Urban–environmental history is a new sub-field of both environmental history and urban history, each relatively recent fields in their own right. In his introduction to this volume, Isenberg discusses the evolution of urban environmental history as it distinguished itself from the larger field of environmental history as a focus of study. Isenberg differentiates between the early studies in this domain that borrowed, he maintains, largely from the model of the urban organism popularized by the Chicago school of sociology, and the work of newer scholars who stress issues such as power, class, and race. These authors, he argues, are freed from the burdens of the past: “No longer concerned with proving the relevance of urban places to environmental history, no longer beholden to the organism or central place models of urban studies, no longer afraid that environmental history will be subsumed by other fields . . . the essays in this collection mark a new direction in urban environmental history” (xiv).

The book is divided into three parts, “Urban Spaces, Death, and the Body”; “The Geography of Power and Consumption”; and “Cities Deconstructed. It includes nine incisive short essays: Ari Kelman on New Orleans’ “phantom” slave insurrection of 1853; Peter Thorsheim on class discrimination in London’s parks; Joanna Dyle’s analysis of San Francisco’s war on rats following the earthquake and plagues of 1907/08; Ellen Stroud on the “Geography of Death” in Harlem; Karl Appuhn on water management in Early Modern Venice; Isenberg on the role of flood control and political conflict in Sacramento, 1848–1862; Matthew Klingle on Seattle “Outdoor Recreation and Environmental Inequality”; Emmanuel Kreike’s challenge to the concept that environmental change moves from a “state of pristine wilderness/Nature . . . to a state of domestication/Culture”; and Sara Pritchard’s analysis of how regionalization reshaped France’s Rhone River.

The essays are insightful and well-researched, often providing perspectives on subjects previously thought to be thoroughly studied. Yet, the obvious question is whether or not this volume lives up to the editor’s promise of “a new direction in urban environmental history” (xiv). Just as Kreike argues that environmental change does not move in a linear fashion, neither does urban environmental history always move in a linear fashion. Some of the themes that are prominent in this book were also present in earlier works, particularly class, power, and landscape, although often to a lesser degree. Themes such as the body and the role of culture, however, are entirely fresh, as is their intertwining with issues of ecology and gender. What Isenberg might have noted is that (to the best of my knowledge) the writers in this volume were all trained as environmental historians whereas few, if any, of the previous generation of
urban-environmental historians were. In many cases, the writers in this volume studied under members of this first generation of largely self-trained urban environmental historians. Happily for the field, they are now reaching beyond them.

Joel A. Tarr
Carnegie Mellon University

_Why Not Kill Them All? The Logic and Prevention of Mass Political Murder._

Men (we are not told much about women) have a dual nature. They are often ruled by jealousy, resentment, fear, and hatred and thereby seek to rid the earth of their enemies. Yet they are also gentle, forgiving, and gregarious, and thereby seek institutions to limit the full expression of their passions. Hence, it is natural (though rare) and welcome that a psychologist (McCauley) would team with a sociologist (Chirot) to explore not only the psychological sources of mass murder but also the social sources of its containment.

The authors have a capacious definition of mass political murder. Unlike many tracts that portray the Holocaust as unique, Chirot and McCauley see the Nazis as historically all-too-common, an example of an ideology of purity that drives states and men to extraordinary acts of cruelty. Like Michael Mann in _The Dark Side of Democracy_ (New York, 2005), the authors view genocide—in which ethnic others are eliminated as part of an evolving state design—as characteristic of the modern age. But they do not link it in any way, as does Mann, to democracy. In fact, the same sorts of motives pervaded predemocratic mass killings, such as Genghis Khan’s in Central Asia and Persia, William the Conqueror’s in Yorkshire, or Thomas Cromwell’s in Ireland. What distinguishes modern genocide is not motive, but the fact that the modern nation-state is much larger than the tribe. Consequently, to wipe out an enemy nationality requires a degree of organization heretofore unknown. The scale of the modern state for the authors of this volume, rather than its association with the democratic age, explains genocide as we know it today.

The book offers a balanced assessment of why mass killings are normal and why they are so rare. Rhetorically, this assessment situates the book’s collaborators as if they were at the two ends of a tennis court, with the reader sitting by the net following the ball—to his/her neck’s chagrin—from side to side. On the one hand, to get the rally going, we are reminded how astounding it is that man could do such things to his fellow man; on the other hand, given what we know about man’s nature, it is astounding that mass killing is so rare. On the one hand, the rally continues, human nature is ugly and will remain so; on the other
hand, men construct institutions (codes of honor; the potlatch, exogamy, Geneva accords) to set limits to their passions. On the one hand, institutions set limits to man’s passions; on the other hand (witness the ubiquitous violations to the Geneva accords), these institutions are hardly sufficient to contain those passions in times of crisis. On the one hand, the Geneva accords were violated with impunity; on the other hand, with American hegemony, they are more likely to carry bite. On the one hand, trading states are more tolerant such that we should expect less mass murder with increased world trade; on the other hand, the great Dutch trading republic massacred and enslaved nearly the entire population of the Banda Islands merely for trading with British merchants. On the one hand, decentralization of state power (as with the case of Karnata in south India) reduces the ability of states to use police power for evil purposes; on the other hand, those same institutions without a strong civil society (as in Côte d’Ivoire) are a prescription for state collapse, civil war, and gratuitous murder. On the one hand, contact between groups fostered by peace interests yields tolerance; on the other hand, when those who experience positive contacts return home, the tolerance wanes.

Missed in this extended rally is a Holmesian attention to what can be learned from dogs that do not bark. The authors focus on contemporary Europe as a place where norms of tolerance reign, lowering the chances of mass killing. But somehow the authors manage to delete Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo from Europe. The potential for disaster in the Muslim-populated slums of Paris also evades them.

Yet, there are surprising arenas where mass killing has not taken place. Although Brazil has had its share of gruesome violence throughout its history, it does not appear in the authors’ compendium of cases. In fact, Brazil is mentioned for its surprising racial tolerance, as compared to the United States. Whereas the North American genocide of the Cherokees receives vivid analysis, the book offers no comparable discussion of why no similar cases exist in Brazil. Is this lapse because the authors do not read Portuguese or because they forget that dogs that do not bark reflect neighborhoods that are free from night stalkers?

The authors devote copious attention to the Jews as victims of mass murder, as would be expected in such a book. They also acknowledge an incident recounted in the Old Testament Book of Judges in which the Jews themselves refrained from ethnically cleansing Canaan, despite the recommendation of their leader, Joshua—the very kind of admonition that has led the authors to identify leaders as the real culprits in mass murder. But the authors do not explain why Joshua could not arouse his people to kill. Were the Jews too tired after their earlier conquests, or were they being pragmatic about their demographic situation, needing

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1 Readers will note that American Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and John Yoo, his legal counsel, are not in the book’s index. On their disregard for the Geneva Conventions, see Yoo’s *War by Other Means* (New York, 2006).
women to bear them children? Or could the author of Judges have been using this “history” as a political tool to warn future Jews about the evils of exogamy? Again, the non-occurrence of the phenomenon promises clues that the authors failed to pursue.

The book ends with an authorial plea for an enlightenment doctrine of tolerance, allowing us to see others as if they were like us. Placed in the final paragraph, this master stroke leaves no further room for a return. But the match between the psychologist and sociologist—with human nature battling social institutions—ends in a draw.

David D. Laitin
Stanford University


The Cold War conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union in the decades after World War II has conscripted a vast army of historians and political scientists. These scholars have produced a prodigious literature concerning the strategies and tactics of superpower decision makers in their confrontations around the world. Since power was concentrated in American and Soviet hands, the focus has been on Washington and Moscow. The Third World usually comes into play as a dependent variable, acting as an arena of competition where ideological, economic, and military superpower is tested, given advantage, or found wanting.

Westad’s The Global Cold War does not dispute those who portray the Americans and Soviets as prime movers in the history of the Cold War. He argues that the two superpowers offered Third World peoples contending models of modernity—the United States inviting incorporation in an empire of liberty and the Soviet Union, membership in an empire of justice. Ideology is at the center of Westad’s argument about superpower motivation, but he is also aware of the importance of bureaucratic infighting, domestic politics, and personality in policy formation. Westad moves beyond traditional accounts, however, to contend persuasively that thinking about the Cold War must be globalized to incorporate Third World people and agendas into the dynamic of history. Thus, he raises the significance of local elites in Latin America, Asia, and Africa who had to respond to superpower interventions while mediating the demands of competing elites and constituents seeking change and reform. Using this interactive model, Westad generates a nuanced account of the Cold War that reveals how the Third World figured in the toppling of one superpower while, at least, temporarily challenging the other to rethink its role in the world.

The Global Cold War is remarkable for its geographical and historical
breath. Researching in diverse archives—including those in the United States, the Russian Federation, China, South Africa, and Germany—Westad provides valuable accounts of superpower intervention and local-elite responses in China, Vietnam, Indonesia, Iran, Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan.

Yet, scholars will have strong reason to contend with The Global Cold War. Westad’s emphasis is on ideological motivation for superpower interventions in the Third World. He maintains that “Moscow’s and Washington’s objectives were not exploitation or subjection, but control and improvement” (5). In the American case, Westad ignores an extensive critical literature that discerns a more complex drive for imperial power. In The Global Cold War, markets take a decidedly low profile and Westad never addresses those who argue that American decision makers since the 1890s have pressed for foreign trade and investments as necessary to the health of the domestic economy. Rivalry for oil and uranium reserves does not deflect the ideological thrust of the book. Racial attitudes of superpower policy makers and agents on the ground play no part in the story. The security concerns of the Soviet Union and the United States are also trumped by ideological mission despite the book’s repeated insistence on just such superpower interests.

Certain chapters, particularly regarding Soviet intervention in the Third World, are overwhelmed by detail, and conceptualization falters. Curiously, the United States is lost in the chapter dealing with the Vietnam War, as Westad focuses primarily on the Chinese–Soviet rivalry.

Robert A. Goldberg
University of Utah


No historian of early medicine can perfectly recapture the clinical reality of his/her subject. There are few patient letters or doctors’ casebooks dating from earlier than 1500 to examine. Scholars have had to construct a one-sided picture of medicine from textbooks of the period, which offer an idealized account that cannot be compared with actual experience. Mitchell has tried to find a way out of that dilemma in this account of health practitioners and institutions in the Latin East from 1095 to 1291, and of the wounds and other traumas that they treated (a second volume on nutrition and disease is promised). Being not just a historian but also a surgeon and a paleopathologist, he has juxtaposed texts with archaeological evidence (for example, the excavation of the Hospital of St. John in Jerusalem) and with paleopathological materials (skeletal remains) in a way that brings readers closer to the actualities of health and injury.
Mitchell’s is a useful effort, but it cannot completely respond to the historian’s difficulty. Because the study of bony remains is still relatively new, it can only play a minor part in the analysis, by exemplifying the consequences of the battles described in the sources. Nor can archaeological evidence easily be interpreted in the absence of texts: Mitchell’s fascinating account of the remarkably sophisticated Jerusalem hospital depends more on a recently discovered description of its functioning in the 1180s than it does on the physical ground plan that has been established. Written evidence must still be the starting point for the medicine of the crusading kingdom, and the great majority of sources from the Latin east in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries are historical and legal, not social or intellectual. They offer accounts of battles, of people wounded in different ways or killed by a variety of weapons (Mitchell interprets shrewdly what must have happened to them, illustrating his analyses with pictures of distinctively perforated skulls or the remains of a twelfth-century mace), but they say nothing about treatment.

What a crusading surgeon actually did for his patients has to be inferred from textbooks of the period, and Mitchell has chosen to depend on the Surgery of Teodorico Borgognoni, a textbook written in Bologna in the 1260s that represents the new literate European surgery that arose late in the life of the kingdom. Is this work really the best index to how Crusader surgeons would have practiced? As Mitchell recognizes, texts that offer testimony to surgical technique have survived from the kingdom itself. The Liber regalis that was translated into Latin in Christian Antioch (1127) includes an extensive section on surgery; 100 years later the Compendium medicine of Gilbertus Anglicus, which purports to reveal the author’s earlier medical activity in Syria, also deals thoroughly with surgical topics. Either would have been a more direct witness to probable Crusading practice than Teodorico, and, taken together, they might have revealed changes—or stability—in the surgery of the kingdom of Jerusalem.

Given the importance of written sources, Mitchell might have extracted more from them in the light of European developments. The 200-year life of the kingdom of Jerusalem in Palestine and Syria was a period of enormous changes in European life, thought, and institutions and those changes were reflected in Crusader society. Mitchell is fully alert to institutional evolution in his world, pointing out, for example, that although leprosaria were founded outside city walls in the twelfth century, by the thirteenth century they were being brought inside. But changes affected medicine more broadly. Europe saw a growing belief in medical learning and an enhanced status for the field after 1200, crystallizing around the new medical faculties apparent at Paris and Montpellier and leading in the thirteenth century to a more consistent distinction between medicine and surgery. Appealing to this pattern of development might have helped Mitchell explain his inability to identify many practitioners in the twelfth-century kingdom, and their much greater presence (with the appearance of “surgeons”) in the thirteenth. It might
also have weakened his belief that any practitioner called “magister” must have had a university degree and that therefore elite practitioners routinely came to Jerusalem. In fact, even after formal degrees came into existence, the term magister could simply be an honorific.

But even though the comparison with Western Europe is perhaps underexplored, the relation of Crusader practice to the Islamic world is intelligently pursued, and with occasionally striking conclusions. The Islamic muhtasib may not explain the introduction of medical licensing in the West, as Mitchell would have it, but he makes a strong case for the Hospital of St. John having become a medical rather than a charitable institution (well in advance of European hospitals) under the influence of Eastern conditions. More radically, yet not at all implausibly, he concludes that Christian practitioners in the kingdom were no less competent than Muslim ones, in the process weighing and devaluing the entertaining stories of Usama ibn Munqidh that historians have so long been content to take at face value. Medicine in the Crusades may not be the last word on the subject, but it makes abundantly clear how a mingling of disciplinary perspectives can help to clarify the life of a mixed society like the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

Michael R. McVaugh
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill


A controversy has raged among historians of the Mediterranean for decades about the cultural and geopolitical meaning of “the Sea”: Does this great body of water unite its southern and northern shores, or is it a marker of difference between them? Strenuous arguments on both sides of the question formed the armature of some of the more noteworthy historical writing of the twentieth century. While Braudel came down on the side of unity, Pirenne launched a whole new school of criticism, arguing that Islam was responsible for transforming the Mediterranean into an immense divide.¹ Muslim forays into Europe after the seventh century, he asserted, broke up the cultural unity of late antiquity, and ushered in a period of discord. According to the “Pirenne thesis,” the Sea lost its properties as a channel of communication and, instead, became the boundary between two separate worlds, each pursuing its own destiny.

More recent scholarship continues in this vein—on the one hand, the “clash of civilizations” camp that emphasizes disjuncture and the image of “two violently warring worlds” (in the words of Stephen Greenblatt), and, on the other hand, the synthesizers who see the sinews

of connectivity everywhere. Davis’ book is situated squarely in the center of this larger debate, and she takes a fresh position on it. Her subject is a fitting and elusive border crosser known in the West as Leo the African, who went by various names and guises, depending on time and place. To his Maghribi fellow countrymen, he was Hasan ibn Muhammad al-Wazzan al-Fasi; in Europe he was known sometimes as Giovanni Leone and sometimes as Yuhanna al-Asad. Born near the end of the fifteenth century in Granada, he traveled extensively throughout the Maghrib, serving various masters on missions of shadowy purpose. On one such foray in 1518, he was captured by Spanish pirates near the coast of Tunis and brought as a prize to Pope Leo X. Catechized and baptized, he spent the next nine years in Italy, absorbed into the cosmopolitan circles of the Vatican court.

At some point he became a writing machine, turning out books, dictionaries, and other compositions for humanist scholars hungry for knowledge of distant worlds. His greatest accomplishment was the History and Description of Africa (Rome, 1526), a monumental work that brought Europeans firsthand knowledge of that vast yet little known continent. A polymath with a keen sense of himself, Leo Africanus was a complex and deeply enigmatic figure whose life and work, once forgotten, is now enjoying a revival in an age drawn to questions of hybridity and ambivalence.

With the confidence of an experienced tightrope walker, Davis enters the fray, selecting and weaving into a rich (if mottled) tapestry the bits and pieces revelatory of the man’s life. Her virtuosity as a historian, her deep knowledge of Renaissance Europe, her surefootedness, and her lack of timidity make what could well have been an unconvincing narrative in the hands of someone less skilled an inspired meditation on the life of a “trickster bird” who practiced dissimulation in order to survive and produced work that has withstood the tests of time (247).

In her introductory chapter, Davis traces the archeology of the text and the evolution of interest in Leo among European and North African scholars. Visions of his life and work have changed over time. Davis herself was drawn to a topic because it allowed her to “explore how a man moved between different polities, made use of different cultural and social resources, and entangled or separated them so as to survive, discover, write, make relationships and think about society and himself” (11). The overwhelming methodological problem was the scanty evidence, which, she admits, caused her to “make use of the conditional—‘would have,’ ‘may have,’ ‘was likely to have,’—and the speculative ‘perhaps, ‘maybe.’” (13).

Chapter 2 concerns Leo’s early life in Muslim Spain and North Africa, his solid yet eclectic education, and his wanderings across North and West Africa as an diplomat, spy, informer, business agent, etc., when he acquired a firsthand understanding of the geography, people, and customs of this vast region. Subsequent chapters examine his years in Italy, where he was thrown in prison with a group of eminent Italian scholars,
Christian and Jewish, who both protected him and exploited him for his knowledge of Arabic and Islam. With the help of prodigious reading in the secondary sources (reflected in the copious endnotes), Davis reconstructs the life of the itinerant scholar/diplomat, curious about the world and developing the ability to transmit his experiences to others.

Discussing the process of writing the Description and using very slim evidence, Davis leads us into the realm of the imagination where historians of lesser mettle would fear to tread. Fully attuned to “the Arabo-Islamic views that he would have brought with him from North Africa,” as well as “the attitudes and sensibilities he developed during his Italian years,” Davis evokes the image of the vagabond storyteller, a stock figure in Arabic literature (97). Facing two audiences at once—the uninitiated Italian one and the more knowledgeable Arabic-speaking one—Leo had to mediate between two worlds simultaneously, “mov[ing] strategically between different cultural positions” (110). Where he himself stood on matters of faith remains obscure. Davis believes that his conversion to Christianity was a mere ruse, calculated to smooth his transition home-ward. Yet, she admits, to dismiss him as a charlatan avoids the larger issue of his skill and empathy at portraying Islam to Europeans in all of its complexity, without losing a feeling for its nuances and inner worth.

Davis’ best chapter explores matters of everyday life, such as Leo’s eating habits, dress, and even his sexuality. With wit and irony, she offers lively readings of how Leo may have traversed the many challenges of adjusting to life in the West: whether to eat with his hands or a fork (he preferred the fork), how to act in the unfamiliar presence of women, and how to manage his personal life. His own probable homoeroticism is also delicately suggested, based on thin yet provocative evidence. And if it were so, would it not be yet further evidence of his transgressive spirit?

In 1527, after the sack of Rome by the armies of Charles V, Leo made his way back to North Africa, leaving little trace. Davis cannot resist speculating on the homecoming, which “cannot have been made easy” (249). He settled in Tunis, the most cosmopolitan corner of the region, where his eccentricity would have been more readily accepted than in the more cloistered cities of the western Maghrib. His writing life seemed to come to an end, perhaps more out of exhaustion than his presumed removal from some mythical “chain of isnad” (transmission), as proposed by the author.

Trickster Travels is an intellectual tour de force, the product of meticulous and passionate inquiry into the universe of North African and Islamic scholarship. A scholar who has spent most of her career in other parts, Davis has made a successful border crossing of her own, even though her status as newcomer is sometimes betrayed in small errors of fact. For example, the Dadès is not a mountain but a river valley (142); the tughra, or ornamental signature, was an Ottoman, not Moroccan practice (49); it is highly unlikely that Leo knew more than a few words of Berber, a much scorned “jargon” in the mind of sophisticated urban-ites like himself (50); and the Jewish quarter in New Fez was hardly
“long-established” when Leo visited it. It was only about fifty-years-old (131). These small points aside, the world of Leo Africanus as Davis evokes it is well worth a visit.

Susan Gilson Miller
Harvard University


This book contains moments of acute art-historical analysis—for instance, the description, though brief, of the iconographical schemes of Andrea Pozzo’s frescoes in the church of St. Ignatius (150–160), of the Jesuit convent in Rome (134–150), and of Pozzo’s design for the St. Ignatius chapel in the church of the Gesù (88–109, 160–178). It also has a short but careful analysis of the iconographical tradition of St. Ignatius, as well as a fleeting appreciation of the spread of Jesuit church design from Rome to Poland (195–232). But Levy subordinates this research to a larger methodological claim.

She begins this study of the Jesuit baroque with a quotation from Adolf Hitler and ends with the current controversy over the preservation of Nazi architecture in Berlin. The more general connection between past and present is exemplified by the early juxtaposition of two images (3)—Albert Speer’s project for the great hall of the Nazi regime and Carlo Maderno’s façade of the basilica of St. Peter’s in Rome. Eventually, the intent of such juxtapositions is fully revealed: “The work of art as propaganda is transparent, invisible, pointing incessantly to its faulty god (Nazism, Fascism, Jesuitism, in short, ideology)” (70). Hence, the two monuments, modern and early modern, are not similar; they are the same. Similitude, presumably, is the intention once again when the expression “culture of the Corporation,” referring to the Jesuits, slips into the popular oxymoron “corporate culture” (77).

An important criterion for evaluating an art historical (or any other) theory is whether it advances our understanding and appreciation of the objects to which it applies. In this case, the question is, Does the modern notion of propaganda help to illuminate projects completed generally under the auspices of the Jesuits in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries? According to the version that provides the organizing principle of the substantive portion of this book, in order for a propagandistic “message” to function, it must be “diffused” by a “propagandist.” In the modern world, that task might fall to, say, a network of partisan radio stations; in the early modern world, however, the network was not so simple. Not all “Jesuit” architectural designs were imposed by “the Jesuits.” Some designs, including one by Jacopo da Vignola, were imposed by others—in this case, by Pope Paul III’s grandson Cardinal Antonio Farnese—at the expense of a Jesuit architect. Who was the supposed “propagandist”? 
If “diffusion” throughout Europe refers to the construction of church buildings with variations on patterns emanating from the Jesuit leadership, this diffusion was neither direct nor monolithic. To be sure, the Jesuits transmitted their message in artworks, as did many other patrons. However, saying that all art is propaganda is not saying much. One form of critical theory might respond that all art, religious or secular, communicates some form of ideology. This concession, however, does not gratify Levy’s thesis, which, intent upon identifying the individual authors of mind control, eschews any form of constructivism. What then can the distinguished tradition of propaganda scholarship, forged into a discipline by the likes of Doob, Bernays, and Lasswell, and elevated to future-shock perspective by Ellul, mostly on the basis of the contemporaneistic experiences of Vladimir Lenin, Joseph Stalin, the Third Reich, and modern advertising, contribute to art history?¹

The question is still open. In this book, propaganda works less as a bona fide theory than as a methodological shortcut—a category in which to collect and collapse heterogeneous objects for classification according to their most elementary similarities. However, history by its very nature resists such an operation, no matter how well integrated historiographical approaches may be within the other social sciences. The purpose of interdisciplinary research is not to dull our sensibilities but to sharpen them and help us to understand precisely why the early modern world is not the modern world, and vice versa.

