Deep History: The Architecture of Past and Present. By Andrew Shryock, Daniel Lord Smail, et al. (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2011) 342 pp. $29.95

Deep History brings together anthropologists, archaeologists, and historians to ponder the challenges of studying the remote past that extends back long before writing. A series of co-authored essays attempt to remove the barriers that separate what the editors call deep and shallow history, studied by seemingly different and distinct methodologies.

The chapters form “a master narrative” in four parts. Part I, “Problems and Orientation,” comprises two chapters. An introduction stresses the importance of deep history, arguing that historians have not yet adjusted to the reality of such a past. Chapter 2, “Imagining the Human in Deep Time,” develops four fundamental metaphors and orientations that can be used as links to the remoter past—kinshipping, exchange, extensions, hospitality, and genealogy. This thought-provoking chapter sets the stage for the three parts that follow.

Part II examines three topics. Chapter 3, “The Body,” connects us to the past through the human form, shaped for most of our existence by culture, more recently by the epigenetic forces of the modern world. Chapter 4, “Energy and Ecosystems,” argues that feedback loops and conjoined patterns of cause and effect, which can be traced far back into the past, are effective devices for deep history. Language receives emphasis, because of both the genealogical relationships between languages and the notion of a web or net; exchanges between languages were crucial to the development of human speech. Four chapters explore “Shared Substance,” among them food and deep kinship, on the argument that sharing is a highly adaptable process that can reveal striking transformations in human behavior. Unlike our primate cousins, we have used food and kinship to create worlds that are highly aware of past and present. Networks of relationship and exchange are also shared substances that represent kinshipping, which allows us to communicate over distance and also to reconnect, a basic tool for creating history.

The final set of essays, “Human Expansion,” takes a broad perspective. Migration discusses the movements of humans around the world, which is made possible by cultural toolkits and mobility. Changes in social networks, different food ways, and adaptations resulted from the settlement of different continents. “Goods” refers to material objects that connected distant populations and built complex exchange networks, the effects of which changed deep history. “Scale” ably dissects the assumption that human development is progressive, cumulative, and directional. Herein lies the central argument of this book: Deep time is visible in the structure of our minds and bodies and in our created material and social world—“the storehouse of the human experience” (272).

Deep History attempts to decipher the challenges of melding the remote and more recent past into a unified history of humankind. The chapters are perceptive, if at times esoteric in their arguments. They are
more of a challenge for historians than for archaeologists, who will be fa-
miliar with many arguments in these pages. But they make a compelling
case for a scholarly communication and an interdisciplinary history that
focus on understanding humanity—something that is long overdue.

Brian Fagan
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Tributary Empires in Global History. Edited by Peter Fibiger Bang and
$85.00 cloth $29.95 paper

The varied travails of the United States have placed empire on the public
and intellectual agenda. Regrettably, the cognitive level of the resulting
discussion has been low. Far too many commentators have assumed
equivalence between Washington and Rome, exemplifying the habit of
treating empire as a monolithic category. This superb collection is to be
warmly welcomed for taking a different approach. Most obviously, it
provides a clear sense of the basic character of pre-industrial empires. Al-
though these polities lacked the advanced means of communication and
transport that distinguished modern commercial empires, they were able
nonetheless to maintain large expanses of territory by extracting tribute
in various forms. The introduction and the chapter by Bang are espe-
cially useful in this regard, describing the pretensions widely shared by
many such empires, while recognizing their fundamental logistical
weaknesses. The dilemma of empire was nicely captured by the Roman
poet Vergil in the Aeneid c. 19 B.C.: Should the state “spare the humble”
or “destroy the proud”? Most empires tried the first strategy but acted
savagely on occasion to remove any notions of genuine autonomy from
the people that they had subjugated.

The first part of the book deals with historiography. Bayly show
how discourses have been, and continue to be, shaped by telescopic
views of development and by prejudicial views of Islam. Fabrizio De
Donno complements this observation by revealing the extraordinary
influence of James Bryce’s Holy Roman Empire (London, 1864) on Italian
historians. Baki Tezcan’s chapter amusingly describes the “standard”
view of late Ottoman degeneracy as a construct of those wishing to re-
form the Empire at the end of the nineteenth century.

The second part of the book ranges widely. Applying a Darwinian
theory of social evolution, Garry Runciman makes intriguing comments
about the differential longevity of empires. Michal Tymowski suggests
that African empires were made especially weak by the absence of settled
agricultural cores. Andre Wink details the ways in which settlement in
north India changed Mongol behavior. David Ludden deals with dis-
putes about the control of borderlands and frontiers. Finally, Giovanni
Salmeri offers an account of Sicilian history from the Roman Empire to
the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, revealing how the inhabitants cannily developed strategies and discourses to defend their liberties.

The third part of the book turns to comparison. After Bang’s chapter, a pair of chapters—one by Walter Scheidel about East and West Eurasia and the other by Chris Wickham about late Rome and the Arab Caliphate—study fiscal sociology. Stephen Blake’s account of the inner politics of the Mughal, Safavid, and Ottoman Empires is a tour de force. The volume concludes with a chapter by Karen Barkey and Rudi Batzell explaining the different responses of the Ottomans, Romanovs, and Hapsburgs to the general crisis of the seventeenth century.¹

The contributors, justly celebrated as experts in their respective fields, write at the top of their form. Anyone wanting to understand the mechanisms of rule in premodern empires, and much more, would do well to start with this volume.

John A. Hall
McGill University

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¹ See also the special issue, “The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century: Interdisciplinary Perspectives,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, XL (2009), 145–303.
cussant’s rejoinder—a useful tool that helps readers to reflect critically on several, disjointed contributions.

In his remarks, Marco Belfanti counterbalances the general pessimism by stressing the success of business history and the scholarship on recent economic phenomena and crises. He also maintains that “the golden age” of the economic history of pre-industrial Europe (which he dates to the decades between 1960 and 1990) coincided with a time when economic history provoked debates among a wider audience because of its methodological innovations. But Belfanti mainly hints at the question of how we might make that moment come alive again (with reference to the need for more collaboration among national historiographies and continued archival research). This theme looms large over the volume as a whole but is never addressed in a sustained fashion.

The second section (“Old and New Insights: Tools”) collects ten chapters, each devoted to one type of primary source used by economic historians—government records, notarial deeds, literary texts, maps, the visual arts, archeological digs, and the private collections of noble families and merchants.

The third section (“Old and New Insights: Relationships with Other Subjects”) seeks to address the controversy surrounding the use of economic theory and quantitative methods (which emerges elsewhere as well). Paolo Malanima emphasizes the importance of both approaches and thus implicitly responds to Alberto Grohmann, whose earlier chapter bemoans the growing recourse to “economic and mathematical models” and “large data bases” at the expense of the use of “archival documents” (34–35). Mark Thomas states that “the economic history literature of early modern Europe was richly quantitative long before formal statistical methods became de rigeur” (430). He then examines the specific statistical methods that have had the greatest impact in the field—regression analysis of cross-section data and time series—but he also discusses nonparametric and spatial analysis, including Geographical Information Systems (gis). Guillaume Daudin continues this assessment by charting the use of different quantitative methods in journals accessible via JSTOR and by summarizing important insights gained through econometrics about specific topics. Supposing that “we all aspire at being foxes rather than hedgehogs” (458), Daudin offers a balanced account of the strengths and weaknesses of quantitative methods, which he examines in their broad variety, to include the “analytical narratives” advocated by new institutional economic historians whose ambition is “to extract generalizations from case studies” (471).

The volume ends with an eclectic “Concluding Round Table.” Its first three chapters trace the representation of scholarship on the pre-industrial period in three academic journals: Investigaciones de Historia Económica, Scandinavian Economic History Review, and Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte. Four brief pieces end the collection with reflections on the future of economic history in Germany (where the prevalence of practitioners who use econometrics is disputed), Italy
(where the discipline is described as conditioned by different institutional constraints in economics and humanistic departments), France (where the influence of Michel Foucault, gender history, and literary criticism is shown to have had a crucial impact on expanding the themes and methodologies used by economic and social historians), Russia (where information technology and statistics are said to be rejuvenating the field and attracting students), and Poland (where after the fall of the Berlin Wall, university curricula have excluded the economic analysis of past societies to concentrate on the recent emergence of the market economy).

