McGilchrist’s *The Master and His Emissary* is a thought-provoking book that deserves a wide readership, even though most historians will find its account of Western history unsatisfying. McGilchrist argues that the driving force in cultural history lies not in institutions or ideas but in the human brain—specifically in the struggle for supremacy between the right and left hemispheres, which have fundamentally different ways of apprehending and engaging the world.

McGilchrist believes that the division of brains into specialized hemispheres became widespread among vertebrates because evolution favored species that could bring two “types of attention . . . to bear on the world.” Successful individuals had “to focus attention narrowly and with precision” in order to “manipulate” the world to meet their needs for food and shelter, but they also had to be open to broader impressions of others and of the world at large: “I have a need to take account of myself as a member of my social group, to see potential allies, and beyond that to see potential mates and potential enemies. Here I may feel myself to be part of something much bigger than myself, and even existing in and through that ‘something’ that is bigger than myself. . . . This requires less of a willfully directed, narrowly focused attention, and more of an open, receptive, widely diffused alertness to whatever exists, with allegiances outside of the self (25).

The two approaches to the world can interfere with each other. The former requires a “necessary detachment” that allows us to control and manipulate our natural and social environment, whereas the latter requires that we maintain “the broadest experience of the world as it comes to us” (22). The neural networks that facilitate these ways of paying attention to the world are located in different parts of the brain to minimize the degree to which they interfere with each other—the “attentive” network mainly in the left hemisphere and the “receptive” network in the right.

Ideally, in McGilchrist’s opinion, the hemispheres should work together in creative tension to facilitate survival and cultural progress, but their relationship is “inherently unstable.” The left side of the brain has a tendency to try to dominate the right side. McGilchrist believes, like Friedrich Nietzsche, Sigmund Freud, and Martin Heidegger, that there has been since ancient times “a gradual encroachment over time of rationality on the natural territory of intuition or instinct,” which in his opinion has had baleful consequences for Western civilization (244). That encroachment has reshaped the human brain, enhancing its (left-hemisphere) capacity for information gathering, manipulation, and exploitation at the expense of its (right-hemisphere) capacity for wisdom, empathy, and altruism.
The result has been “an increasing disconnection of cognitive from emotional processes” that has devalued the body, art, and religion in favor of science and greed. The ascendency of the left hemisphere has facilitated “the destruction and despoliation of the natural world, and the erosion of established cultures,” leaving humans less connected with each other and less happy (244, 434–435). McGilchrist admires the effort by Romantics and continental philosophers to restore the balance between embedded and detached thinking, but their efforts were unsuccessful. Left-brain thinking has dominated Western culture since the Enlightenment.

McGilchrist’s dystopian view of the present shapes every page of his declensionist history of Western civilization—a history that most professional historians will find strained, especially when it suggests that ancient Greeks were more empathetic and less exploitive than modern Europeans. But his larger point—that we cannot understand history without understanding its impact on the human brain and vice versa—is persuasive.

Randolph Roth
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*No Dig, No Fly, No Go: Hows Map Restrict and Control.* By Mark Monmonier (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2010) 241 pp. $18.00

Monmonier writes engagingly and authoritatively about maps and mapping. His most widely known work, *How to Lie with Maps* (Chicago, 1991), written with Harm J. de Blij, explored the ways in which representations of phenomena with spatial attributes can be either purposefully or unwittingly misleading. He bills *No Dig, No Fly, No Go* as a study of “prohibitive mapping,” which he dates as coming to prominence after 1900 and sees as marking a shift from the map as tool of discovery to the map as a complex instrument of social management. Telling anecdotes and technological clarity inform chapters about diverse aspects of property borders, administrative and political boundaries, zoning, and locating.

From a historian’s perspective, the important story in this book is not about modes of prohibitive mapping so much as about boundary making. Maps can be assertions, propositions, representations of agreements, and records of findings, but not all maps are concerned with positing boundaries. Monmonier writes, however, “Any map with boundary lines . . . is fundamentally a restrictive map,” and “the primary symbol on most prohibitive maps is the boundary line” (2). Rather than supposing that “maps restrict and control,” Monmonier might have said that boundaries are outcomes, created through a negotiation about the control of space between competing interests in many cases or through
the imposition of unilateral power in others, which are most easily understood today when presented cartographically. People began to trust cartographical representations more than written narratives relatively recently, largely because of the spread of mathematical cartography in the nineteenth century, although ancient maps of property boundaries have been found in Rome and in China. As a study of boundary making activities, No Dig, No Fly, No Go is a valuable contribution to the examination of the human processes by which claims about the definition of, and control of, space are put into effect.

Maps are social constructions with an amazing persuasive power, given how infrequently they justify their claims to authority. They also can have consequences even when the situation that they claim to represent is no longer valid: For example, wetlands change, but builders sometimes have to follow an out-of-date map. But what this book repeatedly emphasizes is how inconstant and variable boundaries are in practice. A clear property line can be trumped by historical easements and encroachments. Borders defined through multilateral agreement are valid until one party has the power to redraw them. Zoning boards repeatedly accommodate private interests. Politicians manipulate boundaries for partisan advantage. Maps may appear to have authority to restrict and control, but as Monomomier shows with his examples, in practice they are provisional representations of the ongoing competition to control space.

Peter K. Bol
Harvard University

$110.00

The sad neglect of fetal death in historical studies is attributable to both a paucity of data and definitional difficulties: Stillbirths were not registered in England and Wales until 1927 and in Scotland until 1939, and even today, countries and cultures are not wholly homogenous in their definitions of live birth, stillbirth, and miscarriage. This problem was far larger in the past. Some places treated all infant deaths before baptism as stillbirths, and others probably inflated the number of live births through emergency baptism. As a result, they evince wide differences in the calculation of fetal losses, live births (therefore fertility), and early neonatal mortality (therefore life expectancy) that complicate new research into comparative levels and trends. Health and survival are affected by a spectrum of influences that change gradually over the life course. Fetal health is located at one extreme of this range, where maternal health and conditions in the womb are of particular importance. Birth represents an added risk, rendering the study of influences on fetal health particularly
interesting. The issues surrounding fetal mortality in the past have never been adequately addressed until now.

Drawing on a wide range of sources—national-level statistics, surveys, hospital records, and physicians’ case notes—Woods addresses these matters in detail (although inevitably the period from conception to viability is speculative). The early chapters of the book thoroughly cover the exigencies of definition and measurement, highlighting the problems that different registration practices cause for comparisons between one time and/or place and another. Woods explores levels and trends for a wide variety of places, primarily in Europe where data are more available, though he also makes interesting observations about Japan and more recently developing countries. His comparisons inform new estimates of levels and trends in stillbirth and fetal death for Britain before World War II. Contrary to previous assumptions of a much higher stillbirth rate, which declined between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, he suggests the stillbirth rate remained between forty and sixty per thousand births from 1600 to 1930, showing a gentle decline after 1650 and a precipitous one after 1930.

Subsequent chapters examine possible influences on fetal death, including midwifery and obstetric practice, and different approaches to the measurement and classification of fetal death, as practiced by influential midwives and medical personnel. The final chapter discusses the role of induced abortion and the modern-day paradox of high levels of induced abortion and unprecedented concern for the fetus as a patient.

Woods claims that his approach is neither interdisciplinary nor multidisciplinary but “antidisciplinary”; he claims not to “offer a history in the normal sense” but to reveal “how and why change occurred in the long term[,] . . . prepared to use whatever is available and relevant to reach that goal” (9). Rather than eschewing disciplines, however, he mixes and matches, demonstrating in true interdisciplinary fashion how a collaboration of methods is necessary to an understanding of this topic.

In this regard, the penultimate chapter is the most interesting and controversial section of the book, using different approaches (particularly medical history and demography) to answer the question of why fetal health improved between 1650 and 1930. Woods argues that progress in midwifery could have played only a small role in reducing intrapartum fetal death prior to the 1930s. He maintains that mothers’ freedom from infections during pregnancy rather than better nutrition, as suggested by Wrigley, was the key influence on long-term changes in fetal health. 1 Though the evidence is more suggestive than conclusive, the combination of arguments from multiple disciplines is elegant and persuasive: Contemporary observations show that smallpox during pregnancy increases the risk of fetal loss; smallpox and fetal mortality followed similar trends in their decline over time; and hypothetical models

under various demographic conditions indicate that declines in smallpox could well have produced declines in fetal mortality.

Woods’s study does for fetal mortality what Irvine Loudon’s *Death in Childbirth* (New York, 1992) did for maternal mortality—stating the issues, comprehensively detailing the best available knowledge from a variety of disciplines, and introducing approaches to further study. It deserves to be known as the latest definitive word on the subject for medical historians, demographers, epidemiologists, and economic historians.

Alice Reid
University of Cambridge

*The Colour of Paradise: The Emerald in the Age of Gunpowder Empires.* By Kris Lane (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2010) 280 pp. $40.00

Lane’s engaging and informative account of the early modern emerald trade begins with an insight offered by a discipline not usually invoked by historians—geochemistry. Mineralogical analysis reveals that many of the spectacular emeralds that survive today in the best private and state jewelry collections of India, Turkey, and Iran originated in South American shale beds (xi, 29). How did these American gemstones travel halfway around the world, and what did they mean to the people who sought them? Drawing on numerous archival resources, as well as on the work of anthropologists, historians, and geochemists, Lane reconstructs the patterns of production and circulation that allowed Colombian emeralds to travel from the scarred mountain tops of the Eastern Cordillera through the hands of Andean, West and West-Central African miners, mixed-race lapidaries, and Portuguese New Christian merchants to consumers in south and southwestern Asia.

Lane begins by acknowledging that the overall economic significance of emeralds was far less than that generated by either American silver or Asian textiles (11). He ends by conceding that a precise quantitative assessment of the emerald trade is impossible to calculate with certainty due to the inherent unreliability of written records of the trade’s volume (226). Miners hid the products of their labors from the mine operators, and mine owners, in turn, deceived tax collectors to protect their profits. Merchants bearing emeralds were loath to advertise their precious cargo; emeralds often sailed undetected on ships. Purchasers frequently lied about provenance to obscure their source for any number of reasons. But it is neither the numbers of emeralds mined or sold nor their perceived economic value that Lane pursues; his interest is in the “human relationships mediated by material goods” (12). Lane’s rich portrait of the emerald miners, merchants, monopolists, and modern-day emerald barons makes a convincing case that the true value and significance of the jewel rested—and continues to rest—in the far-
reaching and entangled human networks that moved emeralds around the globe.

Using surviving records of royal taxes paid on Columbian emeralds (Appendix 1), Lane provides the most accurate possible outline of the trade’s cycles of boom and bust. Even more impressively, he paints a detailed and fascinating portrait of emerald production and circulation, from the techniques employed in emerald mining and their human and environmental toll to the language of the racial codes used to discuss the mines’ African and Amerindian laborers and to the Sephardic merchant networks that stretched from Cartagena to Goa. His account is made all the more vivid by the photographs, maps, and charts that accompany the text.

Lane describes the process of researching the book as “romancing Colombia’s stones” (xiii), and at times, his enthusiasm for the early modern whirl of commodities and people trumps a more nuanced take on the complexities of the era. However, he never loses sight of the tension that existed between increasingly global market for goods in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the (largely unsuccessful) attempts by increasingly centralized governments to tax and regulate the movement of valuable commodities—and the people who carried them.

Lane’s interest in the links between early modern globalization and present-day conflicts and concerns is clear. He occasionally describes historical events with language that immediately evokes modern struggles for control of material resources and people; he discusses Spain’s attempts at “winning Asia’s hearts and minds” and compares Inquisition torture suffered by Sephardic gem merchants to “waterboarding” (9, 109). Although his use of loaded modern phrases can be jarring, the postscript about today’s esmeralderos, or emerald bosses, underscores the enduring relevance of the trade’s imperial past. Not only does Colombia remain the world’s most important producer of emeralds (xi), but many of the less savory characteristics of the early modern trade continue to shape the emerald market today.

Molly A. Warsh
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_The Enemy of All: Piracy and the Law of Nations_. By Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York, Zone Books, 2009); 274 pp. $28.95


Pirates have traditionally been seen as brutal villains or dashing rogues. Modern historians, however, have recast pirates as radical social innovators whose most important transgressions were in the area of sexual and
Two recent books find yet new meaning in the history of maritime bandits. Heller-Roazen’s *The Enemy of All* sees piracy as the paradigmatic meme for international outlaws, a conceptual prototype for today’s terrorists. Leeson’s *The Invisible Hook* sees the motley crews as miniature libertarian societies, in which welfare-maximizing rules emerge in the complete absence of governmental regulation.

*An Enemy of All* offers an intellectual history of piracy. The approach is literary and philosophical, tracking the genealogy of the concept *hostis humani generis* (enemy of all mankind), which for centuries, and perhaps millennia, has been associated with piracy. Heller-Roazen traces piracy through the writings of philosophers from Cicero to Carl Schmitt. His central inquiry concerns how pirates were conceptualized as literal outlaws in legal and political thought. Because they stand ready to attack the shipping of all nations and are backed by none, pirates exist outside any legal structures. Anything may be done to them by anyone.

After establishing piracy’s conceptual genealogy, Heller-Roazen attempts to identify its progeny. Today, he claims, the concept of piracy has expanded to land. The category of enemy of all mankind has been extended to the perpetrator of “crimes against humanity,” as well as the partisan and the terrorist. Just as pirates were neither criminals nor military foes, terrorists captured by the United States under the Bush Administration were given the status of “illegal combatants,” a paradigm neither fully legal nor military.

The literary approach of *The Enemy of All* falters when it attempts to connect the historical concept of piracy to current events. Law is not simply conceptual; it is eminently practical. One cannot understand it simply by looking to legal labels, which are often acknowledged fictions. The very notion of the pirate as an “enemy of all mankind” describes a legal conclusion—that any nation can prosecute him—rather than the underlying reality.

Much conduct has been grouped under the label *piracy* that has little connection to maritime robbery. Heller-Roazen offers the name of a French anti-terrorism program to support his contention that the piracy paradigm has been extended beyond the seas. The name of the program, *Le Plan Vigipirate*, is an “obscure allusion to the mast up which seafarers of another epoch climbed to look out for the ships of illegal plunderers” (177–178). Perhaps. But law is not allusive. To make the connection between modern international criminals and pirates requires more than the occasional use of similar vocabulary. Indeed, piracy has a broader connotation of predation and illegality without any international or extralegal connotations—software “piracy,” for example. Even centuries ago, treatise writers bemoaned the fact that unbridled use of the term *piracy* led to intellectual confusion.

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1 See, for instance, Peter Earle, *The Pirate Wars* (New York, 2003).
Heller-Roazen offers little additional support for his surprising conclusion that terrorists are modern pirates (in the sense that they do not receive protection from civil or military law) aside from a stray quotation of John Yoo, which likens terrorists to pirates. This casual remark hardly establishes the proposition. Indeed, today’s international terrorists are, unlike sea pirates, not the enemies of all; they are in sympathy with, and often armed or controlled by, particular nations. Moreover, in the United States and elsewhere, courts have repeatedly ruled that such individuals do fall within the protection of the law, though the law might punish their conduct. In fact, international law does not even recognize a crime of terrorism—because one man’s terrorist is, far from the enemy of all, another man’s freedom fighter.

Leeson’s cleverly titled _Invisible Hook_ uses the basic insights of neoclassical economics to explain numerous features of pirate society and practice. Many behaviors that could be attributed to pirates’ blood-mindedness or dogged independence can be explained as rational, welfare-maximizing behaviors. Many historians have remarked about the democratic, horizontal nature of pirate society. For example, pirate captains were elected by majority vote, with universal franchise, and had relatively few prerogatives vis-à-vis their men. This contrasted sharply with the near absolute power of a captain in a merchant fleet or navy. Yet, as Leeson explains, pirate captains had less power than their merchant or naval counterparts not because their principles were more democratic but because their ships were owned by the pirates themselves. The absentee owners of nonpiratical vessels, whether businessmen or the Crown, sought to minimize the risk of entrusting their massive investment in ships and cargo to a band of sailors. Commercial captains could count on a substantial share of a voyage’s proceeds to ensure their loyalty. Similarly, the flat pay scale of pirates was not, as some would have it, the product of an anachronistic interest in social justice. Rather, a roughly even split of the booty eliminated a source of potential conflict, and exceptional feats in battle would be encouraged with special bonuses.