Brendan Dooley
Jacobs University, Bremen


Fuchs has written an outstanding and ambitious study of gender and poverty in nineteenth-century Europe. Her principal concerns are the circumstances and responses of poor women, explored through the lens of gender with its emphasis on the discursive construction of social categories. She retrieves impoverished European women from historical obscurity and analyzes their various strategies for survival as they faced multiple and diverse hardships during the long nineteenth century, 1770 to 1914. Solidly grounded in the quantitative traditions of social history, this work examines the processes of population growth, industrialization, urbanization, and migration. Fuchs underscores long-term continuities and identifies points of rupture, especially those beginning in the 1880s. She examines the impact of economic change and life-cycle events on women within particular family arrangements. Equally as im-

portant, she analyzes their systems of coping with such changes. These central subjects link the perspectives of social and cultural history.

The book’s six chapters combine chronological and thematic approaches. Although the scope encompasses all of Europe, Fuchs focuses extensively on conditions in Great Britain, France, and Germany. She devotes an early chapter to demography, which in many respects set the parameters of poor women’s lives. She traces the fluctuations of fertility rates from the mid-century high to the late-century decline. She includes a review of women’s various strategies to limit conception. Throughout, she is especially successful in including issues that have often been neglected, such as women’s experiences of rural poverty in the mid-nineteenth century. She emphasizes the interactions of key developments, such as the complex links among rural poverty, migration, and urbanization. Fuchs gives considerable attention to the legal framework defining women and poverty. In an early chapter, she carefully analyzes the Napoleonic Code that dominated the continent and relegated women to the status of non-persons. The final chapter examines women’s central roles as recipients in the century-long transformation from faith-based charity to state-funded welfare programs.

The study centers mainly on the responses and actions of the poor. Fuchs defines the poor to include the working poor, “paupers” whose condition is the result of a temporary calamity, the chronically indigent, and the destitute. She stresses that the precariousness of working-class employment was the major cause of poverty. Women were also faced with destabilizing life-cycle crises, such as childbirth or old age. The disasters of economic insecurity and life-cycle catastrophes enveloped poor women in what Fuchs calls a “climate of calamities.” Fuchs adamantly rejects the concept of a “culture of poverty,” and formulates instead a “culture of expedience.” She recognizes the often-overwhelming difficulties encountered by poor women and their impressive resilience.

The tone of the book always remains even-handed and calm; Fuchs does not romanticize. Nonetheless, the extraordinary difficulties facing poor women are powerfully conveyed. The skillful use of excerpts from working-class autobiographies and biographies from a variety of periods and places provide a vivid immediacy to this study. Fuchs demonstrates women’s abilities to survive, manage their lives, and raise their families. She recaptures and communicates the texture of the past and the diverse experiences of women living in poverty. She starkly identifies the powerful constraints that women faced, providing a portrait of their limited successes and their abject failures. Women’s vulnerabilities and their strengths emerge clearly. Gender and Poverty in Nineteenth Century Europe will be welcome by experts for its breadth and by beginning students as a well-written introduction to a complex and relevant subject.

Judith F. Stone
Western Michigan University
Although economic historians have often highlighted the interaction of entrepreneurship and government policy in the economic development of European countries, Millward’s study reformulates part of this general problem, examines it systematically, and breaks new ground in both its findings and its approach. As the title suggests, Millward examines three leading “infrastructure industries” in eight European countries from about 1830 to 1990. In addition to consistent treatment of Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Norway, and Sweden, the experiences of Belgium and Holland are included at points.

Assembling comparable cross-European data on ownership patterns and regulation, Millward applies an economist’s understanding of the inherent characteristics of these infrastructure industries. He stresses that entrepreneurs needed valuable rights of way from states and cities, which imposed regulations as part of the bargain in order to deal with the monopoly problem or to secure other goals, such as economic development or universal service. Joining the quantitative data with a surprisingly detailed qualitative narrative, Millward analyzes patterns of regulation and their relationship to changing patterns of private, semiprivate, and public enterprise in the different countries and sectors. An interrelated theme is the enormous impact of technological change, which gave birth to new sectors with new regulatory issues. Millward’s breadth is impressive, although by no means exhaustive, as he readily admits.

The most striking conclusion is that socialist ideology had little to do with the growing prominence of public enterprise in energy, telecommunications, and transportation, even after 1945. Rather, a multitude of divergent factors and practical considerations carried the day. For example, the new Belgian state built railroads to promote national unity, while those in Germany were nationalized early to please the military. Municipalities often took over profitable utilities in order to secure income and avoid tax increases. Millward also argues provocatively that public enterprises performed as efficiently as their private counterparts after 1945. Economists, historians, and political scientists will find much of this discussion interesting.

More importantly, this intriguing study suggests the coming of age for a new model for scholarship on Europe. Economic historians of Europe have often practiced some form of comparative history. One school, in the grand tradition of Gerschenkron or Landes, featured the leading countries (Britain, France, Germany, and sometimes Russia), while another analyzed statistical series, as in the comparative work of Maddison or Bairoch on economic growth. Millward’s approach is dif-

1 See, for example, Alexander Gerschkenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, Mass., 1962); David Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and
ferent. He combines his expert knowledge of Britain and excellent French-language materials with a wealth of all-important “national” studies on different countries by European scholars who interact and publish at least a good portion of their findings in English. The result is a promising third path—the in-depth comparative synthesis that is truly all-inclusive. Similar results on other problems in European history seem possible.

John P. McKay,
University of Illinois, Urbana


Arguing for the major revision of a received historiography can be a difficult task. To debate generations of scholarship, the evidence has to be overwhelming. That is why this book is so long and detailed. Bernard’s argument that Henry VIII was the author of his own Reformation, moving ruthlessly to enforce his role as God’s lieutenant, aims at overturning the widely accepted interpretations of such scholars as Elton.\(^1\) It rejects the idea that Henry was manipulated by Thomas Wolsey and Thomas Cromwell, or by factions at court; it rejects the idea that Anne Boleyn forced Henry into Marriage; it rejects the argument that the monasteries were dissolved for financial reasons; it rejects the idea that Henry was a Protestant; and it insists that the history of the Henrician Reformation reflects the King’s intentions.

Bernard has been pondering the politics of Henry VIII’s reign for years. Books on the Tudor nobility, the Amicable Grant, and power and politics in early Tudor England have preceded this one, which is the sort of work only possible for a scholar immersed in the records for a long time. After years of study and 600 pages of exposition, his conclusions are succinct. Henry’s Reformation owed nothing much to Protestant thought. His purposes were, in part, political and, in part, Erasmian, “issuing in a deeply felt, and ultimately radically articulated, mistrust of certain integral features of traditional late medieval religion, notably monasteries and pilgrimages” (603).

Bernard reaches these conclusions by asking a question about royal

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power that has been out of fashion for a long time, though it is regaining popularity. Since the early 1950s, the political role of the monarchy has been discounted by Tudor historians, like Neale, who emphasized the importance of Parliament and counsel, and Elton, who emphasized the emergence of bureaucratic government. However, Bernard asks, in a system in which power ultimately rested with the king, what role did the monarch play? Either Henry was a weak chump, subject to manipulation from left and right, or by lovers and friends, or he was the source of power and the mainspring of action in the state. Clearly, Bernard has concluded that what happened in Henry’s name really was what Henry wanted to happen. Seen in that way, the history of the Henrician Reformation has to be read differently. Advisors and wives have different parts to play if Henry were directing the reform.

A number of striking portraits arise from this view of Henry as a politically astute, dominating, and tyrannical king. Boelyn, rather than an enticing minx, becomes a lover denied the king’s bed because of Henry’s commitment to a legal marriage. Rather than being bewitched by an evangelical lover, he was directing the divorce with a clear objective and high religious ideals.

Cromwell was not the brains of the reformation; he was the effective administrator of the king’s plan. Moreover, he did not fall because of a conservative faction exploiting the king’s anger about the aborted marriage to Anne of Cleves. He was a victim of Henry’s cold calculation that rejecting, and executing, Cromwell would show that he was moving away from radical Protestantism, opening new diplomatic possibilities. As Bernard asserts, the timing of Cromwell’s fall “was a purely pragmatic calculation by the king of the diplomatic advantages of now dispensing with a servant too closely, though in many respects unfairly, identified with religious radicalism” (569).

Henry’s “middle way” in religion was marked by theological Catholicism and Erasmian hatred of superstition and monasticism. Cromwell and Thomas Cranmer, says Bernard, “saw themselves not as leaders of a faction but royal servants implementing royal policy,” as they ran the reforms at the king’s direction (531). The first round of dissolutions derived from his belief in the need for reform; the final disappearance of the monasteries was prompted by the monks’ treasonous behavior during the Pilgrimage of Grace. The king’s Erasmian attitude is enough to explain his behavior and makes the passage of the Act of Six Articles completely logical. No conservative faction was necessary to maneuver the king into conservatism; all of his reforms were conservative.

Is Bernard right in his assertions? This thoroughly researched work engages carefully with previous scholars and has much to recommend it. The key to his interpretation of Henry is based on his understanding of Tudor political assumptions and the ways in which rhetoric were deployed. He often asserts that the king had “deniability” because his

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councillors were blamed for what they literally did in his name. When Cromwell acted in Henry’s name, Bernard asserts, he was carrying out what he believed to be the king’s desire.

This book is essential reading for anyone interested in the English Reformation and Tudor politics. Sometimes it is convincing—Henry was king, and all power stemmed from him—and sometimes it raises questions about issues once thought settled. For instance, by making the king’s will the *deus ex machina* and downplaying the role of the political nation, he begs the question of how those around Henry understood and used the power available through him. Ultimately, Bernard’s assertions await the response of other scholars. If he is correct in this new interpretation, how did so many others go wrong?

If nothing else, Bernard has demonstrated, once again, that Henry was an egotistical tyrant who made *raison d’état*, and personal preference into a nasty regime. Elton used to say that he did not like dining at Trinity College because of Henry’s cold eyes staring down on him from his portrait above the high table. Bernard has demonstrated just how cold that gaze was.

Norman Jones
Utah State University


This fine study focuses on several Elizabethan activities that required extensive technological capabilities—copper mining, harbor construction, and navigation. Ash’s investigation of these endeavors provides the basis for his thesis that “expert mediators” became an important tool in the growth of Elizabethan England’s centralized government and that the notion of “expertise” changed from experientially based know-how to knowledge grounded in more theoretical (that is, mathematical) foundations. Hence, he investigates the relationship of technological enterprise to political power and the changes in status resulting from a new notion of competence. The final chapter underscores Francis Bacon’s essential grounding in the late sixteenth-century Elizabethan culture of expertise.

Two case studies provide fascinating accounts of large-scale technological operations in which a central authority attempted administrative control. The first involves the new copper mines in the county of Cumberland. Since the English were novices in copper mining, the English shareholders of the private joint-stock Company of Mines Royal entered into a partnership with German investors in Augsburg who sent their own miners and mine managers to Cumberland. Believing that the Germans would take advantage of them, the English sent their own “expert,” Thomas Thurland, to oversee the operation. The problem for the shareholders, and for Ash’s model as well, is that Thurland was not an
“expert” in any sense of the word, nor did he himself or the shareholders believe him to be. Ash fully documents the ongoing mistrust between the Germans and the English, including the refusal of the English investors to provide the funds needed for the (expected) high cost of starting up a large-scale mine operation. Nevertheless, the Germans successfully excavated and refined the copper ore. The mine failed to turn a profit, not because of the operation itself but because of the failure to find sufficient commercial manufacturing outlets for copper in England.

In contrast to the copper mine, Ash’s study of the construction of Dover harbor fits his model of “expert mediation” beautifully. It also provides a detailed study of a large-scale Elizabethan technological operation. The expert mediator in this case, Thomas Digges, really did possess the requisite knowledge of harbor construction, gained in the Lowlands. He also had surveyed the Dover harbor and was a local resident of sufficient social standing to mediate between Dover’s administrators and the Privy Council in London.

Ash treats Elizabethan navigation in two chapters. The first concerns the transformation of English navigation from a localized, experience-based craft to a mathematical art. The second focuses on the navigational manuals that proliferated in late sixteenth-century England. Together, the chapters provide a concise synthesis of the development of English mathematical navigation and its growing dominance over traditional piloting, the latter based on local knowledge and firsthand experience. Yet Ash argues against the prevalent view that mathematical practitioners developed into a community, stressing the highly diverse and often conflicting interests of English mathematical practitioners.

This book represents an important contribution to ongoing discussions concerning the early modern emergence of experimental philosophy and the role of artisans and skilled practitioners in that development. A thoroughly researched and elegantly written study, its model of changing notions of expertise within the context of a centralizing political authority is an important one that is sure to be considered in other early modern milieus.

Pamela O. Long
Washington, D.C.


The Social Life of Money usefully reminds readers that the modern understanding of money as a neutral, universal equivalent developed slowly, within a context and against the current of a heterogeneous array of attitudes and beliefs. Taking as her subject the period from about 1640 to 1770, Valenze argues persuasively that English people in these decades
“regarded the money they encountered as laden with qualities that indicated its character and connections within broad social networks of meaning” (2). Thus “blood money” might be the return for helping police vagrants and thieves, or, as “filthy lucre,” money might be understood as the symbol of, and incitement for, temptation. Valenze argues that these social meanings tended to linger even as money began to acquire its modern connotations of neutrality and rationality. By the same token, she also argues that the “social uses of money . . . tend[ed] to enhance the degree to which its measuring and evaluative functions [might] seep into other areas of life, thus becoming generalized in common practices outside economic activity” (3). Thus, in the early modern period, money was a medium that allowed meanings to flow both ways—from practices to coins and from uses to other practices.

In the first two sections of The Social Life of Money, Valenze pursues her argument through a series of fascinating case studies, which derive their power from her skill as an archival historian. She finds in the diaries of Nehemiah Wallington and Ralph Josselin, two seventeenth-century Britons, an array of superstitions and fears about money, for example, and in the writings of the Quaker John Bellers she identifies an early attempt to convert money into moral measure, which should be distributed according to the amount of labor an individual expended rather than by the modern principles of surplus or risk. In her treatment of the Shetlander John Harrower, Valenze demonstrates that migration played a central role in stripping money of these early demotic and moral connotations; as individuals like Harrower traveled to London, they inevitably had to use money to facilitate exchange. She also examines the role played by Henry Peacham’s The Worth of a Penny, or, A Caution to Keep Money (London, 1641) in helping to cultivate habits that enabled his readers to navigate urban space, where money was a constant necessity. By deftly choosing a range of such examples, Valenze simultaneously animates her narrative and illuminates the uneven stages by which money gradually acquired most—but not all—of its modern connotations.

Valenze is less successful when she generalizes from these individual cases to what she calls the “acquisitive self” (145) or the “monetary self” (262). Her discussions of such abstractions borrow from the work of literary historians like Finn and Lynch and from cultural theorists like Goux and Simmel.¹ Valenze never explains why such a methodological shift from archival recovery to theoretical abstraction is warranted, nor does she integrate the two methodologies. The theoretical superstructure does little to illuminate the case histories or to develop the causal

narrative; more explicit commentary about how theory supports historical narrative rather than undermining it would have been helpful.

Mary Poovey
New York University

*Unsettled: The Culture of Mobility and the Working Poor in Early Modern England.* By Patricia Fumerton (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006) 288 p. $50.00 cloth $20.00 paper

Bringing together much of the recent research on vagrancy and poverty in early modern England, Fumerton argues in this study that the itinerant manual laborer was the norm of the period in a “domestic economy of mobility.” The makeshift character of this economy, Fumerton insists, affected not only those people long-since displaced from demesne labor, wars, and enclosures, but many in more “established,” yet marginalized, positions of domestic production—householders, apprentices, “porters, ostlers, tapsters, husbandmen, carmen, draymen, chamberlains and servingmen” (25).

The first sections of this book offer crisp summaries of recent accounts of gender in domestic production, urban apprentices, parish-court records of lost spouses, and early modern childhood. Fumerton insists on the existence of a distinct totality of shared experience across a wide range of social categories. Literary scholars will appreciate Fumerton’s careful building of the larger plot that provides a counter-hegemonic perspective of the English court’s idea of “order.” In fact, this book, along with a string of recent publications in “early modern vagabond studies,” substantially overturns the aesthetics of order predicated on a privileging of art and poetry patronized by the aristocracy (readers familiar with Fumerton’s *Cultural Aesthetics* [Chicago, 1991] will note her curious description of it, in this one’s introduction, as an embarrassing phase of formalist distraction).

What replaces this idea of renaissance order is a sensibility of being “multiply displaced,” something of an early modern version of alienation, which Fumerton describes as the cognitive dissonance associated with being forced to move to find work. Fumerton wants to account for this experience in its own terms, free from the middle-class lens that of-

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ten translated itinerant labor in the Tudor Poor Laws into a crafty form of escaping duty. Her challenge is to undercut the literary scholars who focus too much on London’s coney-catching pamphlets and later stage plays, thus participating in the exaggeration, if not celebration, of the unhoused condition of itinerant laborers as a symbol of romantic freedom. Fumerton views this tendency as the early modern middle class creating its own image of the lower class; it takes a keener ear to detect the muted voices in the historical record.

In the latter half of her book, Fumerton turns to the case study of Edward Barlow (b. 1642), whose life at sea provides a kind of historical exemplar of the anxieties associated with the unsettled mentality. Barlow authored a journal of more than 225,000 words and 147 pages of drawings. Fumerton’s treatment of Barlow’s journal, particularly its analysis of his port drawings and the ambivalence about waywardness in ballads, raises interesting questions about how to interpret self-taught literacy and the aesthetics of popular cultural forms. Though aware of the pitfalls, Fumerton takes the risk of trusting the narrative voice of Barlow’s journal as an authentic account (even though Barlow’s own record describes complaints from acquaintances that he is not to be trusted).

A literary critic might read Barlow’s journal through the genre of the picaresque, framing voice, reliability, and narrative turns as scripted conventions. But Fumerton’s interpretive model of trust follows a new empirical turn in historicist literary scholarship, which favors accepting newly found, marginalized texts on their own terms before subjecting them to a hermeneutics of suspicion. Readers might nonetheless ask, given the all-inclusive list of trades, piece-meal labor, and vagabondage in this fluid economy whether laborers in early modern England were able to feel settled, or content at all. Yet, materialists will be intrigued to see, in response to the Brenner debate and the argument about the agrarian origin of surplus labor, Fumerton pointing to the sea: Barlow’s life suggests the true character of proletariat experience, providing an altogether colonial cast to the question of itinerant labor as the engine to capital.2

Poststructuralists may complain that Fumerton’s category of the “unsettled” inadvertently establishes its opposite, settled or nonmobile, as a natural social condition to which everyone aspires. Although Fumerton does not explicitly assume so, readers may well wonder whether the transition to capitalism and its long durée of social displacements was destined to be comfortable for anyone. Since Karl Marx, the critical discourse about abstract economic forces—with its language of faceless motors, determinations, and surpluses—has always seemed to betray an uncanny complicity with the inhuman system that it meant to lay bare.

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Fumerton is able to connect the abstract with the concrete, revealing, elegantly and powerfully, that real human lives are at issue.

Craig Dionne
Eastern Michigan University


Over the past decade, scholars working on both sides of the Atlantic have done much to advance our understanding of the place of violence in the histories of the family and gender relations. Impressionistic tableaux have given way to a host of studies that have capitalized on feminist scholarship and more recent concerns with sensibility, reform movements, and the dynamics of class.

Foyster’s study is best viewed as a synthesis and critique of this expanding field. She focuses on spousal abuse of the nonlethal kind, or more accurately, on social and institutional responses to it. Foyster seeks to uncover the spectrum of familial, communal, legal, and ideological pressures that shaped people’s encounters with domestic violence during the two centuries of her study. Rachael Norcott and Mary Veitch, whose experiences bookend most of the chapters, faced similar difficulties in extricating themselves from violent households, though one sued for separation in 1666, and the other did so in 1837. Of the countless British women who fell victim to abuse during these two centuries, only a few went beyond the informal mediation that sought to keep couples together. Their reticence owed to the fact that their suits for separation, argued before the Court of Arches and similar tribunals, required them to prove that their husbands had not simply exercised a widely sanctioned prerogative to discipline their dependents, but engaged in long-term patterns of cruelty.

The changes between 1666 and 1837 are what require careful explanation. Foyster is skeptical of narratives that involve broad, usually liberating, transformations within short periods of time—especially when they coincide too neatly with academic fashions. More pessimistic, she makes the case for slow progressions marked by continuities rather than breakthroughs. During the time frame that Foyster examines, observers continually probed women’s responses to spousal abuse and discriminated between the blameworthy and the innocent on that basis. Kin and neighbors paid little heed to a putative rise of Victorian anonymity and kept on intervening in private dramas as they had in earlier times. Meanwhile, the cadre of physicians and policemen who took up the problem of marital cruelty by the late eighteenth century hardly made a dent in its prevention.

Foyster shows that new legislation had similarly ambiguous effects.
The Custody of Infants Act of 1839 failed to displace a culturally instilled indifference to the suffering of children in abusive homes, even though the cult of motherhood now allowed a few women to obtain custody. The Divorce Act of 1857 retains a misleading reputation for liberalizing women’s access to divorce. In reality, the Act focused on adultery, remained neutral on the question of marital cruelty, and made it easier for husbands to leave their wives than the reverse.

In Foyster’s view, the most substantive developments in this period stemmed from the efforts of the “respectable” classes to set themselves apart from lower-downs. Once physical violence in the home became a mark of working-class “backwardness,” traumatized women who displayed symptoms of depression or hysteria (considered appropriate to middle-class sensibilities) were taken more seriously. More to the point, they were able to challenge abusive partners, even when cruelty assumed a mental or economic, rather than physical, form.

Foyster’s approach to marital violence is rigorous and broad-ranging. She is especially successful in showing why domestic violence is best approached one case at a time, in context-sensitive terms, with reference to the ebb and flow of competing, but fairly stable, attitudes. This is a sensible perspective that could eventually serve as the springboard for revealing comparisons between marital violence in Britain before 1857 and experiences elsewhere in the world under analogous legal regimes.

