, unskilled occupations from which most of them gained little income or respect. Because they functioned as a reserve labor force, however, some women benefited from the demographic disaster caused by the Black death, although McIntosh explicitly rejects drawing an overly rosy picture of its impact.

Overall, the combination of McIntosh’s balanced interpretive judgment and broad treatment of her subject make this essential reading for everyone interested in premodern women’s history.

Barbara J. Harris
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill


This collection investigates the laws regarding servants in all parts of the British Empire during almost five centuries. The approach is regional; sixteen essays of uniformly high quality examine such places as Kenya,
Hong Kong, South Africa, North America, the Caribbean, and India. The servants under study include indentured laborers, slaves, domestic workers, and a host of others who were subject to servant statutes in particular places at particular times. The volume offers an excellent starting point for those interested in the laws governing servants, their history, their transmission, and their application. The essays, moreover, illustrate themes of general importance in labor, legal, colonial, and imperial history.

The English state had a longstanding interest in regulating labor, and in 1562, the different laws concerning servants were codified in the Statute of Artificers, which established the main categories of service. The editors take this law as their starting point and explore statutes regarding servants in their regional and temporal variants. For example, they compiled a database comprising 2,000 of these laws, and analyzed this data to trace the connections between laws in different places and at different times. The result is a unique vantage on the ways in which English laws were exported and adapted to particular colonial settings, to new categories of laborers, and to complex and heterogeneous populations; the connivance of imperial and colonial governments with the interests of employers; and the importance of servant law in defining colonial subjects.

Almost everywhere, the state was deeply invested in supporting the labor market. As the editors observe, “Everywhere the policy of master and servant reflected its medieval genesis in the plague years: it was predicated on labor shortage, and in particular on defeating the tendency of the market to bid up wages” (33). Thus, workers could be punished harshly for failing to do what their masters or employers wished. In 1834, one newly freed slave in Guiana was executed for allegedly challenging the conditions of apprenticeship, and labor action everywhere could be defined as treasonous. But at times, the imperial administration and local governments acted in opposition, as was the case when Parliament abolished slavery despite the resistance of sugar planters in the West Indies. Labor laws enabled colonial and imperial governments to bind workers to their employers, but they also served to sharpen racial, ethnic, and cultural difference.

The individual essays raise questions central to understanding the nature of colonial societies. Who or what, for example, was a servant? Racial and cultural identities, colonial hierarchies, and status were defined within the context of labor laws. In Hong Kong, all Chinese engaged in a range of laboring pursuits were defined as servants, as were non-Chinese people in ten other categories, including Amah and coachman. The essays similarly point to the ways in which laws codified racial and cultural categories. In Kenya, African workers, but not other laborers, remained subject to corporal punishment into the 1930s. In India, Michael Anderson argues, the colonial state infantilized Indian workers, depicting them as “immature, recalcitrant, and incapable of enjoying full
‘freedom’” (422). The collection’s point of departure centers on statutes concerning laborers, and the authors employ these laws to address fundamental questions about the structures and cultures of colonial societies within the British Empire.

Alison Games
Georgetown University


The principal thesis of this book is that the “consumer revolution” that many historians have claimed to find in eighteenth-century England actually commenced a century or more earlier, and that it began not with a “rising bourgeoisie” seeking to improve its status but with luxury consumption by the aristocracy that was widely imitated and encouraged by the state. Peck argues that the business of luxury in seventeenth-century England was not limited to narrow circles around the court but was widespread, continuing even under the Protectorate. It was not really a revolution at all, but a complex, expanding process in which members of the nobility, officials, and aristocratic virtuosi took the leading roles—although she also shows that in the luxury-goods economy, the lines of social distinction were never rigid.

Peck’s method is to present separate studies of particular topics related to luxury consumption and to show how they support, or more often do not support, prominent interpretations of the phenomenon. One chapter, for example, centers a discussion of the development of shopping as a structured activity around the creation of the New Exchange, an endeavor initiated by Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury, chief minister of James I. Peck cites a wide range of sources, primary and secondary, to show that the pattern of enterprise and consumer behavior associated with the New Exchange conforms to any reasonable definition of “shopping” and that shopping can therefore not be considered, as it usually is, a creation of the eighteenth century. The chapter also touches on several other themes: the importance of fashions derived from abroad; the close connections among consumption, taste, fashion, marketing, and politics; and continuity through the era of the Protectorate.

Other chapters deal in similar ways with the creation of luxury demand for exotic commodities, attempts to transfer from the continent technologies for the manufacture of luxury goods, fashions in constructing the built environment, and the involvement of the Royal Society in the expansion of a wide range of luxury trades. A detailed, interesting chapter concerns a funerary monument ordered from, and made in, Rome for installation in a church in Chelsea.
Certain claims that Peck makes—for instance, that the resale of confiscated royal paintings after the execution of Charles I is evidence of the existence of a coherent art market before the late seventeenth century (266–270)—might be worth a quibble. In general, however, she sustains her major thesis convincingly. Her work and other recent studies have broadened the period within which modern consumption patterns can be seen to have emerged and have shown the centrality of elite culture in creating modernity in all its forms.

However, in addition to refuting existing interpretations, she might have tried explicitly to formulate new questions suggested by her rich materials. What does “luxury” actually mean as an early-modern cultural construction, and to what extent did the tensions that were clearly present in it motivate cultural change? How did the use of luxury commodities for aristocratic political competition connect with elite political convergence and the development of the politics of the public sphere? Can we really talk about national luxury markets when transnational exchanges of goods and fashions are central to luxury consumption? But the fact that such questions suggest themselves shows what an important contribution the book makes.

Woodruff D. Smith
University of Massachusetts, Boston


From its very title, this book announces itself as important, nothing less than a retelling of the emergence of modernity. But the use of the expression “modern self” is a bit misleading, because, for Wahrman, “the self” is itself a modern configuration. Attuned to postmodern insight, Wahrman is not talking about twenty-first century notions of personal being. Rather, “the self” was a formation that crystallized in late eighteenth-century England, only to dissolve in the intellectual and cultural tides of the last half century. What was this “self” that is now receding into the past? It was a form of personhood that was psychologically deep, uniquely expressive, and yet essentially rooted in biology.

However, the book spends little time on the actual career of this modern self. Rather, it concerns how the self came into being and how it contrasted with the sort of personhood that was available before it arrived. Most of the book is an elaboration of what Wahrman calls the “ancien régime of identity,” when personal being was marked by greater mobility and play and not so limited by essentialism and biology. Wahrman makes these abstractions palpable by examining the categories of gender, race, and class, showing in each case how, for most of the
eighteenth century, identities were not as fixed as they later became, how ideas about identity and various practices that manifested them tolerated movement across boundaries and experiments in transformation. Suddenly (and the suddenness matters a lot to Wahrman), in the 1780s, identity options closed down. Identity categories became more rigid, and what had been tolerated became a form of transgression or, as the discourses of identity became more scientific, a violation of the natural order.

Wahrman’s work is both impressive and debatable; if nothing else, it is exciting to read. He brings a wide range of materials to bear on the questions at stake—classical and modern poetry, novels, scientific treatises, prescriptive literature, and canonical and sub-canonical works of philosophical, social, and political thought—to identify underlying patterns of thinking. He looks at fashion and other cultural practices (the masquerade is the quintessential expression of the ancien régime of identity). He also uses visual examples, which are not merely illustrative but carry weight as autonomous evidence. Wahrman reflects interestingly on the methodology of cultural analysis and history: He asks what constitutes evidence and demonstration and employs a range of techniques from “collage” to quantification. The entire book is knit together by a rhetoric that is both bold and self-questioning, though, in the end, boldness wins out in the form of a synthesis that aspires to be the new master narrative of modern cultural history.

Readers will be debating at least four questions about Wahrman’s accomplishment. First, does he establish the basic pattern of change from play to rigidity across identity categories? His research and analysis of the discourse of gender is fine-grained and convincing, based on the examination of hundreds of prologues and epilogues to plays the discursive content of which Wahrman tries to quantify. His case about race is far less definitive, and his findings about class are merely suggestive. Moreover, Wahrman admits that national and religious identity fail to fit the pattern. Hence, his insistence that the foundation of all identity was transformed is belied by his own evidence.

Second, does Wahrman establish the sharp transition on which he insists? The evidence of a rapid shift in ideas about gender is impressive, but Wahrman admits that the discourses of race and class evolved over an extended period. Even regarding gender, he gives no reason to think that the “gender panic” of the 1780s did not subside or, more generally, that the rigidification in identity was irreversible.

Third, does Wahrman establish that changes in the discourse of identity categories constituted a change in the nature of personal being? Even if Wahrman had shown that all of the discourses of identity underwent the same change (and he has not), he would not thereby demonstrate a change in the ontology of personal existence, in the behavioral and expressive capacities of human persons.

Fourth, what is the relevance of English experience in the 1780s
(largely in response to the trauma of the American Revolution) to global modernity? For all that is striking and innovative about this book, casting the English as the pioneers of global modernity is dispiritingly familiar.

Lawrence E. Klein
University of Cambridge


This rich book explores the colonial exchanges and interplays between Scotland and New Zealand as they were articulated through material objects of both Maori and European (especially Scottish) manufacture. It traces these entwined histories from the European “voyages of discovery” of the eighteenth century to the representation of colonial, settler, and crosscultural histories in the modern museum. Central to the argument is the Maori concept of *taonga* (cultural treasure) and its importance to the social relations between people and things and people and people. The ways in which the concept has been observed, applied, appropriated, ignored, abused, misunderstood, refigured, or exploited over time constitutes the history of the entanglement of Maori and settler histories and the attendant movement of objects.

This fascinating story reveals how the Maori experience of European settlement and the energetic Scottish settler experience of New Zealand brought traditional Maori values and those of, for instance, the Scottish Enlightenment, together in ways that continue to resonate through Maori/pakeha (white) relations and the dynamics of objects within this relation. Parallels are also drawn between the accounts and representations of Highlander experience in Scotland and those of the Maori. The cultural politics of both these contentious histories are woven together or resonate with each other, creating a critical space in which to discuss the construction of cultural identities and the telling of histories.

Methodologically, the work sits between anthropology, with its fieldwork and material-culture approaches, to the entangled histories of museum collections, and history itself. Although the subject matter is more conventionally historical, Henare is much stronger on the detailed “ethnography,” whether in bringing together detailed accounts of Maori/settler relations in the early nineteenth century, or accounts of the social dynamics of museum collections encountered through her fieldtrips, which punctuate the book. However, sometimes the disciplines sit uncomfortably together because of the density of the material and its extension over several fields.

Henare explores a vast domain that encompasses almost every intel-
lectual movement from Adam Smith’s economic models through popular Darwinism to contemporary programs of cultural recuperation and commemoration. These broad sweeps demand not a superficial summary but a distillation and density to give clarity of meaning and insight. Too often the broad, “positioning” sections are reduced to bland summaries, of almost journalistic style, which leave too many questions unanswered. Much of the theoretical positioning on exchange, commodity, or social biography of objects from anthropology gets lost in the larger narrative.

Significantly, Henare does not cite some of the key practitioners of crosscultural anthropological history or historical anthropology, such as Dening or Douglas, even though their work is a model of how to handle the differences of scale in contact and crosscultural histories. In many ways this volume should have been two books, not split along traditional disciplinary lines but according to theme. Despite the comprehensiveness, too many avenues are left undeveloped, and in some places, the slotting together of ideas is far from seamless, as if they need more time to mature and cohere.

Nonetheless, this fascinating volume pulls together a mass of diverse and often little-known material, telling a complex and revealing story in an unusual and convincing way. It offers multiple levels of interest within a wide range of historical fields and demonstrates, through its anthropological conceptualization, the incontrovertible interconnectedness of two apparently disparate histories throughout a long period.

Elizabeth Edwards
University of the Arts, London

Health and Wealth: Studies in History and Policy. By Simon Szreter (Rochester, University of Rochester Press, 2005) 345 pp. $90.00 cloth $35.00 paper

In this volume, Szreter collects ten already published essays the main organizing theme of which is to challenge and replace the work of McKeown on causes for the decline in mortality in England and Wales during the nineteenth century. A specialist in print sources on local and national government in nineteenth-century England, Szreter adds discussion of how England developed social capital and, in the last chapter, a new essay on the lessons of history regarding the association between economic growth and advances in health.1

McKeown argued that greater material prosperity led to better nutrition, which resulted in mortality’s retreat. Szreter’s correction is that

1 For example, Greg Dening, History’s Anthropology: The Death of William Gooch (Lanham, 1988); Bronwen Douglas, Across the Great Divide (Amsterdam, 1998)
1 Thomas McKeown, The Role of Medicine: Dream, Mirage or Nemesis (Princeton, 1979).
public-health improvements played the leading part in this retreat in nineteenth-century England, which both authors regard as the key place and period, especially from 1870 to 1900. Many of Szreter’s arguments are persuasive, at least in reasserting the importance of public-health improvements in the new industrial cities of the nineteenth century, where rapid population growth initially outpaced the capacity of town amenities to protect health. Many readers will also cherish Szreter’s condemnation of the 1980s-style disinclination of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund to value developing country investments in public health, education, and health services.

But the larger purpose of this collection is undermined by Szreter’s confidence, which almost exactly repeats McKeown’s confidence. Both authors believe that what happened in England in the nineteenth century holds a key toward understanding gains in survival across the world since then, as well as toward understanding today’s circumstances in countries and sub-populations where mortality remains high. As Szreter shows, England was already in many ways an advanced society around 1870. The English possessed the wealth, engineering talent, effective local government, and expert judgment required to create the sanitary revolution and the other changes in local government that accompanied it. Moreover, English householders accepted the idea of paying for the improvements that they made in their own homes and, via taxes, for public improvements. But most of the rest of the world has not yet fashioned either England’s water and sewage disposal improvements, its level of wealth, or its adept systems of local and national government. Some of the countries that have not done so suffer mightily in the health of their citizens; others have life expectancies nearly as high as those of England and Wales today.

In the realm of social capital, too, Szreter believes that nineteenth-century English experience provides a model for other times and places. The English made progress slowly, letting the growth of institutions gradually lead to the registration of vital events and the creation of local governments able to organize health amenities. Specifically, England created a civil registration system and generalized social security, and it guaranteed certain political liberties—elections, freedom of association, and a free press.

One mistake that McKeown made was to focus attention on the nineteenth century rather than on the period from 1900 to 1950 when England and Wales made rapid gains in survival. Szreter repeats this error. Another of McKeown’s mistakes was to assume that discovering how England made modest improvements in population survival during the nineteenth century would unlock the survival puzzle for all places and periods. Szreter repeats this error as well. His arguments are simply too unmindful of the realities of low incomes and poor health in developing countries during the twentieth century, and in poorly served sub-populations in middle- and high-income countries.
Since low survival prospects still obtain for many people, it is well past time to set aside debates on what happened in nineteenth-century England, and to take up the problems faced by people who confront abridged survival today from a foundation of detailed understanding of their experiences.

James C. Riley
Indiana University, Bloomington

*Servants of the Poor: Teachers and Mobility in Ireland and Irish America.* By Janet Nolan (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 2004) 191 pp. $45.00 cloth $18.00 paper

The emigrant stream from Ireland to the United States from 1840 to 1940 was unusual for the number of young, unmarried women that in certain decades exceeded the number of male immigrants. This book tells the story of women who had National School educations in Ireland and how they used this social capital to make careers for themselves as schoolteachers in Ireland and the United States.

The author draws upon historical and contemporary sources, including archival materials and autobiographical accounts made at the time or in retrospect, and a number of interviews with surviving witnesses, including the experiences of three generations of her own family. Secondary published materials are also extensively quoted. The aim is to show how the educational system in Ireland, in particular the English-language National Schools system—the first system of state-sponsored public education in the United Kingdom, dating from 1833—provided young people, especially girls, with a set of skills (most significantly, a high level of literacy in English) that could be deployed to good effect in America. Those who succeeded in becoming teachers exploited one of the few opportunities for women to become white-collar professionals. Irish-born women and their daughters became public-school teachers in disproportionate numbers in several American cities, challenging the Protestant hegemony of the time. Their battle to overcome religious prejudice and their eventually successful fights for professional recognition, tenure, pensions, and equality with male teachers are the main storylines.

This engaging and highly readable book demonstrates the place of Irish immigrant women schoolteachers in American labor history. However, it might have been longer; it is more in the nature of an essay than a full-length monograph. The scope is limited, being focused on the public-school system and lay women teachers in mostly the western and southern counties of Ireland until the 1910s and in three large American cities (Boston, San Francisco, and Chicago) from 1890 or so. Catholic schools and religious women in both countries are largely left out of ac-
count. Although the title prominently includes the word “mobility,” the book devotes little space to this concept, offering no extended treatment of the cultural and social dimensions of economic and geographical mobility. No theoretical works on social mobility are cited in the bibliography.

Nolan would have made a major contribution to the literature had she shown how these first-generation Irish immigrant women converted the cultural and economic capital of their extended English-language educations and relatively well-paid positions as teachers into the practical expressions of higher social status. This capital would, for example, have greatly enhanced their marriage prospects and given them the wherewithal to marry up the social scale. These women would also have had higher rates of hypergamy and heterogamy; their marriage choices likely would have shown greater selectivity for American-born men (not necessarily of Irish ancestry, or fellow Catholics) in higher-status occupations. Their American-born daughters who became teachers (whether of mixed ancestry or not) would also have had a higher propensity to marry up and out.

Maybe the author will, in her next book, report about the Irish and Irish-ancestry religious women in the Catholic school system in the United States. The idea of “vocation” could turn out to be at least as significant as “profession” in explaining why so many Irish-ancestry, Catholic-educated women saw teaching and nursing as ideal careers. An analysis of their marriage choices would be a good test of their mobility across the boundaries of class and confessional. Such a sequel might well cast its geographical net more widely to include places that are not already so well covered in the literature on Irish America.

Reginald Byron
University of Wales


The Jews of France, who were the first in Europe to be emancipated, are often seen as a laboratory model for the process of Jewish liberation. But, like every other case in Europe, France had its own singular conditions and its Jews had their own singular characteristics. The commonly received narrative holds that the French Revolution constituted a radical watershed in the history of the French Jews, wrenching them out of a quasimedieval existence and thrusting them into modernity.

Berkovitz contests this narrative in his erudite and extensively researched book. Following Shochat’s path-breaking—and still controversial—study of German Jews in the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries, Berkovitz argues that the Ashkenazic communities of Metz and Alsace, as well as the Sephardic communities of southern France, were already exhibiting various signs of modernity in the century and a half before the Revolution. Like Shochat, he points to increasingly tolerant interaction with Christians, the breakdown of communal authority in such areas as sexual morality and dress, and shifts of authority from rabbis to lay leaders. In the analytically most interesting argument in the book, he claims that the shift of authority enabled policies that were informed less by traditional legal categories than by a new sense of a “public interest” independent of religious values. In addition, the Alsatian community began to distinguish itself from its Ashkenazi cultural matrix to the east, thus forming the basis for a modern national French Jewish community.