As is customary, the proceedings of the annual Datini conferences include texts in multiple languages (this time Italian, French, English, and Spanish) that are not always written by native speakers and that are not revised or copyedited before going to print. The result is, once again, a volume that lacks neither useful information nor insights but stands in desperate need of structure, connecting threads, and basic editing.

Francesca Trivellato
Yale University


Why are some people like Aesop’s grasshopper while others are like ants? Why, indeed, are whole countries inclined to grasshopper-like improvidence while others are ant-like in their dedication to thrift? These are the questions that Garon tackles via a transnational and historical study of what we might call “small-savings culture.”

The core of the book, five of its twelve chapters, is devoted to the origins, institutionalization, and fate of thrift practices and bank savings in Japan. Garon, as a specialist in Japanese history, might well be expected to write about the Japanese, and, more generally, the East Asian propensity toward industriousness and thriftiness. Indeed, he supplies a fascinating account of Tokugawa-era exemplars of self-denial and savings. But to him, culture “is formed and re-formed by ideas and institutions” and especially by state policy. Consequently, he finds that the famed Japanese inclination to save, far from being eternal, took shape as the Meiji government introduced the savings institutions and propaganda agencies that had been developed earlier in Europe. He therefore embeds this story into the history of a larger, transnational movement to encourage thrift among the popular classes.

His account of Japanese thrift is interlarded with chapters about the emergence of a cult of thrift in Europe and America (redolent of Benjamin Franklin and Samuel Smiles); the creation of accessible financial institutions (savings banks, mutual banks, and building societies); and the
development of public policy to encourage popular savings, both for purposes of social uplift (civilizing the working classes) and state development (financing war and infrastructure). This international movement varied in its national details, but in most countries, it came to focus on the construction of national postal savings systems that harnessed comprehensive networks of offices to the task of gathering the modest savings of the masses. Nowhere did the postal savings movement succeed in building a financial juggernaut equal to that of Japan, which helped to finance Japan’s empire, its wars, its postwar industrialization, and its current colossal public debt.

Garon ardently supports thrift as a national project; it shapes character, fosters democratic inclusiveness, and stands as a bulwark against base consumerism. He is less concerned with the more instrumental purposes of saving, eschewing altogether the macroeconomic functions of savings in a national economy. Consequently, he has little to say about the reasonableness of state-supported pro-savings campaigns. He agrees with all of them, whether the purpose is the suppression of vicious habits (save rather than drink) or the fueling of imperial ambition. He claims that Japan’s wartime savings campaign was so successful that it prolonged World War II, although he notes that these savings were eviscerated by inflation, gaining the savers nothing. The West offered similar, if less stark, stories of savings expropriated by state policy, but Garon reserves his arch expressions of disapproval for the advocates of consumer credit.

Consumer credit is, in some respects, the alternative to small savings: One can acquire durable goods by saving for them or by borrowing and “saving” to pay off the loan. The difference may well be no more than a matter of timing. But to Garon—and he is certainly not alone in this respect—the difference is enormous, tantamount to the difference between prudence and profigacy, between independence and servility, and between uplift and debasement. Garon insists that policy rather than culture stands behind savings behavior, but the United States stands as an exception to nearly every country in his story. Its anti-saving policies (except between World War I and World War II) seem to have created a durable consumerist culture that has no place for the encouragement of popular thrift. From the toothless form of America’s postal savings system to its pioneering innovations in consumer credit (installment buying, credit cards, home equity loans, et al.), Americans have long been encouraged to under-save and over-consume.

Such, at any rate, is Garon’s opinion. The few comprehensive data sets that he employs do not always support his argument, and he dismisses without much discussion economists’ analyses of savings behavior. There is considerable slippage in his text between the motives for savings among the popular classes and the macroeconomic determinants of the savings rate. Readers will not find a systematic study of the evolving role of savings for household economies, but they will find a lively account, spiced with strong opinions, of the historical policies that have
shaped what we now often regard as national cultures of thrift. On that score, the book is well worth reading.

Jan de Vries
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It was clear at the end of World War II that one of the enduring and consequential results of the fascist regimes, and especially the Nazi dictatorship, was the persecution and dispersal in exile of much of the top tier of Europe’s scholars and scientists and the resettlement abroad of those who survived. The number of refugee scholars was not great, but their importance in the cultural life of the time was enormous. It was obvious that some account of the consequences of this intellectual migration would have to be given. The flow of publications—of memoirs, individual and group biographies, indexes of refugees by country and profession, statistical analyses, and interpretations of the importance of this phenomenon—began in the 1960s and continues to this day, the latest contribution being this volume. Largely memoiristic, the book is unique in the breadth of its coverage; although the essays concentrate on the effort to rescue the scholars persecuted by the Nazis in Germany and the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, they extend beyond World War II and Central Europe to include efforts to help scholars and scientists seeking aid in the Soviet Union, in apartheid South Africa, and in post-Allende Chile.

The core of the book is the evolving history of the Council for Assisting Refugee Academics (cara) founded by William Beveridge in 1933 at the urging of Leo Szilard, a peripatetic physicist, to rescue the academic victims of Nazism in Germany. The efforts of the committee, managed for forty years by Esther Simpson, herself an early refugee, were formidable—far beyond anything undertaken in the United States. Well-organized, the committee scoured the foundations and scholarly organizations for funds and for the identification of endangered scholars, set up a procedure to receive applications for aid, and through intermediaries reached out to the less notable scholars struggling to survive. The seventeen chapters include individual biographical studies of Szilard, Archibald V. Hill, Max Perutz, Karl Mannheim and Viola Klein, and group biographies of women refugees, Austrian social scientists, Central European historians, and refugee academics from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, South Africa, and Chile.

In the introduction, Marks presents a narrative of the evolution of cara, assessings its accomplishments, often in comparison with institu-
tions in the United States and elsewhere that were also involved in helping the refugees. In addition, she provides an overview of the chapters, noting that they “can only go some way to capturing the often tragic but also not infrequently triumphant history of academic refugees in the twentieth century” (25).

As in any collection, the chapters vary in character, breadth, and penetration. Three of the collective studies are especially notable. Tibor Frank, an authority on Austro-Hungarian migrations and an Americanist with much experience in the United States, compares the organized rescue efforts in Europe and the United States, to the detriment of the Americans. Tracing the work of the Rockefeller Foundation, the New School for Social Research, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, he notes in every case the “self-interested beneficence” of these organizations (159). The American foundations, endowments, and research institutions were always looking inward; they “primarily supported those who were viewed as having the greatest potential usefulness for the USA” (143). Indeed, “contemporary critics of the Rockefeller Foundation go as far as to suggest that it occasionally helped Nazi Germany more than it did its victims.” In the end, however, Franks deems “the naked representation of American interests” in these rescue efforts as “unfair” in view of the context: the Depression, the realities of American academic life, American “hostility to foreigners and Jews,” and the quota laws. “Whatever might be said,” he concludes, the U.S. government and the large foundations “did save a great many lives” (159–160).

The chapter by Antoon De Baets, an authority on the censorship of history, attempts to test “Plutarch’s thesis” that exile can be a blessing in disguise. According to Leszek Kolakowski, “the position of outsider, with its uncertain status and identity, confers a cognitive privilege: creativity arises from insecurity” (211). But did it? De Baets concludes that on balance, although forced departure was a tragedy at the micro-, individual level, “at the macro level of historical writing . . . loss for the country of origin was not generally equaled by gain for the country of destination. The international cross-fertilization embodied in, or emanating from, refugee historians would probably have happened anyway, if perhaps more slowly.” The real blessing that the émigré historians conferred was their courage in keeping alive, in difficult circumstances, the version of the history of their countries that conformed to “the critical principles of logic and evidence,” while at home the story had “succeeded to tyranny, falsification, and lies” (223).

