Geschiere’s prescient work has two broad objectives: first, to describe how the language of *autochthony*—a primal form of belonging based on a special tie to the soil (223)—acquires similarly self-evident persuasiveness in widely divergent circumstances and, second, to differentiate the intensity of the emotional appeal that the concept possesses in these varied settings. The first goal is achieved with clarity and artfulness. The second, because of the nuance that it encompasses, raises more questions than it resolves, perhaps as the author intended.

Building on earlier work that analyzed autochthony discourse as part of a “global conjuncture of belonging,” this research engages in an impressive sweep of comparison—from ancient Athens to historical and current France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Ivory Coast, Congo, Senegal, South Africa, and particularly Cameroon. Geschiere notes that the recent upsurge in autochthony movements relates to globalization in its concern for the protection of indigenous cultures and the controversies surrounding increased immigration to Europe. More specifically, he focuses on the combined effects of democratization and decentralization, both converging recently in the African context. Elections serve to create the anxiety that locals will be outvoted by immigrants, while a decentralization strategy advocated by the new development discourse must determine the boundaries of the local communities that stand to profit from the disbursement of resources.

Methodologically, Geschiere draws from a wide range of theoretical and empirical studies of Africa and Europe, combining them skillfully with thirty years of his own familiarity with Cameroon. One of the most valuable aspects of the book is its temporal perspective; Geschiere compares field notes taken from the 1970s with recent interviews in Cameroon, supplementing them with evidence from local archives and newspaper accounts. Careful citations, contextual detail in footnotes, and generous attribution of other scholars’ ideas give the book a remarkable comprehensiveness and depth. Although only one of the five central chapters analyzes events in Europe, focusing on the Netherlands, it serves well to underline similar discourses throughout a range of settings.

Among its multitude of insights, the book reveals autochthony’s paradoxes—its apparent rootedness but actual malleability; its quest for cohesiveness, crumbling to inevitable segmentation; and its promise of security but manifestation in fear. After successfully discrediting the “self-evidence” of autochthony, Geschiere probes further to explore why it maintains power over people’s emotions. On this score, he distinguishes between the European and African settings, arguing that in Africa, the notion acquires a more concentrated force because of its abil-
ity to tap into people’s physical linkages with the soil. Most directly, this connection is manifested in funeral rituals, crucial events that publicly condense the emotional appeal of autochthony in “a visceral involvement of body and soil” (33). He contends that in the context of democratization and decentralization, the elaboration of such rituals has acquired political significance in Africa. Cameroon’s ruling party, for example, encourages elites to form regional associations, to build homes in rural areas and to return home for funerals, thereby establishing ties to their home villages that will serve to marshal votes in the new environment of electoral competition.

This intense emotional appeal of autochthony in Africa contrasts with a more diffuse—though still emotional—identification with the idea in European settings. Because of its difficulty linking to the soil as it does in Africa, Geschiere suggests that the discourse leads more to confusion than to a singular focus. An alternative explanation for the uncertainty may be the necessary compromise induced by vigorous public debates within European democratic institutions, as contrasted with the situation in many African contexts, where authorities can more easily manipulate the content of the term.

More critically, Geschiere’s careful elaboration of varying trajectories leaves some unanswered questions. Though he cautions that the Ivory Coast is not exceptional—that its violence is a logical outgrowth of the obsession with belonging—the fact that Cameroon has not imploded into equally widespread violence is significant. More pressing than the similarities in the depth of autochthony’s emotional appeal throughout Africa are the differences. Mass violence does not occur everywhere. Geschiere laudably traces the unique trajectories in each of his cases, but, in the end, a firm grasp of the common features that make belonging perilous only in some African settings proves to be elusive. This ambiguity may well be purposeful, and the underlying message of the dangerous power in such an empty discourse convinces with force.

Ericka A. Albaugh
Bowdoin College

Atlantic Diasporas: Jews, Conversos, and Crypto-Jews in the Age of Mercantilism, 1500–1800. Edited by Richard L. Kagan and Philip D. Morgan (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009) 307 pp. $60.00 cloth $30.00 paper

In large measure, “the Jew” is a forgotten subject in early modern history, and the Atlantic a suspect one. Yet deep mines of material on each subject lie ready for investigation. Atlantic Diasporas pairs them, excavating them both supremely well, and making clear just how important they were to the period.

Jewish diaspora was not new in the early modern era. Expelled from
England, France, and German principalities between 1200 and 1500, Ashkenazi Jews moved east into Poland, Lithuania, and Russia. In the west, the expulsions of Jews from Spain in 1492 and Portugal in 1497, and repressions of crypto-Jews (marranos) and New Christians (conversos) on both sides of the Atlantic, gave rise to a displaced and relocated collective from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. The collective was comprised of the global commercial and social networks that the diaspora created, which had the ability “to link all the seaborne empires, to connect communities across oceans, and to span the Protestant/Catholic divide” (4). This capacity was a unique economic, cultural, and political phenomenon, as the preface by Kagan and Morgan, ten essays by an array of specialists, and an epilogue by Natalie Zemon Davis show.

Most of the Atlantic Jews, having originated in Iberia or the Maghreb, possessed a common ethnicity and background. Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert observes, “Flight, exile, and movement were all foundational experiences.” Atlantic Jewish merchants in particular were “profoundly marked by the experiences of travel and displacement, and that from an early age” (80). Most of them settled permanently in northern Europe, western Africa, or the Americas. To cope with the dislocation, to maintain a connection with those left behind, and to earn a livelihood, they banded together—inhabiting multi-family dwellings, clustering in barrios, marrying within the clan, and choosing astutely the godparents of their children. Their status depended on time and place. Indeed, as Holly Snyder shows in one of the volume’s richest chapters, they “successfully managed to circumvent legal restrictions on Jewish enterprise and skillfully crossed imperial boundaries in order to cultivate trading relationships” (xii). In the Anglo-Atlantic world, attitudes toward Jewish trading “quickly shifted from generally neutral towards . . . sharply negative” after 1660 (54). Even so, the traders became chameleons, savvily adapting “to variable markets under varied kinds of authority” (63). During the eighteenth century in particular, they took “special care to retain the confidence of their consumers” (73).

Yet much also divided Atlantic Jews. They held no common occupation, instead performing multiple roles. Some were “port Jews,” working in overseas finance, shipping, and trade, as Wim Klooster carefully details, whereas others were “plantation Jews,” managing sugar estates and supervising slave laborers. In fact, the “Nation” was not even exclusively Jewish, its membership including “New Christians, Christians who converted to Judaism, Jews who converted to Christianity but retained old family ties, together with the mulatto offspring of Jewish slave owners,” as well as people who migrated to Africa or the Americas, or who lived in the Americas and (re)migrated to Europe (xi).

How to define a Jew became the diachronic question vexing early modern Atlantic Jewry—whether of Amsterdam, Lisbon, Senegal, Recife, Suriname, or New York. Multifaceted identity, nearly all authors suggest, was typical. “Religious identities cannot be attributed exclusively to spiritual considerations but instead owed much to sentimental,
social, and economic factors,” and the nonspiritual factors, in particular, were constantly in flux (150). Senegal’s or Suriname’s Jews, who, like other Europeans, frequently intermixed with Africans sexually, apparently recalibrated “their definitions of communal belonging,” moving from tracing Jewishness through the father (as they did originally and in the countryside) to tracing it through the mother (as they did later and in the city, in accordance with rabbinical laws) (164–165). Group cohesion, even when it was achieved, was always tenuous; witness the continual intra-community squabbles. The family firms studied by Francesca Trivellato constantly dissolved amidst dispute, and the community congregations in Recife sketched by Bruno Feitler were riven by factional infighting. As Trivellato makes abundantly clear, pace so much social-science theorizing, trust alone was insufficient to maintain networked diasporic relations. Sephardi Jews around the Atlantic basin found it necessary to combine family ties and trust with contractual agreements and other extra-clan institutions.

This volume offers an excellent rebuttal to those who think that either Jews or the Atlantic stand apart from nation and empire. The Jews were as imbricated in Atlantic exchange and life as any other group, and their activities as complex and, often, messy. Their Atlantic world, Davis concludes, was one of “fluid boundaries, not only in economic life, but in religious life and social intercourse as well” (113). Indeed, boundary crossing was critical for their progress, as were reliable networking, the trustworthiness of network members, and the capacity for building a new home in a strange land. Nation and empire cannot be fully understood if historians do not factor in the work of such men and women as well as the larger context of the economic and cultural web that their actions created. *Atlantic Diasporas* moves us closer toward that goal.

David Hancock
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

*Clothing: a Global History: Or, The Imperialists’ New Clothes.* By Robert Ross (Cambridge, Polity, 2008) 221 pp. $64.95 cloth $24.95 paper

Ross’ purpose in *Clothing: a Global History* is to explain how, when, and why Western dress orders have become global, even as they have taken on rich nuances of locality, gender, ethnicity, political affiliation, and class distinction. His book is a successful synthesis of social, political, and economic history with the recent wave of research on clothing and costume that places apparel into larger contexts of material and performance culture.

Ross argues that because Western dress was the first to be industrially produced, it became for many in the Third World a symbol of modernity and progress. He adduces evidence from such diverse examples as Peter the Great’s sartorial reforms in seventeenth-century Moscow
(106–110), Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s national-dress campaign in the 1920s (113–117), Christian missions in the Pacific Islands (83–102), and black nationalist South Africans during the second decade of the twentieth century (123–125). Dressing like a representative of the hegemonic power was significant not only for subaltern peoples but also, in the twentieth century, for women, who signaled their equality with men by putting on trousers (146).

Conversely, for some indigenous peoples under colonialism, since Western dress was a symbol of oppression, dress orders based on traditional revivalism were instituted for formal occasions, as in the case of Kwame Nkrumah’s Ghana in the 1960s (128–129). As Trevor-Roper has documented for the Scottish kilt, these supposed “revivals” of “native dress” bore little resemblance to what had actually been worn before the conquest of the population in question but were often imaginatively cut, as it were, from whole cloth.1 But historical authenticity, as Ross points out, was irrelevant: “What is seen as ethnic dress is . . . almost by definition, distinct from the general pattern which has increasingly spread across the globe. The message it is meant to send out is of local affinity, not of universalism” (135).

Ross makes his points in a lively, readable style (only slightly marred by poor copy editing). Readers are invited to engage in sartorial thought experiments that illuminate Ross’ points. In his discussion of “Reforming the Body: Reforming the Mind” in Chapter 8, for example, he calls attention to the role of Western clothing in the globalized environment of air travel by contrasting the vague references to national dress worn by flight attendants on such national airlines as Nippon, and the universality of Western dress worn by pilots. “Would anyone feel comfortable,” Ross asks, “in a plane knowing that the pilot was wearing a sarong?” The modern uniform signifies the wearer’s modern technological competence.

Clothing: A Global History is a short book, and an easy read that adds a fresh perspective to studies of global history, colonialism, economic development, military history, and the history of costume.

Rachel Maines
Cornell University


Blanning conceived of this book from hearing listeners react to his pre-concert talks, telling him that music went into great decline during the twentieth century. Thus, avant-garde composers only wrote “plinks and

plonks accessible only by other musicians” or popular artists explored “ever more subterranean depths of offensive vulgarity” (325). Finding such reactions subjective, Blanning proposes to show that music triumphed as the most successful of the arts in the modern age. He writes to a broad public, as is common among British music historians, to illustrate how music’s importance grew from the time of Claudio Monteverdi to the present. The book treats five social aspects in successive sections, showing how musicians captured public attention, reshaped the purposes of music, developed new performing venues, expanded their technology, and liberated national consciousness. Blanning characterizes the argument at the start by showing how British golden jubilees brought musical triumphs: George III (1809), Queen Victoria (1887), and Queen Elizabeth II (2002), the latter mingling popular and classical music before an audience of 200 million people. What results is provocative, a good read, though with some problematical aspects.

The most specific aspects of the book work the best, thanks to Blanning’s vivid examples. In the section on venues, he portrays rock concerts in football stadiums as the cathedrals of the modern day, bringing the “religion of the people” to the widest possible public (172). The performance of classical music in big halls in the middle of the nineteenth century—Hector Berlioz performing in a circus palace holding 5,000 people—brought the “democratization” of musical taste and then the standardization of dance forms, everyone doing the same steps even if in different spaces.

The section on technology is imaginative, portraying the musical “saturation” of many social contexts, first through keyboard instruments, then saxophones, and finally the “electrification” of music for the youth. Seeing how inventive musicians have been, Blanning scoffs at journalists who herald the death of the music industry. He also scorns the hierarchical ordering of listening practices so common in music history today, the Whiggish argument that “attentive” listeners did not arise until the early nineteenth century and can be found only in sacralized classical music.

The sections on “Status” (musicians’ self-promotion) and “Purpose” (why compose music or perform it?), however, are built on a problematical argument, that singers and conductors replaced composers as mediators between music and society during the nineteenth century. For one thing, the boundaries between composer and performer remained vague in many instances. For another thing, by the 1860s two-thirds or more of the pieces played by orchestras and string quartets were classics, giving composers a profoundly subordinate position in musical culture. Blanning has little to say about this change.

Blanning mentions the invention of classical music when discussing matters in 1900, even though its origins can be seen in eighteenth-century British repertories drawn from the music of William Byrd, Henry Purcell, and George Frideric Handel. He is wrong to blame com-
posers for abandoning the public from the turn of the twentieth century. A fragmentation of musical life began in the 1850s, severing classical symphonies from popular songs and from “new classical” songs or symphonies. The section on “Liberation” is also problematical. Blanning uses the same term to discuss the operas that Jean-Baptiste Lully wrote in Paris during the 1670s and the influence of the Risorgimento on Giuseppe Verdi (which has come into considerable dispute recently).

But the notion of musical triumph rings true. Music has achieved a special public prominence in Western culture. To Blanning’s list of examples might be added the wide dissemination of Benjamin Britten’s music (the *Ceremony of Carols*, for example) during a period when contemporary music was at a historic low. Rather the same goes for American composers John Cage and John Adams, whose works *4’33*” and *Nixon in China*, respectively, have had a major impact internationally. Now that musical culture is so highly fragmented, a work does not have to reach millions at once to count as a triumph.

William Weber
California State University, Long Beach

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*Rafter’s* *The Criminal Brain* is a superb intellectual and cultural history of biological theories of crime, inspired by the author’s desire to find “a new or third way” to integrate biological, sociological, and historical approaches to crime (251). Rafter’s study, however, is largely a cautionary tale about the potential dangers of searching for biological explanations of criminal conduct. Criminologists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries turned to phrenology, criminal anthropology, evolutionary theory, intelligence tests, and analyses of body types to understand crime in a manner that reified the differences between criminals and non-criminals. Adopting a “medical model” of crime, they focused on the physical traits that they believed distinguished criminals and largely ignored the circumstances in which criminals lived (242).

Most early biocriminologists tried to reduce “the complexities of criminal behavior to a single biological factor,” such as the size of the frontal lobes of the brain, the shape of the skull, or the capacity to learn (243). Most of them were also convinced that biology was destiny. They believed that interactions between biology and the environment played little, if any, role in shaping the behavior of criminals. Given their assumptions, it is not surprising that many biocriminologists embraced eugenics, since they believed that criminals represented a lower, atavistic state of human evolution. Nor is it surprising that behavioral scientists
lost interest in biological explanations of crime once they had witnessed the atrocities committed by the Nazis and other eugenicists in the name of biocriminology.

