

Reviews

La Città e il Fiume: Secoli XIII–XIX. Edited by Carlo Travaglini (Rome, Ecole française de Rome, 2008) 382 pp. N.P.

That antiquarianism is out of fashion these days may explain why Travaglini introduces this group of essays on cities and rivers with just about every catchword in the *Annaliste* vocabulary. Twenty-four articles follow (one in English, seventeen in Italian, five in French, and one Spanish), covering various European cities and rivers (some more than once) from the thirteenth until the nineteenth century. There is no connection between the articles; the sequence goes from London, to Bologna, to Florence, to Rome, etc.—with the topics constantly shifting—until finally reaching Madrid. The contributors are extremely knowledgeable, but the articles all adhere to the *Annaliste* style, which is to say that they do not make the slightest effort to be entertaining.

It would take a local taxi driver to keep up with the fecundity of place names, which the occasional maps and illustrations do not suffice to identify. Nor do the authors expend much effort to explain the functioning of the technology to the hydraulically challenged. Here and there, one runs across a fascinating tidbit—the fact that *hithe* (head) endings refer to landings on the Thames, the thoroughness of thirteenth-century Bolognese contracts, and the exact dating of the bridges across the Arno. But one is frustrated by the repeatedly missed opportunity to relate the plague of the fourteenth century to the life on the rivers, and the fifteenth century, which may at some point have witnessed an increase in population, is largely treated as an undifferentiated unit. Then again, it is interesting to note how a political institution like the Captains of the Parte Guelfa in Florence was gradually transformed by Grand Duke Cosimo I (1537–1574) into his administrators of the flood control.

In terms of vindicating the *Annaliste* methodology, one of the best-conceived articles is the one by Paolo Buonora and Manuel Piñero on the systems of Rome, which also provides an element of chronological flow. Edging into more recent times, an excellent piece by Denis Bocquet discusses the intricacies of decision making regarding the Tiber in the aftermath of Italian unification. But, for the most part, whether looking at this collection from a narrative or from a social science perspective, one cannot help but wonder about the aesthetic or scientific value of so much disparate and largely depersonalized information. Little of it is new, and the most common interpretive device revolves around such terms as “rationalization,” “systemization,” or “modernization,” all of which suggest that, after eighty years of trying, the *Annaliste* school has not come any closer than the imperious Max Weber to setting up a less sententious standard for historical development. A useful part of the essays are the footnotes, which in many cases guide the researcher to a more coherent and detailed treatment of any given topic than can be found in the essays themselves.

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Institutions and Economic Performance. Edited by Elhanan Helpman (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2008) 624 pp. \$55.00

This is an intelligent and important book. Economists have discovered that institutions (a.k.a. histories) are important determinants of economic growth. The chapters in this volume provide a clear view of the current research about this interconnection. That the authors are mainly economists, joined by a few political scientists, means that the essays will often be tough sledding for most interdisciplinary historians. The first half of the book, entitled “History,” is the most accessible, and interdisciplinary historians should read it.

What are institutions? Despite many efforts to define them, they—like art—remain elusive. The chapters concentrate on constitutions and political structures, but they extend to administrative and personal interactions on one hand and to wars on the other. This wide compass is attractive and intriguing; it also indicates a lack of coherence in this snapshot of a new approach in its current formative stage.

Three of the chapters in the “History” section retell familiar stories of European history. Avner Greif notes that political decisions have no force unless they are carried out. He proposes a simple theory of administration, defined broadly as any group that implements a ruler’s decisions. The bargaining between rulers and administrators is affected by the ability of each to do without the other: “The power of financial administration, for example, declines if the ruler gains an independent source of income” (23). Greif illustrates his model with examples chosen largely from medieval Europe.

Joel Mokyr argues in a well-written essay that informal institutions that structured personal relations were as important in early British industrialization as more formal institutions. Gentlemanly behavior and the scientific method encouraged innovation and economic progress. Mauricio Drelichman and Joachim Voth provide an antidote to the tale of European progress: Spain failed to build on the riches that it extracted from South America. Applying Greif’s insight, they argue that the American silver provided Spanish rulers with a way to circumvent the existing parliament and destroy the institutional framework for economic growth. They provide a fresh exposition of this familiar cautionary tale.

The last two essays in the “History” section discuss the flip side of the Spanish conquest—Latin America. They both take their cue from a seminal essay by Engerman and Sokoloff arguing that income inequality caused by the technology of tropical crops, as opposed to Spanish or Catholic cultural influence, retarded economic progress in Latin America.¹ Nathan Nunn compares the fortunes of different South American

1 Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Factor Endowments, Institutions, and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies: A View from Economic Historians of the United States,” in Stephen Haber (ed.), *How Latin America Fell Behind: Essays on the Economic History of Brazil and Mexico, 1800–1914* (Stanford, 1997), 260–304.

countries and concludes that slavery rather than inequality was the villain. Daron Acemoglu, Maria Angelica Bautista, Pablo Querubin, and James Robinson explore the interaction between political and economic inequality in Colombia, arguing that the Engerman and Sokoloff story needs important qualifications. Both essays use regression techniques to discriminate between alternative hypotheses and to advance our understanding of Latin American history.

The second half of the book is divided between “Theory” and “Contemporary Evidence.” Both sections contain essays replete with mathematical models and statistical regressions. They echo questions raised in the historical essays. The theory of civil wars by James D. Fearon shows how the decline of central Spanish authority might have worked out. The analysis of party politics by Gene Grossman and Helpman uses the same reasoning as the analysis of medieval administrators, and the discussion of informal institutions in Kenya is close to the description of informal institutions in industrializing Britain. Four other essays explore aspects of democracies, asking how parliamentary systems work and whether democracies promote economic growth. An essay by Timothy Besley and Masayuki Kudamatsu notes that autocratic governments have the same kinds of disparate effects on economic growth as democratic governments seem to have.

This book will repay the effort that it takes to read the essays; the quality is uniformly high. The concentration on the first half of the book in this review is intended to encourage interdisciplinary colleagues to benefit from the explorations of economists and political scientists as reported in their historical essays. More quantitative interdisciplinary historians will benefit from reading the whole collection.

Peter Temin
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Terra Incognita: Mapping the Antipodes before 1600. By Alfred Hiatt (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2008) 298 pp. \$60.00

Many historians of cartography bristle when their colleagues in the humanities interpret maps as tropes that represent arcane realities. Thus, when a professor of English introduces one element in ancient world maps, the antipodes, “as a space outside of history, faith, and politics” (8), he might find his audience extremely skeptical. Nevertheless, Hiatt proves his claims by mastering an enormous variety of sources ranging from classical texts, commentaries, diagrams, maps, and a scholarly literature that ranges from classics through philosophy to the history of early maps. Indeed, his new book may represent the revival of the history of an idea that evolved as it was applied to a changing array of political contexts.

That evolution is charted in seven chapters spanning two millennia. The ancient Greeks realized that although they could theorize about the

climate in unknown regions of the world, they could not describe the spherical earth beyond a known world, the *ecumene*, constructed from travelers' reports. They therefore speculated about an unknown world beyond it, the antipodes, the antithesis of the world that they knew. Roman writers such as Cicero, Virgil, and Pliny, used the unknown character of the antipodes as a means of questioning policies of the Caesars who ruled much of the *ecumene*. As Hiatt puts it, "If they could not speak, antipodal regions could nevertheless signify . . . in terms that could cut to the heart of European political and cultural identity. . . . The supposition of more than one *antioecumenical* region carried important implications for the imagination of political power (32)."

In the later Empire, claims to authority in the known world were disputed between Christians such as Augustine, who argued that humans could not live in the antipodes, and non-Christians including Macrobius and Martianus Capella, who argued that they could. This debate continued long after the collapse of the Western Empire, gradually taking a visual form. Comments on classical texts began to include diagrams of the earth, which included both the world known in Western Europe and the antipodes. Hiatt interprets these diagrams as "more than visual aids to accompany the text; they are explicitly a mode of understanding with a status equal to words" (51).

These diagrams were not just an evolutionary step in the direction of representing the entire earth as a single space. The antipodes, according to Hiatt, became "metacartographical space—as the part that speaks the whole, expresses its function and rationale . . . opposite to the known world, it also preceded it, signifying land itself, the fundamental basis of habitation, and the precondition for cartographic representation" (66). Medieval illustrators used the space of the antipodes as a *recessus*, a remote place or retreat on which they could write their comments about the unknown world or, in Dante's case, Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven (106). As Hiatt puts it in his introduction with regard to another medieval term used to describe the antipodes, "*terra incognita* constituted an a-cartographic mode of representation within the map . . . land unknown but not unthought" (11).

During the fifteenth century, two innovations made it possible for Western Europeans to explore parts of the world that had been previously considered unknowable. The first was the translation of Ptolemy's *Geography* into Latin, which demonstrated that the second-century Egyptian scholar had already described what were thought to be parts of the antipodes. The second was the extension of travel by the Portuguese around the coast of Africa, thanks to the introduction of the compass from China and the triangular sail from the Indian Ocean, which made accessible a part of the world that, in medieval times, had been part of the antipodes. These new lands were relabeled *terra inventa*, land discovered (147). Their accessibility, according to Hiatt, presented a problem for the papacy, which claimed to represent all Christians, and which had waged the Crusades against Muslims for 300 years. To maintain its eccle-

siastical authority, the Church needed to claim jurisdiction over the newly discovered lands “through acts of representation, whether on a map or a papal bull, or both.”

Hiatt concludes that “the changes to the world image that occurred in the fifteenth century are best understood as a process of reformulation, of land rethought and re-known: *terra recognita*” (148). By the 1490s, the term had been again transformed. “Unknown land is still noted, but its figuration as unreachable or uninhabitable is shattered: it is now *terra nondum cognita*, ‘not yet’ land that will be found, and that has already been claimed” (175).

The notion of antipodes was not so easily dismissed. In the early sixteenth century, the antipodes’ diminished surface took a new form, *Terra Australis*, a space separate from the New World of the Western hemisphere. Hiatt describes it as “a kind of colonial overspill that had to be explored by the European imagination before it was explored by its navigators” (187). In the later sixteenth century, Gerardus Mercator and his imitators described a *Terra Australis* that was partly imaginary and partly real, which could be used both to represent and to satirize the known world.

In his conclusion, Hiatt recapitulates the transformation of the antipodes throughout the 500 years between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries: “(They) came to signify . . . intellectuality itself . . . a place of depth, of escape from the sins and corruption of the known world, a place where purgatory and the earthly paradise might be located. When conjoined with the discourse of New World exploration, that idea of the antipodes as *recessus*—as a non-place conjured by the mind and subject to the laws of rational thought—was expressed anew in the form of More’s *Utopia* and thereafter in many reworkings” (266). The voyage to the antipodes proved an arduous journey, from philosophers’ speculation to the visual representation of the world to the voyages of discovery. Those who follow it with Hiatt will be well rewarded.