Beyond her impressive inventory of court cases, Foyster considers novels, didactic advice, parliamentary debates, and nineteenth-century reform movements. But her interlocutors are clearly concentrated in one field—British social history—that remains wedded to sociological empiricism as its reigning methodology. Her tendency to privilege this one idiom and audience leads her to shy away not only from anthropologists, psychologists, and policy analysts who might contribute new layers to her work, but also from parallel discussions in cultural studies, the history of emotions, and traditional political history that might frame it in new contexts. A willingness to delve farther afield might have enriched Foyster’s treatment of issues like the political stakes of social legislation, the experience of victimization, or (drawing on a theme in her earlier work) the cultural mechanics of an aggressive masculinity.¹ These are matters that all have a clear place in the “Family History” of such a vital topic.

Philippe Rosenberg
Emory University


The social history of the poor is not understudied: since the 1970s, a wealth of work has appeared, written by scholars who have sought to uncover the lives of the obscure and, they argued, powerless folk at the bottom of British society. Hitchcock’s work considers the same subject, but with a consciously different, and, on the whole, successful approach. Rather than tables, charts, and graphs, Hitchcock relies upon narrative and thematic analysis illustrated by the telling anecdote. As one of the founders of the extraordinary website, the Proceedings of the Old Bailey On Line (oldbaileyonline.org), he has become intimately acquainted with a world that few historians know so well. Enshrined in the Proceedings of the Old Bailey is a virtually boundless wealth of detail about London society, both high and low. Hitchcock uses this detail to great effect. Such an approach, based upon narrative techniques as old as Thomas Babington Macaulay, might seem insufficiently rigorous. But the author’s success lies in his ability to illuminate the lives of the poor while constructing an argument no less rigorous or well-supported by the evidence than any statistic-laden doorstop laboriously created by a team of social scientists. He has certainly produced a far more readable work of history than many others who have treated similar topics.

Using legal records, as well as contemporary literary and artistic representations, Hitchcock offers a thorough picture of life at the margins in eighteenth-century London. He argues that the poor were vital to the economy, performing much of the necessary work that made the capital livable. He also believes that beggars and the poor (often the same people) found London “more welcoming and charitable” than some historians have suggested (xvi). Hitchcock demonstrates that the city accommodated its poorest citizens fairly well—due in large measure to the inventiveness and resourcefulness of the poor themselves, who devised shelter from whatever was at hand. Conditions were hardly luxurious; a night in a threepenny flophouse was certainly dispiriting. But Hitchcock reports that the number of Londoners who died as a result of exposure was small and that charitable provisions improved as the century progressed. Nevertheless, Hitchcock argues, the poor deserve much of the credit for sustaining themselves, through begging, work in the “pauper professions,” and, at times, criminality. An important part of Hitchcock’s argument is that the poor were not simply the inert subjects of external pressure; they had the power to organize their own lives—even, surprisingly, within the confines of London’s workhouses and jails.

In chapters about the nature of work for the poor—sweeping chimneys and streets, blacking shoes, sifting cinders and the like—as well as on the nature of begging (both acceptable and criminal), Hitchcock provides a lively picture of a vast economy inhabited by the poor, whose casual labor underpinned the lifestyles of their social superiors. His depic-
tion of the poor-relief system and of the jails is also extremely valuable. London aimed substantial resources toward caring for the poor; in 1776, for example, ratepayers provided over £174,000 to take care of the destitute. The system was certainly not foolproof, nor was it particularly humane (although the full horrors of the Dickensian poorhouse were still well in the future). But the system did offer more aid than many historians have appreciated. Indeed, in one respect, Hitchcock underestimates London’s generosity toward the unfortunate; he has little to say about the many privately funded charitable institutions of the day; hospitals, orphanages, and other foundations that relieved the sick and distressed.

Hitchcock does not mean to sugarcoat eighteenth-century London. He tells more than a few heart-rending tales of neglect and violence, and his genuine sympathy for the poor is clear. Indeed, part of the strength of the book is his ability to conjure living characters from the dead parchment of the past. Hitchcock’s thoughtful combination of rigorous archival research and narrative flair has wrought an exceptional picture of ordinary life in London more than two centuries ago.

Victor Stater
Louisiana State University


Using the methodology of local history, McCartney has written an intriguingly revisionist work about World War I. The study makes modest claims, since it can speak only for the soldiers from Liverpool, but the implications are more far reaching, going against the grain of common assumptions about the war and the experience of the British who fought in it. McCartney does not explicitly say so, but Fussell’s pioneering work, now more than a quarter-century old, is implicitly her foil, even though her picture encompasses only Liverpool.¹ Fussell forcefully depicted the devastating effect of the war upon the British soldiers, as well as their alienation from those at home, and he makes clear what a watershed the war was. But McCartney places much more emphasis on continuity with the period before the war, particularly regarding how volunteer soldiers thought of themselves both before and during World War I. Her discussion of the close relationship of the soldiers with Liverpool shows the regional nature of British society before World War I.

McCartney captures the social significance of the Territorials, who were far more middle class and respectable than the regular army. When the war began, their ranks were swelled by volunteers determined to

protect their country from the German threat. The author might exaggerate the degree to which they actually believed that Britain would be invaded. She concentrates on the various Liverpool units, particularly the Scottish Battalion, with their Scottish caps and kilts, although she does not discuss the significance of their identification with Scotland.

She does not obscure the grimness of the war, the deprivations of life in the trenches, and the high percentage of deaths. The story told in the national press tended to obscure the horrors of war. But, locally, despite official censorship, the soldiers were able to write home ungarnerished accounts of their experiences, and the Liverpool press provided accounts of warfare closer to actuality than might be expected. These “citizen soldiers” maintained a strong sense of having come out of civilian life, destined, should they survive, to return to it. The large proportion of the troops who were both middle class and Liverpudlian allowed the conduct of war to be comparatively flexible and compassionate. Nevertheless, it was an intensely hierarchical situation, reflecting the nature of English society itself. The troops were also anxious to make a name for themselves and their city, as they did in the battle of Hooge in June, 1915. It continued to be celebrated in the city after the war.

There is no obscuring the dreadful cost of the war. Yet, McCartney’s book about the preservation of community in the Liverpool Battalions has the effect of mitigating the horror of war in a way that might to a degree strain credulity. But, with its rich use of local sources, and a command of the relevant literature, this local study of willing soldiers enriches and changes our sense of the story of World War I and its significance.

Peter Stansky
Stanford University


Kamil’s innovative historical monograph richly deserves to be described as interdisciplinary. He deftly interweaves religious, scientific, political, and economic history with geography, demography, genealogy, and cultural anthropology, generously interspersed with provocative analysis of material culture, the visual arts, music, and esoteric texts in this profusely illustrated volume.

Kamil’s study begins in sixteenth-century France amidst Protestant–Catholic confessional violence. The end of the Religious Wars and the promulgation of the Edict of Nantes in 1598 heralded a truce for the Huguenots. Thirty years later, their military might was broken during the devastating siege of their stronghold at La Rochelle. Subsequently,
Huguenots in southwestern France devised ways to live, work, and worship in secret. Their intensely private, metaphysical faith was influenced by continental pietism and the arcane knowledge of Bernard Palissy, potter, alchemist, and natural philosopher. For Palissy, the snail was emblematic of the Huguenots, carrying a “portable fortress” and surviving by “dissimulation and camouflage” (5). Although they could worship openly in England, Huguenot artisans were sometimes targeted by native artisans fearing competition. Hence, they bypassed the guilds through underground economic networks much like those they had used in France. As Kamil explains, William Hogarth’s painting, “Noon, L’Eglise des Grecs, Hog Lane, Soho,” in which the Huguenots recede into the shadows as they exit the French Church, illustrates this secrecy.

The tide of Huguenot migration intensified in the 1680s as persecution mounted in France and culminated with Louis XIV’s revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685. The closing chapters carry the story to the environs of New York City. But the Huguenots’ New World was not encompassed by geographical boundaries. Rather, it consisted of a new mentalité, based on a deeply spiritual, often mystical, theology and material culture.

Kamil challenges the standard thesis that the Huguenots rapidly assimilated, even vanished, in their places of refuge.1 This alleged disappearance was purposely cultivated as a survival mechanism. Huguenot identity was preserved by artisans who created distinctive styles and whose handiwork “hid in plain sight” symbolic images, like the snail (711). For example, Huguenot-crafted cupboards were outsized, even inefficient in design. These movables had many shadowy compartments that could function as a memory fortress. Eventually, non-Huguenot artisans adopted Huguenot styles in their furniture for colonial elites, thereby perpetuating Huguenot influence. Kamil probes Huguenot connections with Quakerism, another persecuted sect attractive to artisans, rather than the more heavily examined and more extensive Huguenot–Anglican connection. In sum, his interpretation of the Huguenot experience and his methodology are highly original.

Deeply researched, elegantly written, and brilliantly conceived, Fortress of the Soul is a major contribution to numerous disciplines, including intellectual history, Huguenot studies, the Atlantic World, and research on early modern and colonial material culture.

Paula Wheeler Carlo
Nassau Community College

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Fulcher continues the project that she began in French Cultural Politics and Music: From the Dreyfus Affair to the First World War (New York, 1997), extending her narrative from World War I to World War II. Her aim throughout continues to be the integration of two historical disciplines often kept separate: on the one hand, the history of “official politics and culture and responses to them” and on the other, the history of “musical, stylistic development” (17). Writing in the methodological vein associated with the “New Cultural History” journal Representations, Fulcher explores music as a form of “representation.” Musical genres, styles, repertoires, and techniques, when “surrounded by a discourse,” are all capable of being “coded” and becoming carriers of “ideological meaning” (11). Since “there is no discursive meaning without interlocution or context,” Fulcher retrieves the “interlocutors who are now absent” and recreates “the dialogues of which they were a part” (323, 18). As a result, we remember the often forgotten—namely, that composers were “also intellectuals who responded to the major ideological-aesthetic questions and polemics of their period” (18).

Each of four chapters is devoted to a political epoch. The first (1914–1918) lays out Fulcher’s method of surveying various musical institutions (schools, publishers, musicological journals, the Opéra, and concert-going)—as well as compositions—deployed in the context of wartime nationalism. The second considers the 1920s, identified today with the avant-garde but dominated at the time by conservative voices. In Chapter three, tables are turned as the socialist Popular Front is elected into government (1936) and the left applies lessons learned from the right. Finally, the fourth chapter follows the pendulum’s rightward swing (1938–1940) following socialist defeat.

Fulcher divides each chapter into two parts, a structure embodying her basic strategy, uncovering the “dialogue,” “tension,” “challenge,” and “opposition”—that is, the always contested meanings—embedded in the codes used by the “two cultures” of “conformity and dissent” in each epoch (46). Wartime factions fought about what constituted genuine “French Music” and whether its “purity” needed to be “protected” against “foreign contamination” (29). These conflicts evolved during the postwar decade to arguments about whether the “classicism” synonymous with “the French” should be seen (from the right) as particularly “national” or rather (from the left) as humanistically “universal” (88). (Jean Cocteau straddled both sides.) During the Great Depression, the increasingly powerful left’s attacks on tradition were opposed by various factions: center to right republicans, Catholics (for example, Francis Poulenc), and fascist sympathizers (260). Finally, although “few scholars have seen an official aesthetic shift in 1938,” Fulcher’s innovative look at a nonconformist “revolutionary spiritualism” from 1938 to 1940 illumi-
nates wartime works, especially those of Olivier Messiaen (328, n. 25). A brief coda looks ahead to both Vichy and Resistance aesthetics.

Fulcher’s two-volume overview of the years 1898 to 1940 adds a crucial piece to a complex puzzle: How do politics and the arts interact, both in tandem and in subversion? Her study could profitably be read with works exploring the post-1945 American scene, including Frances Stonor Saunders’ *The Cultural Cold War* (New York, 1999), David Caute’s *The Dancer Defects* (New York, 2003), and Penny Von Eschen’s *Satchmo Blows Up the World* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004). Since music is the least “representational” of the arts (in the sense of mimetic resemblance), it is often viewed without reference to extratextual reality. Fulcher succeeds brilliantly in her stated (but too modest) aim—to show that “all which we have largely relegated to the ‘background’ . . . were significant forces in French musical evolution” (323). Beyond that project, her retrieval of music as “representation” (in the discursive sense) models an archeological method with which to unearth layers of significance. Fulcher’s study is essential reading.

Stephen Schloesser
Boston College

*Interpreting Spanish Colonialism: Empires, Nations, and Legends.* Edited by Christopher Schmidt-Nowara and John M. Phillips (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 2005) 282 pp. $32.95

This collection’s authors investigate the Spanish Empire, its historiography, and nation-building. They explore “the supposed backwardness of Spain and Latin America,” historical imagination, and modernity (2).

Javier Morillo-Alicea examines the nineteenth-century Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, which together comprised the “Spanish Imperial Archipelago.” There colonial reformers and colonizers confronted and learned from each other. Imperial race policies surfaced in Madrid in 1887 at the “first-ever Philippine Exposition,” which painted a woeful picture of primitives (38).

Dale Tomich sees Cuba’s political economy through the eyes of Francisco Arango y Parreño, whose *Discurso sobre la Agricultura de la Habana y Medios de Fomentarla* (1792) “provided the theoretical framework for the development of Cuba into the world’s leading sugar producer” (55). Arrango advocated a freer trade and a reformed slave system made more efficient by Enlightenment ideas.

Astrid Cubano-Iguina writes that in Puerto Rico before 1898, “The question of identity . . . monopolized a large fragment of the public sphere” (104). Certain writers in the periodical press criticized Spain; others expressed concern about “the implications and meanings of being Spanish” (101). Few advocated independence. A vibrant press discourse
produced diverse views, a “process of redefinition and strengthening of identity” (104).

Antonio Feros’ remarkable essay shows how Spanish identity emerged historiographically. Pompeyo Geyer in 1887 concluded that the former colonies shared an identity, in the form of “an essence or spirit” (109). Eventually, the general perception was that its essential elements were the Reconquista, the American conquests, and the anti-French uprisings of 1808. For the last century, Spanish historians have thought that Spanish American nations should “recognize Spain as the civilizing fatherland” (111). This White Legend became “hegemonic,” espoused by liberals and conservatives as well as socialists and Falangists. Most Spanish historians agreed that theirs was “the most perfect colonialism in the history of humankind” (114). Historians served national and imperial myths. Among their surprising assertions were that Spanish colonizers were uninterested in wealth and that race mixture in America was state policy emerging from the lack of race prejudice in Spain. Feros argues convincingly that belief in a benevolent Spanish Empire is an essential part of how modern Spaniards see themselves.

José del Valle notes that contemporary Spain “is interested in building solid bonds with Latin America” and that the White Legend is essential to the agenda (140). Spain’s linguistic diplomacy, intended to court Latin American intellectuals, reaches back to Ramón Menéndez Pidal, whose nineteenth-century neocolonial language policy touted the “superior qualities of the dialect of Castile” (157).

Jeremy Adelman uses the writing of Latin American history after independence to demonstrate the connections between the two eras. Creole historians wrote “foundational texts” that presented “different models of order and citizenship” (164). Writing history was part of nation-building, and the assertion of “Colonial oppression was the bedrock” (165). Argentine Bartolomé Mitre and Colombian José Manuel Restrepo located “the sources of nationhood in the experiences of Spanish colonialism” (166). Although both offered a Black Legend interpretation that depicted the Spaniards as cruel oppressors, Adelman astutely points out that the Black Legend did not predetermine their narratives.

Nieto-Philips explains a nineteenth-century literary movement in the United States as an American White Legend. Between 1880 and 1915, Helen Hunt Jackson and Hubert Howe Bancroft, complemented by lesser luminaries like Charles Fletcher Lummis and Lebaron Bradford Price, idealized Spanish Indian policy and wrote mestizos out of local history.

Samuel Truett maintains that Herbert Eugene Bolton can teach “modest lessons” about transnational history (217). Bolton’s “Epic of Greater America” is usually dismissed as a tract for the era of the Good Neighbor, although he developed his idea thirty years earlier. The Bolton of the Americas, was the “other Bolton,” whose “mission [was] to rescue America from the clutches of national history” (215, 239).

This volume is an interdisciplinary, well-conceived, and thoroughly
worthy attempt to show that, despite all efforts, Spanish colonial history has yet to transcend the problem of the Black Legend.

James Schofield Saeger
Lehigh University

Colonias para después de un imperio. By Josep M. Fradera (Barcelona, Ediciones Bellaterra, 2005) 751 pp. €30.00

When Spaniards respond to complaints by saying “things could be worse,” they do not say “más se perdió en América Latina,” they say “Más se perdió en Cuba!” (we lost more when we lost Cuba). Although the loss of the whole Spanish colonial Empire, from Mexico to Argentina, was an indisputably great blow to Spain, the loss of its remaining territories—Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines—left the deepest wound. From all appearances, it is still open. Of the three, Cuba, invariably called “la isla siempre fiel” (the always faithful island), arguably left the deepest mark. Spain had invested most of its overseas capital there and showed by its enormous infusion of manpower that it was determined to hold onto it through rebellion, civil war, and American invasion.

The author’s central purpose is to analyze how Spain attempted to handle the three remaining “overseas territories” and how and why it failed in what was an iron-clad national undertaking throughout the nineteenth century to retain them. Contrary to its previous colonial practice, Spain developed three new administrative models to govern each of the remnants of its erstwhile enormous empire. Alas, its efforts were in vain. Even as the rest of Europe was rushing to Africa to carve out new colonies, and older imperial powers such as Britain, France, and the Netherlands further tightened their exploitative hold on their extensive holdings, Spain was unable to control the forces of autonomy and secession in its much smaller areas. How to explain the disparity?

The author’s answers draw from an array of sources in Spanish, English, and French. That footnotes comprise more than one-third of the book is excusable, given the complexity and scope of an analysis that seeks to describe, in interdisciplinary fashion, the interaction between Spanish theory and practice in each of the three colonies in the context of an expanding global trading system. The author is particularly good at analyzing the role of paradox, which often eludes social scientists. One paradox that bedeviled Spanish administration involved the attempt by Britain, which had abolished its slave trade in 1807 and slavery itself in 1834, to sabotage the Cuban slave plantation system, even though Britain by 1850 was the largest importer of slave-produced sugar. Not surprisingly, market forces, not moral exhortations, carried the day in slave sugar-producing Cuba.

Unfortunately for Spain and Cuba, this market success meant the
unraveling of the colonial system. The author minutely documents and analyzes this disintegration in the single most original part of the book. It deals with the great gap between the Liberal-driven constitutional and legal theory that characterized the possessions not as “colonies” but as integral, albeit “overseas” (“Ultramar”), parts of the mother country and the actual practice in these territories. Predictably, practice differed not one iota from what occurred in the exploitation of the colonies of other metropolitan powers. Also as in the case of these other powers, the question of the African race, whether slave or free, continuously confounded any attempt at a successful policy of colonial integration. As the author notes, “One thing was to invoke equality, and another quite distinct was to practice it” (80). Another paradox was at the root of the problem: The very persons to whom Spanish citizenship was denied, the “castas pardas” (those with any degree of African blood), were the same ones who composed the most effective members of the colonial militias. Is it any wonder that they eventually became the backbone of the armies of liberation?

Anthony P. Maingot
Florida International University

_The Splintering of Spain: Cultural History and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939._ Edited by Chris Ealham and Michael Richards (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005) 282 pp. $90.00 cloth $18.00 digital

The publication of this valuable collection of essays demonstrates that, despite the voluminous bibliography already in existence, there is still something new to say about the Spanish civil war. It also provides additional evidence that the best historical writing on the war has largely overcome the partisanship that marred it in the past. Although black-and-white dichotomizing continues to characterize popular histories of the war, serious scholarship, like the essays in this volume, now strives to add texture and complexity to the old master narratives that interpreted the conflict within binary frameworks such as “fascism vs. democracy (or communism),” “Spain vs. anti-Spain,” or “tradition vs. modernity.”

Instead of focusing on high politics, the clash of ideologies, or military and diplomatic events, the contributors seek to recover the experiences and perceptions of ordinary Spaniards through an understanding of the social, cultural, and spatial dimensions of politics, broadly defined. Behaviors, beliefs, and social relations are examined through three overarching themes—language, locality, and identity. Together, the essays call attention to the multiple cleavages and conflicts that fractured Spanish society, but also to the inherited cultural symbols and meanings that rendered collective action intelligible and rational to participants. Many of them draw on sociological and anthropological theories that have informed historical writing in other fields for nearly two decades but that
are only now having a serious impact on the historiography of modern Spain, for reasons that the co-editors make clear in their introduction. Historical writing, like other forms of social memory in twentieth-century Spain, was profoundly shaped by the civil war and the Franquist dictatorship. The dichotomizing tendencies mentioned above, as well as the survival of Marxist paradigms well after their disappearance in other historiographies, can be attributed to the trauma of the war and its long aftermath.

The nine essays in this volume are organized into three parts, entitled “Overviews: Violence, Nationalism and Religion,” “Republican Political and Cultural Projects,” and “Identities on the Francoist side.” In Part I, three essays analyze the ways in which the war intensified and transformed traditional discourses that structured and gave meaning to individual and collective action. Eduardo González Calleja discusses the radicalization and polarization of language during the Second Republic as the manifestation of a more general recourse to violence, especially among militant youth organizations. Xosé-Manoel Núñez Seixas suggests that the nationalist rhetoric that increasingly characterized political discourse on both sides in the civil war may provide evidence of a shared national identity more deeply rooted in Spanish society than previously thought. Mary Vincent concludes that the rites of violence directed against the church and the clergy, which inverted traditional Catholic practice and power relations, were symbolic acts of purification and catharsis that their perpetrators believed would make possible the creation of a new revolutionary order.

The essays in Part II stress the importance of local cultures and spatial organization in shaping working- and middle-class responses to war and revolution. Writing about Barcelona and Gijón, Enric Ucelay-Da Cal, Ealham, and Pamela Radcliff all emphasize the persistence of myths of urban populism that, at least for a time, mediated divergent corporate interests and inspired visions of a “revolutionary city without alienation and hierarchy” in 1936 (113).

In Part III, the contributions of Rafael Cruz and Francisco Javier Capistegui examine the processes by which the universe of possible cultural representations of the Nationalist cause was simplified and codified in the aftermath of the military rebellion. In contrast, Richards’ essay seeks to understand how the tension between the needs of the Franquist regime, the doctrinal absolutism of the Church and the ambiguities of popular religiosity fragmented the definition of the war as a “crusade” and the meaning of Holy Week as a communal expression of mourning and sacrifice.