In Rafter’s opinion, the changes in biology since World War II will make it possible to create a “biosocial” criminology that avoids the pitfalls of early biocriminology. “For the first time,” she writes, “there is a genuine possibility for collaborations between social scientists and cognitive, genetic, and neurological scientists working on crime” (246). Biologists no longer belittle “the possibility that social factors might affect criminal behavior,” because the ways in which genes are expressed “depend on social factors” (243, 246). Brain damage, lead poisoning, childhood traumas, stress, poor diet, drug abuse, and other factors can help to predispose people to antisocial behavior. Genes play a role in human behavior, but they do not determine it. Furthermore, although biologists no longer believe it possible to draw a sharp physical line between criminals and non-criminals, between “us” and “them” (245), Rafter is excited by recent research on acquired biological deficits, cognitive deficits, genetics, and neuroscience. This new work will not improve our understanding of crime, however, unless social scientists “acknowledge that biological factors affect crime” (246).

Rafter spends little time on recent works in primatology that suggest that many criminal behaviors—theft, deceit, sexual assault, and homicide—have deep evolutionary roots. She spends more time on the differences between criminals and non-criminals than on the potential of all humans for criminal behavior. Nor does she consider at length the evolution of moral reasoning, which gives humans the capacity to define certain kinds of behaviors as criminal. The Criminal Brain is nonetheless an outstanding book, which should be required reading not only for criminologists, but for all scholars who would like to engage scientists and social scientists in a more fruitful dialogue about human behavior.

Randy Roth
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Martha Lampland and Susan Leigh Star (eds.), Standards and Their Stories: How Quantifying, Classifying and Formalizing Practices Shape Everyday Life (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2009) 244 pp. $65.00 cloth $22.95 paper

Lampland and Star have compiled a series of essays and short vignettes to describe how “standards” and the practice of standardization pervade modern life. The volume is organized into an opening chapter with a framework for studying standards as a part of “infrastructure studies,” followed by six chapters organized around particular types of standards. They use examples of standards for age, the body-mass index, ASCII,
metadata, productivity, toxic chemicals in the environment, and many others. The book includes an appendix on teaching a course on standards as part of infrastructure studies.

The dictionary defines a *standard* as “something established by authority, custom, or general consent as a model or example” or “something set up and established by authority as a rule for the measure of quantity, weight, extent, value, or quality.”¹ Standardization is the process of creating standards to facilitate a practice or behavior.

The editors’ goals are both eclectic and ambitious. Their analytical tools and references derive from history, philosophy, the social sciences, statistics, and cultural studies, and, as a result, their bibliography is extensive and useful. Their examples of particular standards range from medieval prints illustrating the seven deadly sins to applications forms for joining Al-Qaeda. They also examine in dozens of short case studies how particular standards are applied, used, and changed. Thus, the book is great fun to read for the surprising insights into how standards both facilitate and frustrate social processes and how people compensate when standards fail for one reason or another.

The chief strength of the book is its capacity to bring an almost invisible aspect of social life to the forefront of analytic treatment. By comparing different types of standards and processes of standardization, Lampland and Leigh Star display the social decision making, power relations, ethical issues, conflicts, and benefits built into them.

This long reach, however, also has its drawbacks. The book is less successful at developing a sustained argument about when, where, and how an individual standard, or standardization in general, slips from being a useful facilitator of everyday life to becoming a burden on behavior or social life. For example, the invention of standardized sizing for clothes permitted a readymade industry to develop, but it also created a problem for people with body types that do not match the available sizes. The authors do not systematically discuss how to evaluate such tradeoffs, how to decide whether a standard is inappropriate, undemocratic, or outdated, or how to go about changing one.

The book ultimately raises more questions than it answers. More structured argument and summary analysis of the six chapters of examples would have been welcome. Nevertheless, Lampland and Star have successfully opened an important research area. Hopefully they and others will continue to develop the field of infrastructure studies.

Margo Anderson
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

As its title indicates, this innovative work is a study of the basic economic structures of the Roman Empire in comparison with those of other premodern empires. Bang argues that an analytical comparison of this type is necessary for the Roman economy (57)—especially since the misleading developmental model of the transition from the ancient to the medieval and early modern economies of Western Europe has been most frequently used as the standard of measurement for Roman “development.” He rightly contends that the constant comparisons of ancient and modern are not conducive to a better understanding of ancient economies, including Rome’s. Given the quality and quantity of the surviving evidence, he argues that it is more fruitful to measure the Roman Empire against similar premodern empires—like that of Mughal India (ca. 1530–1740).

The main problem in the Roman case, as Bang realizes, is the absence of a whole range of quantitative data needed to answer basic questions of economic history. Like many other researchers, he therefore has recourse to the device of parametric modeling of gross domestic product (GDP), the amount of tribute or tax collected by the state, and the size of the state budget relative to the annual income of the Empire (see Chapter 2, especially Table 2.1, 87–88). On this basis, Bang is able to postulate the likely share of the whole economy that was dominated or controlled by the state and, by default, what was left to the private sector. One result of his efforts (in Chapter 1) is a lively defense of the Finleyan model of the ancient economy as a premodern system bounded and defined by overarching social constraints. Bang therefore rejects the idea, whether of Roman historians like Pleket or modern economists like Temin, that the economy of the Empire was basically “modern” in type, characterized by large conglomerates of interconnected price-setting markets.

Instead, the author argues, the tributary requirements of both Mughal India and imperial Rome usurped so much of the available surplus in the economy that they left relatively little to the private sphere. Two consequences follow for the Roman Empire, as well as for Mughal India: First, the class of traders and merchants could never develop sufficient wealth and power to challenge the landed service aristocracies tied to the state. Second, the instruments of tribute governed by the state tended to be driving forces in economic development, both in the geographical placement of its main centers and in the modes of investment.

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In the second half of the book, Bang turns to investigate the markets in both empires. Employing mainly Egyptian price series (which seem to be less than conclusive on the matter), he argues that a lack of market integration caused prices and supplies in these economies—which were characterized by bottlenecks, imbalances, and asymmetries—to shift erratically (139). The result, which can be seen in both the Mughal and Roman worlds (Chapter 5), was the recourse of merchants and traders to a “bazaar” economy in which friends, families, and various associations became the main conduits of information and supply. Rather than failing to achieve a spurious modernity, these precapitalist economic entrepreneurs were actually “going with the flow” and working successfully within the confines of their peculiar type of market.

Bang’s aim is to construct a new framework for explicating the economy of the Roman Empire (292)—a model which, as he is at pains to emphasize, is not a weak compromise between primitivist and modernist reconstructions of the economic past. He offers a portrait of the Roman economy that is not “a failed version of modernity or an agrarian economy approaching mechanization,” but something to be understood on its own terms. Despite the author’s boast of being the first to essay this kind of comparison, his analytical confrontation of the Roman Mediterranean with the economy of the Mughal subcontinent is not entirely new; see, for example, John Haldon, *The State and the Tributary Mode of Production* (London, 1993), 218–240, which covers many of the same questions and sets of evidence. The main problem with most of these adventurous studies, including Bang’s, is not new either—a huge deficit in the required types of evidence, such as consistent runs of market prices for given commodities. The upshot is that that the theorizing tends to outrun the available data, with heavy recourse on both sides of the comparison to parametric modeling—which, in the end, seems to produce the “facts” necessary to complete the comparison.

In this contentious field, where much of the evidence and its interpretation is still in dispute, other researchers will certainly disagree with some, if not many, of the author’s claims. But Bang’s well-researched and clearly written (and much-warranted) investigation will prove valuable to anyone interested in the comparative history of premodern empires and economies. Bang is surely right to claim the need for more studies of comparable ancient structures rather than more comparisons between ancient and modern ones. His is a first big step in the right direction.

Brent D. Shaw
Princeton University
The Making of Roman India. By Grant Parker (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008) 357 pp. $99.00

The title of this work may deceive unwary readers. Some will find their expectations disappointed—or perhaps subverted. Parker does not refer to the shaping or the evolution of an India under Roman influence. There was no such Roman influence. Indeed the book deliberately skirts any actual, authentic, or concrete India. The “making of India” alludes to the image of that land and people in the eyes of classical authors, to the imaginative realm framed by those remote from its reality, to the discourse about that distant place—in short, to the construct of India. Even the “Roman” part of the title can be misleading. Much of the work treats Greek conceptualizing about India, starting from classical authors like Herodotus, Hecataeus, Scylax, and Ctesias and moving into high gear with Hellenistic representations by the Alexander historians, by Megasthenes, and by Clearchus. Moreover, many of the texts in the Roman period that Parker exploits are, in fact, the work of Greek authors—Strabo, Lucian, Ptolemy, Philostratus, and Diogenes Laertius. If there is anything distinctively Roman about the portrayals, it is difficult to discern. Most of the construct had been manufactured by Greeks but only adapted by Romans.

This book is a learned one, drawing impressively upon a wide range of sources, and framing India through a multitude of lenses—historians, geographers, mythographers, visual depictions, rhetoricians, philosophers, even Christian writers, who had their own perceptions and their own agendas. Some writers found fascination with India as representing the ends of earth, imagined as a land filled with marvels and monsters, or as a utopia, blurring the lines between truth and fiction (insofar as such lines existed at all). Others, spurred by the increased familiarity fostered by commercial contact, especially the spice and silk trade, conceived India as a seductive site of wealth and luxury. Still others fashioned Indian intellectuals as oriental purveyors of wisdom, ascetics, and holy men, by analogy with Hellenic philosophers or Christian sages. Parker rightly stresses the multiplicity and the complexity of the images. No single thread runs throughout, but a variety of strands.

One pivotal figure, however, does take center stage—Alexander the Great. The conqueror’s celebrated campaign in the east brought him as far as the Indus valley and into the Punjab. He left little or no tangible impact on India, but he fired the imaginations of Greeks, prompting the projections of fabulous fictions, inspiring new geographies and ethnographies, and, most tellingly, providing a model for Roman emperors who sought to emulate Alexander’s feats, and to claim as their own, penetration to the boundaries of the world. Parker exaggerates this last impulse. Only Trajan among emperors evinced a desire to follow Alexander’s footsteps to India, and even he expressed the idea only when he reached the Persian Gulf near the end of his life. But the resonance of Alexander echoes through the Greek and Latin literature on this subject, and Parker properly calls attention to it.
The book does not profess to bring an interdisciplinary approach or methodology to its topic. Parker pays the conventional homage to Said and acknowledges that his notion of “Orientalism” gains reflection in the Roman tendency to view the east as a totality. But he rightly resists the idea that this impression casts the east in a consistently negative light or resolved itself into an “us and them” antithesis. Parker’s study breaks no new methodological ground. But it reveals the diversity of elements that formed the complex mosaic of this alluring subject.

Erich S. Gruen
University of California, Berkeley


Adroitly blending the vast scope of historical geography with the contextualized specificity of individual biography, Ogborn brings to life Britain’s central role in the creation of the early modern global world. He eschews interpretive models based on such grand narratives as the rise of the West, or on such single economic explanations as the rise of capitalism, and he is not concerned with the political or administrative history of the British Empire. Instead, Ogborn employs a model of multiple webs or networks, tracing the patterns of engagement with the world that brought power and profit to some and oppression and exploitation to others. He views global history as made up of a variety of different processes, increasingly integrated by multiple forms of mental and manual labor, and contested through wars fought with weapons and ideas. The processes of trade, empire, labor, and exploration are illustrated by the activities of forty-two individuals who helped to create the New World. Merchants, explorers, captives, slave traders, enslaved Africans, indigenous intermediaries, brokers, sailors, landscape painters, plantation owners, pirates, and rebels, from the well known to the obscure, populate the pages.

Ogborn surveys the fragile beginnings of empire under Elizabeth: the often violent and savage European settlement of North America; the financial precariousness of the Atlantic triangular trade; the blending of American land, African labor, and European capital and management to form Caribbean plantation society; the setting up of trade with Asia which, because it already had land-based empires, regarded the Europeans as just one more set of merchants; and the exploration, driven by the dual desires of empire and enlightenment, of the Pacific. This increasingly global world was forged by explorers and entrepreneurs and by muscle, cooperation, and resistance. Sailors unfurled sails, loaded and unloaded ships, and manned guns. Enslaved Africans torn from their homelands toiled in the sugar islands of Barbados and Jamaica. Local in-

termediaries were vital to the success of every British venture. African merchants and rulers skillfully negotiated their place in the new Atlantic economy, and cultural and economic brokers known as nharas opened the way for Europeans to engage with African networks. Empire building in Asia would not have been possible without the assistance of groups like the pandits in India. Tupaia, a Polynesian navigator, mediated between the British and Pacific islanders. Ogborn details the unforeseen effects that the expanded interaction had on different cultures, as well as the efforts of those who resisted British imperialism.

*Global Lives* skirts scholarly debates, supplying mainly a fluent synthesis of secondary sources for non-specialists. Ogborn’s approach transforms the typical overarching, abstract narrative of global and imperial history into an investigation of human endeavor. Understanding global processes through the lens of biography highlights the role of human actions. Even with limited intentions, no overall plan, and uncertain outcomes, these human actions were crucial to the making of the New World. Greater nuance in the biographies would have been welcome, as would more of a focus on relationships. Ogborn offers lively descriptions of individuals and their world, but little analysis of what they thought and felt about the vast changes.

Linda A. Pollock
Tulane University

ELECTING OUR MASTERS: THE HUSTINGS IN BRITISH POLITICS FROM HOGARTH TO BLAIR.
By Jon Lawrence (New York, Oxford University Press, 2009) 328 pp. $59.95

This splendid study discusses the relationship between Britain’s political leaders and the public from the eighteenth century to the present. It has little concern with the ideas of the politicians or what they actually did but rather with how they dealt with those who lived in their constituency at the time of their attempts to win election to Parliament. From roughly the time of William Hogarth to the appointment of William Gladstone as prime minister, the hustings—the small temporary grandstands within constituencies where potential members of Parliament were selected to run, allowed to speak, and eventually declared winners—held much of the drama of Britain’s elections.

Slightly misleadingly, Lawrence uses the term *hustings* to cover the entire study, although the hustings actually disappeared in 1872; in their stead followed the generally more controlled “election meetings,” which, in their turn, have been largely supplanted by walkabouts, “surgeries,” posters, and leaflets distributed within particular constituencies, and television broadcasts, which operate on a national scale. The remnant of the hustings is evident in the present gathering of candidates in local halls where winners are declared. In an important sense, those who
control the media and the interviewers have replaced the roistering crowds of earlier days.

The drink, corruption, and disorder that characterized the hustings (and continued much longer than one might have expected; Edwardian England was particularly rowdy) were ironically an indication of a hierarchical and class-bound society. In this period, those lower on the social scale were licensed to cause their “betters” distress, whether or not they actually possessed the vote. How the candidates handled themselves was an important test of political worth. But with rare exceptions, the mayhem did not represent any challenge to the political system. As the nineteenth century progressed, the confrontations calmed down, but they certainly did not disappear or lose significance. What might have appeared as class warfare was, in fact, an affirmation that the upper classes, whether Tory or Whig/Liberal, would remain “masters.” Ironically, the class aspects of elections dramatically diminished with the advent of the Labour party, when workers became much more of a political factor (as Lawrence points out, the political elite today, as in the past, consists of much the same sort of person, regardless of party).