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A History of Murder: Personal Violence in Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present. By Pieter Spierenburg (Cambridge, Polity, 2008) 274 pp. \$69.95 cloth \$24.95 paper

During the last two decades, historians have produced a rich literature on violence. In this fascinating book, Spierenburg synthesizes this enormous body of scholarship, blending quantitative and qualitative evidence into a sweeping analysis of European murder from the Middle Ages to the present. He leavens the narrative with case summaries drawn from his own research on early modern Amsterdam as well as from dozens of micro-studies of violence. Spierenburg frames the topic broadly

and discusses both homicide and a wide range of lesser-known forms of aggressive behavior, such as house scorning, buttock stabbing, and nose slitting.

According to Spierenburg, rates of murder in Europe plummeted from the late Middle Ages until the mid-twentieth century. Over this span, Europeans became less impulsive and less emotionally volatile. Moreover, honor-based violence lost much of its respectability, and murder became increasingly concentrated within lower-class society. These cultural and behavioral shifts were most pronounced during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though they continued until the middle decades of the twentieth century, when rates of homicide hit their lowest recorded levels. At least in terms of interpersonal violence, Europeans became pacified.

To explain the dramatic decrease in lethal violence, Spierenburg relies on Elias' theory of a "civilizing process."¹ Elias argued that emotional restraint became a core component of early modern court culture. The expansion of the state during this period institutionalized and extended elite, courtly sensibilities, monopolizing the use of violence and criminalizing aggressive, disorderly behavior. According to Spierenburg, such a model of cultural and institutional change accounts for the falling rate of European murder. "All of the evidence combined," he concludes, "provides powerful support for the theory of civilization" (224). Spierenburg adds that "the fit between the evidence about male fighting and the theory of civilization is so obvious that it hardly needs stating" (225).

Where elite cultural authority was strongest and state formation was most complete, rates of murder plunged, as knife fighting, drunken brawling, and feuding waned. The civilizing process even transformed the code of honor, according to Spierenburg, substituting a nonviolent "spiritualization" of honor for the aggressive, violent expressions of manly honor that had flourished during earlier eras. To explain trends in parts of Europe where rates of murder remained high, Spierenburg adapts Elias' theory, drawing a distinction between an "inner zone" of the continent, where the civilizing process pacified society, and an "outer zone," where state formation was less complete, where elite sensibilities commanded less influence, and thus where feuding, banditry, and knife fighting persisted.

Some historians have argued that Elias' theory relies on evolutionary, essentialist explanations, truncating cultural and social variations and employing an English or French framework to account for historical change across the European continent. These scholars may take issue with Spierenburg's overarching argument. Furthermore, Spierenburg devotes the lion's share of *A History of Murder* to the early modern period and to Northern and Western Europe. He covers the period from 1800 to 1970 in a single chapter, for example, and only briefly examines East-

1 Norbert Elias (trans. Edmund Jephcott), *The Civilizing Process* (New York, 1978).

ern Europe and the Mediterranean region. But even scholars who question the usefulness of Elias's theory or who specialize in the modern period or Europe's "outer zone" will find Spierenburg's book engaging, well informed, and laden with insight.

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The Industrious Revolution: Consumer Behavior and the Household Economy, 1650 to the Present. By Jan de Vries (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008) 327 pp. \$80.00 cloth \$22.99 paper

By now, most readers are familiar with de Vries' paradigm-shifting notion of a European "industrious revolution," which he first laid out in an impressive journal essay in 1994. Since that time, economic historians have revised substantially the narrative of economic progress in Western European history. Gone is the familiar parade of British inventions, which had borne the weight of explanation for European industrial expansion throughout generations of history exams. Gone, too, is the argument that crucial changes necessary for "take-off" occurred in the late eighteenth century and thereafter. With the evaporation of a particular form of British exceptionalism has come a changed focus for inquiry, from the supply to the demand side of the picture. Scholars from an array of disciplines, many of them depending on economic theory, have explored the phenomenon of consumption as the driving force behind a very different kind of transformation. In this collection of interlocking essays, de Vries poses the problem this way: How did Europeans move from being leisure-rich in the context of a conservative, coercive economy to embracing a money- and consumption-orientation in comparatively free economic arrangements?

The industrious revolution has thus become a history of motivation, orientation, and workforce management at the level of the household, as well as an account of different types of employment and expenditure. It is an argument filled with explanatory thicket and sand traps, which de Vries navigates with a confidence that is both inspiring and unnerving. Readers will find three chapters at the center of the book most useful as a masterful synthesis of scholarly work in economics, sociology, and history, including discussions of women and the family.

The first and later chapters, however, depend on sociological modeling that is less satisfying and, at times, pointlessly polemical. De Vries is enamored of Becker's concept of "Z-commodities," which enables him to focus on the ambiguous way in which families combined effort and pay packets to achieve efficiency in consumption (26–27).¹ Through this device, it becomes possible to assume that everything that working fami-

1 Gary Becker, "A Theory of the Allocation of Time," *Economic Journal*, LXXV (1965), 493–517.

lies achieved in the economic sphere was funneled effectively into consumer objectives as early as the seventeenth century. In order to champion such activity, de Vries feels compelled to shadow-box with Marxist and feminist arguments of the past (many of them dating from the 1980s and even 1970s, and some of them irrelevant to the subjects at hand) that focused on the subordination of female and child labor and the exploitation of workers by manufacturers. His insistence on familial coordination does not necessarily require identifying an equal measure of genial cooperation, though it seems to be the implication. De Vries' chapter on the withdrawal of women from the labor market in the nineteenth century ("The Breadwinner-Homemaker Household") is marred by incorrect representations (few, if any, scholars of women's history would mount an argument about separate spheres in the terms that he presents) and internal contradictions. Yet his discussions of child labor, along with the quantitative data on European households, will prove useful to further discussion.

Despite these problems, *The Industrious Revolution* belongs on the shelf of every scholar of the industrial period and all those who wish to understand the complex nature of what we used to call the "industrial revolution." Readers will find invaluable information and numerous *bon mots* ("perspiration, not inspiration . . . [governed the] first industrial revolution" [112]) assembled therein to help them comprehend a generation of creative scholarship. That de Vries generates so much heat and energy stands as proof of the vitality of a long-standing historical debate.

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The Realities of Witchcraft and Popular Magic in Early Modern Europe: Culture, Cognition, and Everyday Life. By Edward Bever (New York, 2008) 240 pp. \$95.00

Bever's book is an exciting and provocative contribution to the study of magic and witchcraft. Reaching far beyond the usual material of history into the disciplines of psychology and neurophysiology, Bever has drawn conclusions both stunning and profound in a work that will move the field forward as surely as it will inspire debate. To begin at the end, Bever concludes that the early modern campaign to eradicate witchcraft and magic ultimately failed to eliminate the belief in, and practice of, magic in Europe, although it had a substantial impact on the beliefs of the majority of people. "Magic persists because it is real," Bever writes, sure to invite an uproar from those who have understood him as well as those who have not (430).

The reality of magic and witchcraft that Bever describes exists on many different levels—no doubt inspiring the plural *realities* in his title.

When early modern people made witchcraft accusations, the details of those accusations often referred to unquestionably plausible acts: material theft, physical violence, verbal assault, and poisoning with biochemical agents. Bever points out that such physical acts are often ignored or marginalized by scholars of witchcraft as irrelevant, despite being identified as witchcraft by the accusers. This important insight, however, is quickly marginalized by the main thrust of Bever's argument. His intent is not merely to describe the physical acts that composed witchcraft but to muster research from psychologists and neurophysiologists to explain the scientific reality of apparently supernatural effects.

The heart of this book is a series of readable and engaging descriptions of insights from recent research in the biomedical fields about the nature and implications of the recursive relationship between mind and body. Witchcraft was real, Bever explains, because ill will can cause real somatic harm in the body of the recipient through the powerful intermediary of the subconscious mind, which can detect it through subtle clues (if it is not made explicit) and express it in illness, paralysis, and even death. Bever is careful to explain that this argument about the reality of witchcraft is not meant to advance the guilt of particular suspects, nor to justify the fates of any accused witches. Even those who may be skeptical regarding the prevalence of this reality of witchcraft in the majority of trials will find Bever's treatment both sophisticated and convincing.

Although he begins with classic witchcraft trials, he does not end there. Particularly interesting are his analyses of the cultural, psychological, and pharmacological origins of the witches' sabbath, healing arts, and divination. For scholars of early modern witchcraft, Bever's work will prove an invaluable source, updating what were sorely outdated notions of psychosomatic responses to witchcraft. For historians generally, this work can stand as a model for how our understanding of human nature and of both the continuities and varieties presented by human societies can be expanded by reaching beyond the social sciences to scientific studies of the human organism itself.

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Shifting Boundaries of Public Health: Europe in the Twentieth Century. Edited by Susan Gross Solomon, Lion Murard, and Patrick Zylberman (Rochester, University of Rochester Press, 2008) 338 pp. \$90.00

If the most timeless issue in the history of public health is the tension between individual rights and the public good, the timeliest issue may well be the relationship between the local and the global. Emerging diseases such as AIDS, Ebola, and SARS have created a scalar rhetoric, according to

which no epidemic is local in a globalized world. They demonstrate that there is little overlap or contiguity between political borders and the boundaries of a spreading disease. Although microbes have no respect for such borders, moving effectively via networks of trade, travel, and contact, policies for controlling diseases are often constrained by specific nation-states.

By the mid-nineteenth century, the rapid spread and global reach of epidemics such as cholera, typhus, and plague between colonial and metropolitan centers led to the establishment of a series of international sanitary conferences designed to overcome this tension. Such institutions in turn inspired the development of international health organizations with a larger reach, including the Office International d'Hygiène Publique (1907), the League of Nations Health Organization (1920), and the World Health Organization (1948). Yet most health policy has remained a decidedly local affair; specific political, social, economic, and cultural contexts evince dramatically different approaches to disease control.

This collection brings a collaborative and interdisciplinary perspective to these problems in a series of essays on health governance in twentieth-century Europe. Although the individual essays are uneven in quality and scope, collectively they advance a clear thesis and a clear chronology. Early initiatives, like the sanitary conferences, were largely informal discussions among select health officials and diplomats. By the 1920s, such activities became formalized and invested with scientific expertise; "internationalism" was the rule of the day. The 1930s witnessed a return to a local emphasis, as international organizations and foundations began to invest less in one-size-fits-all solutions to global health problems than in community-based organizations better-suited to pursue health concerns on the ground.