Carolyn P. Boyd
University of California, Irvine

Brucker has collected ten recent papers and lectures (three previously unpublished) with a short introductory autobiography. His autobiography of an Illinois farm boy qua acclaimed scholar highlights the main ideas and methods of this collection as much as the author’s historical essays. For Brucker, as he reflects on history, fortune rules. He remains a devoted, close reader of Niccolò Machiavelli, while following “only two valid historical ‘laws’: (1) everything pertaining to our species is in constant flux and (2) accident and contingency play as important a role in history as does human design” (xxv). He unapologetically accepts criticism for his “theoretical poverty” and values his life’s work for its fascination and foundation in archival research. He remains critical “of a serious defect in Florentine history: the failure to summarize and integrate recent scholarship” (108), which is the real object of these essays on medieval and Renaissance Italy in general (Chapters 1–5) and Florentine history in particular (Chapters 6–10). Throughout, Brucker’s masterful eye for detail, his imaginative weighing of primary sources, his generous praise for the contributions and correctives of fellow scholars, and his incisive powers of synthesis and generalization give this book the unobtrusive authority and quiet dignity of its author, who sees himself, above all, as one among many in an international community of scholars.

Brucker begins with a historiographical essay that traces the Renaissance in Italy according to the nineteenth-century “vision” of Burckhardt, by debunking its now, oft-repeated, textbook myths. Instead, the complex context of demographic, economic, and social patterns undergird historical continuities punctuated by endemic conflict from war, famine, and plague; powered by the essential material foundation of an extraordinary concentration of capital in the hands of urban elites; and rationalized by the new ruling class’ adaptations of the humanist cultural revolution. The thrust of the first five peninsula-wide essays, however, is to engage Putnam’s thesis about civic traditions and horizontal social bonds, which Brucker finds as wrong-headed as Burckhardt’s view. Putnam’s overly idealized Italian commune distorts the historical tensions between “civic” and “feudal” forces, campanilismo (local particularism) and national civil society, rich and poor, town and country, and Church and state. “The crucial importance of contingency . . . [with] chance and accident [of births, marriages, deaths, inheritances, battles, and events from Frederick II to the Sack of Rome] . . . as important . . .

as... structure” (62) explains much about the political fragmentation of Italy, and sets the stage for its conquest. Machiavelli is Brucker’s guide in emphasizing that “the spirit of particularism and of pervasive distrust [was] so deeply rooted in the mentalité of this society” that the faith engendered in economic relationships could not carry over to politics, where “trust was a shrinking commodity” (82, 103).

The five Florentine-focused essays are a paean to “a body of scholarship that has no equal in European urban history before the French Revolution” and restates the case “for Florence’s ‘exceptionalism’” (105, 113). The book’s title chapter emphasizes “that sense of vulnerability, the awareness of grave perils that threatened Florence’s security and prosperity during Leonardo’s lifetime” (116). An archivally researched essay examines chaplains servicing cathedral chapels; another draws a portrait of the Pandolfini family in their parish; and the collection concludes with “The Eventful Life of a Florentine Matron,” Alessandra Strozzi.

Brucker’s essays are not afraid to make strong judgments (pace Burckhardt and Putnam) and sharp insights (on faith and trust). They offer a grand overview of the period’s problematical claims to “modernity” and of the current state of the field of Renaissance Italian and Florentine studies from one of its most important students in the second half of the twentieth century.

John A. Marino
University of California, San Diego


Redles argues that because the early Nazi movement was rich in millennial and apocalyptic symbolism, Nazism must have been millennial and apocalyptic. His interpretation of the movement employs the conceptual repertoire and terminology of millennial studies to reassert the psychohistorical approach to understanding Adolf Hitler and the Old Guard Nazis. To the convergent troubles of the Weimar Republic, Hitler offered a ponderously spiritualized response, which drew its élan from his developing awareness of prophetic destiny and shamanic insight into the deeper causes of Germany’s woes. This response, with its relentless topoi of betrayal, disdain for “degenerates,” impending violent purification, and doom for Jews as the “Evil Others” responsible for it all, awakened an “apocalypse complex” among right-wing extremists. As the one individual capable of resolving its inherent tensions, Hitler did not so much exploit as tap into this complex by reconstructing a sense of harmonic order (45). Thus, the Führer and those first touched by his appeal were
psychically simpatico. They united naturally and with grotesque tenacity behind the movement’s great idea of national redemption via apocalyptic cleansing.

It is not surprising that an expert in comparative millennialism would define the carrying power of Nazism as essentially spiritual, nor that he would insist that the movement be interpreted in religious terms. The question arises, however, whether the empirical record from which this definition and interpretation are supposed to spring matters less to the author than asserting the relevance of millennial studies does. Redles starts from the conclusions that millennialism matters and that Old Guard Nazis were millenarian occultists. Then he proceeds to find “pervasive” evidence in Nazi rhetoric, symbolism, and the Führer cult to support these two claims (12).

Much of this evidence—the ideas of the Thule-Gesellschaft (a German occultist organization), the messianism that Hitler supposedly developed while recovering from gas attack in Pasewalk hospital, the account of Hitler’s youth given by his teenage companion August Kubizek, the testimonials of men like Gregor Strasser and Alfred Rosenberg, and Hermann Rauschnigg’s Hitler Speaks (London, 1939)—has been criticized for its unreliability or rejected outright by such well-established scholars as Kershaw. Nonetheless, Redles believes that although it may be “of marginal value for traditional objective history,” this evidence, despite its enervating factual inaccuracies, is “essential for grasping the murky but crucially important subjective world of Nazi millennial myth” (192). According to Redles, every utterance worth taking seriously in evaluating the cognition of the early Nazis is at least epiphenomenal of an apocalyptic mentality, however temporary, latent, repressed, or even unconscious. The millennial accents of Nazism were so clear that the implications for the field are unavoidable: Historians who do not read the evidence as Redles does fundamentally, even willfully, misunderstand the essential nature of Nazism (208, n. 30).

Because it is fixed within the tight interpretive paradigm of millennial studies, Redles’ description of Nazism is remarkably neat. Hitler the messiah was “perfectly suited” to lead the rudderless Germans suffering under the chaos of Weimar (159). The symbolic expressions of Nazi ideology resonated precisely with eschatological longings common among individuals eager to relax their elemental fears by projecting onto Hitler an “apocalyptic complex” of their own. The “Final Solution” was intended. Circumstances may have delayed its implementation, but Hitler’s racial soteriology implied the extermination of European Jewry from the very beginning.

Agreement with Redles’ tidy history will depend significantly upon acceptance of his argument that the sources are trustworthy and that his chosen paradigm for interpreting them is more reliable than the methods

1 See, for example, Ian Kershaw, Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris (New York, 1998).
of “traditional objective history.” Many readers will remain unconvinced.

Jeffrey T. Zalar
Pepperdine University

*The Nazi Appropriation of Shakespeare: Cultural Politics in the Third Reich.*
310 pp. $119.95

Symington’s fascinating study examines productions of William Shakespeare’s plays during the Third Reich to see how Nazi ideologues attempted to appropriate the preeminent playwright of Western culture. Adolf Hitler was savvy about the cultural transmission of master narratives. Rather than ban Shakespeare’s plays outright, the Nazis attempted to reinterpret them for their own propagandistic purposes. Thus, they reconceived the figure of Hamlet not as a protagonist with a conscience but as a proto-German warrior. The Nazi newspaper *Der Stürmer* turned *Hamlet* the play into a narrative of Germany, likening “the crime that . . . deprived Hamlet of his inheritance” to the Treaty of Versailles and “Gertrude’s betrayal [to] that of the spineless Weimar politicians” (190).

The German literary canon had long appropriated Shakespeare as central, following the translations of August Wilhelm Schlegel and Ludwig Tieck; the Nazis rejected Hans Rothe’s later translations as part of their larger repudiation of literary modernism (97). Nazi leaders presented Shakespeare not as an English writer but as a German, expressing Nordic racial values and tied to Germans through bonds of blood (169). Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels announced in 1939 that Hitler himself had permitted the staging of Shakespeare productions (172).

In similar manner, the Nazis rendered George Bernard Shaw acceptable by viewing him as an Irish writer opposed to England and his plays as propaganda against England (174). Shaw’s published articles opposing the English government and his sympathy for eugenics led Hitler to issue orders to “protect” Shaw, making him, as Symington writes, “the most successful living dramatist [in] the Third Reich[;] . . . the number of productions of his plays actually increased in wartime” (173). Symington notes that Hitler enjoyed both of the productions of Shaw’s *Caesar and Cleopatra* that he saw (173).

The regime, however, banned Shakespeare’s historical plays. By March 1941, formal permission from the Reich Dramaturgy was required for any production. The result was a drastic drop in the performance of Shakespeare’s plays: 1,034 productions were mounted in the 1932/33 season, 1,263 in 1940/41, but only 831 in 1942/43 (167, 175). Symington reports that most of them were comedies. The most useful play for Nazis was *The Merchant of Venice*, which was broadcast on radio shortly after Kristallnacht, and given a command performance in 1943,
commissioned by the Baldur von Schirach, SS Gauleiter of Vienna, to celebrate that the city had become Judenrein. According to newspaper accounts, when Werner Krauss, the Nazis’ leading actor, first appeared on the stage of the Burgtheater as Shylock in 1943, he made the audience shudder: “With a crash and a weird train of shadows, something revoltingly alien and startlingly repulsive crawled across the stage.”

Resistance to Hitler via productions of the plays did not occur (268). Yet even though the Nazis did not attempt to influence the scholarly study of Shakespeare, academics usually “played right into the hands of the regime” by viewing the plays as reflections of the Nazis’ own “heroic age” (269).

Symington notes the irony that Shakespeare’s work, which emphasizes the complexity of the individual, conscience, and interiority, would be appropriated by Nazis, but concludes that ultimately his great plays were immune to manipulation and propaganda. The classics retained their power. In Symington’s words, “the most seditious reactions in the theatres resulted from productions of classical plays” (270).

Susannah Heschel
Dartmouth College


Surely two of the most interesting and important questions that historians will ask in the future relate to the general disposition and conduct of the German people during the twentieth century. How could a supposedly civilized society descend into an abyss of cruelty and murder, and how could the same people return from the depths of horror to a civilized state? Jarausch addresses the latter of these two puzzles in this fascinating work, and he does so not by implication but directly. This theme constitutes the book’s central and persistent concern, viewed—on the basis of a broad familiarity with the literature—from above and below, from the structure of government to the behavior of individuals. A feature of this examination of German developments from the end of World War II into the first years of reunification is that the author—unlike most who have dealt with this period—engages events in all of Germany in 1945 and in both German states that emerged from the occupied wreckage of the Third Reich. This special characteristic of the book facilitates the author’s effort to delineate differences and similarities and thus to illuminate both the Federal Republic in the West and what called itself the German Democratic Republic in the East. Although these differences are naturally tied, in large part, to the different policies of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union in their respective client
states, Jarauch’s approach facilitates his effort to understand the actual impact of those policies on the people living under them.

The demilitarization of Germany was not only imposed by the Allies but internalized by Germans who saw the vast destruction wrought by the war and the slow return of prisoners of war. Unlike the aftermath of World War I, this time Germany evinced a real reluctance to re-arm, even when eventually seen as necessary in the West and imposed in the East. The bombing and the fighting in Germany may have initiated the “re-education” of the Germans before defeat provided an opportunity for the Allies to impose their policies. Although the various peace movements in postwar Germany were influenced much more by anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiments than Jarausch suggests, they certainly reflected a distancing from enthusiasm for things military. In practice, the policy of “denazification” was similarly effective. The Nazi Party and its multitude of affiliated organizations were not only dissolved formally but had discredited themselves in most Germans’ eyes. With increasing contacts across the border dividing Germans, a sense of cultural unity and patriotism could develop without the element of supernationalism that had disfigured the country in the past.

The economic issues of Chapter 3 show a West Germany moving toward a relatively free market system while the East—except for a spoiled political elite—begins to stress equality. In the political sphere, the West showed a slow but real trend toward acceptance of a parliamentary democracy whereas a new dictatorship ruled the East. Jarausch convincingly points out that the internalization of the change in the West by most of the population created a framework to deal with the new problems and challenges of the 1960s and 1970s. His approach to the upheavals of 1968 and the emergence of a terrorist element on the political scene in West Germany is particularly interesting. Because it left no opportunity for open discussion of possible changes, the system imposed on the East by the Soviets and their German followers was incapable of making realistic adjustments to the needs of the situation and collapsed in 1989. The reunited state has an abundance of problems but also a population that deals with them in a democratic manner. The challenges of xenophobia and globalization bring both unease and horrific incidents, but the leadership—once it awakens to the dangers—can rally the population toward engaging these issues in a constructive way.

For a work examining a major transformation in one of Europe’s largest populations, this book has a few astonishing omissions. Discussion of what is called the Morgenthau Plan fails to engage that plan’s map, which would have reduced the number of German expellees from about 12 million to 6 million. The collapse of the East German state is surely understandable only with reference to the military reality of the moment. The Russian troops had orders to stay in their barracks—unlike in June 1953—and the East German troops could not be used against demonstrators who might have been their own families. These are, however, minor points in the broader picture. Internal develop-
ments, foreign contacts, and a deliberate effort by outsiders assisted the German people in aligning themselves with the West not only in the military sense but also in the values of civil society. That process is reviewed in this book in an exemplary fashion and with a fair attention to the disputes that have attended it.

Gerhard L. Weinberg
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill


Russia was an “enigma” not only for Winston Churchill. Riasanovsky’s Russian Identities shows how Russians themselves have tried for a millennium to decide who they are—European, Asian, both, or neither. In 988, Grand Prince Vladimir decided, by adopting Christianity, that Rus was European. Many scholars, Riasanovsky among them, consider this the most important event in Russian history. Russia became “the eastern flank of Christendom rather than an extension into Europe of non-Christian civilizations” (20). But, after church and secular leaders adapted Orthodoxy to Russian conditions and declared Moscow “The Third Rome,” Orthodoxy differentiated Russia from West European states.

As the plural—identities—in the title indicates, the book assumes that Russians have had different and competing identities. In this book, the term usually means self-identity, but it occasionally means how others identified Russians. The underlying theme of this book seems to be that in the Kievan period “the Rus were a people, a state, and a country” (29), and they have been ever since. But deep crises have seriously threatened the survival of the idea of Russians as a common “people.” The Time of Troubles, Pugachev’s Rebellion, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Civil War are examples of such crises.

The factual base of this book is, as Riasanovsky says (6), his frequently updated A History of Russia (New York, 2005; orig. pub. 1963) and his other publications on Official Nationality and the Slavophiles. The book uses a synthesis of intellectual, cultural, and political history as a means of focusing facts on identifying characteristics of each period. The result is a work that will either help scholars in Russian studies better understand facts that they might already know or make Russian history accessible to the interested nonspecialist. Riasanovsky reveals how a given Russian’s perception of Russia (European, Asian, etc.) determined his own course of action or one that he proposed for others.

1 See, for example, Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855 (Berkeley, 1959); idem, A Parting of Ways: Government and the Educated Public in Russia, 1861–1855 (New York, 1976); idem, Russia and the West in the Teachings of the Slavophiles (Cambridge, Mass., 1952).
For instance, Peter I’s negative assessment of Russia in 1700 caused him to be an energetic “Westernizer.” Nicholas I, however, considered Russia superior to Western Europe because of its Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality. He declared Peter Chaadaev insane and placed him under police surveillance for publishing an article in *The Telescope* (1836) that Orthodoxy had retarded Russian civilization and that Russia had learned nothing from either Asia or Europe despite its location between them (151–152).

The chapter on the period of 1855 to 1917 is more narrative in form than previous chapters. The intense debate among Marxists, Populists, Liberals, and Conservatives about Russia’s characteristics during this period is an excellent opportunity for Riasanovsky to reveal how conflicting perceptions of Russia caused conflicting reform programs. He shows that Georgi V. Plekhanov’s perceptions of Russia caused him to repudiate Vladimir Lenin’s coup d’etat in 1917. But what of the Mensheviks as a whole? And how did Karl Marx’s identification of Russia as more Asian than European shape Lenin’s justification of the 1917 coup? This chapter is a disappointment.

The final chapter, on the Soviet Period, asks whether the population of the Soviet Union (not only Russians) believed Marxist ideology. Riasanovsky speculates that most people did not believe. The regime’s antireligious policies and attacks on large categories of people alienated the population. The people believed in “survival” (228).

Among the virtues of this elegantly written book is its establishment of a context for the daily news from Russia. The lead article in the February 28, 2007, issue of *Izvestia* (the day of this review’s composition) is a summary of comments by seven of Russia’s most prominent political scientists at a conference on Russia’s proper place in the post–Soviet world. Vyacheslav Nikonov, President of the Politika Foundation, is quoted as saying, “It will take Russia a long time to come up with a conclusive answer to the question of which civilization we belong to, whether we are the East or the West, Europe or Asia, and so on.”

Charles Timberlake  
University of Missouri, Columbia

*American Curiosity: Cultures of Natural History in the Colonial British Atlantic World*. By Susan Scott Parrish (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2006) 321 pp. $49.95 cloth $22.50 paper

In 1769, just as the imperial crisis was heating up, Pennsylvania Quaker farmer John Bartram sent a couple of large and noisy bullfrogs to the British king. The message was not antagonistic, a grumpy gesture from a disgruntled and otherwise silenced pacifist, but an act appropriate to cultural fascination with the specimens of American natural history and to the requirements of a diligent royal scientist in the colonies. The frogs
were kept in the pond of London physician John Fothergill, until one escaped, and after many months had elapsed without the second gaining an audience with George III, the doctor allowed it to go in search of its mate. This pair of frogs were failed specimens. But most of the other flora and fauna that colonists sent across the ocean were decidedly not. Offering a careful and elegant account of the dynamics of natural history on both the western and eastern sides of the British Atlantic, American Curiosity explains why. The British American colonies, and hence their specimens and informers, were crucial to the New Science under such intense elaboration in metropolitan London.

Parrish describes her approach as “a social history of knowledge making and a cultural history of representations” (15). The social history is peopled with members of a variety of social groups—not just colonial farmers and part-time botanists like Bartram and his brother William, but also elite women, such as Eliza Pinckney of the South Carolinian planter class, and slaves, such as the unnamed “black servant” of Charleston naturalist Alexander Garden, as well as native American informants sent further into the “wilderness” than privileged whites cared to go. The cultural history, which carries the greater analytical weight, involves close readings of a similarly wide variety of texts in the genres and medias concerned with natural history. Pastoral poetry, sermons, travel accounts, and especially personal letters are all set firmly against the more formal, propagandist and myopic publications of the Royal Society.

“Curiosity” and the New World make Parrish’s approach uniquely desirable. She argues that America was an immense and provoking material curiosity for scientists, and that proper curiosity involved an English gentleman, well schooled and detached, honing scientific facts about nature in concert with other similarly disinterested and apprehending men of similar stature. Thus, curiosity requires both a social history of observers and a cultural history of what was observed. Curiosity was sufficiently flexible, and the longing of the New Science for natural facts and artifacts sufficiently powerful, for it to be ambivalently extended to, as well as defined against, that of certain native American informants (Indian sagacity) and the enslaved (African cunning). Women of Pinckney’s ilk, meanwhile, made female curiosity respectable via pastoralism and practical application, carving out a place for themselves in the informal epistolary networks that were science’s primary conduit.

American Curiosity develops both the social-constructionist scientific history exemplified by Shapin and the older entwined history of literature and science associated with critics such as Nicolson. Both traditions emerged in attempts to account for the full richness and complexity of European arts and sciences; both still tend to take the view from the

metropole where institutions were thickest on the ground and print culture deepest rooted. The main achievement of this book is to demonstrate how the colonies, and diverse inhabitants therein, were thoroughly constitutive of the ordinary workaday practices of metropolitan science. Parrish shows this participation to have been integral to curious empiricism, despite some of the louder claims of the New Science. The focus on specimens, and the preference for small fragments of knowledge over grand theories, made it newly possible for local, read peripheral, expertise to matter in unusual and surprising ways.

Sarah Knott
Indiana University


Ricci’s study of American citizenship is a historical and analytical inquiry with normative intent. The purposes of the work turn on the obvious—but not trivial—point that “in a democracy citizens rule, yet if they rule badly, all will suffer” (3). Ricci addresses the challenge of promoting good citizenship by way of a historical reconstruction of competing conceptions of citizenship; the social, political, and economic forces that shaped the discourse of citizenship; and an analysis of how these accounts and transformations comport with the ideal of an engaged and responsible citizenry.

Much of the historical inquiry is suggestive rather than exhaustive, and in its analytical content, the work is straightforward rather than subtle. These features make this study an unlikely scholarly reference about citizenship and civic life in the United States but an ideal introduction to developments, themes, and problematics in American civics. Readers familiar with the history and theory of civic discourse will likely quibble with the content of Ricci’s narrative, and partisans of different ideals of citizenship may find his prescriptions (in Part III, Chapters 8 and 9, the core of which is a thinly veiled critique of modern conservatism) controversial. But Ricci’s methodology, which entails crafting the materials to cohere in a conceptual framework focused on the central dimensions or aspects of citizenship, can turn the substantive deficiencies of the work into well-grounded opportunities for further inquiry. Good Citizenship in America may well be an excellent benchmark from which students of American civic life can begin their own intellectual—if not political—journeys.

Ricci parses (especially in Chapter 1) the discourse of citizenship in terms of its active moments, not its legalistic or formal meanings: obedience to sovereign authority (which he calls “Citizenship I”), participation in public life and the exercise of sovereign authority (“Citizenship II”), and the pursuit of moral and/or ethical “excellence,” or virtue...
Within this conceptual framework, Ricci broadly examines the substance of “Early Civic Ideas” (Chapter 2) and their articulation in both their “republican” (Chapter 3) and “democratic” (Chapter 4) expressions within the framework of “American Exceptionalism” (Part II, inclusive of Chapters 3–5). He then discusses the “challenge of good citizenship” raised by republican and democratic discourses (Chapter 5) as radically modified by “The Modern Economy” (Part III, inclusive of Chapters 6–7), especially in “the rise of consumerism” (Chapter 6) and “the costs of consumerism” (Chapter 7).

There are many ways to reconstruct the discourse of citizenship, but the great strength of Ricci’s approach is that it invites systematic and rigorous thought about the complex historical legacy and analytically complicated issues that constitute civic discourse, both academic and popular. Ricci does not write in a style intended to provoke or challenge (though the book’s assumed authority will be a source of provocation for some), but Good Citizenship in America contributes to sharpening the quality of debate and discussion among advocates of an active ideal of citizenship.

Stephen Leonard
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Venereal Disease and the Lewis and Clark Expedition. By Thomas P. Lowry (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2004) 117 pp. $21.95

The bicentennial commemorations of the Lewis and Clark expedition were marked by an outpouring of books and ephemera. Not all of it was celebratory; some of it was contentious. The achievement of the Corps of Discovery, impressive as they were, have to be seen against the meaning of the expedition for the Indian peoples who inhabited the territories that Meriwether Lewis and William Clark traversed. The Lewis and Clark trail has become historically contested ground. All of this reaction is appropriate, was to be expected, and should be welcomed as the nation continues to reflect on what has become a defining event in its formative history. Less expected, and certainly less welcome to those who prefer their national heroes to lack human failings, is Lowry’s slim study of sex, syphilis, and gonorrhea on the expedition, not least his jolting suggestion that Lewis’ suicide may have stemmed from syphilis of the brain. Author also of The Stories the Soldiers Wouldn’t Tell: Sex in the Civil War (Mechanicsburg, 1994), Lowry has written what may be the “dirty little book” of the Lewis and Clark expedition.