For the period after the Revolution, Berkovitz offers similarly contrarian interpretations. Far from immediately improving the Jews’ lot, the Revolution at times worsened it, retarding modernization, because of the general chaos caused by the Reign of Terror, anti-religious outbursts generally, and anti-Jewish sentiments stirred up by the Revolution. Many traditional Jews, such as yeshivah students and rabbis, fled France. But the Jews also embraced the revolutionary idea of régénération, which was often used by their enemies, as a motto for moderate reform. Under this slogan, the Jews believed that they could transform aspects of their lives without discarding the traditionalist core. New rituals were developed that identified traditional Jewish values with the patrie. If the Jews of pre-Revolutionary France were protomodern, the post-Revolutionary Jewish community held to traditional mores much longer than has previously been admitted.

Berkovitz also offers a radical interpretation of the famous Napoleonic Sanhedrin. Whereas other interpreters have seen the Jews’ responses to the emperor as servile and apologetic, Berkovitz claims that many of their positions were rooted in rabbinic innovations regarding Jewish-Christian relations from the centuries before the Revolution.

Although much of this book is straightforward social, political, and intellectual history, Berkovitz also stakes a claim to an anthropological approach in his title. He gives an interesting account of the folkloric traditions of the Alsatian Jews, especially the ones surrounding life-cycle issues, which were not greatly different from those among other European, and non-European, Jewish communities—belief in demons, use of amulets, etc. On this level, the pre-Revolutionary Alsatian Jews hardly anticipated modernity; nor had they begun to differentiate themselves nationally. Berkovitz also sketches out, though more briefly, some of the new rituals of the nineteenth century, such as the confirmation rite. However, his thesis that the Revolution constituted less than an abrupt caesura might well lead to the supposition that the older rituals

1 Azriel Shochat, *Im Hilufei ha-Tekufot* (Jerusalem, 1960).
and practices persisted into the nineteenth century. When did they disappear? Why? The ritual approach that Berkovitz promises is only partly fulfilled.

Berkovitz’s thesis is intriguing, but it suffers from some of the same defects as Shochat’s. That preachers attacked public morals may say more about the preachers than about the morals. Changes in communal power may look like incipient modernization, but such changes have occurred in earlier periods. More persuasive is Berkovitz’s argument that the Revolution was less than an unmitigated blessing for the Jews, which is a most important corrective to a widespread convention.

David Biale
University of California, Davis

*Divided Houses: Religion and Gender in Modern France.* By Caroline Ford (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2005) 170 pp. $35.00

*Divided Houses* is an engaging account of the dynamics of gender, law, and religion in nineteenth-century France. Ford shows how the feminization of religion affected the civil and political status of women, and, especially, how it impacted French republican secular culture.

Ford opens by describing the increasingly negative associations of women with religion during the French Revolution. Specialists of the period may find her discussion rushed, but it sets the stage for her analysis of nineteenth-century interactions. The rest of the book is constructed around four microhistories: the case of an adolescent who converted to Catholicism despite her Protestant father’s opposition; the emergence of a cult of a new saint; and the stories of two nuns, one of whom charged her order with incarcerating her against her will, and the other of whom left her convent and demanded the return of her property. A brief epilogue relates these cases to contemporary debates about whether Muslim girls should be allowed to wear the veil in French schools.

Ford combines approaches from religious, cultural, legal, and gender history. She pays particular attention to the literary qualities of her sources, showing how courtroom narratives and religious devotions drew on tropes of melodrama. She also reveals some constraints on these narratives, such as the challenges of adapting a rhetoric of paternal authority to protest a girl’s religious conversion or applying captivity narratives to a nun who ultimately wanted to remain in her order.

More generally, Ford uses these cases to explore nineteenth-century ideas about power and rights. She argues that because female religious congregations were not covered by the Napoleonic Civil Code and had an ambiguous legal status, women religious could sometimes subvert juridical constructions of paternal authority. Although her protagonists were not feminists, she depicts them as thoughtful users of a postrevo-
volutionary language of individual rights. In contrast to common views of such women as passive or archaic, she suggests that they might have had more freedom to choose where to live or how to dispose of their property than their counterparts in civil society. She also shows that courtroom themes of claustration and religious seduction fed French anticlericalism, and she highlights the threats that female religious congregations and female religiosity seemed to pose to both state and family authority.

Any microhistorical approach faces the question of “representativeness.” Ford argues convincingly that although the people that she discusses are exceptional, their cases drew considerable public attention and resonated with broad social anxieties. However, she might have justified her selection further, particularly her decision to combine three legal conflicts with an analysis of a new saint. Saint Philomène’s cult is clearly part of the feminization of religion and connects to some of Ford’s other themes; she notes, for example, the attraction of the growing number of women with religious vocations to an adolescent martyr revered for sexual purity. But the saint still fits oddly with Ford’s general focus on legal drama. There are also some curious gaps. That Ford’s archival materials in this book are Parisian leaves open the question of how such conflicts played out beyond the capital and in cases that did not reach central authorities. She says little about the archetypical enemy of French republicans—priests, and their real or imagined role in nineteenth-century conflicts over family, law, and politics.

Although the book’s title invokes the sweep of “Modern France,” Ford concentrates on the period from the 1820s through the 1860s. She insists on the historical specificity of her cases, noting that a trial for unjust incarceration of a nun would not have played out the same way a century earlier or later, and that the cult of Saint Philomène belonged to the early nineteenth century, essentially disappearing by World War I. Ford’s microhistorical approach, however, is inherently discontinuous. It can make it difficult to identify longer-term developments and assess how much changed from the early nineteenth century to its end. The motors of change or continuity after the Revolution are particularly obscure. Ford analyzes certain broad developments in the nineteenth century that affected contemporary debates—like changes in the legal status of women’s religious communities—but her cases are more revelatory as sites of tension and negotiation than as decisive turning points.

Overall, however, this is a lively, provocative, and readable book. Ford illuminates the distinctive development of the French version of secular republicanism, and she provides a series of useful lenses for reflecting more widely about the intersections of gender, power, and religion.

Jennifer Heuer
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Police Stories offers a panoramic view of policing in France under three regimes of the first half of the nineteenth century—the Bourbon Restoration, the July Monarchy, and the Second Republic. The focus is on the commissaire de police (cp), the period’s central figure of local policing, and on provincial France, with some comparative examples from the Paris region. This primarily social history of police and policing addresses two main topics. The first is a portrait of the cps and their conditions, especially in the Restoration and July Monarchy periods. In this context, the subtle interplay of patronage, political loyalty, and competence is evident in the constitution and evaluation of police personnel, and letters requesting appointment or appealing dismissal illuminate professional identity often with poignant autobiographical detail.

The second topic is a tour de France of police work that visits the important places, notably markets and urban toll gates (octrois), and witnesses ordinary conditions and situations, such as begging, prostitution, strikes and workers’ associations, theater going, food prices, peddling and vagabondage, and café and cabaret life. Some valuable observations and insights emerge. For example, the rapid growth of urban peripheries (faubourgs)—a phenomenon well known thanks largely to the author’s previous work—contributes to the progressive bureaucratization and centralization of local policing. Communication between authorities in Paris and rural mayors, to regulate flows of migrants in response to changing economic conditions, reveals a de facto nationalization of policing before the advent of formalized control by the central state.

Faithful to its title, the panorama takes in a multitude of individual cases, stories or parts of stories gleaned from a treasure trove of such archival and published contemporary sources as police memoirs, manuals, and proposals for reform. The effect is a rich, complex and multihued tapestry of impressions and evidence that flesh out and enrich existing studies of police institutions. New empirical knowledge from the French provincial case, rather than any significant institutional analysis of its own, is the study’s main contribution. One exception is the account of the conflict between the municipalities and the central state over control of the cp, which ended in favor of the state. Workers’ insurrections, such as those of the early July Monarchy, also hastened centralization. The analysis of the contribution of these factors to the building of the French state is first-rate.

New knowledge supports certain generalizations of particular interdisciplinary interest: growing professionalism of cp appointment, function, and sense of career; the surprisingly routine nature of most police work, amid a constant obsession with political surveillance and fear of

social disorder from outsiders and, increasingly, from militant workers; a peculiar type of administrative tension between the central state’s control of police appointments and the municipalities’ responsibility for paying police salaries; and a broad continuity with Old Regime (pre-revolutionary) patterns. These generalizations have relevance for comparative police studies, for study of the professions, and for administrative history. The ever-present archival research and the vivid presentation of its results are likely to attract historians and humanists inclined to savor the texture of the concrete instance and the well-told anecdote, of which Police Stories offers an abundance.

George J. Sheridan, Jr.
University of Oregon


In this outstanding collection, twelve leading scholars of Spanish North America reflect on coercive and other means of social control. As David J. Weber notes in the foreword, the ruling colonial ideal was for Indians and Spaniards to live in separate spheres, but for everyone to reside in towns dominated by the rich and well-born. The authors describe variations on that theme in eighteenth-century local communities.

In a study of the frontier society of Alta California, James A. Sandos employs gender theory, as developed by Bederman, to show how the wronged wife of the province’s governor manipulated ambiguities in the system of social control to salvage her self-respect. The governor’s error was to be caught sleeping with an Indian servant, and racial mixture is a recurring theme throughout the book. Julianna Barr offers a good discussion of racial intermarriage between Caddos and Europeans on the early Texas–Louisiana frontier. Focusing on the elite of Saltillo, José Cuello demonstrates how racial exclusion was practiced in the white marriage market of a typical colonial community. By contrast, Cynthia Radding stresses the defiance of racial barriers by Indian women who intermarried in Sonora and Arizona. In an exceptionally lucid synthesis of racial and class analysis, Frank shows how class gradually supplanted race as the basic social architecture of New Mexico during the eighteenth century. He describes the elaboration of racial discourse about ancestral mixtures becoming so confused and arbitrary that it collapsed by 1800, to be supplanted by the simple distinction between Hispanic town dwellers (vecinos), and all others.

Those who like their social history served raw will be at home in this book. Ethnohistory is interdisciplinary by definition, but these writ-

ers are not in search of theoretical innovations. They rely primarily on administrative reports in Spanish archives and well-tested methods of analysis. An exception is the fine first chapter, in which Alfredo Jiménez describes Spanish Americans as less coerced by the church and state than persuaded by their own self-imposed social control, inspired by a deep reverence for Catholicism and His Most Catholic Majesty. By that means, he argues, the empire’s subjects acquired a collective voice that “qualified” the king’s power and forced the Crown “to take into consideration the expectations of its subjects” (21). If this popular power was weak by comparison to that of Anglo-American colonists, with their elected governments, it also meant that individual choices were more negotiable than Spanish imperial authorities would have preferred.

Other regions covered include Florida (Jane Landers), Spanish Louisiana (Gilbert C. Din), Nueva Vizcaya (Susan M. Deeds), Northeastern New Spain (Cecilia Sheridan), and Nuevo Santander (Patricia Osante). One problem in the book is the failure to give the military apparatus enough attention. After all, standing garrisons of regular army soldiers provided the ultimate coercive power in the empire. An outline map of the region would also have been helpful. Nonetheless the writers in this volume cooperated to pursue common themes far more successfully than those in most collections.

Thomas N. Ingersoll
Ohio State University, Lima


Historians of medieval and early modern Europe have long studied the sumptuary laws regulating clothing and expenditures on such family celebrations as weddings. They generally view them as rooted in concerns about public morality, excessive spending on luxuries, the elision of social distinctions, and protection of the local economy. Hence, these laws prohibited low necklines, twelve-course dinners, fur on anyone who was not a noble, and imported wines. In this study, Stuard examines the earliest such laws, from the cities of northern Italy in the early fourteenth century, finding a different origin for them.

The earliest sumptuary laws focused on women, and, to a lesser degree, on young people of both sexes, not because they were the most egregious consumers of luxury goods but because fashion was properly the province of men. Affluent adult men cinched their clothing with enameled buttons and gilded belts to make it more form-fitting; accessorized outfits with multicolored hats and sleeves; added bling with gold-threaded ribbons, silver chains, and inlaid buckles; and hung real or or-
namental weaponry from a broad-linked metal belt. Fine clothes, and the latest styles, were a symbol of the power and gravitas of those who made the laws, and who were, at least initially, beyond their reach. Well-dressed adult men displaying themselves in city streets did not signify frivolity but marked a community’s wealth and status. Sumptuary laws were thus originally designed to prevent women from mimicking men in their creation of fashion. Only later did they come to have other moral, economic, and social purposes.

In advancing her argument, Stuard draws on far more than sumptuary laws and the pronouncements against le pompe by preachers and moralists. She uses artistic evidence, including the clothes worn by various side figures in religious images, and household inventories to discover what people were actually wearing. She analyzes tradesmen’s account books, contracts, and other sorts of financial records to determine what these clothes cost and who might have made them, embellished them, and remade them to keep up with the latest styles. Comparing the price of both basic and luxury items with the cost of living, Stuard finds that luxuries were often far more expensive than necessities—far more than most people could ever hope to afford.

Her analysis is pertinent to recent debates in economic history, such as those about the effects of the Black Death and the bullion shortage in the late-medieval economy. It speaks to current areas of concern among art historians and cultural theorists as well, including patterns of patronage and the role of clothing in the “self-fashioning” of new identities. Drawing on her own earlier work on Ragusa/Dubrovnik, Stuard incorporates discussion of silver production in the Balkans into the story, and details the careers of individual merchants involved in aspects of the luxury trade.¹

_Gilding the Market_ effectively links the material and cultural, showing that fashionable clothing is not simply a matter of visual discourse and self-representation but a primary item of exchange, often produced under dreadful conditions. Stuard comments that had the men of Florence, Venice, Genoa, Milan, and Bologna actually seen themselves—there were no mirrors in the fourteenth century—they might have toned down their attire. Today, mirrors are everywhere, but men sporting gold chains (or gold watches) and eying each other for sartorial signals of allegiance to a particular group (or a particular designer) have not vanished from city streets.

Merry Wiesner-Hanks
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee


The eighteenth century is one of the most closely researched and fiercely contested periods in modern Italian history. As much as fascism and more than the Risorgimento, it is the ground on which Italian historians have fought their weightiest ideological battles. Yet the fact that only a small number of the major Italian studies have been translated into English presents a dual problem for non-Italian researchers—first to find something new to say and then how to present it to anglophone readers for whom this richly charted and heavily mined territory is likely to be terra incognita.

Wahnbaeck’s study of how European debates on luxury affected Italian economic thinkers is a valiant attempt to walk this tightrope, though it fares better on the second than on the first count. He starts with a clear summary of current Italian research and debates and then re-traces the European debates about luxury from Bernard Mandeville’s *Fable of the Bees* (1723), which reflects on how luxury consumption can stimulate production; through the commentaries of David Hume, Adam Smith, Jean-Francois Melon, Voltaire, and the Physiocrats; and finally to Jean-Francois de Saint-Lambert’s “Un Essai sur le luxe” in Denis Diderot’s *Encyclopédie* (Paris, 1764), ix.

This approach establishes a useful comparative platform from which to explore the reactions of Italian economic writers. Wahnbaeck emphasizes how, in translation, these debates were adapted to local conditions and concerns. For Ludovico Antonio Muratori, in *Della pubblica felicità* (Modena, 1749) Mandeville’s discussion of private vice and public virtues was an incentive for enlightened Catholic thinkers to take the practical and pragmatic issues of economic development seriously. In Naples, by contrast, initial enthusiasm for the idea that luxury would stimulate production gave way to moral doubts. Tuscany proved much more receptive first to Muratori’s pragmatic economics and to the ideas of the French Physiocrats. The Tuscans’ pragmatism, Wahnbaeck notes, reflected the partnership between the government of Peter Leopold and the provincial elites, and he draws attention to the role of the periodical press in the emergence of new forms of public discourse in the Grand Duchy.

In Austrian Lombardy, by contrast, governance came from Vienna. Wahnbaeck sees in the economic writings of the leading Lombard writers—Beccaria and Verri, the founder of the Milanese journal *Il Caffè* and the famous *Academia dei Pugni*—an imprint of the more autocratic organization of power in Habsburg Lombardy. Verri, Wahnbaeck claims, finally moved the debates about luxury beyond an impasse that

1 See, for example, Cesare Beccaria, *Elementi di Economia Pubblica* (Milan, 1804); Pietro Verri, *Meditazioni sulla felicità* (Milan, 1764).
vacillated between economics and morality by making interest rates the prime mover of economic growth.

Wahnbaeck’s claim needs to be measured against Capra’s masterly new biography of Verri.\(^2\) In general, Wahnbaeck’s discussion of the Italian economic writers is most useful as a commentary on other interpreters—among them Cochrane, whose work, rightly, he frequently cites.\(^3\) The three vignettes on Naples, Tuscany, and Lombardy illustrate the author’s insistence that there were many Italian Enlightenments, while obviously not covering them all. Even for this trio the treatment is rather unequal, however, and in comparison with Tuscany both Naples and Lombardy get short shrift.

The Italian debates on luxury enable Wahnbaeck to set Italy’s Enlightenments in their wider European and historiographical contexts. This concise and well-edited book will be of interest to historians of economic ideas and eighteenth-century culture in general.

John A. Davis
University of Connecticut

Love and Death in Renaissance Italy. By Thomas Cohen (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2004) 320 pp. $27.50

The social history of early modern Italy has produced important works the significance of which stretches beyond the confines of time and place. The sources are rich and the characters colorful. The lives of “everyday” Friulians or Florentines have provided scholars with opportunities to ponder larger questions like the nature of knowledge, the significance of honor, and the place of faith in premodern Europe. Hence, Cohen is not the first to take a microhistorical approach to early modern Italian matters. What sets his book apart, and what may interest readers of this journal in particular, is his play with different literary forms in the process of historical reconstruction.

Cohen is searching for new ways of interpreting and relaying episodes of social history. Thus, one story, he tells us, will take the form of textual soap opera; another an “epistolary novelette” (7). The sources themselves are traditional for social microhistories—primarily trial records from a major Roman tribunal. But Cohen teases out the individual stories’ distinctiveness while experimenting with different forms of literary and, more generally, cultural expression.

Cohen’s engagement is primarily with these methodological approaches rather than with broader historical issues of early modern Italy. The conclusions that he ventures are always interesting (for example, his discussion of competing notions of male honor and Christian mercy), but analysis clearly takes a back seat to story.