Leeson shows how the articles of agreement under which pirate ships operated provided public goods and social insurance (pensions for wounded pirates), policed against negative externalities (smoking bans and other safety rules), and established rules to prevent and resolve conflict among the crew. Indeed, the articles may have done a better job at improving group welfare than many national constitutions—not surprising given that they were adopted unanimously. Leeson also provides economic accounts of apparently irrational or romantic behaviors, like flying the Jolly Roger. Most criminals do not fly flags attesting to their status unless the self-identification works in their favor. The skull and bones allowed pirates to capitalize on their brand, establishing their rep-

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3 For Yoo’s quotation, see Jane Mayer, _The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror Turned into A War on American Ideals_ (New York, 2008), 153.
utation for ruthlessness to induce merchantmen to surrender voluntarily. Although pirates could easily defeat most civilian vessels, battles could damage their prize and thus reduce their revenue.

Leeson rarely strays from primary sources. His chapter about pirate constitutions quotes numerous such documents at length, and he generally punctuates important assertions with colorful quotations from pirates or their victims. The danger of looking for rational bases for historical practices is that it can result in just-so stories or ad hoc fallacies. The Invisible Hook may not entirely avoid this malady. Yet on the whole, Leeson’s account is parsimonious and does not force itself on the evidence, or, as in his discussion of pirate conscription, acknowledges the limits of his explanation. Moreover, his economic explanations, though not rigorous, can function as checks on alternative, noneconomic explanations of pirate behavior, which often attribute irrational motives to their conduct, assumptions belied by their systematic organization.

Eugene Kontorovich
Northwestern University School of Law

Restoration Ecology: The Search for a Usable Environmental Past. Edited by Marcus Hall (New York, Routledge, 2010) 329 pp. $95.00 cloth

This useful collection features short essays by historians, geographers, anthropologists, sociologists, philosophers, and ecologists about ecological restoration. The first premise is that many previous attempts at restoration have not adequately considered history; instead, they have often either misinterpreted or simply imagined an undisturbed, pristine past. The second premise is that the practice of “restoration” can be improved only with an adequate consideration of history. Most of the authors are practitioners who are actively involved in restoration. Their hope is that a better understanding of history will clarify goals and guide further attempts to reach them.

Most of the essays are case studies; a few of them take a broader view of the issues that these studies raise. The first section, which treats “restoration in history,” starts with David Lowenthal’s reflections on art and politics as well as ecosystems. This section also introduces contrasting approaches to restoration in Europe and North America during the past century. The book then examines the uses (and misuses) of “history in restoration,” especially regarding the ancient forest of the Scottish Highlands, which disappeared thousands of years ago from largely climatic causes. Next follow case studies about restoration on California coastlines, Yorkshire fens, Japanese rice paddies, American Indian reservations, and urban New Haven, Chicago, and Leipzig—all engaging and illuminating. These projects make use of everything from pollen cores to archival documents to reconstruct complex histories of ecological
change. Many of them endorse the importance of past cultural practices in creating prized ecological systems, even today.

In sharp contrast are two essays, representing a more radical vision, that try to discover an earlier ecological state in which human impact was minimal or nonexistent and that propose novel human interventions to restore that state on a large scale—the central paradox of “rewilding.” Franz Vera advocates “naturalistic grazing” by large ungulates to restore supposedly ancient wood pasture systems in Europe. Josh Donlan and others argue for a “Pleistocene rewilding” of the North American plains by introducing African proxies for extinct American megafauna. This use of history is implicitly rejected by almost every other essay in the book. Chris Smout and Jan Dizard explicitly oppose it, questioning both the possibility and the purpose of trying to restore “original” landscapes on a large scale; they endorse the use of history to do a better job of stewardship that meets today’s needs.

As Smout points out, however, this recommendation leaves room for areas that are set aside for minimal management, or for attempts to restore versions of earlier ecological conditions. Smout praises Vera’s results in promoting biodiversity, without giving much credit to the idea that it broadly represents Mesolithic Europe, which does not seem to be supported by the pollen record. In other words, rewilding has a useful place within a broader array of stewardship across the landscape, if shorn of the claim that it represents the most ecologically virtuous condition and that everything else is mere gardening.

Eric Higgs closes the circle by reaffirming (even as rapid climate change makes literal restoration even less possible) the cultural and ecological benefits of mustering people to work on restoration projects. Reconnecting people to nature is all to the good, and history can help to make the process more meaningful and effective ecologically.

Brian Donahue
Brandeis University


This edited volume is a most welcome addition to the interdisciplinary literature on taxation. Bringing together leading scholars in multiple fields (sociology, history, political science, law, and economics) and methods, this well-organized collection covers a range of issues grounded in the intricate dynamics that underlie, and are generated by, taxation. Built around the notion of taxation as social contract and deeply concerned with placing the phenomenon in historical, political,
and social context, the volume both encourages conceptual insights and provides those who design tax policy with much food for thought.

The effort is beautifully framed in the Foreword by Charles Tilly and in Chapter 1 (“The Thunder of History: Origins and Development of the New Fiscal Sociology”) by the co-editors. They explain the importance of the field, outline its inspiration (Joseph Schumpeter), and concisely trace the history of approaches to studying tax policy. They consider the relationship of the new fiscal sociology to more insular traditions for analyzing how taxation evolves—modernization theory, elite theory, and militarist theory—and convincingly explain how the more synthetic approach adds value. In the Epilogue, John Campbell reinforces this point and transposes it to the context of contemporary policy debates.

The volume is divided into three parts that respectively cover state-based sources of tax policy, the evolution of taxpayer consent, and social consequences of taxation. Part I focuses on the trajectory of the fiscal-social contract in the United States from the perspective of the state. Joseph Thorndike analyzes the evolution of New Deal taxation and its role in shaping conflicts embedded in the present U.S. tax system (Chapter 2). Andrea Campbell presents an illuminating empirical analysis of the relationship between elite rhetoric and citizen attitudes about taxes (Chapter 3). Fred Block deconstructs the factors underlying the tax cuts of President George W. Bush (2001/2003), showing how the political right used an individualistic ideology to win over religious conservatives and business elites (Chapter 4). Finally, Christopher Howard shows how and why politicians with opposing perspectives about tax rates have commonly used tax expenditures as social policy (Chapter 5). All of the chapters discuss how the state and politicians relate to different groups in American society.

Part II turns to the perspective of taxpayers inside and outside the United States. Drawing on state responses to HIV/AIDS in Brazil and South Africa, Evan Liberman shows how social identity and the historical forces that shape it affect the consent of taxpayers and how they relate to public-expenditure benefits (Chapter 6). Esako Ide and Sven Steinmo look at the role of trust with regard to tax compliance in Japan and the influence of previous government choices on trust levels (Chapter 7). Naomi Feldman and Joel Slemrod examine the effect of war on compliance (long framed as a driver of tax development) (Chapter 8); they find a modest positive effect that erodes as fatalities increase. Finally, using the experience of pre-Revolutionary America, Robin Einhorn analyzes the extent to which democracy and liberty influence taxpayer consent (Chapter 9). Collectively these chapters demonstrate the effect of evolving state–citizen relations on tax systems and taxpayer compliance.

Part III treats the social and cultural effects of taxation. Tilly argues that democracy benefits from taxation, given that trajectories of tax policy over time help to institutionalize negotiations between the state and the people (Chapter 10). Edgar Kiser and Audrey Sachs investigate the
emphasis on traditional centralized tax administration in low-capacity countries of sub-Saharan Africa at the expense of important political and historical dynamics that are consistent with a more decentralized approach (Chapter 11). Drawing on Adam Smith, Beverly Moran concludes that wealth taxation is preferable to income taxation in the United States because of its potential to redress historical inequities reinforced by the present system (Chapter 12). Edward McCaffery depicts the tax system as reproducing gender inequalities and creating conflicts (Chapter 13). Finally, W. Elliot Brownlee analyzes the efforts of Carl Shoup to design a new tax system for Japan during the postwar occupation (Chapter 14). Despite initial acceptance, the system came unraveled when interest groups pressured subsequent governments. Although covering a broader range of issues than the other sections, these chapters cogently highlight the diverse nature and effects of tax systems in history.

Collectively the chapters in this volume challenge scholars of taxation to think beyond their comfort zones. Part I describes the political conflicts that shaped the unusual U.S. tax system, raising questions about the tax regimes of particular states and drawing implications about what lies ahead. Part II explores the factors underlying voluntary tax compliance and coercion in particular cases, robustly accentuating the importance of the social, not just individual, factors that dictate taxpayer consent. Part III touts the benefit of the new fiscal sociology not only for scholarship but also for practical application, by moving beyond mainstream theory (particularly,”optimal” taxation theory, which has long dominated policy) that simplifies reality and fails to understand historical trajectory adequately.

Although the book might have covered a broader range of countries in the chapters and forged a more deliberate balance of topics within sections, the introductory and concluding material provides an excellent synthesis of the chapters and highlights larger themes. Overall, this volume is an engaging and productive contribution. The new fiscal sociology appears to have a promising future.

Paul Smoke
New York University

The Oxford Handbook of Genocide Studies. Edited by Donald Bloxham and A. Dirk Moses (New York, Oxford University Press, 2010) 675 pp. $150.00

Despite its heft and cost, this volume should reside on the desk of every Holocaust and genocide scholar, as well as in all academic libraries. It is invaluable in both its comprehensiveness and its specificity. The thirty-one experts who contributed to the volume come from all over the globe and a wide range of disciplines—history, international relations, religion, social anthropology, genocide studies, law, philosophy, and
comparative politics. An equally wide range of history and geography are represented in the genocides, ethnic cleansings, and massacres that they examine.

In their introduction, the editors acknowledge that genocide studies began in the 1990s “as a marginal field, part offspring of, part junior partner to, the longer standing discipline of Holocaust Studies” (3). Their justification for the volume is straightforward: Genocide is “unfortunately ubiquitous,” and the term is “frequently misunderstood” (1). Their goals include “probing the limits and utility of the concept of genocide for historical understanding”; reflecting upon “the relationship between genocide and broader historical trends, periods, and structures”; and “problematis[ing] the prospect of the ‘international community’ as benevolent policeman” (8, 13). These goals are admirably achieved. Bloxham and Moses also reveal their keen awareness of the “politics” of scholarship within the field and demonstrate their willingness to be candid—indeed, blunt—about such politics.

The structure of the text accommodates ease of use as a reference. “Part I: Concepts” sets up definitions, provides a fascinating re-evaluation of Raphael Lemkin who created the term genocide in 1943—committing it to print first in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (Washington, D.C., 1944)—and addresses issues such as gender and memory. “Part II: Interdisciplinary Perspectives” provides six lenses with competing claims: Genocide “is first and foremost a legal concept “(123); it “can be described as a peculiarly sociological crime” (142); it “is always a political phenomenon” (163), and so forth. Parts III and IV provide the historical sweep of the volume, from premodern through the early twenty-first century, and Part V undertakes to evaluate the “tools” for responding to genocide—the United Nations, military intervention and the principle of R2P (the responsibility to protect), prosecution of genocidaires, and efforts at avoidance. Each chapter is a tight twenty pages or so, and most of the chapters have a formal summary/conclusion and a list of suggestions for further reading.

Inevitably, some overlap of topics exists (for example, the genocide in Guatemala) but always from differing perspectives. A surprising number of chapters begin with an open question, “Was this event really genocide?” The responses of these scholars shape the field. Readers will also find well-researched attention to less-frequently explored topics, such as genocide in Latin America and the question of American Indians and genocide. Threaded through many chapters is the issue of causal links between colonialism and genocide, an area of significant growth in genocide studies.

The final word belongs to Mark Levene, whose chapter, “From Past to Future: Prospects for Genocide and Its Avoidance in the Twenty-First Century,” focuses on the preconditions for genocide, specifically global warming and the “carrying capacity” of the earth. Disappearing sources of water and viable land, for example, can cause tribal
confronts, or exacerbate other tensions, which in turn can lead to genocide. No individual or nation is protected from climate change: Levene calls for “a thoroughly post-Lemkin effort to recognize the false chimera of the globalizing project and . . . a sufficiency and sustainability . . . geared toward the values of human scale” (658). Such values are precisely those of many victims of genocide in recent centuries; one can only hope that a book such as this can be instrumental in achieving such an effort.

Elizabeth R. Baer
Gustavus Adolphus College


Few historians have been as consummately and consciously interdisciplinary and innovative as has Davis, a long-time member of this journal’s board of editors. Responding to Crouzet’s suggestion that historical inquiry is appropriately “cross-pollinated” by other scholarly disciplines that serve as “fertile sources of creativity,” Davis adds that ideas from other disciplines help to suggest where historians should look. “We set up a back and forth,” she writes, “between our sources and these new sets of questions—yes, a kind of cross-fertilization” (49).

In another part of this delightful set of prolonged conversations, Davis, whose path-breaking publications have ranged across centuries, continents, problems, and genres, chides her interlocutor, “A book is not a lesson.” In her work, she has two goals in mind: (1) that readers become interested in the historical inquiry, be amused and saddened in appropriate turn, and be captured by the “possibilities of the past,” and (2) that readers become aware that her interpretation is not the only one. Davis calls her style of writing a “dialogue,” placing her in enlightening conversation with such long-dead subjects as al-Hasan al-Wazzan (Leo Africanus), Marie de l’Incarnation, Christine de Pizan, Martin Guerre, or any of the other fascinating individuals (many on the margin) who have had her historical ear. Davis also defends her use of the conditional tense to indicate what her subjects, some of whom left few archival traces, might have been thinking or might even have done. Speculation is acceptable, she says, if it is well-grounded in probability and in a historian’s firm grip on the period, the context, and the individual.

Davis entitles the first chapter of this engaging book “Wonderments,” expressing her feeling about communing intimately with the past. She also cautions historians to be humble toward the past “that beckons us.” Historians do not have the power to understand every-
thing; they must remain appropriately detached and certainly not romantic about their discoveries.

Almost every page in this book contains words of wisdom and of fascination, particularly for historians entering the field who are wondering where to begin. But more mature historians will also learn from Davis’ reflections on what she has done and why she has traversed, even hop-scotched, the historical fields in the adventuresome manner that she has adopted. Davis has been an inspiration to scholars and students across many disciplines. These expressive pages demonstrate why.

—R. I. R.

The Economy of the Greek Cities from the Archaic Period to the Early Roman Empire. By Léopold Migeotte (trans. Janet Lloyd) (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2009) 200 pp. $50.00 cloth $19.95 paper

With their uncompromising insistence on the lack of adequate quantitative data for the ancient economy, the works of Finley have been instrumental in dissuading nearly an entire generation of scholars from devoting much attention to Greek economy. As a result, Greek historians have mostly lost touch with the development of economic history during the last twenty years or so, and only recently have some scholars started working to fill this gap. The book under review is not really part of such an enterprise. Written in a clear and accessible way, Migeotte’s book is a concise, highly competent, and traditional survey of the main aspects of the Greek economy, from production to trade and taxation, devoting a good deal of attention to how the Greeks conceptualized what we call their economy.

Apart from brief references to the debates between primitivists and modernists and to the controversy surrounding the origins of coinage, the book generally eschews scholarly controversies, preferring to focus on ancient evidence, abundantly referenced. A minimal selection of ancient sources in translation is appended to each chapter. The chapters that comprise the core of the book—those dealing with agriculture, crafts, and trade—are synchronic on the whole; diachronic developments are addressed within each chapter. Migeotte tends to stress continuity over discontinuity. Instead of portraying the archaic economy, the classical economy, and the Hellenistic economy as distinct systems, as most other scholars do, he describes the economic world of the polis in broad, uniform terms. He returns to the problem of development over time in the conclusion, but he is skeptical that the concept of economic growth has any application to the Greek economy.