The direct documentary evidence is skimpy and scattered, and some of it requires reading between the lines. Even enhanced by a review of the history of syphilis since 1492 and of the state of knowledge about the disease by the time of the expedition, the book is slim. Yet the evidence makes clear that the members of the Corps of Discovery spent
a lot of time thinking about sex, having sex, and treating the consequences of sex. Lewis and Clark expected their men to engage in sexual intercourse with Native women along the way, anticipated that they would contract venereal disease, and loaded their medical cabinet with items for treating syphilis and gonorrhea.

Venereal disease was already widespread in Indian country, especially in those communities regularly visited by European traders. Lewis and Clark knew the dangers that awaited their contingent of fit young men, but they also knew that two years of abstinence was too much to ask. Expedition members had sex with Indian women early and often. Indian women often were eager to have sex with the men of the expedition, although for reasons that the men could barely fathom. The sexual exploits of Clark’s black slave, York, became legendary. Sacagawea, inscribed on the dollar coin as a national heroine, seems almost certainly to have had a gonorrheal infection, contracted most likely from her husband Toussaint Charbonneau. Many, perhaps all, of the men received mercury treatment—the common prescription for syphilis—during the expedition. Lewis and Clark were extremely circumspect about their own sexual activities along the trail, but the stories about babies fathered by Clark in Indian communities and the mystery surrounding Lewis’ death are suggestive.

This readable little book provides easy access to an aspect of the expedition that has been generally, and perhaps deliberately, overlooked. In restoring sex and its attendant diseases to the story, Lowry enriches its human tapestry and adds to our appreciation of the encounters and tragedies that Indians and explorers shared.

Colin G. Calloway
Dartmouth College

Colin G. Calloway
Dartmouth College


Closer to Freedom is premised on the idea that masters and slaves used space differently, that there were black spaces and white spaces that represented “rival geographies.” Camp adapts this term, used by Said and geographers to describe resistance to colonial occupation, for the plantation South where the enslaved perpetually challenged their enslavers’ control of time, space, and movement.1 Playing with the double entendre of the concept of place, Camp explains that whites’ “social place” was predicated on the control of black movement and the containment of blacks to particular spaces. In Closer to Freedom, slave resistance is understood as “mobility in the face of constraint” (7).

For Camp, not only did the rhythms of the plantation have everything to do with the ways that blacks and whites used time, space, and place differently so did the different ways that enslaved men and women challenged white mastery of plantation geographies. Given that the woods, swamps, and slave cabins were spaces where the enslaved could exercise more autonomy than the fields and other open spaces on the plantation, bonded men had more autonomy than women because the latter were more confined to the plantation. Building on existing research of absenteeism, Camp’s discussion of women as truants and truancy facilitators deepens our understanding of resistance as both an individual and collective endeavor. She argues forcefully that although men comprised the majority of runaways and truants, the role that women played in providing food and information made these two forms of resistance individual and collective at the same time, and gave bonded men and women more control of the southern landscape than whites ever wanted them to have.

Intriguing and interesting is Camp’s treatment of the body as space. According to Camp, imagining the enslaved body in space allows us to see how the enslaved “claimed, animated, politicized, personalized and enjoyed their bodies” (62). Blacks took their bodies to religious ceremonies and other surreptitious gatherings, and women, in particular, adorned and used their bodies in ways that allowed them to become instruments of self-expressive style. Although this part of Camp’s argument might have benefited from a fuller explication of the interaction of mind, body, and soul, Camp argues insightfully that the enslaved had at least three bodies: one that the enslaver dominated, one that processed and endured that domination, and another that the enslaved claimed and enjoyed—the contested site between the enslaver and the enslaved.

The concept of rival geographies works well when applied to the Civil War and Jim Crow era. According to Camp, the Civil War disrupted the spatial arrangements of slavery; blacks and whites, men and women were all both figuratively and literally “out of place,” enabling and increasing black resistance to white domination. By the time Closer to Freedom arrives at the Jim Crow era, Camp has laid the foundation for her description of segregation as “a modern, state-sponsored response to an old problem” (140). Built on established habits, Camp concludes that “segregation seems as much tradition in a new form as a modern break from it” (140).

Closer to Freedom queries some old questions in new ways and gives deeper analysis to what is already on record. Regrettably, the domestic slave trade, with all of its movement through the southern countryside, is nowhere to be found in this study of movement, place, and space.

Deborah Gray White
Rutgers University

No field of history has been enriched more over the years by the comparative method than slavery studies. Indeed, the roster of comparativists—beginning with pioneers such as Tannenbaum, Elkins, Klein, Genovese, Goveia, and Degler and running all the way to contemporaries such as Morgan and Miller—constitutes a veritable who’s who in the field.1 Most of the comparisons made have been between different slave systems or regimes, though some scholars—Bowman and Kolchin, most notably—have compared slave societies to societies organized around other forms of labor control.2 In Agrarian Elites, Dal Lago builds on the work of Bowman and Kolchin, comparing social processes and patterns in the southern part of the United States and southern Italy (the Mezzogiorno) between 1815 and 1861. Despite (or because of) the fact that these areas were informed, if not dominated, by different systems of labor organization—slavery in one case and sharecropping and tenancy in the other—Dal Lago’s study contributes significantly to our understanding of both these areas and of the expansion and elaboration of capitalism more generally during the period under study.

At first glance, the decision to compare the American South and southern Italy seems strained. To be sure, they are both “souths,” both were agricultural areas, and both were integrated, albeit in different ways, into consolidating nation-states over the course of the nineteenth century. But the economy of the American South—organized around racial slavery, the plantation, and the commercial production of cash crops (cotton, rice, sugar, and tobacco) for world markets—seems far different than the economy of southern Italy, organized, as it was, around latifondi, stockraising, more limited commercialization, and greater self-sufficiency. To his credit, however, Dal Lago makes a compelling case for comparing the two regions, arguing that the “agrarian elites” who dominated both regions shared much in terms of both their respective economic and political ideologies and their economic and political behaviors.


According to Dal Lago, the economic ideologies and behaviors characteristic of such elites in both “souths” could best be described as partly traditional (patriarchal/paternalist) and partly modern (capitalist). Moreover, the author, who is sympathetic to world-systems analysis, argues that the regions dominated by these elites occupied roughly analogous “peripheral” positions in the capitalist world economy of the nineteenth century. In the political realm as well, Dal Lago emphasizes similarities. For example, he argues that the regnant agrarian elites in both areas embraced nationalist projects in the nineteenth century, projects made manifest in 1861 with the near simultaneous births of the Confederate States of America and the Kingdom of Italy. In each case, however, nationalism came with certain qualifications—most notably, vigorous opposition to intervention of distant national governments in local affairs, and nowhere more so than in South Carolina and in Sicily, which remained hotbeds of regionalism in the American South and the Mezzogiorno.

Dal Lago has done the profession a service by attempting this complicated comparison. If his attempt to reconcile ideologies, behaviors, interpretations, and “souths” is not altogether convincing (this reviewer remains more impressed by the differences between the two regions), Agrarian Elites is a wide-ranging study as spirited as it is provocative.

Peter A. Coclanis
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill


Most studies of the post–Civil War American South have focused on either the politics of reconstruction or the long-term impoverishment of the region due to the war’s devastation. Yet despite the fact that the South was much poorer in the decades after the war than it was beforehand, southern businessmen and planters seemed to rebound financially with less difficulty than observers, in retrospect, might have expected. This intriguing volume explains why.

The author argues that the short-lived federal Bankruptcy Act of 1867 proved to be a godsend to southern debtors and creditors alike. States-rights rhetoric notwithstanding, southern whites flooded the federal courts in the South seeking to take advantage of the law’s provisions. Focusing on cases arising in the South Carolina lowlands, eastern Tennessee, and southern Mississippi, Thompson demonstrates that although lawmakers viewed bankruptcy legislation as distinct from reconstruction, the statute played an important part in the program’s outcome. By economically empowering southern whites, it allowed them to reassert control over the region’s politics.

Southern debtors benefited from the bankruptcy act in several ways.
The law exempted from execution for debt a substantial amount of property (often based on the value thereof instead of acreage), reaffirmed state laws permitting planters to transfer property into their wives’ names to shield it from attachment, made it easier for debtors to initiate voluntary bankruptcy proceedings, and permitted (unlike earlier statutes) partnerships and corporations to file for bankruptcy. In addition, federal district courts tended to favor local interests, and the judges thereof were less susceptible than state judges to the effects of oscillating party fortunes in state politics.

Although historians are certainly cognizant of how economic self-interest has often trumped ideological consistency among states’-rights proponents, Thompson is nonetheless to be lauded for bringing to the surface the remarkable breadth of that hypocrisy. Whereas southerners comprised about one-quarter of the population in 1870, they accounted for 36 percent of all bankruptcy filings (a disproportion that was no doubt greater given that nearly all proceedings involved white debtors). In the districts under study, more than eight times as many voluntary bankruptcy proceedings were adjudicated as involuntary ones. Creditors filing involuntary proceedings were most prevalent during the mid 1870s—after the economic depression had begun. Although northern creditors were more likely to initiate involuntary proceedings than southern creditors, the latter accounted for 45 percent of the involuntary cases studied. Nor were the voluntary bankruptcy filings the work of a few fee-hungry attorneys. Most law firms represented no more than three or four debtors, and those firms included prominent anti-reconstruction attorneys.

Problems? Given the closeness of the votes in each branch of Congress when enacting the law, Thompson might have explored the various partisan, factional, and regional components of those divisions. Moreover, her analysis of the law’s repeal in 1878 seems hurried. A lack of data, finally, hampers Thompson’s efforts to reconstruct an accurate portrait of debtors’ property holdings. Nonetheless, historians of Reconstruction must come to grips with the findings of this exceptionally well-researched and well-written book.

Lex Renda
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee


As the guns of the Civil War fell silent in 1865, former slaves looked to the future with hope and optimism. After generations of toiling without recompense, they could now work for themselves. It soon became apparent, however, that the road to economic independence would be
long and tortuous, even for the most industrious and fortunate. Indeed, blacks, especially in rural areas of the deep South, were often unable to free themselves from the iron grip of white landowners. Instead of working as slaves, they labored as sharecroppers, remaining in perpetual debt. In the midst of this seemingly endless cycle of discrimination and exploitation, some former slaves left their white employers and journeyed to remote, backwoods areas to form all-black communities, or “freedom colonies.”

This study of freedom colonies in Texas offers a new perspective on black independence and land ownership during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. How and why did these communities spring up? Where were they located? What were the settlers’ social, religious, cultural, educational, and economic values? What did living in all-black settlements mean? These and other questions are explored in this study of independent black settlements. As the years passed, many members of these communities and their children became independent and self-sustaining landowners through hard work and industry. Thus did they remain free from the insults and degradations of Jim Crow. “Nobody had to get off the sidewalk to let a white man pass or be careful not to look directly at a white woman” (61). By examining these settlements, the authors have filled a void in the literature on the black experience. Although Texas, having the largest frontier area of any southern state, probably contained more colonies than the more densely populated areas of the east, a detailed view of how such communities worked in one state should encourage similar studies in other states.

The authors have done a commendable job in looking at these settlements from the inside, but they are less successful in placing them in a larger demographic context or in specifying the “hundreds” of colonies that came into existence. Nor do they emphasize that only a tiny fraction of black Texans lived in these separate enclaves. In addition, the authors rely almost exclusively on secondary sources and oral history, avoiding county court records that contain a wealth of information about land transactions and race relations. Consequently, they missed the opportunity to understand more fully how the settlers became independent landowners and to discuss how and when settlers came into contact with whites. Indeed, it seems doubtful that those who settled in the freedom colonies lived in the “splendid isolation” that the authors suggest.

Loren Schweninger
University of North Carolina, Greensboro
McManus’ book about a small section of the United States–Canadian border has larger implications; it is a model study about how we draw lines—on the landscape, among races, between genders—and attach cultural meaning to them. No geographical features mark the boundary between Montana and Alberta, the focus of her study. The territory was the homeland of the Blackfoot Indians, a seminomadic buffalo-hunting people who were among the last native people to have sustained contact with Euro-Americans. The tasks of the U.S. and Canadian governments were (1) to create a border where none naturally existed, (2) to contain and distinguish “American Indians” from Canadian First Peoples, and (3) to foster settlement on unpromising land. Considering these standard western issues in new ways, McManus lucidly demonstrates the cultural assumptions about race, gender, and nation on which policies were based.

In six paired chapters, she first examines the creation of the physical boundary at the 49th parallel through surveys and mapmaking and the land policies designed to maintain distinct ideas of “nation” north and south of it. In the second set of chapters, she shows how early governmental treaties and policies distinguished between different groups of Blackfoot and penned them into reservations/reserves and then imposed gendered white cultural norms—monogamy, farming, domesticity—upon them. In the third set of chapters concerning white settlement, McManus examines the issues of gender and race in the recruitment policies of both governments and demonstrates how central white women were in maintaining these cultural norms.

Each of the three pairs—mapmaking and nationbuilding, Indian policy and native resistance, settlement policy and the responses of settler women—are different topics, requiring different kinds of sources and interpretive strategies. Only McManus’ firm understanding of cultural theory makes the three topics cohere. She begins with the insight that both the U.S. and Canadian governments saw their western regions as key sites for “nation-making” (xii). Then she draws on the work of Foucault and Anderson to explain how the imposition of an imaginary line on the map created two national communities.1

For her discussion of the rules imposed on the Blackfoot, McManus relies on the insights of cultural geographers such as Gregory and Jackson who have examined the production of gendered and racialized space.2

She borrows from feminist postcolonial scholars such as Stoler to show how the land policies of both governments were driven by assumptions about whiteness and gender. Throughout, she clearly demonstrates the multiple interconnections between nation, race, and gender, while offering detailed analyses of topics as diverse as mapping, oral testimony as a source for Indian resistance, and nuanced readings of the personal letters of white settler women.

The skill and clarity of McManus’ exposition makes *The Line Which Separates* required reading not just for borderlands historians but for all historians who seek to understand how we make distinctions—that is, for all of us.

Susan Armitage
Washington State University


This book is extraordinarily engaging and insightful. Deloria’s penetrating, poignant, and humorous prose reveals the struggle of Native people against powerful cultural forces that sought to confine them in stereotypical notions of Indian life.

Deloria brilliantly counterpoises a colonial project to sideline and trivialize a frozen Indian past with Native initiatives to create a hybrid culture based on remembered traditions and selected elements of American culture. With an eye for iconography and loaded descriptors, he deftly discusses local newspaper coverage of South Dakotan murders, the cultural content and space of Wild West shows, the typical plot of Hollywood westerns, Indian actors’ efforts to fashion more realistic depictions of Native people, portrayals of Native athletes as the epitome of organic physicality, representations of Indians using sewing machines and cars, the popular nagging tom-tom that is actually nothing like the heartbeat rhythm of Native drumming, and hybrid musical forms. Deloria illuminates a historical moment in the early twentieth-century when Native people challenged how they were portrayed and offered alternatives.

Deloria’s keen analytical lens spotlights Native efforts to modernize and offers reasons for why they ultimately failed. As descendants of a settler society, Americans needed certain stereotypes of American Indians to justify their dominion. Indians must be aggressive, conquered, and poor. “Outbreaks” from contained reservations replaced “uprisings.” Families hunting game were constructed as violent to justify vigilantes who murdered them. Indians performed their conquest in Wild West shows, but also toured Europe and hobnobbed with royalty and heads of state.

state. Old westerns that revisited this theme, however, required Native actors to step aside for white lead actors. Riding in cars was anathema, especially for old warriors like Geronimo. Indians who used modern technology risked charges of “squandering” their money. A photo of Red Cloud Woman in powwow regalia sitting under a hairdryer always provoked titters.

In the conclusion, Deloria explains why Native activists demanded their own cultural space. Native people share a living memory of an autonomous, sovereign time and remain indigenous. Despite colonialism’s devastation, Native groups retain a collective sense of themselves as distinct people. Taking advantage of legal and judicial windows to enlarge that sovereignty characterizes Native activism in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Debilitating stereotypes have left a horrible legacy for Native and non-Native people alike. Contemporary society is impervious to its modern American Indian people. The growing wealth and influence of gaming groups is met by a backlash of anti-Indian sentiment. After all, Indians should be poor and live “in harmony with nature,” not lobby state politicians. Fans defend Indian mascots as “honorable” despite Native protests. Native children are denounced as inauthentic if they fail to exhibit physical or cultural stereotypes, whereas white schoolchildren can dress in long, black braids and Plains symbolism at Thanksgiving with impunity. Deloria argues that Americans need Native people to conform to white images instead of attend properly to the realities of their lives. When they fail to do so, they are forced to bear a heavy ball and chain.

Melissa L. Meyer
University of California, Los Angeles

Merchants, Midwives, and Laboring Women: Italian Migrants in Urban America. By Diane C. Vecchio (Champaign, University of Illinois Press, 2005) 152 pp. $35.00

In this book, Vecchio examines the multiple forms of wage labor for Italian women in comparative perspective, challenging the view that Italian immigrant women in early twentieth-century America engaged in work only as factory laborers and only in major urban centers. Vecchio analyzes Italian women’s work experiences on both sides of the ocean—in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Endicott, New York, and in the village of Santi Cosma e Damiano, Sicily, though she also compares variations of women’s workforce participation by region in Italy.

Vecchio uses a variety of social-science data, business and employment records, census material, and public-health records, as well as oral-history interviews to make a compelling argument that Italian women, both in Italy and in the United States, had a long and varied history of la-
bor-force participation—from agricultural, domestic, and factory labor to small business enterprise, and professional occupations (notably midwifery, which required a high level of skill and education). Vecchio contends that Italian women immigrants came to the United States at the turn of the century fully prepared to participate in whatever economic opportunities were available to them in a variety of locales. The more common perception is that Italians migrated only to a few large cities as common laborers and that Italian women had no prior experience with work outside the home before immigration.

She grounds her work in the new feminist literature on Italian immigration history, anthropology, and sociology. It takes issue with push/pull migration theories that shortchange the complex processes of migration and reduce women to mere appendages in them. Instead, like Miriam Cohen, *Workshop to Office* (Ithaca, 1993); Kathie Friedman-Kasaba, *Memories of Migration*, (Albany, 1996); Donna Gabaccia and Franca Iacovetta, *Women, Gender, and Transnational Lives* (Toronto, 2002); and McKibben, *Beyond Cannery Row: Sicilian Women, Immigration, and Community in Monterey, California, 1915–1999* (Champaign, 2006), Vecchio shows that women migrants, like their male counterparts, made rational choices about migration, as individuals and as members of families; they took full advantage of the economic opportunities available to them at destination sites.

She begins her analysis in Endicott, location of the Endicott Johnson Corporation. Endicott Johnson offered Italian women employment in the shoemaking industry, conforming to “Italian traditions of providing support to extended families” in a system of welfare capitalism and family-friendly corporate culture (44). The company offered medical benefits and housing as well as “welfare work” in the form of American cooking, sewing, and housekeeping classes (48–49). Child care was not available, but Endicott Johnson allowed working mothers to create flexible schedules to take time for family needs. Italian immigrant women responded to the welcoming policies of Endicott Johnson by embracing the company and resisting union activism.

By contrast, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, did not offer the type of light-industry factory labor available to Italian women immigrants in Endicott. Yet, Italian women continued their traditional contributions to family economies in Milwaukee by taking boarders and setting up such businesses as grocery stores, drugstores, and confectionery shops that catered to a thriving Italian ethnic enclave. Most important, Milwaukee’s large community of Italian immigrants attracted a significant number of professional midwives who migrated on their own, were highly trained and well-educated, and often used their own names in their professional practices, whether or not they were married.

The focus on paid work is obvious in the title of the book, but the analysis might have emphasized that Italian women’s work for wages was part of a much larger project that included the work of family, kinship, and community. This ambitious and valuable comparative analysis
could have included more about return migrations, the Italian communities in Endicott and Milwaukee, and their relations with other immigrant communities. Vecchio’s work makes an important contribution to an interdisciplinary scholarship that utilizes gender analysis to provide a better understanding of the complexity of migration for ethnic groups, and to explain the variety and significance of workforce participation for Italian immigrant women.

Carol Lynn McKibben
Seaside History Project, Seaside, California

On the Great Plains: Agriculture and Environment. By Geoff Cunfer (College Station, Texas A&M University Press, 2005) 292 pp. $55.00 cloth $28.00 paper

On the Great Plains challenges the “declensionist narrative” of environmental, especially regional, history exemplified by such works as Donald Worster’s Dust Bowl (New York, 2004), which pits humankind against nature on the plains in a story of “ignominy and ecological failure” (10). Cunfer argues that although population has been in flux, land use has been stable. “The patterns of crop and pasture have been so consistent across time and space, in fact, that it is not unreasonable to label American agriculture in the plains sustainable,” he writes. “The Dust Bowl was a temporary disruption in a stable system” (5–6).

Cunfer’s argument rests mainly on statistical evidence, the agricultural census; he uses manuscript and published sources to supplement the narrative and offer examples. He discovers that the plowing of the plains did not happen quickly, but took decades in any locality. The process was halted and rolled back by drought and depression in the 1930s. At present, “70 percent of the Great Plains has never been plowed,” the remaining grassland representing “an enormous stockpile of relatively undisturbed native land cover” (36). Cunfer defends pastoral use of grassland, pointing out that rather than depleting vegetative cover, grazing tends to increase it. In their croplands, too, farmers “crafted a land-use system that was remarkably sustainable and resilient” (112).

This new work directly confronts the given narrative about the causes of the Dust Bowl. “The severe drought of the era,” Cunfer concludes, echoing Malin, “might better explain the occurrence of dust storms than the land-use practices of plains farmers” (158)\(^1\). Particularly intriguing is Cunfer’s counterintuitive evidence that black blizzards seemed to roll into cropland from rangeland denuded not by grazing but by drought.

Cunfer finds the exploitation and depletion of the Ogallala Aquifer, like the efflorescence of open-range ranching in the 1880s or the expan-

sion of wheat farming in the 1920s, one more instance of overextension within a broader context of stability. In the long term, however, he perceives an impoverishment of soil nutrients under either grazing or farming.

The arguments in *On the Great Plains* are not totally convincing. Gross cattle numbers can be misleading, given the drastically different effects of cow–calf and transient grazing regimes. Statistics do not capture the condition of range or the diversity of soils; there is no substitute for boots on the ground combined with sensitivity to local specifics. Statistical diversity of cropping can be misleading, as an apparent diversity of crops and land uses can be focused toward production of one staple product. In general, Cunfer is open to the criticism that his bedrock evidence is statistical. His use of written evidence is selective, and it is impossible to be sure that what he says in his book is verifiable on the ground.