\(^3\) See, for example, Eric W. Cochrane, Italy, 1530–1630 (New York, 1988).
Cohen’s strategy is to present his stories with a variety of methodologies and largely to refrain from interpreting them. Nevertheless, patterns appear. One theme that emerges is the difficult position of women. Cohen rightly highlights the actions of certain women as well as the layered (and thus at times contested) nature of their oppression: Women are murdered by enraged husbands, bullied on their deathbeds by greedy brothers, and raped as teenagers by powerful neighbors. Early modern Rome emerges as a place of brutality.

Cohen’s lively style and evident delight accentuates the piquancy of his stories. The most interesting case is that of Vittoria Giustini, a teenager whose dying disposition of her estate created family battles among her siblings, including a swordfight. Cohen takes the risky step of recreating the drama as a theatrical dialogue (based on testimony from different family members), complete with stage directions.

This book is both charmingly accessible and maddeningly elusive. For one thing, Cohen makes no attempt to tie the different stories together. Playing with different representational models and concerned with issues of textuality and metonymy, Cohen frames each story with questions before launching into his colorful and dramatic narrative. His breezy, chatty style is well suited to the form that he wants these tales to take.

Monica Chojnacka
University of Georgia


Burke’s rich and provocative Changing Patrons shows how much can be learned about lesser and less documented Renaissance patrons through an observant eye, a firm grasp of the literatures of both history and art history, and archival research of impressive breadth and depth. The patronage of the Nasi and Del Pugliese families of fifteenth-century Florence conformed broadly to a familiar pattern, including the decoration of churches; palace building; and the acquisition of objects for domestic use, and of medals, portraits, and manuscripts. Burke considers how these activities manifested their “identity and social status” in the customary contexts of the self-fashioning of the lineage, and of neighborhood, civic, and religious communities (12).

At the same time, she inverts or re-frames certain key questions about the production of art, and distinguishes current usages of “patronage” from a more “meaningful” concept of “art patronage” new to the quattrocento. Reacting against an exaggerated notion of “the patron as artist,” she frequently shifts her focus from the individual activities of patrons or artists—terms that she studiously avoids—to the audience, and
the cooperation of collectivities, particularly clergy and neighborhood, in ecclesiastical patronage. Her account of the important but neglected issue of *ius patronatus* is especially enlightening. However, she does not consider this concept as a *locus classicus* of the relationship between “clientelismo” and “mercenatismo” (personal and artistic patronage) as means of social and self-definition.

Lacking the personal documentation of letters and diaries illuminating Medici, Rucellai, or Strozzi patronage, Burke skillfully foregrounds visual and material evidence. Many of her suggestions—for example, that the Nasi purchased the old and imposingly sited Mozzi palace to burnish their image as an ambassadorial family—are imaginative and plausible, but necessarily speculative. Her aim to re-define patronage is not advanced by attributing agency to the object itself, though indubitably the work of art also defines the patron, but often her focus on the object and its devotional purpose, as opposed to the patron’s or artist’s role in its creation, yields fresh insights. She re-locates Savonarola’s influence on painting from prescriptions in texts to functions of images, and observes that Pietro Perugino’s *Apparition of Saint Bernard to the Virgin* for the Nasi, and Filippino Lippi’s painting of the same subject in the same period for Piero del Pugliese, are “differing visions” because “one celebrates the potency of sight, the other of the written word” (149).

Sometimes Burke’s diverse aims and complex analyses appear contradictory. She relates Piero del Pugliese’s interest in collecting and copying books to their prominence in the complex and personal program of Lippi’s *St. Bernard* altarpiece, which includes a portrait of the donor. She also discerns in the choice of saints depicted in Piero di Cosimo’s altarpieces for Lecceto and the Innocenti expressions of Del Pugliese’s commitment to charity, represented by St. Elizabeth of Hungary and St. Nicholas, whom she calls Del Pugliese’s “alter ego” because that saint also bears his features. Nevertheless, she doubts that “meaningful” patronage relationships existed between her families and the artists who worked for them, and questions whether an individual should be considered “the ‘patron’ of religious ‘art’” at all (137).

She also suggests, on the basis of one of the most remarkable of the many interesting objects associated with her two families—Filippino Lippi’s double portrait of himself and Piero del Pugliese—that the novel concept of “art patronage” arose from a new friendship between patrons and artists that replaced “patronage” with “sincere” affection, a distinction that even Florentines found difficult to make. Several of Burke’s stimulating proposals might fruitfully be tempered by anthropological insights absent from her interdisciplinary armory, a more historical evaluation of sources, language that is far more than “hyperbolic” (108), and a sharper awareness of the importance of exact dates in charting change.

Dale Kent
University of California, Riverside

Swett’s excellent study shows how confrontation and violence between rival political militias in Berlin contributed to the dissolution of the Weimar Republic. Making extensive use of the methods of both urban history and urban sociology, Swett paints a portrait of an overcrowded working-class area of the Kreuzberg district characterized by five-story tenement buildings, courtyards stocked with livestock, a ubiquitous culture of drinking centered on the local pubs, and patriarchal violence against women in marriage. The social and generational crisis precipitated by World War I made matters worse. Unemployed youths found themselves in the streets for much of the day, facing both poverty and potential loss of dignity and self-respect. There they formed gangs.

The setting for the rise in gang violence was, paradoxically, the more stable neighborhoods. With the stagnation of the economy came a decline in migration to the cities. As people moved to cheaper apartments for economic reasons, neighbors continued to be in contact or to recognize each other. Though violence between Communist and Nazi gangs may have made use of political slogans, the driving issues were personal and “neighborly”: who controlled which streets, which pubs, and which women. Like street gangs in the United States, the Berlin militia members had a clearly articulated set of rules about how to interact when violence became an option and about which types of violence were legitimate. In short, the violence that Swett describes was not a chaotic product of anomie but a relatively structured set of actions governing a community in crisis.

As Swett observes, even Communists and Nazis directly involved in street fights often gave local rather than political reasons for their actions. Political ideology did not drive the culture of violence. Swett shows how little local Communists were under direct control of central leadership, for example, and how at times Nazi leaders had to restrain their street fighters. But politics mattered. The Republic whose capital was Berlin was strongly associated with the Social Democrats (SPD). Police and social workers associated with the SPD appeared to threaten the social order of the neighborhoods. The riots of May 1, 1929, seem to have started as confrontations between taunting youths and overreacting policemen. Soon, however, political meaning was imputed to the events. SPD-controlled police were blamed either for their repression of radical gangs or for their inability to maintain the order desired by other community residents. Radical opponents were drawn either to the Communists, for their “allure of the forbidden,” or to the Nazis, for their call to “order.” Notably, both groups offered financial incentives to attract youth impoverished in the economic hard times.

The one aspect of Swett’s book that could be improved upon concerns the connection between violence and politics. Perhaps under the
influence of sociological studies of neighborhood gangs in the United States, Swett’s study suggests a dearth of political ideology at the local level. But utopian political images, from Nazi representations of order and loyalty to Communist calls for solidarity, are ubiquitous in Swett’s study. These, and not just local violence, may help to explain how and why neighborhoods in social and economic crisis, preoccupied with their own problems, nonetheless turned out in large numbers in 1932—to vote for the opponents of the Republic.

Peter C. Caldwell
Rice University

The Dynamics of German Industry: Germany’s Path toward the New Economy and the American Challenge. By Werner Abelshauser (New York, Berghahn Books, 2005) 150 pp. $45.00

In The Dynamics of German Industry, Abelshauser argues that Germany is well-equipped to overcome its present economic difficulties and meet the “American Challenge.” This book represents the first time that Abelshauser’s important and influential ideas about Germany’s economic history have been made available to a wide swathe of English speakers.

Against today’s conventional wisdom, Abelshauser asserts that Germany can continue to prosper economically into the twenty-first century because of its “diversified-quality production” regime developed in the late nineteenth century. Diversified-quality production has been characterized by a high-level of industrial organization and coordination, as well as such corporatist arrangements as management-labor co-determination. Taking his cue from North’s “institutional economics,” Abelshauser, as he has done throughout his career, stresses the endurance of Germany’s strong industrial organizations in the face of war, postwar Allied reform policies, and the efforts of Ludwig Erhard, West Germany’s postwar economics minister, to introduce a social, though deregulated, market.1

Germany’s diversified-quality production regime emerged from the series of depressions between 1873 and 1896 that ended its first “liberal era.” Faced with intense competition from the United States and experiencing a cultural reaction against the speculative boom following unification, Germany focused on the “New Economy,” of the electrical engineering and chemical industries, that encouraged high levels of organization and barriers to entry. Unlike the United States, Germany welcomed cartels and strong industrial associations to facilitate such high quality production. Following World War I, organized labor was integrated gradually into this system through the institution of co-determi-

nation. Despite the caesura of 1945, this corporatist system endured. Far from representing a fundamental weakness in the present era of globalization, Abelshauser argues, Germany’s diversified-quality production regime is ideally suited to maintaining its competitiveness during the continuing shift in developed economies from traditional manufacturing to the production of quality products and services.

This book is to be welcomed primarily because it provides an opportunity for nonspecialists to familiarize themselves with Abelshauser’s important ideas. It can also arouse serious discussion about an economic historian’s attempt to use history to inform a present debate. On a historical level, though certainly correct in stressing the enduring strength of Germany’s corporatist institutions, Abelshauser’s short book tends to minimize the intense social conflicts that have characterized German industrial history. Secondly, though many German companies today are indeed competitive because of high-quality market niches, other fundamental problems plaguing the economy, such as unemployment and chronic deficits, need to be addressed. Finally, despite some impenetrable English that is not representative of Abelshauser’s usually fine writing, readers should find encouragement in this book to explore Abelshauser’s other great scholarship in detail.

James C. Van Hook
DNI Open Source Center


In National Cleansing, Frommer presents the first full account of retribution trials in the Czech lands after World War II. Previous assessments conflicted sharply: Czech Communists condemned the trials as corrupted and incomplete, but their rivals alleged that the left used retribution to eliminate those who opposed its seizure of power in 1948. Frommer’s work supports neither option, but agrees that the trials were about more than the guilt of collaborators; they were “a battleground between clashing forces intent on imposing their own interpretations of the past in order to determine the country’s future” (9).

Rather than rehearsing dichotomies inherited from the Cold War, Frommer emphasizes that these interpretations did not involve a black and white opposition of evil and good. Edvard Benes, an avowed liberal, and his followers framed the major laws governing the trials of collaborators, and these laws “encouraged gross abuses to be perpetrated later” (9). The abuses took essentially two forms: the “wild retributions” of the immediate postwar months, in which thousands of Germans were tortured or murdered by Czech vigilantes, and the extreme severity of Czech national courts, which rendered decisions beyond appeal, and death sentences that had to be carried out within hours of the verdict. As
a result, the Czech lands, with “one-fourth of the French population,” “executed almost as many defendants as France” (90).

Frommer concludes that “Nazi occupation and its attendant horrors discredited liberal (‘bourgeois’) democracy as a form of government” (343), but his analysis suggests that greater optimism might be in store. The Communists and their allies indeed attempted to incite a popular desire for vengeance in the service of “class struggle,” but with the passing months, they encountered greater resistance from voices in the press, like Ferdinand Peroutka; from former concentration-camp inmates who had been enlisted to work in people’s courts; and from the public at large, whose “passions [for vengeance] cooled considerably” by 1947 (211). The Communist coup of February 1948 might have cut short a gradual recovery of Czech liberalism, though this question of political culture has been ignored in previous accounts, which tend to focus on the dealings of elites.

National Cleansing also provokes a range of questions in regard to its central theme of justice. The author addresses the matter of the Holocaust squarely: “Amid condemnations of political intrigue and naked vengeance, it should not be forgotten that Czech people’s courts exacted a measure of justice for the Nazis’ crimes, including their genocide of the Jews” (180). But what about justice for the many other crimes committed in the Protectorate? The book offers little guidance about the penalties that might have fallen within reasonable bounds, adopting instead a mostly critical attitude toward the actions of the first postwar government.

These questions do nothing to diminish Frommer’s achievement; indeed opening paths of inquiry is more the rule than the exception for works of lasting importance such as this one. In the magnitude of its contribution, Frommer’s book stands out among all relevant historiographies, whether work on East Central Europe or on the legacies of World War II, or on war-crime tribunals. The author employs a mass of archival research and exhaustively surveys newspapers and secondary literature in an analysis that moves relentlessly through his major subjects. Frommer displays unusual gifts of storytelling and a sure hand for the revealing formulation or anecdote, and no matter how attuned to detail, his narrative never becomes dry or routine. Though the book focuses on the Czech lands, Frommer also treats related debates in other contexts (especially the French) when they are relevant.

Frommer shows unusual boldness in launching new assessments into a historiographical field that harbors a fair number of unexploded mines, for example on the issue of wartime collaboration. After dismissing the extreme views, Frommer writes, “like most people throughout occupied Europe, Czechs accommodated themselves.” But he also notes the unflattering specificity of “Schweikism,” which did “more for individual and national self-esteem than for the undermining of Nazi rule” (24–25). Frommer shows how the Schweikian option was perceived by occupied and occupier, causing sharply divergent perceptions to emerge about the nature of Nazi rule and popular behavior. This unusually
complex and dynamic view of a historical process will set standards in the study of modern Bohemia for some time to come.

John Connelly
University of California, Berkeley


McNamara links the rise of the sense of place, ritual, and architectural presence to the objectives of two rising professional elites. The author’s investigations play upon the pioneering insights of Miller, who argued that the law nudged aside religion as the primary liturgical expression of a new nation. Unlike Miller, who found the law’s primacy prior to the Revolution, McNamara’s evidence suggests that the decisive triumph occurred in the last decades of the eighteenth century, even though the upsurge in litigation that marked it made lawyers uneasy about their self-professed destiny as the elect of the new nation.

As Tocqueville guessed, lawyers would manage the affairs of a fractious republic as self-anointed aristocrats. How they managed to convince fellow citizens to go along with such unrepresentative plans has never been entirely clear. McNamara guesses that in the Massachusetts context, Puritan antipathy to sacral space may have provided a wedge of entry, finally moving the courts out of meetinghouses as well as taverns (20–22). Her title is odd since her evidence suggests that the full courts met in the meetinghouses and that only individual justices heard small cases in the ordinaries.

McNamara reminds us that the lawyers had help in their quest from the professionalization of architecture, which allowed architects, also aspirants to social and political status, to “present themselves as separate from common builders—a definition that rested on abstractions such as ‘taste’” (83). She concentrates on the “housing” of courts in buildings of tasteful permanence, tracing a process of specialization in both the function and design of buildings dedicated to the law. This task is all the more difficult because of the relatively few surviving examples of these courthouses. McNamara documents the shift during the last decades of the century when the buildings found new homes at a distance from commercial town centers. The complexities of a commercial society allowed the profession to convince a hostile and skeptical public of its expertise in navigating economic and social relations and conflicts (46–53).

Generously illustrated, McNamara’s study provides concrete exam-

ples of her argument. Documenting the growing “refinement” of urban landscapes, she demonstrates the emergence of legal liturgies, the carefully scripted performances wherein professionals dominated sanctuaries buffered from the very commercial activity that financed taste and the new landscapes (75–79). Libraries, critical resources for lawyers, also attracted architects, as did subscription libraries, monuments to expert knowledge confined to privileged social and intellectual elites (90–94).

An epilogue illustrating unhappiness with courts and lawyers facing abolition and fugitive slave laws is too brief to be any more than a hint at future troubles. But McNamara’s explication of legal and architectural change, adroitly employing the history of professionalization, rituals, landscapes, and the law, deserves a wide readership.

A. G. Roeber
Penn State University, University Park


The task of writing a history of American childhood is daunting; few have attempted it.¹ Part of the challenge lies in the vast scope of the project, the sheer number of primary and secondary sources that must be mastered. Another difficulty lies in its inherently interdisciplinary nature, requiring familiarity with sociology, social work, psychology, psychoanalysis, and the law. Finally, the scholar who takes up the challenge must come to grips with how to organize a mass of material that has no obvious chronological order or milestones; unlike the Civil War, which has a definite beginning and end, the periodization, watersheds, and interpretation of American childhood are truly the product of historical imagination.

Mintz’s attempt is a tour de force. It is an original interpretive synthesis, grounded in a wide array of secondary and primary sources, that is both informative and provocative. Mintz divides the history of childhood into three overlapping historical eras: the colonial era (premodern childhood), when religious and secular authorities regarded childhood as a time of deficiency, and the young were seen as adults in training; the mid–1750s to the 1950s (modern childhood), when an increasing number of parents began to view children as innocent and malleable, and childhood became increasingly viewed as a separate stage of life, requiring special care and institutions to protect it; and the 1950s to the present (postmodern childhood), resembling premodern childhood, in that children are no longer considered innocent or naive, but differing radically from the earlier period in that children have become independent consumers and participate in a semi-autonomous youth culture.

Mintz complicates his periodization by skillfully emphasizing a

¹ Joseph E. Illick, _American Childhoods_ (Philadelphia, 2002).
number of important themes, especially the diversity of American childhood, which depends on class, race, gender, ethnicity, or region. Mintz’ other themes include the rise of children’s rights, beginning as early as the Revolutionary War, and the emergence of a separate youth culture in the 1950s. In illustrating them, Mintz uses lively primary-source accounts of ten- and twelve-year-old indentured servants, apprentices, soldiers, cabin boys, female textile operatives, and teen-age “bobby-soxers.”

Throughout *Huck’s Raft*, Mintz successfully deflates numerous myths about the history of childhood and reveals that no “golden age” ever existed. In particular, he demonstrates that childhood was never carefree; instead, young white people suffered from child labor, neglect, and malnutrition while routinely undergoing protracted periods of doubt, confusion, and restlessness, especially in the early nineteenth century. Young African Americans suffered even worse, first under slavery and then, for a century thereafter, from harsh discrimination. Similarly, Mintz finds that throughout American history, the idea that families were stable is inaccurate: Secure family life was exceptional; one-third of the country’s children lived in single-parent families at the beginning of the twentieth century. Nor has America ever been particularly child-friendly. Deeply ambivalent about their children, American parents envy them their youth and resent their intrusions on time and resources. Even the many late twentieth-century reforms that were designed to protect children from abuse were instituted to insulate adults from children.

Mintz lays to rest the notion that the history of childhood has been one of either unrelieved progress or declension. He demonstrates that such polar opposites as parental engagement replacing emotional distance, kindness and leniency supplanting strict and stern punishment, scientific enlightenment superseding superstition and misguided moralism are false dichotomies. Conversely, he rejects the idea that childhood has disappeared; children are not growing up too quickly or losing their malleability, innocence, or playfulness.