With the growth of broadcasting, especially television, the situation has become complex; at present, no definitive electoral pattern is obvious. Lawrence’s last line suggests that broadcasters may have become the new masters now, but there is good reason to doubt it. Yet, aggressive interviewers and media figures certainly play central roles in deciding the format of political presentations. The tradition of heckling and of throwing rotten cabbage and other missiles at candidates persists in British politics as a right, even in a hierarchical society.

Lawrence’s insightful analysis of the important relationship between politicians and the public “out of doors,” whether in a remote constituency or in a television studio, is a considerable achievement.

Peter Stansky
Stanford University


In this busy study, McKitterick, who has long emphasized the centrality of the written word in our understanding of early medieval culture, has brought the scholarship of historians, paleographers, and codicologists to bear on the reign of Charlemagne. For McKitterick, the great Frankish king’s far-reaching achievement rests chiefly on his reforms, which were responsible, as the subtitle of her book proclaims, for “the formation of a European identity.”

The book opens with a detailed examination of the image and career of Charlemagne as portrayed in the biographical and narrative de-
picturions of contemporaries. Throughout, McKitterick emphasizes the retrospective nature of these accounts and the implications, often occluding, for elucidating the person in his own time and place.

The second chapter examines the beginnings of the Carolingian dynasty—Charlemagne’s ascension to sole kingship and his expansion of the realm. Readers are treated here, and elsewhere, to knotty scholarly debates about Carolingian legitimacy, Charlemagne’s early rule, and his plans for succession. Charlemagne’s wars of expansion are quickly surveyed, but they do not receive the exegesis that they merit in view of the Frankish preoccupation with warfare.

The final three chapters explore Charlemagne’s governance of the realm. Chapters three and four examine the royal court and the vexed debates about its location and alleged itinerancy. McKitterick argues against the idea that Charlemagne presided over a primitive administration, forced to rove around an underdeveloped realm in search of food and scarce resources. Rather, a close examination of the documents and their manuscript traditions suggests periods of movement and residence, and a division between the ruler and the court, which might conduct royal business from several fixed places. Charlemagne himself seems to have traveled surprisingly little outside the heart of his realm in the Rhine-Moselle region, with the exception of his foreign campaigns or visits to Rome, which must have required a sophisticated network of communications and officials to disseminate the royal will.

The study culminates with a chapter on the so-called Carolingian Renaissance, Charlemagne’s synthesis of a distinctive European culture from Roman, Christian, and Frankish traditions—the most far-reaching of his successes. At this point, McKitterick binds up many of the themes raised in the preceding chapters, as well as in her previous monograph, *History and Memory in the Carolingian World* (New York, 2004). She brings these themes to bear on Charlemagne’s administrative and religious programs, placing them squarely within the context of Carolingian piety, which valued orthodoxy, liturgical and linguistic correctness, ties to the papacy, a veneration of Frankish royal tradition, and fealty to the saints. This concern for correctness was heightened, she argues, as the empire was enlarged, and the Franks came into contact with non-Christian peoples.

McKitterick’s study may well combine, and recapitulate, the traditional and recent scholarship on Charlemagne’s era a little too much for those seeking an evocative portrait of this pivotal ruler. The study speaks mostly to specialists, but in this capacity, it makes fundamental contributions to ongoing discussions about Charlemagne and the meaning of his reign.

Hans Hummer
Wayne State University

Shortly before the turn of the current millennium, medieval scholarship, especially in the United States, assumed, to a significant degree, a polemical mode. Although this shift is hardly revolutionary—the principal inquiry is still the actual past, not current perspectives on that past—nevertheless, today that inquiry is often pursued through an interrogation of the pivotal works that have appeared since the mid-twentieth century.

No subject has attracted this cognitive mode more intensively than the question of whether “the year 1000” marked a time of transformation or of continuity. Barthélemy has been a key participant in this debate from its outset. The book under review is a modified translation of an original volume published in French twelve years ago, in which Barthélemy forcefully argued for continuity. Barthélemy’s work leading up to it intersected with a major debate on the same question published in Past & Present in response to an article by Bisson in 1994 that famously named the contested period “the feudal revolution.”

The present book considerably modifies the French original, adding a new short preface and two new historiographically oriented chapters. The subject of this book is simultaneously the real past in the contested period and the historiography of that past. The book seems to be pitched against Barthélemy’s understanding, or interpretation, of the contested period as expressed by Georges Duby in La société aux XIe et XIIe siècles dans la région mâconnaise (Paris, 1953). Barthélemy dismantles Duby’s major criteria of transformation, one by one, refuting the whole by subverting the parts.

Barthélemy aims his opening chapter at Duby’s discernment of a documentary shift from charter to notice during the contested period, claiming that these and similar classifications are blurred and that documents with attributes falling somewhere along that continuum were produced from the Carolingian period well beyond “the year 1000.” To him, the only transformation during the contested period was in the quantity and language of the documentation; what Duby (and others) saw as transition in the real world was in fact a transition in the records about that world—a “feudal revelation,” not “revolution.”

Two chapters then rebut Duby’s inference of a transition from a rural society, sharply polarized between the free and the unfree, toward something in between—serfs—fostered by a new type of seigneurial power. Through a close analysis of the Marmoutier “book of serfs,” Barthélemy observes instead a continuous diversity of status, specialization, wealth, and other criteria of social standing, affecting this particular population of servi—which he explains by reference to the initiative of the servi themselves rather than seigneurial repression. Apart from their

polemical thrust, these two chapters represent the kind of close study of a rural population that is now, happily, returning to prominence.

The next three chapters focus, first, via the same sources, on patterns in the usage and meaning of the terms miles, nobilis, et al., that reveal, supposedly contra Duby, substantial continuity over the contested period. Next, shifting from words to power relations—the crux of Duby’s 1953 “knighthood” problem—Barthélemy argues with what he interprets as Duby’s wholesale transformation of élites—from a long-entrenched, Carolingian, nobility to a new, upwardly mobile, assertive knighthood; the supposedly new seigneurial groups turn out to be, on prosopographical grounds, an old pedigree. Nor does Barthélemy agree that those groups were more violent, brutal, repressive, and difficult to control than their predecessors had been in the Carolingian period, or that they were “independent” of both territory and institution. Their “castles” varied in size, structure, social organization, chronology of construction, and effectiveness. Royal, comital, episcopal—in short, old and “Carolingian”—power persisted throughout the period under contention. Apart from the polemics, Barthélemy’s points comprise an excellent, highly textured contribution about the most important social groups during the contested period.

But, in the end, is his perspective on “knighthood” convincing? Cogently argued as it is, Barthélemy’s case is seriously undermined by what might be called a persistent weakness of attribution. Throughout the book, he battles a strangely amorphous, moving target, framed by formulaic, reductive shorthands. Beneath the ubiquitous “year 1000,” Barthélemy attributes ideas to an open-ended, collective scholarly population (or different collective populations) subsumed by such abstract, plural nouns as “transformationists,” “mutationists,” “millenarianists” (which, at one point, mutates into “millenaro-transformationists”), the “old school,” and the like. He sets these reifications in quotation marks as if agreement about their referents were a given, and yet, at the same time, as if that presumed agreement were implicitly problematical. The historians with whom Barthélemy contends comprise an enormous population, but their works are difficult to associate with the labels that he bestows on them. Sometimes it is impossible to determine whose views on which subjects he is addressing; Duby, Pierre Bonnassie, Bisson, Richard Landes, Thomas Head, and others, seem to morph into one another. Moreover, his treatment of particular scholars often betrays a kind of strategic overstatement and simplification. The general impression is that the scholarly world against which Barthélemy argues is completely fungible.

Throughout the book, Barthélemy’s conclusions about opposing views are assurances made from authority, not explanations or sequences of reasoning meant to prove or disprove. Moments of actual refutation are oddly devoid of substance, as when Barthélemy repeatedly asserts that someone almost gets it right but “goes too far,” has failed to make
an inference “properly,” or is just wrong. His arguments are frequently hortatory, established by an exclamation point or a rhetorical question. His ultimate intention is to proclaim that he has been vindicated—that most historians now agree with his attack on “mutationism”—which, though historiographically accurate, is left completely unexplained with regard to particular authors. Instead, he identifies a more or less collective base of support, a mode of abstraction consistent with the intellectually fungible approach that he employs in the characterization of his opponents.

Even Duby in 1953 was, arguably, far less of a “mutationist” than Barthélemy implies. His views need to be adversely construed in order to create an intellectual space for polemic as accommodating as the one that Barthélemy conjures up in this book. What Barthélemy presents as square disagreement with Duby is frequently more a matter of emphasis or refinement. Barthélemy sometimes overstates Duby’s inference of a spectral, or a relative, change, into something much more global and wholesale, or he confuses his own discernment of a pattern, or a dynamic, that is not necessarily incompatible with Duby’s observations as an outright conflict. Barthélemy’s putative rebuttals of Duby’s semantic transitions are cases in point. Hence, what Barthélemy offers in this book is a series of valuable studies about several major subjects that had interested Duby in *La société* but not a direct refutation of Duby’s contribution on those subjects.

On one subject, the problem is far more serious. Barthélemy is mistaken about Duby’s understanding of violence and the social order. Duby did not, in *La société*, simply assert that the newly dominant seigneurial groups were violent and unruly. Rather, he observed modes of conflict resolution falling between uncontrolled violence and formal adjudication. Although he may have expressed these insights in early, undeveloped form, it is misleading to imply that he did not express them at all.

*The Serf, the Knight, and the Historian* is most important for the questions that it raises about historiography. In Barthélemy’s favor, it is frequently necessary to streamline particular views, especially views widely diffused through a large body of literature, into shortened, simplified, paraphrases or summations, and even cautiously to classify holders of such views by conceptual categories. It is even permissible to condense the œuvre of one scholar or a group of scholars into a singular body of ideas, and, regardless of its own history, internal ambiguity, variation, and the like, to use it as a a target for strong polemic. But strong polemic ought to be directed at a robust, not a demonstrably weak or a strategically simplified, version of an argument. It ought to match, or preferably exceed, its opponent, or opponents, in clarity. It ought not displace careful reasoning with rhetorical or exhortatory figures.

Barthélemy’s book should not function as a substitute for the actual reading of the historiography that it invokes. If it were to do so, the outcome would not, perhaps, be a “revolution” but a “mutation,” in that
Freedom of speech is one of the most highly prized, as well as fragile and contested, values of modern democratic society. In this book, Walton explores why successive French governments in the old regime and French Revolution either encouraged or restricted freedom of speech and the press. After examining debates and judicial decisions from the Enlightenment through the Terror, he concludes that by 1789, and thereafter, most French citizens wanted some degree of these freedoms. However, even the most liberal among them were aware that freedom of speech, if used in inappropriate ways, could harm a stable, democratic order. Walton explores how various groups tried to square the desire for free speech with a concomitant commitment to deeply rooted values from the old regime, such as respect for authority, honor, and religion.

Unfortunately, there were simply too many conflicting views on how to define France’s core values to allow a smooth transition from the old to new regime. In the old regime, honor was hierarchical in nature, validating the dignity of the elite but not the common person. Catholicism was regarded as the foundation of the moral and political order, and supreme authority was embodied in the monarch. A complex, and not always coherent, network of censorship tried to ensure that these central values would not be attacked through the printed or spoken word. At the same time, reform-minded intellectuals and government officials began to realize that the free circulation of ideas could create a more enlightened and productive citizenry, which would enhance French strength.

During the Revolution, core values were transformed. Honor was democratized, conferring a new sense of legitimacy on the actions of the common person. Religion was still regarded as essential to the political order, but revolutionaries envisioned a patriotic, tolerant religion rather than exclusive Catholic doctrines. Sovereignty was now to be shared between the king and people. When the revolutionary government began to free the press, the result was usually not enlightenment, however, but conflict. Different groups used speeches and publications to make the case for their vision of how France should be reconstructed, and soon insults were flying.
The National and Constituent Assemblies wanted to find a way to define freedom of speech that would maintain respect for national authority, but it proved extremely difficult to do so, particularly when crowds in the street demanded vengeance for perceived indignities. Walton argues that the high point of repression, the Terror, grew less out of Jacobin fanaticism than a cycle of vengeance that had deep roots in old ideas of honor and religion that could not easily accommodate compromise. Swearing civic oaths and creating programs to foster public spirit were attempts to avert violence through consensus, but they had virtually no chance of success.

It becomes clear from Walton’s research that freedom of the press and speech is extremely difficult to maintain in a weak state with conflicting notions of legitimacy. Walton also shows that France was not uniquely illiberal, as recent manipulation of the press by the United States government illustrates. All in all, Walton’s analysis offers a thoughtful perspective on the complexity of defining and institutionalizing core democratic freedoms, and a salutary reminder that we should not take them for granted.

Gail Bossenga
College of William and Mary

The Newton Wars and the Beginning of the French Enlightenment. By J. B. Shank (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2008) 571 pp. $55.00

Nailing down the precise origins (or what the author prefers to call “the beginning”) of the French Enlightenment has never been an easy task, and this book on the reception of Newtonianism in early eighteenth-century France helps to explain why. Shank argues that some of the difficulties derive from the mythology spun by the philosophes regarding their role in promoting Isaac Newton’s theories, one of the foundations of Enlightenment thought. The philosophes, notably Voltaire, took far too much credit for having established Newtonianism as a new scientific orthodoxy, and even today some historians are all too ready to accept the philosophes’ self-congratulations at face value. Shank contends, in line with much recent scholarship, that Newton’s ideas had acquired a strong following within the French academy well before Voltaire and the “party of humanity” undertook to explain and champion them during the 1730s. He insists that, at this stage of the debate on the “beginning” of the French Enlightenment, still another version of how Newton inspired the philosophes is patently unnecessary. Rather, we need a fresh look at how the philosophes, among others, embraced and repackaged Newton’s theories for their own purposes, which is precisely what the author undertakes in this book.

In his introduction, Shank explicitly acknowledges his method-
ological debts. To Foucault, he owes the notion of “genealogy,” a form of analysis designed to avoid the teleological fallacy of much historical writing.¹ This Foucauldian influence explains Shank’s choice of “beginning” over “origins,” which he considers altogether too unidirectional and deterministic. The author also acknowledges the impact of Habermas on his methodology, particularly his notion of the “public sphere,” which increasingly began to eclipse the authority of the monarchy and the Church in art, literature, politics, and science during the eighteenth century.² Yet despite his bows to Foucault and Habermas and an occasional nod in the direction of the linguistic turn, Shank relies most heavily upon the traditional methodology of the history of ideas in a manner that would not have bewildered or displeased its founder, Arthur Lovejoy.

With great skill and knowledge, Shank teases apart the multiple strands of Newtonian thought to demonstrate how various factions within the French academy came to weave one or more of them into their pre-existing philosophical, scientific, religious, and methodological outlooks. He finds no single Newtonian party in France, but many, each with its own stake in Newton’s victory. Similarly, he shows that far from representing a clear and present danger to established religion, Newtonianism, at least in some of its versions, was perceived as a bulwark against the dangerous, allegedly Spinozist tendencies of the competing philosophy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. In that light, Newton’s eventual victory now appears, if anything, overdetermined. The philosophes may have claimed Newton as one of their own, but in that respect, they were hardly exceptional. Although many pieces of the complex story of how Newton conquered France have already been told, Shank’s book performs a valuable service in bringing them all together.