Consider, nevertheless, the enormous accomplishment of the book. It moves the continuum of argument. Before it appeared, scholars could only discuss the extent of human abuse of nature on the plains; they had no grounds to argue that the declensionist narrative itself was inadequate. Cunfer’s numbers and maps reverse the burden of proof. Given the overall stability that he documents, the declensionists now must find a way to counter what he has established.

Thomas D. Isern
North Dakota State University


Schoen’s well-written book signals from the title that the politics of fertility variously underwrites both autonomy and constraint. In fact, Schoen’s work argues that women who live under a regime of reproductive constraint often search for ways to wrest reproductive autonomy out of the teeth of coercion. This book focuses, with appropriate complexity, on the related histories of birth control, sterilization, and abortion, showing how physicians and politicians crafted and enforced various interventions over time, while women consistently recognized and often acted upon the need to manage their reproductive capacity, no matter what the law or the authorities said.

In an era when most Americans reduce this fraught terrain to the peculiar binary “choice”/“life,” Schoen’s complicated perspective is particularly illuminating. She shows how, for example, during the Depression, workers in one segment of the federal government—the Farm Security Administration—treated the use of birth control as a mark of “forward-looking citizenship,” even while the head of the Women’s
Bureau forbade states to use federal money for programs that dispensed contraceptive advice. Where birth control was available during this period generally only white women had access, making modern fertility control a racial privilege. Less than thirty years later, government programs were to target poor African American women in the context of anti-welfare, anti-population growth, and civil-rights movements. Meanwhile, millions of women of every race—rich, poor, and middle class—took advantage of any opportunities to limit their pregnancies.

Similarly, Schoen shows that the practice of sterilization in the United States has been more complex than sometimes portrayed. Women with few economic resources and less social power could be caught in official or unofficial anti-fertility stratagems. Sterilization was variously touted and practiced as a way to ward off poverty, to punish or stamp out criminality, to abort mental deficiency (sterilization functioned as abortion before the fact), or to reduce welfare expenditures. Schoen also argues that sterilization could be—and was—an opportunity for thousands of women who had no other way to limit conception.

Once again, in relation to abortion, Schoen stresses the ways that a variety of agendas—be they physicians’, politicians’, women’s, or clerics’—yielded an array of different “kinds” of abortion—elective, therapeutic, and eugenic. Schoen effectively reveals how ideas about aborting women changed over time and also how the target of abortion prosecutions shifted, from the man who caused the pregnancy (and putatively, the abortion) to the abortionist. This work also provides interesting material on North Carolina legislative maneuvers regarding legalization during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Schoen’s lack of attention to the prevalence of self-abortion allows her to suggest that inept practitioners were the chief source of danger to women in the criminal era, not the law itself, which demanded that women submit to enforced childbearing or resort to dangerous methods. In Schoen’s history, legal abortion becomes more a form of consumer protection than a women’s rights issue. Furthermore, although Schoen’s title signals complexity, it notably glosses specificity. The heart of the book focuses exclusively on North Carolina roughly from the 1930s to 1970.

In the course of researching and writing this book, Schoen was able to stimulate an enterprising North Carolina newspaper reporter to write, and convince his editor to publish, a series of articles about the state’s Eugenics Board sanctioning the sterilization of hundreds of poor women in the mid-twentieth century (Schoen calls the Board’s approach to every case an “almost automatic authorization of sterilization” [129]). This is the sort of impact that many academics dream of initiating and rarely achieve.

Rickie Solinger
New Paltz, New York
The Battle for the Black Ballot: Smith v. Allwright and the Defeat of the Texas All-White Primary. By Charles Zelden (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2004) 156 pp. $29.95 cloth $12.95 paper

Zelden’s The Battle for the Black Ballot is a short but detailed account of litigation challenging the primary elections, open only to whites, held by many state and local Democratic party organizations in the first half of the twentieth century. Books of this nature face three challenges: to provide the social and political background of the problem giving rise to the litigation, to describe the litigation’s stages, and to explain in relatively nontechnical terms the litigation’s legal basis—all in a reasonably compact space. Zelden meets the first two challenges well, and does a better than decent job with the third.

Zelden explains how the white primary solved problems that remained even after the disfranchisement of many African Americans. Disfranchising only African Americans patently violated the Fifteenth Amendment. Literacy tests and similar devices of disfranchisement were imperfect, eliminating some whites and not all African Americans from the voting rolls. African American voters sometimes were an appealing target population for politicians seeking to win close elections. Denying African Americans the right to vote in the only election that counted, the Democratic party primary, was an effective means by which white politicians could restrain the impulse to win a particular election at the cost of what the politicians believed were deeper values. Zelden does not explicitly allude to Ulysses and the Sirens, but his account fits well with standard stories about how meta-rules solve coordination problems.

Zelden also writes an effective narrative of the white primary litigation, which extended over several decades. He deploys, with a relatively light touch, Galanter’s distinction between one-shot litigators and repeat players, whose long-term interests give them incentives to invest greater resources and develop expertise in specialized litigation.1 In Zelden’s narrative, the litigation effort faltered when one-shotters controlled it, and succeeded when the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, a quintessential repeat player, took charge of it. Zelden may overemphasize his theoretical framework in this instance. Some lawsuits brought by one-shotters succeeded, and, more important, the major victory over the white primary occurred in Smith v. Allwright (1944), when the Court had been transformed by President Franklin Roosevelt’s appointments. The liberals whom Roosevelt appointed to uphold his New Deal legislation were also liberals on issues of race. The Court’s reconstruction may well have mattered more to the outcome than who happened to control the litigation.

Zelden lays out the legal details effectively. His description of differ-

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ences between the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on racial exclusions from voting and the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws is thin, as is his discussion of why and how such nominally private entities as political parties might nonetheless be required to adopt nondiscriminatory membership rules. But Zelden’s treatment of these difficult legal issues is certainly good enough for this book’s purposes. Probably the only real omission is a discussion of how American legal realism affected the approach of justices to legal issues in the early 1940s, when they decided United States v. Classic (1941), which was not about race but provided the essential precedent for Smith v. Allwright.

Mark Tushnet
Harvard University Law School


In 1980, Kahn, the dean of code-breaking’s history, published a significant article in the prestigious Historical Journal. In it contained a section that raised the questions of why the Allied code breakers of World War II were able to conquer Germany’s most secret encrypting machines (Enigma and Tunny) and why the Germans did not, despite much evidence, admit to themselves that their Ultra communications had been thoroughly compromised by war’s end. Kahn answered those questions through a list of managerial, historical, technical, and even cultural-psychological factors. Five years later, Mulligan, a noted archivist, published a detailed piece about why Germany’s investigators rejected the idea that their fabled Enigma machine was breeched. Like Kahn, Mulligan found some good and bad reasons for the Axis’ belief that, with a few improvements, the Enigma would be safe.

Between the appearance of those two publications, the author of Delusions of Intelligence began to study Enigma’s broad history. More than a decade later, that project turned into a well-crafted interpretive 1996 dissertation. It appeared after an extensive secondary literature had accumulated and just after a major declassification of American documents. In a few years came a second large-scale release of top-secret U.S. files, and then the British began to make some of their holdings public. Delusions made use of many of those new materials not available to Kahn or Mulligan.

Nonetheless, Delusions adds little to our stockpile of facts about German intelligence and counterintelligence: It adds few grounded ex-

planations or new material about Allied code-breaking organizations, and it does not bring into credible play any social-science or interdisciplinary theories or “laws.”

In fact, some of the new documents undermine the strength of Delusions’ main theses. For example, Delusions posits a near irrational faith in abstract mathematical analyses as leading to Germany’s dismissal of warnings that Enigma was being compromised. But Germany’s numerous protective changes to the system weaken that contention. The volume stresses that Germany’s intelligence failures were due to a focus on tactical rather than strategic intelligence. But the Germans were successfully attacking most Allied strategic systems until mid-war, when the Allies finally deployed up-to-date cipher machines. Also emphasized is how little successful code breaking of any type the Germans accomplished and how quickly and thoroughly the Western Allies gained the cryptological upperhand. The Germans were able to read most critical Allied systems only early in the war, whereas many of the Allied victories came late and continued to hinge on German operational mistakes.

Some of Delusions’ theses are weakened by more than slippery explanandums. Downplaying the role of individuals and genius, the author emphasizes differences in organizational structure, but she does not draw from much organizational theory. Ratcliff’s calling on Frederick the Great’s mandates to explain bureaucracy in the 1930s was also not helpful; nor was her use of Ringer’s now weary thesis concerning academic alienation in Germany.3

Sadly, and perhaps due to editorial cost-saving, some out-and-out errors appear in the work (John von Neumann and the Colossus prototype) and the book’s index is incomplete and frustrating.

Colin Burke
Columbia, Maryland


Koistenen has long been a recognized authority on the World War II economic mobilization. In this book, he cements his mastery of it. Mobilizing the United States for war was the subject of heated debate, setting in motion acrimonious political battles. The stakes were extraordinarily high, both at home and abroad. The vast economic resources mobilized by the United States were of decisive strategic importance during World War II. The success of the economic mobilization enabled the United States not only to outfit its own troops but also to provide munitions to allies. At home, the World War II mobilization under-

mined the political and institutional support that was vital to the New Deal. Depression-era agencies and New Dealers in Congress left the war much weakened. In contrast, business leaders in and out of government and military agencies were much more powerful by the war’s end. The decline of the New Deal and the ascent of big business and the military were propeled by the economic mobilization.

One question that can be raised from a social scientist’s perspective is, Why did the New Deal decline while the military establishment and big business grew stronger? Koistenen’s examination of these issues in his first book stressed the political power of big business, suggesting that corporate power, not efficiency, led to these outcomes. When returning to this topic in the Arsenal of World War II, Koistenen’s views have softened. Now he identifies technological and logistical demands as the main cause.

Although this massive volume is detailed, and in most respects thorough, several important issues were given slight attention. Koistenen’s investigation of the mobilization through the lens of the War Production Board (WPB) is certainly plausible. The WPB was the most visible planning agency; when created in 1942, it was charged with overall coordination and control of the mobilization. Nevertheless, the WPB’s centrality was challenged by the autonomous military agencies as well as independent civilian agencies controlling labor and oil. Moreover, the Office of War Mobilization (lodged in the White House) challenged and ultimately superseded the WPB’s policymaking authority. In addition, the financing of the industrial expansion played a large role in tilting the balance of power. But Koistenen provides little information about the activities of the Defense Plant Corporation or the direct lending supplied by the Army and Navy. By the war’s end, the United States owned more than 40 percent of the nation’s industrial assets. Koistenen has little to say about the manner in which the postwar disposition of these assets contributed to the concentration of economic power in civilian sectors. Nor is he concerned about the industrial facilities and network of relationships that would serve as the foundation for the military-industrial complex of the 1950s and 1960s.

Koistenen’s review of archival materials is exhaustive; his bibliographical essay is invaluable to anyone studying these issues. In this sense, his research about World War II is definitive. However, because he devoted so little attention to engaging, criticizing, and evaluating theoretical accounts of the overall balance of power and its legacy for the postwar period, Koistenen leaves important questions unanswered. The changing balance of economic and military power in the United States has been a central concern for historians and social scientists throughout the postwar era, beginning with Mills. Nonetheless, his careful histori-
ography provides a valuable foundation and guide to those who study World War II to understand the origins of the postwar power structure.

Gregory Hooks
Washington State University


In this comprehensive overview of American foreign-policy initiatives during the World War II period, Borgwardt argues that the Atlantic Charter provided the basic blueprint for the development of the modern international human-rights regime in the aftermath of the war. Although Borgwardt acknowledges that the human-rights ideals that become prominent after the war have a much longer historical pedigree, she contends that particular historical factors, especially Americans’ experience of the depression, laid the groundwork for making both Americans and people in other countries more receptive to human rights at that point. Americans did not “create” international human-rights ideals, but they played an essential role in propelling these norms to a prominent place on the global agenda. The central purpose of Borgwardt’s book is to tell this story.

In the introductory section of the book, Borgwardt provides an overview of negotiations leading to the adoption of the Atlantic Charter and seeks to demonstrate the intersection between New Deal thinking and an emerging multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy. After introducing her basic argument and framework, Borgwardt explores the ways in which her argument plays out in three key substantive areas: the adoption of the Bretton Woods institutions, the creation of the United Nations, and the establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal. In her conclusions, she discusses the implications of her argument for contemporary developments in American foreign policy. In particular, she contrasts the current emphasis on unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy with the multilateralism of the postwar period, underscoring that such a policy risks undermining both the effectiveness and legitimacy of U.S. human-rights initiatives both at home and abroad.

Although A New Deal for the World demonstrates Borgwardt’s familiarity with a wide range of academic disciplines—including political philosophy, international relations, and economics—the book’s analysis is grounded most clearly in history and international law. In particular, Borgwardt relies on records of international negotiations, diplomatic letters, and speeches and statements by foreign-policy elites as her primary evidentiary base. She weaves concepts and theories of international law through her description of the foreign-policy positions of elites to develop her argument. Thus, the strength of her argument is in presenting
an official, “top-down” version of the contributions of American foreign policy to the modern international human-rights regime.

A corresponding weakness is that Borgwardt does not as thoroughly explore the ways in which non-state actors or bottom-up processes shaped the development and evolution of international human rights. She regularly refers to the growing convergence between American public opinion and foreign-policy elites’ beliefs in support of multilateral policies contributing to the growth of human-rights norms globally. However, she does not adequately explain what processes helped to shape elite ideas about foreign policy and human rights or the mechanisms by which the amorphous concept of “public opinion” was translated into actual shifts in policy. For many political scientists and constructivist scholars of international relations, a focus on non-state actors and “bottom-up” processes is essential for understanding why states adopt particular policies. Borgwardt’s argument would have benefited from greater attention to these actors and processes. Despite this limitation, the book provides a detailed and fascinating history of the Atlantic Charter and major foreign-policy initiatives associated with this important moment in U.S. history.

Debra L. DeLaet
Drake University


Starting in the 1950s, a group of economists created a new field of financial economics based on the notion that risk can be measured with statistical methods. MacKenzie presents an important and needed history of the development of financial economics.

The book’s title refers to MacKenzie’s view that the mathematical models of financial economics do not describe financial markets but enhance their performance. Consequently, his goal is to show that financial economics exhibited “performativity” by influencing financial markets. He derives the term “performativity” from sociology but also borrows ideas from economics, mathematics, and statistics. The result is a well-written history of financial economics and financial markets in the United States since the 1950s. Its overriding question is the extent to which the two histories are linked by the changes that financial economics brought to financial markets.

To address that question, MacKenzie focuses on the big theories of financial economics: Modigliani and Miller’s theory of the irrelevance of dividends; Markowitz’s theory of portfolio selection; Sharpe’s capital-asset pricing model; Fama’s efficient-markets hypothesis; and Black, Scholes, and Merton’s option-pricing model. These economic models

1 Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, “The Cost of Capital, Corporate Finance, and
all employ mathematics and statistics at a high level, but MacKenzie explains them well. His review of their development draws on written articles and on interviews with many of the practitioners of financial economics. The use of oral history gives insights into the development of financial economics not ordinarily available to historians.

The second part of the “performativity” thesis requires MacKenzie to provide a history of financial markets, for which he again relies heavily on oral history, with the assurance that he corroborates individual memories. The biggest changes that he highlights include the development of markets for derivatives—financial instruments such as options derived from an underlying security (stock shares, for one). Derivatives had a precarious existence in financial markets until the last three decades, when they began to be traded on the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. As an example of “performativity,” MacKenzie cites how the option–pricing model gave legitimacy to option trading. Moreover, respectable economists were able to use their models to convince securities regulators that markets for derivatives were reasonable. The introduction of index funds also came from financial economics.

These illusions of how professionals used the models of financial economics in financial markets help MacKenzie to give a positive answer to his question of “performativity.” He does not, however, overextend his claims for the validity of his answer. Just as he notes that many of the financial economists that he studied were well aware of the limitation of their models, he is aware that his answer is not conclusive. But he tells a good story that anyone interested in financial economics will find worth reading.

Donald Stabile
St. Mary’s College of Maryland

From Marriage to the Market: The Transformation of Women’s Lives and Work. By Susan Thistle (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2006) 296 pp. $50.00 cloth $19.95 paper

From Marriage to the Market argues that women’s relationship to domestic work altered in the twentieth century, placing women’s unpaid labor squarely at the center of the developing “new economy.” Relationships
to the family emerged that were divided sharply by class and race. “Changes in women’s . . . work within the home in the first decades after World War II,” Thistle argues, “underlay the profound alterations in family structures, sexual relations, and gender roles over the second half of the twentieth century” (10). The book is an excellent overview of changes in women’s work both within and outside the family, differences among women rooted in race, the ways gender trumped those differences, and the transformation of older family relations by the penetration of the market into domestic life.

Thistle relies on secondary research from several disciplines to construct the framework for her study and draw a portrait of the gendered twentieth-century economy. Her methodology is essentially sociological. Her primary research source is the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), a standardized sample of federal census data, which she interprets to create a generalized picture of social change. The book includes numerous tables and figures that provide useful information about education, income and poverty rates, work, and biological reproduction.

The author makes two fairly sweeping claims that are not necessary to her project. First, she sets up “some feminists” (undefined) as strawpersons who believe that paid labor results in equality for women, or that patriarchy is the root cause of gender inequities. Such oversimplifications of “feminism” most feminist scholars no longer find useful. It is no great accomplishment to “challenge” them (3). Second, she claims that scholars have not yet clearly articulated the notion that the twentieth century marks a distinct watershed in the nature of women’s economic relations. In one sense, this contention is true: No scholar has made this case clearly for the twentieth-century United States. Thistle effectively covers the major trends in the integration of women’s paid and unpaid labor, and she clearly demonstrates the importance of work inside the home to our understanding of economic development and globalization.

In another sense, however, hers is an old argument advanced with great clarity by anthropologists, economists, historians, and sociologists working on the emergence of industrial capitalism or the rippling impact of capitalist development around the world. Safa’s studies of women in Latin America, Boserup’s analysis of the economics of development, and Boydston’s articulation of unpaid housework as the basis for early capitalism (cited in the work under review), all connect motherhood and unpaid domestic labor to capitalist development.¹ The gendered nature of the “New Economy” is a new wrinkle on an old process.

Angel Kwolek-Folland
University of Florida

Leone’s *The Archaeology of Liberty in an American Capital* reviews the two-plus decades of archaeological research that he has undertaken as director of the Archaeology in Annapolis project. The book covers the issue of ideology, specifically possessive individualism, the primary ideology of capitalism. Leone develops a critical archaeology that has the potential to create new forms of social understanding. His aim is clearly lofty, but he marshals a wide variety of evidence from archaeology, historical documentation, oral history, community engagement, and reflection to realize it, as well as to trace his own failures and successes in both theory and practice. His reflexive professional maturation is the glue that ties the use of varied source material together.

The book investigates how activities that seem beyond the reach of ideology are the basis for reproducing capitalism: seeing and walking (shown in the archaeology of landscape); reading and hearing (an archaeology of the print shop that produced the *Maryland Gazette*); and sitting, eating, and telling time (an analysis of ceramics and similar common household artifacts). Leone argues that the archaeological record is defined by its opposition to ideology. Its very creation is a by-product of the refinements required to produce what seems natural. Archaeology consists of what was culled to meet necessity and what was buried to build things considered desirable. The archaeological record is thus both the partner of the documentary record as well as the very actions that produce a normal life. The issue that confronted Leone was the failure of his findings to generate a social understanding of ideology. Leone realized midstream that archaeology, as any other modern pursuit, was based on the burial of certain aspects of itself in order to generate a legible product. He redesigned his work to recover archaeology’s capacity for excavating the forces that produced American liberty, which meant understanding how people lived with and countered violence. For Leone, African-American archaeology can show how to work against ideology.

Leone’s approach is novel within historical archaeology. Long mired in efforts to make the archaeological record represent Africans in America, the discipline never bothered to see that Africa was part and parcel of all of America. He makes his point through an interpretation of the African spirit bundles hidden under floors where enslaved, and later emancipated, African Americans worked and lived as domestics. The bundles consisted of a variety of objects intended to direct spirits to fix, or harm, someone—in Leone’s view, masters. He also shows that these bundles were a component of conjuring that defined entire spaces, as illustrated by a cosmogram formed by a series of caches found under a kitchen. This phenomenon showed Africa in America not simply because it involved people of African descent who retained African spiri-
tual traditions, but because Americans inhabited these spaces. Their meanings may have been dual (African and white) in one sense, but Leone argues that this duality blurs the unity revealed in the single set of archaeological objects. There is one American culture, and it is more African than typically acknowledged.

Leone elucidates his critical archaeology by referring to “the insight [that] comes through seeing how different something familiar can be when it is in another’s hands, thus showing the artificial and arbitrary way the dominant society has arranged its relations between peoples” (236). He forged alliances with African Americans seeking control of their past to establish political positions required for democratic action. He learned that the practices associated with the spirit caches in Annapolis are still widely practiced in African America, and that the practitioners are also devout Christians. He explains that Christianity and Hoodoo are not mutually exclusive but that their hybridity reveals the initiative of those dispossessed and exploited. Working with an African American educator, he began to teach students that “archaeology is theirs to learn and use” (259). This educator teaches an Afrocentric archaeology that has only tenuous scholarly support. Yet, Leone feels that only by making archaeology available to those most capable not only of critiquing but parodying the dominant ideology can public scholarship become viable political action. Archaeology resides within ideology, but it need not be there exclusively. It can be the fragment of itself that remains when those who mock it also control it.

Christopher N. Matthews
Hofstra University

Water and Ritual: The Rise and Fall of Classic Maya Rulers. By Lisa J. Lucero (Austin, University of Texas Press, 2006) 253 pp. $45.00

The thesis of this book is that those who were later to become Maya rulers staked their claims by performing water rituals that benefited the community and eventually led to their acceptance as a ruling elite. The end of Classic Maya polities was in the currently popular versions, which may (or may not) have caused the collapse of economies and the commoners’ loss of faith in the ritual importance of their rulers.

Lucero supports her thesis with six pages of definitions and seventeen pages of tables detailing various offerings and burials at Saturday Creek, Belize; Altar de Sacrificios; and Tikal. She focuses upon the Maya lowlands and never mentions the highlands, except in ethnographic analogies taken from these still existent (although much-changed) Maya communities. Copán is included, but no other Honduran Maya sites, nor any of the coastal Guatemalan or Salvadoran sites known to be part of the great Maya realm. This narrowness of scope is indicative of a greater problem with the book. Tropical ecosystems are
not all the same. The omission of this variation is not solely Lucero’s problem; Mayaists have been homogenizing the tropics for decades. You would think that in the current resurgence of environmental determinism, they would look to their atlases.