Behind *Huck’s Raft*’s broad themes and conclusions, its real value is its rich details, clever turns of phrase, balanced judgement, and nuanced argument. This book will become an instant classic.

E. Wayne Carp  
Pacific Lutheran University

*Securing the Commonwealth: Debt, Speculation, & Writing in the Making of Early America*. By Jennifer J. Baker (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006) 218 pp. $50.00

This little book devotes its pages to the growth and development of the idea of paper money and the manipulation of debt as legitimate and pos-
itive means toward self-improvement as well as national prosperity. The author explicates selected literary texts from each of three eras—early eighteenth century, mid-eighteenth century, and the post-Revolutionary period—to examine the evolution of writers' ideas about sound forms of individual economic behavior in a changing world. Baker joins a new school of intellectual and cultural historians who are applying their disciplinary techniques to a topic hitherto of scant interest, the development of capitalism. Enthusiasts refer to their endeavors as “the new economic history.”

Baker concentrates her considerable intelligence on the works of a half-dozen authors: Cotton Mather’s *Life of his Excellency Sir William Phips* (London, 1697) for what it says about “Puritan” attitudes toward paper money; Ebenezer Cooke’s *Sot-Weed Factor* (London, 1708) and *Sotweed Redivivus* (London, 1730) for what they reveal about the use of tobacco as legal tender in Chesapeake society; Benjamin Franklin’s *Autobiography* (London, 1793) and *Nature and Necessity of a Paper Currency* (Philadelphia, 1729) and the published responses to the latter; Royall Tyler’s play, *The Contrast* (1787), about the postwar economic depression and the debate about what to do about public debts; Charles Brockden Brown’s *Arthur Mervyn; or Memoirs of the Year 1793*, which draws parallels between the yellow-fever epidemic of that year and the potentially toxic effects of economic speculation on moral integrity. Lastly, Baker probes the works of Judith Sargent Murray (such as *On the Equality of the Sexes* [1792]) to explore the zone between rational self-interest and compassion for those less fortunate. In an epilogue, Baker considers the emergence of a mass audience for serious works of literature that took place in the nineteenth century and its effect on writers’ own understanding of their function. She seems to suggest that economic history may offer a narrative structure for understanding the evolution of early American literature.

Baker brings a fresh and critical eye to works already well-known to specialists but probably unfamiliar to historians in general. Her questions are good. How the use of paper money, the experience of inflation, or speculation in government debt altered colonial and early national conceptions of public welfare are largely unknown. Baker makes use of numerous primary sources to supplement and assist in interpreting each of her target texts, and she is keenly aware of other scholars’ readings of them. The book falls short in its failure to provide sufficient and up-to-date context for the chosen texts. For instance, Baker accepts the old “declensionist” image of what was in reality a robust New England economy in the eighteenth century and apparently believes that tobacco prices in the Chesapeake were perpetually falling.

Gloria Main
University of Colorado
Old Dominion Industrial Commonwealth: Coal, Politics, and Economy in Antebellum America. By Sean Patrick Adams (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004) 305 pp. $45.00

Although focused on the history of just a single mineral fuel in just two states, this book could have been titled “Why Pennsylvania Grew Rich as Virginia Grew Poor.” Both states were well-endowed with fertile cropland and extensive coal fields, but Pennsylvania’s farmers, miners, and industrialists proved far superior at turning resources into wealth, that is, marketable goods.

Slavery certainly played a role in Virginia’s relative inability to tap its mineral resources. Slaves were incapable of utilizing, or could not be trusted to run, expensive machinery like steam-driven water pumps. Slaves who excelled at mining were rare, and the institution of slavery made it difficult for Virginia to retain its white laborers, let alone attract immigrant miners. But, Adams warns, slavery was only part of the story. Ultimately, Virginia’s coal enterprises foundered because their government failed to foster them, and at times even opposed them. Pennsylvania’s colliers, by contrast, thrived because their government did not hamper them, and at times even extended them a helping hand. Fueled with cheap coal, Pennsylvania’s industrial sector blossomed while Virginia’s remained enslaved to slavery, of both the economic and political varieties.

The outcome, Adams argues, was largely a function of governmental structure. Virginia’s constitution allowed Tidewater planters to prey on the rest of the state. Since representation was by county rather than population, the older, eastern parts of the state, where counties were small and numerous, were overrepresented in the legislature. The governor was weak; suffrage was limited by stringent property requirements. Elite interests also controlled the powerful county-court system. In contrast, Pennsylvania’s constitution was modeled after the U.S. Constitution, which instituted three powerful branches of government to check each other. A bicameral legislature and universal male suffrage further ensured that the government usually acted for the common weal. Seemingly all Pennsylvanians wanted economic growth, and the government was happy to oblige, sometimes by not interfering with private enterprise, sometimes by passing enabling legislation, and sometimes by actively promoting industrial growth, as in the late 1830s when it sponsored a statewide geological survey.

Adams supports his arguments in the old-fashioned way, with a dense web of historical narrative, telling descriptive statistics, and careful reasoning. He presents neither models nor equations. Adams also ventures into the work of serious economic and business historians.

The book, though, suffers in places from a lack of economic acuity. Adams confuses real and nominal values in Table 1.2, and in Table 2.2 he prices different types of coal by weight instead of by energy production. More troubling, Adams ignores crucial concepts like “comparative
advantage” and “efficient scale.” He also ignores the economic-growth literature, including the recent spate of work applying the finance-led growth hypothesis to the early republic. He also repeatedly praises government for the successes of private enterprises, anthracite-utilizing iron producers, and the myriad private contractors, investors, and shipping companies that made the Erie Canal project a success (85). Finally, he presents a much too sanguine view of internal improvement projects actually operated by state governments, all of which, in the tradition of state industries, were colossal flops both economically and developmentally.

Nevertheless, this is an important book, or at least could be, if the members of the professional history establishment will lay aside their pretensions and pay attention to its profoundly powerful insights into the importance of political and economic institutions.

Robert E. Wright  
Stern School of Business  
New York University


The South had a middle class! Most discussions of the antebellum South focus on slavery, plantation owners, or sometimes even the small yeoman farmers, to understand the backwardness of Southern society in contrast to a dynamic middle class in the North dedicated to hard work, delayed gratification, temperance, industry, and reform. Wells argues that the South developed an articulate middle class of business professionals who shared most of the same values as their northern cousins—with one important caveat: The southern middle class remained dedicated to the institution of slavery.

Wells begins with a discussion of how the South and the North shared an intellectual world through travel and literature. The travel section of this analysis depends largely on anecdotal evidence showing how both northerners and southerners traveled in each others’ regions. When Wells turns to a discussion of literature, he uses anecdotal, with some quantitative, evidence to demonstrate the existence of a national audience for the literature of both regions, although southerners were more heavily dependent on the North than northerners were on the South. Neither chapter in this section, however, proves the existence of a southern middle class, though both show an active cultural exchange that forms the background for the next two sections.

Part two is a cultural portrait of the signposts of the nineteenth-century middle class: religion, reform, voluntary associations, gender roles, and the family. Like the first section, it has a mix of anecdotal and
quantitative evidence. Wells argues that, similar to their northern counterparts, middle-class southerners were interested in a respectable revival that led to a call for reform. In particular, the southern middle class developed a critique of the plantation gentry’s code of honor and unsuccessfully attacked dueling. The southern middle class had a better record in pushing educational reform, even if public education continued to trail northern efforts. Southerners also engaged in a wide variety of associational activity, forming clubs, attending lyceums, and participating in debating societies. Like northerners, the southern middle class also wanted to educate women to help prepare the next generation for the world of business if they were male, or for motherhood and schooling if they were female. Although Wells makes a case that all of these middle-class elements existed in the South, he does not fully compare it to what the middle class in the North was doing. It is one thing to discover reform in the South but another to compare it to the wide-ranging and comprehensive efforts of the North. A dying patient’s faint pulse falls far short of a healthy thumping heart.

The final section defines the middle class in relation to both the planter and working classes. Wells argues that the southern middle class’s efforts to push for industrialization and urbanization put it at odds with the planters who remained dedicated to growing cotton. It also generated conflict with a white working class because southern industrialists supported the use of slave labor in the factory. This acceptance of slavery ultimately distinguished the southern and northern middle classes as well.

In the end, Wells is able to substantiate a southern middle class that presaged the pro-business industrialists of the postwar New South. However, he does not demonstrate that its members were absolutely vital to the South before 1865. They may have helped to move the South toward industrialization, but their efforts paled in comparison to those of the northern middle class. Planters and the slaveocracy ruled the South, pushing their region to secession and civil war.

Paul A. Gilje
University of Oklahoma


Southern Single Blessedness explores the lives of wealthy, white “spinsters” in, primarily, Charleston and Savannah. Notwithstanding the overweening importance of marriage in slave society—the institution of marriage modeled paternalism and hierarchy—more than one-half of Charleston’s white women were unmarried at mid-nineteenth century. Carter argues that these women served as the “glue that helped keep
elite social networks... [and] individual families intact” and that, rather than challenging the ideology of southern womanhood, they perceived themselves as acting within gendered protocols that demanded “womanly piety, usefulness, and devotion to family” (5, 7).

The author challenges the classic notion that northern women were quicker to celebrate the positive attributes of “single blessedness” than their southern counterparts. Only when the Civil War forced a reconsideration of both manhood and womanhood, and decimated the population of marriageable men, did southern women embrace the notion that remaining single and “useful” represented a higher calling and yielded greater happiness than marrying the wrong man.¹ Carter provides convincing evidence that throughout the antebellum decades, “significant pockets” of unmarried women in the South’s key urban centers thrived on their intimate female friendships, benevolent work, social and intellectual societies, and their much-needed service to family members (41). Carter further argues that southern spinsters distinguished themselves from their northern counterparts in that, like married women, their identities remained firmly rooted within their families. They “did not pine for economic independence or vocational purpose” as did middle-class and wealthy women of the North (6).

In five chapters focused on the antebellum years, Carter describes and analyzes the physical and intellectual milieu of her protagonists. She uncovers a “surprisingly positive” southern literature about “spinsters” adapted from northern and European writers (47). The author plumbs traditional manuscript sources—letters, diaries, and church and organizational records—as well as literary sources to provide a detailed chronicle of the familial duties of unmarried women from which they derived their identities as “useful, needed, and loved women” and “cement[ed] places within their extended families” (66). Also documented are the female friendships “that sustained and occupied” unmarried southern women and the benevolent work that “provided a sense of purpose, community, independence, and a public role” (117, 118).

In her final chapter, Carter provides multiple examples of how unmarried, white, southern women “had the time, inclination, and, especially in the cities, a strong tradition of antebellum benevolent work that led them directly” into war-related service. Now their “mantra to be useful” shifted; “it demanded service to . . . [the South’s] massive, unprecedented needs” (151, 170). More innovative is Carter’s assertion that impending war ended the “relative permissiveness” about spinsterhood (153). Many young women rushed into marriage, often lowering their standards significantly and thus bringing greater scrutiny upon those who did not follow suit. Unmarried women were forced “under the microscope” as debates raged about their proper roles and their fates (153).

One wonders if the war precipitated similar public discussions in the North as all Americans increasingly pondered the horrendous loss of life.

Cynthia M. Kennedy
Clarion University of Pennsylvania

_The Railroad and the State: War, Politics, and Technology in Nineteenth-Century America._ By Robert G. Angevine (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004) 351 pp. $70.00

This carefully written and clearly argued book successfully tells the sprawling history of the U.S. Army and American railroads during the nineteenth century. Previous writers on the topic tended to draw straight lines between the West Point military academy as the early republic’s leading source of engineers, the General Survey Act of 1824 that sent them into the field, and the evolution of a more-or-less standardized railroad system that took form with significant military influence. Angevine is in no such rush. Although earlier authors, such as Hill, Goetzmann, and O’Connell, stressed the Army’s impact on railroading, Angevine emphasizes several countercurrents, particularly the intense political polarization that constrained proposals for internal improvements and that buffeted the Army.¹

Brave speeches everywhere about building railroads for national defense frequently amounted to overblown rhetoric. Following the Baltimore & Ohio, railroad officials quickly learned the game of mobilizing local politicians and fabricating military utility as needed to line up a valuable engineering survey and an apparent government endorsement. In their surveys, Army engineers typically preferred routes that offered significant economic benefits and rarely recommended routes with only military benefits. A wave of resignations (107 former Army engineers worked for railroads in 1837) paved the way for military professionalism at West Point, which esteemed traditional military drilling and military history. Thus, Army engineers served less as vectors of uniform practices and more as agents of capitalism.

From the mid-1840s, the Army’s role in railroading remained marginal until the Civil War broke out. Not much came from the four transcontinental railroad surveys commissioned by Secretary of War Jefferson Davis. They produced, as one railroad engineer put it, a “dearth of that kind of practical knowledge which capitalists require to induce them to invest in railroads” (119). More consequential were the land grants, beginning with the Illinois Central’s receiving nearly a quarter of the public land of Illinois in 1850. The transfer of federal property to

state control proved so popular that by 1871 eighty railroads had received over 155 million acres to sell, retain, or develop as construction subsidies. In his treatment of the war, Angevine outlines the use of railroads by the Union generals Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, and Philip Henry Sheridan (West Pointers all), observing that railroads dramatically increased the size of armies that could be assembled on a battlefield. Yet Angevine’s real concern is the wartime funding, managing, and organizing of railroads. The hands-off Confederate railway policy was a disaster: When its loads were carried at all, the Confederacy was fleeced by profit-minded southern railroads. They also refused to exchange rolling stock needed for through shipments. Southern roads captured by the Union were for some years directly owned, operated, and controlled by the U.S. Military Railroad.

In sharp contrast, Angevine judges the Union railroad policy as a striking success. Certainly, tensions existed over rates, both sides making threats during tough negotiations, but, by and large, the Union and northern railroads cooperated harmoniously. After the war, a symbiotic relationship between the Army and railroads developed in the trans-Mississippi West. Angevine details the Army’s cold-blooded strategic use of transcontinental railroad building, troop mobility, and the spread of “civilization” to battle the Plains Indians. Even before the Golden Spike was driven in 1869, the railroads facilitated a deployment of troops more than 3,000 miles from Washington to Sacramento in just twenty days.

By 1883, according to Sherman, the completion of four transcontinental lines “ha[d] settled forever the Indian question, the Army question, and many others which have hitherto troubled the country” (216).

From an interdisciplinary viewpoint, there is clearly more to be done. Although Angevine briefly cites Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (New York, 1992), his focus is more on the Army as an evolving institution rather than “the state” as a dynamic entity. Accordingly, such state activities as patenting, regulatory and corporate law, and the antitrust movement receive at best cursory mention. (Readers can follow up with James Ely, Railroads and American Law [Lawrence, 2001] and Steven W. Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation: Business, Technology, and Politics in America, 1840–1920 [New York, 2002].) Although political history is part of Angevine’s narrative frame, concepts from political science are not given prominent attention, as in Colleen Dunlavy, Politics and Industrialization: Early Railroads in the United States and Prussia (Princeton, 1994). Angevine also obliquely addresses a growing literature on standardization and “network” dynamics. All the same, The Railroad and the State is a significant contribution to several distinct historical literatures and a successful example of synthesis. Scholars consulting this work will appreciate its clear structure, complete bibliography, and helpful index.

Thomas J. Misa
University of Minnesota

Egypt Land is an “irreducibly interdisciplinary” tour de force of cultural and historical analysis (xviii). It engages such topics as the “melodramas of archaeological entrance” (95)—that is, of opening a tomb—the unwrapping of mummies, the curses of mummies, the Egyptian revival in architecture (such as The Tombs in New York), and the gendered story of Cleopatra and her racialized “strip-tease” in sculpture and poetry. Trafton unravels the ways in which the obsessive fascination with ancient Egypt embodied racial anxieties. He pays particular attention to “the radical interactions between various factions of nineteenth-century American culture: sacred and secular, professional and popular, classicist and Orientalist, Aryanist and Afrocentrist, black and white” (xvii), as they play across the various fantasies of origins.

As Trafton shows, the attempts by the American School of Ethnology—Nott, Glidden, and others—to establish a white supremacist “scientific construction of race” were completely “coincident and interactive with the rise of American Egyptology. . . .” In America, the scientific construction of race begins with the question of ancient Egypt and vice versa: the question of the race of the ancient Egyptians inaugurates the field of American Egyptology” (49). While Trafton traces the convoluted logic of the American School to create their narrative of the white origins of civilization, he also examines how African Americans attempted to appropriate or transform the racial constructions of ancient Egypt. In particularly acute fashion, he illuminates the extent to which “‘Afrocentric’ and ‘Negrophobic’ positions were in dialogue” (72). When proto-pan-Africanists like Delany countered such constructions as the biblical myth of the sons of Noah, they relied on the same assumptions as the white supremacists.

Trafton sees racial categories deeply embedded in Egyptomania, and the tropes of racialized Egypt influencing other enthusiasms. For example, he takes great pains noting that many lost race or hollow-earth novels employ many of the same figures as those involved in the narratives of discovering and opening lost Egyptian tombs—particularly the trope of the “racial rupture” (90), a crucial element in the accounts of entering the tomb involving the stark encounter with the racial other. Trafton relates this trope to Edgar Allen Poe’s Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym (London, 1838), which employs many Egyptian figures, as well as

1 George Robins Glidden, Ancient Egypt (New York, 1847); Josiah Clark Nott, Essay on the Natural History of Mankind (Mobile, 1851); Clark and Glidden, Types of Mankind; or, Ethnological Researches (Philadelphia, 1854).
to such lesser known works as John Cleves Symmes’ speculative fiction *Symzonia: A Voyage of Discovery* (New York, 1820). In equally deft fashion, Trafton recounts how “the curse of the mummy was a narrative of racialized revenge” (142), the rage of the suppressed African, among other dynamics.

In each of these aspects of obsession with Egypt, Trafton calls upon a wide variety of disciplinary methodologies—historical investigation, literary interpretation, discourse analysis, and aesthetic explication of architecture, sculptor, and art. *Egypt Land* is a major contribution to understanding the complex underpinnings of American culture, and its “irreducibly interdisciplinary” approach, essential to its ambitious task, is brilliantly executed.

Hilton Obenzinger
Stanford University


In *Planting Nature*, Cohen offers a compelling cultural history of tree planting in the United States. Drawing principally on Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, Cohen excavates the tangled roots of how non-profit citizens’ groups, the timber industry, and the federal government colluded to create, to maintain, and to normalize a sense of stewardship and civic duty grounded in planting trees. This patina of patriotism, Cohen argues, is one layer of gloss on deeper patterns of manipulation that ultimately hobbled the environmental movement by shifting attention away from fundamental causes of environmental problems. Inspired by Marxist critiques of capitalism and consumption, Cohen decouples the chain of money, public-relations strategies, and official rhetoric enveloping the act and meaning of planting trees in America.