The book’s main strength lies in its clarity of structure and exposition and in its masterful control of the evidence. Readers unfamiliar with the economic world of the Greek polis will find it a reliable intro-

duction. In some ways, however, the book is less user-friendly than it could have been. It has no guide to further reading, only a fairly long list of titles that functions as a bibliography. Since the book has no footnotes and its references to modern scholarship are often allusive, it can offer little help to non-specialists who are interested in locating more detailed treatments of its various themes or in gaining more information about the few ancient texts that it presents without any introduction or explanation. These are serious drawbacks that should have been avoided in a book intended primarily for general readers.

Nino Luraghi
Princeton University


Many will ask, “Why write another book about the origins of World War I, which has been a controversial subject for almost the century since the war’s beginning in 1914?” The answer implicit as well as explicit in this book is Mulligan’s insistence that the years from 1871 to 1914 are too often seen through the prism of the war itself. The central argument of this study is that the maintenance of peace between the major powers in the preceding decades merits examination on its own terms and that the developments did not point to an inevitable worldwide conflict.

Utilizing the relevant literature, and especially publications of the most recent years, Mulligan reviews the initial controversies about the so-called war-guilt question and more recent arguments and interpretations. The longest chapter engages the international relations of the forty years of peace between the major powers and the evolution of the alliance system. Mulligan emphasizes that all of the countries involved saw alliances primarily in defensive terms. While emphasizing German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s role in the maintenance of peace, however, he neglects to mention Bismarck’s obtaining a bribe from Austria-Hungary—dropping the plebiscite in Schleswig from the 1866 peace treaty—before his acting as “honest broker” at the Berlin Conference of 1878. The contribution of this bribe to the estrangement between Germany and Russia needs emphasis. The maps are unfortunately inadequate, especially in a book designed for serious scholarship.

In separate chapters, Mulligan engages the roles of the military and of public opinion. He exposes the defensive patriotism in all of the major powers, none of which had much enthusiasm for offensive warfare in Europe, in spite of friction in Africa, East Asia, and the Ottoman Empire. Absent from the discussion of the military is the fundamental shift from the basically defensive plans of Helmut von Moltke the Elder to the offensive plans thereafter. The kind of stalemate that would have grown out of Moltke’s plans would have been entirely different from what developed in 1914.
A fascinating chapter examines the changes in the world system of communications and in the global economy. Utilizing statistics, Mulligan illuminates how global markets in goods and capital changed the world dramatically between 1871 and 1914, but without war being an inevitable outcome of whatever rivalries developed. The statistical tables, which show the evolution of each major power, serve to illuminate aspects of the period.

Mulligan stresses how changes in the views of Berlin, Vienna, and St. Petersburg after the Second Morocco Crisis of 1911 contributed to a weakening of the restraints on war and contributed to turning the July 1914 crisis into a reason for war. He points out that, for Germany alone, mobilization meant war but fails to explain why. In the conclusion, he relates his findings to later events in the twentieth century but unfortunately misses how the German plan to save the great-power status of Austria-Hungary by invading Belgium prefigures the 1938 French plan to rescue Czechoslovakia by invading Libya from Tunisia.

Gerhard L. Weinberg
University of North Carolina


Julius, a distinguished British lawyer best known for having bested David Irving in court and for being the counsel for Princess Diana’s divorce case, previously published T.S. Eliot, anti-Semitism and Literary Form (New York, 1995), as well as two books on art history. His investigation of antisemitism in England is formidable in length and erudition. The study is interdisciplinary in its variety of sources as well as in its author’s profession as a lawyer rather than a historian. But, unfortunately, the fact that Julius is not a professional historian is more of a liability than an advantage in this case.

Writing such a book is admittedly a minefield and gives every promise of continuing to be one. Few areas have been so influenced, indeed almost overshadowed, by recent history—in this case, the Holocaust. Moreover, the vexed issue of Israel is always a source of strong feelings. Present concerns about Israel, far from ignored by Julius, make it difficult to discuss the subject of antisemitism in any sort of detached way. Julius makes little attempt to do so. Ultimately, he is disgusted with the subject, referring to antisemitism on his last page as “a sewer” that he hopes never to write about again (586).

English antisemitism is a perplexing subject. It was so intense in 1290 that the Jews were expelled from the realm and not readmitted until 1656. Since then, however, England, unlike other countries, has enacted hardly any legislation specifically directed against Jews. After their re-admission, Jews faced the same discrimination in English society as any other group not comprised of Anglican gentlemen of means. Grad-
ually, like their compatriots, Jews became full-fledged participants in English society. By 1858, when a Rothschild became a Member of Parliament, they were as viable as any other citizens. They were still subject to informal discrimination, but whether their social status had a unique quality that differentiated it from that of, say, Catholics or the poor is difficult to ascertain.

Julius discusses the usual important suspects at length, although he tends to make chronological leaps, frequently drawing examples from different periods on the same page. He shows little sense of change or development, and the victims of antisemitism, the Jews themselves, are barely present in his narrative. Since, technically, Jews are not the subjects of the book, their absence might be excusable. So far as history is concerned, Julius covers the well-known topics of the Jew Bill of 1753 and the Aliens Act of 1905. He also discusses the canonical works of literature that were particularly influential in negative portraits of Jews—Geoffrey Chaucer’s *Prioress’s Tale* and, even more important, the figures of Shylock from William Shakespeare’s *The Merchant of Venice* and Fagin from Charles Dickens’ *Oliver Twist*. Julius’ suggestion of a visceral hatred of Jews in England based on the blood libel—the notion that Jews murdered Christians, particularly boys, to use their blood to make matzos during the Passover—may be intriguing, but it is not completely convincing. Despite the book’s numerous pages, Julius fails to provide an adequate explanation of English antisemitism and of the reason why many regard the Jews in England as not truly English.

Although his study covers many years, Julius is most interested in the present and the implications for today’s attitudes toward Israel. Unlike other nations in the Western world, England tends to show little sympathy for Israel. Could this negative view be a result of England’s historical ties with the Middle East and its tradition of romanticizing the Arabs? Could it be the result of England’s role in the modern history of Palestine? Julius seems to accept, with some hesitation, that antisemitism and anti-Zionism are not much different. The book often seems more like a lawyer’s brief than a historical work. All historians are deeply influenced by concerns of the present. The challenge is to use them constructively. On the whole, Julius fails to do so. He mainly seems determined to argue the case that the abomination of antisemitism is alive and well in England.

Peter Stansky
Stanford University


Mortimer’s book is concerned with the impact of Socinian theology on seventeenth-century England, especially during the 1640s and 1650s.
Mortimer’s introduction, which offers a useful discussion of Socinianism, and the following chapter, which examines the challenge that the ideas of Faustus Socinus and his acolytes posed to European Christianity, demonstrate the distinctiveness of Mortimer’s approach to her subject. Whereas other scholars often treat Socinianism only as an anti-Trinitarian heresy, Mortimer presents Socinianism as a theology that posed important questions about the relationship between nature, religion, and free will. In contrast to Skinner and Tuck, who argued that theories of natural rights had essentially secular roots, Mortimer contends that Socinianism provided an important theological foundation to the language of natural law. Socinians separated natural law from religion in order to “preserve space for individual moral responsibility and human freedom” (10): Christianity was not ingrained in human nature but a religion that men chose of their own volition.

Particularly important for such Royalist writers in the 1640s as Dudley Digges and Henry Hammond, who were eager to counter Parliamentarian resistance theories grounded on the natural right of self-defense, was the way in which Socinians saw these rights as being abrogated, or at least severely limited, in Christian societies. In this regard, Mortimer brings to the discussion some surprising “Socinians,” not just such notorious civil-war-era anti-Trinitarians as John Biddle and Paul Best (discussed in Chapter 6) but also such renowned Anglican divines as Hammond and Jeremy Taylor. Mortimer demonstrates that, for Hammond in particular, a selective reading of Socinian works, especially those of Socinus’ follower Johannes Volkelius, helped to challenge the Long Parliament’s war against the king and its later attack upon the Church of England. Using Socinian sources, Hammond argued that the church and its bishops comprised a Christian institution that could not be fundamentally altered by the civil magistrate, allowing him to counter Erastian arguments from both Royalists and Parliamentarians during the late 1640s for the abandonment of episcopacy.

Mortimer’s approach to Socinianism derives from a traditional history-of-ideas perspective, well-grounded in the historical context. Although the scholarship on display is impressive, her approach poses a significant problem, at least as it applies to a phenomenon like Socinianism. The fact that this theology was, from its very beginning, deeply controversial—attacked as heretical by both Protestant and Catholic writers—poses two difficulties for Mortimer’s methodology: First, because those who may have been influenced by Socinian ideas were at pains to deny it (Mortimer quotes Hammond himself denouncing Socinians as “men to whom the late Divinity of these evil times [the 1640s] oweth so extremely much” [135]), Mortimer cannot easily demonstrate the direct influence of Socinian ideas, as opposed to describing positions that appear analogous to Socinian ones. Second, because the

label “Socinian” was employed, as Mortimer acknowledges, as a “polemical weapon” (208), it was fixed on a variety of individuals—some of them, such as Hammond, who had read Socinian works, and others, such as the Puritan minister Anthony Wotton, who had not.

Mortimer’s work might have been strengthened had she had explored these polemical strategies further, as Ann Hughes recently did in Gangraena and the Struggle for the English Revolution (New York, 2004) with regard to accusations of heresy in the 1640s. As Mortimer demonstrates, in the 1630s, Socinianism became a useful discursive tool for churchmen to deploy, fostering Lutheran and Calvinist cooperation by creating a heretical threat that they could unite to oppose. An exploration of similar strategies in later chapters might have enriched Mortimer’s discussion of Socinianism overall. This criticism aside, Mortimer’s study remains a valuable work, shedding light on an underexplored theology and demonstrating its importance to seventeenth-century English political and religious discourse.

Ted Vallance
Roehampton University

The Price of Emancipation: Slave-Ownership, Compensation and British Society at the End of Slavery. By Nicholas Draper (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010) 401 pp. $95.00

Among the many issues surrounding Parliament’s outlawing of British Caribbean slavery in 1833, the £20 million raised by the British government to compensate slave owners for the loss of property in people has attracted the greatest outrage, not least because the enslaved received no compensation. Controversial as it has been among modern scholars interested in issues of human rights and restorative justice, the compensation given to slave owners was not much of a concern to most contemporary supporters of abolitionism. By the 1820s, the primary issue was not whether compensation should be paid to owners but how much they should receive and by what means. Moreover, whatever the morality of the process, the resulting arrangements provided a remarkable body of information about the nature of British slave ownership and its implications for British society in the age of abolition. This information lies at the heart of Draper’s analysis of slavery and British society. The richness of the data and the quality of analysis that Draper brings to bear on them make his book extremely important for those who seek to understand the relationship between slavery and British history or to pursue other agendas, including reparations.

At the core of Draper’s study is his analysis of the 30,000 awards by the compensation commission to owners of slaves in the British Caribbean during the 1830s and, more specifically, the 4,730 awards, con-
tested and uncontested, of more than £500, which accounted for 80 percent or more of the total slave-compensation payments. Research of other records allowed Draper to identify 96 percent of those who claimed awards exceeding £500 and to begin to explore their life histories, as well as that of their ancestors and their descendants. This research will inform other projects, including one about the legacies of slavery in British society.

From this evidence, Draper is able to expose patterns in British slave ownership and slave compensation c. 1830 that challenge existing assumptions and advance new understandings. Among other things, he shows that proportions of compensation larger than previously assumed were paid to absentee owners in Britain, including rentier as well as mercantile interests; that slave owners and others identified economically with slavery comprised a significant proportion of the most wealthy people in Britain; that widows and other female relatives of slave owners, as well as former slaves, were recipients of compensation; and that owners of slaves in Jamaica and British Guiana received more than 60 percent of the payments. Exploration of these findings and the detailed personal life histories of slave owners that underlay them occupy much of Draper’s study, including the seventeen appendixes that comprise almost one-quarter of the book. Draper’s study of slave ownership in British society is by far the most comprehensive that has appeared to date. It will undoubtedly call into question many of the assumptions about slavery’s impact on British history.

The significance of Draper’s book, however, extends beyond its immediate remit; it deserves attention from those interested in other issues, as well as in interdisciplinary approaches to historical research. Most obviously, the book provides ammunition for those who focus on the history of human rights or on efforts to right “historical wrongs.” Those who study the politics of reform in nineteenth-century Britain will find food for thought in Draper’s discussion of the balance between vested interest and ideology in the voting behavior and other activities of MPs with connections to slavery. Given the scale of the funding and number of claimants involved in the compensation scheme, those who research the historical evolution of bureaucracies and the state will also find valuable material in Draper’s assessment of the efficiency of the compensation commission’s organization and operation.

Overall, Draper’s book is a vital reminder not only of the importance of slavery to British social history through the 1830s but also of the impact of slave emancipation as a force for political innovation and reform in British society during the age of abolition.

David Richardson
University of Hull

The Horrible Gift of Freedom “was a depressing book to write,” concludes Wood (354). The book is an extended indictment of Anglo-American culture, brimming with irritation, if not outrage, at New Labour, the Royal Mail, past scholars, and, especially, white abolitionists and the many groups then and now who have trumpeted their achievements.

The book was inspired by, and culminates in, the frenzy of media output, art events, and museum exhibitions surrounding the 2007 bicentennial of the abolition of the British slave trade. The first five chapters of the book provide a theoretical frame for understanding the 1807/2007 phenomenon and excavate the visual traditions underlying it. These chapters focus on British prints—on which Wood is an authority—though they also make substantial forays into visual production in the United States, Brazil, and the Caribbean. The final two chapters concentrate on the 2007 bicentennial performances and exhibitions in Britain, from the notorious Westminster Abbey service and “So Sorry” march to the more thoughtful interventions done at Wilberforce House Museum and other institutions.

Wood ultimately argues that, despite some creative attempts to break the pattern, “nothing has changed much in two hundred years” (317). The dominant representation of emancipation in the Euro-American world has always been about moral self-congratulation. Britannia and America and the other slave states celebrate themselves for ending a criminal system that they organized and brutally implemented for their own enormous profit. In the process, the standard representation at once dodges the white majority’s complicity with slavery and perpetuates the psychology of slavery, by rendering the black slave a passive recipient of the newly benevolent state’s “gift” of freedom. Using the anthropology of gift exchange and Fanon’s critique of colonialism, Wood argues that white society’s gift of emancipation is really a gift to itself, inflating its own moral superiority—hence the title of this book.¹ The gift trapped and infantilized its supposed recipients even as it legally released them from bondage.

Wood has considerable talents of acute observation and vivid description, but the framework of his argument is so overwhelming that it tends to force his analyses into predictable results. Hence, for example, he decries a 1980 UNESCO stamp showing victims of the slave trade for its “melodrama” and “white sentimental fantasy” (235), whereas he praises a 2007 Barbados stamp using the same source image (an eighteenth-century French print, rendered schematically in the UNESCO version and more elegantly in the Barbados stamp) for inviting viewers to participate imaginatively in the scene (259). In Wood’s defense, the framing devices

and context of each image in the Barbados stamp are unique, thus permitting interpretations to multiply, but his own readings largely follow a script laid out early in the book.

*Horrible Gift* is therefore a more repetitive exercise than Wood’s previous book on the representation of Atlantic slavery, *Blind Memory: Visual Representations of Slavery in England and America, 1780–1865* (Manchester, 2000). *Horrible Gift* has no major counterweights, such as Joseph Mallord William Turner’s masterpiece “Slavers Throwing Overboard the Dead and the Dying,” which Wood defended eloquently against recent criticisms that it failed to represent the victims themselves. Yet if he had looked beyond the celebratory prints produced after emancipation, Wood could have found other artists, such as John Quincy Adams Ward in the United States, who were trying to rethink emancipation as an ongoing struggle, much as Wood would like us to do now. Whereas Turner’s painting decorates the cover of *Blind Memory*, the cover of *Horrible Gift* shows a black janitor using a push broom to clean Abraham Lincoln’s nose in the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C.—arguably a great work of art but one that Wood’s text passes over in silence.