Thomas E. Kaiser
University of Arkansas, Little Rock


In this provocative study, Popiel focuses upon the connection between Jean-Jacques Rousseau, educational reform, and domesticity in France between 1762 and 1833. For the past two decades, Rousseau scholarship has been seriously revised, thanks to the work of such prominent femi-


² See Jürgen Habermas (trans. Thomas Burger, with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence), *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Cambridge, Mass., 1989; orig. pub. in German 1962).
nist scholars as Landes and Pateman. Critics have argued that Rousseau’s misogynistic ideas helped to create a repressive “sexual contract” and the gendered division between public and private life. By contrast, Popiel reads Rousseau through the eyes of his immediate contemporaries to understand why men and, more intriguingly, women themselves found Rousseau so compelling, his misogyny notwithstanding. To understand this dynamic, she focuses upon Rousseau’s influential educational treatise Émile (1762), tracing how it informed educational practice until the Guizot laws of 1833 (which ordered that every commune establish a public primary school). Popiel draws upon an array of printed sources, ranging from domestic treatises to ABC primers, and uses objects from material culture, including clothing and toys, in innovative ways.

According to Popiel, Rousseau’s Émile revolutionized ideas about nurturing childhood, self-control, and gender differentiation, forcing readers to consider the family as a special place for social change. Going beyond John Locke, Rousseau insisted that children were inherently good and rational, once parents had removed them from society and entrusted them to a loving mother. Rousseau identified a kind of universal, prerational stage in children, in which proper education could mold moral sensibility and harness a child’s primal virtue. Children should develop freely and experience life in independent (if not democratic) terms. However, this liberated childhood required new clothes, new toys, new books—and new mothers. Mothers had to assume a new social role, as they were key for transforming society. They had to make sure that their children became moral and socially useful grown-ups. By dedicating themselves to their children, women could find domesticity to be empowering, because it gave them a meaningful social role and instilled in them a strong sense of purpose and values. This identification cannot be dismissed simply as a false consciousness through which women rationalized away patriarchal submission. Rather, women saw themselves as having been entrusted with society’s most precious resource, children.

In this discourse, contemporaries clearly distinguished between private education and public instruction. For them, the private education that preceded formal schooling was concerned with forming a moral being, rather than imparting social graces or specialized knowledge (Rousseau famously doubted the value of both). Young persons had to learn to balance self-control and liberal freedom so that they could become free and independent in public life. Reformers believed that women could use maternal love to teach young people that personal qualities, not hierarchy or birth, determined individual worth.

Significantly, Popiel traces Rousseauvian ideas about domestic education into the French Revolution, Restoration, and July Monarchy. In

1 Joan Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution (Ithaca, 1988); Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, 1988).
drafting instructional reforms, lawmakers and pedagogues assumed that mothers had already provided their children a solid moral foundation. These beliefs appeared in the renowned proposals from Talleyrand and Condorcet, the laws associated with Joseph Lakanal and Pierre Daunou as adopted after the Reign of Terror, and subsequent Restoration efforts to reform public and religious instruction. Political sympathies notwithstanding, post-Revolutionary reformers emphasized moral autonomy and believed that early domestic education could best attain this goal.

Popiel has written an impressive, important book. She offers a fascinating and provocative analysis of Rousseau’s influence on educational thought and practice and on women’s understanding of these new domestic roles. She further demonstrates that scholars must consider the role of child rearing and domestic education in the broader history of education. This book is essential for scholars working on the history of Enlightenment education, gender studies, and modern French culture.

Sean M. Quinlan
University of Idaho

_Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914–1918._ By Richard S. Fogarty (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008) 374 pp. $60.00

In spite of France’s claims to universalism and equal rights as foundational republican principles, the “problem” of ethno-racial difference has profoundly troubled the color-blind model of French society and politics for centuries, notably affecting colonial policy and shaping post-colonial struggles about the integration of immigrants into contemporary society. Fogarty’s _Race and War in France_ makes a welcome and significant contribution to the history of these contradictions and their legacies in modern France by examining how French attempts to integrate colonial troops into the French Army during World War I deployed ideas about racial difference and in the process exposed the contradictions of the republican model.

World War I was not the first time that the French used colonial troops on French soil (rather than just in the colonies). North Africans served during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71, and they were deployed in the south of France to “pacify” crowds during the massive wine producers’ demonstrations of 1907. But World War I was the first time relatively large numbers (500,000) fought in Europe. Fogarty has researched scrupulously the racial policies that incorporated North African, Madagascan, and Indochinese soldiers into the war by thoroughly mining an impressive body of archival sources that include French military, colonial, and Foreign Ministry archives, as well as published sources and the contemporary scholarly literature. He has examined not only official, top-down military policies but also has analyzed the letters and tracts produced by soldiers themselves.
The conscious exploitation of racial difference provides the analytical frame of the study. The result is a fascinating and detailed, if occasionally repetitive, investigation of the issues concerning colonials in a supposedly republican army—recruitment (and the distinctions that the Army made between martial and less martial races), conditions of service (most colonials served at the lowest levels and in segregated regiments, with limited opportunities for advancement), linguistic differences (teaching colonial soldiers French intimated both racial prejudice and beliefs in the civilizing power of language), and accommodations to Islam (despite the worry that religious solidarity, particularly with the Ottoman allies of Germany, would take precedence over loyalty to France), and regulations about intimate liaisons with French women and citizenship.

As Fogarty reasonably argues, the fundamental contradiction that disrupted efforts to “republicanize” the Army was that treating colonial soldiers as equal to French soldiers risked undermining colonial relations of domination and subordination. Thus, the Army strongly discouraged and occasionally punished sexual liaisons between colonial troops and French women, seen as harmful to French prestige and possibly leading to racial “contamination.” Granting citizenship to troupes indigènes likewise posed serious problems. In the case of Muslims, the “fact of Islam,” which included such social practices as polygamy as well as religious observance, militated against citizenship rights; authorities granted only a small proportion of requests for citizenship, despite the fact that after the end of hostilities, colonial troops remained for extra service to occupy the Rhine, exposing them to the unbridled racism of the Germans.

Even as France attempted to integrate “indigenous” troops into the Army and the nation, and proclaimed the “perfectibility” of colonial servicemen, the French alienated those whom they deemed unworthy of full membership. Ultimately it was more important to preserve the status, prestige, and power of France over its colonial subjects. Although Fogarty misses a golden opportunity to analyze how ideas about gender and race mutually reinforced and complicated one another, he has capably conveyed how the French “sense of entitlement to exploit an imperial resource” conflicted with republican ideals and contributed to debates about assimilation and integration that persist to this day (274).

Laura Levine Frader
Northeastern University


This book is a welcome addition to three fields that have seen considerable expansion during the past generation—Iberian history, colonial history, and the history of science. It is a novel project that only scratches the surface of a topic that will hopefully engage scholars for years to come.
come—the history of Iberian science. Indeed, as its editors claim (and several of the contributors repeat), *Science in the Spanish and Portuguese Empires* is the first collection of essays about it ever published in English. Given all of the attention lavished on the Iberian empires by Anglo-American scholars throughout the past two centuries, the long delay in the appearance of this kind of work is surprising, regardless of whether it was caused by the predilection of historians of science for the pioneers from Northern Europe (with the notable exception of Galileo) or, more insidiously, by the Black Legend—a prejudice that denied early modern Spaniards and Portuguese the capacity for rational thought. Not only do the articles in this volume dismiss any shadow of doubt that might still hang over the scientific dimensions of the Iberian expansion; they also demonstrate that Iberian science was global in scope decades (if not centuries) before the horizons of Northern Europeans expanded to the same degree.

These points should be well known to those who study the history of science, but they are not. The strangeness perhaps comes from the unfamiliar names of the protagonists in this volume, as well as the exotic locales in which they worked—Madrid, Seville, Lisbon, Goa, Mexico City, and Manila. But the areas examined in the chapters are canonical for the history of science, at least as it has been recast during the past few decades, from forms of intellectual history into examinations of sociability between scholars, the circulation of knowledge, and the practices of philosophical inquiry. Spaniards and Portuguese engaged in technological innovation, in the exact sciences of astronomy and mathematics, and in such descriptive endeavors as botanical illustration and cartography all in the service of empire. Yet the definition of “imperial science” is fluid, easily comprising royally sponsored expeditions, bureaucratic practices aimed at managing and exploiting new territories and their populations, and observations made by private individuals or members of religious orders. As such, the chapters of this volume have a thematic, rather than chronological, organization.

Seeking to produce a useful volume, as well as to provide a forum for new research in the field, the editors include surveys of the literature relating to the developments in the Spanish and Portuguese history of science throughout the twentieth century. These overviews set the stage for the specific analyses that follow, none of which seem to overlap greatly with the other chapters. The contributions fall largely into three categories: the technology of the early sixteenth-century discoveries; the mental and bureaucratic organization of the empires from the late sixteenth until the late seventeenth centuries; and the projects for imperial consolidation at the end of the eighteenth century, largely borne out of rivalries with other European empires, and between Iberians and Creoles.

The articles that fall into the first category reveal the novel character of navigational techniques and its repercussions on mathematics and cosmography, as well as the social and political configurations that influenced Spanish and Portuguese maritime activities. Those in the sec-
ond category examine how Iberian imperial projects were realized with the help of individuals trained in empirical observation, yet open to different forms of knowledge offered by indigenous peoples, especially medical techniques and remedies. These chapters also explore the concept of the “baroque” as it relates to the specific visions of nature articulated by Spanish observers, drawing parallels between Iberian naturalists and their peers elsewhere in Catholic Europe. The articles in the third category, which focus on Enlightenment-era developments, show that Iberians had a keen desire to keep abreast of the changes occurring in French intellectual circles. But their interest was not just to keep up with the leading lights of the day; Iberian and American savants also produced voluminous quantities of observations and descriptions that were on par with those produced in Northern Europe.

This volume makes a strong case for re-shaping the history of science in the early modern period. Hopefully, future scholarship will continue the interesting and challenging work that this volume has begun.

Liam Matthew Brockey
Michigan State University

Famille, genre, transmission à Venise au xvi e siècle. By Anna Bellavitis (Rome, École Française de Rome, 2008) 245 pp. 29€

Bellavitis has written numerous essays about Venetian family life and a book about marriage and social mobility among that city’s cittadini (citizens). In this new study, she takes a broader perspective, considering not only cittadini but also humbler social groups and looking beyond marriage to inheritance.

Famille, genre, transmission is divided into two parts. Bellavitis first tackles the law—family governance, succession law, rules about restitution of dowry to widows, and guardianship of minor children after the death of their father. These chapters rely heavily on a secondary literature for Venice and other cities and on the 1244 statutes of Venice and an eighteenth-century compilation of statutory “corrections.” On its face, this hardly seems a new approach nor are her findings overtly innovative. But Bellavitis offers something rare and important; too often other scholars study the topics that her chapters cover as if the rules were simply an unchanging backdrop to historical actions and social patterns. Bellavitis’ more diachronic and comparative approach prevents such a mistakenly passive sense of law. She makes absolutely clear, for example, that the father-son relationship was the pivot around which intestate succession rules worked; hence, succession needed no probate and was immediate.

In the first part of the book, Bellavitis employs court records from 1592 to 1595 to examine the statistical frequency of certain inheritance patterns. Intestate successions led to generalized and dispersed distributions for women’s estates but concentrated and gendered transmission of
men’s. Widows’ claims for their dowries met with delays and eventual payouts only loosely related at times to the contractual amounts, but courts enforced those claims, just as they enforced testamentary clauses putting widows in charge of their minor children.

The second part of the book rests on the study of several hundred testaments of middling sorts of people—artisans, merchants, and professionals—who were neither wealthy nor, conversely, poor and thus unconcerned with transmission. As testaments worked modifications on the usual rules of transmission, this section is less about law and more about choices, but within legal and societal expectations. Bellavitis separates the testaments of men from those of women, thus allowing her to show in each class how women shifted their property by a particularized sense of needs and relationships in both natal and marital families.

In each chapter, Bellavitis provides statistical tables of heirs and executors of different types of testators. The total numbers are not large. The major difficulty is the lack of a single table in each chapter to present a statistical overview. That said, Bellavitis succeeds in showing how these classes in which women worked—often as part of a family shop, with dowries more constitutive of the household—used the same legal devices that patricians used in different ways to suit their interests and needs. Modest artisans or merchants had little need or sense to devising the kind of multigenerational substitutions that were essential in patricians wills, though they used them from time to time. Men and women of these classes left bequests to illegitimates, relatives, and favorite charities. Merchants’ wills sought to prevent morcelization of estates that underlay family-based firms. Testators who were notaries or officials were concerned to transmit not only property but also a nonmaterial inheritance of education and comportment.

Bellavitis’ sense of generational transmission is properly expansive. Beyond the settlement of property on survivors (or determining which among them received what), the transmission of social responsibilities, family roles, and education were at stake in drawing up a testament, as Bellavitis is able to show only because she first lays out the norms of intestate succession and family membership. She has both added social nuance and context to Venetian history and a useful pattern of analysis to be taken to other early modern societies, in and out of Italy.

Thomas Kuehn
Clemson University


Emigh’s The Undevelopment of Capitalism, explains why fifteenth-century Florence did not develop into a capitalist manufacturing economy and
society despite propitious conditions. This excellent book is the culmination and synthesis of years of building-block studies by this author. The first half of the book is a veritable textbook on the tools that sociology can bring to bear on the study of history to yield maximum understanding—something that George Homans’ famous book applying sociology to history, *English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century* (New York, 1941), is not. Despite this huge apparatus of theory, the book is not overburdened because Emigh tersely and directly evaluated the sources of theory and tightly cross-referenced chapters and sections throughout the book to avoid repetition.

The second half of the book examines economic factors in Tuscany, such as the great difference in wealth between city and contado, the growing predominance of sharecropping (*mezzadria*), the buying up of land in the contado by wealthy Florentines, and the loss of control over agricultural management by the workers of the land. She concludes that despite the profits of agriculture being invested in the cities, capitalism and manufacturing did not develop in Florence because urban markets overpowered rural markets and destroyed them. She does not blame this condition on the retrogressive nature of sharecropping, which she finds to have been profitable for landowners and sharecroppers alike, but on the collapse of rural markets.

Any criticisms aimed at this book should be considered minor. Undervalued in the book, however, is the motivation of all Florentines, rich and poor, to secure a steady supply of grain and other necessary commodities, and the concomitant need to secure a steady supply of land and labor, especially if the grain regulations were not working. Yet, whether or not it hurt rich Florentines in the pocketbook to fix the price of grain, starvation and food riots were worth avoiding. Whole bureaucratic institutions were involved in this effort, institutions that had a long history in the Roman *annona*. Regardless of how useful the controls on necessary commodities were, the best assurance of a steady grain supply in trying times was the ownership of grain fields for the rich or the availability of land to work for the poor. Furthermore, Emigh could have paid more attention to the effect of the plagues on labor/landowner relations. As landowners vied to attract the remaining laborers, they offered better inducements, such as loans of grain, animals, and money. A grain loan could mean a great deal to a poor grain buyer who found himself buying grain just before harvest when grain prices were at their highest. Mezzadria contracts could be initiated with those who owned nothing. Lastly, it is unfortunate that Emigh’s quintessential landowning family, as dictated by the extant primary sources, needs to be the Medici, who were sui generis in both wealth and power in Florence.

Emigh presents compelling arguments about how loans of grain, animals, and money at the beginning of a tenure represented investments in the land and not the creation of debts of bondage. Likewise, her discussion of the knowledge that wealthy Florentines had about
farming and managing their land rings true from the evidence of existing mezzadria contracts in a private account book. The Undevelopment of Capitalism is an important book, destined to become a classic.