Examples from sources as varied as liturgical texts, a depression-era painting, popular children’s’ magazines, and ancient Rome establish a broad temporal and theoretical background in the first chapter. Chapter 2 positions arboreal evangelist J. Sterling Morton at the intersection of the “rain follows the plow” mentality of the 1873 Timber Cultures Act and Andrew Jackson Downing’s efforts to popularize horticulture through hobby journals. Cohen frames Morton’s attempts to institutionalize tree planting with the origins of the American Forests—a conservative consortium of botanists, academics, nursery owners, and concerned citizens dedicated to combating excessive timber cutting. Chapter 3 concentrates on the Arbor Day Foundation’s attempts to cast itself as apolitical, a claim to neutrality complicated by the organization’s decid-

edly political behavior and active efforts to market tree planting to other institutions as a signifier of neutrality.

The second half of the volume conveys the sources, methods, and mentality of direct and indirect government support for tree planting across the spectrum of citizens, industries, and non-profit groups. Cohen follows American Forests’ green transformation from a technical forestry-policy organization to a popular citizens’ group in Chapter 4, fleshing out how the Global Re-Leaf program—a flagship activity since the mid-1990s—created common ground on which capital interests and the general public could stand together in stewardship solidarity. Chapter 5 analyzes how federal, state, and local emphasis on numbers has resulted in widespread “palliative tree planting,” expiating national guilt at best and exacerbating environmental problems at worst (101). The final chapters critique the prominent role of the United States Forest Service in managing planting discourse alongside an analysis of the timber industry’s promotional materials and advertising campaigns.

The argument in Planting Nature is as subtle and effective as the double entendre in its title. Just as trees take root in the earth, suggestive illusions of stewardship take root in the rich soil of human minds. The book’s strength lies in highlighting the extent to which associations of vice and virtue permeate cultural institutions and spill into natural-resource policy. This inexorable drift of ideas across disciplinary divides also points up the book’s primary deficit. Cohen could have done more to contextualize different kinds of evidence, rather than abstracting paintings, policies, and practices to the same level of intertextual critique.

Barry Ross Muchnick
Yale University


In 1898, the United States acquired the Philippines and in 1946, fulfilling the terms of the Tydings-McDuffie Act, gave it independence. According to Kramer, race was a defining element in the negotiations between the Americans and Filipinos during the intervening period. Moreover, this process occurred, not as an example of American exceptionalism, but rather within the context of transnational history and colonial discourse.

Kramer begins not in 1898 but with the history of Spanish-Filipino relations, explaining that “‘Philippine history’ . . . was the product of Spanish conquest” (8). He explores how Filipino identity was shaped within the matrix of Spanish colonialism and how Spanish-Filipino interactions would serve as the background for Filipino judgments of
American actions. To support this innovative approach, the author uses research from both Spain and the Philippines, translating Spanish language sources that usually do not appear in this context.

The next several chapters cover the familiar ground of the Philippine-American War, the establishment of civil government and the associated politics of benevolence, and the exhibition of Filipinos at the 1904 World’s Fair. Kramer focuses on the issue of Filipino racial identity as Americans tread a difficult path between suppressing the Filipinos militarily (even as they courted the Filipino elite), promising the Filipinos independence, and denying their readiness for immediate self-government. In Kramer’s view, the United States created a “bifurcated racial state” with Spanish roots that attempted to attract elites by emphasizing the racial difference between Christian and non-Christian Filipinos (5). Thereby Americans sought to show that their control was necessary to bring progress as well as to protect non-Christian and Christian Filipinos from each other. Filipinos, in turn, presented a “nationalist-colonialist” argument that they were capable of governing and uplifting the non-Christians, thereby proving their ability to shoulder the “white man’s burden” (6). Kramer stresses that these exchanges about race defined an ongoing process of negotiation; they were not a mere exportation of American racial views.

Kramer’s final two chapters on politics under Woodrow Wilson and on Filipino immigration in the 1920s and 1930s also cover territory usually ignored in an exploration of Filipino-American relations. The effort by Filipino nationalists to achieve the independence that Wilson seemed to promise comes to focus around the issue of nationalism. Filipinos sought to prove that their past history and present actions demonstrated their status as a nation, whereas American retentionists claimed that Philippine nationhood was under formation as part of a “calibrated colonialism” that depended on future American recognition of Filipino capacity (300). In the end, Kramer argues, Filipinos gained independence not because they developed capacities that accorded with the inclusionary racial vision touted by supporters of American imperialism but because they benefited from the exclusionary racial vision of American nativists and labor activists, who wanted to protect the United States from a Filipino “invasion” of people and products during the 1920s and 1930s.

Kramer’s insistence that racial formations were not exported is problematical because it denies any role for pre-existing American racial assumptions. Yet even if Americans did not simply drop Filipinos into established categories, nor even know where they belonged initially, the idea that racial beliefs did not provide a context for negotiation is hardly obvious. Despite Kramer’s careful examination of Philippine experience with the Spanish as a framework for understanding the colonial relations with the United States, he fails to provide the same nuanced contextualism to the American side, dismissing a role for assumptions about African Americans in the beginning chapters, dealing only slightly
better with Asians in the final ones, and practically ignoring Native Americans throughout. Moreover, Kramer tends to treat American racial views as static. He misses, for instance, that the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War led many Americans to question the “race” of the Japanese and that views on American Indians covered a broad range, shifting dramatically during the period that he covers. Although these views are clearly not his focus, by ignoring them he misses an opportunity to show how American-Filipino negotiation was constrained and shaped by pre-existing American beliefs.

In the end, Kramer’s well-researched book is unusual in that it covers almost the full spectrum of American control of the Philippines. His argument about the politics behind the Tydings-McDuffie Act and his use of a transnational context are groundbreaking.

Anne Paulet
Humboldt State University


During the campaign to restrict suffrage in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century South, upper-class Democrats from heavily African American areas urged all whites, regardless of geography, class, or past partisanship, to recall the “horrors” of Reconstruction and unite behind the “reforms,” pledging that legal means to disfranchise nearly all blacks, but no whites, were possible. Feldman contends that poor whites were so strongly and irrationally racist that they believed the Democrats’ empty promises, ignored their own economic and political self-interest, and committed political suicide (9–10, 23, 136). Often heavy-handedly attacking Woodward, Webb, and this reviewer as credulous propagators of “the disfranchisement Myth” that “plain” white anti-Democratic-party sympathizers opposed suffrage restriction, Feldman seeks to restore the white-consensus view of southern politics, shorn of its original racist purposes (3–11, 123).1 Misrepresenting the views of the historians that he attacks, distorting or ignoring evidence to fit his thesis, and performing only the most simplistic statistical analysis of election returns, Feldman fails as badly as the disfranchisers did to obscure white disunity.

No historian has, as Feldman charges, “portray[ed] solidarity against ratification [of the 1901 constitution] among poor whites in north Alabama and the Hill Country” (115); none has argued that poor-white racism “meant nothing in real terms” (8); and all have understood, since

Woodward pioneered the argument in *Tom Watson* in 1938, that some Populists shed any signs of racial liberalism after Democrats counted them out and discouraged many of their followers from voting (77). What the historians that Feldman attacks have contended is that white Populists and Republicans, along with some hill-country Democrats, were much more likely to oppose disfranchising laws and constitutional amendments than Democrats from the Black Belt and upper-status Democrats everywhere were. In contrast to Feldman, who offers a static consensus view, those that he seeks to refute have emphasized the divergent and shifting class and partisan interests among whites, the importance of preconstitutional disfranchising laws—such as the Sayre Law in Alabama that Feldman almost entirely ignores—and changes and fluidity in late nineteenth-century southern white attitudes and behavior. Feldman sees an undifferentiated forest; we see clumps of trees of different species, sizes, and ages.

Feldman’s equation of Populists and white Republicans with “poor whites” and any residents of majority-white counties allows him to treat any statement from anyone in a majority-white county and any election return from such an area as representing anti-Democratic sentiment (122, 146). Rather than attempting to draw a representative sample of “plain white” opinion, he quotes not only scattered Populists and former Populists but, even more often, upper-class plantation, corporate, or merely partisan Democrats, as reflective of Populist views (26–27, 77, 94–106, 112, 115, 144–45, 158). His opinion sample is not just unsystematic; it is flagrantly biased.

More than thirty years ago, I employed ecological regression analysis to estimate how Alabamians who had supported the Populists in earlier gubernatorial contests voted in the referendums for calling the 1901 constitutional convention and ratifying its handiwork. This statistical technique took into account turnout and choice differences between voters in each county. In contrast, Feldman merely groups counties into those that were majority white or majority Populist and calculates the average white-county and Populist-county percentages for each side in the referenda, downplaying the specific county-level votes. He also assumes, without any evidence whatsoever, that the ballot-box stuffing that so obviously distorted the returns from the most heavily African American counties was absent in white-majority counties, an assumption belied by percentages for disfranchisement in several counties that greatly exceeded their white percentages.

Feldman’s bluster should not obscure the weakness of his evidence, research design, and qualitative and quantitative methods. The myth is that he has refuted anyone’s contentions about disfranchisement.

J. Morgan Kousser
California Institute of Technology

The lifelong ambition of Henry R. Luce, the son of China missionaries, who built a publishing empire on the foundation of *Time* magazine, which he co-founded in 1923, was to advance American power in Asia in the service of Christianity, democracy, and anti-communism. More than any other media magnate, Luce used his trio of mass circulation magazines—*Time*, *Life*, and *Fortune*—as a platform from which he advocated an ideologically driven vision of American foreign policy, particularly with respect to Asia.

Herzstein’s pedestrian study contains much generic information about Luce and his times that has little to do with the book’s purported focus on America’s twentieth-century crusade in Asia. It offers an almost purely descriptive and disjointed narrative that, except at the most superficial level, fails to engage any of the obvious questions worth exploring from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, including history, politics, ethics, journalism, and cultural studies. Do news journalists have a responsibility to report objectively and not twist or withhold information that contradicts their prejudices, as Luce did routinely? Was Luce a journalist or a flack for a globalist America, or both? (Herzstein’s evidence suggests that Luce served as an informal U.S. Secretary of Propaganda during the Cold War.) What degree of influence did Luce and his media empire have on U.S. foreign policy? Was Luce an opinion leader who helped to shape elite views on foreign policy or a transmitter in accessible and colorful language of the dominant foreign-policy consensus to a mass readership?

On thin evidence, Herzstein asserts that Luce exerted considerable influence over several decades of U.S. policy toward Japan, China, Korea, and Vietnam. Just because Luce hobnobbed with top American officials and used his publications to play at secretary of state is no proof that his influence was as great as Herzstein—who treats Time, Inc., like a fourth branch of the government or a shadow foreign ministry—would have us believe.

The author of an earlier comprehensive biography of Luce, Herzstein is far from being an uncritical admirer of his subject, but his critique is unsystematic and episodic rather than holistic. He condemns Luce as an apologist for French colonialism in Indochina, a bellicose booster of U.S. intervention in Vietnam, and a starry-eyed hero-worshipper of Chiang Kai-shek, Douglas MacArthur, Syngman Rhee, and other Cold War stalwarts, but he doesn’t synthesize his critique into a comprehensive analysis. He mines the papers of Luce and his Time, Inc., associates and has consulted the scholarly literature on U.S. Asia policy during the Cold War, but he adds little to that literature. Students familiar with the subject will find no new information and few fresh insights
into the career of a man who was a precursor of the neoconservative ideologues of our time.

Steven I. Levine
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill


This book traces the changing fortunes of modernization theory, from its origins in early postwar social-scientific debates about liberalism’s global future, to the apex of its academic and political influence during Cold War struggles of the 1950s and 1960s, its decline amidst conservative and postmodernist challenges of the 1970s and 1980s, and its reinvention as a neoliberal construct beginning in the 1990s. Gilman’s purposes are to narrate the creation and promotion of modernization theory by notable figures at three key academic institutions in the United States; to analyze “the sociology of mid-twentieth century American academia” by diagramming “the social networks that gave rise to an enduring terminology and set of ideas about development” (4, 21); to explore the relationship between modernization theory’s complex vision and Americans’ ongoing efforts to define their own identity and purpose in the world; and so to enhance the “growing body of historical literature concerning the idea of development” in the second half of the twentieth century (20).

Three case studies advance Gilman’s multipronged analysis. Harvard University’s interdisciplinary Department of Social Relations, under the “guiding light” of Talcott Parsons, first propounded a “descriptive, omnidisciplinary theory” of modernization (73). The Social Science Research Council’s Committee on Comparative Politics (ccp), most notably Edward Shils and Gabriel Almond, adapted Parsonian precepts to determine how postcolonial politics “differed from that of the industrialized world”—and how the former’s political and social “development” could be brought into line with the latter’s (113, 139). At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies, Lucian Pye, Walt W. Rostow, and others pondered communism’s psychological appeal and devised state-sponsored strategies to counter it. “Authoritarian” tendencies appeared most pronounced among the MIT crowd. But modernization theorists generally saw themselves as “mandarins of the future”—“heartfelt” in their belief that a “meliorist, rationalizing, benevolent, technocratic state could solve all social and . . . economic ills,” yet “disdainful of anything”—including democracy—“that stood in the way of progress as they defined it” (11, 8, 20, 16, 8).

“The methodological approach to these institutional studies,”
Gilman writes, “is grounded in a fundamental assumption about the sociology of postwar American academics, namely that the proximate cause for most arguments is a reaction to the writing of other academics” (21). The author effectively uses the memoranda, publications, and conference presentations of practitioners at all three institutions to trace fine points of controversy and show how each organization, especially the CCP, preserved consensus and marginalized dissent. Personalities themselves might have been more boldly sketched. Individual and institutional conflicts form a crucial dimension of Gilman’s story, but the human dimension is sometimes missing. Readers also might wish to be reminded of specific events and trends, beyond the Cold War generally, that provided context for discussion, especially given the author’s assertion that “modernization theory, while overtly focused on the plight of the third world, echoed and amplified unfolding American sentiments about the condition of modernity at home” (12).

Development specialists and scholars of the academy, however, will welcome Gilman’s attention to the nuances of academic debate. His poignant contention that the course of modernization theory “represents in miniature the tragedy of postwar American liberalism”—“as liberal confidence about modernity declined, so too did” faith in development theory—illuminates twentieth-century U.S. intellectual history generally (12, 4). The author’s rueful meditation on a post-9/11 world, wherein anxious Americans again hubristically extol the American way of life but this time proffer few hopeful antidotes to global inequality and strife, may be productively contemplated by thoughtful readers across the disciplines (271).

Deborah Kisatsky
Assumption College


The question examined by Valelly’s _The Two Reconstructions_ is why the enfranchisement of African Americans in the 1960s succeeded, while the earlier attempt after the Civil War failed. A glib but not implausible answer would be that the United States could not afford to fail twice in the attempt to practice the democracy that it preaches. Certainly, the wider social and cultural context in which the later attempt was made had changed so fundamentally from the first that any explanation would have to start by examining how much more favorable the overall circumstances were.

But Valelly takes an approach more appropriate to a political scientist, focusing his attention on those political and legal institutions that
first could grant the suffrage, then sustain and stabilize it, and finally give it legal sanction. Since this institutionalizing process begins at the national level, the book systematically analyzes each enfranchisement attempt from this perspective in great detail.

According to Valelly’s model, each enfranchisement initiative began when a national political party or presidential administration faced an electoral threat that could be countered only by forging a winning coalition through the mobilization of existing black voters, or the creation of new ones. Hence, the “coalition of 1867–68” was created by the Republican majority in Congress that was threatened by President Andrew Johnson’s efforts at party realignment. A century later, the initiative emerged in two stages, first with the Truman administration’s “coalition of 1848” and then the Kennedy “coalition of 1961–65.” Although the Republicans’ creation of an African American constituency in 1867/68 can be readily explained as stemming from the party’s dire need to prevent the Democrats from winning the South, the assertion of a similar imperative in 1948 and from 1961 to 1965 is contestable. Besides, how could the new black voters anticipated by the Kennedy administration be generated quickly enough to take care of a supposedly pressing electoral crisis in 1964? Surely, there are other reasons why the Truman and Kennedy/Johnson administrations embarked on initiatives toward black voting and civil rights.

Nevertheless, after these coalition-creating initiatives were taken, the viability of the new voting group was determined, so Valelly argues, by the quality of the “party-building” and “jurisprudence-building” that ensued. In the post-Civil War case, because the support from the northern Republican Party and the federal courts was inadequate, it failed to stabilize the Republican Party in the South. Accordingly, it collapsed under pressure from the Democrats, and the black vote was ultimately eliminated by disfranchisement around 1900.

By contrast, the second enfranchisement of blacks fared much better. Despite much opposition (though not as lethal or as unrelenting as in the 1870s), this later party-building operation succeeded because it did not begin anew as in the 1860s but was grafted onto an existing southern party structure, albeit a one-party system. The courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, moved quickly to recognize black voting rights and uphold the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and its subsequent extensions, as did the national Democratic and Republican parties. Unlike the earlier sequence of the 1870s, when the Court and Democrats from both the North and the South were unfriendly from the outset, this time the endorsement was fast and easy.

Based on an impressive knowledge of the historical and political-science literature about these two episodes, The Two Reconstructions is an insightful and always interesting comparative study. Yet, by restricting his scope to political and legal institutions—important as they may be—the author limits his ability to explain the second enfranchisement’s suc-
cess. All the same, historians and political scientists will be challenged by this provocative book, which, for the first time, provides a systematic comparison of two historically significant initiatives, which had similar objectives but vastly different outcomes.

Michael Perman
University of Illinois, Chicago


The intensification of globalization during the past three decades has brought about unprecedented integration of asset markets. Using an international political economy (IPE) approach based on industry case studies, the book examines the reactions of U.S. corporations to substantial inward (incoming) foreign direct investment (FDI). This phenomenon, at least in its inter–industry form, is familiar to Mexico, Brazil, China, or Thailand. Crystal explains the surprisingly inept handling of this reversal of fortune by the United States—from being the world’s biggest exporter of capital to becoming its biggest debtor in a span of less than two decades—using the interplay of economic interests and domestic political structures (institutions and norms).

The book consists of seven chapters; the first two chapters and the concluding one outline the theoretical framework. The middle four chapters are organized into four sets of case studies that are designed to illustrate, if not to prove, three working hypotheses concerning the puzzling inter- and intra-sectoral variations in responses to production-based competition via FDI.