Wood’s prescription for moving beyond the sorry tradition of emancipation imagery is to focus more on slave art and resistance. He writes sympathetically about an antebellum Virginia image of a slave dancing (though this image may well be more ambivalent than Wood would have us believe) and about a slave potter as examples of slaves who sought and expressed freedom of thought and spirit. He claims that “the time has come to unearth, and to contemplate deeply” such production, but archaeologists, art historians, and cultural historians have been mining this vein for more than three decades (363). Wood also valorizes violent slave resistance, another subject of increasing academic attention, without exploring representational traditions surrounding non-violent disobedience, as in the civil-rights movement in the United States, which was also successful in using the mainstream memory of Lincoln and the U.S. founding fathers to support black aspirations for freedom. The emphasis on martyrdom in the civil-rights movement, so evident at tourist sites in the U.S. South, has problems of its own, but it would have been interesting to discuss in comparison to the British celebrations and apologies of 2007.

Wood’s final chapters about the commemorative events of 2007 are particularly useful for those who could not be in Britain at the time. Interestingly, the case studies from museums and artist studios that he develops are less predictable than his readings of the earlier prints and official stamps. There is much to admire in the concentrated thought and creativity that the bicentennial provoked, even if the official events and much of the popular response engendered a “sense of increasing tedium” that casts a pall over Wood’s book.

Kirk Savage
University of Pittsburgh

In the flood of new research about Victorian musical life that has been reported in recent decades, two large sections of society have often been neglected—the working classes and the nonconformists. This study manages to open up both topics. Tonic sol-fa was a simplified music notation, based on letters of the alphabet and a few other ordinary signs. It was cheap to print and could be taught with little difficulty to people who lacked musical training and the means to acquire it. It was brilliantly successful, providing, for the first time, a disciplined and participatory form of music for the masses. It was invented by Sarah Glover, an Anglican schoolteacher, but John Curwen, a Congregational minister, was the one who seized on its potential for a vast expansion of musical activity and, hence, moral uplift.

McGuire, who is already known for his distinguished work on Edward Elgar and Ralph Vaughan Williams, has boldly taken up this less conventional topic with flair and alacrity. He says that he came upon it by accident: When looking for other works that would have been performed during the same period as Elgar’s oratorios, he found a composition by George Frideric Handel printed in tonic sol-fa, which whetted his curiosity (218). The historical development of the notation had already been investigated by Bernarr Rainbow (in his book unhappily titled The Land Without Music [London, 1967]). But McGuire goes far beyond Rainbow in exploring the social significance of the tonic sol-fa movement. Curwen, who effectively controlled its activities through a series of musical editions and periodicals, believed in the power of music to encourage virtuous living and thinking, especially among the poor. McGuire’s first chapter, “Dissenters, Philanthropists, and the World of Tonic Sol-fa,” cogently explores Curwen’s paternalistic aims and his methods of advancing them.

The three succeeding chapters show how far tonic sol-fa affected three quintessentially Victorian enterprises—the temperance movement, Christian missions, and women’s suffrage. For temperance advocates, music carried danger in its association with dancing, provocative theatrics, and drinking. By encouraging innocent and uplifting forms of music as a harmless entertainment, Curwen and his followers hoped to steer the masses away from its more pernicious associations. Tonic sol-fa helped him to accomplish this end, because those who had learned to read it were necessarily restricted to singing whatever Curwen chose to print in that form. The music that he provided was accessible, demure, and for the most part based on tunes already well known. For missions abroad, tonic sol-fa proved to be equally beneficial, since people of any culture could learn how it worked with relative ease and could be taught to sing hymns and tunes of the missionaries’ choosing, first in English and later in their own language. McGuire records the astonishing success
of tonic sol-fa as an adjunct to the London Missionary Society’s work in Madagascar, before the French conquest of the island in 1895.

In the third enterprise, the women’s suffrage movement, tonic sol-fa played a relatively unimportant part, since, as McGuire explains, most suffrage activists were aristocratic or upper-middle-class ladies who had been raised in the knowledge of classical music in conventional staff notation. Though the rationale for placing this chapter in the book may be thin, it provides an opportunity for investigating the extent to which music in general contributed to the suffrage movement. McGuire’s Epilogue explores the reasons for the rapid decline in tonic sol-fa’s popularity after 1900.

This valuable book helps to restore balance in our knowledge of the varied musical life of Victorian times. It is persuasively written, thoroughly documented, and on the whole well produced (except for the examples in staff notation, which are unbelievably slapdash, with a considerable number of wrong notes). It is particularly gratifying to see how a seasoned and broadly based scholar reacts to a phenomenon that most have not thought worthy of their attention.

Nicholas Temperley
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

*Juries and the Transformation of Criminal Justice in France in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.* By James M. Donovan (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2010) 272 pp. $65.00

Many Americans are unaware that their country’s reliance on trial by jury, however often plea bargains and settlements may circumvent it, is unique in the world. In France, for example, the use of juries has diminished so much during the past century that their introduction in 1791 has begun to resemble a naïve but well-intentioned experiment in the country’s long legal history, an episodic flirtation with curial democracy. One of the many merits of Donovan’s erudite and incisive book is to trace the many twists and turns of the experiment and to explain why it has been so troubled.

A paradox runs throughout his book: Each attempt to strengthen the jury system planted the seed of its undoing. The jury of the Revolution, bringing the people into the judicial process and promising an end to secretive and arbitrary justice, provoked an authoritarian reaction by magistrates and governments almost as soon as it was introduced. The jury of the July Monarchy (1830–1848), strengthened by its newfound powers to moderate sentences, was immediately weakened by the relegation of many crimes to correctional courts where judges could hold sway without the hindrance of the juridical illiterates of the box. The jury of the Third Republic (1870–1940), which was supposed to restore the powers that the jury had lost during the Second Empire (1851–
1870), fell prey, slowly but inexorably, to the efforts of magistrates and professionals of all sorts to constrain it, once and for all. The jury after 1914, newly empowered to determine penalties, lost its autonomy to judges insinuating themselves into its deliberations, a practice that lasts to this day.

It is tempting to attribute this braided story of reform and reaction to the passions of French political history since the Revolution. In this scenario, juries and laymen represent the left, while judges and specialists populate the right—one side permissive and the other repressive. Rarely the twain would meet, as goes the refrain. Such simplicities are not altogether mistaken, but liberal as well as conservative regimes came to fear unbridled juries. Moreover, the legal resort after 1914 to new professionals—criminologists, psychiatrists, sociologists, and many others—who belittled the competence of jurors could serve the left and the right alike. In fact the “triumph of experts over jurors” after 1914 cannot be explained in purely political terms at all (Chapter 6). Donovan threads the internal legal history—for example, the problems of jury discretion or nullification (panels that acquitted defendants despite thinking them guilty, or passing unduly lenient or, more rarely, harsh sentences)—with the external political history of the past two centuries.

An expert on French legal history who has written extensively about the jury, Donovan has written an authoritative and useful book. Though he might have provided a little more context—by showing, for instance, that magistrates and legislators were just as affected by regime changes, intellectual fashions, and public anxieties as jurors were—the book would certainly have lost its concision. Such questions might better be raised in what, as far this reviewer knows, is still sorely lacking—an English-language history of French law.

Paul F. Jankowski
Brandeis University

Gender and Justice: Violence, Intimacy, and Community in Fin-de-Siècle Paris. By Eliza Earle Ferguson (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010) 268 pp. $60.00

In this innovative study, Ferguson shifts attention away from the well-documented crimes of passion committed by fin-de-siècle social elites to examine acts of intimate violence within the domestic partnerships of Parisian workers. Historians have relied upon France’s rich judicial archives to investigate criminal acts, domestic conflict, and sexual violence. Much of this scholarship, however, is influenced by Foucault’s work on the late-nineteenth-century medicalization of crime and criminal behavior.1 As a result, scholars have evaluated intimate violence almost exclusively through the cultural scripts authored by medical ex-

1 Michel Foucault (trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith), Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (New York, 1994).
erts and legal professionals. Conversely, Ferguson employs the methods of theoretician Bourdieu, ethnologists, and feminist historians to contextualize official discourses within the social world in which acts of intimate violence occurred. Ferguson deftly links professional discourses to worker experiences by analyzing the published writings of contemporary criminologists, sociologists, jurors, and politicians alongside the depositions, testimony, letters, confessions, and witness accounts provided by the people involved in some 264 cases brought to trial before the assize court of the Seine between 1871 and 1900.

In Ferguson’s account, acts of intimate violence provide a lens into the private lives of the working people of Paris. The trial records generated by these acts reveal how workers navigated France’s judicial system by setting and testing the limits of appropriate gender behaviors. Acts of intimate violence, argues Ferguson, demonstrate that gender norms were not constructed through medico-juridical discourses but were negotiated within “the immediate and contingent context of daily life” (212). Specifically, trial records show that episodes of intimate violence neither intentionally mimicked crimes committed by social elites covered in the press nor indicated a general malaise plaguing Paris, but stemmed from ongoing domestic disputes between the individuals involved. In these cases, couples struggled to balance emotional security with material security, and it was often over issues of fidelity or finance that they fought.

The legitimacy of a violent act and the appropriateness of a defendant’s behavior rather than a crime per se was at issue in the courts. Significantly, appropriateness was defined by the local community and within the courtroom in gendered terms. For example, acts of violence against women were considered legitimate if the female victim was unfaithful, whereas acts against men were deemed valid if the male victim did not honor his financial obligations to the household. Thus, Ferguson contends, these cases illustrate that the state did not impose a code of conduct onto a submissive population but that “the people co-opted the state system for their own objectives” (158). Verdicts were “the outcome of a complex process of social interactions with multiple systems of standards of behavior” (158).

Ferguson’s compelling book successfully demonstrates the active role that workers played in shaping judicial proceedings and gender norms in fin-de-siècle Paris. Her careful analysis of assize court records alongside pervasive professional and cultural texts from the period enables Ferguson to recreate artfully the social and symbolic worlds in which acts of intimate violence derived meaning. A fascinating portrait of the working people of Paris, this book is indispensable to scholars working in legal and social history, gender studies, and the history of modern France.

Holly Grout
University of Alabama

New World Gold: Cultural Anxiety and Monetary Disorder in Early Modern Spain. By Elvira Vilches (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2010) 361 pp. $45.00

Vilches has done a prodigious amount of research in the propaganda and literature triggered by, and written about, the impact of America on Spain, by which she means primarily Castile. She has mined the plays and short stories of the era for popular impressions of the impact of America and of American bullion and examined writings by proto-economists of the day and by a number of arbitristas—writers who proposed various policies (some idiotic and others plausible) to restore Spanish/Castilian industry, commerce, and, above all, moral health.

Echoing in an uncanny way 2010 arguments about government deficits, loans from outside lenders, selfishness and malfeasance at the highest levels of economic activity, Vilches discusses the growing distance between a Christian, Catholic, Iberian moral economy and a growing world of imaginary money. The latter took the form of credit, government bonds (juros), futures buying and selling, purchase and sale of annuities, and parasitic spending habits by wealthy elites. This flood of paper, or “near money,” combined with the vast influx of gold and silver, triggered inflation. Most of the bullion was silver, but Vilches prefers a literary allusion to gold as the symbol of fixed value in money. This inflation undermined the stable relationship between goods and gold upon which the fondly remembered (if not imaginary) moral economy was based.

Vilches’ underlying premise is that the discovery of the Americas—and its bullion—was central to expanding the world of exotic finance, triggering the cultural anxiety to which the title refers. This cultural anxiety was, in part, a reaction to the re-orientation of the aristocracy, which was no longer known for its military expertise and leadership but for its conspicuous consumption and effete social mores. The aristocracy’s growing dependence on entails (mayorazgos); mortgaging of entail income without investing productivity; and buying annuities from the Crown, monasteries, and convents marked the elite class as an unproductive social parasite. Concurrently, the growing use of credit by the commercial world; the dangerous mingling of public and royal loans and credit; and the multiplier effect of government credit, thanks to American silver, created a shadowy world of finance and imaginary money that was understood by few and misunderstood and feared by many.

The linkage between American bullion, Hapsburg power, the decline of Castilian manufactures and urban life, and recurrent food shortages and epidemics is well known to historians of early modern Spain. Vilches discusses how during the first generation of exploration, when returns to investors were meager, the conquistadores peddled the novelty of new birds, new plants, new art forms, new minerals, and new people as a form of wealth. Vilches documents the connections between this early “wealth,” the expansion of Iberian trade, and the later diver-
The linkages that produced cultural anxiety are well explored; the underlying assumption of a correlation between American wealth and Spanish decadence, however, is a vintage interpretation. Yet correlation does not always explain causation. In fact, Vilches leaves out another contribution to Spain’s prolonged crisis: The Crown’s role in accumulating, sometimes confiscating, and routinely exporting bullion on a huge scale to pay for its endless wars in the Mediterranean, Germany, and the Netherlands hastened the spread of inflation and stimulated competing industries in Italy and northwestern Europe.

Vilches implies that the vast influx of wealth (that is, monetary metals) from America created the social and moral gulf between high finance and the moral economy of local, everyday life. But this dynamic had been active in much of Europe for at least three centuries—a case in point being the Italian banking crisis of the 1390s. Moreover, most of the financial techniques of sixteenth-century Europe were used elsewhere as well, from the Ottoman Empire to Persia, India, and China. This common Eurasian tradition was crucial as Europeans began to venture abroad. This point does not so much challenge Vilches’ work as it suggests that the book might have devoted a few pages to a larger perspective.

Vilches also uses the words nation and nationality in an anachronistic way. Sixteenth-century Spain was, in fact, a cluster of at least four distinct countries. Its rulers, Charles V and Philip II, also ruled half of Europe. They negotiated with Castilian, Italian, German, and Portuguese financiers. A pro-Castilian tariff policy, if it could even have been enforced, was not a high priority for Spanish rulers, who depended on merchant bankers all over Europe.

Finally, Vilches ignores the fact that all of sixteenth-century Europe suffered from cultural anxiety. Witness the Protestant Reformation, the concurrent Catholic Reformation and Religious Wars, and the challenge to traditional authority by socio-political innovations. The Spanish version of cultural anxiety needs to be related to this pan-European malaise.

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Nuns and Nunneries in Renaissance Florence. By Sharon T. Strocchia (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009) 261 pp. $50.00

After the daunting demographic and economic challenges from the mid-fourteenth century to about 1430, Florence’s nunneries saw tremendous
growth; the number of nuns more than doubled from 1478 to 1515. By 1552, about one-eighth of the female population lived in convents, and by the seventeenth century, “almost half of Florentine patrician daughters became nuns” (2). Strocchia documents how this change happened and why it was important. Though focused on Florence, this carefully researched book presents “the constitutive role that nuns and nunneries played in the grand narrative of early modern Europe” (ix), making frequent references to literature about other parts of Europe and using Florence’s convents as a test case against the truisms applied to Europe in general. For instance, the book convincingly dismisses the idea that pre-Reformation convents were “morally lax” (8).

Strocchia’s evidence derives from original sources in Florence’s state archive, as well as in its archiepiscopal archive, the Vatican secret archive, and others. Her archival approach in this work, however, is closely informed by women’s studies; the book’s overarching theme is, in her words, “female agency” (xv). By viewing a historical issue through the lens of women’s experiences, needs, and goals, Strocchia portrays convents from an inside perspective that rightly places the women who populated and ran them in the central role. She emphasizes convents’ active recruitment of potential nuns, the volatile dowry market for girls destined for convents, the impact of early death on leadership, and the problems of deferred maintenance. She depicts convents as sites of socialization and opportunity for women, even though many women became nuns against their desire. Parts of the book—for instance, the discussion of nuns as the makers of clerical robes or lace—employ the methodology of art history.

The best part of the book treats convent economy and finances, positing a relationship between work and enclosure. In the silk industry, nuns constituted “the single largest . . . labor force” (121). Florentine authorities made sure that those who needed nuns’ labor, as well as those whose products were needed by nuns (for example, scissors makers), received entry permits to convents, which “flagrantly violated church decrees and threatened the very ideology of female enclosure” (123). By 1525, one convent realized about two-thirds of its income from work and only one-third from alms. Nuns often had usufruct of various investments, permitting them to spend extra resources on anything from decoration to charity. Their acquisition and management of property and investments allowed them to use their “business skills and social contacts” and to develop “a high degree of understanding about how local credit markets worked” (87, 99). Nuns provided important services for other women, like letter writing. The copying of books made them money and benefited society; “nuns played a critical role in the diffusion and expansion of literacy” (146). The fact that nuns were among the few females to own and manage shops and houses—even significant parts of entire neighborhoods—and that laywomen could visit convents also helped to define the use of Florentine space; as Strocchia put it, convents “remapped . . . social geography” (58).
The book argues that nuns may have “promoted a spirit of harmony” (44), but the later discussion of “fiscal mismanagement or convent disorder” suggests that this point is debatable (49). The discussion of voluntary vs. involuntary poverty needs to be placed in the context of the rules of a given order and further distinguished between collective or individual cases. However, this well-conceived work breaks new ground for the role of convents in society and politics in early modern Europe.