The postwar era gave rise to the World Health Organization as the *de jure* clearinghouse for international health affairs. But, in reality, this period returned the nation-state to prominence, as Cold War politics and other diplomatic phenomena pushed internationalism aside. Only the appearance of "emerging diseases" in the last decades of the twentieth century has effectively re-invested internationalism with significant importance; microbial networks have subsumed the nation-state's boundaries as the critical frame for disease control. The essays collectively trace this chronology while also emphasizing critical themes: the relationship between state actors and nongovernmental organizations, the transportability or translatability of local health solutions into global contexts and vice versa, the tensions between cosmopolitan public-health policies and individual states' political agendas, and the importance of environment and place-based approaches to global health governance.

Historians are the primary contributors to the volume (with the occasional political scientist or policy analyst thrown into the mix), and the

book's primary concerns are the origins and development of public-health policy debates in Europe. Discussion gravitates toward the early to mid-twentieth century; only a few essays move beyond the 1950s. That said, the book engages with contemporary as well as historical issues. Graham Mooney's laudable essay on the uses of demography for epidemiological purposes in Britain, for example, traces the discipline from its nineteenth-century origins to the present, and Dorothy Porter's and Peter Baldwin's offerings discuss contemporary debates over obesity and AIDS, respectively.

The book will be a useful tool for historians interested in European health policy during the critical periods of its development, primarily in the aftermaths of the two world wars. Regrettably, the volume does not engage much with two of the essential problems facing European health policy at present—the crisis of the welfare state and the fading of European influence in the shaping of global-health discourse. But perhaps another volume can take these problems as its central focus.

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The 1549 Rebellions and the Making of Early Modern England. By Andy Wood (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 291 pp. \$99.00

This work is a wide-ranging study that makes important contributions to our understanding of politics in early modern England. Two main arguments run throughout the book. First, Wood argues that the 1549 Rebellions marked a turning point in English political history, the last flowering of a “popular political culture which, after the defeats of 1549, was broken” (150). Wood emphasizes the social divisions among the 1549 rebels, highlighting the “fragile unity” between poor laborers and wealthy yeomen, whose aims did not always align (18). The accelerating socioeconomic differentiation of the Elizabethan period and the inclusion of yeomen in the Elizabethan state served “to fracture the social alliance upon which the tradition of late medieval popular rebellion had rested” and contributed to the decline of popular rebellion in the later sixteenth century (203).

Second, Wood aims “to dispel the notion that the ‘masses of the Tudor period’ were ‘inarticulate’” by demonstrating that “popular political culture in Tudor England was rich, sophisticated and vibrant” (xiii). Wood pursues this task most directly in fascinating chapters on “Speech, silence and the recovery of rebel voices” and “Rebel political language,” but also more broadly by rejecting views of popular politics that emphasize its conservatism, showing instead how the 1549 rebels and commonwealth thinkers “aimed at the radical reform of the social and political order” (151).

Methodologically, Wood explicitly sets out to cross traditional historiographical and disciplinary boundaries. Throughout the last decade, the social and the political history of early modern England converged, as scholars heeded Collinson's oft-quoted call for "an account of political processes which is also social" (xvi).¹ Wood's analysis of the 1549 Rebellions builds upon this growing sociopolitical historiography, and his persistent attention to language, memory, and meaning also adds a valuable cultural dimension to his account of social and political change in early modern England. Wood's approach is constructively interdisciplinary, employing insights from anthropology, linguistics, political theory, and literary studies to illuminate his archival research. For example, Wood draws upon literary analysis to consider how historians might discern authentic rebel voices and ideas in hostile contemporary representations of rebel speech. Elsewhere, anthropological and linguistic analyses of speech and power play a significant role in shaping Wood's discussion of the ways in which "speech and silence constituted power relations" in a society where elites equated order with plebeian silence (92).

The breadth and sophistication of Wood's arguments are laudable. He examines topics ranging from the relation between religion and economics to the politics of memory, and he moves chronologically from late medieval rebellions to the appropriation of the 1549 rebellions in modern British politics. This book will be of obvious interest to historians of early modern England, but it will also be of value to a broader range of scholars who are interested in language, politics, and society in the early modern period.

Karl Gunther
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The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560–1660. By Alison Games (New York, Oxford University Press, 2008) 381 pp. \$35.00

The Web of Empire provides an impressive and important contribution to our understanding of the development of the English empire during the century before 1660. Games focuses on the people, "cosmopolitans," who traveled between the various outposts of English commerce and later colonization to make visible the messy process by which English men (and they were men) found their way in the world and eventually built an empire.

Games first establishes the context with discussions of recreational travel, the English in the Mediterranean, and the English merchants of the period. These chapters demonstrate the crucial role of adaptation in the life of merchants and travelers: The secret to success was fitting in

1 Patrick Collinson, *Elizabethan Essays* (London, 1994), 14.

with local society. A chapter on Virginia shows how the Virginia project started as another trading station, like those in the Levant or Japan, only gradually to be seen as a settlement that could provide income through the production of a staple crop. Games convincingly argues that Virginia became the model for colonial development in unexpected and circuitous ways. The remaining chapters alternate between the personnel of the empire (including the clergy) and other attempts at colonial settlement, in Madagascar and Ireland. In the process, individuals moved from one place to another, clearly learning from prior experiences in each new place.

This important book challenges existing arguments in several ways. First, the scope of the book demonstrates the limits of “the Atlantic” as a framework for understanding the development of English overseas activity. Second, by placing Ireland at the end rather than the beginning of the story, Games argues that Oliver Cromwell’s plans in Ireland owed more to Virginia and Massachusetts than vice versa. Finally, as she scans the short history of English control over Tangier, she is able to show how the model for expansion had changed over the course of the period: By 1660, Virginia was indeed the model, not the trading station. As the English moved from the periphery to the center of Europe, they stopped trying to adapt to local culture; they tried instead to remake it.

By focusing on people, Games is able to interrupt our familiar narratives, and show how what was learned in one place was applied—not necessarily successfully—in another. As such, the book is full of vivid personalities—not just the ubiquitous John Smith but also people like Nathaniel Butler, who served in turn as Governor of Bermuda, and of Providence Island; or the Scottish chaplain Patrick Copland, who made at least two East India voyages (one to Japan), then served in Bermuda during the 1620s, and ended his career in Eleuthera. These men, and others like them, Games insists, were changed by their time overseas.

Games, who is a sophisticated thinker about the nature of the early modern world, uses narrative to build a theoretical argument; at times the accretion of detail makes the overall shape of the argument more difficult to track. The concept of “cosmopolitan” is defined in practice, with no attention to recent work on the subject. Although her book shares much with prosopographical studies, it never embraces prosopography as a method: It would have been useful to include a table to offer a visual overview of where different individuals were engaged in the world. Likewise, a bibliography would have been a welcome addition. But these are minor complaints about an excellent book, which will help shift discussions of British overseas activity from the Atlantic to the world, and will demonstrate that the English were changed by the world that they tried to shape.

Susan D. Amussen
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The Culture of Giving: Informal Support and Gift-Exchange in Early Modern England. By Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008) 426 pp. \$99.00

Using an interpretative model associated with anthropology, research methods associated with historians, and language skills associated with scholars of English literature, Ben-Amos offers a thorough assessment of informal support from 1580 to 1740. Informal support was not always voluntary nor entirely separate from state policies, but it was distinguished from public relief based on compulsory taxation, and commercial transactions based on price. Relying on the gift-exchange model of Mauss, Ben-Amos views this type of assistance as a form of gift that created binding ties of obligation and commitment.¹

Imaginatively deploying an impressive range of sources, Ben-Amos investigates the many different kinds of help offered, the discourses and practices that sustained an economy of giving, and the connections between it, the state, and the market. She incorporates all ranks of society, examining not just subsistence aid but also help that improved the quality of life. Families and kin were key mechanisms of support. Their help was augmented by the activities of parishes, guilds, and mutual aid societies—all of which continued to provide aid even after the poor law was established—as well as by charitable gifts, which surged rather than declined following the Reformation. Together, these institutions offered a diverse array of assistance, from money and lodging to education and prayers. The state also contributed by sponsoring and funding charitable enterprises like hospitals, schools, and almshouses.

This culture of giving was embedded in personal transactions that linked individuals in chains of obligation. Social relations become enmeshed in a cycle of offerings and reciprocation, and the intensely personal nature of these interactions made them vulnerable to breakdown. Informal support was cultivated and encouraged through the means of feasts, gifts, and the enhanced reputation such giving brought. Gifts were listed and evaluated in account books kept by the middling and upper ranks, who recorded them as a visible demonstration of status in the community. Gift giving was also encouraged by Christianity, as an expression of piety that bore witness to the glory of God. Ben-Amos' analysis of sermons and catechisms reveals the modification of the more stark principles of Protestantism. Despite ongoing tension between the competing values of discrimination, constraint, and liberality, in practice, more attention was paid to the obligations of the giver than to the moral worth of the recipient, and unconditional and spontaneous gift giving was celebrated.

Giving did not decay with the advent of Protestantism, the creation of institutional relief, the expansion of a bureaucratic state, or the rise of

1 Marcel Mauss (trans. W. D. Halls), *The Gift: Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies* (New York, 1990).

a market economy but was revitalized and transformed. The expansion of the state and the market provided new venues for, and new techniques of, gift giving. Ben-Amos notes the increased potency of the written word, not just petitions for support or tomb inscriptions testifying to generosity but also the newly emerged begging letter and appeals for help published in newspapers.

There is a great deal of thoughtful analysis, insight, and information in this book. But gift-exchange theory, for all its benefits and applicability, privileges instrumental interaction. It downplays emotions, both the compassion of the donor and the humiliation of the recipient. These factors are not the whole story but they should be a larger part of it.

Linda A. Pollock
Tulane University

Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of Britain's Covert Empire in the Middle East. By Priya Satiya (New York, Oxford University Press, 2008), 458 pp. \$55.00

Satiya makes a series of novel arguments about Britain's role in seizing large parts of the Middle East from the Ottoman Empire during World War I and then in controlling, covertly and often viciously, its new client states, notably from the air. In her reading of events, the process proceeded in three stages. First, in the early twentieth century, a elite community of men, and one woman (Gertrude Bell), whom she calls "intelligence agents," began to venture into the region then known as Turkish "Arabia," drawn by the desire to secure the land route to India and in the hopes of finding a metaphysical certainty that they could no longer find at home (3). Baffled by the "intelligibility"—in James Scott's term—of the desert terrain, they forsook empiricism for an "intuitive intelligence epistemology modeled on their understanding of the Arab mind" (5).