The “production profile hypothesis” argues that import-competing industries with capital that is specific to domestic markets will likely be hostile to FDI (consumer electronics and steel). The “global industry hypothesis” posits that industries involving firms with strong international trade and investment ties are likely to favor liberal FDI policies, including equal national treatment (machine tools and antifriction bearings). The “strategic investment hypothesis” suggests that firms in industries, especially in the service sector (where trade and FDI) are naturally fused are expected to condition their support of FDI on reciprocity from foreign governments (airlines and telecom services). Finally, industries with multiple and conflicting interests are likely to have ambivalent attitudes toward FDI (semi-conductors and automobiles).

The methodological innovation of Unwanted Company is rooted in the idea that although firms may have a singular ultimate goal (profit maximization), there does not exist, a priori, a one-to-one mapping between this goal and the many policies that may be deployed to advance its cause (not to mention the multiple strategies that a firm can employ to promote preferred policies). Crystal argues that deductive economic
analysis must, therefore, be supplemented with analysis of at least the demand side of the domestic political market. This book shows how institutions and rationales (national security, anti-trust, jobs, etc.) for protection against imports of goods turned out to be woefully inadequate in providing timely protection against market-driven FDI with its promises of jobs and technological transfers.

Crystal’s well-chosen case studies support the three hypotheses and underscore the limitations of inferring policy preferences from economic interests. Ignoring the relevance of the policy process, he insists, has a cost in terms of explanatory power. Feasibility (in terms of collective action and lobbying costs) and legitimacy (in terms of liberal economic ideology) jointly determine the expected payoffs from lobbying for one policy over another. However, although the case-study approach is useful in narrowing down the set of preferred policy menus, it is inadequate for gauging the magnitude of the net benefits involved.

Given the growing internationalization of production (via global supply chains) and financial markets, it is also not clear that the “national” flag of globally networked firms is a powerful conceptual entry point for IPE analysis of economic integration. Unwanted Company is certainly lucid and worthwhile, especially for those interested in the (initial) reactions of U.S. firms to a taste of their own medicine. It is administered this time mainly by protection-evading upstarts inspired by the Nipponean business model of sequenced hyper-diversification—sectoral as well as geographical.

Finally, it is ironic that, since the publication of the book, outward FDI (that is, outsourcing) has become an even more potent issue, perhaps because the interests of labor (not just capital) have gained political traction. It is certainly easy for a country to be a free trader, as List noted long ago, when its homegrown firms have the competitive advantage to win fair and square. The market, being a taskmaster, has a way of punishing the self-satisfied.

Berhanu Abegaz
College of William and Mary


Readers of this journal might wonder why they should be interested in a monograph about Newfoundland. Yet, for anyone interested in the social and economic development of the early modern Atlantic world, Pope’s Fish into Wine warrants a close reading on three counts: It is a brilliant and meticulous historical reconstruction of the seventeenth-

century fishery; it offers new hooks for understanding the place of New-
foundland and the fishery in the Atlantic world; and it raises provocative
questions about the meaning of modernity.

In the 1980s, archaeologists in Newfoundland and Labrador began
major excavations at a number of early modern sites, most particularly at
Ferryland on the Avalon Peninsula, where George Calvert, Lord Balti-
more, first planted a settlement in 1621, and Red Bay, Labrador, where
sixteenth-century Basque whalers had a large plant to render whale oil.
Archaeological remains from these sites indicate a far higher level of Eu-
ropean investment in the region than previously thought, thus forcing
reassessments. Pope’s book is the first major monograph that systemati-
cally reanalyzes the seventeenth-century documentary record against the
archaeological record, using social and economic theory, and compari-
sions with developments elsewhere in the early modern world, to tease
out the story.

The book’s narrative thread centers on the Kirke family in New-
foundland. In the late sixteenth century, Gervais Kirke had commercial
ties in England and France, which his five sons extended into the Medi-
terranean and across the Atlantic. In 1638, David, the oldest, appropri-
ated Baltimore’s settlement at Ferryland, and substantially rebuilt and ex-
panded the facilities, spending at least £10,000 over the approximately
£20,000 that the Calverts had already invested. David Kirke, also in-
volved in the trade in fish and wine between England, Newfoundland,
and Spain, was probably the most prominent merchant to settle in New-
foundland and run a fishing plantation as a way to guarantee a regular
supply of fish. His family resided at Ferryland until the French attacked
the plantation in 1696 and took the surviving sons, George, David, and
Phillip, to Plaisance, where they died in prison in 1697. For Pope, the
challenge was to explain this “well-capitalized resident industry,” which
the standard historical interpretations of Newfoundland could not ex-
plain (8).

Pope contextualizes the Kirkes within the international trade in fish
and wine, the competition for maritime laborers that produced high
wages for men employed in the fishery, the local economy that made the
consumption of tobacco and wine more commonplace in Newfoundland
than in England, the diversification of the plantation fishing econ-
omy into agriculture and the hospitality trades, and the domestic and in-
ternational struggles to control the fishery, one of the most productive of
the transatlantic trades in the seventeenth century. Pope shows that set-
tlement in Newfoundland was not episodic, but a continuous and con-
sistent part of the English fishery beginning in the early seventeenth cen-
tury. The society that emerged was stratified with a “merchant gentry”
at the top who owned the largest plantations, employed the most labor-
ers, and provided a modicum of governance, much of it through
patron–client relations. Below them were small planters, equivalent to
yeomen or tradesmen in England; a third class was divided between
skilled and unskilled servants. The integration of these classes into capi-
talist and transatlantic networks made them integral parts of the emerging modern world rather than peripheral to it.

_Fish into Wine_ exemplifies the best interdisciplinary work, in which apparent strengths can just as easily be weaknesses. Some of its comparisons are strained, but a book that is boldly conceived is preferable to one that is too cautiously argued. _Fish into Wine_ is also a cautionary tale in an academic world where young scholars are urged to do interdisciplinary or comparative work but also required to publish quickly. These kinds of books are time-consuming to craft; Pope’s took twenty years of steady work to complete. If the profession wants more interdisciplinary books, then more universities have to provide the time for them to be written.

Elizabeth Mancke
University of Akron

_Mohawk Saint: Catherine Tekakwitha and the Jesuits_. By Allan Greer (New York, Oxford University Press, 2005) 249 pp. $35.00 cloth $19.95 paper

Most people write her name “Kateri Tekakwitha,” although few know that the second word should be pronounced something like “Degagwitah.” Almost no one considers, as Greer has, that the first name (which should be pronounced “Gaderi”) might have been coined by an 1891 Anglo-American biographer whose racialized worldview could not accommodate “a complicated badge of colonial hybridity.” Hence, she reasoned that “if you take the French sound of ‘Catherine’ and try to pronounce it with an Iroquois accent, you end up with something that might well be rendered ‘Kateri’” (197). Greer’s insistence on a return to the hybrid name “Catherine Tekakwitha”—equally Catholic and Mohawk—is at the heart of this readable new study of the woman beatified by Pope John Paul II in 1980, three centuries after her death at Kahnawake, near Montreal.

For Greer, Catherine Tekakwitha was both Catholic and Mohawk in at least two subtly connected ways. First—like every other scholar who has recently taken on the subject—he stresses the hybridity of her life experience and her religious behavior and belief. Born in the Mohawk Valley village of Gandaouagué in about 1656 as the daughter of an Algonquin woman who had been captured in war and adopted into a Mohawk lineage, she was orphaned at age six, when both parents died in a smallpox epidemic. Although baptized in her home village by a Jesuit priest in 1676, she had, Greer says, only a slight grasp of Christian theology until after she migrated to Kahnawake a year later—a move that may have had more to do with factional disputes and kinship ties than with religion.

1 The biographical work in question is Ellen Hardin Walworth, _The Life and Times of Kateri Tekakwitha, the Lily of the Mohawks, 1656–1680_ (Buffalo, 1891).
At Kahnawake, Catherine Tekakwitha enveloped herself in an environment that was unquestionably Christian—at least as measured by the certainty of religious indoctrination and strong prohibitions against drunkenness and sexual “impurity” (enforced more by Native people than French clergy). In terms of kinship, residence, and subsistence patterns—as well as in its considerable political autonomy—Kahnawake remained a Native world. There, women like Catherine Tekakwitha struggled to make sense of Catholicism on their own terms, sought the sacred in familiar ways, modeled their behavior after the nuns whose practices they imperfectly understood (but perfectly knew to be a source of power), and devoted themselves to extreme forms of collective physical penance that went far beyond the private “disciplines” that their French priests condoned.

Such practices probably led to Catherine’s death in 1680. The stories of her pious end and of the miraculous cures attributed to her through the years highlight the second way in which Catherine Tekakwitha was both Catholic and Mohawk. Nearly everything known about her earthly life traces back to the writings of two Jesuit priests who knew her at Kahnawake. Pierre Cholenec and, especially, Claude Chauchetière, cast their narratives in the complicated tradition of Catholic hagiography. Anything identifiably Mohawk in Catherine Tekakwitha’s life must be carefully inferred from their overdetermined stories of the Blessed Catherine. The vexed chore leads Greer to make his book virtually a dual biography of Tekakwitha and Chauchetière, whose own tortured spiritual life found meaning in her death and miracles.

Greer succeeds better than any previous scholar in untangling the strains, but, in the end, more of the Catholic than of the Mohawk remains in the story. “When I first visited Kahnawake in 1993,” Greer confesses, “I had difficulty finding anyone interested in talking about Catherine Tekakwitha” (200). From the earliest days after her death, French Canadians, not Mohawks, almost exclusively claimed to feel the power of her spiritual intercession. Today, her greatest following is among Indian Catholics in the United States, rather than in Canada, where the Tekakwitha Conference finds her a powerful symbol of their efforts “to unify Native Catholic voice, presence and identity” (201). To them, she will always be Kateri, not Catherine.

Daniel K. Richter
University of Pennsylvania

“Enough to Keep Them Alive”: Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873–1965. By Hugh Shewell (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2004) 441 pp. $60.00 cloth $35.00 paper

Canadians found comfort for decades in the assumption that their government’s treatment of Indians was more compassionate and humane than the stereotypically aggressive, militaristic actions of the United
States. *Enough to Keep Them Alive* provides a critical and insightful perspective on this important policy field, arguing that, “welfare—relief, social assistance—has been used by the state as a weapon to undermine First Nations cultures and to induce their assimilation and hence disappearance into the dominant Canadian economic and social order” (ix).

Although the majority of the text is devoted to a careful and well-researched reconstruction of Canadian policy, Shewell’s book situates administrative developments within broader political, social, and cultural contexts. He draws comfortably on the work of Said, Wolf, Noël, and Wallerstein, among others.¹ He takes a Marxist approach to the issues at hand, arguing that “Euro-Canadian civilization—liberal democratic capitalism—has laid waste to aboriginal peoples and their cultures” (4).

Shewell looks first at the context of relief and the broader role of government in society at the time of Confederation. He then relates the provision of relief to administrative efforts to subjugate the Indians. The book then examines how government efforts shifted to tie the provision of support to citizenship. In what are the two most important chapters in the book, Shewell describes the role of social sciences during the post-war period in defining Indians and then discusses the evolution of the bureaucracy of Indian welfare. The latter chapter is particularly useful in understanding how welfare evolved from the provision of emergency supplies in times of hardship to a complex economic and political relationship between Indians and the government of Canada. The final chapters include a study of the transition to increased provincial involvement in Indian welfare and an (overly long) conclusion that considers the theoretical and conceptual issues raised by the history of government relief and welfare payments to Indians.

*Enough to Keep Them Alive* examines policy and public administration without becoming overwhelmed by political details and personalities. Shewell pays particular attention to the political culture of public administration and to the manner in which bureaucratic processes reflect dominant ideologies. Most significantly, the author does not treat Indian policy in isolation but instead relates developments in the field to broader national and international trends in concepts of citizenship, minority rights, and the ideology of industrial capitalism. Shewell’s study has much to recommend it, including its comprehensive assessment of national policy and administrative assessments and strong theoretical elements. Unfortunately, but understandable given the nature of the archival record, is the fact that comparatively few aboriginal voices appear in the study. In the tradition of much Canadian scholarship on aboriginal issues, *Enough to Keep Them Alive* is strongly, even stridently, political.

The advocacy that runs through the book adds to the intensity of the argument but raises concerns about its partisanship. In his provocative chapter on the political influence of the social sciences after World

War II, Shewell argues that “the social science introduced a new culture into Indian Affairs that allowed the government to reinvent paternalism based on the ‘benevolence’ of secular understanding, knowledge, and the tools of social engineering. The social sciences simply furthered the state’s aims and provided the knowledge and rationalizing to legitimate state activities in First Nations communities” (227). Shewell and others appear to be as confident in their analysis about the best means of addressing aboriginal needs and aspirations as the post–World War II social scientists were in their assessment of the options facing First Nations in Canada.

Ken Coates
University of Waterloo


Genuine comparative treatments in both political culture and history are challenging because authors must be equally knowledgeable not only in two disciplines but, as in this case, about two countries. Cruz maintains a consistently comparative approach with great assurance throughout the entire book, although each country is discussed in separate chapters. Her deft and absorbing handling of the historical analysis is the highlight of the work. On the other hand, her presentation of the political and cultural theory relevant to the topic is swallowed in dense academic jargon that frequently seems unnecessary and is sometimes baffling.

The author’s argument is “that political culture is best defined as a system for normative scheming embedded in a field of imaginable possibilities” (3). Political culture in the book’s context in turn derives from a Manichean synthesis created at the time of Nicaragua’s conquest, balanced by a Manichean exceptionalism from the earliest conquest history of Costa Rica. This point does not actually explain anything, except to say that the two countries had different histories, but Cruz uses the terms to contrast the two societies from that moment to current times. Cruz argues that political culture or identity shapes politics by forcing participants to engage in normative scheming, which gives rise to different fields of imaginable possibilities and different regimes of arbitration.

To put the argument in historical terms, Cruz points out the way in which Costa Rica immediately following independence from Spain pursued an emphasis on peace and wide landownership, insulating itself from the regional turmoil of Central America by the 1830s. Thus, Costa Rica’s “exemplary civility” and its self-identification as an exceptional nation were evident at all times. Nicaragua, however, institutionalized confrontation amid civil wars and struggles for regional preeminence. By the 1920s, Costa Rica’s “possibility mongers” sought the emergence
of electoral parties, populism, expansion of suffrage, mass literacy, and the secret ballot, while its Institute for the Defense of Coffee served as a long-term mediator between small coffee producers and the processors and exporters, thereby mediating class conflict. In the 1948 civil war, Costa Rica’s exceptionalism imploded but was supplanted by a more democratic variant. The outcome was to enhance Costa Rica’s sense of political legitimacy, helping to produce the strongest democracy in Latin America.

Nicaragua, with the exception of the so-called Regime of Thirty Years (the conservative republic from the 1860s to the 1890s), has a history of inadequate or illegitimate institutions of arbitration that limited its scheme of imaginable possibilities. Cruz’s narrative becomes sharply critical (and revisionist) in her treatment of Nicaragua’s history from the Somoza dynasty to the Sandinista Revolution. She focuses on the internal divisions among the Sandinistas, and the Sandinista National Liberation Front’s (FSNL) differences with labor and peasants, as well as on the tension with capitalist elites, all of which represents a continued vacuum of legitimate arbitration.

The best chapter in the book is the final one, which carries the narrative of Nicaragua beyond the stunning outcome of the 1990 election and into a period when both the Sandinista movement and the rightist coalition rapidly divided internally. Most of the sources in this chapter are from personal interviews that the author conducted with participants and leaders of the FSLN and the National Opposition Union (UNO) including most of the major figures. It makes for sharp and insightful political narrative that will influence readers’ views of the Sandinistas.

Timothy E. Anna
University of Manitoba

Dutra’s World: Wealth and Family in Nineteenth-Century Rio de Janeiro. By Zephyr L. Frank (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 2004) 246 pp. $45.00 cloth $22.95 paper

In the midst of a long quantitative project on wealth in the nineteenth-century city of Rio de Janeiro, Frank paused to consider the postmortem property inventory of barber-surgeon Antonio José Dutra, who owned thirteen slaves, urban properties, and rented out six of his slaves as a musical band. A former slave, Dutra had been born in Kongo and sold from Angola; after buying his own freedom he became a successful entrepreneur by purchasing slaves. This book is not, however, about the uniqueness of Dutra. Rather, Frank argues that Dutra was typical of middle wealth holders because of his reliance on slavery.

From his sample of over 1,000 inventories, Frank establishes that Dutra’s wealth was “like [that of] thousands of other residents of Brazil’s
capital” in the first half of the nineteenth century (5). This group of middle wealth holders lost ground in the second half of the nineteenth century, Frank argues, as coffee, railroads, and the abolition of slavery radically transformed Rio de Janeiro’s economy. Because the middle wealth holders had significantly more of their capital invested in slaves than did the richest ones, the cessation of the slave trade (in 1850) and the abolition of slavery (in 1888) hit them harder. The wealthiest inhabitants of Rio de Janeiro invested in stocks and bonds and in urban real estate after 1850, but the middle group found it increasingly difficult to maintain their financial position in an urban economy once they could no longer easily purchase slaves. As a result, wealth became more concentrated and social mobility more limited.

Who exactly are these middle wealth holders? They comprise a category in Frank’s analysis of the inventories; he defines them as the middle 60 percent of the distribution of wealth holders in his sample. Beyond the fact that slaves constituted an important part of their wealth, we know little about them. To give his quantitative analysis of the transformation of wealth among them a compelling narrative voice, Frank relies on the story of Dutra, whose property at his death was close to the sample mean. In interweaving the larger analysis of wealth with the individual life story, however, Frank’s narrative strategy becomes problematic. On the one hand, he presents Dutra’s property as typical of the middle wealth holders, but, on the other hand, he seeks to recreate the economic world that made possible Dutra’s extraordinary rise from slave to middle wealth holder in nearly thirty years. To what extent does Dutra’s situation represent that of the middle wealth holders as a whole?

The strength of Frank’s contribution in this book lies not in his study of Dutra but in his analysis of the transformation of wealth holding over time. This analysis of the property inventories leads him to challenge many accepted views of slavery in nineteenth-century Brazil. He argues that urban slavery did not exist hand in hand with extreme inequalities in wealth holding. He maintains that the abolition of slavery undermined the position of the middle groups and curtailed the social mobility of free blacks in Brazil. He wonders whether the ownership of slaves is the best marker of wealth, suggesting instead the ownership of urban real estate. These far-reaching claims will generate broad and fruitful discussion among students and scholars, even if the identities of those in Frank’s middle group—defined solely by the distribution of his sample and Dutra’s example—ultimately remain in question.