Finally, Christian Fleck, a devoted analyst of the émigré scholars, offers an account of the Austrian refugee social scientists that goes beyond the well-known luminaries to portray statistically the fate of an entire cohort of émigrés—mainly Viennese and Jewish—who became social scientists in their destination countries. By careful analysis, Fleck shows that, in general, there was a considerably greater mass of victims in Austria than in Germany; a larger proportion of Austrian than Ger-
man professors were dismissed from the universities; and a preponderance of Austrians among the émigrés who became social scientists. Finally, in contrast to history, the benefit in the social sciences accrued entirely to the host country with little loss to the country of origin, since before their emigration, “most of those who became social scientists after their escape were earning their living by working in different occupations, sometimes obscure ones” (200). The social scientists were a young, cosmopolitan group who assimilated well, particularly in the United States. They, too, were helped by the refugee organizations, but mostly by the Americans, who were more open to social science than the British were. Fleck concludes that whether because of age and outlook, or political and religious identification, many of the Austrian émigrés had the individual and cultural characteristics that led more easily to upward mobility in the host country and to successful careers in academia.

This fascinating book explores through biographical studies and group analyses the farthest reaches of the effort, centered in Britain, to rescue the persecuted scholars who became refugees between 1933 and the 1980s.

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Bernard Bailyn
Harvard University


At a recent meeting to refine public-health guidance in humanitarian emergencies, an expert in disaster relief leaned toward me and whispered that although he worked for humanitarian organizations, he did not really know how to define humanitarianism. He might do well to read Barnett’s Empire of Humanity, at least to find some justification for his uncertainty. The closest that Barnett comes to defining his subject is his notion that “different traditions of humanitarianism, and different kinds of humanitarian organizations with different missions make different decisions . . . and project different kinds of moral imaginations that challenge themselves and the world in different ways” (33). Although this definition is maximally ambiguous, it is, nevertheless, accurate. Barnett tries to sort through these differences, catalog them, classify them, and analyze them. He does so with varying degrees of originality, and at different levels of depth, but overall his book is a convincing and, most of the time, entertaining history of a significant (although not as significant as Barnett claims it to be) area of global activity that has been grossly underrepresented in the academic literature.

There are, indeed, many different perspectives on how to try to
provide assistance to the unfortunate millions around the world who are caught up in circumstances that leave them in the most vulnerable state imaginable. From a historical standpoint, Barnett presents three: imperial humanitarianism, practiced from the early nineteenth century (encompassing the age of slavery and abolition, and the savagery of the colonial era) through the end of World War II; neo-humanitarianism, the guiding principle of the Cold War period, which included the rise to independence of most of today’s developing countries; and liberal humanitarianism, practiced in an age relatively free of interstate conflict but increasingly characterized by ethnic strife, terrorism, and the failure of established states.

Insofar as the philosophical and political trends that have helped to shape humanitarianism are concerned, this historical breakdown makes sense, though many nuances within the field could be taken into account. The field of public health in humanitarian crises began to develop at the time of the Cambodian genocide of the late 1970s; it continued to take shape during the refugee crisis in Somalia, which extended from that time (after the overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie and the establishment of the communist Dergue regime in neighboring Ethiopia) until the mid-1980s.

Serious attempts to grapple with “failed states” and to provide even minimal levels of assistance to those affected by the collapse of their political system (as ineffectual or inequitable as it might have been) became the focus of humanitarianism after the debacle of foreign intervention in Somalia in 1991. A move to “professionalize” humanitarian workers—to ensure minimal levels of competence for international aid workers, as opposed to relying mostly on good will and generous spirits—began after the colossal failure of the “humanitarian community” to provide effective relief to Hutu refugees fleeing Rwanda to Goma, in then Zaire, after the overthrow of the genocidal regime in Kigali in July 2004.

Barnett presents his history of humanitarianism in broad strokes, largely for the benefit of those unfamiliar with the sometime strange land of humanitarianism rather than for the handful of knowledgeable, but often heavily opinionated, observers and commentators who more permanently inhabit the humanitarian world. For this general audience, Empire of Humanity is an excellent and thought-provoking introduction.

In his attempt to deconstruct the larger picture into its smaller pixels, Barnett’s other principal distinction is between those organizations and individuals who practice “emergency relief” and those who use “alchemical” processes to address the root causes of humanitarian crises and transform stagnant and struggling societies into budding, even thriving, success stories. The emergency groups, typified by the International Committee of the Red Cross and Medecins Sans Frontieres, purportedly supply immediate relief in a politically independent manner to those affected by catastrophe; they bandage the wounded, care for the sick, and so forth. However, they do not seek to alter the underlying circum-
stances that are more distally related to a crisis. Barnett points out, correctly, that this “apolitical” posturing is a political stance in and of itself.

Barnett reserves the designation of alchemists for those organizations that provide not only relief in the short term but also play an active role in trying to extirpate the underlying factors of humanitarian tragedies. These organizations are heavily influenced by their donors (frequently the governments of rich countries) and by their interpretation of what is morally, ethically, and socially desirable. Many of them are also faith-based and grounded in at least the principles, if not the practices, of organized, invariably Western, religions.

Although this difference in orientation will be obvious to many readers, and although the transition from short-term relief to longer-term development in the wake of natural or man-made disasters is widely known to be problematical, Barnett’s compelling presentation of the two sides is a worthwhile contribution to the literature. Nonetheless, the book has three flaws—two of omission and one of commission. First, given Barnett’s clear presentation of the three historical trends of humanitarianism (imperial, neo-, and liberal, he might well have explored how a single humanitarian intervention would have worked in each of the three eras. A simulation of this kind could have driven home, neatly and conclusively, the points that the author tries to make throughout the book.

Second, the growing trend toward the involvement of military forces in humanitarian interventions, though mentioned, is not given nearly as much attention as it deserves. An incisive discussion of the increasingly frequent and highly controversial incursion of the foreign policies of donor nations into the humanitarian discourse would have been welcome.

Finally, Barnett’s tendency to use the first-person singular often blurs the line between intellectual analysis and personal opinion. His mini-lectures can distract from the flow of the narrative and inject excessive emotion into what purports to be an objective and scholarly treatment. Yet, Barnett’s obvious passion for his subject is not necessarily a detriment; insofar as the book both educates and entertains, it can certainly be excused.

Ronald J. Waldman
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This is the most important book on Byzantium to appear in my lifetime. The authors admirably fulfill their stated intention to discuss political re-
covery and institutional reshaping, the final stages in the evolution of eastern Orthodox dogma, the emergence of a new political and social elite, the transformation of urban life as well as urban-rural relations, and the generation of a new “medieval” perspective on the past. The crucial significance of the iconoclast era, which nestles within, but is not fully contiguous with, what historians usually call the “Mid-Byzantine Period,” has always been recognized. But with the appearance of this book, its history will never be the same. The book contains an astonishingly thorough synthesis of the scholarship, a scrupulously fair presentation of historiographical contention, and a number of original arguments.

The book’s first five chapters present a historical survey of the period, with questions of iconoclasm, image breaking, at the heart of the discussion. In the traditional telling, iconoclasm was introduced by Emperor Leo III in 726 and dominated Byzantine history until the middle of the ninth century. The next six chapters are thematic, treating social, economic, political, and institutional history, sparing no critical topic. The final chapter asks what iconoclasm was actually all about. The book is dense and detailed, although nicely written. It is likely to be consulted more often than read cover to cover.

The product of a felicitous collaboration between an art historian and a historian of society and institutions, this volume is truly interdisciplinary. The authors read and interpret the written sources fully and carefully, according special attention to matters of genre and audience. But they also use visual and material evidence—mosaics, frescoes, and images on coins; architecture; cloth and metal work. In key sections of Chapters 6 to 11, the authors deploy numismatic evidence and arguments. Sigillography plays an important role in several chapters. The Byzantines have left behind thousands of lead seals that bear names, dates, and titles. Everywhere they use archaeology, drawing always on the latest research.