Second, before, and especially during, the war itself, the "agents" constituted themselves as an omnipresent network that managed Britain's military campaigns in the region, mixing intelligence with a huge influence over policy, in particular the promotion of Arab unity. Third, after the war, they created an informal "parallel" administration, hidden from public view and heavily reliant on the use of British airpower to identify, and then to discipline, rural trouble makers (7).

Flawed though it is in many ways, the book makes a considerable contribution to two areas of British imperial and cultural history. For one thing, it elucidates that aspect of Edwardian culture in which men and women, disillusioned with many aspects of modern life, became fascinated by the primitive, the occult, and the minimalist—all of which they believed to have found in what Satiya calls "an Arabian counterpoint," an "Arabia of their dreams" (59/60). Satiya's more original con-

tribution to imperial theory is her discovery of a way to link the various parts of Britain's Middle Eastern enterprise—mandates, colonies, and protectorates—in one overarching notion of a covert empire run by agents skillful enough to shroud their activities in ways that defied both democratic inspection at home and the comprehension of client regimes in the region itself.

Provocative and stimulating as this material is, it comes at some cost. The agents on which Satiya concentrates were a much more hard-headed group than she suggests, visionary when they wished to impress, but equally concerned, even in the case of the mercurial Mark Sykes, with scanning the prewar terrain for railway routes and defensible frontiers. Thomas Edward Lawrence, too, was far from being just a guerilla-warfare expert on a camel, having turned himself by 1915 into a skilled modern military intelligence officer with a detailed knowledge of maps, aerial observation, and the business of wireless intercepts.

Just as important, Satiya allows herself to repeat many of the same hardy myths promoted by General Edmund Allenby, Lawrence, and others after the war about their superior ability to outwit and deceive their plodding Ottoman enemy. But as Sheffy's excellent work on British military intelligence conclusively demonstrates, the Ottomans and their German allies were every wit as good at the same game, with the added advantage that the Ottomans, as long-time governors of the region, had much better skills at managing the fickle Syrian tribes.¹ Only when this story of the real war in the Middle East is better known will it be possible to challenge the powerful fictions that still continue to inform public perceptions of the desert Arabs and that Satiya herself does much to embellish.

Roger Owen
Harvard University

Il rinascimento italiano e l'europa. IV. Commercio e cultura mercantile. Edited by Franco Franceschi, Richard A. Goldthwaite, and Reinhold C. Mueller (Treviso, Angelo Colla Editore, 2007) 840 pp. Euro 95.00

Ten years ago, I and my coeditor of a volume on the history and civilization of Venice chose not to include an essay on the Venetian economy since, in our view, economic history, long a mainstay of Venetian studies, seemed mired in the past and focused on outdated questions and methodologies. Based on the evidence of the volume under review, the same cannot be said of economic history today. As the footnotes to the fourteen essays included in this volume indicate, the late 1990s and first years of the new millennium have witnessed an explosion of new work on nearly all aspects of the Italian Renaissance economy. The reasons for this renewed interest are not hard to discern: The present-day interest in

1 Yigal Sheffy, *British Military Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign 1914–1918* (London, 1998).

globalization and cultures in contact and conflict (an arena in which businessmen are often in the forefront), the looming decline of Western economic supremacy, and the collapse of various sorts of economic bubbles in the past few years all have served to refocus historians' attention, in general, on economic issues and, in particular, on a period that saw Italian merchants and manufacturers first take the lead in European economic development and then see that lead slip away. Together, the essays provide much to consider not only regarding the Renaissance economy but the present-day one as well.

The editors have grouped the essays, most of which are works of synthesis but a few of which include original research (most particularly the essay co-authored by Neil de Marchi and Louisa Matthew and that by Luca Molà), under four rubrics focusing on particular types of merchandise (such as wool, silk, marble, antiquities, and slaves), conducting business in foreign lands, business techniques and practices, and panoramic overviews of the period of the "long" Renaissance—defined as running from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries. In their own far too brief introduction to the volume, the editors highlight the need for greater study of the ways in which merchandise, manpower, and ideas circulated between Italy and the rest of Europe. They note the ultimate inability of the Italians to generate the same kind of demand in northern Europe for their goods (with the exception of silk, antiquities, and marble) that they had in the Levant, as well as the need to understand better why certain business techniques like the letter of exchange gained European-wide use whereas others, most notably double-entry bookkeeping, did not. They also observe that the Renaissance businessman remains a nebulous figure—still in need of disentangling from early- and mid-twentieth-century scholarly claims about the origins of capitalism and the ideology of the bourgeoisie. On this last topic, Molà's fascinating essay on the role of Renaissance businessmen in promoting technological innovations is exemplary.

Several other themes that run throughout these essays, two of which might seem at first glance to be contradictory, are especially worth noting. Several of the essays emphasize the role of individual businessmen and the decisions that they made in Renaissance economic development. But governmental policies and needs were just as critical. As Mario Infelise observes in his essay on the circulation of commercial information, the state needed a global perspective on the news much more than the individual businessman did. Infelise's essay, like several others, also sheds light on the extent to which business in the Renaissance operated at the intersection of the traditional oral and the new print culture. Finally, in an especially provocative essay Maria Luisa Pesante suggests that the preoccupation in Italian Renaissance economic discourse with distribution rather than production—a discourse infused with Christian ethics—in the end placed the Italians at a disadvantage especially *vis à vis* the English, who were able, in her view, to move economic thinking to a higher level of abstraction because of their emphasis on production.

The essays in this rich volume provide eloquent testimony to a revived field of scholarly inquiry and offer much to consider in a new period of extraordinary economic transformation.

Dennis Romano
Syracuse University

Hitler, the Germans, and the Final Solution. By Ian Kershaw (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2008) 394 pp. \$35

A well-balanced summary of a career so distinguished as that of Kershaw is always a pleasure to review. Spanning roughly three decades of scholarship from the early 1980s to the present, this satisfying collection will help those in Holocaust Studies retrace the trajectory of the last few decades of debate, which has seen monumental shifts in interpretation and an explosion of new evidence due to the availability of Eastern archives after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Kershaw has always been extraordinarily adept at distilling this historiography while making his own important contributions, from his early work on popular opinion in Nazi Germany to his well-known two-volume biography of Hitler—*Hitler: A Biography* (New York, 2008). In addition, Kershaw's ability to appeal to both specialists and non-specialists is a sign of the originality of his research, his analytical clarity, and the deftness of his prose, making his work foundational in the study of the history of National Socialist Germany.

The editors at Yad Vashem have chosen to organize the essays thematically around four clusters: the role of Hitler, analyzing popular opinion, historiographical debates concerning the Holocaust, and the question of the uniqueness of Nazism. As Kershaw makes clear in the introduction written for this volume, however, he thinks that the essays would make more sense arranged chronologically, to show his biographical and intellectual development, as well as that of the field. There is logic to this soft criticism, but the editors preferred to read the trajectory of his thought through the lens of his Hitler biography. Although this work is important in balancing the functionalist-administrative development of the Nazi state with the decision-making role of Hitler, by placing the analysis of Hitler first in the anthology's arrangement, the editors downplay Kershaw's exceptional earlier analysis of popular opinion. This editorial choice emphasizes the role of the political leadership, with its specific ideological goals, at the expense of Kershaw's social history of the generation coming of scholarly age at the time when Broszat was writing.¹ This social history, which is evident in key essays throughout the volume, assumes a slightly different cast, given the thematic opening on Hitler.

1 See, for example, his classic text, Martin Broszat, *The Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich* (London, 1981).

Although Kershaw has not integrated certain of the newer theoretical elements within the recent study of Nazi Germany (such as an analysis of gender or culture), his work is still of central importance to our current and future debates. In the last two essays, he speaks to the bigger picture of the Holocaust in relation to the violent trajectory of modern history since the twentieth century. His mastery of the literature and his range of archival sources are matched by few in the field. The strength of this work and the prospect for future production are well on display in this important new collection.

Paul B. Jaskot
DePaul University

Building the Devil's Empire: French Colonial New Orleans. By Shannon Lee Dawdy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2008) 336 pages \$35.00

In her insightful analysis of French New Orleans (1718–1769), Dawdy draws upon the methodologies of history, archaeology, and anthropology to argue that the city's early history reflected not the failure of imperial designs but the success of “practical knowledge and flexible survival strategies.” New Orleans was transformed “from an experimental colonial enterprise . . . to a more stable, locally adapted society . . . in which actors [came] to share a basic set of understandings about who's who and how things work” (5–6). Using the trope of disorder that historians of the city find difficult to avoid, Dawdy locates the roots of this perspective in the importance of smuggling to the city's economy, the heterogeneity of its population, and a process of local governance that she calls rogue colonialism.

Dawdy contrasts the idealized plans (both literal and figurative) of the city's Enlightenment architects with the adaptations that colonists made to local circumstances. Smuggling was one of their strategies for survival that required those involved to evade the constraints constructed by metropolitan mercantilists. The case of smuggling illustrates how rogue colonialism could be both illegal from the metropolitan perspective and permissible out of expediency. Anyone, from an enslaved boatman to a colonial governor, was likely to participate in it, either as a perpetrator or as a consumer. That smugglers understood their activities as illicit, even if accepted by fellow colonists, is underscored by their efforts to limit their presence in the official and judicial record. Dawdy is able to overcome this absence of documentation by fruitfully turning to the archaeological record and finding evidence of smugglers' activities in the material culture that colonists left behind.

Documentary absences are also a problem in coming to terms with the demographic make-up of New Orleans' population. Dawdy effectively challenges those who use lack of presence in the historical record

to argue for historical absences—for instance, those historians who claim that *forçats* (the forced exiles who comprised as many as one-quarter of French immigrants) “had almost no demographic impact” on the colony, partly because they do not appear in censuses and other official reports (151).¹ Dawdy instead argues that the census categories themselves increasingly deemphasized differences in legal status among Euro-New Orleanians in favor of organizing the population into groups defined by ancestry, gender, and age.

Although she finds an increase in the use of racial categories in an attempt to make the colonial population legible, to paraphrase Scott, her analysis of free people of color in censuses shows that the transition from an emphasis on status to one on race was not yet complete by 1769.² The relative absence of people identified as free persons of (at least partial) African ancestry does not, as Dawdy demonstrates, provide support for those who can envision scarce *métissage* and little manumission in French New Orleans. Rather, it reveals the lack of concern that many French New Orleanians had with identifying and categorizing people solely on the basis on ancestry. Dawdy makes this point dramatically in her description of a cemetery excavated in the 1980s. Analyzing the organization of the burial sites, she concludes that even at the level of the individual household, ordinary people in the city “were a multihued lot who mingled in casual, intimate, and sometimes profound ways” (141). Such evidence allows Dawdy to look beyond the idealized, and often unrealized, plans of metropolitan officials for segregating easily identifiable populations and to appreciate where local knowledge and creole innovations greatly shaped the city’s development.