Carol M. Bresnahan
The College of New Jersey


The interaction among art historians, economists, and historians during recent decades has added an important new dimension to our understanding of the world of the artist in Renaissance and early modern Europe. To the traditional focus on content, style, inspiration, and influence (with consideration of biography usually secondary) has now been added a huge body of information about prices, income, markets, sales techniques, and, in general, the financial and social setting in which artistic productivity functioned. Whether this new information has led to a more nuanced understanding of the ways by which aesthetic standards are shaped and defined is not clear, but it has certainly expanded enormously what we know about the lives of the artists and the audiences that they served.

The most extensive work in this area has concerned the Low Countries, though there has also been substantial research into the workings of the art market in Britain and Italy.¹ Spears and Sohm, however, have gathered a volume of material on seventeenth-century Italy that can rival the detailed findings about the Netherlands to which scholars have become accustomed. Painting for Profit is a vast, unrivaled compendium of facts and figures about the daily existence of painters in five cities (Rome, Naples, Bologna, Florence, and Venice) during a period billed as 100 years, though it stretches at times from the fifteenth to the eighteenth centuries.

Because of the book’s perspective, it is full of characters and elusive

details that would never, in more traditional studies, gain much attention. Sohm, for instance, tells of Lionello Spada, a fresco painter in Bologna, who had to be fed while on the job, and whose hobby was to construct, on the floor of the room where he was working, a pyramid of the bones from the animals that he had eaten. On top of this pile he placed a sign—“Funeral of the Death Feast.” In another instance, the far more famous Salvator Rosa accepted Parmesan cheese instead of cash as payment for his efforts. But food is just one of hundreds of such sidelights. A number of charts show the decline of artists’ income in old age; others offer analyses of the relative prices paid for various subject matters (history paintings were the most expensive and still lives the least); statistics also demonstrate the criteria—such as prestige, the overall size of a work, or the total count of individual figures that it contained—that helped to determine monetary value; and page after page compares the life styles, earnings, expenses, and sales techniques of artists both famous and obscure.

The one figure who rises above all others is Guido Reni, who reappears in almost every chapter as being able to demand the highest prices, which were matched only by his extravagance. At the other end of the scale were the day laborers, who could barely make ends meet. In between were the hundreds of men and women in these five cities (a tiny percentage of the workforce serving an ever-rising demand) who turned out the canvases, frescoes, and other decorations that made the Baroque style ubiquitous throughout Italy. The best prices were paid in Naples (where Caravaggio did much better than he had in Rome), but famous artists, such as Nicolas Poussin, were not always the highest earners. A shrewd operator like Pietro Liberi could do well enough to have a palazzo built on the Grand Canal in Venice, even though he was hardly one of the great talents of the age.

Fascinating as this material is, its presentation, in dense double columns of text, makes the book seem more like an encyclopedia than a sustained narrative. The one exception is a remarkable summary chapter by Richard Goldthwaite, which pulls the threads together in a penetrating assessment of painting as an industry. Goldthwaite locates painting within the overall economy—the reasons for its growth, the innovations in method that changed its appeal throughout the centuries, the development of its markets, its inherent economic limitations, and a comparison of its value between Italy and other European countries—with a coherence and analytical bite not apparent elsewhere in this volume. Goldthwaite’s appraisal shows the interdisciplinary enterprise at its best. The other chapters are mines of information, but for an argument that has relevance well beyond the confines of Painting for Profit’s subject matter, the reader is advised to turn to the final essay.

In general, this is not a book that tells us much about the sources of creativity, the criteria for artistic excellence, or even the political context of patronage (for example, the shift from Spanish to French dominance in seventeenth-century Rome). In Goldthwaite’s analysis, however, we
gain a clear picture of the forces that determined the economic conditions under which Italian painters functioned during the Renaissance and early modern times.

—T. K. R.

**Italian Vices: Nation and Character from the Risorgimento to the Republic.** By Silvana Patriarca (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010) 288 pp. $95.00

In the early 1990s, a perfect storm of intellectual and political circumstances (which included a major shift in methodological fashions within the historical profession), the end of the Cold War, and the sudden implosion of the principal mass parties on the peninsula, combined to spark a remarkable resurgence of scholarly interest in the identity of the Italian nation, its characteristics, and its ostensible fragility. Patriarca’s theoretically sophisticated and deeply researched history of the discourse of national character in Italy represents one of the most impressive achievements of this resurgence. Although those acquainted with Christopher Duggan’s *The Force of Destiny: A History of Italy Since 1796* (New York, 2007), Alberto Banti’s *La nazione del Risorgimento* (Turin, 2000), or Patriarca’s previously published essays will be familiar with many of the book’s arguments, the sharper focus of *Italians Vices* allows Patriarca to offer a more complex exploration of how the supposed defects of Italian character have shaped the country’s political and social discourses during the past two centuries. Her subtle use of linguistic analysis and gender theory makes the book a model of interdisciplinary scholarship.

Patriarca dissects the rhetoric and tropes of national character in accord with a standard periodization of modern Italian history; different vices take center stage at different moments of crisis. Her book begins with the Risorgimento in the early nineteenth century, when patriotic artists and writers discursively constructed the idea of Italy. From the outset, these architects of national identity tended to reproduce, internalize, and embellish foreign stereotypes of Italian vices. Thus, they lamented, in particular, the “effeminate” indolence of Italians, a vice that they ascribed less to nature, climate, or race than to the emasculating effects of foreign occupation and indigenous despotism during the peninsula’s long decline from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. Both moderate and democratic patriots linked the nation-building project to the moral regeneration of the Italian people.

With the emergence of a unified nation state in 1861, invidious comparisons with other “more advanced” nations like Germany and Britain increasingly framed the discourse on national character. By the late nineteenth century, fashionable pseudo-scientific theories of Latin race and ethnicity had supplanted historical developments as causal agents in the discourse on Italian vices, as pessimistic educated elites
sought to understand the growth of socialism, parliamentary paralysis, the “Southern Question,” and the country’s colonial failures. More ominously, in the decades prior to 1914, new nationalist intellectuals began to promote war to redeem past humiliations and to transform undisciplined, inefficient, and effeminate Italians into a heroic and virile people. Once Italy had entered World War I, the “moral problems of national character,” rather than failures of political or military leadership, served to explain battlefield setbacks like that of Caporetto in 1917.

Patriarca shows how both fascists and anti-fascists employed the rhetoric of flawed national character to attack their adversaries and advance their respective political agendas in the decades after World War I. While many of her conclusions about Benito Mussolini and his regime cover ground that other scholars of fascist culture have already tilled, she highlights important discursive continuities between the black shirts and both their pre-war predecessors and their contemporary political adversaries. Thus, the perception of the inadequacy or inferiority of Italians present in the rhetoric of liberal elites also informed Mussolini’s project to create a “new fascist man” in ways that had no counterpart in Adolf Hitler’s regime, in which the Nazis assumed the fundamental health and racial purity of the German people. For their part, Mussolini’s intellectual adversaries also relied on tropes of national character, treating fascism as the product of Italian vices. Not surprisingly, the country’s disastrous experience in World War II provided a new occasion for the mobilization of multiple narratives of collective virtues and vices. Although unrepentant fascists attributed the military debacle to the character failings of Italians, a broad array of antifascist forces represented them as humane, untainted “good people” either to obscure prior collaboration with the dictatorship or to increase the prospects for a democratic renewal of political life on the peninsula.

As Patriarca clearly recognizes, the theme of character remained largely marginal to the supranational discourses of Italy’s two leading political parties, the Christian Democrats and the Communists, in the decades after 1945. The discourse of national vices, however, did not disappear during this period, as her final chapter, about Italian cinema, demonstrates. Indeed, the enormously popular “Comedy Italian Style” films not only recapitulated old stereotypes but also carried them to a much wider mass audience, both at home and abroad. These films projected a recurrent image of Italian men as weak, unreliable rascally mama’s boys perpetually under the thumb of their families or wives.

The political crisis in the 1990s, which triggered another wave of self-questioning, allows Patriarca to bring her narrative up to date. As she shows, a largely critical character discourse once again emerged to account for the sudden collapse of the ruling party system, the Northern League’s challenge to national unity, frustrated hopes for progressive change, and the rediscovery of nationalism in reaction to new waves of non-European immigration. Much as in the past, a spate of recent popular and scholarly works have decried Italians once again for their cynicism, individualism, corruption, and other vices.
Given the methodological framework that Patriarca has adopted, the book effectively illuminates the character discourse in the political, cultural, and social debates of the past two centuries. The book’s shortcomings reflect the larger limitations of the “linguistic turn” that informs her approach. Not surprisingly, the historical protagonists of *Italian Vices* are a relatively small cast of journalists and public intellectuals whose texts explicitly articulated a notion of national character. Such a narrow focus comes at the expense of the experiences of ordinary people and the larger structural forces shaping the “real Italy,” which remain largely extraneous to her account. Patriarca does not deny the existence of “some distressing realities” in the country’s situation, both past and present, but her own conclusions are not especially helpful (13). Indeed, she offers little or nothing in the way of causal explanations, preferring instead to highlight the inadequacies or dangers in the historical interpretations that have been advanced to explain developments on the Italian peninsula in the modern era.

Anthony L. Cardoza
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*Ship’s Surgeons of the Dutch East India Company: Commerce and the Progress of Medicine in the Eighteenth Century.* By Iris Bruijn (Leiden, Leiden University Press, 2009) 388 pp. $39.95

Bruijn’s book is a welcome addition to research about eighteenth-century imperial science and medicine, especially for the Dutch seaborne empire, which remains mostly inaccessible to non-Dutch readers. Bruijn’s research indicates that, as in the case of the English East India Company and Royal Navy, the practice of medicine in the Dutch East India Company (voc) was the model for medical care in the Dutch Admiralties, and, more generally, shaped the nature of modern scientific medicine. Indeed, Bruijn is eager to trace the roots of modern medicine—including its use of empiricism, the rise of modern hospitals, and surgery’s move into medical practice and away from barbers—to the voc surgeons’ experience of caring for hundreds of men on ships sent to Asia for commercial gain.

Unlike Cook’s analysis of the role of Dutch imperial commerce in the scientific revolution, Bruijn focuses on details of the everyday lives of the surgeons.¹ She uses databases compiled from a number of archives to refute contemporary and present-day generalizations about poorly trained, ill-paid, and ineffective surgeons on voc vessels. As Bruijn states at the outset, “Present medical history no longer belongs to the discipline of medicine, but to that of social history” (19). As a result, the study has more in common with social histories of sailors, such as Rodger’s early works, than cultural histories of medicine and ideas, with

muster rolls of surgeons forming the basis of the archival research. Bruijn painstakingly traced nearly 3,000 surgeons, representing between 25 to 33 percent of all surgeons who sailed during the 200-year operation of the VOC, not only forward through their careers or to their deaths but also backward to their places of origin and training.

The picture that emerges is one of experienced and trained surgeons, mostly Dutch petty bourgeoisie who were financially successful. The conditions onboard and the experience of foreign climates resulted in high mortality; one-third of the sampled surgeons died within their first five years of sailing. Surprisingly, Bruijn notes that mortality rates did not decline after this initial exposure, suggesting that the traditional narrative of “seasoning” is inaccurate (198–201). Bruijn is careful to point out, however, that life expectancy rates in Amsterdam were similar if not lower, albeit due to high infant mortality. On a happier note, Bruijn’s research clearly demonstrates that being a VOC surgeon presented prospects for respectability, thanks to medical experience that was appreciated by contemporaries, as well as opportunities for economic advancement, especially through trading on the side.

Bruijn’s detailed study is not concerned with conceptual shifts; instead, it rounds out a portrayal of imperial commercial medicine that is not often closely examined. Nevertheless, conceptual shifts are contained within the data. The decline in experienced surgeons from the Dutch Republic mirrors the decline of the VOC, and the Dutch Empire in general. By the same token, the ability of VOC surgeons to rise within their various career paths, and the social standing of those who offered their services, suggests that medical experience overseas was widely respected. Surgeons acted as experts—eighteenth-century intermediaries between abstract knowledge and policy. Although Bruijn’s statistical data provide rich insights into the social lives of surgeons, it would be fruitful to apply her evidence to broader issues in the history of science and to the decline of the Dutch Republic.

Erica Charters
Wolfson College, University of Oxford


The historiography of colonial New England has deep interdisciplinary roots. Long before the professionalization of historical scholarship, some of the region’s most influential writing about its past came from literary


artists such as Nathaniel Hawthorne and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. Even after the rise of modern academic disciplines, Miller and other literary scholars were among the strongest voices in New England’s historiography, their scholarship grounded in the study of Puritan religion as well.\(^1\) By the 1960s, methods drawn from demography, sociology, and economics began to compete with bellettristic approaches.

Science studies, however, lagged far behind, partly because alchemy, the most prominent form of natural philosophy practiced in New England’s first century, fit poorly within the triumphal narratives favored by historians of science, and partly because earlier scholars dismissed it as an exotic offshoot from the main stem of Puritan orthodoxy. The appearance of *Prospero’s America* marks a great leap forward in the integration of science studies with the grand tradition of colonial New England historiography, as well as in the integration of New England into studies of the early modern Atlantic world.

Woodward defines John Winthrop, Jr., as a “Christian alchemist,” a term devised to bridge the gap between older studies of alchemy that saw the practice as essentially spiritual and occult and more recent ones that emphasize its utilitarian purposes. For Woodward, Winthrop’s alchemy was indeed spiritual but by no means occult. He situates Winthrop within the “Republic of Alchemy and the Pansophic Movement” that converged in England during the Thirty Years’ War to escape from Europe’s violence and to experiment with various designs for a better world. *Prospero’s America* tells the story of Winthrop’s multifaceted efforts to bring the ideals of the pansophists to the New World.

The story begins with Winthrop as the promoter of a plantation at New London intended to join New England’s natives with English settlers to create prosperity from the hidden mineral resources of the region. One of the strongest chapters turns to Winthrop’s work as an alchemical healer among both New London’s native and English populations as they acclimated to the conditions of a changing world. In this context, Woodward demonstrates the centrality of alchemical learning within New England’s Puritan culture most convincingly. Later chapters describe Winthrop as a power broker in the transatlantic politics of knowledge production. As governor of Connecticut, Winthrop resolved internal disputes (including Connecticut’s witchcraft crisis of the 1660s) and protected the region’s resources from the prying inquiries of English scientific imperialists, whose quest for knowledge was tied to colonial projects that threatened the independence of New England’s polities.

In tracing the career of a figure so thoroughly enmeshed in early New England’s culture, Woodward must venture into the dense thickets of historiography surrounding every prominent issue in the region’s history. Occasionally, the thickets entangle him, as when he cites one religious historian’s careful account of New England’s primitivist “goal” as

“the restoration of prior perfection” and immediately contradicts it with reference to a literary scholar’s fanciful claim that Puritans were “futurists embarked on a mission to usher in the millennium” (40). But Woodward mostly displays a sure hand in providing the best available account of the predisciplinary career of New England’s most multidimensional founder.

Mark Peterson
University of California, Berkeley


Klepp’s Revolutionary Conceptions presents a strikingly new explanation for the causes of the so-called “fertility transition.” The well-documented, dramatic decline in the number of children born to individual woman began suddenly in North America during the mid-eighteenth century and has continued unabated (with only a brief interruption after World War II) until the present day. To take one example, whereas male delegates who gathered in 1776 at the Second Continental Congress came from families that had an average of 7.3 legitimate children, their own families would consist of an average of six children. By 1787, when another group met to write the U.S. Constitution, each representative’s completed family size had dropped to an average of only 4.8 children.