Among the book’s larger arguments is, first, that iconoclasm itself was never a mass movement. It was a tool of imperial politics, as was the triumph of the iconophiles. Second, the normative iconophile interpretation of iconoclasm that emerged in the ninth century can no longer stand. Its central arguments were tendentious, to be sure, but also authentic ways of telling the story the way in which they believed it had to be told. The authors are less “iconoclastic” about the sources than Speck was—and not all readers will accept all their criticisms—but they destroy the iconophile narrative once and for all.1 Third, seventh-century Byzantium practiced “crisis management,” whereas eighth- and ninth-century Byzantium engaged in substantive and successful reform.

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Fourth, the authors drive the last nail into the coffin of Ostrogorski’s argument that the “theme system”—Byzantium’s fundamental institutional structure—emerged with Herakleios (610–640) and took shape by the middle of the eighth century. In fact, it was introduced by Nikephoros I (802–811) and assumed final form during the 830s.

In the end, iconoclasm was about representation and about Byzantine responses to Islam. The shift in the way that sacred images were either embraced or rejected came at the turn of the eighth century as Byzantium faced the massive crisis caused by the Arabs and Islam. It was the total situation, and not aniconic Islam—a crucial point—that spawned the controversy. Why was God punishing his people? Living holy men and relics provided access to the divine but they were not infinitely reproducible. Images painted by humans were, but they raised questions about the relationship between the image and the person represented. The critical issue was a shift from physical presence to representation. Contention about visual representation soon turned into a battle about the representation of history, religion, and culture.

Thomas F. X. Noble
University of Notre Dame


Six vignettes, meaningfully ordered as one would expect of any carefully constructed theatrical masterpiece, constitute the core of this study: (1) In 1506, Pope Julius II took hold of the recently excavated ancient marble masterpiece wherein the Ancient Greek god Laocoön vainly attempts to protect his two sons from a lethal tangle of snakes, a grouping that seduces the viewer with its portrayal of excruciating, sexually charged pain. (2) Reports from the New World about cannibalism, a linguistic corruption of the term Caraíba (Caribbean), evoke subliminal anxieties about the symbolic eating of Christ’s body and blood. (3) Thomas More’s Utopia (1516) incongruously allows for slavery. (4) In 1561 at Goa, Portuguese inquisitors fighting the devil’s dentist defeat mercantile profiteers to capture and execute by fire the daladā, Buddha’s left canine tooth, a relic as powerful as any in the Christian panoply. (5) In his love letter to Ophelia, Hamlet’s reference to his body as a machine, or perhaps he refers to his penis, suggests an image first seen in Leonardo da Vinci’s drawings nearly a century earlier. (6) Italian wandering humanist Pietro della Valle encounters a hospital in Gujarat, India, where loving care is provided for birds that have lost their mates, evoking memories of how death has taken his beloved wife Sitti Maani

Gioerida, a Christian warrior whom he describes as being armed in “the manner of an Amazon” (274).

Wojciehowski weaves this erudite, exotic array of six historical moments to challenge in a fundamental way our understanding of the Renaissance. Her approach is fiercely psychoanalytical. Readers of lesser tolerance for this discipline’s iconic formulations may prefer Stephen Greenblatt’s prize-winning but heavily diluted version of post-Freudian analysis, The Swerve: How the World Became Modern (New York, 2011). The present book is for those who prefer their Freud straight up, at most splashed with a twist of wry humor and spiked further with theoretical formulations from Didier Anzieu.

Space precludes treatment of the wonderful nuances and suggestive possibilities found on virtually every page of this labor of love, almost Dantean in its careful, chiseled expression and richly illustrated with eight color plates and thirty-two additional illustrations. Instead, a raw condensation must suffice. Wojciehowski asserts that the key to Renaissance dynamics is group identity, first in the emergence of the significance of group (Italian gruppo) as an organizing principle and second in the rapidly shifting challenges to group identity that flowed from the contact of the European-Christian group with grouped “others” during the long sixteenth-century age of discovery and expansion. In her account, Burckhardt’s emphasis on individualism, humanism, and Greco-Roman culture are turned inside out, starting with a re-dating of the inception of the Renaissance by two centuries. Thus does she set aside the classical revival initiated by such Florentine artists as Cimabue and Giotto in favor of the travel journals of amazed European explorers suddenly stripped of their recently formed group identity.

The group is a body, as in the “body politic,” and the Renaissance Euro-Christian body behaved as any (Freudian) body would—incorporating, biting, expelling, penetrating, reproducing, and maiming. Look at any sixteenth-century map of the New World and see the image of a female monster, with a giant breast and an enticing belly. The very term “America” was an instant success because of its maternal phonemic forms. But watch out for the cannibals guarding access to her womb, wherein lay the hidden treasures of golden civilizations in contact with the waters that also washed upon fabled China. The future of Renaissance studies, Wojciehowski concludes, is in the application of emerging theories of embodied cognition to the analysis of historical group subjectivity.

Rudolph M. Bell
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Barbarians and Brothers is a beautifully written work “about restraint and atrocity, about the many ways societies seek to limit war’s destructive power, and about the choices and systems that unleash it” (2). In it, Lee argues that the balance between restraint and “frightfulness” in any particular conflict can best be understood in terms of four variables—capacity, control, calculation, and culture. War’s devastation can be checked by the limited destructive capacity of the belligerents. Cultural values or calculations of utility can also lead communities to attempt to moderate the violence employed by their warriors, or conversely may encourage states to push their soldiers to the extremes of brutality. Either way, the question of control then comes into play—most typically when governments find it difficult to limit war’s effects on enemy civilians after prolonged conflict has bred inter-society hatred or when logistical failures force troops to fend for themselves by taking food from civilians.

Barbarians in this context means enemies with a different cultural background who do not share the same “language and logic of war”; brothers means compatriots, people who might be members of the same polity after a war. In brothers’ wars, the tendency was to keep violence limited: Empathy was stronger; an enemy could be expected to recognize and reciprocate restraint; and excess harm to the opponent was understood to threaten the desired post-conflict community (which would include the chastened “brothers.”) In order to explore these concepts, Lee examines case studies drawn from the Anglo-Irish warfare of the sixteenth century; the English Civil War; colonial American warfare in 1586 and 1725; the American Revolution (including the 1779 campaign against the Iroquois); and more briefly, the American Civil War. His guiding idea is that “the events of one campaign, and the choices of one leader and his soldiers . . . reveals more about the nature and experience of the war, and the restraints on violence within it, than a fly-over view of the entire war” (73). This approach is fully justified by its execution.

Lee chose his chapter topics well and researched them thoroughly, eliciting fresh information and insight. Moreover, the chapters collectively enrich our understanding of how sixteenth- and seventeenth-century wars in the British Isles, along with local conditions, affected the military ideas and expectations of Britain’s colonists in the New World at a time when the foundations of a distinctive American approach to war and military organization were being laid. Lee’s most striking and important point comes in his conclusion: An exceptionally large proportion of the conflicts that shaped Anglo-American views of warfare were waged against either “barbarians” or “brothers,” rather than (as was more common in Europe) against antagonists who were peer competitors (243).

Although Lee’s thinking is clearly influenced by the work of sociologists and anthropologists like Bourdieu and Collins (both of whom he
cites in his introduction), the works of scholars outside the discipline of history are rarely referenced explicitly. Nonetheless, Lee’s work is more informed by theory than is often the case with military history. Readers with a wide range of interests—including the cultural aspects of warfare and the debates about the value of the concepts “limited” and “total” war, the military revolution, and the “American way of war”—will find Barbarians and Brothers rewarding reading.