Jennifer M. Spear
Simon Fraser University

Political Moderation in America’s First Two Centuries. By Robert McCluer Calhoun (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009) 310 pp. \$90.00 cloth \$24.99 paper

This book takes on the challenge of providing an interpretative framework for the wide-ranging literature treating political, religious, and legal aspects of America’s experience with political moderation from its

1 See, for instance, James D. Hardy, Jr., “The Transportation of Convicts to Colonial Louisiana,” *Louisiana History*, VII (1966), 207–222; Mathé Allain, “*Manon Lescaut et Ses Consouers: Women in the Early French Period, 1700–1731*,” in James J. Cooke (ed.), *Proceedings of the Fifth Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society, March 29–April 1, 1979* (Lanham, Md., 1980), 18–26; Thomas N. Ingersoll, *Mammon and Manon in Early New Orleans: The First Slave Society in the Deep South, 1718–1819* (Knoxville, 1999).

2 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, 1998).

colonial period through the 1880s. Calhoun shows how political moderation was practiced by Americans during these years. Although the modern tendency is to regard political moderation as a mere “splitting-of-the-difference” and its practitioners as uncourageous compromisers, Calhoun persuasively shows that a principled tradition of political moderation was an important development in America’s history. He suggests that the concept of political moderation in America was a mixture of idealism and realism, often displaying nuanced, thoughtful positions that were not clear-cut.

Calhoun defines as moderates “persons who intentionally undertake civic action, at significant risk or cost, to mediate conflicts, conciliate antagonisms, or find middle ground” (6). Among the questions that he explores are how and why some Americans chose this position and what price they paid for doing so. Calhoun focuses on what he calls “the peripheral outer edges” of moderation that “made contact with political culture and where religion and ethics disseminated moderation into the civil order” (8). This tie of political culture with religion is one of his principal findings.

While tracing the roots of political moderation back to classical antiquity, Calhoun explores how Americans sought a political middle ground not only during the colonial and American Revolutionary periods but also through the antebellum period in the southern backcountry and the Middle West. A final chapter delineates the ways in which denominational and primitive Christianity had a moderating effect on politics and society.

From a methodological perspective, the strength of the book is its broad synthesis of a very large literature. It demonstrates the value of exploring the overlap of religious history, political culture, and the history of ideas—fields that are frequently studied in isolation from one another.

In addition to exploring the nexus between religion and culture in America, one of the principal achievements of Calhoun’s work is to demonstrate the dynamics of moderation. He follows the search for moderation by examining the actions of well-known and lesser-known Americans during times of crisis and controversy. Calhoun deftly reveals the complexity of their calculations, which were both intricate and situational. In the end, Calhoun emphasizes that moderates were made and not born.

On occasion, Calhoun’s application of moderation seems problematic. For students of American constitutionalism, for example, James Wilson, John Adams, and Alexander Hamilton would be unlikely exemplars of constitutional moderation. Calhoun’s implicit assumption that America’s constitutionalism after the Revolutionary War operated with a necessarily moderating effect oversimplifies the contested nature of questions of constitutionalism in the early Republic.

Notwithstanding this reservation, Calhoun resurrects political moderation as an important American political and religious tradition. His

elegant treatment of ideas exemplified through political behavior will undoubtedly stimulate further study of this neglected dimension of American civic life.

Christian G. Fritz
University of New Mexico

Creating Abundance: Biological Innovation and American Agricultural Development. By Alan L. Olmstead and Paul W. Rhode (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008) 466 pp. \$80.00 cloth 23.99 paper

The authors of this impressive book challenge “the misconceptions that, before the advent of hybrid corn, American farmers single-mindedly invested in labor saving mechanical technologies and that biological technologies were static” (iii). To use only the labor time saved by introducing mechanical-harvesting equipment and other farm machinery to measure increases in agricultural productivity ignores, they suggest, the numerous biological innovations that contributed to agricultural output. Their definition of biological innovations is sweeping, including the importation of seeds, livestock, and methods; the adaptation and substitution of crops to regions, subregions, and soils; the modification of specific plant varieties by selection and hybridization, selective breeding, and substitution of animal breeds; and the measures required to fight off insects, microorganisms, and animal diseases.

After an introduction in which the authors explain the shortcomings of prior analyses of American agricultural productivity, they consider the histories of the major field and horticultural crops and livestock, focusing on the biological elements involved. Chapter 2 deals with the wheat crop, emphasizing the role of the hard red varieties. Next follows a chapter on corn. Cotton, however, obtains three chapters—one on the establishment of the cotton-growing regions, one on cotton’s enemies, and one on the twentieth-century revival of the industry. Tobacco, the “stinking weede,” merits a chapter that emphasizes the importance of soil types in producing quality products. California’s horticultural and tree fruits inspire a chapter, “Creating a Cornucopia,” giving special attention to raisins, oranges, and figs. Four chapters deal with livestock feeds in the farm economy, the changing breeds and types of livestock, the dairy industry, and animal draft power. A final chapter, “Tying it Together,” sums up the authors’ case and includes a section qualifying contentions that nitrogen fertilizer was the major cause of the productivity take-off in the 1930s. Advances in crop and animal breeds also played a significant role. Over all, the chapters focus on pre-1970s evidence. An extensive listing of references and a helpful index conclude the work.

In their chapters, Olmstead and Rhode provide much information about the importers and growers of specific crops and, from 1850, the government scientists who led in the search for new or improved crop

varieties, in the battle against pests and microorganisms, and in the development of agricultural chemistry. They acknowledge the role of government in providing standards and requirements that sometimes had important effects; the bovine tuberculosis test, for example, saved innumerable human lives. They adeptly trace the sometimes complicated effects of changes in agricultural practice. Readers at large need not shun this book. Notwithstanding a couple of competing “models,” in the form of hypotheses, in the introduction and the occasional regression coefficient elsewhere, the book is not a mathematical treatise. Numerous simple tables and figures support an interesting story. The authors evaluate the developments sketched by comparison and skillful estimation. In this respect, the book can provide helpful guidance to researchers in other history fields and disciplines.

This splendid book will compel a great deal of revision in agricultural history and the broader field of economic history. It will be a standard reference for many years.

Allan G. Bogue
University of Wisconsin

Other Souths: Diversity and Difference in the U.S. South, Reconstruction to the Present. Edited by Pippa Holloway (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 2008) 451 pp. \$69.95 cloth \$26.95 paper

In a collection that spans from Reconstruction to the beginning of this century, *Other Souths* presents some of the most important recent articles on the South that employ gender, race, class, and sexuality as intertwined categories of analysis. These previously published essays emerge together as a useful teaching text and important intellectual piece. The collection stretches southern history beyond traditional places, showing, for example, the extent to which events in Florida are critical to our understanding of the civil rights movement, the Cold War, and environmental policy. It also reveals how historical events affected everyday people and how everyday people contested and conformed to legislation in complicated and diverse ways. From the public political acts of low-country freedwomen to the discovery of the real John Henry, the interrogation of suspected lesbian educators, and the Latinization of the southern landscape, it uncovers the multiple layers of southern politics, rendering obsolete the divide between public and private or between grassroots politics and more formal electoral politics. In the process, the collection offers the possibilities of comparing big questions across time and place.

Using legal cases, oral histories, literary texts, folk music, personal testimony, and government files, *Other Souths* depicts a region of politically organized and politically active people. Common to many of the essays is an examination of how a vast array of southerners negotiated

and contested laws and customs that reached into the most intimate personal and local spaces. These laws affected the food that people grew and ate, the control that they had over their bodies, and even where they chose to live, swim, and golf. Kevin Kruse locates the rise of the New Right in Atlanta's urban city center where black and white residents argued over access to public recreational space. In essays by Jeanette Keith, Jennifer Brooks, and Alex Macaulay, southern military men, often seen as exemplars of the martial tradition, opposed the draft in World War I, formed both the front lines of the civil rights movement and of white resistance, and participated in the antiwar movement in the late 1960s and 1970s. Their political activism rejects simple categorization.

Debates about working-class female sexuality and eugenics in interwar North Carolina, racial purity in Virginia, homophobic Cold War policy, and grassroots civil rights organizing in Florida, demonstrate that sexuality and sexual violence are not subtexts of political movements but primary texts for political discourses. In Danielle McGuire's essay, the rape of a black female collegian served as a catalyst for student organizing and participation in the civil rights movement. In LuAnn Jones' essay, white rural women and black rural families utilized itinerant merchants and traveling salesmen to access a consumer culture and, more importantly, to avoid the gender, racial, and sexual hierarchies that pervaded the local general store and broader southern culture. In each of these cases, "southern custom" spurred resistance, not conformity or obedience.

In the end, this collection provides intellectual fodder for several new and old questions: How do politics work in local contexts? How have sex and sexuality shaped southern and American politics? Why do regional boundaries matter? How have gender ideologies shaped political responses of various southerners? These questions are addressed across the entire post-Civil War era. The complex region that *Other Souths* creates offers a cacophony of stories and voices that breed questions and reject easy binary categories. The practice of pluralizing the South may well be a more fruitful intellectual path than one that leaves the regional category intact but pronounces its demise.

Elizabeth Gillespie McRae
Western Carolina University

From Yeoman to Redneck in the South Carolina Upcountry, 1850–1915. By Stephen A. West (Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 2008) 261 pp. \$45.00

To explain why clean-up efforts on the Gulf Coast following Hurricane Ike had been delayed, a FEMA official reported, "You can't work too many people because it's just too dangerous. And you can't just put Bubba or Skeeter out here on a dozer."¹ By referring to "Bubba" and

1 Quoted in the *Seattle Times*, 2 Dec. 2008, Section A, 6.

“Skeeter,” the official evoked the image of the southern redneck and all that that moniker connotes. But, where did the term *redneck* originate, and what does it mean? In *Yeoman to Redneck*, West draws from the historical experience of the South Carolina upcountry during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to answer such questions.

Fundamentally, this book is about social class and its ramifications in this location and during this time period. In the antebellum period, the primary class divisions were between the landed and the landless and between slaveowners and non-slaveowners. Slaveowners could be distinguished further by the number of slaves owned, but that measure was of secondary importance. According to West, a family’s place in this stratification system influenced its response to the abolitionist message and movement, its enthusiasm for joining “Minute Men” vigilante groups, and even its commitment to the Confederate cause. Yeomen were those economically and politically independent farmers who owned land and possibly a few slaves. Although they did not necessarily support the political and social agendas of the landed elite, for whom slaves were a major source of wealth, they were not viewed pejoratively by their richer neighbors.