Yet Klepp’s study moves well beyond a focus on white elites. Although she draws from many existing demographic studies, Klepp herself generated an impressive amount of data to undergird her argument. One of the work’s many strengths is its scrupulous attention to class, regional, and religious variations in birthrates. Although the general trend in births was downward, religious minorities, free and enslaved African Americans, and white people of various classes experienced the decline in slightly different ways.

Statistics merely represent Klepp’s starting point. In contrast to previous studies, which focused primarily on the economic changes that may have contributed to the decision to limit childbearing, Klepp’s work concentrates on what fertility and family size meant to people at the time—most especially, to the women who gave birth to the children. The problem, however, is that most people in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries did not speak openly or directly about the female body, reproductive issues, or birth control. Nonetheless, through an exhaustive examination of an enormous variety of qualitative sources—including letters, diaries, medical treatises, almanacs, novels, and visual images—Klepp is able to reconstruct important shifts in how people thought about these sensitive issues.
Klepp’s most important claim is that despite its failure to grant women political rights, the American Revolution ushered in significant changes for women. For at least some women, the revolutionary experience enhanced their desire for greater independence and control over their own bodies. Women used a variety of methods, including delayed marriage, abstinence, extended periods of breast feeding and herbal remedies, to reduce the number of children that they bore. These changes were accompanied by shifts in private discourse, public intellectual debate, and visual iconography that de-emphasized women’s maternal fecundity and sanctioned other roles for women.

Thus, in Klepp’s view, women rather than men drove the fertility transition. Instead of male heads of household making hard-headed economic calculations about wages, land prices, and the need for fewer children, thousands of individual women decided to apply the fundamental principles of the Revolution to their own private situations and produce fewer children. In a fascinating transnational comparison that seems to confirm her point, Klepp notes that France, which experienced its own revolutionary tumult in the 1790s, experienced a decline in birthrates similar to that of the United States, whereas Britain, which avoided upheaval, did not.

Klepp’s work is a true example of interdisciplinary work at its best—rigorous yet imaginative, nuanced yet sweeping. Although specialists in particular disciplines might quibble with specific aspects of her interpretation, Revolutionary Conceptions offers a new paradigm for thinking about reproductive politics in an era long before that term had been coined.

Rosemarie Zagarri
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In Hock: Pawning in America from Independence through the Great Depression. By Wendy A. Woloson (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2010) 213 pp. $35.00

During the February 2010 primary elections in Illinois, Democratic voters not only had to find a replacement for the disgraced former governor, Rod Blagojevich; they also had to deal with the forced withdrawal of the surprise victor in the lieutenant-governor’s race, Scott Lee Cohen. Cohen faced allegations of domestic violence, as well as negative reaction to the source of his considerable wealth: He was a pawnbroker whose clientele was comprised largely of minorities.

Woloson’s excellent book was undoubtedly in press by the time of Cohen’s misfortune, but her first two chapters about the traditional image of the Jewish pawnbroker places it in larger context. The prejudice that she describes ran deep in European history before being brought to colonial America. She shows how such cultural developments as phre-
nology and mass-market magazines helped to spread a prejudiced and false stereotype of Jews as moneylenders. Her analysis also places both the profession and the ethnic group that became its public face in the context of social-mobility studies. The book adopts something of a defensive tone as it handily succeeds in its effort to destroy negative myths, but in doing so, it sometimes becomes repetitive.

The core of the book is Woloson’s case for the scholarly examination of how modest exchanges of money and credit gave a small measure of security and predictability to the lives of not only workers but also the middle-class and the elite. By providing money to carry people through temporary shortages of funds, the pawnshop became a necessary underpinning for the rise of capitalism. The book admirably approaches the topic from many different perspectives. What was pawned? Economists might benefit from the discussion of the powers of sentiment in controlling personal economic behavior. Drawing on studies of consumerism, Woloson shows that mass production both altered patterns of consumption and desire and lowered the value of goods crossing the pawnshop’s counter. Excellent knockoffs that were passed off as genuine victimized pawnshops as well as customers.

Who were the pawners? The author demonstrates that the principle of pawning was simple and highly adaptable to the needs of the wealthy who needed extra cash for a night on the town or to those of the poor who faced hunger and eviction. In her discussion of personal-level economics, Woloson reveals the surprising size of the clientele. Without making the point explicitly, her study also argues effectively against the predominant image of the city as impersonal and anonymous by describing the strong bonds of personal trust between pawners and their brokers that were able to withstand the forces of urbanization and geographical mobility.

Finally, who were the pawnbrokers? In Hock demonstrates how the Irish in the United States became major players in the profession and how pawnshops were passed down through the generations. The book stresses the honesty of most brokers—the scrap dealers were the villainous fences—and the paper trail of bureaucratic forms turned the pawnshop into an adjunct, instead of an impediment, to law enforcement. Few businesses were as heavily regulated.

This excellent study of a specialized small business is filled with insights about the economic behavior of the poor throughout history, up to today’s “Great Recession.” As for Scott Lee Cohen, a few months after his tearful exit from the Democratic ballot, he decided to re-enter politics. He ran for governor of Illinois in 2010 as an Independent.

Perry R. Duis
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Ox Cart to Automobile: Social Change in Western New York. By Thomas Rasmussen (Lanham, Md., University Press of America, 2009) 194 pp. $35.00

Ox Cart to Automobile is a history—economic, environmental, and social—of Allegany County, New York, from the time of European settlement to the present. According to Rasmussen, “two central organizing ideas, central place theory and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, illuminate 200 years of rural western New York history” (11). He chronologically organizes his material into chapters that cover the major phases of the county’s economic history. He makes interesting use of geographical information systems (gis) analysis to show how physical distance from larger market villages and land elevation affected initial settlement patterns. He relies heavily on demographic and economic data from federal and state censuses from the mid-nineteenth century onward. Rasmussen also demonstrates the importance of getting a firsthand look at the evidence available outdoors, walking the streets and hillside trails, examining the changing architectural styles, and searching out the old pasture trees amidst the new growth forest—preferably with a camera. The book has around sixty photographs, about half of them taken by the author. Its integration of multiple kinds of evidence and analysis into a short, clear, comprehensive narrative make it a model for other county histories.

Rasmussen’s use of the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a framing and explanatory device might prove controversial. Although he acknowledges the obvious problems, he argues, “Assuming that humans pursue their individual self-interest simplifies complex reality to get to essential regularity in human behavior in many different settings in many different times” (9). One can certainly quibble, but his well-chosen examples manage to sustain this assertion. Rasmussen does not fully explore how cultural values complicate, and even contradict, the patterns of self-interest, but he does not ignore them either. However, he relies to a great extent on standard conclusions from the secondary literature to provide this context. Some aspects of culture get less attention than they deserve. Readers familiar with nineteenth-century upstate New York will wonder why religion does not occupy a more prominent place.

Although Rasmussen’s examination of the relationship between county and state after 1950 is insightful, his depiction of Allegany County’s residents as economic rather than political actors contains an unresolved ambiguity. The Prisoner’s Dilemma makes their economic behavior seem more rationally self-interested than their behavior as voters. Rasmussen leaves unexplained, however, the county’s unvarying commitment to the Republican party, an attachment impervious even to the Great Depression and the welfare-state transfer payments that enable many to live in the region today, despite a dearth of economic opportunities. County voters, for reasons that Rasmussen does not explore
in depth, have shown more interest in “hot button” values issues than matters more self-evidently tied to material or economic self-interest.

Nonetheless, Ox Cart to Automobile is a splendid county history. It serves as a reminder of how impoverished the United States remains in the kind of local coverage that the Victoria county histories gave to the United Kingdom. Such a cumulative impression could well turn out to be depressing, given the preponderance of rural counties in the United States. Rasmussen resists the temptation to embrace a narrative of decline, but it is impossible to read his last two chapters—involving the collapse of dairy farming and cheese making, the erosion of manufacturing, the closing of the railroad, and the lack of an interstate highway—without some sadness. One wishes that the loyalty of those people to this place (and Rasmussen duly notes the not inconsiderable compensations that remain) were not so precarious.

Tom McCarthy
U.S. Naval Academy


In 1850, Swiss naturalist Louis Agassiz commissioned daguerreotypist, Joseph Zealy, to create a remarkable set of images—photographs of seven slaves living and working in and around Columbia, South Carolina. Through the camera, Agassiz hoped to make visibly and incontrovertibly apparent the physical distinctiveness of black bodies in order to substantiate the theory of polygenesis. This theory purported that the differences between whites and other races were so profound that each race must have originated and developed separately. This view challenged monogenesis, the idea that all humans originated from a common ancestor. The slaves, who included “Delia” in this book’s title, were stripped of their clothes and placed in front of the camera, exposed, and examined as scientific specimens.

Delia’s Tears tells the story of how these extraordinary images came to be. From its subtitle, the book also promises to examine the junction where scientific racism and photography met in the nineteenth century. Photography was well suited to serve the interests of white supremacy, which, as an ideology, depended on visible markers of difference. Enlightenment scientific practices revolved around the classification and ordering of natural phenomena based on discernible differentiations; for early naturalists, seeing formed the cornerstone of knowledge. When photography emerged in the 1840s, it became a valuable scientific instrument due to its capacity to record and reveal truths that the human eye might miss. In this particular case, it promised to fix in place assumed hierarchies of racial difference.
Rogers, however, pays comparatively little attention to the origins or consequences of scientific racism or the role of visual technologies in it. Instead, she widens the frame of the photographs to permit the context behind them—the cotton plantation economy, South Carolina slaveholders, and naturalists like Agassiz—to come into view. Rogers aims for a general audience; her style is mostly narrative. Although the book shows careful research, it does not cover much new scholarly ground. Even as a narrative history, however, its various strands do not entirely come together. Rogers has widened her scope so far that the overall purpose or thrust of her story becomes lost in all of the detail.

The most striking parts of Rogers’ narrative are the fictional vignettes that she has created for each of the photographed slaves to counteract the dehumanization of slaves that the images represent. Indeed, if Zealy’s daguerreotypes stand as any kind of evidence, it is of the objectification to which slaves were routinely subject. Rogers fictionalizes Delia and the others in her narrative to allow them some subjectivity and to re-animate them as human beings. The concept has merit, but, unfortunately, Rogers’ prose, which is otherwise lucid, comes across as strained and self-conscious in these sections. Furthermore, because she imbues all of the characters with the same tone and voice, these vignettes tend to flatten them as historical figures. She would have done better to use testimonies, speeches, and other documents to convey the experiences of slaves within her larger narrative, as she does to some degree with Frederick Douglass.

Amy Wood
Illinois State University


The people who inhabit the pages of this book—New Orleans’s nineteenth-century Creoles of color—make difficult, yet fascinating, subjects of historical and cultural study. They are difficult for two reasons: (1) Their story, which is complicated and unfamiliar to most readers, requires Thompson to explain the precarious yet prosperous existence of a group of French-speaking free people of color, with ties to Europe and the Caribbean, in the midst of a U.S. slave society; (2) although most were well educated, and many of them were writers and intellectuals, few of their personal papers are stored in archives (most of those that have survived remain in private hands). Scholars, therefore, must look to a variety of sources to piece together the history of Creoles of color. In the book under review, this array of documentation includes legal and property records, Romantic poetry, newspaper editorials, and evidence of the built environment. To address such disparate sources, Thompson
wields a number of methodological tools, from theories of urban space to literary criticism, historiography, and legal analysis.

The fundamental problem that frames this book, according to the author, is the Creole of color community’s “struggle to become American.” This fight centered on the transformation of New Orleans from a Creole to an American society during the course of the nineteenth century—that is, the “move away from an emphasis on place and history towards an emphasis on race” (38). This transformation left Creoles of color “exiles” in their own land (15). Rather than endure such a fate, some of them became literal exiles, setting sail for Europe or the Caribbean. But most of them remained in New Orleans to face an increasingly repressive society built along racial lines that threatened to obscure the legacy and identity of an ethnic group that did not fit into an American hierarchy (whether confronting these circumstances was the same as struggling “to become American” is questionable).

The author retrieves important pieces of this legacy, examining, for instance, traces of the business dealings of François Lacroix—a wealthy tailor and property owner—and the political ideologies of such writers and educators as Paul Trévigne and Armand Lanusse. She addresses several facets of the racial dilemma of the home “exile”: contested claims to whiteness among light-skinned Creoles, the social and legal consequences of plaçage (a formal, extralegal agreement between a white man and a free woman of color for sexual companionship in exchange for financial support), and formerly free people’s decisions to align themselves politically with African Americans after the Civil War. In her most innovative chapter, Thompson considers how Creoles of color staked their claim on the city through property ownership, neighborhood development, and institution building.

Because of its imaginative forays into sources, this book may well give too much weight to the issue of plaçage, at the expense of day-to-day survival strategies of free people of color. Although plaçage was common, it did not define the Creole of color community to the extent that many accounts suggest. Several of the sources that Thompson uses—sensational court cases and literary works, for example—drew heavily upon the symbolism of these interracial relationships. But the study of more prosaic archival sources, such as marriage records, would reveal many unions between Creoles of color, as well as the extended families that supported those marriages. Moreover, although one of the community’s most important institutions, the Couvent School, was established, in part, to aid the “half-orphaned” offspring of plaçage, it also served many children of two-parent families of color, providing them with an education previously only available to white children and preparing them for the difficult task of living at home, in exile.1 Attention to these facets of Creole life would have made the author’s focus on the

efforts of Creoles of color to establish their own place within American society even stronger.

Mary Niall Mitchell
University of New Orleans

Financial Fraud and Guerrilla Violence in Missouri’s Civil War, 1861–1865.
By Mark W. Geiger (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2010) 306 pp. $55.00

In September 1861, Major General Sterling Price, commander of the Missouri State Guard (soon to be mustered in as Confederate troops), defeated a garrison of federal troops stationed at Lexington. The federal commander had been instructed to secure this Missouri River town and to remove the funds deposited in the Farmers’ Bank of Missouri. With the defeated federal commander at his side, Price ceremoniously returned the funds to the bank. As Geiger explains in this groundbreaking study in economic and social history, Price’s action underscored the importance of banks to the southern cause in Missouri.

Price—a state bank commissioner when the Civil War began—and other leaders of the state’s central slaveholding region had won the passage of a new banking law in 1857 that secured their interests. As Geiger points out, men like Price were not opposed to capital markets. Indeed, they were determined to shape those markets to their advantage. The new banking law required the establishment of new branch banks, and almost all of the banks established after 1857 were in the state’s largest slaveholding counties. These new banks “shifted capital out of St. Louis and into the high-slavery counties” (30). In the secession crisis, as pro-Confederate Missourians began to form the Missouri State Guard, they funded it with promissory notes. “Missouri Confederates gained control of most of the banks’ money, leaving behind a mountain of paper promises” (81). Price returned the confiscated funds to the Farmers’ Bank in Lexington confident that the bank’s director would continue the practice of funding promissory notes.

Geiger refers to this practice as “fraud.” The men of southern principles who signed the promissory notes had no intention of repaying them. If the debt were to be honored at all, they expected it to be funded by the Confederate state of Missouri. Unfortunately for those who signed the notes, Price’s army and the pro-Confederate state government were driven from the state. Unionists took control of the banks and began to file civil suits to recover the debt created by the promissory notes. The litigation continued for several years, but “when it was all over, most of the defendants had no property left” (99). As a result, “a disproportionate number of the young men from these dispossessed families joined the guerrilla bands” (3).

Geiger builds effectively on a 1977 study by Bowen that empha-
sized the importance of extended kinship networks in understanding the motivation of Missouri’s guerrillas.\(^1\) As Bowen noted, many of the identifiable guerrillas were too young to own much property. But when Bowen located them in extended kinship networks, it became clear that they represented a class of ascending slaveholders. Such were the men who signed the promissory notes that were readily accepted by Missouri’s pro-Confederate bankers, only to be dispossessed when Unionist bankers collected the debt. Missouri guerrillas had good reason to fight close to home (and burn courthouses). They had scores to settle.