Clifford J. Rogers
United States Military Academy


Recent work on the Irish famine has moved away from the revisionist notion that British officials cannot be faulted for their failure to relieve Irish hunger. Instead, historians now blame laissez-faire economics. Nally, a geographer, contributes to this literature with an interdisciplinary methodology. Drawing on copious primary sources to create a searing portrayal of Irish poverty, Nally’s work is a thorough account of the famine in a long-term perspective that places it in a contemporary theoretical and postcolonial framework. One great strength of this book is that Nally embeds the famine in comparative studies, drawing on the work of Sen and others, who demonstrate that famines are the result of both crop failures and the inability of the poor to pay for food.¹

First, Nally takes a discursive approach, demonstrating that accounts of travelers, British officials, and such intellectuals as Thomas Carlyle created an image of the Irish people as primitive and barbaric. This is not an original observation, but the detailed, vivid accounts of Irish poverty that Nally quotes are useful for those who study the Irish famine. Nally writes that the “Irish poor emerged as objects of calculation rather than acting subjects,” but he ignores their popular protests, a common failing in governmentality-centered research (96).

Second, Nally uses Foucault’s paradigm of biopolitics to demonstrate that political economy did not only involve laissez-faire, that is, the government’s refusal to intervene, but also the government’s attempt to reshape Irish society and landholding.² The British imposed centralizing governmental initiatives, such as a national primary-education system and a poor law. Nally draws on the work of postcolonial scholars to analyze nineteenth-century Ireland as a “site for exploitation” as well as

“a laboratory for modernity,” and he demonstrates how scholars of Ireland, such as McDonagh, have applied this insight to delineate the extension and centralization of government in early nineteenth-century Ireland. Nally’s claim that the Irish poor law was fundamentally different from the English poor law is an overstatement, as he later acknowledges: The Irish poor law was much harsher in denying a right to relief, but it was based on the English New Poor Law’s philosophy of limited eligibility and placing paupers under discipline in workhouses. Once the famine broke out, the government selectively applied laissez faire policies, for instance insisting that the Navigation Acts required exports and imports to be carried on British ships. The task-work system was also a way of enforcing proletarianization and labor discipline on the poor.

Finally, Nally draws on such theorists as Agamben. Generally, early nineteenth-century politicians wanted to manage Ireland in terms of biopolitics, imposing such discipline on the poor in order to “improve” the economy and make Ireland more governable. However, the famine turned Ireland into what Agamben calls a “state of exception” where normal ethical rules did not apply. Nally demonstrates that British policy transformed the biopolitics of managing populations into a “necropolitics,” borrowing Mbembé’s phrase. The Irish were reduced to “bare life,” in Agamben’s terms, seen as bodies superfluous to the state’s requirements, who could be allowed to die. Thus did the Irish become “human incumbrances” (230).

Anna Clark
University of Minnesota

By Gillian Weiss (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2011) 408 pp. $65.00

This learned, extensive and detailed book tells the story of almost three centuries (1550–1830) of enslavement and captivity of French nationals in the North African Barbary Coast. During these centuries, about 1 million Europeans were kidnapped or taken to the half-autonomous Ottoman regencies of Barbary—Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoly—and to the Empire of Morocco, held there as slaves or hostages to be ransomed. The number of French captives in Barbary amounted to tens of thousands (the book features a meticulous appendix of slave numbers in Barbary). The kidnapping and enslavement of the French reached its climax during the second half of the seventeenth century. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, it

3 Oliver MacDonagh, Early Victorian Government, 1830–1870 (New York, 1977); idem, Ireland: The Union and Its Aftermath (Dublin, 2003).
was mostly an “imaginative” threat to France (131). Nonetheless, the con-
cquest of Algeria in 1830 was excused by the French government at the
time as a measure to end “white slavery” (156–157).

This book traces the changing responses of French society and gov-
ernment to the predicament of the French and other Europeans in Bar-
bary, and explores the shifting motivations and rationale for ransoming
and freeing the captives/slaves. These changes indicate, according to
Weiss, altering understandings within France about who was entitled to
be considered French, Christian, and even human. Whereas in the sev-
teenth century, ransoming and anti-corsairing initiatives were subject
primarily to religious considerations and fears (for example, the fear of
forced apostasy in Barbary), in the eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
tury, the French Crown adopted a more humanistic approach, which
enabled the release not only of Catholics but also of Huguenots and
other non-French Europeans. In its turn, the practice of “white slavery”
(a category created to distinguish the European slaves in Barbary from
sub-Saharan African slaves in the New World) became so atrocious in
French eyes that despite its diminishing numerical scale, it could serve
the weak monarchical regime of Charles X as a way to gain legitimacy
for what was actually an imperialist conquest of Algeria in 1830.

Although Weiss’ book is meticulous and important, it is not partic-
ularly interdisciplinary. The book indeed deals with many important so-
cial and historical issues, but it does not conceptualize them or integrate
ideas, methods, and notions in other than a “traditional” manner. The
broad issues include state–society relations, church–state relations, and
state–building mechanisms and processes (Weiss uses the term “state
building” several times throughout the text but hardly explains what she
means by it and why certain occurrences and phenomena contributed to
it). The book is informative historically but not developed in terms of
“the general lesson” that can be drawn from it. Methodologically, it re-
lies largely on presenting and contextualizing “true accounts” of re-
deemed French slaves, redemptive religious orders’ correspondences and
documents, and French official archival materials. Because it offers no
material in Arabic or Turkish, its picture of corsairing and slavery in Bar-
bary is one-dimensional.

Although Weiss occasionally mentions the equivalent phenomenon
of kidnapping and enslaving of Muslims in France’s Mediterranean gal-
tleys or the ill-treatment of Muslim diplomats and merchants in France,
the main focus of the book is the French predicament, suffering, and
policy. This approach is legitimate and understandable, but it also carries
several shortcomings. An explicit comparison between French accounts
and Barbary ones might have provided a more comprehensive under-
standing of Mediterranean slavery, of which French slavery was just a
part. But Weiss’ (lack of) treatment of the Barbary polities risks framing
them as “natural objects” rather than as historical subjects. Similarly,
Weiss never discusses the “regencies” as political and societal entities—
who ruled them and in what manner. Did they encourage or discourage corsairing?

By restricting the viewpoint of the book, Weiss, though critical of the anti-slavery argument as an excuse for the 1830 French occupation of Algeria, reduces Barbary to an amorphous geopolitical entity/region that acted upon France (by kidnapping its nationals) or that France acted upon (even if for only “imaginative” reasons). She thus misses to a large degree the mutual constitution and the complexity of Mediterranean slavery and captivity—an intricacy acknowledged decades ago in Fernand Braudel (trans. Siân Reynolds), *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York, 1972; orig. pub. Paris, 1949).

Weiss’ keeps its promise to provide new, detailed, and interesting insights into the roots of French policy and imperialism in North Africa during the twentieth century, as well as into France’s relations with the Islamic world. But in so doing, it also reproduces notions about the Islamic geography of danger that are prevalent even today in Western society.

Oded Löwenheim
Hebrew University of Jerusalem


This well-researched book discusses a topic about which we knew, until now, too little. Yet it starts with an obvious mistake—that Francisco Franco’s death occurred on October 1975 (1). It actually occurred in November. This mistake, and other minor errors, which a good editor should have easily detected, does not obscure the author’s achievement. Radcliff has devoted a good deal of archival research—in often sparse and elusive documents—as well as considerable skill, to provide a comprehensible, well-written, and convincingly argued portrait of how ordinary people, and obscure and sometimes ephemeral institutions, changed Spanish society and made the arrival of democracy possible. Radcliff’s search for information about such organizations, such as the much-neglected and (often) maligned Housewives Associations, is admirable. Her use of the information that she gathered is wise and insightful.