Class arrangements in the South Carolina upcountry changed after the Civil War. Ownership of land remained an important dimension of stratification in the countryside, but tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and agricultural wage laborers replaced slaves as the primary workforce on large plantations. Changes in the nature of the agricultural economy, and the overwhelming emphasis on cotton as a cash crop, made the yeoman farmer a relic of the past. Expansion of the railroads, coupled with emerging banking and merchant sectors, fueled the growth of towns and cities, as well as the development of a new urban class. Discouraged and displaced rural people sought economic refuge in the mill towns that were associated with new textile factories. West argues that this altered class structure gave rise to new tensions that shaped politics and social arrangements in the upcountry and, ultimately, gave birth to the term *redneck*, which originally referred to the sunburned necks of farmers but eventually broadened to include non-farmers.

Rednecks comprised two major groups in the upcountry—poor, landless, rural whites and textile mill workers. According to West, the town class viewed both groups with disdain and contempt. The rednecks’ economic distress and lack of education made them vulnerable to demagogues like “Pitchfork Ben” Tillman and Cole Blease who exploited the class differences for political gain. The town class also grew concerned over the levels of lawlessness, including lynching, because they were a blemish on a region that grew increasingly interested in, and dependent upon, interregional and international connections.

West relies on a variety of sources for evidence to support his thesis. In addition to the obligatory primary and secondary ones, he makes use of original census enumerators’ manuscripts from the late nineteenth century. Most innovative is his execution of intercensal record linkages to trace individuals over time, thereby enabling him to examine changes

in “slaveholder” status between 1850 and 1860, and linkages between individual census records and membership lists to profile the Minute Men groups. These methodological approaches are among the many strengths of West’s book. The only possible weakness is the relatively low profile of African Americans in West’s story. But, whites, not blacks, are the focus of this book.

West concludes by wondering whether the term *redneck* will disappear from the American lexicon, as *yeoman* has. The word may become less common in the future, but its spirit will probably endure. Just as Vance observed in the past, many Americans today continue to disdain intellectualism and fail to recognize their own class interests when making political decisions.² As long as a reference to “Bubba” and “Skeeter” effectively conjures up the population that holds such views, *redneck* will have a place in American society.

Stewart E. Tolnay
University of Washington

Reno’s Big Gamble: Image and Reputation in the Biggest Little City. By Alicia Barber (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2008) 319 pp. \$34.95

In her study of downtown Reno’s development from 1868 to the present, Barber cites research findings in history, cultural geography, city-planning literature, political science, and other fields to construct a conceptual framework for explaining how tourism and the landscape that it spawns can affect urban residents. Three major concepts drive her interpretation of Reno’s evolution from maverick city on the make to the decaying casino core of today—civic reputation, sense of place, and promoted image. Civic reputation represents the outside world’s view of a place; sense of place covers residents’ emotional attachment to their locale; and promoted image stands for how political and business leaders would like outsiders to perceive their place. Barber consistently invokes these concepts at strategic points as she traces Reno’s evolution from its birth as a river ford and Comstock railroad hub to its later years when liberal divorce, gambling, speakeasies, and prostitution transformed it into a glamorous vice capital for celebrities and tourists who reveled in the city’s last-frontier revolt against American mainstream culture. In catering to the shifting whims of visitors, Renoites commercialized their city’s appeal until a tourist-based landscape completely engulfed the downtown area by the late 1970s. This process finally began to wane in recent decades when Las Vegas megaresorts, California Indian gaming, and other forces conspired to reduce tourist bookings, resulting in the closure of many downtown hotels and clubs.

2 Rupert B. Vance, “Rebels and Agrarians All: Studies in One-Party Politics,” *Southern Review*, IV (1938), 26–44.

The city's civic reputation plummeted despite desperate efforts to give the fickle public the new resorts that Renoites thought it wanted. As the author correctly suggests, this story defies Rothman's "devil's bargains" model in which tourists' needs often push aside residents to the point of compromising their sense of place.¹ Barber observes that Renoites, anxious to promote local prosperity and shift taxes increasingly onto visitors, were complicit in the wholesale dedication of their downtown to amusement—a position that they are now struggling to change.

Barber's volume is an informative account of Reno's big gamble—repeatedly risking its reputation and natural appeal in the pursuit of profit; the author's conceptual framework enlightens the text throughout. But the interdisciplinary works about place identity that suggest her framework appear only in the book's introduction. Except for a brief discussion relating Thorstein Veblen's theory of conspicuous consumption to Reno's commodification (113), Barber makes no further reference to interdisciplinary methods and scholarship. Her brief three-page conclusion would have benefited from one more discussion of relevant findings in a variety of fields, enabling her to suggest "additional models that more clearly explain a wider range of experiences" (10) in the study of western tourism. Such models, along with her own, would allow tourism scholars to move beyond Rothman's unidirectional paradigm.

Eugene P. Moehring
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Voices from Haskell: Indian Students between Two Worlds, 1884–1928. By Myriam Vučković (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2008) 330 pp. \$34.95

The phenomenon of the Indian boarding school, a topic that has gained more scholarly attention during the last two decades, has a mixed legacy at best. Federal officials clearly saw the boarding-school program, which removed native children from their homes, families, and communities in order to educate them "properly" and inculcate them with American values, as a method for "civilizing" native populations. According to Vuckovic, "the philosophy and purpose of Haskell Institute had remained constant during all these years: to destroy indigenous cultures and to elevate Indian children from the 'savagery' of their people's past to a brighter future of American citizenship and civilization" (29). Yet, native children, much to the chagrin of boarding-school officials, often transformed their boarding-school experiences into a way to strengthen native identity and create a larger pan-Indian identity by covertly maintaining traditional practices and forging connections with students from

1 Hal K. Rothman, *Devils' Bargains: Tourism in the Twentieth-Century American West* (Lawrence, 1998), 10–14.

other native groups. Vuckovic's study of Haskell Institute in Kansas provides a glimpse of the intersection of these competing goals and interests and the results of this conflict.

Vuckovic's work combines institutional history with social and cultural history, integrating theories of hegemony and theories of public and hidden transcripts (2, 211–212). She first places the creation of the boarding schools within the broader federal policy of assimilating indigenous people. Federal officials thought that reservation day schools could not counteract the negative effect of the students' regular exposure to indigenous practices and traditions (13). Removing native children from these influences would promote their acceptance of English language and cultural instruction, which would also aid in the spread of Christian religion, another goal of the larger assimilation program for native peoples. A third part of this program was the allotment of tribal lands "to break up traditional tribal structures and to speed up the dissolution of the western reservations" (14). The larger goal of schools such as Haskell had more to do with assimilation than the welfare of the students; against this backdrop, Vuckovic presents the students' personal accounts of their experiences at Haskell.

Each following chapter considers a specific aspect of student life at Haskell by mining letters, student files, and the Meriam Report, an investigation of native boarding schools. Vuckovic's discussion includes the decision that families and students made to attend the institute, the regimentation of student life at the institute, the curriculum offered, the types of activities in which students participated outside the classroom, student living conditions, students' attempts to preserve their own cultural identity despite the goals of the institution, and the experiences of Haskell graduates. Vuckovic reveals the tension between the intentions of boarding schools and the experiences of students by juxtaposing what school officials said about an issue—health care for students, for instance—and what students said about deplorable health conditions in letters to parents and school officials (212). Similarly, although school officials touted the success of graduates who returned home and became active in tribal politics or as cultural mediators, Vuckovic notes that some students experienced sharp feelings of alienation upon returning home from Haskell (251–254). In the end, Vuckovic offers a poignant account of native children's boarding-school experiences, which could be simultaneously positive and strengthening and deeply destructive to the individuals and native cultures involved.

Fay A. Yarbrough
University of Oklahoma

Americans All: The Cultural Gifts Movement. By Diana Selig (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2008) 367 pp. \$49.95

In recent years, the United States has been divided by controversies about diversity, multiculturalism, and what immigrants need to do to become truly “American.” Such debates have occurred repeatedly throughout American history, most notably during the second major wave of immigration between 1882 and the passage of restriction in 1924. Selig’s impressively researched book describes the efforts of various individuals and groups to promote a more pluralistic nation during the period of limited immigration between 1924 and World War II.

Selig begins with a thorough discussion of the work of social scientists and psychologists to undermine the scientific racism that prevailed in the first quarter of the twentieth century. These scholars sought to demonstrate that differences in intelligence were environmental—rather than genetic—in origin. They also researched the roots of racial prejudice, finding that bigotry was learned rather than innate.

Within this intellectual framework, educators like Rachel DuBois at the Service Bureau of Intercultural Education created school programs to expose children to the “cultural gifts” brought by the Ellis Island wave of immigrants, and, to a lesser extent, by African Americans. For instance, students were taught about the artistic contributions of Italian Americans and the scientific contributions of German Americans. Selig shows how “cultural gifts” advocates first designed these programs to reduce prejudice among native-stock children by educating them about the benefits brought by the newcomers. By the 1930s, however, they became more concerned with raising the self-esteem of the second-generation immigrants. At the same time, the interfaith movement, led by organizations like the National Conference of Christians and Jews (NCCJ), advanced religious pluralism by promoting the concept of a “Judeo-Christian” nation. By the late 1930s and the early 1940s, the “cultural gifts” approach, with its focus on the contributions of different ethnic groups, fell out of favor as the need for national unity took precedence during a time of international peril.

Selig is critical of the “cultural gifts” approach to the black/white divide. In her mind, its focus on education often ignored the economic and institutional realities of segregation. She also argues, like many scholars of “whiteness,” that its efforts expanded the boundaries of Americanism to include white immigrants while excluding blacks. For instance, she writes that the NCCJ’s interfaith programs “solidified a definition of whiteness that included Jews and Catholics, even as it marginalized other religions and reinforced racial divisions between white and nonwhite peoples” (150).

Selig might not have the last word on this point. Although many of these programs did not thoroughly challenge the Jim Crow framework, in the face of the intense nativist and racist climate of pre-World War II

America, these groups helped to lay the groundwork for the more liberal postwar climate that allowed the civil rights movement to flourish.

American All features extremely detailed discussions of numerous topics. Some of the sections in the book, like the one on changes in social science, could have been edited to make the book more readable without diminishing the substance of Selig's argument. Nonetheless, Selig has used a tremendous array of archival sources to produce a valuable addition to the literature on pluralism between the wars.

Robert Flegler
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Making a Non-White America: Californians Coloring Outside Ethnic Lines, 1925–1955. By Allison Varzally (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2008) 305 pp. \$60.00 cloth \$24.95 paper

In 1943, a Mexican American woman and an African-American man, both in their early twenties, met on the production line at Lockheed Aviation and began to date. Ostensibly, Andrea Pérez and Sylvester Davis made an unlikely duo, but, in fact, the two shared similar biographies, having been raised Catholic in multiracial neighborhoods by working-class parents who had migrated to Los Angeles in the 1920s. These commonalities cemented their relationship, and when Davis returned to town after a stint in the Army, he and Pérez started to talk of a future together, bracing themselves to confront their parents' opposition, if not quite anticipating the other barrier in their path—the county clerk's office.