Geiger’s work breaks important new ground, and his extensive appendixes encourage scholars to follow his lead. One line of inquiry seems particularly promising. The guerrillas fought the federal government as a generalized tyrannical force that empowered those who dispossessed their kin. A careful study of the civilian victims of guerrilla attacks might extend Geiger’s analysis. At some level, the Civil War was about winners and losers. Geiger has discovered a new class of losers and convincingly linked them to the guerrillas. Who were the winners? Who gained control of the property taken from the guerrilla families?

Louis S. Gerteis
University of Missouri, St. Louis

The Culture of Property: Race, Class, and Housing Landscapes in Atlanta, 1880–1950. By LeeAnn Lands (Athens, University of Georgia Press, 2009) 295 pp. $24.95

The history of racial and class segregation of American cities was, until two decades ago, shrouded in myths about individual choice and free markets. “White flight,” the term used to describe the mass movement of working- and middle-class white families to lily-white single-family home-owning suburbs, was seen as a logical, if somewhat racist, response to the deteriorating living conditions and growing violence in largely African-American urban centers. Yet, as scholars questioned the inevitability of racial segregation, their primary targets were the federal housing programs that subsidized white suburban home buyers and denied investment capital to urban neighborhoods. These New Deal housing programs, no doubt, inflicted racial segregation on the postwar landscape. But in blaming government bureaucrats for putting racial requirements on housing loans, scholars have perpetuated the notion that single-family home ownership—the proverbial house on a tidy yard—was a natural human desire and an inevitable result of American political ideology. This assumption about Americans’ housing aspirations is ahistorical, and, crucially, for the past century, has narrowed housing options.

for most Americans and limited the imaginations of planners, builders, and policymakers struggling to create stable, diverse communities.

Lands aims to shatter that assumption. In a well-researched study of Atlanta’s housing markets from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, Lands demonstrates that a set of social forces—driven primarily by builders and land speculators—guided the aesthetic choices of Atlanta’s white elite; thereafter, builders, planners, and government officials, using a variety of discursive strategies, effectively naturalized the white elite’s newly acquired vision of the proper family home. Late nineteenth-century Atlanta housed neighborhoods of rich and laboring—and, to some extent, white and African-American—people where renters outnumbered home owners. This social diversity and variety of housing types was wrecked with the creation of “park-neighborhood sensibilities” (42), the construction of new elite communities that stressed home ownership and park-like landscapes. Promoted by early twentieth-century land speculators, these communities generated what Lands calls a “landscape way of seeing, the practice of looking [at] and absorbing (consciously or unconsciously)” a broad expanse “and attaching meaning to what one sees” (5). In other words, elite home owners considered the properties beyond their own and the residents of neighboring houses as shaping the aesthetic value of their homes. By the 1930s, whiteness was associated with single-family home ownership and park-like landscapes. Racial exclusion and class stratification, couched in seemingly benign aesthetic choices, were codified in federal housing policies during the New Deal.

Lands is concerned with the ways in which urban space and housing forms helped to constitute social identities and ultimately cement racial and class differences in twentieth-century cities. She uses GIS, federal census data, and federal housing maps, along with such literary sources as builders’ advertisements and planners’ manuals. Her work relies heavily on whiteness studies, the scholarship that links the construction of whiteness to social privilege. Lands brings urban geography to whiteness studies, emphasizing how early twentieth-century racial ideologies and visions of the family home were intertwined. The emerging “culture of property” was, usually and implicitly, racist and elitist.

Segregation by race and class derived from deliberate attempts to reshape the urban landscape and boost property values. This second aim receives little attention in Lands’ study. She effectively traces the emergence and circulation of home-ownership ideology but leaves largely underanalyzed the economic incentives that intersected with, and buttressed, that ideology. A “culture of property,” as Lands acknowledges, traces the discursive construction of the urban landscape, or shows how particular housing forms were invested with meaning. The connection between meanings and material advantages, between aesthetic and economic value, remains implicit in her discussion.

Lands’ final chapter is her most innovative and most impassioned, detailing the legacies of the property culture constructed in the early
twentieth century. With tragic precision, she demonstrates that the social practices used to segregate Atlanta (and its suburbs) did not end with the dismantling of racist federal policies and local segregation laws. Even now, white realtors, builders, and home owners continue to justify exclusionary zoning policies with lightly cloaked racist rhetoric. Lands’ important contribution is to show that racial exclusion and class stratification began well before federal programs, and persisted into the twenty-first century. The white elite’s celebration of single-family home ownership continues to limit the housing options of laboring residents, and to reinforce the long-standing racial and class divisions in Atlanta and many other cities.

Margaret Garb
Washington University


Advocates of diversity in American science and engineering have seen women’s participation grow substantially over recent decades, but black representation in engineering has stalled at just over 5 percent. Slaton links this situation to an institutional reluctance to reform within modern engineering itself, “a body of knowledge and practice rooted . . . in a racially stratified worldview generally resistant to radical social change” (80). Although reformers periodically pushed to open engineering education to more African Americans, the system kept reverting to narrow criteria for excluding students, justified by conservative definitions of rigor. By embracing seemingly objective quantification and standardization, engineers sought to render race invisible and to separate technology from real-life political and social considerations.

Slaton’s methodology brings together ideas from science and technology studies, African-American studies, education studies, and sociology into a historically centered analysis meant to inform present thinking and policymaking about education. Slaton presents historical case studies of six universities—the historically black and traditionally white campuses of the University of Maryland and Texas A&M, plus the Illinois Institute of Technology and the University of Illinois at Chicago. Slaton skillfully contrasts these examples to illustrate how policymakers, administrators, trustees, faculty, and others approached institutional and cultural questions of race and engineering.

Slaton argues that for decades, even progressive-minded educators envisioned a two-tier economy in which African Americans served as rural workers, repairmen, or mechanics rather than modern engineers. “[E]xecution of good science was believed to require segregation . . . Blackness and technological achievement . . . remained . . . mutually ex-
clusive categories” (50). Amid the civil-rights pressure of the 1960s and 1970s, university leaders initiated projects to support selected minority individuals, but they backed away from accepting students whose marginal test scores or grades hid potential talent. Engineers resisted offering remedial courses, fearing accommodations would damage their reputation with accreditation boards and funding sources. They excluded topics such as environmental problems, affordable housing, and public transport from teaching and research, lest such unconventional inquiries undermine profitable connections with the Defense Department and industry.

Despite the backlash against affirmative action, Slaton writes, the 1980s through the 1990s brought small successes. The National Science Foundation and other federal agencies sought to prove that technical excellence can thrive with inclusiveness. In earmarking research support for historically black colleges, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) defied conventional granting procedures by rethinking arbitrary time frames. NASA expected results of equal quality, but allowed more open schedules to compensate for the structural challenges of overcoming long-standing inequities.

Slaton regards such flexibility as the key to increasing minority membership, calling on faculty, schools, and other decision makers to “expand our ideas about the sorts of character traits and educational background that may produce a successful engineer” (208). By creating remedial courses, learning communities, and other alternative teaching approaches, reformers can redefine restrictive constructions of competence and “recognize the social instrumentality of rigor as another important and persistent, if unintentional, means of perpetuating African American absences from STEM fields” (217).

This thought-provoking book should interest educators and scholars in the humanities and the social sciences, as well as engineers and scientists. It shows beautifully how an understanding of history can inform present-day thinking about crucial questions of race in our technology-centered society.

Amy Bix
Iowa State University


The history of motherhood, fascinating as it is, has attracted little scholarship, particularly in the twentieth century. Although republican motherhood, scientific motherhood, and maternalist politics within social-reform movements have certainly received attention, “Mom,” a creation of the second half of the twentieth century, has only now found her biographer. Using an impressive array of printed and archival sources
and giving close readings to such germinal works as Philip Wylie’s *Generation of Vipers* (New York, 1942) and Betty Friedan’s *The Feminine Mystique* (New York, 1963), Plant provides a detailed analysis of the rise of the modern woman known as “mom,” uniting traditional historical sources with an effective analysis of the psychological literature of the interwar period.

Plant argues that the transformation of motherhood began in the wake of World War I and was nearly complete by the 1960s. Mother love, the dominant cultural ideal that held sway for generations, gradually surrendered its place in American life under assault from a cadre of experts who depicted it as pathological rather than praiseworthy. In making this claim, Plant is careful to note that this attack targeted only white, middle-class mothers and that the dialogue was never one-sided. Some women responded to Wylie, Friedan, and others by asserting the value of traditional motherhood in the face of a new psychology that depicted it as a threat to society as well as to individual offspring. Others expressed their wholehearted support for the new view. Setting her analysis in this framework allows Plant to foreshadow debates that arose in the era of second-wave feminism, even as she keeps her focus on the unraveling of traditional motherhood in earlier decades.

The most interesting and informative chapters concern the mothers of soldiers. Plant reports that Congress ironically was funding pilgrimages of gold-star mothers to the graves of their sons who had died fighting in Europe during World War I at the same time as it was ending the Sheppard-Towner Maternity and Infancy Protection Act. Even African-American mothers and widows were sent on these overseas trips—albeit in segregated second-tier ships. By World War II, the glorification of mothers who had sent their sons to war ended; mothers who sought sympathy for their sacrifice found, if not hostility, only grudging acknowledgment. Indeed, mothers were blamed for their sons’ rejection from service on psychological grounds, as well as for their sons’ neuropsychiatric discharges and their combat exhaustion. “Momism,” the pejorative term popularized by Wylie, threatened national security; the statistics concerning rejected servicemen gave evidence of the perils that it posed to the nation. Experts still advised the intensive mothering of infants, but for older children, a mother’s obligation was to diminish emotional dependency. The once-celebrated cords of love that bound children to mothers now became a psychological noose that threatened to strangle vulnerable offspring. An epidemic of mother blaming was about to get underway.

Readers will find much to think about in Plant’s fine book. Her analyses of anti-maternalism and its proponents will re-inform historians’ understanding of both the interwar years and the baby-boom era. Scholars of women’s history, family history, and modern American history and culture would do well to take notice.

Janet Golden
Rutgers University

To a certain extent, the complexity of nineteenth-century Mexico’s political instability has served as a deterrent to scholarship. The dearth of documentation has made the topic even more forbidding. But in the recent past, historians have begun to address Mexico’s nineteenth-century chaos, partly through the discovery of archival material at the state level allowing for a regional approach to the topic.

Rugeley’s book is the latest entry into the field. It is based on prodigious research in the archives of Yucatan as well as in Mexico City and Belize, and it is supplemented by material from the British Foreign Office records available in the Bancroft Library. Even with a regional focus, the topic is huge in scope; as Rugeley shows, the massive violence of the middle of the century—the famous Caste War of Yucatan—grew out of the political problems that emerged as the colonial regime began to collapse. The study ends with the onset of the Porfirian regime, the era of generalized political stability growing out of, rather than breaking with, the past.

In each of the chronologically organized chapters the author discusses politics, politicians, political participation, political programs and ideology, state power and finances, land policy, clergymen and the Church, the militarization of society, and the social and economic impact of disorder and eventually of massive violence. One of the major concerns of the book is to show how a society responded to what the Rugeley calls “la Violencia,” the term used in Colombia to refer to the breakdown of political order after 1948 and the subsequent outbreak of conflict. Rugeley periodically refers to this phenomenon as well as to numerous other instances of it in places like Bosnia and Rwanda, hoping that the book will shed some light on adaptation to the politics of mass murder. However, Rugeley does not carry out any systematic comparison of the cases, which are mentioned in passing, and does not employ methodological approaches derived from the social sciences. As a result, he manages to convey little about such adaptation. In this sense, the book does not succeed as an interdisciplinary analysis.

But it succeeds admirably as a historical monograph. Rugeley provides a wealth of detail about all of the above-mentioned themes, in a compelling and interesting way. His approach encompasses people of all social classes, and his many examples, far from being tedious, are well-chosen for what they are supposed to illustrate. He also manages to demonstrate the importance of micro-regions, especially eastern Yucatan, in regional politics.

The book’s shortcomings are minor: its failure to explain the separation of Campeche from Yucatan, an index that is much too brief for scholarly purposes, and the use of slang or idiom (for instance, “perks”) that not all readers will understand. How is one to explain to a non-American the meaning of a sentence that, when referring to directives
on land policy, reads “These words put milk of magnesia in administrative stomachs” (212)?

Despite these quibbles, this first-rate book helps to explain Yucatán’s instability and massive violence without becoming one more narrative of gore. It thereby contributes significantly to the ongoing reassessment of nineteenth-century Mexican politics and society.

Robert W. Patch
University of California, Riverside

Industrial Development in a Frontier Society: The Industrialization of Argentina, 1890–1930. By Yovanna Pineda (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2009) 209 pp. $55.00

The study of Argentina’s presumed failure to industrialize has become a cottage industry. Most of the works try to explain the conundrum of the post-1930 period, after the decline of the liberal global economic system and of Argentina’s privileged position within it. This book concentrates on Argentina’s “golden age” instead. Its dust jacket asserts that although Argentina was “on the brink of industrialization” in 1890, in the following four decades it failed “to develop an efficient manufacturing sector,” even by comparison to other countries in similar circumstances such as Brazil, Mexico, and Japan.

The author does not provide evidence for this comparative claim. But the historical statistics on the world economy culled by the Angus Maddison in The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris, 2003) show that by 1930, Argentina’s GDP per capita was four times higher than Brazil’s, two-and-a-half times higher than Mexico’s, and two times higher than Japan’s. It would be plausible that these gaps resulted simply from the exceptional productivity of Argentina’s fabled agropastoral export sector. If so, the limitations of industrialization would have been hardly a concern unless that particular source of wealth had somehow become a fetish. Few people, after all, ask or care why Denmark “failed” to industrialize. But in Chimneys in the Desert: Industrialization in Argentina during the Export Boom Years, 1870–1930 (Stanford, 2006), Fernando Rocchi demonstrates that industrial output increased two-and-a-half times as much as GDP between 1890 and 1930 and that “industry’s share of Argentine wealth was as large as that of agriculture by the 1920s” (2).

Pineda’s comparative claim may not hold much water, but she has plenty of original and important things to say about Argentine industrialization. Her research is solid and thorough. It includes manuscript and published censuses, commercial guides, and company-level data for fifty-nine firms across ten manufacturing sectors that were listed in the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange, allowing her to examine, in Chapter 2, total factor and labor productivity level, labor productivity, economies of scale, and concentration ratios. The results are particularly convincing
for labor productivity because they cover the entire period (the other factors are mostly restricted to the 1895 census). This part also includes information about trends in female and child labor.

In Chapter 3, Pineda ingeniously gauges trends in Argentine investment in industrial capital goods by tracing the import of machinery, parts, and fuel, using British, North American, German, and French export data. The consistent growth in the importation of machinery, with an unsurprising dip during World War I, increased productivity in almost all of Argentina’s industrial sectors, but it is also seen by the author as evidence of the country’s inability “to develop the technological capabilities needed to sustain industrialization” (56).

Chapter 4 offers an equally inventive analysis of merchant finance groups that fuses quantitative and qualitative sources using a prosopographical method. It shows that the problem was not a lack of capital per se but stringent bank lending that limited credit to dominant groups and provided incentives for investment in mercantile rather than industrial activities. Together with the next chapter on entrepreneurial strategies and manufacturing profits, this section offers an excellent sociocultural history of business.

The last chapter deals with industrial legislation. The tales of interest groups, lobbying, political pusillanimity, legislative myopia, and lack of long-term planning sound eerily like current international news. Le plus ça change. . . ?

Jose C. Moya
Barnard College

In the Eye of All Trade: Bermuda, Bermudians, and the Maritime Atlantic World, 1680–1783. By Michael J. Jarvis (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2010) 684 pp. $65.00

During the seven decades after the 1684 revocation of the Somers Island Company’s charter, Bermuda became largely invisible within the British imperial structure. Under company governance, Bermudians grew tobacco and shipped it to England where the metropolitan government taxed it. Royalization afforded colonists the liberty to abandon tobacco cultivation and pursue diverse and mutually reinforcing maritime trades, few of them subject to imperial enumeration or taxation and thus to imperial scrutiny. Given Bermuda’s small size—only twenty square miles of territory—and its isolation—situated 600 miles east of the Carolinas, the nearest land—taking to the sea for a livelihood made good sense for its inhabitants.