Radcliff’s main argument is that the Francoist regime encouraged the creation of civic associations, most notably after 1964, in an attempt to reconnect with society. Although this policy ultimately failed, those associations helped to school their members in both participation and diversity, transforming Spaniards into citizens. Some of those associations
remained controlled by Francoist supporters well after the dictator’s passing; others were independent; and others changed hands during the mid-1970s. From this vantage point, Radcliff provides a different vision of the transition to democracy in Spain during the 1970s. Although many authors continue to focus too much on the role of the elites and the big parties and unions, Radcliff provides a portrait of how ordinary people in Spain have worked to improve society since the early 1960s, within a wider process of collective political learning. Notably, she pays attention to the women’s groups that both female and male scholars have tended to neglect, in part because they declared themselves to be non-feminists.

With this book, Radcliff provides historians, political scientists, and sociologists a valuable analysis of Spain’s transition to democracy. The fact that her documentation centers largely on Madrid, however, forces her to omit issues specific to regions that not only had to cope with the inefficiency of the Francoist authorities to address social problems but also with the arrival of immigrants and their different cultural backgrounds and languages. Such was the case in Catalonia (mainly Barcelona province) and the industrial areas of the Basque country. An analysis of inter-community relations and the role of associations in those places would have been a plus in what is nonetheless an excellent book.

Antonio Cazorla-Sanchez
Trent University


Venice Incognito represents the first monographic study of the history of masks in Venice—a remarkable fact considering that the mask has long embodied Venetian material culture. Ritual masking was a unique practice in Venice, starting as early as the thirteenth century, reaching its height in the eighteenth century, and continuing in one way or another to the present day. Indeed, one of the most common complaints voiced by Venetians now is that too many local butchers and vegetable stalls have turned into tourist mask shops, pointing to the continued presence of the mask in the city. Johnson has brilliantly hit upon a subject that is both at the center of Venetian life and, until now, has remained almost untouched by Anglophone scholars.

Among the many topics that Johnson covers in the twenty-one short chapters of his text are where, when, and why both Venetians and visitors to the city regularly wore masks. During the eighteenth century in particular, all of Venetian society donned masks for (a surprising) six months of the year—a practice linked not to an extension of Carnival, as many have long assumed, but to the Venetian theater season. Johnson argues that on the stage, in the street, and in the infamous gambling halls...
of the city, masks did not work to disguise or create anonymity. Con- 
trary to our modern understanding of masks as deceptive, masks had a 
much more conservative function, “preserving distance, guarding status, 
and permitting contact among unequals through fictive concealment. 
Rather than obscuring identities, masks affirmed their permanence” 
(xii).

In general, masks protected rather than altered the self, and, along 
these lines, they served many specific functions: They guarded female 
modesty at the theater, covered the pride of beggars, and allowed nobles 
to mix comfortably with the underclasses and Venetian patricians to mix 
with foreigners, which was otherwise prohibited by law. Thus, by offer-
ing a figment of anonymity, masks enabled communication among peo-
ple and groups that was otherwise forbidden. Johnson argues that, in 
general, any sense of disguise was merely token; most people knew who 
the person behind a mask was (206). Masking did not encourage people 
to forget their identities but instead to revel in them. These conclusions 
and the others Johnson draws about the tradition of masking in Venice 
will prove fascinating, even to those possessing a great familiarity with 
the city and its history.

Despite this strength, the text is uneven. Certain chapters present 
copious new ideas and interpretations about masks. For instance, Chap-
ter 7, which explores the numerous occasions when Venetians wore 
masks, is full of astonishing information (masked Venetian nobles 
greeted traveling masked heads of state with masked entourages [50]—
how bizarre!), and Chapter 13 contains a compelling analysis of how 
masks defended social status. Other chapters, however, cover age-old 
general knowledge about the history of Venice that in no way merits 
repetition. Indeed, Part I (the first six chapters) discusses Venetian Car-
nival and Casanova in a way that offers little that is new and, oddly, little 
about masks.

The unevenness of the book could stem from changing tides 
in publishing and a desire to reach scholarly and general audiences 
simultaneously—a goal that is not easy to achieve. Academic historians 
of Venice, for instance, will find Chapter 18—Johnson’s discussion of 
Bakhtin, Davis, and the idea that Carnival functioned as a political 
“safety-valve”—extremely dated, whereas a general audience might 
have no interest whatsoever in such literary and anthropological theo-
ries.¹ This study reveals some of the pitfalls involved in trying to straddle 
this divide in readership. Nevertheless, its better chapters are genuinely 
strong, providing food for further thought about the deeper meanings of 
the Venetian use of masks.

Liz Horodowich
New Mexico State University

¹ See Mikhail Bakhtin (trans. Hélène Iswolsky), Rabelais and His World (Bloomington, 
1984); Natalie Zemon Davis, “The Reasons of Misrule,” in Society and Culture in Early Modern 
France: Eight Essays (Stanford, 1975), 97–123.
In this book, Kohut, a historian with training in psychiatry, utilizes post–World War II interviews with sixty-two members of the Free German Circle born between 1900 and 1926 to track how this generation came to remember certain pivotal events and circumstances. Drawing together portions of the interviews in a series of combined memoirs and analytical essays, Kohut recounts German history as these individuals experienced it during and right after World War I, the Weimar Republic, the Nazi regime (including the collapse and immediate postwar years), and the subsequent years of the Federal Republic. Given that all of the people interviewed became enthusiastic supporters of the Nazi regime—at least in the beginning—the author does not come to like them. He tries, however, to take them at their word, while remaining sensitive to the issues of deriving accurate and realistic understanding from the products of oral history.

In part because these individuals met at regular intervals to discuss personal experiences and current events, they shared great commonalities in their views, at least by gender. Those readers who are interested in German women’s history will find Kohut’s examination of gender distinctions particularly interesting. Kohut explores more than just the vast, and hardly surprising, differences between the struggles of men, broken and defeated in their return from prisoner-of-war status, and of women at home to re-establish some semblance of normality after Germany’s defeat in World War II. Other noteworthy aspects of the gender issue surface in his accounts, such as the ways in which men’s and women’s evaluation of their labor-service experience diverged.

Common views about the turmoil in Germany after World War I, a desire for group identity, and an attraction for the Nazi movement—especially the labor service that the new government required—come to the fore in all of the interviews, as well as a real or pretended fear of the secret police (although, as is now well known, the German public essentially policed itself). A sense of group cohesion encouraged many Germans to look down on others and to look away when others, especially Jews, were persecuted. In the end, all of the interviewees saw themselves as victims of developments in which they themselves played no part.

Kohut’s juxtaposition of interviews and analyses allows readers to ponder the main issues before the author presents his own deductions. This fruitful procedure highlights the generational divide between the interviewees in the postwar Federal Republic. A map of wartime Germany would have been helpful (and would have spared the author the error of placing Auschwitz in the Warthegau [163]). Kohut is particularly careful and convincing in showing how the interviewees turned their eyes and their memories away from the Holocaust. He might also
have noted their disregard of the comparative successes of the Weimar Republic, which avoided total occupation of the country; saw the occupation end twelve, rather than forty-nine, years after the war; entered the international organization, the League of Nations, eight, rather than twenty-eight, years after defeat; acquired a permanent position on the League council; and so forth. But these are minor quibbles with a book that is both innovative and revealing.

Gerhard L. Weinberg
University of North Carolina


This tidy, modest, and clearly written book contextualizes a Swedish attempt of 1619 to de-legitimize astrological prognostications. Kjellgren recounts the persecution of Sigfrid Forsius, a moderately successful mathematician and almanac producer from Finland, by a commission (technically, an “inquisition”) that included a “scientific” expert—a former professor of astronomy and almanac maker, who had become a bishop in Sweden’s anxiously confessional and royally controlled Lutheran establishment.