Alida C. Metcalf
Trinity University

Economic historians have long puzzled over Latin American countries’ failure to achieve growth and prosperity. Brazil is a prime case. Seemingly blessed with endless natural resources, it was left in the dust after the 1950s by the dramatic growth of the East Asian tigers. Why, despite the best efforts of the World Bank, innumerable advisory missions, and willing foreign investors, has Brazil been a laggard in both growth and equity?

Historians have increasingly turned to the nineteenth century for answers. The year 1800 turns out to have been a watershed. Wealth and resource endowment among principal economies around the world were roughly equal that year. A century later, the inequalities were striking. North America, West Europe, Australia, and Argentina had leapt ahead.

What had happened in the intervening century? One answer concerns the nature of Brazil’s insertion in the world economy (“globalization” in today’s terms). One key to that relationship is the role of resident foreign merchants. None was more prominent in Brazil than the British. Britain dominated Brazil’s foreign trade and finances throughout the nineteenth century.

It is therefore appropriate for economic historians to tackle the subject of the role of resident British merchants in Brazil. The author has approached her topic with vigor and imagination. It should be noted, however, that economic history is not the methodology that guided the author’s analysis. True, she discusses merchants’ accounts and details on expediting shipments from Britain, but this analysis does not reach the point of affecting our understanding of nineteenth-century Brazilian economic evolution. She provides no links to the larger picture suggested by Leff and Bulmer-Thomas, among others. Nor does she pay much attention to the relationship between British merchants and Brazilian entrepreneurs whose development would have been crucial for the growth of a capitalist culture. Cardoso, among others, emphasized the foreign origins of Brazilian entrepreneurs for a later period. The issue is important because many observers have seen the absence of a homegrown business class as a defect in Brazilian development.

The primary interest of the author is historical anthropology. She uses the century-long documentation of this British–Brazilian community as an opportunity to study the social interaction of two nationalities,

particularly the British component as an example of the “postcolonial” phase of European overseas expansion. Guenther shows how the British adapted to Northeastern Brazilian food, climate, dress, and social manners. She is eloquent about their obsession with “tropical” climate; not until the first three quarters of the century passed did the cult of “tropical medicine” succumb to modern medical science.

Guenther also discovers that because the British never were a great source of social cohesion and emotional stability, the community was subject to frequent depressions. One of the causes was the community’s iron commitment to maintaining their “Britishness,” rather than integrating with the Brazilian community. One of the greatest strains was generated by sexual behavior. Not a few of the British husbands maintained liaisons with Brazilian women. Evidently their wives turned the other eye (maybe this wifely behavior was not uncommon back home in Britain).

Guenther is fascinated with how the “proper English” survived a long exile in the distant tropics. She shows convincingly that overseas merchant communities are a rich source for the interpretation of national character as generated by the home country.

Thomas Skidmore
Brown University


This collection of articles, most of which previously appeared in print, demonstrates the wide range of work, as well as the interdisciplinary nature, of the “new” history of health and sickness in Latin America. Instead of the more traditional emphasis on individual doctors and treatments, this new research places doctors and medicine into a social and cultural context; explores the interaction between health, politics, and the masses; and concentrates on the manner in which disease is represented. In other words instead of envisioning medicine and public health as objective disciplines, this research underlines the effect of human subjectivity and culture on issues of health. This assumption is reflected in the major sub-fields of this “new” history: the history of medicine (primarily biomedicine), the history of public health, and the sociocultural history of disease.

In his introduction, Armus provides a good general overview of the field, clearly seeing Brazil as the Latin American leader in this context. The nine articles that follow are divided by their overriding locales—Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. The two articles on Argentina demonstrate the breadth of the field. Laura Malosetti Costa’s article centers on a painting by the Uruguayan artist Juan Manuel Blanes, depicting the yellow fever of 1871, and the reaction to its display in Buenos Aires’ Teatro
Colón. Malosetti views the overwhelming success of this painting as a sign of a new sensibility regarding disease. Armus tests Foucault’s theory about the relationship between “medicalization” and modernization’s need to create order and discipline by examining the participation of Buenos Aires tuberculosis patients in making decisions about the nature of their treatment.¹ He finds that patients did not hesitate to reject certain therapies and to defend their right to try others.

Susana Belmartino’s article is the only contribution that has an explicitly comparative perspective. Drawing heavily on “neoinstitutional” political theory, she examines the relationship between social services, the construction of the state and politics in mid-twentieth-century Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. She hypothesizes that the overall success of medical services was related to the degree of political autonomy of governmental social services, the independence of institutions representing workers, and the particular segments of society covered by these services.

At least two of the pieces about Brazil concentrate on the way in which public-health movements affected racial ideas. The first, by Nísia Trindade Lima and Gilberto Hochman, highlights attempts at reforming public health in Brazil during the First Republic. The authors find that public-health leaders and other intellectuals perceived illness as a key national problem, identifying Brazil as a sick nation and stereotyping the “typical” Brazilian as ailing and weak.

Sergio Carrara provides an example of the sociocultural history of disease in his examination of the relationship between syphilis, race, and national identity in mid-twentieth-century Brazil. Drawing primarily on the work of Freyre and other Brazilian intellectuals of the post World War I period, Carrara traces the gradual movement away from a negative view of racial miscegenation and tropical degeneration to a more positive vision of mestizos as ideally suited to life in the tropics.² Part of this transformation was recasting syphilis as a disease linked to Europeans, specifically Portuguese colonists.

The last Brazilian contribution, by Simone Kropf Nara Azevedo, and Luiz Otávio Ferreira, examines the complex history of tripanosomiasis americana, more commonly known as Chagas disease (for Carlos Chagas, who discovered it in 1909), within twentieth-century Brazil. Because the medical community failed to reach consensus about the nature of the disease, no systematic attempt to control it was undertaken until World War II had ended. Combining history and sociology of medicine, the authors explain the reasons for this medical failure, as well as the relationship between biomedical research and public health.

The last three articles examine late nineteenth- and twentieth-century Mexico. Claudia Agostoni focuses on the growing hygiene move-

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² Gilberto Freyre, Casa Grande e Senzala, (Rio de Janeiro, 1992; orig. pub. 1933), 47.
ment among public-health practitioners, a result of the modernization campaign begun under Porfirio Díaz. Faced with a perceived need to prevent the spread of epidemic disease, physicians and officials constructed a central role for women (primarily mothers) in the campaign to encourage public and private cleanliness.

Eric Van Young’s piece, which comments on material dealing with Mexico City’s mental asylum, is the least successful contribution to this collection, since readers are unlikely to have firsthand knowledge of the paper under discussion. Nonetheless, Van Young’s willingness to draw attention to the problems that historians encounter when applying subaltern theory to people—in this case, patients—who left little documentary evidence, is interesting.

Lastly, Alexandra Stem returns to the issue of medicine and race, focusing on biotypology, a system of classification that stressed measurement of physical and mental traits used by public-health practitioners and social workers in Mexico during the 1940s and 1950s. Although avoiding racialized categories, Stem sees these social constructs as closely related to the eugenics movement and earlier mestizophilia.

Susan M. Socolow
Emory University


After the armed uprising by indigenous peasants in Chiapas, Mexico’s southernmost state, it became apparent that the region’s twentieth-century history remained relatively unknown and unwritten. This book makes an important contribution toward filling that gap by focusing on “Chiapas’s revolutionary and post-revolutionary experience through the lens of the rural schoolhouse” from 1920 to 1940. According to Lewis, at this time both the modern Mexican state and nation were forged, and the Ministry of Public Education (SEP), created in 1921, became the federal government’s most important state and nation-building institution. Besides improving levels of education and combating religious “fanaticism” and alcoholism, the SEP was to be the means through which important federal reforms—notably federal labor legislation and land reform—would be introduced throughout the republic. Its remit was thus to redeem and “modernize” the Mexican population and to construct a national identity through the celebration of “popular agency, class struggle, sobriety, patriotism, and secular thought” (xvii).

In historiographical terms, The Ambivalent Revolution is a reaction against the earlier “revisionist” historiography of the Mexican revolution, which questioned both the popular and revolutionary nature of the great social and political upheavals from 1910 to 1940. In such revisionist
historiography, cardenismo (the period of the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas [1934–1940]) is particularly vilified, portrayed as the era during which the Leviathan state imposed itself at the local level and the corporate institutions that came to form the authoritarian party–state apparatus of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) were consolidated. By contrast, this book “highlights the inability of the federal government to fully impose itself in Chiapas” after 1920 (xiv). As Lewis illustrates, SEP teachers had to contend with “a backdrop of grinding rural poverty, inadequate infrastructure, a fiercely independent rancher and planter class, and an ethnically diverse population that vacillated between indifference and open hostility” (xii). Furthermore, after 1934, when the SEP moved to the left and took on “Socialist Education” as its pedagogy, and SEP teachers became increasingly engaged in social reform and political activism, local opposition to the federal government’s radical program intensified.

Lewis concludes that the state’s partial successes left an ambivalent legacy—for example, contributing to the establishment of a system of political bossism (caciquismo) that still persists in many highland Indian communities, but also convincing many poor mestizos in rural lowland communities about the value of schooling and the promise of agrarian reform. Overall, he concludes, “Cardenismo had a positive, even transformative impact in Chiapas . . . where teachers [were] able to submit agrarian reform requests, unionize and mobilize workers and peasants, and introduce the ideology of the revolution” (xv).

Lewis’ analysis, which is informed by anthropology and sociology, takes a regional and chronological approach that highlights the importance of geographical, economic, social, and ethnic differences in influencing the success of the SEP’s project in Chiapas from 1920 to 1940. He also ties the trajectory and outcomes of federal education policy, and its corollary indigenismo, to political struggles at the national and regional levels, and, in contrast to much scholarship on state and nation building in twentieth-century Mexico, emphasizes the significance of the SEP’s material goals as well as its cultural agenda.

Chapter 1, a survey of politics and public schooling in Chiapas before 1922, which is drawn largely from secondary literature, does not really address the relationship between schooling and political and economic modernization in Chiapas before the creation of the SEP in 1921. But chapters 2 to 9, which illustrates the author’s interpretations and arguments convincingly, and often vividly, through the travails of federal schoolteachers in Chiapas, successfully explore the messy business of state building and national consolidation in Mexico from 1920 to 1940. The most problematical aspect of the book is that it begins and ends with the state’s recent political history, jumping from the armed uprising of 1994 to 1945 and back again. Although a relationship clearly exists between state and nation building in Chiapas and the rebellion of 1994, Lewis does not fully analyze the links in the text (nor could he in a book
principally about the 1930s and 1940s). Furthermore, has enough time passed to place the recent Zapatista rebellion in historical context at all?

Nevertheless, the outcome is a well-written and informative book, in which the author presents a comprehensive social history of Chiapas in the first half of the twentieth century, analyzes the complexity and contradictions of federal education policy and *indigenismo* in Mexico from 1910 to 1945, and highlights the way in which the weakness of the federal state vis-à-vis local elites influenced processes of state and nation building in Chiapas. Lewis’ greatest achievement is to weave a solid analysis full of dramatic incidents and characters gleaned from archives in Mexico City and the state of Chiapas. These tales of intrigue and assassination, the images of the smoking gun of the hired thug (*pistolero*) and of federal teachers bunkered in a schoolhouse fearing for their lives, speak not only to the human experience of social revolution but also to the language and violence of the period. Thus, Lewis shows that flesh and blood battles about land and labor reform were as much part of state and nation building as were ideological battles about secularism and citizenship, and that class struggle and the ability of regional elites to limit, subvert, and transform federal initiatives were at least as important in shaping the history of twentieth-century Mexico as were the “modernizing” agenda of politicians in Mexico City.

Sarah Washbrook
St. Antony’s College, Oxford

*An Economic History of South Africa: Conquest, Discrimination, and Development.* By Charles H. Feinstein (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) 302 pp. $75.00 cloth $34.95 paper

For the past three or four decades, most economic historians have come to embrace quantitative methods as the *sine qua non* of their subfield. The general effect has been to produce rigorous, highly technical research papers, limiting the readership for most publications in economic history to a small subset of specialists. Few economic historians have aspired to write broadly conceived works that could appeal to a nonspecialist readership.

Feinstein’s *An Economic History of South Africa* is a welcome departure from this trend. It is a generally accessible account that follows 450 years of the political and social history of white settlement in South Africa. It is the first general economic history of South Africa since that of de Kiewiet some sixty-six years ago.1 Moreover, as its subtitle suggests, the text takes explicit account of the devastating effect of land alienation and racial discrimination on the economic development of South Africa. It is to be welcomed as an appropriate economic history of South Africa for the post-apartheid era.

Feinstein’s vision of South African economic history in the period before Dutch settlement in 1652 is standard. The Khoikhoi herding and Bantu mixed-farming societies in the region of South Africa are understood in good measure by what they lacked—economic dynamism and markets. The principal historical dynamic from 1652 until the mineral revolution in the late nineteenth century is the demographic expansion of the European farming frontier, powered by population growth and in-migration, at the expense of the indigenous peoples. The European settler economy was also remarkably lacking in economic dynamism, and the export successes that were achieved, as a result of the introduction of the merino sheep, were extremely modest in comparison with those of European settler economies in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, Argentina, or the United States.

The grand utility of Feinstein’s work is that it analyzes dispassionately and lucidly the effects of the early dispossession on the African communities, thereby establishing a deep baseline for understanding the more extensive dispossession and disabilities that were visited upon the majority communities after the discovery of diamonds in the late 1860s and gold in the mid-1880s. The author explores the applicability of Lewis’ export-oriented “dual economy” model of economic growth, in the context of land alienation and racial discrimination. He unmasks the bigoted contexts in which economic debates took place about the incentives necessary to convince black workers to leave the land in favor of the mine or white-owned farm. He provides a neoclassical economic analysis to explain the wildly lopsided economic development from the late nineteenth century until the 1970s, during which period wealth accrued to whites and poverty to Africans.

Several of his chapters are more technical in approach. He explores the unique performance of gold in world markets through an analysis of the gold standard and international exchange rates, the effect of state-subsidization on the white-manufacturing and commercial-farming sectors, and the successes of the growing South African economy during the first six decades of the twentieth century—even as it burdened itself with ever more savage racial inequalities. Other chapters highlight the broader political history of apartheid, from its increasing international disrepute in the 1970s, to the flight of international capital and the decline of South African economy.

*An Economic History of South Africa* highlights the costs that have been imposed on the majority populations and the economy itself by the illogic of racial exploitation and the denial of educational and occupational opportunity. This book provides a reliable introduction to the economic history of South Africa.

James L. A. Webb, Jr.
Colby College

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Islamic Imperialism: A History. By Efraim Karsh (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006) 276 pp. $45.00

Karsh leaves no doubt about which side of the contemporary Western–Muslim and Arab–Israeli disputes he takes in Islamic Imperialism. The message contained therein is that the Arab–Muslim kettle has no business calling the Western pot black when it comes to imperial ambitions. Karsh’s foray through the rise of Islam to the present, which gives more attention to recent events than to the distant past, is intended to demonstrate the deep-seated, virtually irrepressible expansionist impulses of Islam from Muhammad to Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. He begins with four quotations. The first is an injunction from Muhammad, “I was ordered to fight all men until they say ‘there is no God but Allah.’”1

Similar words from other Muslim stalwarts—Saladin, the Ayatollah Ruhollal, and Osama bin Laden—follow. All of them are certain to make the hair of any non-Muslim stand on end. They proclaim Islam’s message to have been universalistic and militant, aspiring to bring all peoples under the sway of Muslim rule.

The book is timely as well as polemical. Its polemics and its obvious intention to arouse strong responses should not deter readers, since it is a work deserving to be read for its penetrating analyses of the long history of Islam as an expanding and proselytizing faith. The terms empire and imperialism, however, are anachronistic for much of the history of Islam as treated in this book. Until the nineteenth century and contact with European imperialists, Muslims did not have a word that translates easily into empire and certainly no word for imperialism, even though the early Muslim leaders were surrounded by, and quickly conquered, other states that referred to themselves as empires (the Roman, Byzantine, and Persian empires). In contrast, Muslims designated themselves as members of an umma, a community of believers. They called the Muslim lands dar al-Islam, or the abode of Islam, to distinguish them from the areas not yet ruled by Muslims, referred to as dar al-harb, or the abode of war. The closest classical Arabic word to the idea of empire and imperialism is dawla, which implies a turning, and, thus, in some cases, can suggest that the time or the turn has come for a new group to exploit power at the expense of others. But the fact that the book does not engage at any level with the Arab–Muslim terminologies for empires and imperialism is clearly a significant oversight.

This work has two powerful messages. The first, which occupies the first half of the book, argues that from its birth, Muslim leaders have sought nothing less than world domination. No Muslim hero escapes the charge of being a self-aggrandizing imperialist. For Karsh, the events that were critical in rendering Muhammad’s message savage and cruel were the difficulties that he encountered with the Jewish people living in Medina and elsewhere in the Arabian peninsula. Instead of embracing his message and seeing him as a worthy successor in a long line of God’s prophets—though, in this case, the final and definitive messenger—the
Jews spurned his tenets and caused Muhammad no end of vexation. Karsh also deals critically with Saladin, disputing the flattering treatments often presented in Western accounts of the crusades. In Karsh’s view, Saladin had his own personal, expansionist agenda, within which the Christian crusaders, ensconced in Jerusalem and various other parts of the Holy Lands, were not a prime concern.

Nonetheless, Karsh’s chapters about the militant, expansionist—even imperialist—nature of Islam cannot be swept aside by his dismissive style. The Umayyad rulers, who held sway over the Islamic territories from 660 to 750, would probably fit any modern definition of imperialists. Their empire favored Arabic-speaking peoples of the world; non-Arabs were expected to pay taxes and were not encouraged to become Muslims. This description would sound familiar to historians of the modern British Empire, in which citizenship was reserved for Britons born at home and subject status for peoples of color born overseas and ruled by Britons. In fact, the citizen/subject distinction was the essence of every modern European empire, even those that allowed small escape hatches for well-educated and “civilized” peoples of color.

The second half of the book presents a much more detailed and fully researched history of Muslim–Western relations during the last 200 years, the period of European and American expansionism in the Muslim world. The author propounds two powerful, seemingly contradictory, yet persuasive messages. The first harkens back to the main theme of the volume—that the leading Muslim figures are and were avowedly imperialist, driven more by personal ambitions and self-aggrandizement than any deep-seated religious commitment. The Muslim world’s big men of the last 200 years—Gamel Abdul Nasser, the sheriffs of Mecca, the Shah of Iran, and many others—turn out to have had feet of clay. Their egoism is boundless; their use of pan-Arabism and Islam highly cynical. Karsh offers Nasser, Egypt’s charismatic president, as an ideal example of a leader who used the pan-Arab ideology to advance the interests of Egypt and his own fame.