Lucero’s points about the probable origins of rulership in ritual are interesting although, as she herself says, ritual is not capable of precise definition, and, in fact, the ideology behind the remains of many rituals—conventionally named “grave goods,” “house dedication deposit,” “termination offering,” etc.—is unknown. Many rituals, however, leave no remains, and others leave no clue to the behaviors and beliefs associated with them. Lucero emphasizes that many rituals were the same among elites and commoners, although the rich had more goods, and more expensive or exotic goods, to offer (and thus remove from circulation). This important observation makes clear that although new rituals associated mainly with rulers and performed publicly may have been added, ruler and ruled shared basic ideas.

Lucero’s ideas about ritual, shared ritual, new ritual, and the dangers of changing ritual too radically are supported by a wealth of historical and ethnographical material from other places. She may well be correct that the first arrivals, in the Early Preclassic period, established rights to land and parlayed them, along with ritual performance, into rulership. Proving it might be difficult, but the mere suggestion places the Maya firmly into the context of the rise of early states elsewhere in the world. Nonetheless, until conclusive evidence of a long-term model that affected the entire, highly variable, region of Maya culture becomes available, the conclusions of this otherwise interesting thesis will have to lie in abeyance.

Karen Olsen Bruhns
San Francisco State University

*Children of the Father King: Youth, Authority, and Legal Minority in Colonial Lima.* By Bianca Premo (Chapel Hill, University of North Colina Press, 2005) 368 pp. $59.95 cloth $24.95 paper

*Children of the Father King* analyzes the complex history of child-rearing practices in colonial Lima as a crucial element for the social reproduction of racial, gender, and class hierarchies under Spanish domination. Premo’s main subject is not children per se, however, but the relationship between minority as a legal status and the changing discourses and practices of adult authority from 1650 to the late eighteenth century. Like other recent legal studies on Latin America, Premo analyzes law and litigation as key elements in the formation and negotiation of the legal cultures and social identities of adults and children. She not only analyzes the normative and prescriptive discourse on minority at the time, but also explores the ways in which ordinary people understood and
made use of such discourse before the courts. Her book is an important contribution to the growing literature on the intersection between patriarchy, colonialism, and law in Latin America.

In medieval Spanish law, minority was a legal status applied to individuals under the age twenty-five, but the category was later expanded in the New World to include certain adults, such as slaves and Indians. Ruling as a father to all his colonial subjects, the king offered protection, guidance, and correction through his courts, the office of Defensor of Minors (created in 1543), and other institutions. The domestic power of male elders ideally mirrored that of the Father King. But, as Premo demonstrates, the Crown’s interest in protecting and controlling children increasingly undermined the authority of local patriarchs, especially in the late eighteenth century, when a new emphasis on economic productivity, utility, and secular control elevated the royal state to the position of supreme authority over family life and child education.

Premo explores the ensuing tensions between the patriarchal spheres of public, regal, and domestic authority through a careful analysis of colonial litigation between 1650 and 1750 involving minors in ecclesiastical, notarial, and criminal records. Her research reveals a world in which child-rearing practices constantly belied the ideal-typical models of household authority. She shows that patriarchy was expressed mainly in generational, not gender, terms; mothers, female slave masters, and priests could also claim authority over minors. Similarly, children were raised and trained by their fathers as well as a variety of other adults in Lima that included women and slaves. Nonetheless, litigants of this period rarely challenged the patriarchal ideals in court. Indeed, most of them were members of the elite, and, as Premo contends, their main concern was to secure access and control over their children’s assets, not to assert political or natural rights over children.

During the Bourbon Reforms, however, ordinary inhabitants who took children in their care started to challenge elite men and masters in court. Late colonial litigation over custody rights shows that nonelite limeños battled fathers successfully over custody, using new arguments that revolved around the emotional bonds between adult and child, the quality of education provided, the treatment of children, and adequate child support. A close analysis of the arguments advanced by litigants shows that common people were also conversant with such enlightened ideas as *buena crianza*, which stressed making children useful rather than “well mannered” as education’s main goal. With Charles IV’s Instruct on Slavery (1789), even the treatment and care of slave children became a matter of royal concern. Parents and relatives of slave children now sued slaveholders over child support and brutal abuse. Unfortunately, the enlightened ideals did not make their way into criminal courts. A fascinating chapter on youth and crime shows that criminal judges paid scant attention to the new equalizing philosophies of child rearing when sentencing non-white minors, particularly fatherless members of the castas. Acting as harsh substitute fathers, judges distributed sentences according to the culprits’ social standing.
Premo effectively shows that child-rearing practices and child–adult relations in Lima were intimately connected to colonial policy. Her numerous and insightful comparisons with other early modern societies and colonial situations will be of great interest to scholars of other periods and regions.

Javier Villa-Flores
University of Illinois, Chicago

*Death and the Idea of Mexico.* By Claudio Lomnitz (New York, Zone Books, 2005) 581 pp. $34.00

From the sacrificial cults of the Aztec Empire to the tourist extravaganza of the contemporary Day of the Dead, Mexicans have had an enduring fascination with death. In this brilliant and bewildering book, Lomnitz argues that death was a central force in the creation of the Mexican state.

The work is, first and foremost, an important and original history of the Day of the Dead. Anthropologists and cultural critics have long speculated on possible connections between pre-Hispanic celebrations and present-day practices. Lomnitz documents the historical development of Todos Santos, combining the social history of colonial mortuary practices with the cultural history of the festival's subsequent commercialization. During the conquest, Spanish evangelists extirpated the rituals of human sacrifice and home burial but allowed indigenous theatrical practices of festive mourning. By restricting Corpus Christi and other public celebrations, eighteenth-century reform Catholicism encouraged the Day of the Dead to expand into plazas and marketplaces. Commercialization continued apace until mid-twentieth-century intellectuals began to condemn the “Americanization” of the holiday. Ironically, the festival benefited from European and North American tourists seeking a more “authentic” alternative to the clinical isolation of dying. Although its evidentiary base is limited to familiar colonial chronicles and, for the modern period, Mexico City archives, this book makes an invaluable contribution to Mexican cultural history.

Yet Lomnitz seems curiously uninterested in this accomplishment and aspires to write a more ambitious political history of death—a genealogy layering colonial *mentalités* with an anthropology of nationalism—which places the grim reaper at the center of Mexican state formation. As he observes, the viceregal government of New Spain was born of an unprecedented demographic collapse, as Old World diseases ravaged the New World. Moreover, the indoctrination of Catholic beliefs in purgatory, as well as European individual inheritance practices, were vital to colonial taxation and to the spread of capitalism. But since virtually all colonial regimes have been founded on such physical and spiritual violence, this fact does not explain the centrality of death in Mexican culture.

In a similar fashion, although Day of the Dead imagery provides fas-
cinating insights about Mexican politics, the attempt to deploy it as a po-
litical history leads along a well-trodden path from the funeral of Anto-
nio López de Santa Anna’s leg to the murder of revolutionary leaders
Emiliano Zapata and Francisco “Pancho” Villa. Lost amidst the tomb-
stones is the promise, made in the introduction, to show how “Mexican
death totemism reflects structural differences between nation formation
in strong and weak states” (28). The book lacks even a conclusion to
draw these diverse threads together. It ends, instead, with an epilogue
describing yet another death figure popular among contemporary
narcotraficantes. Lomnitz proposes a bold program for interdisciplinary
history, but, unfortunately, the brilliant parts never fit together as a
whole.

Jeffrey M. Pilcher
University of Minnesota

Confronting the American Dream: Nicaragua under U.S. Imperial Rule. By
Michel Gobat (Durham, Duke University Press, 2005) 373 pp. $84.95
cloth $23.95 paper

The well-argued and cleverly conceived study of United States–
Nicaraguan relations will mark Gobat’s career in Latin American studies.
Gobat divides these relations into four time periods. First he ties William
Walker—who led the most successful isthmian filibuster, the 1856 con-
quest of Nicaragua—to the U.S. intervention against José Santos Zelaya.
Both interventions tried to control the transit and canal route. Second,
Gobat examines the crisis of social authority that grew out of the forced
removal of Zelaya. Third, he examines Dollar Diplomacy’s successes
against the cultural conflicts in Nicaragua in the 1920s and 1930s about
American-induced “modern women” and the one between peasants and
landlords. Fourth, he finds meaning in the revolution of 1927–1933 dur-
ing which Anastasio Somoza adjusted power sources in Nicaragua by the
murder of Augusto César Sandino in 1933.

The book treats U.S. intervention in Nicaragua from the Walker
era until the killing of Sandino and the rise of Anastasio Somoza García.
An “Epilogue” carries the story into contemporary times. Gobat tries to
explain why many elites in the Walker era supported the filibuster well
into his adventure and why many opponents of the Somoza dictatorship
were Americanized Nicaraguan Conservatives. He finds deep meaning
in the Nicaraguan dichotic adoption of certain U.S. ways and rejection
of others. In the 1912–1933 intervention, Gobat notes, “Conservative
oligarchs from Grenada [developed] an anti-American image of them-
selves and the nation.” These varied responses to U.S. intervention came
from the “uneven effects of U.S. intervention on distinct social groups.”
Gobat insists that both liberals and Conservatives were Americanized.

One of Gobat’s major contributions (among many in this book) was
the use of regional sources for his investigation and argument. His extensive search of local Nicaraguan sources underscores his method to determine the impact of imperialism on the classes of a subjugated nation. He found Grenada “an ideal lens to examine how U.S. imperial rule could inadvertently ‘democratize’ rural society.” This regional analysis emphasized the value of local archives and reduced Gobat’s dependence on U.S. State Department sources.

A series of interesting questions indicated the path that Gobat pursued. He notes that the Nicaraguan elites, especially the Grenada grandees, divided and switched positions with ease. The grandees wanted to preserve the old, conservative values that anchored them. The ruling Conservative oligarchs did not necessarily reject U.S. consumption and leisure practices but thought that the U.S. occupation encouraged inamicable liberal institutions and practices.

Gobat’s use of baseball to explain one social and political linkage between U.S. and Nicaraguan cultures, and simultaneously within Nicaraguan class structure, supplements Louis A. Pérez, Jr., “Between Baseball and Bullfighting,” Journal of American History, LXXXII (1994), 493–518, on baseball in Cuba in the nineteenth century. Gobat’s passage and Pérez’s superb article are prime examples of informative cultural international history. Grenada’s wealthiest families embraced baseball and English, yet tempered the manner and extent of their commitment to U.S. ideology and political aspirations.

Gobat used the surviving Nicaraguan public archives (thinned by eighty years of earthquakes) together with U.S. materials to develop an important monograph with a persuasive interpretation of the interrelationship of Nicaraguan social and political classes, especially the elites, with U.S. imperialism. America’s imperialistic past still remains difficult for many North Americans to accept, but reckoning with it is necessary to illuminate the role of the United States in the present and its likely role in the future.

Thomas Schoonover
University of Louisiana, Lafayette


Sivasundaram considers the experiences of the missionaries from the London Missionary Service in the Pacific Islands to offer a new perspective on the relationship between nineteenth-century science and Christianity. Although science and religion may have been at odds in Europe during this same time period, this study asserts that they were not so “outside the West” (3). Indeed, the author’s main argument is that the Pacific evangelical missionaries’ “observation, collection and significa-
tion of nature served as an important bridge between the two,” largely because these missionaries “saw themselves as practitioners of science, while their knowledge was avidly consumed by a religious populace” (2–3). The author pays “serious attention to the symbolic and material functions of natural knowledge” but more specifically to how the evangelicals of this era related to nature in the Pacific (8). It is important to note that Sivasundaram characterizes the early nineteenth-century missionary in this study as “an individual who mediated on nature, educated children, translated scripture and preached on the Sabbath”; “such practices defined [the evangelical’s] sense of self and the community to which he belonged” (10).

Sivasundaram covers the emergence of the London Missionary Society (lms), its attitudes toward learning, and the relationship between colonialism and missions in the nineteenth-century, as well as how nature and scientific method combined with reading, writing, preaching, and meditating to form the missionary identity. He also explores converts’ adoption of this “theological language of nature,” whether it be through “creative appropriation” or “defined resistance” (10). The second part of the book examines nature as a public arena—namely, the separation and ordering of space, the clothing of converts, and the transporting of artifacts. Sivasundaram asserts that artifacts transported between the Pacific and London “meant that the environment could serve as a common ground of knowledge between missionaries, their converts and their supporters” (11).

Sivasundaram employs a variety of sources throughout his work (an lms board game, missionary letters, and mission illustrations, periodicals, and maps, along with other traditional materials) to establish his argument. His creative case studies include the depiction of a sloth and a beaver for evangelical/educational purposes and the linking of the natural history of the environment with concepts of conversion, civilization, and death. But the absence of Pacific Islander voices throughout the work weakens many of his conclusions. The few Pacific Islander viewpoints that appear first pass through a European/American lens.

Nonetheless, this study of how European missionaries employed nature to instruct converts and interpret God’s designs brings a new layer of analysis to encounters between Europeans and Pacific Islanders. Sivasundaram offers strong evidence that “nature was a public site of theology” for the European missionaries in the Pacific and that “the missionaries’ science could justify a range of activities from control and civilisation to conversion” (176, 13). Challenging the often cited dichotomy between religion and science, Sivasundaram convincingly argues that, at least in the Pacific, “missionary natural history was a form of knowledge that cannot be strictly categorized as religion, science or colonialism” (213).

Kerri A. Inglis
University of Hawai‘i, Hilo

The first edition of the present work was published in 1988. This edition has been expanded to include chapters that place New Zealand’s worst natural disaster and worst public-health crisis within the context of World War I and the history of influenza both before and after 1918. It includes the latest (as of 2005) on the bird flu (the avian H5N1 strain), which seems to be inexorably spreading but still only from bird to bird. Birds have occasionally infected humans (with devastating results), but the virus has not (so far as we know) developed the means of spreading from human to human. Many experts, however, fear that birds have a only a precarious monopoly on a virus that will sooner, rather than later, jump the species barrier to become a disease of humans, thus triggering the next influenza pandemic.

The epidemic that killed more than 8,000 isolated New Zealanders in November 1918 wiped out an estimated 50 million people worldwide before it burned out. Such a number, although staggering, represents a low-case fatality rate because most people then alive got sick. Ominously, however, the case fatality rate inflicted by the H5N1 strain on the relatively few humans infected has been around 70 percent. Hence, Rice suggests the gloomy possibility that between one-third and one-half of New Zealand’s 4 million people could die in an H5N1 pandemic (280). Such a calculation expanded for the world means that the death toll produced by this influenza strain could be counted in billions rather than millions.

New Zealand’s experience in 1918 indicates the appalling circumstances surrounding such a catastrophe: governmental miscalculations, inefficiency, ineptitude; wrangling between the central government and local directors; the demand for hospital beds, forcing the conversion of schools and other public buildings into hospitals; untrained volunteers replacing regular health professionals out with the flu; ineffective medications and quack remedies; profiteering by physicians, pharmacists, and undertakers; children waiting for parents dead in bed to wake up; food shortages; and businesses, even whole towns, closing.

Rice has ingeniously utilized death certificates to track the 1918 epidemic geographically. It began in New Zealand about the time of Armistice, although many of the country’s soldiers abroad and on troopships had already acquired firsthand knowledge of the disease. It did the greatest damage in the North Island, especially in Auckland, the country’s most populous city, and relatively less in the South Island. The flu was especially virulent among the Maori, killing them at a rate 7 times greater than it killed those of European descent, for reasons that seem to have been environmental but may also have had an immunological component.
Black November is a beautiful book, featuring glossy pages and containing more than 50 contemporary, vignette-like accounts by survivors and more than 200 photographs of buildings, people, ships, medical equipment (just about anything connected with the epidemic), as well as newspaper clippings and cartoons.

The work is both fine local history and medical history, though it lacks an analytical index, and its index of names and places makes the book difficult to navigate, at least for an insider. Other scholarly apparatuses are in place, however; the endnotes and bibliography reflect the book’s exhaustive research.

Kenneth F. Kiple
Bowling Green State University


Anecdotes about the Prophet Muhammad, called hadiths, were first transmitted orally and eventually through a mixture of written and oral exchange. For any given hadith, the chain of the names of its transmitters constituted evidence of its reliability (or lack thereof). The number of transmitters in such chains during the first two centuries of Islam alone is more than 9,000, and the total number of extant hadith variants is probably more than 200,000. By the ninth century, the corpus of hadiths had been largely standardized, having been compiled in many books. Yet these books, various hadiths within them, and individually floating hadiths continued to be handed down through the centuries from teachers to students, generating ever-lengthening chains of transmitters.

The hadith literature and the scholarly networks that sustained it clearly demand quantitative analyses. Senturk’s book is one among the first batch of such studies. Senturk uses his empirical findings to illustrate theoretical assertions about the relationship between words and deeds, as well as between narratives and social structure. The book is thus relevant to three disciplines—Islamic studies, literary computing, and social theory. However, the limited scope of the contribution means that an article would have been a more suitable venue.

Senturk is interested in the scholarly networks of hadith transmitters from the seventh century through the fifteenth century A.D. He limits himself to 1,226 transmitters who were especially prominent (those retrospectively given the title hāfīz). He divides the nine centuries into twenty-six generations, or “layers” of scholars. These layers are overlapping; scholars at any given time might belong to several different layers. Senturk measures the denseness of the ties between scholars belonging to different layers—a “tie” indicating that one scholar transmitted hadiths to another.
The central empirical finding of the book is a phenomenon that has always been well known: Scholars tended to transmit not from scholars in their own layer but from contemporaneous scholars who belonged to the earliest layer possible. Transmitters sought the shortest possible chain to the Prophet for any given narrative. Although this observation is not new, Senturk’s confirmation and quantitative establishment of it across many centuries are positive contributions.

For Senturk, this phenomenon has deep theoretical implications for the relationship between speech and action. It shows that narratives can determine and shape social networks, just as they can be shaped by them. Although this conclusion may be valid, far more banal examples of it might suffice. For example, jokes attract a different type of audience than historical narratives. Moreover, all other factors being equal, the larger a comedian’s repertoire, the more frequently he or she is able to entertain audiences. Thus, narratives shape social patterns—namely, patterns of attendance at performances.

Another result is Senturk’s graph of the number of hadith transmitters in different cities for three different generations of transmitters: (1) the Companions (those who actually met the Prophet), (2) the Followers (those who met the Companions but not the Prophet), and (3) the Followers of the Followers (those who met the Followers but not the Companions). The graph is based on the selected list of 1,601 transmitters given by the medieval author Ibn Hibbān in Mashāhīr ‘ulamā’ al-āmsār (Beirut, 1987). This is a convenient source, given Ibn Hibbān’s enumerated list of transmitters separated according to region and generation. The total number of transmitters in a particular category is obtained by subtracting the number of the first transmitter in that category from the last one (and then adding 1). Senturk’s errors in subtraction result in numbers for Medina, Kūfa, and Syria that are wrong by 100 transmitters apiece. As a result, he mischaracterizes Syria as the main center of Hadith transmission under the ‘Umayyad caliphate, a glaring inaccuracy that would surprise any scholar of hadith. Another puzzling mistake is Senturk’s statement that, in the second generation, Mecca had seventy transmitters and that the number “dropped even further” in the third generation (39). Yet his own graph shows an increase from fifty-one to fifty-eight transmitters. The figure of seventy, according to his graph, denotes the number of transmitters in Medina. Senturk’s errors in the basic tasks of counting, subtracting, and reading graphs do not inspire confidence in the reliability of the more computationally sophisticated results. In fairness, however, the other results at least do not look implausible.

The hadith literature, as the book points out, led to one of the longest-lasting, documented scholarly networks in existence. Senturk’s book draws attention to the importance of quantitative approaches to this literature.

Behnam Sadeki
Stanford University
Thanks to this translation from Hebrew, English speakers can now benefit from the insights of an accomplished Israeli historian. Shilo presents a thick description of the lived lives of Jewish women in nineteenth-century Jerusalem, and she largely succeeds in her stated goal to strike an appropriate balance between theory and narrative (xxviii). Though aware of the anthropology of family and pilgrimage as well as the feminist critiques of women’s social environments, Shiloh refuses to become their captive. Rather, she sets the experience of her subjects within the time-honored frame of historiography that finds meaning in the narrative sequence of events localized in time and space.

The Jewish women of Jerusalem resembled their East European cohorts, deeply enmeshed in ultra-Orthodox beliefs that provided both spiritual enlightenment and cultural certainties. They brought this mentality to Jerusalem, but added the quest for spiritual fulfillment that many women found closed to them in Europe. Shilo follows the Jewish life cycle of these immigrant women, treating the private world, such as marriage, and then widening her focus to encompass the public realm of economic and philanthropic activities that opened for women in Jerusalem’s distinctive environment. Unmarried women formed an unusually high proportion of the population. New forms of religious practice that they developed around holy sites allowed them to express religious sensibilities in ways denied to them in Eastern Europe. Education for women also offered a novel opportunity, especially toward the end of the century with the introduction of the Enlightenment ideas of equality and self-realization.

Shilo skillfully envisions the ambiguous realities that these changes wrought. Though tradition had assigned women the job of earning money to support their husband’s Torah study, it accorded them no rise in status. That same tradition of work, however, formed the basis of their future liberation. By the end of the nineteenth century, even the most orthodox clerics recognized the importance of a practical education for women. New schools for Jerusalem’s Jewish women flourished. Shilo tells such stories of change in loving detail, with all the contradictions of real life that defy general statements.

She does not shy away from expressing her own sympathies. Was the Jerusalem woman a “Princess or a Prisoner”? The title of the book is far more than a marketing ploy. It represents the author’s stance as a judge as well as a historian. Shiloh clearly sides with the modernizing ideas of the early Zionists who strove to break the grip of tradition on Jewish culture. Each story concludes with a moralistic verve that extols liberation from religious oppression, as understood by twentieth-century moderns. Needless to say, tradition takes a beating: Women of the old system “became victims on the altar of their husband’s spiritual life” (6).
Was the Jerusalem woman a “Princess or a Prisoner”? To Shilo, “there is only one possible answer” (68). Yet her deep engagement with historical method saves her work from the typical pitfalls of judgment by hindsight. She embellishes her moral judgments with a host of contrary details and a variety of interpretive possibilities. Her fastidious presentation of contradictory data often permits judgments contrary to hers.

The result is an engaging and engaged narrative in which the author’s subjects receive their due. Shilo’s women never become mere representations of a theory or an analytical category. They emerge from their own historical environments with all of the trappings of irreconcilable contradiction. It is a deft performance.

Shilo has made her name charting the course of modern Zionists who began to overturn Jewish tradition in the decades surrounding World War I. In her epilogue, she suggests that the new world that the Zionists created might have some connection with the old world that is replaced (224–228). With her deep exposure to both eras, traditional and revolutionary, she occupies the rare position of observing Zionist innovations from the perspective of its antecedents.