Laura Ikins Stern
University of North Texas


Villard’s book is a masterful study of Italian political, diplomatic, and intellectual history of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Geographically, his “Italy” excludes regions south of the Papal States, Piedmont in the north, and only occasionally refers to Venice, enabling him to focus on the regions most applicable to this study. In structure, he considers traditional republics, principalities, and ecclesiastical states. As implied by the title, Villard moves chronologically from fifteenth-century tyranny to methods of removing tyrants and the ability of rulers by the late sixteenth century to transform possible actions against them into opportunities to strengthen their sovereign position.

The mid-fifteenth century concept of tyrant depicted a ruler who paid no attention to sound counsel, overtaxed the population, and succumbed to insatiable sexual desires frequently rumored to be homosexual. Rivals for power made frequent references to the role of Brutus in the assassination of Caesar that often inspired crowds (occasionally assisted by imported mercenaries) to mutilate tyrants and slaughter their families. Villard presents account after account of such scenes. Yet, they were not the only result of such plots. Occasionally, rulers could strike first and bring plotters to justice. Naturally, this kind of success confirmed God’s protection and endorsement. In some cases, it even inspired rulers to “invent” false plots in order to remove other potential threats to his authority.

Villard observes the transition from a total rejection of a tyrant’s authority to its acceptance in many cases as a necessary evil, during the sixteenth century, to protect the populace from the alternative of mob rule. It is only a short step further to the notion of an obligation to obey a tyrant regardless of his shortcomings to maintain God’s political order. Not surprisingly, the term tyrant was increasingly replaced in political discourse by the much less offensive term prince. Violence did not come to an end, but princes tended to employ it most often to keep the peace. By the end of the century, the concept of “raison d’État” sufficed to justify a sovereign’s actions.

That Villard’s methodology derives from a combination of traditional political history, diplomatic history, and intellectual history is hardly surprising in a study dealing with developments in Renaissance
Italy. For his sources, he has delved deeply into the relevant state archives and libraries across Italy, and he cites slightly more than 1,000 printed primary sources.

Ronald Martin
Santa Ana College


The existing historiography of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German science in general, and of the history of biology in particular, follows to a large extent a well-established hierarchy. Science is done at universities and then trickles to the “popular” realm. One classical example is natural history. An “avantgarde” science at the beginning of the nineteenth century, it became more and more outdated during the course of the century, when other disciplines based on the theory of evolution and experimental methods took over. In this scenario, natural history was pushed out of the center of university science to more peripheral places like museums, zoos, and amateur natural-history associations. There, collecting and classifying continued without any major impact on the “leading” academic disciplines.

Nyhart already contested that scenario in “Natural History and the ‘New’ Biology.” In *Modern Nature*, she demonstrates, unfortunately only implicitly, that the traditional picture is mainly due to methodological limitations in the existing historiography. By approaching her subject with a combination of individual biographies, institutional histories, and the history of a scientific concept and embedding it in the general social and cultural history of nineteenth-century Germany, she creates an entirely different picture. The thread that she follows is the emergence and history of what she calls the “biological perspective.” The genuine achievement of the book lies in the quasi-archaeological (even though Michel Foucault is never mentioned) reconstruction of this notion, which is hard to grasp with more traditional methods from the history of science, since it falls between a well-formulated concept and a mentality held by people from different social and political backgrounds. Nyhart shows that the “biological perspective,” by oscillating between the different arenas, nevertheless had a considerable impact on a broad array of areas, both scientific and nonscientific. Therefore, she not only contributes to a specialist question of nineteenth-century history of biology but also gives a lively account of some overlooked aspects of German history in general.

After an introductory chapter, Nyhart portrays the career and work of taxidermists in their private and public museums and in their quest for

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more lively displays. In the third chapter, she shows how the zoo movement contributed to this quest. In Chapters 4 and 5, Nyhart introduces Karl Möbius and his concept of Lebensgemeinschaft, which can be seen as a conceptual expression of the previous ideas, and how it became established, not through academia but mainly through classrooms and the school-reform movement. Chapters 6 and 7 are devoted to natural-history museums. With the help of three richly portrayed examples, the author shows how the museum as an institution changed at the end of the nineteenth century and how the ideas of liveliness and Lebensgemeinschaft—the core concepts of the biological perspective—influenced the emergence of the new museums. In Chapters 8 and 9, the biological perspective returns, again via schools, to university, where it had considerable influence on the development of ecology as a research program and an academic discipline in Germany. In her conclusion, Nyhart compares the German to the American situation to show national specificities and general transnational trends.

Modern Nature is well written and nicely illustrated. It offers a fresh approach to both historians of science and a broader readership interested in nineteenth-century German history and popular culture.

Christian Reiss
Max-Planck-Institute for the History of Science


In writing about Theodor Herzl, Schorske reasoned, “His concept of nationhood helped Herzl to transform his longstanding fear of the masses into hope. Heretofore, as a liberal and a Jew, he had faced them—anarchists, socialists, nationalists, anti-Semites—as threats to the liberal order.”1 Schorske’s historical analysis of Austrian politics, culture, and art would have most probably been labeled as a blend of cultural and intellectual history, or Geistes- und Kulturgeschichte. The dimension of biographical writing in his studies, however, makes him also a representative of “contextual biography,” a particular method of biographical and historical writing that analyzes a historical epoch, its institutions, political atmosphere, and power relations by referring to prominent personalities, using them as a “window” or “prism.” Their ideas, texts, memories, and agency allow readers to experience the past in a more authentic fashion than structuralism could offer. Unlike U.S. and Anglo-Saxon academia, which had been more tolerant toward such new methodological approaches as micro-history, oral history, and biography, German historians, mostly of the Bielefeld School, adhered until the 1970s to the

1 Carl E. Schorske, Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture (New York, 1979), 166.
method of structuralism, refusing biographical writing as “unscientific personalization” (Berghahn, 234–235). Historians, in particular those studying the Nazi state, were to investigate institutions, demography, and geographical and administrative factors that shaped historical events, relations, powers, and decisions; biography focusing on individuals could never explain the past satisfactorily.

Berghahn and Lässig’s collection of essays includes texts by such distinguished historians as Ian Kershaw, Joachim Radkau, Angelika Schaser, and John C. G. Röhl. The volume’s strength lies in presenting the methodological problems that biographical writing poses to historical analysis. Kershaw, in “Biography and the Historian: Opportunities and Constraints,” for example, describes the value that his interdisciplinary usage of Max Weber’s theorem of “charismatic leadership” had for his biography of Hitler (34). In “Women’s Biographies—Men’s History?” Schaser, focusing on gender in historiography, laments the lack of adequate research about the female leaders of the women’s movement from Wilheminian Germany to the National Socialist period (78). The detailed introduction into historical methodology by Lässig (“Introduction: Biography in Modern History—Modern Historiography in Biography”) and Berghahn’s outlook on biographical writing (“Structuralism and Biography: Some Concluding Thoughts on the Uncertainties of a Historiographical Genre”) are of immense value for younger historians who plan a historical and/or political biography.

In spite of the academic excellence of the volume, however, two minor points of critique remain. First, the geographical locale of Central Europe in the subtitle is misleading; none of the contributions discusses Austrian, Czech, Slovak, Polish, and Hungarian biographical writing. Most of the essays focus on German history; two are dedicated to Dutch history. Second, the volume would have benefited from a contribution dealing with intellectual history and the importance of political thought and philosophical analysis for a biography. Researching the philosophical ideas of a Central European politician, for example, would offer new insights. Such an interdisciplinary approach would assess not only the limits and possibilities of individual political agency within the institutions and structures of the region’s states but also enlarge the methodological dimension.

Josette Baer
University of Zurich

2 See, for example, Zdeněk V. David, “Masaryk and Locke within the Context of the Austrian Philosophical Tradition,” in idem (ed.), Lumen Historiae Diversorum in Orbe: Festschrift for Prof. Svatava Rakova (Praha, 2008); Baer, Slavic Thinkers or the Creation of Polities: Intellectual History and Political Thought in Central Europe and the Balkans, 19th Century (Washington D.C., 2007).
Resistance to the Nazi Holocaust employed more than one strategy. Jews who escaped the ghetto of Minsk to join partisans in the woods engaged in an act of defiance no less honorable than that of the Jews who used armed resistance in the well-known Warsaw ghetto uprising. Epstein supports this thesis by building her case with facts, names, and details as dense as the nearby woods where partisans, including Jews, gathered to fight Nazi occupation. Historical, political, and geographical circumstances in Byelorussia—Minsk, in particular—provided the opportunity for Jews to attempt to defy certain death. Four waves of Nazi massacres of Jews in the Minsk ghetto from 1941 to 1942 made it all too evident what fate awaited them. Some 10,000 Jews from a ghetto population of about 100,000 dared to join forces with bands of partisans, with the intent not only to save their own lives but also to bring victory to the Soviet Union.

Contrasted with Warsaw or Kovno, Minsk had been under Soviet rule for about two decades by 1941. During that period, relatively good relations had developed between Jews and Byelorussian Communists, who adopted an internationalist attitude of acceptance of all people. Because of these friendly ties, the ghetto underground linked with a well-organized city underground. Individual acts of courage on the part of Communists, Byelorussians, Jews, POWs, and even a few sympathetic Germans made it possible to form a conduit from the ghetto to the forest close enough to reach in a day’s journey. Lax guarding of the ghetto and elaborate ruses allowed Jewish men and women, especially if armed, to join partisan forces and often, with the help of clergy, to spirit away Jewish children to orphanages or to sequester them in private Byelorussian homes. Not all outcomes, perhaps not even half, were successful. Some escapees and their helpers were executed despite clever planning and immense daring. To cap the list of cascading tragedies, the Soviets after the war felt nothing but mistrust of the participants of both the Byelorussian and Jewish underground, suspecting that survival depended on collaboration with the Germans. At worst, survivors were killed; at best, they suffered discrimination. It took decades of pleading by survivors to win belated Soviet recognition; for many this grudging official acceptance came too late.

Based on memoirs, a substantial number of interviews with survivors in both Minsk and Israel, and copious secondary material, Epstein describes in detail numerous acts of resistance that place Minsk on the honor roll of Jewish defiance of Nazi genocide, a record that historians have largely ignored. Maps of Eastern Europe, the Minsk ghetto, and locations of partisan bands, as well as a roster of names with brief biographies, enhance the book. While there are innumerable, and perhaps un-
avoidable, repetitions of events in a narrative organized topically rather than chronologically, this book serves as a sturdy memorial to the Jews of Minsk and to all those who aided them. A painfully sad book to read, it nonetheless fills in the blank spaces of a chapter of history filled with horrendous hatred but also with soaring heroism.

Patricia Herlihy
Brown University


Rice’s study of the Potomac River Basin, which brings together environmental, Native American, and colonial agricultural history, is a model of successful interdisciplinary history. His sobering tale of the destruction of native peoples and environmental degradation draws from sources as diverse as the disciplines that he employs, skillfully weaving together archaeology, oral traditions, travel accounts, and archival material to construct a compelling narrative of a region central to the early American experience.

Along the way, Rice helps to nudge the field in several new directions. Recently, environmental history has had a homogenizing tendency, focusing exclusively on, say, the South, New England, or the West. Rice thinks that the field needs a more localized approach. Nature and History makes a strong case for the power of a more modest geographical scale in environmental history. Rice also strikes a powerful blow against fragmentation. Recently, colonial history has shown a tendency to break apart; students of the environment, Indians, slavery, and export agriculture have specialized and gone their separate ways. Rice brings these several areas of study back together, showing that despite specialization, it is possible to see early America as a coherent whole if working on a modest geographic scale.

Rice not only takes pains to understand the European invasion of the Potomac region from the perspective of Native Americans; he also demonstrates that the political history of the colonies and the settlement patterns of the invaders cannot be understood without considering the presence and aspirations of the region’s indigenous peoples. From the perspective of a scholar who has long struggled to keep up with a rapidly expanding and fragmenting field, Rice’s close attention to those working in other subfields signals a new direction in colonial history, aptly demonstrating the benefits to an interdisciplinary approach. In sum, this well-written important new book—persuasively argued and firmly rooted in the evidence—deserves a wide readership among students of

Magra invites historians of the imperial crisis and the American Revolution to pay closer attention to the colonists’ maritime interests, including their trade in fish. He links New England’s role as the catalyst of revolution with the region’s leadership in the colonial offshore fishery. During the early eighteenth century, New England mariners expanded their fisheries beyond coastal waters to tap the more abundant but more distant waters of the Sable Island Bank and the Grand Bank, south and southeast of Newfoundland. They primarily caught cod, a large protein-rich fish, to feed the poor in southwestern Europe or to sustain the slaves of the sugar plantations in the West Indies.

The trade in fish enabled the New Englanders to procure rum, sugar, and molasses from the West Indies and, by trans-shipping those products, to procure manufactured goods from Great Britain. But this boon to New England appalled the mercantilists of the British Empire; the colonists competed with the English fishermen based in the West Country. Used to dominating the Grand Banks, the West Country merchants bristled at losing market share to the New Englanders, who also wooed away laborers sent from England to Newfoundland for the fishing season. The New Englanders also alienated the powerful sugar planters and merchants of the British West Indies, who resented the growing trade in fish with their rivals in the French West Indies. The Royal Navy officers also despised that illicit trade, because it helped the French colonies during their frequent wars with the British.

Responsive to the West Country merchants and West Indian planters, the British government enforced trade regulations on the New Englanders more strictly during the 1760s. That crackdown increased New England’s alienation from the Empire. As punishment for resisting taxes and harassing customs officers, Parliament passed a “Restraining Act,” which barred New Englanders from the offshore fisheries. But the news of this law reached New England ten days after the Revolution had erupted into fighting at Lexington and Concord.

Thorough and careful in his research, Magra makes a persuasive case for the importance of the fisheries to colonial New England’s economy and attitudes toward the Empire. But he overstates his subsequent argument for the pivotal importance of the fishermen to winning the War of the American Revolution. By playing up their role with regard...
to the navy and privateers, he sells short the massive power of the Royal Navy, which dominated the Atlantic until the French entered the war as American allies. He also misses an opportunity to clinch his case by closing the book with only a perfunctory discussion of the role of the fisheries in the peace negotiations. He leaves unexplored the consequences of the war for the place of the New England fisheries in the political economy of the new nation. Did the revolution reward the fishermen who did so much to create the breach with the empire?

Alan Taylor
University of California, Davis


Slauter reports that John Wheelock, president of Dartmouth at the end of the eighteenth century, authored a lengthy manuscript about the rise and fall of nations. Wheelock’s investigation into the “habits, customs, and political forms of nations” was pitched by a would-be publisher “as a kind of American equivalent to Montesquieu.” The only problem was that early reviewers “couldn’t tell what the main subject of the book was” (89–90). To report a similar conclusion with respect to Slauter’s book is too harsh. However, if there is a main subject of Slauter’s text, it surely has more to do with the book’s subtitle than with its title.

Characterized as a “work of intellectual, cultural, and literary history,” Slauter’s text explores multiple features of early American culture using an impressive array of primary sources (personal correspondence, broadsides, newspapers and magazines, and professional handbooks) and secondary literature in literary criticism and political theory (18). Slauter’s goals appear to be two: (1) He aims to flesh out particular aspects of American life, for example, the drawing of miniatures or the tendency among whites to criticize black poetry as “slavish” imitations of celebrated “masters.” (2) He seeks to link these practices to better-known features of early American constitutionalism—to identify certain metaphors or concepts as culturally motivated. With reference to miniatures, he attempts to connect the practice of “taking” the likeness of a person to standing notions of representation (an assembly ought to “resemble” the people) (127, 140).