In 1948, Pérez and Davis successfully sued to nullify California's ban on interracial marriage, becoming the first couple to quash an anti-miscegenation law in any state. Yet, although at the time their story made national headlines, in recent scholarship it has rarely surfaced beyond the occasional footnote. This lacuna is symptomatic of a larger problem: Comparative histories of race have tended to pivot on the color line between white and non-white, particularly white and black, seldom exploring encounters along other boundaries, boundaries like that between black and brown.

Varzally sets out to rectify this imbalance. Placing herself in conversation with historians of the consolidation of whiteness, such as Jacobson and Roediger, Varzally explores “the often hidden history of mingling and mixing among minorities” (2).¹ She argues that if the dominant conception of national belonging during the first half of the twentieth century was of a White America (Varzally's capitalization), then its counter-

1 Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998); David Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (New York, 1991).

point was of a “non-White America,” a racial imaginary founded on “situational commonalities” (184). In a society structured by white supremacy, Varzally points out, “non-Whites mixed because it was difficult not to” (6).

Spanning the period between the great migrations of the 1920s and the witch hunts of the 1950s, Varzally’s narrative surveys a handful of the experiences and concerns around which Pérez and Davis and others of their generation came together as “non-White”: youthful rebellion, interracial intimacy, nativism on the domestic front, and racism on the battlefield. These sketches culminate in a final chapter on such civil-rights milestones as *Perez v. Sharp*, the ruling that allowed Miss Pérez to become Mrs. Davis; echoing conventions in current scholarship on the long civil rights movement, Varzally concludes rather than begins with overt protest to demonstrate how “a spirit of quasi-cosmopolitanism” in the classroom and on the shop floor gave rise to a strategy of coalition building in the courtroom and in the legislature (4).

This claim about the seemingly apolitical roots of the political is entirely convincing, partly because of the historiography that Varzally references and partly because of the sheer mass of evidence that she presents. She taps all manner of sources—oral histories, newspapers, memoirs, novels, personal papers, court records, sociological treatises, census data, maps, and photographs (she includes a number of striking studio portraits). Although much of this material is already treated in other studies, Varzally’s focus is not excavation but juxtaposition. The memories of Cesar Chavez take on new significance when paired with the prose of Chester Himes.

But if Varzally’s sources hail from multiple disciplines, her methods never stray from the empiricism of social history. Analytically, Himes’ prose stands on equal footing with Chavez’s memories, and in turn with photographs and maps: All amount to mere units of evidence, not symbolic acts. Yet people do not put pen to paper or pose for cameras simply to record their worlds for posterity. People *make themselves* through memoirs and maps. Himes contributed to “the making of a non-White America” by writing a novel, for example, and it is important to read him as a novelist and not a sociologist. Only when historians use interdisciplinary tools to ask how we know what we know can we begin to grasp how individuals have embodied the multiple meanings of a social construct such as race. Consider the case of Pérez and Davis; they had to sue to marry because although Pérez viewed herself as “Mexican” (not “non-White”), the state categorized her as “White.” If “non-White,” like “White,” is as much an identity as a border, then Varzally never quite elucidates it, though she does provide future scholars with an ample and fascinating context to chart its history.

Dara Orenstein
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Who Owns the Sky? The Struggle to Control Airspace from the Wright Brothers On. By Stuart Banner (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2008) 353 pp. \$29.95

This fine book is an imaginative study of a forgotten byway in American legal history. By an old common-law maxim, whoever owned a piece of land also had rights to whatever lay underneath the surface, plus rights all the way up to the heavens (“usque ad coelum”). In the nineteenth century, this guideline was not much of a problem, except for the occasional issue of overhanging branches, and the irruption of balloons once in a while. The airplane changed everything. Were these flying machines trespassing when they passed over somebody’s land? Legal scholars argued and argued the point. In the end, the answer was generally “no,” pilots were not trespassers. Clearly, this had to be the case, whatever the validity of the ancient maxim. Otherwise, the whole industry would have been strangled in infancy. Getting permission from every landowner would have imposed impossible costs on aviators and airline companies. To be sure, landowners did own and control their air space, but only up to a point, and certainly not as high as the sky. The situation on take-off and landing was more complicated; landowners unlucky enough to live near an airport or airstrip often suffered real damage. This issue is still, one might add, very much alive.

On the national level, the question of rights came out quite differently. After all, as early as World War I, airplanes had become war machines, which dropped bombs on targets from the sky. Nations clearly had to be able to control their sovereign air space. This claim was quickly conceded. But then came the invention of satellites, which orbited in outer space, high above the earth. At some point, national sovereignty had to end; outer space (wherever that can be said to begin), like the high seas, was free for all nations to use. Today, the air is “full of flying things . . . jumbo jets, news helicopters, small private planes, model rockets” (288). Each new kind of “flying thing,” as it developed, posed new difficulties for the legal system. Most, but not all, of these issues were resolved to general satisfaction.

This brief synopsis hardly does justice to a rich, witty, and informative text. The ways in which scholars and jurists wrestled with the question “Who owns the sky?” is fascinating in its own right. But Banner is after bigger game. He wants to explore how changes in technology impacted law, and, by the same token, how “legal change also influenced the world of aviation,” since the “arrow of causation . . . pointed in both directions at once” (203–294). The last chapter of the book is a brief but trenchant essay on these reciprocal relationships. There is also an imaginative chapter on the “rise and fall of air law,” which explores how “aviation law” developed as a field in the legal academy—only to disappear quickly; this chapter is a wise and original contribution to the history of legal education and legal scholarship. In general, *Who Owns the Sky?* is

an excellent addition to the literature of American legal history and, one might add, to the literature on law and society in general.

Lawrence M. Friedman
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Here, George Washington Was Born: Memory, Material Culture, and the Public History of a National Monument. By Seth Bruggeman (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 2008) 280 pp. \$59.95 cloth \$24.95 paper

Bruggeman's "public history of a national monument" evolved out of his research for an administrative history of the George Washington Birthplace National Monument (GEWA) that was published by the National Park Service (NPS) in 2006. Bruggeman was given unfettered access to the site's NPS records, which are significant in American history as representative of the hagiography of Washington and of the interpretive problems with which the NPS struggles around the country. Prior to 1930, the NPS focused on preserving the nation's natural resources. Assumption of responsibility for the George Washington Birthplace brought with it a host of headaches that the NPS had never anticipated, such as issues of "memory, ownership of the past, and the wonderfully slippery meaning of authenticity" (6), which are frequently the subject of debate at public history sites. The saga surrounding the creation and operation of the place where Washington lived until he was three offers an opportunity to explore the kind of fundamental questions with which public historians wrestle on a regular basis.

The National Monument at the center of Bruggeman's study had an inauspicious beginning. Shortly after the conclusion of the War of 1812, George Washington Parke Custis, Washington's step-grandson and self-appointed keeper and promoter of his memory, set sail in his schooner for the site on the Virginia peninsula known as the Northern Neck, where Washington was born in 1732. Since the house was destroyed by fire in 1799, all that remained on the site when Custis arrived in 1815 or 1816 were the ruins of a chimney. After piling up several bricks, Custis deposited a stone on top of them proclaiming, "Here The 11th of February, 1732, (Old Style,) George Washington Was Born" (26). Although archaeologists later concluded that Custis missed the mark with the placement of his stone, his action imbued the site with a sense of importance that still resonates.

GEWA has been a revered, yet controversial site since the NPS assumed ownership in 1930. Bruggeman chronicles the resulting "decade upon decade of commemorative recalibration," each layer invoking "the ideological exigencies of its time" (51). Thus, Bruggeman offers a case study of the site's evolution and the changes in its interpretive focus, as well as a fascinating glimpse into the inner workings of the NPS. Among his conclusions is the notion that the NPS plays a more important

role than any other organization in “shaping how our nation’s history is understood” (6).

The GEWA site exemplifies how the NPS can be both a leader and a follower in setting standards of interpretation; Bruggeman does not shy away from offering a candid assessment of the agency’s efforts. An early attempt at developing a “living history” component at GEWA represents both the NPS’ forward thinking and its inability to move beyond the social constraints of the time.

Bruggeman’s exploration of the flexuous nature of history as it is revealed for public consumption makes a fine addition to the memory studies and public-history canon. It also offers great insight into the policies, practices, and politics of the government agency that stands as the guardian of many commemorative sites in the United States.

Jennifer W. Dickey
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The Elusive Dream: The Power of Race in Interracial Churches. By Korie L. Edwards (New York, Oxford University Press, 2008) 240 pp. \$29.95

It is often said that 11AM on Sunday morning, when many Christians gather for church, is the most segregated hour in America. Indeed, as Edwards notes, “[I]nterracial churches, where no racial group comprises more than 90% of a congregation, make up only 10% of churches in the United States” (15). In this volume, Edwards employs a sociological methodology to examine the role of race in interracial churches, focusing specifically on congregations with African-American and white members. She adds to recent studies, including the work of Emerson, that examine multiracial congregations as organizational alternatives to the dominant patterns of religious and racial division.¹ Although Edwards pursues a similar research agenda, her results temper her optimism. Combining evidence from her own in-depth congregational study with survey data from the National Congregations Study, Edwards argues that interracial congregations frequently perpetuate white privilege and reaffirm whiteness, despite their professed desire to challenge this bias.²

Edward’s attention to the social production of whiteness in interracial churches is a welcome addition to congregational studies. The types of questions raised in this book should resonate beyond what is at times a narrow subfield of sociology, even for historians and other scholars who might not share its methodology. In her examination of how “race works to reproduce white hegemony,” Edwards touches on themes of

1 Michael O. Emerson and Rodney M. Woo, *People of the Dream: Multiracial Congregations in the United States* (Princeton, 2006); Emerson and Christian Smith, *Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion and the Problem of Race in America* (New York, 2000).

2 Mark Chaves, *National Congregations Study*, data file and codebook, Dept. of Sociology (Univ. of Arizona, 1998).

diversity, inclusion, and difference through the lens of power, constraint, and concession. She measures whiteness primarily in terms of congregational practices, which include worship styles, race-related discussions, and community and political involvement. Using these measures, Edwards proposes that interracial congregations are more like white churches than African-American churches. Some historians might take issue with the use of religious habits or cultural styles as markers of racial identities. Historically, congregational practices have varied among both African-American and white churches. To her credit, Edwards recognizes this variation and provides a brief historical overview on race and religion in the United States in her introduction. She also does a wonderful job of describing differences among both African-American and white members in the congregation that she studied. Nonetheless, not everyone will agree that she accounts adequately for those historical variations in her sociological description of whiteness.