Gerald M. Berg
Sweet Briar College

_A Tender Voyage: Children and Childhood in Late Imperial China._ By Ping-chien Hsiung (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2005) 339 pp. $70.00 cloth $29.95 paper

The history of childhood in China comes to us in the form of this English adaptation of a prize-winning introduction to the topic recently published in Taiwan, as translated by the author. Shaped by the theme of the early modern “discovery of childhood” made famous by Ariès, Hsiung’s work argues for Chinese difference based on two dissimilar kinds of evidence—texts of pediatric medicine, and biographies, autobiographies and memoirs largely from the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries. ¹ What both have in common is a focus on children in the context of the Confucian “concern for posterity,” which made kinship the ritual as well as the pragmatic center of Chinese social life.

By contrast with medieval Europe, where the health of infants and children was largely the domain of grannies and midwives, 1,000 years of print culture and rich traditions of scholar’ly medicine in China left a voluminous written record of teachings about infant and child health, shared between learned doctors and upper-class men, and presumably filtered through popularization to the matrons and midwives who ordinarily dealt with the nursery. In Hsiung’s hands, the record of medicine is testimony to Confucian concern for the survival of infants and young

children, even as she acknowledges that the work of demographers like Liu and Lee cannot supply evidence for an impact on child mortality.\textsuperscript{2} In making her own claim for medical progress between the eleventh and the eighteenth centuries, she can more easily point to scattered and individual records of best practices than to successful networks of communication disseminating them broadly.

In her reconstruction of social and psychological lives of young children, Hsiung has drawn heavily on “chronological biographies” (\textit{mianpu}), narratives organized year by year that were a standard genre of biographical and autobiographical writing in upper-class families. As constructed memories, these stories of childhood were heavily inflected by scholar-official norms. Sons recalled fathers as teachers, revealing a society fixated on precocious intellectual development of young boys. Sons recalled mothers as self-sacrificing providers of basic needs, revealing the investment that women had in binding their sons to them emotionally through tales of maternal suffering and hardship. Evidence to counterbalance this picture of the sober, bookish, and obedient child that an older man might remember is hard to find in the “chronological biographies” themselves; these documents were composed under the shadow of mortality and recorded for posterity.

Hsiung’s case for an alternative comes most immediately in the beguiling illustrations of children playing that are scattered through the volume. Here Confucian cultural preoccupation with posterity found a different kind of generic representation—that of carefree youngsters, predominantly boys, occupied with such instantly recognizable diversions as floating boats, teasing small animals, and spinning tops. Produced for holidays or birthdays, these paintings celebrated childhood as both ritually auspicious and socially unfettered. A similar picture emerges from Hsiung’s chapter on girlhood. Though feminists may question her assumption that her upper-class male sources can show that childhood was a time of relative gender equality, she offers some compelling examples of a possible kind of female privilege in girlhood: Free from the obligation to study, girls might be favored and petted by their fathers, out of both love and sympathy for the hardships expected for them as women “married out.”

In her last chapter, “Concepts and Realities,” Hsiung reveals that her ultimate goal is to move beyond the representation of childhood to children’s experience, which she accomplishes by mining her sources for traces of an emotional life redolent of independent, authentic subjectivity. Some of them involved acute observations of adult weaknesses—a timid father, a drunken uncle, quarrelsome agnates. The most powerful recalled such strong feelings as the shock of seeing a father’s corpse, out-

rage at an unjust beating, and rebellion expressed in a refusal to eat or speak. Memories of death and separation were particularly common, suggesting to Hsiung how the harsher demographic and social realities of premodern family life affected its most vulnerable members.

Methodologically, the author takes a biosocial perspective on medicine and treats her personal narratives as discourse. Sociologically inclined readers may regret the absence of a systematic profile of the 800 subjects in her “chronological biographies”; she provides no data about class background, kinship relations, or health and illness events. Cultural historians, particularly those unfamiliar with classical Chinese literary genres, could have benefited from a fuller account of the forms of textuality shaping her biographical sources. However, this book is best appreciated for its humanistic agenda. The author’s encyclopedic reading has yielded a densely woven fabric of anecdote and story that aims to connect emotional worlds of the past with today’s readers. The resulting book, which was extraordinarily popular in its Chinese version, also has something to teach English readers about the complexity of contemporary Chinese perspectives on Confucian traditions.

Charlotte Furth
University of Southern California

_The Merchants of Zigong: Industrial Entrepreneurship in Early Modern China._
406 pp. $45.00

In this important book, Zelin brings early modern China squarely into the comparative literature on the history of the firm, along lines pioneered by Chandler. This outstanding study, long in the making, is remarkably well-informed on the operational details of the case under study because of its energetic use of rich archives. It offers a comprehensive history of the rise and fall of the salt-refining industry of the southern Sichuan province from the eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries.

Technological innovation played a significant but limited role in this industry. The application of natural gas (a by-product of the salt wells themselves) as fuel for the refining process gave a major boost to its fortunes, but well into the twentieth century, the major source of power remained buffalo labor. More critical factors were the political environment—the transition from the benign neglect of the late imperial state to the predations of warlordism and the clumsily aggrandizing bureaucratic capitalism of the Nationalist Party—and the military context. In fact, the disruptions of other salt production and distribution networks downstream on the Yangzi during the Taiping campaigns of the 1850s sud-

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1 See, for example, Alfred D. Chandler (ed. Thomas K. McGraw), _The Essential Alfred Chandler: Essays toward a Historical Theory of Big Business_ (Boston, 1988).
denly promoted Sichuan salt from a regional industry to an interregional one. As a result, the industry’s internal structure underwent a change, while Sichuan’s own internal disorder of the early Republican era contributed to the escalating costs and indebtedness that spelled the industry’s decline.

The real news in this book comes in its first half, charting what Naomi Lamoreaux notes in her jacket blurb as a model-challenging case of industrial development in the absence of either a robust commercial credit market or an established company law. This development was possible, as Zelin and others have amply demonstrated in a recent (highly recommended) companion volume, because of the refined regime of property rights and written contract in late imperial Chinese business culture, which was enforced by the otherwise un-intrusive state. Building with great creativity upon this situation and upon private capital mobilized via lineage trusts (tang), the merchants of Zigong created, and continually recreated, partnerships of great scale and flexibility; set up professionalized management bureaus (daguan) to oversee diverse operations; and, mostly through interlocking investments, achieved considerable “vertical integration” of supply, various stages of production, and marketing. It is a remarkable story.

Zelin hardly claims Zigong as typical of Chinese business history; she is more apt to stress its uniqueness. Nor does she argue that the salt industry spawned broader regional development: Despite fostering numerous ancillary enterprises, such as buffalo raising and bamboo cultivation (for brine and gas pipes), its larger effect was to reduce the region to something like an industrial “monoculture.” From time to time, she offers suggestive comparisons to other cases, such as Lamoreaux’s New England textile industry, but these moments are not sustained. For better or worse (according to taste), Zelin’s real love turns out to be local history.

William T. Rowe
Johns Hopkins University


Among the instruments of Japanese imperial expansion in the first decades of the twentieth century were Korean peasants who, seeking land and livelihood, migrated from their homeland into adjacent Manchuria—in particular, the Kando region, now the Yanbian Korean

Autonomous Region in China. Park focuses on this Korean minority to highlight the relationship between what he sees as two contradictory phenomena: the territorializing impulse of empire and nation-state and the expansive tendencies of capitalism that ignore national boundaries. Criticizing earlier treatments of Japanese colonialism in Manchuria for their dichotomous approach, he adds a third element, the Koreans, to emphasize the importance of “the social,” which he fails to define clearly, in understanding the economic and political tensions that abounded in a bitterly contested region. Park denies the autonomy of politics, and interprets ethnic, historical, and cultural differences between Korean migrants and Chinese peasants as reflections of antagonistic property relations. His last chapter, only loosely connected with the preceding ones, analyzes the role of Manchurian Koreans in the communist movement.

The monograph may be read on two levels. The more valuable part is an in-depth and insightful social history of Korean migration to Kando, and the political, economic, and social institutions that the Japanese empire, the Chinese government, and Manchurian regional authorities devised to enmesh Koreans in their conflicting projects. Park makes excellent use of monographs in Korean that most earlier scholars have not tapped. He also provides interesting socioeconomic readings of work of Korean fiction, particularly the novel *Pukkando* (1911), written by An Sugil, to elucidate the temporal and territorial themes of Korean families in the Japanese empire.

The other level is an example of what might be called contrarian revisionism, a genre of scholarship that denigrates all previous work on the subject and, in Park’s case, attempts to build an intellectual high-rise scaffolding on top of a one-storey ranch house. The first chapter in particular is an exercise in postmodern and neo-Marxist verbal calisthenics in a style as dense and inaccessible as an equatorial jungle, requiring the intellectual equivalent of machetes and insect repellent to traverse. Thankfully, the succeeding chapters have far less jargon. Such obscurantist theorizing dresses up what would otherwise be a valuable and solid, but not particularly exciting, monograph.

Steven I. Levine
University of Montana

*Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda: New Perspectives.* Edited by Susan Cook (New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2006) 299 pp. $49.95

Along with the Holocaust, Rwanda’s genocide and Cambodia’s politicide (mostly Khmer-on-Khmer violence) stand out as key cases in this field of study. This collection of nine articles explores aspects of each that have not been the subject of extensive research. Consequently, although the book will interest specialists, those seeking an introduction
to the major themes in genocide studies or to these particular cases should look elsewhere. None of the articles explicitly compares Rwanda and Cambodia, but Cook’s preface artfully identifies commonalities and classifies the articles into four groups, albeit by a mix of disparate criteria, “to facilitate comparative analysis” (vii).

Group I, comprising the first three articles, examines the importance of political discourse in genocide. Philip Verwimp’s contribution uses textual analysis of entirely new primary material—speeches of Juvénal Habyarimana, Rwanda’s assassinated President—to make the original suggestion that the roots of a genocidal ideology were evident early in Habyarimana’s presidency, beginning in 1973. He argues that ordinary Rwandans implicitly understood the anti-urban, anti-intellectual and pro-peasant discourse flowing through these speeches as anti-Tutsi messages. Verwimp’s analysis, however, includes none of the speeches that followed the outbreak of Rwanda’s civil war in 1990, largely recognized as a turning point in interethnic relations; these might have weakened his otherwise bold and insightful claim that the “civil war was not the cause of the genocidal plan” (3).

The other two articles in this grouping are more intuitively related, each using historical analysis to examine the relationship between the Khmer Rouge and the neighboring countries of Vietnam and Thailand. Dmitry Mosyakov relies on newly declassified material from the Soviet Union’s diplomatic archives to show that the relationship between Hanoi and the Khmer Rouge was much more nuanced, particularly after 1973, than the hostile rapport implied in “Western” accounts during this period. Notwithstanding the substance of his argument, Mosyakov might have moderated the ambition to “present an objective and impartial picture of what was happening” by acknowledging the risks of over-reliance on one resource (41). Thirty-three of the thirty-four primary documents cited are from the Soviet archives.

Puangthong Rungswasdisab’s contribution, in contrast, draws on a remarkably broad range of secondary and primary sources, particularly local and regional newspapers, and attributes the Khmer Rouge’s evolution from enemy to ally of the Thai government to a plethora of domestic and external factors. She argues that the principal ones have national self-interest as an overarching rationale, centering on Thai “perceptions of national security and the lucrative trade [with the Khmer Rouge]” rather than “the ideological conflict between Thai ‘Capitalism’ and Khmer Rouge ‘Communism’” (104, 105).

The two articles in Group II examine social institutions in genocide. Although the value of the comparison is dubious, given that one presents an institution as the cause of genocide whereas the other looks at the consequences of genocidal policies on an institution, the individual anthropological work is excellent. Charles Mironko interviewed 110 Rwandan self-confessed perpetrators in their native tongue (thereby avoiding interpreter effects), faithfully reproducing his interviews without any noticeable “editing.” He argues that the perpetrators’ consis-
tency in referring to attack groups during the genocide in terms of the precolonial institution of ibitero, or hunting groups, is more than an attempt to interpret their participation. It explains their participation. Unfortunately, Mironko does not reveal his sampling method and does not discuss any potential selection bias implied by interviewing only those who were willing to confess.

Kaylanee Mam’s research on the strength of the family unit during the Cambodian genocide, based on a sample of forty-six respondents, is, in contrast, explicit about its methodology. Mam provides a helpful table disaggregating the survivors interviewed by region and demographic background. She systematically analyzes seven policies that the Khmer Rouge purposively implemented to destroy the family unit and to replace familial bonds with loyalty to Angkar (the organization), thus contradicting an established claim to the contrary. She argues that these policies were ultimately unsuccessful because of the small acts of resistance offered by family members—reminiscent of those described by James C. Scott in Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, 1985). Mam’s descriptions and analysis bring the horrors of the genocide to life. Nonetheless, her inference of a systematic Khmer Rouge policy from the reports of a relatively small number of survivors must be weighed cautiously.

The third group, comprised of two articles of questionable similarity, examines what happens to genocidal regimes after they have been toppled. Richard Orth’s piece evaluates the insurgency and counterinsurgency that followed Rwanda’s genocide from the perspective of military strategy and tactics. His insight comes from his role as a U.S. Defense Attache there for two years. The piece, which does not pretend to be an academic contribution, is laden with description and chronology. Kelvin Rowley’s historical piece is a clear, though hardly novel, interpretation of mostly secondary sources. It argues that the Khmer Rouge remained alive after its expulsion by the Vietnamese in 1979 because of its strategic importance to the United States and China during the Cold War. His most compelling observation is that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Khmer Rouge self-destructed at least in part because of its own paranoid and brutal leadership.

The last group of two articles addresses the issue of remembering genocides. Rachel Hughes demonstrates how memorial sites and commemoration days represent opportunities that have been exploited to make political and other symbolic points in post-genocide Cambodia. She dexterously combines her own observations from visiting the sites with an understanding of the politics inherent in the post-genocide discourse, adduced from primary and secondary sources. Cook presents a detailed and precise account of her visit to a genocide memorial in Rwanda as well as a lucid understanding of the politics behind memorials, as gleaned from interviews with many of the people involved. Not only does she discuss the implications of, and possibilities for, memorial sites; she also offers policy prescriptions based on her research.
Overall, the choice of such disparate topics covered in this book does not evince a strategic rationale behind its compilation. It is not strictly comparative and is clearly not intended to be theoretical. However, the book does add to the store of useful empirical knowledge about each of these genocides and would sit well on the shelf of a genocide or area specialist.

Omar McDoom
London School of Economics

Japan in Print: Information and Nation in the Early Modern Period. By Mary Elizabeth Berry (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2006) 342 pp. $44.95

The prolific print culture of early modern Japan has been the object of repeated scrutiny from historians and aesthetes, but Berry’s virtuosic investigation (based primarily on the rich Mitsui Bunko Collection of published maps and illustrated books) recasts these materials as a “library of public information” that both reflected and nurtured a burgeoning national consciousness among seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Japanese. Recent scholarship in modern Japanese history, intent to discredit essentialist notions of a timeless national cultural identity, has depicted “Japaneseness” itself as a modern “invented tradition,” dating back to the late nineteenth-century Meiji project of nation-building. Berry provides a cautionary corrective—if not an outright refutation—of this view, arguing that the prodigious “information texts” available during the Edo period (1600–1868) indicate a “quiet revolution” in spatial and social imagination, linking people across status and geographical boundaries with a shared “cultural literacy” and a “common social lexicon.” “The profound change across the Meiji divide seems...to have been enabled by a prior public consciousness that had already overridden the status order with presumptions of a collective stake in Nihon [Japan]” (251).

A model of clarity, wit, and readability, Berry’s book is also exemplary for its masterly readings of a wide variety of materials. The longest and most methodologically inventive chapter, “Maps are Strange,” describes a shift in “spatial ideology” and “cartographic imagination” that occurred in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The widely shared experience of disorientation and reorientation, resulting from a century of civil war, the breakdown of medieval patterns of land stewardship, mandatory cadastral surveys, and the 1590s’ invasions of Korea, inspired new ways “to think generically about the space of the nation” and to depict this new spatial ideology via maps that both revived and revised ancient imperial visions of Nihon (60–61, 98). Berry deftly traces changes in spatial imagination through interrogation of the “iconic codes” that eventually became commonplace cartographical conventions.
Other chapters address the “recalculation of identity” in this status-oriented society through travel compendia, Military Mirrors (rosters of samurai households), and urban ethnographies (136). In this information society, “cultural literacy” facilitated a sense of “social entanglement,” binding strangers together in a “collectivity of knowledge” (195, 246–247). Avoiding the facile term “proto-nation,” Berry instead characterizes early modern Japan as “a nation without nationalism” (212, 248), in which the relationship between ruler and ruled was relatively remote and historically contingent (230–240).

With the exception of brief comparative remarks on contemporaneous European cartography (57), Berry refrains from drawing parallels with the rise of empirical science and taxonomical epistemologies occurring simultaneously in Europe (a curious omission, since her book is part of a series entitled “Asia: Local Studies/Global Themes”). Historians of the early modern world, however, ought not to overlook Japan in Print. They will find it instructive on a number of themes: the rise of cities, market economies, and popular media; social and geographical imaginations; and the antecedents of the modern nation-state. They will also witness a truly gifted historical imagination at work.

E. Taylor Atkins
Northern Illinois University

*Isami’s House: Three Centuries of a Japanese Family.* By Gail Bernstein (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005) 283 pp. $50.00 cloth $19.95 paper

Bernstein assumed an ambitious challenge in this book. Through the lens of one family’s story, she offers an account of 300 eventful years of Japanese history. When done successfully, such an approach can bring history to life in a way that few other styles of historical research can. It can show vividly how the abstract political and economic events portrayed in the textbooks affected the individuals who lived through them, and how the experiences of individuals and families can differ markedly from widely accepted national narratives that may have been taken for granted. Bernstein’s coverage of three centuries, including both the “premodern” and “modern” eras (traditionally if somewhat arbitrarily divided in the case of Japan by the Maiji Restoration of 1867/68), also offers the opportunity to transcend these categories. For the most part, Bernstein is successful in realizing such possibilities.

Matsuura Isami (1879–1962) is the central character in the book (Japanese names are normally written with the family name first). His long and eventful life makes fascinating reading in itself. Born into a family that had been hereditary headmen of Yamashiraishi village since 1680, Isami was the elected mayor of his village for four decades—a position that he passed on to his son. During those decades, Isami struggled
to support the economy of the village in the face of rapid economic change. He saw its sons off to war, from which many never returned. He strove to provide the best possible education to his fourteen children, and then to find suitable marriage partners for each of them. He attempted to revive his own flagging fortunes by investing in new businesses, and by developing his talent for invention (on the day of his fatal stroke at age eighty-three, he was trying to persuade a factory to adopt the mechanical rice husker that he had developed). He tried, not successfully, to instill in his children the essentially Confucian—but also essentially human—precepts of loyalty, devotion to public service, steady commitment, and paternalistic authority that were the legacy of his long and distinguished lineage.

Using Isami as an anchor, Bernstein forays backward in time, to Isami’s ancestor Yajibei and his successors as village headmen. Drawing from family archives and a history prepared by Isami himself, Bernstein shepherds us through the business activities, local politics, marital and succession crises, and relations with villagers of eleven generations of Matsuura family heads. There is much fascinating material, as in the descriptions of the prominent roles played by some Matsuura wives over the generations. But Bernstein detracts significantly from her story by the confusing narrative strategy that she adopts, starting each chapter with an episode from Isami’s life and then going back in time to describe an incident from the lives of his ancestors. It is often unclear what century she is describing, and it requires constant cross-checking to stay on top of the shifting narrative. Bernstein is strong in bringing her long-dead characters to life (especially the women), but a little weak in her treatment of the village economy and its relations with the Matsuura family. For example, she does not engage at all with the extensive literature on the Japanese feudal system, landlords and tenants, or peasant protest.

The latter part of the book is mostly about Isami’s children. It, too, tends to be confusing in narrating the stories of more than a dozen siblings and even of their children. But their varied experiences, which took them to the far corners of the Japanese empire and saw them struggling to deal with the social and economic chaos of defeat and trying to rebuild their lives to take advantage of the freedoms of the postwar era, make fascinating reading. Bernstein, however, is also hampered at times by the wealth of her material. She might have explored in much more depth the ways in which her characters’ lives intersected with, and at times contradicted, the mainstream stories of Japanese history. Instead, she treats those stories mainly as background, often providing only a glib summary when the Matsuura family history might actually have highlighted the events’ complexity.

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Reasonable Men, Powerful Words: Political Culture and Expertise in Twentieth-Century Japan. By Laura Hein (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004) 328 pp. $45.00

Hein’s multifaceted portrait of six Japanese economists is a poignant account of the struggles of progressive social scientists to promote an alternative vision of society in twentieth-century Japan. Öuchi Hyōe (1888–1980) and his students Arisawa Hiromi, Minobe Ryōkichi, Ōmori Yoshitarō, Takahashi Masao, and Wakimura Yoshitarō were among Japan’s leading Marxist economists. In the prewar era, their engagement in social science and politics was primarily via Marxism. As a result, they became frequent targets for censorship, arrest, and incarceration by the state. After the war, they boldly took center stage in the major policy debates to advance their socialist agenda of reducing poverty and economic inequality and promoting pacifism and a citizen-centered democratic society. Their legacy, Hein concludes, was mixed but important. Their commitment to social science gave them the courage to challenge an increasingly repressive wartime state, though at great personal cost, and to take the postwar conservative cabinets to task for neglecting the needs of ordinary citizens. Moreover, their technocratic concerns for rationality and efficiency encouraged them to be “reasonable men”—to reach across ideological lines to find common ground with conservative technocrats and ultimately to compromise their vision.

Adopting an approach similar to that of her previous work, Fueling Growth (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), Hein deftly shifts the focus away from the predominant themes of postwar economic growth and political consensus to the conflicts, debates, and compromises that made growth possible. Total defeat opened up a new political space that these economists occupied in important ways: demanding fiscally responsible policies to protect the savings of citizens; encouraging greater government transparency through reliable and publicly accessible statistics; decoupling remilitarization from economic growth; and promoting a consumer-oriented, high-wage, productive labor strategy to provide the social vision behind Japan’s income-doubling plan. Hein skillfully examines the postwar political tensions and clashes between economists and groups on both the right and the left, particularly the Japan Socialist Party. In highlighting the differences between the strategies of the Ōuchi group and the government, however, she downplays the shared technocratic vision among progressive social scientists and conservative planners who had their own version of a technology-driven, high-wage, high–value-added economy.

Hein raises intriguing questions about the transformation of these economists from prewar Marxists, who took up non-Marxist economics “to find employment,” to postwar technocrats who commanded authority on the basis of their expertise in these areas. Her book focuses more on the intellectual strategies adopted and difficult personal choices that helped these men to survive in the changing political environment.
than on the formation and evolution of their economic ideas and broader technocratic vision.

Hein’s book gives due respect to these men, for the breadth of their activities and their tireless personal commitment to democracy, and it provides a deeper understanding of the important role of social scientists in prewar and early postwar Japan.

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