This approach to the study of early American culture and constitutionalism is coherent. In practice, however, there are at least two problems: First, not every metaphorical or conceptual feature of the Founding meshes with the specific cultural practice that Slauter assigns to it. Miniatures offer a plausible foundation for ideas about the proper constitution of a representative assembly, but in the same chapter, he also connects a competing image of the legislature (a body intended to “refine and enlarge the public views”) to the practice of transcription in
shorthand (148). The substantive “fit” proposed by the author makes less sense in this case. The point of transcription, according to a how-to manual cited by Slauter, was for practitioners to take “down their own thoughts, or the sentiments of others” accurately—not to improve the style or substance of what was spoken (151). Similarly, the author discusses the Montesqueuvian notion that “constitutions and governments needed to accommodate people,” or conform to the pre-existing tastes of the population, but he curiously grounds that theory in contemporary ideas about the judgment of art: An “aesthetic totalit[y]” such as the proposed Constitution ought to appeal to the “taste” of the reader-qua-critic (95, 117).

The second problem reflects the intellectual commitments of social sciences in which causality (how to demonstrate it, or how to choose between competing accounts of it) generates considerable scholarship. Each chapter draws a causal arrow between a cultural practice and some aspect of the “constitutionalism of the revolutionary period” (8). In no chapter, however, is Slauter’s cultural account of origins explicitly set against an alternative explanation. For example, he maintains that criticism of the hermetic life—“[i]n solitude men would perish”—reflected standing societal unease about those who lived in isolation (223). Such an account needs to confront the long tradition of social contractarian thought, which employs the solitary individual as a theoretical starting point for politics, and the attending claim that early Americans merely appropriated older ideas when invoking this image.

Thus, we are left where we began—with fundamental uncertainty regarding the subject of Slauter’s book. Surely the subject is not “the state as a work of art”; the effort to ground the language of “framing” in architectural ideas is limited to the first chapter. Nor is the subject constitutional history, for the very reason given above. Slauter’s book is best described as a detailed exploration of early national life across a host of cultural sites, critical to understanding the world that gave birth to the Constitution but less convincing as an account of Constitutional origins.

Eric Lomazoff
Harvard University


Historians have long known that the voting rights of free blacks were limited, in the antebellum period, to a handful of New England states. Less than 10 percent of adult black males living even in the free states were eligible voters in 1860. Less well known is the contraction of those

1 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay (ed. Terence Ball), The Federalist, with Letters of “Brutus” (New York, 2003), 44 (No. 10).
voting rights from the era of the American Revolution to that of the Jacksonian period. When the federal constitution was ratified in 1789, free blacks held the same legal right to vote as whites in every state except Virginia and Georgia. As of 1792, free blacks could vote in twelve of fifteen states, and not until 1803 did a northern state restrict the franchise to whites. By 1840, free blacks could vote on equal terms with whites in only four of twenty-six states. Despite a movement in favor of black suffrage in the 1840s and 1850s, blacks effectively held the franchise in only five of thirty-six states by the time the Civil War had ended.

Malone seeks to explain why blacks’ voting rights declined in the early republic and, to a lesser extent, why they remained intact or were revived in a few states. The author attributes three factors to explaining the timing of the change (or lack thereof) in these voting rights: “the changing economic structure of race relations, . . . the changing partisan structure of racial affiliation, . . . [and] the changing discursive structure of racial coalitions” (6). He focuses on four states—New York (where African Americans were effectively disfranchised in the late Jeffersonian period), Pennsylvania (where they were disfranchised during the height of the Jacksonian era), Rhode Island (the only state where blacks lost and then re-gained the right to vote before the Civil War), and Massachusetts (where African Americans retained suffrage rights throughout the years in question).

Malone’s analysis demonstrates most clearly the role of partisanship in all four of the states studied. In New York, blacks had supported the Federalists and thus the Jeffersonian Republican faction most closely allied with fellow partisans in Virginia spearheaded a movement for disfranchisement. As a result of constitutional changes in 1821, the property qualification for voting was eliminated for whites but increased to a nearly prohibitive $250 in valuation for African Americans. In Pennsylvania, Democrats responded to the rise of a potent Whig opposition party and the closeness of elections in certain locales, where voting by blacks may have contributed to the outcome, by including disfranchisement in the state’s 1838 constitution. In Rhode Island, blacks had been disfranchised by statute in 1822, but because they helped to defend the government after being spurned by the rebellious Dorrites in the 1842 uprising, blacks gained enough support from Whigs to be re-enfranchised in the new state constitution. In Masssachusetts, originally an overwhelmingly Federalist and then later a predominantly Whig state, neither Jeffersonian Republicans nor Democrats made any serious effort to disfranchise blacks. Although the author does not emphasize it, the requirement of a majority of the votes cast (instead of just a plurality thereof) to win gubernatorial, congressional, and legislative elections in the Bay State, as in other New England states, probably discouraged would-be disfranchisers in either party from possibly alienating white racial liberals, who might have reacted by casting protest votes for the Liberty party.
Partisanship and the closeness of elections were not, however, the only relevant factors. Malone argues that when voting rights were still predicated on property holdings, as during the Revolutionary War and immediate postwar era, white elites tended to display a paternalistic attitude toward blacks with civic aspirations. Those blacks who managed to attain property (especially those who had been or were still servants of wealthy whites) were considered qualified by virtue of having overcome what was perceived as an inferior background. As property qualifications were eliminated, however, an ascriptive form of racism replaced the paternalistic variety, and skin color became the clear-cut determinant of voter qualifications (for Malone, the tension between these types of racism forms the dominant motif of race relations even to this day). By the 1810s, the notion of a “white republic” had become commonplace outside New England. No debate about black suffrage took place in any of the states—north or south, competitively Democratic or overwhelmingly Democratic—that were admitted into the Union during the late Jeffersonian or Jacksonian eras.

For Malone, the growth of visible free black communities—especially in southeastern Pennsylvania and New York City—combined with urbanization, immigration, and the development of a distinctive working class among whites, formed the broad economic backdrop of a new, competitive racism that provided elites with the opportunity to pursue disfranchisement for narrower partisan or factional reasons. He convincingly shows that the declining density of the black population in the free states did little to offset the political motivation of partisan elites, who capitalized on white resentment toward the free black community.

Although the author does not present a quantitative model for testing the additive and interactive effects of the aforementioned variables, his narrative account of the process in these four states (and by extrapolation to other states with similar dynamics) certainly seems plausible. This fine book thus invites additional research.

Lex Renda
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee


Not so long ago, most historians viewed the Federalist Party as comprised of losers who were out of touch with the democratic reality created by the American Revolution. In the 1990s, however, scholars began to take the Federalists more seriously. Federalists may not have understood the egalitarian impulses of the day, but they were at least

1 See, for example, Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800 (New York, 1993); David McCullough, John Adams (New York, 2001).
committed republicans whose ideas reflected important currents of their times. But even this reappraisal attributed to those ideas a weak legacy that had little impact on later ages and the democratic traditions of the American people. Cleves offers an important corrective to this understanding of the Federalists.

Language is the key to Cleves’ methodology. She begins by taking the overheated rhetoric used by Federalist New England ministers at face value, tracing its ideological roots to the Calvinist belief in the depravity of man. Based on this assumption, Federalist Calvinists thought that human passions could be too easily swayed toward violence. Relying mainly on published sources, Cleves follows this rhetoric throughout the 1790s and into the reform movements of the nineteenth century.

A fear of violence lay behind the Federalist concern with limiting the excesses of democracy. This fear found its most eloquent expression in the Federalist opposition to the French Revolution and the anti-Jacobin rhetoric used to attack Jeffersonian Republicans. This rhetoric extended to the issue of slavery almost from its inception. In the nineteenth century, the call for public education became a means of training the young to avoid passionate violence. The same concerns appeared in the anti-war movement that accompanied the War of 1812. During the 1830s, 1840s, and 1850s, the interest in limiting violence—especially against slaves—became an important component of the abolitionist movement. In short, the Federalists’ conservative worldview, and its language, underpinned much of the progressive (small p) and liberal reform of the antebellum period.

Although Cleves demonstrates an impressive mastery of the sources, and the subtlety with which the language of violence could be employed, she seems focused on such key terms as massacre, reign of terror, and guillotine in a manner that fails to do justice to a larger context after the 1790s. It is not always clear whether the salient Federalist ideas had been transferred from generation to generation and group to group with all of their force intact or whether their once peculiar Calvinist meaning eventually eroded, leaving only a generic language of anti-violence. Whatever the full extent of Federalist influence, Cleves has written an important study not only about the uses of political rhetoric but also about the legacy of the Federalist Party.

Paul A. Gilje
University of Oklahoma


In this synthetic work, Balogh works to dismiss, once and for all, the myth that the early United States was ungoverned. He specifically high-
lights the activities of the national state, which until recently was widely assumed to have been particularly impotent. Balogh contends that the state was actually influential, though its activities, contrary to the wishes of such statist founders as Alexander Hamilton, were often indirect, inexpensive, or otherwise “out of sight.”

A Government Out of Sight makes two important contributions, both of which will be most valuable to historians of American government in the twentieth century, the author’s primary intended audience for this book. First, it summarizes many of the most innovative recent studies of law and government in the United States between the Revolution and the Progressive Era. Second, it challenges traditional long-run narratives of American history, which too often have provided facile accounts of a linear rise of the modern state. Particularly valuable is Balogh’s observation that the 1880s, a time of unusually low levels of state regulation and public enterprise, should be understood “as an exceptional moment in American history that many twentieth-century scholars have mistaken for all of nineteenth-century political development” (5).

Although these contributions should be useful to many readers, the book is also disappointing. Although most of its errors are minor typographical ones, a few others—including the bizarre statement that Thomas Paine, the author of Common Sense (1776), “served multiple terms as governor of Virginia” (24)—are significant enough to place the author’s command of his subject in some doubt. More understandable are the problems that come from trying to create a coherent book by surveying a large, interdisciplinary body of literature. Because Balogh relies so heavily on recent monographs and articles from a variety of subfields, the narrative is necessarily disjointed. The first section of the book, on the early republic, concentrates on the ideas of national political leaders like Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson. The middle section, on the antebellum and Civil War years, describes the work of the state in the fields of local regulation, communications, transport, land policy, and military operations. Finally, the book’s treatment of the late nineteenth century focuses on intellectuals and the federal courts. All of this material adds up to a rich and interesting survey, but it does little to track the long-run development of any one subject.

The book is further limited by a mismatch between its evidence and some of its major contentions. The descriptive element of Balogh’s argument, that the operations of the national state were “hidden in plain sight” (4), seems reasonable enough. Raising revenue through customs was relatively unobtrusive; governance by law was cheap and subtle; the seat of national government was removed from major centers of commerce and population; the military was concentrated on the frontier; and even the giant postal system operated via contractors and offices in commercial buildings. Less well substantiated, however, are Balogh’s claims that this hidden leviathan was the one preferred by the American people, as well as a mode of governance more effective than the heavy-handed modern administrative state. The book offers little evidence of
any kind about popular understandings of government, or the relative efficacy of different forms of statecraft. Nor does it have much to say about the history of Reconstruction, which offers an important illustration of how indirect and cheap forms of state power may fail to achieve important public purposes.

Balogh ends his book by holding up the obscurantist nineteenth-century state as a model for effective, enlightened government in our day: “I urge progressives to embrace this historical tendency, rather than fight it” (397). More than he acknowledges, this move has already occurred, albeit not always consciously and enthusiastically. As progressives and others continue to debate Balogh’s concluding challenge, they would do well to also consider Hamilton’s warnings about the likely long-term costs, as well as the potential benefits, of promoting a government that eschews and veils the direct exercise of public authority.

Mark R. Wilson
University of North Carolina, Charlotte


Since World War II, historians and political scientists have stressed the significance of voluntary associations in American society, especially the rapid upsurge in such groups during the antebellum period. They took their cue from Tocqueville’s observation that “Better use has been made of association, and this powerful instrument of action has been applied to more varied aims in America than anywhere else in the world.” Interpreting associations as emblematic of democracy and “modernization,” Cold War–era scholars emphasized their role in achieving consensus in politics and society. Now, drawing on the insights of Habermas, Skocpol, and other writers on civil society, Neem offers a thoughtful, nuanced, re-evaluation of voluntary associations in Massachusetts between the Revolution and the Civil War. His argument stresses the tensions and conflicts surrounding their emergence in the Early Republic.

At the end of the Revolution, republican theory held no place for a sphere of “civil society” between the people and government. Though there was a constitutional right of assembly, there was no right of “association.” Voluntary organizations, like political factions or parties, were viewed as potential threats to the common good. With few exceptions,

2 See, for example, Jürgen Habermas (trans. Thomas Burger), The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (Cambridge, Mass., 1989); Theda Skocpol, Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management In American Civic Life (Norman, 2003).
Massachusetts law required the formal incorporation of such groups. Neem traces the developments and contests that altered this situation during the next half-century. The rivalries of Federalists and Republicans, the diversification of economic and cultural endeavor, and struggles about state involvement in education and religion forced re-evaluations of voluntary association. Neem focuses partly on constitutional conflicts involving churches, colleges, and the rights of incorporated bodies, but he also stresses the formation of a “grassroots public sphere” during the 1810s and 1820s, through the efforts of clergy to organize men and women in charitable, educational, and moral-reform associations that could counter political hostility to church–state alliances.

According to Neem, purposive action of this kind, not an inevitable development in democracy, turned Americans into “joiners,” making voluntary associations ubiquitous by the time Tocqueville visited America. Change was registered in the notable Commonwealth v. Hunt decision of 1842 that legalized trade unions. Assembly, once regarded as a conspiracy against the common good, became recognized as a right. There was no consensus regarding associations, however. National Republicans and Whigs began to employ them as counterweights to direct democracy that could remove certain functions from political control. Democrats suspected them as pockets of privilege or monopoly power beyond majority influence. The emergence of abolitionism demonstrated the power of an organized minority to precipitate political and social conflict.

Neem’s clear, incisive, and informative study deserves to be read widely by historians of early America and by social scientists interested in voluntary action and in the influence of associational groups on political change. It demonstrates that voluntary associations did not resolve the tensions in democracy between the “people” and the state, or between majorities and minorities. Abolitionism, for instance, both sharpened conflict over slavery and challenged the boundaries of citizenship by including African Americans and women in public action. But scholars will also be prompted to apply Neem’s insights to a broader range of activities than his book addresses. What was the influence, for example, of developments in manufacturing, public improvements, agricultural societies, the academy movement, and even freemasonry in the creation of early American civil society?

Christopher Clark
University of Connecticut


In the first pages of Fruits and Plains, Pauly argues that horticulture is more than an upmarket word for gardening. Think biotechnology fused
with social engineering, and doused with an optimistic American nationalism, and the result comes close to capturing how Thomas Jefferson, among others, held the word. Pauly takes a subject familiar to historians—how Americans naturalized exotic plants to the conditions of Philadelphia, St. Augustine, and Sacramento—and turns it into a story of accident and ambition, of ideology and the search for utopia. “My goals,” Pauly writes, “are to convey the breadth of horticulturists’ activities and their struggles to come to grips with landscape, with nationality, and with species having agendas of their own” (5).