Edwards' argument could have been strengthened with a more sustained analysis of class within a broader view of American religious history. She gestures in this direction when she cites the work of Ignatiev, which describes how Irish Catholics used whiteness as a strategy of economic mobility.³ But she could have pursued that angle further, especially given the fact that interracial congregations are overwhelmingly middle-class. Do African Americans participate in congregations that perpetuate whiteness in an effort to achieve or sustain a certain economic status? Work in anthropology on race and class, such as that of Roediger on whiteness, in addition to Verba's work in political science on "Anglo-white civic skills" (although Harris and others contest this category), could add insight to an already fascinating study.⁴ As suggestive as it is conclusive, the *Elusive Dream* should be required reading for anyone interested in the relationship between race and religion in America.

Chad E. Seales
George Mason University

The Teahouse: Small Business, Everyday Culture, and Public Politics in Chengdu, 1900–1950. By Di Wang (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2008) 355 pp. \$65.00

I have spent time in a Chengdu teahouse only once, but it was a memorable few hours. The tea was good, the company excellent, and the sight of men and women having their ears cleaned as they sat and chatted to friends was nostalgic, if a little unusual (an image of the very teahouse is

3 Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (New York, 1995).

4 David R. Roediger, *The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class* (New York, 1991); Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1995); Frederick C. Harris, *Something Within: Religion in African-American Political Activism* (New York, 1999).

provided on page 125). Wang's new history of Chengdu teahouses in the first half of the twentieth century places my small experience into a beautifully elucidated context, and it is a pleasure to read. Indeed, I read it happily over several cups of tea.

As a work of accessible history and as a labor of poignant description, the book is a great success. The few criticisms of its methodology must be taken in that light. Briefly, the interdisciplinary nature of the work lies mostly in its sources, which range from archival data to modernist writings (such as the works of Li Jieren), to songs and pictures from the period. The analyses, especially in the final section regarding public space and civil society, show that the author is clearly aware of the scholarly debate since 1989 about that subject in both republican and post-liberation China. Although the bibliography is sound, Wang does not engage directly with the theoretical groundings in that literature, leaving the book conceptually thinner than it might otherwise have been. Perhaps the promised sequel on the teahouse after 1949 could bridge that gap and consider some of the difficult questions around civility, public life, and sociality that are clearly at the heart of the teahouse as an institution. Likewise, a more robust discussion about the place of Sichuanese exceptionalism in the place politics of the teahouse would have been helpful. Wang makes reference to the politics of place kinship under a central government, but it is anecdotal rather than developed (232).

Wang divides his story into three sections, broadly covering business and labor, life and entertainment, and politics. This approach allows him to use substantial archival material from a number of different perspectives. For example, a few key "characters" (whose careers as teahouse entertainers and waiters presumably spanned a good deal of the period under discussion) turn up at more than one juncture. Blind Jia, Pockmarks Zhou, and Fatso Si (waiters and peddlers) populate the pages of various sections as though inviting readers to feel like regulars—always demonstrating an awareness of their status as highly skilled members of the laboring poor and their undoubted vulnerability to the gangs, soldiers, and spies who used the teahouses as a venue for criminal and political activities.

The first section of the book sets the scene, providing financial, topographical, and demographical accounts of the city of Chengdu and the place of teahouses in its social landscape. It gives a detailed and lively account of the interplay between the teahouse union or guild and the organs of local government in the setting of prices, taxes, and regulations (62–65). The most astonishing facts remind us of the scale of inflation during the final years of the War of Resistance (*kangri*): "During 1942–1945, after constant struggle, the guild managed to increase the price from 60 cents a bowl to 12 yuan to catch up with inflation" (64).

The second section again offers a lively and detailed discussion of the skills and conditions of the waiters, and a long section on waitresses, which reveals how women's access to public life waxed and waned in

relation to masculine conceptions of morality and self-interest. Sadly, no improvement in women's rights to/at work occurred as the imaginative structures of republicanism and modernity took hold in the teahouse. Similarly, Wang's discussion of how class manifested even in the egalitarian world of the teahouse are suggestive more of contemporary China than of an antiquated past (184).

Finally, the book discusses politics, and relates the struggle between the teahouse as a public space open to political discourse and the teahouse as a site for carefully placed Kuomintang propaganda. Wang's book makes the travesty of this appropriation clear, clashing with the teahouse of old as a vibrant space of entertainment, cinema, healthcare, politics, small business, and, above all, relaxation.

Stephanie Hemelryk Donald
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Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia. By Ayesha Jalal (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2008) 373 pp. \$29.95

This book, by one of the most eminent scholars of South Asian history, unpacks the many layered meanings of *jihad* in South Asia. Taking a concept that is too often simplistically and reductively understood, it traces jihad's centrality to Islamic thought in South Asia from precolonial times to the present day. It brilliantly asserts the importance of jihad as a "moving spirit" in Islam, and the shifting meanings of jihad as part of "a spiritual, intellectual and moral struggle" to establish personal and social equilibrium within the Muslim community (14). It deals with jihad as both internal striving and external action and does not shy away from times when jihad has resulted in fighting and the waging of war: "Both kinds of jihad have animated Muslims in varying measure, depending on the historical context" (303).

Jalal writes with a sensibility that is alive both to the inner meanings of faith and the pressures on intellectual ideas exerted by external, historical circumstance. Hence, her interpretations of jihad are not abstracted and stripped from their timeframe; Jalal comprehends the leading South Asian Islamic thinkers, from Shah Waliullah to A. K. Azad and Mawdudi, against the backdrop of their own historical and intellectual environment.

One of the book's many strengths, and the virtue of its historical perspective, is its challenge to notions of fixity and unity in Islam by showing the scope for *ijtihad* (independent reasoning). Many changes over time have occurred as leading thinkers and Islamic groups have struggled with the tension between ethics and jurisprudence, the demands of politically expedient accommodation and resistance to political forces, alongside the inner struggle "to be human." For instance, "it was not until the eighteenth century that fears about loss of Muslim sover-

eignty triggered a redefinition of jihad as the obverse of *aman* (peace)” (15). Yet, above all, the intellectual debates between Muslims have been just as—if not more—important for the shaping of these ideas than encounters with non-Muslims. Political forces, both in the past and in the present, have appropriated and simplified historical jihads, such as Sayyid Ahmad’s war against the Sikh kingdom from 1826 to 1831.

As Jalal argues, South Asia has been a particularly important test bed for Islamic thought. South Asia, where Muslims have often faced being in a minority, shows how commonplace stereotypes of Islam fall short. In particular, Jalal stresses the redundancy of “the limited and sterile dichotomy between the religious and the secular” (241). Islamic thinkers have shown great versatility in accommodating different notions of state power. Yet, sadly, anticolonial and nationalistic expressions have lately given way to radical reinterpretations of jihad in Pakistan among groups that support unethical and dehumanized action. “Jihad has gone from being the core ethical principle of Islam to becoming a justification for unethical actions, in pursuit of worldly aims” (300).

This book opens up many more questions and should inspire new research about the ways in which interpretations of jihad by leading Muslim thinkers have filtered down beyond elites to Muslims in general.

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Bengal in Global Concept History: Culturalism in the Age of Capital. By Andrew Sartori (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2008) 288 pp. \$55.00 cloth \$22.00 paper

In this signal contribution to the emerging field of South Asian intellectual history, Sartori avoids the commonplaces of the colonial archive by a close reading of vernacular texts and an intensive engagement with Marxist social theory closely associated with Postone.¹ Through a study of canonical Bengali thinkers such as Bankim Chatterjee, Rabindranath Tagore, and Aurobindo Ghosh, Sartori affirms an established periodization of Bengali history that accords with the classic scholarship of Kling and Sarkar, as well as the new, influential arguments of Goswami.² Following Kling, Sartori situates the “failure” of Bengali liberalism and the rise of Hindu “culturalism” in the context of the fall of the Union Bank in 1848 and the passing of the Act X of 1859, which defined the rights of peasant farmers against landed elites. With Sarkar, he isolates another

1 Moishe Postone, *Time, Labor, and Social Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical Theory* (New York, 1993).

2 Sumit Sarkar, *The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903–1908* (New Delhi, 1973); Blair Kling, *Partner in Empire: Dwarkanath Tagore and the Age of Enterprise in Eastern India* (Berkeley, 1976); Manu Goswami, *Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space* (Chicago, 2004).

watershed of Bengali thought in the “failure” of the Swadeshi movement, 1905–1908, and with Goswami, he locates the rise of Indian territorial nationalist imagination in the context of post-1857 infrastructural innovations of the British Raj.

The impressive novelty of Sartori’s argument derives from his interpretation of how the political economy of Bengal, located within a system of global capital, determined the history of ideas in the region. By the term *culturalism*, Sartori means a set of responses by Bengali Hindu intellectuals to the alienation and dislocation brought by the rising global capitalist order. Before the economic crisis of 1848, culture was associated with liberal “reformism” and with what Sartori calls the proclamation of free, “underdetermined” subjectivities *vis-à-vis* the realm of nature. To be cultured among the Bengali *bhadralok* was to be above nature and instinct, and to be occupied with reading, writing, and erudition. Culturalism as antiliberalism first arose in Bengal after 1848, Sartori argues. The concept became part of a quasi-Romantic discourse among high-caste Hindu intellectuals as they reasserted their organic connection to the land and to the productive powers of rural labor. The failure of the Bengali Hindu productivist project at the end of the Swadeshi movement in 1908 led a large group among the Hindu political right toward a new, retrenched form of culturalism that set itself against the so-called barbarism of the “Muslim popular” threat and that located culture not in proximity to nature but in an internal realm of Hindu subjectivity.

Sartori’s approach generates other new findings. Abul Mansur Ahmad’s Bengali Muslim “Pakistanism” and Manabendra Nath Roy’s Hindu Marxist “parochial cosmopolitanism” were twentieth-century responses to culturalism in Sartori’s view, which were nonetheless caught up in the contradictions of global capitalism. However, bringing attention to the interregional social milieus and transnational conversations that sustained the pro-Pakistan and Marxist movements in Bengal would have enriched the latter sections of the book. Also, the strict dyads that Sartori adopts—liberalism versus culturalism, circulation versus production, and the global versus the local—may obscure alternative ideologies and intermediary spaces that operated within a global frame. For example, there is no discussion of forms of Bengali internationalism or cosmopolitan aspiration as possible alternatives to both liberalism and culturalism. Yet, on balance, Sartori presents a highly disciplined, careful, and imaginative intellectual history, and his Marxian history of ideas, grounded in economic relations instead of in discursive responses to the “colonial divide,” will incite lively debate and provide a much-needed stimulus to the writing of South Asian intellectual history.

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