In the Eye of All Trade restores not just the island’s residents to visibility but also a vast arc of the western Atlantic from Tortuga to Newfoundland, and the many harbors, creeks, capes, and inlets where Bermudians traded, cut timber, harvested turtles, or picked up cargo. Jarvis
delicately situates the details of Bermudian history within this Atlantic sweep, thereby crafting a book that is finely calibrated—a cross between an intimate study of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Bermuda and a panoramic vision of a complex, dynamic, and often messy and contentious Atlantic world. To achieve a near panoptic sweep, Jarvis utilized diverse methodological and theoretical tools of the last half-century of scholarship. He analyzed governmental records and settlement patterns, reconstituted families and commercial networks, and teased out intercultural relations from labor contracts and the privileges accorded slaves, recognizing that people found economic survival, if not prosperity, in the mundane commodities of the Atlantic trades. In many ways, Jarvis (unlike a succession of imperial officials) absorbed a Bermudian sensibility, reasoning that riches might be hidden in plain sight.

Sections of *In the Eye of All Trade*, at least, should be required reading for Atlantic scholars. The chapter about “working the Atlantic commons”—producing salt in the Caribbean, cutting timber on the Yucatan and Miskito coasts, diving for salvage from shipwrecks, and hunting turtles off the Caymans—is an excellent analysis of how marginal peoples acquired some control of their labor in the volatile interstices of imperial sovereignties and legal regimes. Jarvis’ narrative reconstruction of the superb craftsmanship in Bermudian schooners, renowned for speed and maneuverability, is an eloquent encomium to the innovations of hundreds of nameless shipwrights, joiners, sailmakers, and skippers who embedded beauty and safety into the mundane needs of transport. Many readers might be surprised to find that Jarvis’ renowned article about Bermudian slavery is not reproduced as a chapter. Rather, he weaves his analysis of slavery throughout the book, reinforcing the idea that slavery and peoples of African descent were warp and woof of the fabric of Bermudian society.

Scholars in many disciplines will consult *In the Eye of All Trade* for Jarvis’ interpretation of myriad topics. But his overall argument is that many Atlantic developments occurred not under imperial purview but through the “self organization” and initiatives of countless people (180). The Atlantic world with its “permeable and blurry maritime boundaries” defied imperial regulation, especially when people operated in small vessels and engaged in unregulated trades, as did most Bermudians (462). Jarvis’ theme of self-organization, pursued also by Hancock in his work on Madeira and its wine trade, will keep scholars busily debating for decades.

Elizabeth Mancke
University of Akron

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Trumbull has compiled a remarkable study of knowledge and power in the premier French colony in Africa, examining Algeria, Algerians, and the practice of Islam through ethnographies composed by French professionals and amateurs during the Third Republic. In the period that he covers, the French occupation of most of Algeria, north of the Sahara, was certainly in place, if not completely secure. The French system of administration and observation required the production of ethnographies about the groups now under French rule. As the first French colony in Africa, Algeria was the laboratory of experience and “wisdom” that taught the French how to deal with other territories, particularly those where Islam was important. “Algeriens,” the code for French officials with Algerian expertise, operated extensively in Morocco and West Africa, often with great authority.

In the first chapter, entitled “Writing like a State,” Trumbull shows how intimately the government was involved in all aspects of the production and dissemination of ethnography. With the governor general’s encouragement, Louis Rinn’s *Marabouts et Khouan: Étude sur l’Islam en Algérie* (Alger, 1884) became the indispensable companion for French administrators in Algeria. Trumbull begins with a citation from Rinn about the absence of contestation of French rule to show how little the government and its intellectuals understood about the resistance and resentments of Algerians.

Trumball gives a great deal of attention to religion, mainly the Sufi orders, and to the exploration and conquest of the Sahara, which reinforced and modified the stereotypes that the French held about Algeria. He links the religious theme to the metropole and the ongoing struggle of republicans with the Catholic church and its schools, devoting some attention to the Dreyfus Affair and antisemitic attitudes.

Trumbull thoroughly researched the careers and writings of the ethnographers and the audiences for which they wrote, composing a convincing picture not of Algeria but of the French intellectual world about Algeria. His subjects mainly worked outside the academic setting, in some cases as members of the Algerian or metropolitan government. Most of them were male explorers with a connection to the settler community of Algeria, and some of them had apparently done fieldwork before. Trumbull provides useful portraits of such well-known figures as Alfred Bel, Edmond Doutté, Arnold Van Gennep, and particularly Henri Duveyrier, who came to prominence through his positive portrayal of the Tuareg in *Les Touareg du Nord* (Paris, 1864) when he was in his early twenties and committed suicide in 1892. Trumbull also gives extensive treatment to the massacre of Paul Flatters and his command in 1880 and the negative and “criminal” portrayal of the Tuareg “culture” that emerged as a result.
Trumbull builds a chapter around the Sufi orders that were prominent in the Maghreb, especially the Tijaniyya, who became “allies” of French conquest and expansion, unlike their confreres in Morocco and West Africa. He has much to say about Aurelie Picard, the Bordelese woman who married Ahmad al-Tijani—one of the main Tijaniyya leaders—in the early years of the Third Republic, and became a source of French intelligence for several decades thereafter. Other chapters deal with popular religious practices and with gender. The final chapter treats collective stereotypes and criminality, particularly associated with the conquest of the Sahara, the missions of Duveyrier, Flatters, and others.

Trumbull’s work has implications for future research about other parts of the French Empire, as well as other European imperial territories in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In my own work on Senegal and Mauritania, and Muslim societies coming under French colonial rule, I can clearly see the influence and authority wielded by “les algériens.”

In establishing protectorates in Tunisia and Morocco, the French probably became more aware of the limitations of their Algerian models. Trumbull’s brief conclusion does little justice to his findings, offering questionable generalizations about the construction of ethnography. How did the ethnography of Algeria change over the time during the Third Republic? How did the “empire of facts” create new facts? Are the “new facts” just illustrations of what was already true from the beginning, or do they modify the earlier suppositions? Finally, did any of the ethnographies and ethnographers that Trumbull studied come closer than others to the Algerian realities of the late nineteenth century? Surely he can make some distinctions among the many voices that he cites.

These questions do not diminish Trumbull’s substantial achievement—a probing examination of the ethnographic literature about the Algerian “native” societies that reinforced French colonial attitudes and served as a basis for exploration, conquest, and administration. The gap between this literature and the realities of the Algerian societies gives pause about the reliability of colonial archives and published materials for reconstructing the history of subordinate and subaltern peoples.

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A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants & Refugees. By Reșat Kasaba (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2009) 194 pp. $70.00 cloth $27.40 paper

The epigraph that Kasaba fastened onto his text poignantly inscribes the scholarly labor required to investigate imperial trajectories: “The new men of Empire are the ones who believe in fresh starts, new chapters,
clean pages; I struggle on with the old study hoping that before it is finished it will reveal to me why it was that I thought it worth the trouble.” So says the narrator of Coetzee’s *Waiting for the Barbarians*, a work, like Kasaba’s, that deals with the tenuous nature of institutional longevity.¹ The epigraph is also an apt beginning for Kasaba’s short but thought-provoking effort to re-map the arc of Ottoman history through postbinary modes of research and writing. Committed to unraveling such classificatory dichotomies as new/old, state/non-state actors, core/periphery, official/rebel, and even empire/state, Kasaba uses “mobility” as both a theme and a process to create an alternative to periodization models mired in the ethos of rise and decline.

The Ottoman Empire proves an excellent case for such a research agenda, since, as Kasaba contends, it “was a political entity with imprecise and constantly changing borders, in which not only spatial but also social mobility blurred the lines of division within society” (37). It was an empire on the move, with long-distance migrations superimposed on regional relocations and exchanges that together forged a complex social geography continuously challenging fixed boundaries or categories. Kasaba culls from mixed documentary genres—petitions for Sultanic redress of grievance, court records, and imperial edicts dispatched to regional leaders and officials. Using his skills as a social scientist to parse the secondary literature on demographic shifts, he builds a persuasive argument that “nomadism” was an administrative category constitutive of the state itself. He thus avoids the vacuity of studies that simply postulate the fluidity or accommodative tendencies in the Ottoman Empire, proposing that heterogeneity was, in fact, a peculiar strategy of the Empire’s elite.

Kasaba’s focus on mobility and nomadism knits the old Empire with the new national Republic of Turkey where the ministry of the interior discovered that as much 63 percent of land resources in the 1940s were still devoted to animal husbandry (139). The real rupture in state formations occurred not in 1923 but in the late seventeenth–century, with the conjuncture of inter-state competition and the rise of Atlantic economies predicated on clearly demarcated borders and narrowly defined identities (20). Thus, as his five chapter headings clearly delineate—“Empire, State, and People”; “A Moveable Empire”; “Toward Settlement”; “Building Stasis”; and “The Immovable State”—the Istanbul-based governing apparatus gradually shifted away from a flexible frontier mentality toward one that aimed to manage boundaries and enforce settlement.

This organization seemingly belies the evolutionary model that Kasaba’s study proposes to undermine and highlights the entrenched scholarly habits that he opposes. It is hard not to discern in the text an old pattern in the field of Middle East and Ottoman Studies linking moments of state formation and reform to encounters with, and reactions

to, the so-called West. Even Kasaba’s use of a “continuum” (19)—certainly his most profound contribution and not solely because of its indigenous auspices in the philosophical history of Ibn Khaldun—between settled, centralizing goals and nomadic, peripatetic lifestyles breaks down into a state/society divide with nomads, migrants, and refugees presented as objects acted upon rather than as participant forces in institution-building and state formation.2

Nonetheless, Kasaba’s effort to build a “both/and” rather than an “either/or” approach to the Ottoman past is definitely “worth the trouble.” Although most of his previous work and archival knowledge focuses on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, he makes the rare leap backward and creatively re-reads published manuscripts to provide a new prism for Ottoman imperial studies. His take on 600 years of Ottoman dynamism challenges specialists to re-think epistemological paradigms, illustrates to the general scholar the necessity for new methodological tools, and remains accessible to the student interested in comparative Eurasian history.

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Ancestors, Virgins, and Friars: Christianity as a Local Religion in Late Imperial China. By Eugenio Menegon (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2009) 450 pp. $45.00

This is a study of microhistory (a local history) that challenges several widely accepted assumptions of macrohistory (Chinese history as a whole). The founding of the Fuan Catholic church in the early seventeenth century and its survival down to the present day contradicts a claim that has long pervaded Sino-Western history, namely, that Chinese culture is fundamentally hostile to a foreign faith like Christianity. In addition, Menegon challenges the widely held belief that the uncompromising tactics of the Spanish friars were always less effective than the accommodative approach of the Jesuits who cultivated a Confucian Christianity.

In 1632, several Christian literati from Fuan met the Dominican priest Angelo Cocchi in Fuzhou. They helped him to evade an expulsion order, and eventually brought him to their mountainous and remote region of Fuan in northern Fujian province. Admittedly, the Do-

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Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406), born in Tunis but a prominent court figure in al-Andalus until the fall of Granada to Reconquista forces, spent his final years in Egypt where he witnessed the Mongol invasions and acted as intermediary with Timur. His life experience culminated in the writing of the Muqadimmah (Prolegomena), which radically broke from theological and dynastic traditions of historical interpretation, and provided a universal philosophy of change based on the cyclical interchange and competition between nomadic and settled mores and populations.

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minican missionaries can be credited with only part of the initial impetus in establishing this Christian community. Far more important were the Fuan Christians who embraced and transformed the faith and martyred themselves for it. In 1632, the Spanish bishop Diego Aduarte, from his base in the Philippines, wrote of a plan for a “spiritual conquest” (conquista spiritual) of China, a land with “room enough for thousands of conquistadores” (41). Although we tend to dismiss such a statement as chauvinistic, its application in Fuan was surprisingly effective.

A second area in which Menegon breaks new ground is in his presentation of the Dominicans’ unique ministry to women—a sphere to which the friars gave more attention than the Jesuits (304). Rather than build the model of Christian virginity upon native virgin goddesses or Buddhist nuns, the friars drew from other Chinese models of chastity (zhēn) (316). In the Ming and Qing periods, the neo-Confucian ideal of chastity had become incorporated into a state-sanctioned system that used arches and shrines to honor women who committed suicide to protect their chastity and to honor widows whose loyalty to their deceased husbands led them to refuse remarriage or even to commit suicide. The Chinese ideal was blended with European models of female chastity called beatas, which had emerged in thirteenth-century Europe as a lay religious order (“third order”) of women and later evolved into a female religious community of the “second order” (250). These Chinese beatas belonged to more affluent families and resisted familial and Confucian pressure to marry. As such, they represented a feminist force. By 1816, Fujian province had 300 beatas out of a total Christian population of apparently 40,000 (148).

To assess its historical significance, microhistory must ultimately be related to macrohistory and Menegon’s failure to do so represents a serious weakness of this book. Was the Fuan Christian community a fascinating but isolated exception to the entire body of Christians in China, or was it a model of local church development that applied, mutatis mutandis, to other regions of China? Apart from this weakness, Ancestors, Virgins, and Friars is a meticulously researched book and a work of unusual quality for a first book by a scholar.

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By Penelope Francks (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009)
249 pp. $90.00 cloth $32.99 paper

The Japanese Consumer offers what it promises—a concise, readable account of Japan’s modern economic history; it is “alternative” in that it places consumers rather than producers center stage. The book nicely combines a modest dose of quantitative economic history (only seven
tables in 250 pages) with a wide variety of qualitative evidence and numerous well-chosen illustrations. Its coverage is broad, ranging from the seventeenth through the twenty-first century in just 220 pages of text. Inevitably, it is primarily a work of synthesis. Francks draws impressively from the scholarship of a wide variety of historians writing in Japanese and English, including anthropologists and cultural, political, and economic historians.

The book’s principal arguments are that consumption in Japan was robust and expanding in the early modern era when the goods and services consumed were indigenous ones, not Western imports, and that consumption of those indigenous goods and services remained prominent, if not dominant, until the middle of the twentieth century. An additional argument is that despite its reputation as a nation of savers, Japan has also in modern times been a nation of aggressive spenders, its modern economic growth owing much to its consumers; one should not overstress exports in the analysis of Japan’s industrial or economic history.

A brief first chapter usefully situates a study of the Japanese case in the context of recent work on early modern consumer revolutions, particularly in Europe. The next two chapters look at consumption in the cities and countryside of Tokugawa era Japan (1600–1868). The urban story is relatively well known, although effectively told. The emergence of what Francks calls “ordinary consumption” in the countryside, however, has seen far less analysis in existing work, especially in English. Franck’s argument for the growth in demand for a wide range of goods, especially from the rural elite, is persuasive.

The remaining four substantive chapters focus on the expanding world of goods in connection with modern civilization in the late nineteenth century; the interwar flourishing of what was understood at the time as a Japanese version of global modernity; the postwar transformation of daily life, particularly through the spread of electrical goods to the home; and the more diverse consumption patterns of the recent post-bubble or postmodern decades. One point driven home is that indigenous goods, such as kimono, in both early modern and modern times had their own elements of fashion and trendiness, which kept them fresh and desirable in the eye of consumers (130–131). More generally, Francks emphasizes that the rising levels of consumption through mid-century reflected not only the purchase of products of modern industry (electric fans, gas burners, etc.) but also the greater access of ordinary people to indigenous goods (such as white rice and tatami mat floors) that had previously been out of their reach. Francks is attentive to questions of gender. Her discussion, in Chapter 5, of the redefinition of the mid-twentieth-century housewife as a rational, scientific manager of consumer life, in addition to her role caring for children and husband, is important.

With regard to interdisciplinary interests, Franck’s examination of the culture of consumption—how people at the time understood and
gave meaning to it—is limited. In early modern times, people had a range of responses—from excitement and pleasure to sanctimonious disapproval, and even a fear that profligate ways would destroy the country—which is not much discussed. Furthermore, treatment of what people in the 1920s began to call the “double life”—mixing modes of consumption understood to be Western and Japanese—is too brief, and misleading. The “double life” is strangely described as a concept introduced by Edward Seidensticker and “later theorists” (136). In fact, it was a term in wide circulation during the interwar era, usually lamented but sometimes celebrated. Closer consideration of the dilemma that it imposed would have strengthened this valuable study.

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