Pauly opens a metaphorical space, revealing the ways in which Americans transferred the plastic qualities of plant genetics to other realms. Jefferson experimented with people as well as plants; Pauly suggests that Jefferson’s “mixing” with Sally Hemings should be seen as cross-pollination, as an extension of Jefferson’s thinking about the creation of American cultivars from old-world seeds. Liberty Hyde Bailey believed that foreign pests, like the Hessian fly, served a historical role; they spurred progress through the transformation of wilderness into agrarian clearing in order to destroy the insect’s strongholds. Pauly’s interpretation is more grounded: Plant-quarantine legislation created a regulatory structure that furthered state formation, as when the United States became the biological protector of Florida’s citrus industry.

When a Massachusetts horticulturist named Ephriam Bull found an odd and weedy vine in the corner of his garden, he moved it to the center, pruning and coaxing it until it fruited in 1843. The Concord grape—“large, good-tasting, hardy, and early”—moved from Bull’s garden to the cultural center. Bull promoted it for wine and the table, but the grape’s fortunes went up and down in the following decades—attacked by parasites and fungi, snubbed for its indelicacy and lack of nuance. Yet it attracted the attention of a New Jersey dentist who pasteurized it for use as a nonalcoholic sacramental wine. Welch’s Concord Grape Juice was born. Sam Schapiro, a Jewish immigrant, and the Manischewitz Matzo Co. saw the same potential for mass-produced kosher wine.

Did horticulture transform America? It clearly did more than decorate people’s perennial borders. It contributed to cultural identity, national expansion, commercial enterprise, and even religious transcendence. Pauly demonstrates that Americans wanted plants that would make the most of land and labor, plants that added value and helped them to colonize the continent.

Pauly wrote Fruits and Plains during years when he suffered from cancer. He died of the disease on April 2, 2009. The Rutgers Center for Historical Analysis held a memorial seminar a few weeks later to celebrate the book and its author. Those who knew Phil admired his plain-spoken criticism and his insistence that environmental history and the history of science exist symbiotically, the one nurtured by the other.

Steven Stoll
Fordham University
In the history of the Americas, frontiers and borderlands have long been defined as regions just beyond the reach of centralized power exercised by colonial European or Euro-American governance and, as such, disassociated with processes of the nation-state. Seeking to unite the state, borderlands, and Indians, DeLay explores how frontiers defined nation making for Mexico and the United States from the early to mid-nineteenth century. Using as his touchstone the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo’s Article 11 (which required the United States to stop the incursions of Plains Indians into Mexico), he argues that these processes, or the course of the U.S.–Mexican War, cannot be understood without recognizing the far-reaching consequences of the raiding warfare of Plains Indians before and throughout the war. Indeed, the ongoing raiding warfare—what DeLay calls the War of a Thousand Deserts—converged with, and often profoundly influenced, the causes and outcome of the conflict between the United States and Mexico from 1846 through 1848.

DeLay divides his book into three sections, beginning with the disintegration of peace between Spanish-Mexicans and Plains Indians. He next looks at the divide between Mexico’s northern states and its central government in Mexico City, which emerged in response to increasingly devastating Indian raids and erupted into federalist uprisings across northern Mexico in the 1830s. The final section examines the U.S. government’s use of these political and violent tensions to justify its war with Mexico and the annexation of great swaths of northern Mexico in the war’s aftermath. DeLay makes clear that, contrary to prevailing understandings, Indian polities were just as central to mid-century power struggles as were those of their Mexican and Anglo neighbors. The fate of newly developing nation-states in nineteenth-century North America, he concludes, was inseparable from the history of interethnic violence among Mexicans, Texans, norteamericanos, and Plains Indians.

In border crossings of another kind, DeLay’s research methodology utilizes a broad array of sources from both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border not only to amass an impressive database in a twenty-eight-page appendix that conveys the magnitude of Mexican–Comanche violence from 1831 to 1848 but also to give readers entry to the wide-ranging perspectives of a complex story. Although DeLay includes some discussion of Apaches and Navajos, his main focus remains on Comanches and Kiowas. He mines ethnographical scholarship, but to a far greater extent Mexican and Texan contemporary accounts, to speculate on potential Indian motivations and goals. In this context, the book’s analysis seems to falter, reflecting its larger struggle to argue for the crucial importance of Indians to its narrative despite the fact that its primary vantage point remains that of Anglos and Mexicans. Though it persuasively and conclusively argues for the importance of Indian polities in the U.S.-
Mexican War and in the general pursuit of public goals, the nation building of the Indian polities does not merit the same scope as does that of Mexico and the United States. This imbalance seems most clear in the book’s tension between the economic and political rationales supposedly underlying native raiding and the less rational “vengeance” adduced to explain the violence and destruction that accompanied the raids.

Most importantly, however, this analytical struggle reflects the challenges boldly undertaken by DeLay’s thoroughly researched, lucidly written, and imaginatively argued work. Those seeking a provocative retelling of the borderland narrative of interethnic warfare and nation making along the U.S.-Mexican border would do well to read it.

Juliana Barr
University of Florida

From Cotton Field to Schoolhouse: African American Education in Mississippi, 1862–1875. By Christopher M. Span (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2009) 252 pp. $35.00

Traditional histories of black education in the United States tend to portray African Americans as objects, not subjects. Things were always being done to them; they were never or rarely autonomous agents. However, the last two decades have seen a dramatic shift from a race-relations model that places African Americans on the periphery to an “agency” model in which African Americans are at the center of their own history. Span has produced an excellent example of this latter trend. Confining his work to Mississippi from 1862 to the end of Reconstruction in 1875, Span demonstrates that in the quest for a comprehensive tax-supported public-school system, African Americans played a central role at every stage.

Span divides his books into two parts. Part I (Chapters 1–3), covering the years 1882 to 1870, shows how the origins of universal education came from former slaves in Mississippi, not at the behest of northern missionaries, as most assume. Though influential in the process, the missionaries often disagreed with the type of education that African Americans wanted for themselves and their children. Not surprisingly, white reaction to black education was often violent; however, some whites supported limited education for blacks and even started schools on their plantations.

Part II, covering the years 1870 to 1875, concentrates on the quest of African Americans to control their education. The cost of public education in Mississippi escalated during this period, and the violent white reaction scaled back progress for black education in Mississippi for the next century.

The earliest educational efforts by Africans Americans had begun under slavery with self-teaching, Sabbath schools, and native schools.
During Reconstruction, northern missionaries felt that the former slaves were not “developed” enough to run their own affairs. This conflict persisted until the end of the period that Span discusses, when northerners largely retreated from the South, leaving the field to southern whites.

The danger, as most Mississippi whites saw it, lay in the kind of education that African Americans wanted for themselves and their children—a liberal-arts education meant to produce autonomous and full citizens of the state. Public schools promoting this ideal were therefore physically, financially, and legally attacked. The comprehensive education that finally emerged in 1868 was a dual system, one for African Americans and one for whites; the black school system was geared to producing skilled laborers, not scholars. Nonetheless, nearly a century later, African Americans once again challenged the system in order to achieve educational equality.

Span’s book, grounded as it is in prodigious archival research, can well serve as an exemplar for other southern state histories of black educational efforts before, during, and after the Civil War. Those interested in African-American history, Southern history, Reconstruction history, and African-American educational history will find it most informative.

Kenneth W. Goings
Ohio State University
stantly falling dust and dangers of the mining life, articulating a view of human existence as struggle and work” (123).

Callahan structures the argument as something of a case study, grafting particular forms of cultural theory onto an established historical base. He is most intrigued with theories of “everyday life,” drawn primarily from Bourdieu and Williams’ conception of “structures of feeling.” Both constructs allow Callahan to interpret religious expression less as theology or denominational history than as a cultural idiom through which people express their sense of reality. In fact, Callahan sees a fundamental consensus in that idiom among the white, native-born mining families that he studies, beyond denominational or doctrinal disagreements. He also sees a gender consensus that he might have demonstrated more concretely; although men and women both shared the experience of work in a mining context, surely their differing roles within that world and their contested relationships within the household (which Callahan does not discuss) generated at least a differentiated religious sensibility.

Overall, however, Callahan’s application of cultural theory through the idiom of faith works well. In clear, jargon-free language, he analyzes texts of oral histories (conducted by others in the 1970s) and religious music (memorably, the song “O Death”) in compelling ways. The book’s less creative historical grounding may help to explain why Callahan saw such an uncomplicated cultural consensus. His argument that the Appalachian spirituality of body and work originated in the agrarian world of the nineteenth century, among sectarian Baptist congregations, relies on a 1980s historiography that considered profit seeking a violation of the religious idiom of work and community. He would have been better served by seeing pre-coal Appalachian culture as more contested and multifaceted.

Callahan fares better in the coal-town era, where he adds (with good effect) the tumultuous Holiness groups to the Methodists and persisting Old Regular Baptists. Nonetheless, he travels well-trod paths: Whenever scholars wants to investigate some aspect of Kentucky mining life, they invariably head, as does Callahan, for Harlan County. Perhaps such quibbling is ill-advised, since it is not the author’s purpose to write new (or better) history. In any case, the appeal of Harlan County is primarily one of sources, which are particularly voluminous for the notorious miners’ strikes of 1931/32. The memoirs and investigative hearings concerning the strikes allow Callahan to extend the theology of the body theme to labor agitation. Union action, Callahan says, assumed the same religious meanings, for both men and women, as did mining work itself—including action through the Communist-affiliated National Miners’ Union. The Harlan strikes offer a fitting conclusion to this com-

mendable piece of scholarship, completing the link between cultural
theory, religious studies, and history.

Robert S. Weise
Eastern Kentucky University

Make Room for Daddy: The Journey from Waiting Room to Birthing Room.
By Ruth Walzer Leavitt (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina
Press, 2009) 448 pp. $35.00

How fathers made their way into the birthing room is the story of their
triumph over entrenched institutional resistance. On their way, fathers
forged alliances and overcame powerful opponents. Their changing ter-
ritory provides a metaphor for their involvement in the woman’s birth
experience—starting with their lack of any place in traditional home
birth, through their relegation to keeping “vigil” in the waiting room
while their wives labored in a nearby “delivery” room, to what is pre-
sented as their final destination, the birthing room, where they suppos-
edly became equal partners.

Leavitt recounts this journey using a range of familiar sources—
interviews and popular media, particularly television, which started to
come into its own just as fathers made their first faltering steps into the
birthing room. She also consults selections from the mid-twentieth-cen-
tury “Fathers’ Books”—reminiscences and reflections of fathers derived
from notebooks provided in the “Stork Club,” the name given to the
waiting room near the hospital labor ward. Fathers were encouraged
both to record their own reflections and to read those of their predeces-
sors.

These journals constitute a veritable goldmine of delectable data
about fathers’ experiences. Their comments demonstrate joy and pain
but, most of all, the agonizing tedium of waiting. The value of these tes-
timonies may be constrained to some extent by their restriction to liter-
ate fathers—a potential source of bias about which Leavitt does not re-
mark. Moreover, Leavitt gives disappointingly little attention to the
origins of this extraordinarily significant data source. She relies exclu-
sively on material from Chicago, Illinois, and Madison, Wisconsin, al-
though other midwestern states also took part in the program. Leavitt
does not discuss why the books emerged in this setting and not in others.

The three major parts of Leavitt’s book are not particularly well in-
tegrated. The popular media sources and interviews combine with the
Fathers’ Books to form the main part of the text. The final part com-
prises an “Epilogue,” strangely entitled “Expectant Fathers’ Expecta-
tions.” The material in this section differs substantially from the major
part of the book, almost contradicting it. The epilogue adopts a critical
and analytical approach to the presence of fathers, posing a wealth of
crucially important questions. This section is cogently supported, though not as plentifully supported as the other chapters, which draw on a wider and more populist literature base. In it, Leavitt neglects the abundance of research evidence demonstrating the less favorable and less frequently publicized aspects of the fathers’ experience.

Leavitt’s book contains a wealth of amusing illustrations, though they are not always fully integrated into the text. Providing a little more context for them would have facilitated a better understanding of fathers’ experiences. Although Leavitt frequently attends to the medicalization of childbearing, she fails to mention certain other concurrent developments, such as the changing role and increasing contribution of the obstetric anaesthetist.¹ Linked with the medicalization of childbearing is the Irish leviathan, termed “active management of labour.”² It is possible that health systems’ global economic problems and the resultant staff shortages may have facilitated fathers’ welcome into the labor, delivery, and birthing room.³ These late twentieth-century innovations are difficult to detach from the entry of another person into the birthing room—the doula.

Rosemary Mander
University of Edinburgh

Where We Live Now: Immigration and Race in the United States. By John Iceland (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2009) 223 pp. $50.00 cloth $19.95 paper

Spatial assimilation, a key benchmark of immigrants’ integration in receiving countries, refers to the process whereby immigrants move away from ethnic enclaves, usually located in poorer areas of a city where housing is cheap, and attain residential propinquity with members of the dominant, native-born population in wealthier, middle-class neighborhoods. Virtually every immigrant group that settled in the United States experienced residential segregation from white Americans, at least initially. For instance, Irish and German enclaves were prevalent in American cities during the nineteenth century, whereas Italian and Russian Jewish ghettos dotted the urban landscape during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Over time, as European immigrants became acculturated and climbed up the socioeconomic ladder, however, they were able to co-reside with white Americans, and eventually become bona fide Americans themselves—blurring the spatial and social boundaries

that once separated them from mainstream white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants.

The great debate in the immigration literature concerns whether, and to what extent, post-1965 immigrants—the majority of them racial/ethnic minorities of Asian and Hispanic origin—have been able to follow the spatial trajectories of their European predecessors. Iceland’s Where We Live Now provides rigorous empirical research about contemporary immigrants’ residential patterns and the implications of the observed spatial patterns for American race relations.

The book’s introductory chapter summarizes the spatial-assimilation debate and the potential consequences of segregation for individual life chances and intergroup relations. Chapter 2 provides a historical overview of pre-1925 European immigrant residential patterns and a synthesis of the major theories of residential segregation. Next, Iceland presents trends in racial and ethnic segregation patterns between 1980 and 2000, showing that overall patterns of black—white segregation have declined significantly. In contrast, continued replenishment of new Asian and Hispanic immigrants has produced modest increases of Asian and Hispanic segregation from the white population. These initial chapters introduce the social and political debates to readers not familiar with the segregation literature, and may well refresh the memories of those already familiar with the topic. The inclusion of historical trends in U.S. race and ethnic relations, immigration policy, urban neighborhood transitions, and intermarriage rates brings greater depth to the issue and frames the discussion of immigrant residential integration in a way that encompasses many disciplines.

Chapters 4 through 6 present new empirical findings based on Iceland’s analysis of restricted-use 1980, 1990, and 2000 census data. This unique dataset distinguishes this book from previous studies of residential segregation. Iceland uses traditional aspatial measures of global segregation, such as indexes of dissimilarity (a measure of how evenly distributed two groups are in a given study area), isolation (a measure of the extent to which a group is ghettoized), and diversity (or entropy score), to assess immigrants’ and racial and ethnic minorities’ segregation from native-born whites. He demonstrates that despite moderate increases in Asian and Hispanic segregation from whites between 1980 and 2000, post-1965 immigrants are able to attain spatial proximity to native-born whites, especially as their individual income and acculturation increases.