Forsius, the author of no fewer than twenty-seven publications between 1602 and 1623—nearly all of them in Swedish (listed on 306–308)—is the most interesting character in this story. He was Sweden’s first author specializing in almanacs—which were rare until 1600—eventually becoming sufficiently well-known for his “name [to be] used as a sales pitch even after his death” (278). But this apparently autodidact Finnish-born cleric was an incorrigible Bohemian, described as an “annoying and restless man” or as “restless, unruly, and irresponsible” (209, 215). His censors were not exaggerating. Forsius’ escapades include service in Estonia as an army chaplain in both 1599 and 1616; a border-mapping expedition to Lapland in 1601/02; an arrest in Finland in 1606; and serious quarrels with, and long separations from, his wife. A guest was once killed after a drunken brawl in their house.

Laurentius Paulius Gothus, the other main figure, published eleven works between 1591 and 1636 (the first two being almanacs), while obtaining high rewards after steering successfully through the dangerous waters of a state church in flux (309–310). En route, he appeared to change positions about the utility of astrological prognostications between his early almanacs and his role in de-legitimizing Forsius in 1619. However, Kjellgren argues, the censure of Forsus had much less to do with the permissibility of astrological forecasts in almanacs than with simply silencing an embarrassing clerical “black-sheep”: “There are no new arguments raised against astrology, only a new inclination to define
the efforts of astrologers as illicit” (257). As late as 1636, notes Kjellgren, Paulius still offered a limited defense of astrology’s usefulness in medicine and agriculture (286).

This book contains some interesting sections about how Swedish Lutheran astronomy and astrology encountered the Gregorian calendar reform and a comparison between Forsius’ and Paulinus’ commentaries on a comet in 1607 (122–127, 164–172), but it offers no genuinely interdisciplinary approach and rarely ventures beyond the northernmost margins of a deeply confessionalized Europe. Forsius notwithstanding, Sweden in 1619 seems to have been a kinder and gentler place than England, where a 1603 regulation threatened that authors of “prophecies exceeding the limits of allowable astrology shall be punished severely in their persons” (25). Sweden also seems to have been a universe apart from post-Tridentine Italy, where Galileo was investigated by the Roman Inquisition in 1600 for making excessive claims about the predictions of his horoscopes and twenty years later circulated a letter to the dowager grand duchess of Tuscany arguing that mathematically demonstrated astronomical truths took precedence over Scriptural texts.

William Monter
Northwestern University

Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought: The Red Army’s Effectiveness in World War II. By Roger Reese (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2011) 386 pp. $37.50

“The Red Army was at all times militarily effective,” although it “simultaneously fought quite inefficiently” (306). By “effectiveness,” Reese means “the ability of an army to sustain battle” (3). Supported by the public as a whole, Soviet forces performed poorly on many occasions but never lost the ability to fight the Germans.

Soviet citizens served or evaded duty for many reasons. Reese uses published memoirs, archival sources, and recollections available online to show that although some soldiers rejected Stalinism, most fought for the socialist system and for Stalin. Even those who had directly suffered in the prewar years generally did not perceive “evil intent on the part of Stalin or see them [repression, dekulakization, etc.] as inherent to the economic and social systems” (13). Injustices were instead ascribed to Stalin’s underlings.

Red Army troops fought because of loyalty to Russia; “normal obedience to the state”; the conviction that resisting the invasion was a “just war”; the belief, especially of young people, that the postrevolutionary generation now faced a great historical task; the understanding that Nazi rule would not improve life; and self-interest, the idea that service might improve one’s personal situation (10).

Patriotism did not necessarily equate with support for Stalinist gov-
ernance; people can and do fight for regimes they dislike. By the same token, surrender or desertion from the Red Army resulted from various motives and situational factors, not always disloyalty. Reese argues that coercion in securing service has been overrated. He details the large number of volunteers from the major cities and compares their willingness to fight to the evaporation of self-sacrifice during World War I. Few Soviet volunteers came from the peasantry, but when the army became “repeasantized” in 1942 after horrendous losses among urban soldiers, the armed forces remained effective.

The book counters ideas—often based on remarks by former German soldiers—that Soviet troops behaved like animals or automatons in battle. Reese shows instead that Soviet soldiers largely acted on their own initiative, deciding for themselves why they fought. Political officers often conducted little indoctrination; rather, they explained to untested men what they should expect in battle. Reese also corrects the record concerning blocking detachments. Contrary to legend, they did not fire machine guns at retreating troops. The detachments were not even designed to intimidate soldiers. Bearing only small arms, they rounded up stragglers and disorganized, retreating men and returned them to the front. The blocking attachments arrested only 3.7 percent of the soldiers that they detained, and only 1.5 percent of the detainees received death sentences (170). The penal battalions, in which casualties could be extremely high, did not mean permanent punishment; service in them sometimes lasted only several days. Survivors usually returned to their original units and ranks. Little evidence suggests that women soldiers and support troops ever failed in action; despite horrendous conditions and sexual harassment, women were “vital” to Soviet success.

Reese could have given more emphasis to German air superiority in 1941/42. The invaders bombed and strafed at will and detected formations approaching the front, greatly damaging Red Army morale and performance. Furthermore, the book can be excessively conceptual. Why divide those who obeyed to “the point of self-sacrifice” into “soldier-philosophers” or “soldier-victims” (131)? When troops were surrounded and bombed, shelled, and cut apart by armor; when they ran out of ammunition, food, and water in the summer heat; no theoretical explanation for surrender is needed. Thankfully, readers can easily cut though this occasional foliage.

*Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought* makes an excellent contribution to the literature about the Soviet people’s response to World War II and Stalinism. Simplistic notions about glorious patriotism or pervasive disloyalty are unhelpful. Reese instead introduces a variety of human motivations, emotions, and responses to the war and to the regime.

Robert W. Thurston
Miami University
Collier’s treatment of Russia’s neoliberal experience in *Post-Soviet Social* is a subtle and empirically grounded conceptual discussion of neoliberalism that invigorates a debate that has become rather stale. Rather than take the easy path of accepting neoliberalism as a coherent doctrine backed by corporate interests to gut the state, Collier borrows from Foucault’s methodological orientations and paints a much more complex and convincing picture of neoliberalism in practice, with all of its contradictions and compromises on full display.¹ One of the most profound contributions of the manuscript is to rescue the work of Stigler and Buchanan from those on the political right who use it to champion shrinking the state. Collier reminds us all that Stigler’s “Theory of Regulation” is just as critical of the excessive influence of corporate interests on policymaking, which is the essence of Stigler’s capture theory of regulation. In addition, Collier highlights the central role of redistribution between rich and poor regions in Buchanan’s work on fiscal federalism.²

Given the prominence that Buchanan and the “Virginia” school and Stigler and the “Chicago” school had in the right’s reconstruction of neoliberal thought, Collier’s insights suggest a much more equivocal relationship between the intellectual founding fathers of neoliberalism and its current champions. Collier’s insights on Stigler and Buchanan also force critics of neoliberalism from the left to reassess their assumptions about neoliberalism as an uncompromising and coherent line of thought underpinned by a desire to elevate corporate over public interests at all costs and by any means necessary. Without a doubt, the debate about neoliberalism has been highly politicized, divorced from its intellectual roots, and stripped of empirical analysis in recent years. Collier’s work provides just the right approach to advance the discussion.

Yet Collier is not satisfied to simply cast the argument in theoretical terms. Instead, he proceeds to demonstrate how uneasily thinly drawn accounts of neoliberalism by both the right and the left square with the Russian case. His treatment of economic reform in the single-company towns of Belaya Kalitva and Rodniki in the last fifteen or so years paints a rich picture that supports his account on both the micro- and macro-level. On the micro-level, he describes the wrenching experience of the 1990s in the two factory towns with a clear eye. Attributing the causes of the upheaval in everyday life to both the failure of Soviet planning and the mismatch between economic reforms and Soviet-style infrastruc-

¹ See, for example, Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College De France, 1978–79* (New York, 2008).
ture, Collier describes how Soviet decisions on heating and budgetary policy continued to influence social life and economic outcomes in the post-Soviet era. A perfect example is his treatment of heating pipes in apartments. A standard neoliberal approach to heating reform would prescribe the installation of individual meters for each apartment so that costs could be traced to individual decisions. However, because Soviet planners attached many apartments to a single boiler, the costs of switching from collective to individual metering of heat were prohibitive. This institutional constraint significantly raised the costs of heating reform in a post-Soviet environment relative to other settings.