A second contention of the latter portions of the volume is that even though some of these leaders lacked strong followings and should have been easy clients in the hands of their more powerful imperial masters and the grand strategists of the Cold War, they had far more influence on crucial events in the last century than commonly thought. Karsh contends that the Sherifian family, with a pitifully small circle of followers, duped the British into allowing them to become monarchs in Iraq and Transjordan after World War I. Nasser had his way in the face of American and Soviet opposition in provoking the disastrous 1967 war with Israel. Time and again, the Middle Easterners called the historical shots that shaped their history in spite of the fact that they lacked imposing international power. The last point is well researched and entirely persuasive although what insight it offers into the American invasion of Iraq and the effort to establish a pro-American democracy there is hard to discern.
As expected, Karsh concludes his study with a brief overview of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, continuing his argument that al Qaeda represents the latest in a long list of Muslim groups seeking world dominion. Some of the specific complaints that bin Laden has made about the European partition of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the creation of the state of Israel, and the stationing of American forces inside Saudi Arabia get short shrift. To Karsh they are propagandistic tools to be used within the larger frame of recreating an Islamic empire.

Robert L. Tignor
Princeton University


Workers at War is an important new analysis of class formation among the Chinese proletariat, focusing on workers in the arsenals at Chongqing between the outbreak of war in 1937 and the consolidation of Communist power in the early 1950s. This long and richly textured book contains chapters on China’s armaments industry before and during the war, and on economic, social, and political aspects of workers’ lives, concluding with (slightly less well-integrated) chapters on Yu Zusheng, a worker-intellectual in the 1940s and on the early period of the Communist regime.

The book makes many innovative contributions to the discourse on modern Chinese history, while always being ready to use comparative insights from historical study of Europe—particularly Italy and Germany. It brings issues of class back to center stage. Though not denying the importance of ethnicity and locality, it argues that the arsenal workers often had multiple sources of identity and increasingly came to see their situation in class terms. Moreover, in contrast to works that counterpose the appeals of class and of nationalism, Howard follows Smith in showing how workers could be mobilized along both class and nationalist lines at the same time.\(^1\)

Howard points out that the availability of sources is crucial in determining his methodology and the questions that he can ask (368). He marshals with great skill a wide range of sources, which he approaches in a properly balanced and critical fashion. He consults mainly the municipal archives of Chongqing, but he also uses other archives in China and the United States, as well as interviews and memoir literature. The turning of management into a bureaucracy, which is a major theme of the book, and the fact that the arsenals were run by the government probably created more plentiful sources than for other industries. These factors, however, might limit the degree to which the findings of this study

\(^1\) Steve Smith, Like Cattle and Horses: Nationalism and Labor in Shanghai, 1895–1927 (Durham, N.C., 2002).
could be applied to workers in other sectors of the Chinese economy. Yet, many of the phenomena described in the book were as resonant of the situation of post-1949 enterprises as they were of labor before the revolution.

The book is essentially a work of history, informed primarily by its sources, but Howard’s theoretical take on class formation is highly sophisticated and nuanced, making use of a wide range of ideas from other disciplines. From political economy, he borrows Hirschman’s model of exit, voice, or loyalty as a response to political repression. He is also well aware that economic factors of supply and demand were at least as important in determining the situation of labor as were social or political influences. Most importantly, the book draws on ideas such as those of Katznelson in analyzing class formation through four levels—structure, ways of life, disposition, and collective action. Despite his extensive use of theoretical and comparative work on class formation, however, Howard might have made more use of studies of factory organization and its implications for class. He argues (31) that “mass production changed the social landscape of the shop floor, creating structural conditions conducive to class formation,” but only briefly cites Braverman and not at all the work of Beynon, Burawoy, or Nichols.

This major new contribution brings both theoretical sophistication and imaginative use of sources to the study of a particular, but important, segment of China’s working class.

Tim Wright
University of Sheffield


Japan has a critical place in any understanding of the historical development of capitalism as a worldwide process, but those who do not read Japanese are at a disadvantage concerning Japan’s pivotal “early modern” period, as the age of the Tokugawa shogunate (1600–1868) is now most commonly called. The lack of English sources is especially glaring be-

cause Japan’s early-modern economic history is richly documented in Japanese, and economic history as a discipline has long been an extraordinarily large and active field of inquiry within Japan. This book goes far to bridge the gap. A translation of chapters from the first three volumes of the most important recent collection of scholarly work on Japan’s economic history, the *Nihon keizaishi* (Japanese economic history) series, published by Iwanami in 1988/89, this volume distills the results of many decades of detailed research. The individual writers are among Japan’s most senior and best-known economic historians.

The question is why it took sixteen years for such an important collection to appear in English, and only with Japanese funding (a Chinese translation of the series in its entirety, at Chinese initiative, appeared eight years ago.) This work is more than a translation; parts of it have been recast and updated, with new material added.

The book begins with a wide-ranging introduction by Hayami on the emergence of “economic” (or market) society in Japan (the overarching concept of *capitalism*, which would appear to be highly relevant to this book is avoided by these scholars.) Matao Miyamoto has contributed a treatise in two chapters on quantitative aspects of the economy and on prices and macroeconomic dynamics. Masaru Iwahashi outlines the institutional framework of the economy in both its political and market aspects. Kazui Tashiro explores foreign trade under the so-called “closed country” regime. Hiroshi Shimbo and Akira Hasegawa discuss market and production dynamics. Yūjiro Oguchi delves into central-government finances. Hayami (again) and Hiroshi Kito provide an overview of changes in demography and living standards. Shunsaku Nishikawa and Masatoshi Amano explore the economic policies of domainal governments. Osamu Saito and Masayuki Tanimoto outline the proto-industrial transformation of traditional industries. Toby contributes an important new chapter on rural banking networks. Shimbo and Saito, again, close the volume with a broad synthetic view of Japan’s economy on the eve of industrialization. Also included is a new appendix containing reference information, a glossary, index, and bibliography.

This volume contains rich work of the highest quality, presenting a comprehensive picture of the economic dynamics of Tokugawa Japan. Every chapter could form the basis of many further essays of critical exposition. *The Economic History of Japan* is not immodestly named; it is a standard work indispensable for anyone studying Japanese history in any of its aspects and equally indispensable for anyone undertaking to explore the emergence of capitalism as a world-historical process.

Mark Metzler
University of Texas, Austin

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1 The three volumes are Hayami Akira and Miyamoto Matao (eds.), *Keizai shakai no seiritsu, 17–18 seiki* (The Establishment of Economic Society, Seventeenth–Eighteenth Centuries); Shimbo Hiroshi and Saitô Osamu (eds.), *Kindai seido no taidō* (The Quickening of Early Modern Growth); Umemura Mataji and Yamamoto Yuzo (eds.), *Kaiko to ishin* (Opening of the Ports and the Meiji Restoration) (Tokyo, 1988–1989).
Secret Weapons and World War II: Japan in the Shadow of Big Science. By Walter E. Grunden (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2005) 335 pp. $39.95

Grunden’s overview of major scientific developments in Japan during World War II contributes to the historiography of Japan’s wartime mobilization, the evolution of bureaucratic systems of economic control, and the development of science in Japan. Grunden seeks to describe the impact of science on Japan’s conduct of the war. Additionally, he examines how attempts to harness “Big Science”—defined as government-controlled research projects in such cutting-edge technology as nuclear weapons, radar, rockets and guided missiles, and chemical- and biological-weapons systems—ultimately contributed to Japan’s spectacular postwar growth. However, by not making greater use of other disciplinary techniques, Grunden ultimately fails to answer the larger questions that he poses.

Grunden thoroughly lays out the basics of Japan’s wartime mobilization of science and technology, providing a broad comparative perspective with the other major combatants—Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States. He shows that Japan’s forays into Big Science were crippled by the sheer inadequacy of its economic base; endemic turf warfare between competing bureaucracies (the highest expression of which was found in the army and navy); a total disinterest in systems perceived as merely “defensive” (like radar); and a paranoid insistence (again, best-exemplified by the military but not native to it) on secrecy, compartmentalization, and keeping even the most cutting-edge research “in house,” away from the wider scientific community. Indeed Grunden makes it abundantly clear that Japan was by far the least successful in mobilizing the human and research potential of its major universities, which were left largely to pursue their own work during the war.

Grunden’s finding that the United States was able to mobilize Big Science much better than Japan is secure, though he never satisfactorily explains why. A wider, interdisciplinary scope would have helped. What factors in Japanese society, politics, and culture make knowledge a coin to be hoarded rather than shared? Why were the Japanese unable to embrace the more open exchange of information inherent in “the Republic of Science,” which, as Richard Rhodes notes in Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1995), was essential to the success of the Anglo-American effort and survived even wartime compartmentalization? What makes bureaucratic turf battles so central to the story of modern government in Japan? That the phenomenon exists is indisputable, but some explanation of why it overrode all attempts to make a common effort when even national survival was at stake requires broader analysis.

Grunden’s conclusions about the ultimate impact of Big Science on Japan’s postwar recovery are also less than convincing. The failure of Japanese science was largely blamed for Japan’s defeat. But to what extent was this a sober analytical conclusion rather than an effort to deflect
blame from a government and bureaucracy that had recklessly plunged into war without regard to its costs or dangers? To what extent can the greater “success” of government mobilization of postwar science be attributed to lessons learned from the war rather than a simple thinning of the bureaucratic herd as a result of occupation reforms? And does postwar success constructing bullet trains and developing consumer electronics really constitute the success of the government-directed Big Science that Grunden suggests?

Paul E. Dunscomb
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_Unfamiliar Relations: Family and History in South Asia._ Edited by Indrani Chatterjee (New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 2004) 302 pp. $60.00

Chatterjee opens this volume with an appeal for recognition of the “unfamiliar” nature of the family in precolonial and early colonial India. In Chatterjee’s view, the interests and assumptions of the present have obscured the complex relationships and practices that characterized families in the region during these eras. To understand these histories requires a self-consciously multidisciplinary approach, bringing to the study of history the methodologies of anthropology, literature, and political philosophy.

The essays in this volume suggest that this approach is partially inherent to the nature of the family in South Asia at the time, which confounds any attempt by modern scholars to identify a distinct domain of kinship separate from politics, economics, and the like. As Chatterjee comments, “there has been no family in South Asian history that was not simultaneously a political, economic, social and juridical entity” (35). Yet, since the disciplines of anthropology, history, and political philosophy were historically constituted through precisely such delineation of kinship or the family as a distinct object of study, historians of the family in precolonial South Asia face the methodological conundrum that defining or delimiting their object of study is itself a project historically rooted in the colonial encounter, as the essays by Michael Fisher and Sylvia Vatuk in this volume attest. For this very reason, however, the history of the family in precolonial South Asia also lends itself to reflection on different ways of representing family relations across historical, literary, and legal genres and across written and oral texts, as suggested in the essays by Chatterjee, William Dalrymple, Pamela Price, and Ramya Sreenivasan.

The eight essays in the volume, which cover diverse geographical regions of the subcontinent, identify several key ways in which the history of the family in this region challenges contemporary assumptions. All of the essays share an emphasis on the fundamentally public and po-
itical nature of kinship. The strong and suggestive pieces by Sreenivasan on the precolonial consolidation of elite Rajput lineages and by Price on the vicissitudes of relationships within a Telugu lineage in South India demonstrate the centrality of conflict within families and the varied ideological uses of literary narrative (Sreenivasan) and of the legal domain (Price). Similarly, Sumit Guha’s work on family feuds in Western India and Chatterjee’s own work on oral and literary narratives in the eastern dynastic state of Tripura foreground the intimate nature of conflict, or what Chatterjee terms the “central dialectic of violence and intimacy” (250). Fisher’s piece on the extraordinary life of the Begum Sombre (Samru) and Vatuk’s on the contested meaning of family in an early nineteenth-century South Indian princely state explicate the multiple indigenous terms for family relations and the varied ways in which indigenous elites drew upon the idiom of family in their attempts to shape relationships and entitlements in the early colonial context.

The essays by Chatterjee and Price—like Dalrymple’s essay on the love affair between Muslim noblewoman Khair-un-Nissa and James Achilles Kirkpatrick, the British Resident of Hyderabad—also foreground the complexity of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century households, and the ways in which they incorporated “outsiders,” creating and structuring both elite and nonelite social relations. The critical presence and agency of slaves, servants, and other dependents within elite households offer different ways of thinking about intimacy and power. However, further discussion and theorization of the ideologies and practices that constituted elite and nonelite categories would enrich the volume. Indeed, all of the essays that touch on the colonial period, with the exception of the final essay by Satadru Sen, deal with “native states,” or dynastic realms that retained certain limited forms and symbols of sovereignty in relation to the emerging colonial state. The differences between the family politics of these petty rulers and others not so positioned in relation to the colonial state bear more explicit acknowledgment and discussion.

The final essay by Sen on the colonial project of creating heteronormative families among convicts in the Andaman Islands penal colony is the only piece to focus on a subaltern population; it is also the only piece that addresses the late nineteenth century. As such, it sits in odd relation to the remainder of the volume, not least since the penal regime certainly operated at one extreme of many more quotidian colonial efforts to create a new politics of the family during the late nineteenth century.

The essays in this important volume raise a host of theoretical and substantive issues that necessarily extend beyond the history of the family to the history and ethnography of early modern and modern states, as well as to divergent forms of textual production and circulation in the operation of historical modes of social power.

Rachel Sturman
Bowdoin College

In The Future of the Great Game, Brobst examines Caroe’s influence on British strategic thinking during the decolonization of South Asia, arguing that Caroe correctly augured that great power competition for power in Asia would continue long after Britain’s official withdrawal from India. Caroe served as foreign secretary for the British Government of India during World War II, and later as governor of India’s North West Frontier Province in 1946/47, before being forced out by nationalists who regarded him as pro-Pakistan (an unfair charge, Brobst maintains). Throughout his career, Caroe urged British decision makers to consider geopolitics as they formulated imperial strategy. In particular, he was convinced of what Brobst calls “the subcontinent’s geospatial centrality,” particularly as a bulwark against Russian expansion. He linked a strong and unified South Asia with the defense not only of Asia as a whole but also of the Middle East. Brobst argues that Caroe foresaw many Cold War developments, including the importance of the Middle East, and maintains that many of Caroe’s concerns about the Great Game—a term that refers to the rivalry over preeminence in Asia—are still relevant today.

Most of the book is organized geographically, making its chronological line hard to follow. It begins with the strategic issues at stake in British-occupied India, primarily Britain’s need to maintain stability after its imminent withdrawal. Brobst next discusses India’s “outer ring”—including Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet, and Southeast Asia—which Caroe saw as forming “a secure shield under which India could progress free from care” (36). These buffers protected India primarily from Soviet encroachment, although Caroe recognized China as a potential threat as well. Brobst’s subsequent turn to India’s “inner ring”—where Baluchistan (now in southwest Pakistan), Nepal, and the Naga Hills of northeastern India provided convenient bases for British imperial troops—shifts the story back and forth in time, obscuring both the development of Caroe’s vision and British strategic thinking. Not until Brobst takes up the period of Caroe’s governorship in the North West Frontier Province does the drama of Caroe’s often-frustrated efforts to influence the official mind of the Raj come out in full force.

Although the title suggests that the book offers an interdisciplinary examination of future strategy and the direction of South and Central Asian geopolitics, it focuses on the history of the 1940s and to a lesser extent on the Cold War era. Readers seeking a substantive discussion of present—or future—strategy and policy will be disappointed; only a few pages of the final chapter deal with current events, let alone look ahead into the twenty-first century. However, Brobst’s discussion of the historical roots of current affairs in South Asia, including Pakistan’s relations with the United States, Afghanistan’s role in great power competi-
tion, and links between South Asia and security in the Middle East, has clear policy relevance. As a result, this book will engage scholars of Britain’s postwar strategy, the decolonization of South Asia, and the development of the Cold War, as well as those interested in the imperial origins of contemporary problems in South Asia.

Lucy Chester
University of Colorado, Boulder


For the past twenty years, DeBernardi has published many articles on the temples and rituals of the Chinese community in Penang. She has provided detailed anthropological studies of the social and religious life of the local Chinese community with an eye to placing it not only in its Malaysian context but also in the broader comparative context of Chinese communities elsewhere. In this book, she applies the same perspectives to the history of the community from the early nineteenth century to the present, raising interesting issues concerning the interdisciplinary approach.

The book is divided into two parts, “Religion and Society in Colonial Penang” and “Religion and the Politics of Ethnic Revival in Contemporary Penang.” Topics include the conflict between the colonial governor and the Kong Hok temple in 1857, the social role of the Heaven and Earth Society “sworn brotherhoods,” the creation of the “Chinese Town Hall” in 1886, the political context of the Hungry Ghost and Nine Emperors festival revivals in the 1970s, and the historical narratives embedded in the lives of the deities. The author applies her understanding of the rituals and the narratives to the formation of ethnic identities in both the past and present, proposing that the formation of popular religious institutions in colonial Penang and the contemporary revitalization of popular religious culture were “social movements designed to create and sustain unity” (4). She contrasts her view with that of “social-movement theorists” who argue that ethnic-identity movements, although they may combine modern ideologies with mythic reaffirmations of the past, are different from religious revivals based on invented ritual traditions, which the theorists dismiss as “escapist.” To support her interpretation, she invokes recent trends in anthropology and history, adding to the mix of insights into rituals and their meanings a remarkable new source, the words, or “texts,” of the Chinese spirit medium.

DeBernardi’s most controversial methodological challenge involves her conclusion that the leaders of the sworn brotherhoods of the mid-nineteenth century acted in their initiation rites as mediums for the spir-
its of the founders, thus combining secular and sacred authority in a manner that had a great impact on the initiates. She goes beyond the recent groundbreaking work of Murray, Ownby, and ter Haar on the invention of the sworn brotherhood’s traditions and the meaning of their rituals as performance, investigating “how the inventors of the sworn brotherhoods used historical narrative and ritual process to construct a social contract (81).”¹ The “shamanistic dimension” of their rites, the models of political centrality and authority expressed in the narratives, and their periodic festivals invested with cosmological significance are akin to the convergence of rites, narratives, and periodic festival celebrations that occurred in response to the May Thirteenth Crisis of 1969 and the resulting Rukunegara, or “National Ideology” of Malaysia. In both cases, popular religious traditions were reinvented and revitalized with the help of influential secular power-brokers in ways that reaffirmed the local Chinese community’s sense of its cultural roots.

The detailed descriptions of the historical narratives, community institutions, ritual paraphernalia, and public action in themselves make this book fascinating reading for anyone interested in Chinese popular religion, colonial history, or contemporary cultural politics. The interdisciplinary insights into the complex ways that local cultures and national or global politics interact, free of master narratives and theoretical blinders, make it especially exciting.

Jerry Dennerline
Amherst College