1 Segregation studies typically rely on census data that give population counts for racial and ethnic groups at the census block-group or census-tract level. Confidentiality concerns, however, preclude the publication of small cell sizes for groups where there are fewer than the U.S. Census Bureau’s suppression thresholds (population counts for a given sub-population category will not be reported for census tracts with fewer than 100 people). These data restrictions have limited the extent to which researchers can calculate segregation indexes for immigrant subgroups from specific regions or countries of origin and Hispanic race, as Iceland has done in the book.
In Chapters 4 and 5, Iceland marshals comparisons of blacks, Hispanics, and Asians by nativity status, as well as specific Hispanic race groups, to support his argument that spatial assimilation (as opposed to place stratification or segmented assimilation) is taking place. In Chapter 6, he questions the widely accepted conventional wisdom that racial turnover is an inevitable outcome of the neighborhood invasion–succession process. He shows that racially integrated neighborhoods have not only increased significantly during the last twenty years, but they have also remained remarkably stable. Related, homogeneous white neighborhoods have declined during this same period. Despite the growth and stability of racially integrated neighborhoods, Iceland observed that spatial proximity does not necessarily mean diminished social distance and racial or social harmony among neighbors, especially when ethnic conflict arises from competition for neighborhood resources or turf.

Each empirical chapter presents a national-level perspective followed by an in-depth analysis of how national residential patterns are instantiated in the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C. Iceland’s movement between the national and a local context helps to ground perspective in certain respects. But the lack of local segregation measures (for example, at the neighborhood or census-tract level) results in a one-sided view of overall residential patterns—especially since there is often substantial geographical variation in segregation across different neighborhoods within a city, region, or metropolitan area. Furthermore, given recent methodological advances in spatial segregation measures, Iceland might have profitably integrated a few local spatial-segregation indexes into his analysis. The inclusion of local and/or spatial segregation indexes would not substantially alter the book’s overall findings and conclusions regarding spatial assimilation and growing diversity, but it would certainly offer a more nuanced view of residential segregation patterns and dynamics across different local immigrant receiving contexts in the United States.

Iceland concludes the book with a tone of cautionary optimism about the future of American race relations. While acknowledging the diminished salience of race and the blurring of racial boundaries in the spatial assimilation process for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians, Iceland also raises concerns about blacks, irrespective of nativity status, continuing to experience the greatest degree of segregation from native-born whites than any other group. He further warns that the close connection of socioeconomic mobility and acculturation with residential integration might portend increasing Hispanic–white segregation, given continued flows of low-skilled Hispanic immigrants from Mexico and other Spanish-speaking countries.

Zoua M. Vang
McGill University
Gootenberg traces the history of cocaine from its origins as a medicinal drug in the nineteenth century to its popularity as the “champagne” of recreational drugs in the 1970s. He situates the story in the Andes where natives first cultivated coca and used it as a stimulant, Peruvians studied and promoted cocaine for medical purposes, and drug dealers turned cocaine into a multi-billion-dollar criminal enterprise.

Merck scientists in Germany first isolated the cocaine alkaloid in coca leaves in 1860, recognizing its potential as a local anesthetic. Peruvian scientist Alfredo Bignon, originally from France, published widely on cocaine’s potential as a treatment for such nervous and neurological disorders as hysteria, epilepsy, and neurasthenia—a use that also interested Sigmund Freud. Marketing potential increased with the discovery that coca extract mixed with beverages released a stimulant, prompting the launch of a Bordeaux and coca mix (“Vin Marini”) in France, and the “soft drink” Coca-Cola in the United States, from which the cocaine alkaloid was removed after 1903.

The rapid deterioration of coca leaves in shipment, however, limited commercial potential. A solution was developed by Bignon and Arnaldo Kitz, a Merck chemist working in Peru, through processing the leaves into cocaine cake for exportation. Kitz set up laboratories in Pozuzo, Huánuco, a German-Croatian colony near the coca fields, collaborating with politician Augusto Durand, who controlled the local cocaine trade until his death in 1923. During these years, Peruvians took pride in coca as a uniquely Andean product, and in cocaine as a modern drug developed in Peru.

After the turn of the century, the international medical community became increasingly critical of cocaine, particularly after the development of Novocain as a superior local anesthetic. The United States criminalized cocaine, created new bureaucracies to combat illegal narcotics, and convinced Peru to outlaw cocaine in 1949. Nevertheless, the United States still allowed Coca-Cola to import coca leaves for processing into syrup.

Cubans popularized cocaine as a recreational drug and sold it to American tourists and others. After 1959, however, Fidel Castro expelled drug dealers, who re-established their businesses in neighboring countries. New cocaine merchants also appeared in the Andes, notably the Huasaff-Harb clan from Chile, who sold the drug in Rio, Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, and elsewhere.

The cocaine boom dates from the presidency of Richard Nixon, whose anti-marijuana campaign increased demand for substitute drugs. Peruvian coca farmers in the Huallaga Valley dramatically increased production, and Colombian drug dealers, who had replaced the Chileans,
processed it into cocaine using methods first developed by Bignon and Kitz.

Gootenberg presents a sophisticated analysis of cocaine commodity chains and public policy based on extensive archival research and a firm grasp of Peruvian history. The book should stand as the standard economic history of Andean cocaine for years to come. Despite Gootenberg’s research and analysis in this book, however, we still know relatively little about coca farming, including labor recruitment and the social relations of production, as well as the impact of drug profits on Andean and global economies.

Michael J. Gonzales
Northern Illinois University


In late 2001, Argentina fell apart, economically and politically. President Fernando de la Rúa resigned precipitously, following years of increasing unemployment and foreign debt, and months of escalating protests. It was a dramatic period, and momentous for the absence of military intervention. Yet, as Veigel demonstrates in Dictatorship, Democracy, and Globalization, the 2001 crisis was in some ways less unique than it initially appeared. Veigel traces Argentine economic policies and developments from the early 1970s—during the governments of Juan Domingo Perón and his wife and successor, María Estela (Isabel) Perón—through the rise of military authoritarianism in 1976, the collapse of the military regime in 1983, President Raúl Alfonsín’s early resignation in 1989, and, finally, the 2001/2 crisis. In the process, Veigel effectively demonstrates the extent to which Argentine policymakers have continued to repeat many of the same errors, been hampered by many of the same constraints, and ultimately faced surprisingly similar ends.

In essence, Veigel argues that Argentina’s economic struggles have been largely a function of the lack of political or social consensus about a single economic model, whether statist or liberal. The pressures from competing interest groups often forced governments to rescind economic reforms, or new leaders to offer dramatically different alternatives. Veigel also demonstrates the difficulties that Argentina’s national governments have encountered when seeking to control the deficit, given provincial governments and public enterprises with sufficient autonomy to thwart the efforts of national leaders. Yet, despite the emphasis on social and structural constraints, Veigel finds that economic policymakers did indeed contribute to the country’s overall economic failures, mostly by focusing on short-term crisis response at the expense of long-term
consequences (207). Foreign entities and leaders, especially the IMF and the United States, have also influenced economic outcomes in Argentina, but Veigel tends to portray their role as more moderate than decisive.

Methodologically, the book is notable for its depth of research. Veigel meticulously researched not only the development of Argentine economic policy but also the policies of the IMF and the United States when relevant. He conducted an interesting array of interviews with principle actors and drew from numerous primary documents, including news reports, memoranda by central figures, telegrams, and even luncheon invitations. Based on this research, Veigel has been able to provide intriguing insights about how personal views and relationships influenced some of Argentina’s major economic developments.

That said, there are a few holes in the research. Veigel’s expertise is clearly concentrated on economic policy. Yet, when the book touches on other issues—as it inevitably must—the author’s research and depth of understanding seem more superficial. He tends alternately to skirt or ignore different indicators and sources of social conflict, including guerrilla warfare during the 1960s and 1970s, social protest (such as the piqueteros, beginning in the mid-1990s), and the military rebellions that shook Argentina from 1987 to 1990. Overall, Veigel demonstrates considerably less familiarity with these contentious actors or their political and economic impact. Since a major portion of the book deals with the emergence, collapse, and aftermath of military rule, Veigel necessarily addresses some of the cleavages within the armed forces, but his references to the various groups tend to be inconsistent. Since he often neglects to define such critical terms as corporatist, nationalist, and neoliberal, or even such economic terms as Keynesian or monetarist, some of these discussions can be confusing.

Nevertheless, no book can cover everything. This one may not be an encyclopedic examination of Argentine political or social history during this period, but it does stand as an informative discussion of Argentina’s economic history. To his credit, the author avoids simplification: He apparently prefers economic liberalism, but he focuses mostly on the necessity of consistency in economic policymaking. He highlights the importance of globalization and shifting international trends with respect to the role of states in managing their economies but stresses the impact of domestic actors. He points to the severe social conflicts and structural constraints that have challenged Argentina’s economic teams, but he recognizes the influence of individual policymakers. These nuances may confound all attempts at a simple summary, but they make the work thoughtful, valuable, and intriguing.

Deborah L. Norden
Whittier College
Social Networks in Byzantine Egypt. By Giovanni Ruffini (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2008) 278 pp. $110.00

The vast quantities of documentary texts surviving on papyrus (ancient paper) and excavated in Egypt provide unequaled access to the social lives of individuals and institutions in Byzantine world. Papyrologists are necessarily concerned with the demanding task of editing texts, but, increasingly, the data derived from such texts are providing the basis for statistical analysis and synthetic historical study. Ruffini significantly advances the application of quantatative analysis to data extracted from papyri. His study examines the social networks of two settlements in the sixth-century and, crucially, proposes a new model for understanding the social structures of the contemporary Byzantine Empire.

The edited corpora of two large finds of papyri from a district capital, Oxyrhynchos, and from a contemporary village, Aphrodito in the Antaiopolite district, provide the author’s data. Chapters 1 and 3 introduce and evaluate the social networks of Oxyrhynchos and Aphrodito, respectively, employing traditional prosopography, whereas Chapters 2 and 4 use quantitative analysis derived from anthropological and sociological theory to support or challenge the results (2–3). In order to achieve the aims of Chapters 2 and 4, Ruffini uses the social network analysis software UCINET and the more powerful Pajek, together with NetDraw, a program that produces visualizations of the imported data.

Ruffini’s conclusion—that Oxyrhynchos’ centralized ties privileged an aristocratic elite whereas Aphrodito’s decentralized ties provided non-élites with access to economic mobility (especially through literacy)—is not unexpected. As for which model might be more applicable to Byzantine Egypt and, likely, to the larger empire, Ruffini reasons that Byzantine Egypt, “probably looked quite a bit like Aphrodito in Oxyrhynchos, in which village networks formed from strong horizontal ties connected to nome-wide networks through centralizing vertical ties” (249).

The volume benefits from Ruffini’s ability to communicate in simple, straight-forward language with surprisingly little jargon. He describes the limits of his methodology and datasets honestly, arguing in favor of transparency and providing a web address through which to access his datasets (21, n. 67). He acknowledges that social-network analysis cannot replace traditional prosopography, though it can be used as quantitatative confirmation or as a means to challenge impressions gained through reading the texts (2). For example, his study provides quantitative support for Keenan’s identification of the centrality of shepherds in Aphrodito’s social network (218–226).

The integrity of the datasets is more troubling. The sources of Ruffini’s data, Paola Pruneti’s I centri abitati dell’Ossirinche: repertorio toponomastico (Florence, 1981) and V. A. Girgis’ Prosopografia e Aphroditopolis

(Berlin 1938), are not optimal. So far as quantity is concerned, twenty-three additional volumes of the *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, many containing Byzantine texts, have been published since 1981 (for a total of seventy-two volumes in 2008), and Girgis’ Aphrodito prosopography is now more than seventy years old. As for quality, Girgis has been much maligned by papyrologists on several counts. Ruffino characteristically addresses these concerns (200–201, 210–211), but he argues that the sample is statistically significant and capable of smoothing out errors nevertheless. An actual demonstration, however, would have been preferable. Ruffini’s own forthcoming Aphrodito prosopography (150, n. 13) will redress this issue as a critical means by which to support or refute his method.

All in all, the book’s pioneering use of social-network theory, underpinned by rigorous quantative analysis, is a welcome contribution to papyrology and the social history of the Byzantine world. The future of the field looks promising, indeed.

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This book is a dazzling account of the evolution of the modern Kumbha Mela in Allahabad. The study exemplifies empirical narrative history, engaging, to some extent, the anthropology of pilgrimage and postcolonial theory about religion, politics, and the colonial state. Maclean’s method is archival, with reference to discourse and visual cultural analysis. The book is enlivened by the author’s delightful, often humorous prose.

Maclean’s central argument is that Allahabad’s yearly religious *mela* (gathering) prior to 1760 was an important pilgrimage event but was not a Kumbha Mela, the massive gathering that today can only be adequately photographed by NASA. However, Maclean shows that within a century, Allahabad became not just a Kumbha Mela location but the premier location—the first Kumbha Mela in Allahabad taking place in 1870 (99). The basis of Maclean’s claim is the lack of any reference—whether in English, Hindi, Sanskrit, or any other language—to the Allahabad mela as a Kumbha Mela before this time. Her argument is, as she admits, an argument from silence, but it is persuasive nonetheless. The story of the rise and subsequent use of the Allahabad Kumbha Mela in political and public culture is the crux of this sparkling historical account, which touches upon modes of colonial resistance, British surveillance and control, the manipulation of colonial policies by various Indian elites, and the way in which politicians use pilgrims.

Maclean traces British attempts to manage, coerce, and simply to
comprehend the Allahabad mela in the context of several forces—the influence of Allahabad’s Hindu elites who served (and directed) the needs of pilgrims; the often-violent *sadhus* or holymen, who are the hallmark of all Kumbha Melas; and other North Indian nationalist elites and English-language journalists who saw in the mela a license to challenge colonial authority in the name of “religious” freedom. The book concludes with a chapter about the postcolonial Kumbha Mela, focusing almost exclusively on the 1954 Kumbha Mela in Allahabad that saw hundreds of pilgrims killed in a stampede. Maclean deftly uses this chapter to demonstrate continuities with the former colonial government’s approach to the mela, as well as its English-medium public-sphere representations.

The sources for this work are predominantly from the colonial archive or from English-language media; Maclean states that pilgrims have not left much of a durable archive (16). She does use some non-English evidence such as the “mela sources,” writings from Allahabad’s “vibrant community of publishing houses” (17, 126), and the vast material of the Hindi public sphere only sparingly. Her focus on English records gives the impression that she locates “power” primarily in the colonial state and its media outlets, even though her narrative suggests that local Hindu elites, other nationalist elites, the Hindi press, and the mass of humanity involved in Allahabad were the major forces behind the modern Kumbha Mela.

Maclean is less interested in a theory of power than in vividly displaying power in all its glorious imperial ambivalence. Her introduction offers some sense of her theoretical orientation, and the first chapter gives an excellent and pedagogically useful survey of how the Kumbha Melas have been used in various English-language public spheres, especially in visual culture (photographs, picture books, etc.). For those interested in postcolonial theory, Maclean’s book is a treasure of illustrations, and for those who like their historiography empirically rich and narratively coherent, this book will delight.

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ERRATUM

The header for the review by William Monter in XL:4 (Spring 2010), 605–606, should be *The Scourge of Demons: Possession, Lust and Witchcraft in a Seventeenth-Century Italian Convent*. By Jeffrey R. Watt (Rochester, University of Rochester Press, 2009) 312 pp. $75.00