Collier is also cognizant of the high politics of neoliberalism and draws an equally convincing picture of the evolution of the views of the World Bank and Western neoliberal academics who initially emphasized the macro-economic elements of transformation—privatization, stabilization, and liberalization—but then emphasized building institutions and adjusting their policies in light of continuing technological and political constraints. His depiction of the changing tasks of neoliberal reform over time provides a convincing rebuttal to those who view the reform agenda as immutable and driven solely by ideology and corporate interests.

These positive points would be enough for a good book, but Collier goes further. In the first half of the book, he situates his argument within the long-standing literatures in Sovietology and urban planning. He engages with geographers, political scientists, and historians of the U.S.S.R. who have emphasized the Soviet leadership’s penchant for big projects, which some have labeled “gigantomania.” Without downplaying the incentives built into Soviet-style socialism to favor large projects, Collier also identifies the critical role played by small and medium-sized industrial cities, which, contrary to much common wisdom, were actually overrepresented in the U.S.S.R. He focuses on city planning, again unwilling to accept the terms of the debate uncritically. Although he acknowledges the dominant view that city plans were rarely met, often contradictory, and subject to sabotage by powerful industrial ministries, he nonetheless shows that the plans were able to create a public sphere between workplaces and the state. For all of their deficiencies, city plans helped to implant the infrastructure of the modern city in Russia in a distinctly Soviet fashion. But rather than concentrate on demonstrating the “uniqueness” of the impact of city planning in Russia, Collier also expertly traces how it molded social life in the late Soviet period and continued to shape Russia’s engagement with liberal reforms into the twenty-first century.

A less ambitious scholar could easily have taken these two projects and split them into two books. But by treating them under one cover, Collier manages to show how past decisions shape the present in far more detail than is usually the case.

Timothy Frye
Columbia University
Higher School of Economics-Russia
Western historians have been working on gender issues for decades; relatively little is known, however, about the history of women in Central Europe. Under Communism, Czechoslovak, East German, and Hungarian women enjoyed constitutionally guaranteed equality with men and the right to work. Yet, society conceived of their role as the traditional one of mother and wife; occupied with family matters during their entire lives, women took care of their grandchildren after retirement.

Einhorn and Waylen vividly described how the political change of 1989 affected women who were marginalized by the new democratic and economic spirit. Women were the first to lose their jobs when the privatization of state-owned enterprises began in the 1990s. Another new development was the hitherto unknown phenomenon of sexism. The import of the Western concept of liberty certainly introduced Berlin's two freedoms—freedom from state oppression and freedom to engage in matters common to all, for example, building the polity with the democratic vote. But negative phenomena also insinuated their way into the Central European post-totalitarian societies—criminality, pornography, greed, ruthless selfishness, and asocial behavior. A sad consequence of the regime change has been the trafficking of young Eastern European women, who apply for a job in the rich West and often land in brothels, where they are forced into prostitution.

Feminism was not popular under Communism. Havel, the most prominent dissident of Charter 77, explained in 1985 that Czechoslovak women considered feminism as “dada, the fear of becoming unintentionally ridiculous when publicly addressing women’s oppression by men.” To a society that oppressed the civil and political rights of all, women’s issues were neither interesting nor of vital importance.

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1 All translations into English are by the reviewer, including the volume’s title and the titles of the individual chapters. So far, the volume is available only in Slovak.
A new historiography free from ideological constraints, as well as the fear of embarrassment, might explain the skepticism about the feminist approach to historiography: Central European scholars started only in the mid-1990s to investigate women’s roles and functions in society. Given this background, *Toward the Modern Woman* is a unique contribution to Slovak and Central European historiography. Its interdisciplinary methodology combines analysis of social history, ethnology, art history, literature, historical anthropology, and sociology. The book presents a chronological account of Slovak women’s lives from the eighteenth to the twentieth century in a Central European context, referring to the Austrian, Czech, German, and Hungarian women’s movements.

The fine fabric of social historiography is one of the volume’s strongest points. It conveys a vivid picture of the motives, goals, ideas, and everyday reality of Slovak women, who, in the nineteenth century, found themselves in a catch-22. On the one hand, they were eager to engage in gender issues—for example, an attempt to establish educational institutions for girls. On the other hand, they shared men’s view that the political situation demanded the nation’s unity to resist the Magyar assimilation. Emancipation in the Western understanding of the freedom to choose how to spend one’s life would have meant fighting a battle on two fronts—first, against the domination of men and, second, against political oppression.

Slovak women had neither the financial means nor the political clout to redress either affront. Moreover, any desire to promote feminist issues was complicated by their particular understanding of feminism and emancipation: “The fact that the Slovak women’s movement was weak and lacked decisiveness, indeed, that it was too modest, tells us more about the general conservatism ruling in Slovak society than the conservative orientation of Slovak women... The representatives of the Slovak women’s movement were also convinced that, in the long run, a policy of small steps would be more successful than immediate radical actions.”

After an introductory chapter on Slovak family relations, Chapter 2, “The Ideal Picture,” deals with gender stereotypes and normative val-

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6 A good account of gender studies in contemporary Central European academe is Dudeková, “Learning to Crawl before We Can Walk: Gender in Historical Research (Not Only) in Slovakia,” in *Historiography in Motion: Slovak Contributions to the 21st International Congress of Historians* (Bratislava, 2010), 146–167.


9 Dudeková, “Konzervatívne feministy?”, in *idem* a kol., *Na ceste k modernej žene: Kapitoly z dejín rodových vzťahov na Slovensku* (Bratislava, 2011), 51.
ues of womanhood and manhood in the early nineteenth century—the traditional idealized perception of women as wives and mothers (19–127). Chapter 3, “The Ways of Emancipation,” focuses on the beginnings of the women’s movement in the second half of that century; it highlights the crucial importance of the opening up of the public sphere, contextualizing women’s public appearances in the national spolky, and the various cultural–national associations (choirs; reading circles; and the first women’s association, known as Živena). Women’s main activities were social care, welfare, literature, and the teaching of cooking and sewing. The education of girls was not a burning issue, since a labor market for women did not yet exist. Few women engaged in the international women’s movement; the majority still adhered to the conservative view of “faith, modesty, industriousness and also passivity” for women.

Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, “The Real Picture,” explore the consequences of the social change in the early twentieth century, which allowed women to enter politics and professional life. Rich in detail, the contributions include the importance of sport as well as women’s legal and social status in the authoritarian First Slovak Republic and during the Holocaust and the communist regime (147–423). Chapter 5, “The Vocation of Women,” emphasizes the entry of women into the modern professions of lawyer, teacher, journalist, editor, and artist (551–616).

Chapter 6 presents professional biographies, illustrating the career of the first female doctor of medicine, a university lecturer in medicine, and a pastor (631–684). In the conclusion, Dudeková presents a summary of the research results, identifying the intrinsic connection between national and female emancipation as the main reason for the feminist movement’s weakness: “Society assigned to the mothers the educational task of instilling in the children confessional and ethnic identity. This very task opened up the area of education to women, which was the basis for their further emancipation and self-realization. A comparison of the histories of female emancipation in the lands of the former Habsburg Empire shows that the building of a modern nation and aspirations for an independent state were at the centre of attention [of each national group].” Such was the reason why modest contacts between Slovak feminists and the international women’s movement emerged shortly before World War I. Constitutional equality had to await the democratic system of the Czechoslovak Republic (1918–1938), which granted human rights and instituted higher education for girls, laying the grounds for future gender equality.

11 Daniela Kodajová, “Odborné vzdelávanie ako predpoklad a prostriedok emancipácie,” in Dudeková a kol., Na ceste, 149–175.
Toward the Modern Woman features meticulous scholarship, a sound interdisciplinary method, and a critical approach to key concepts and normative values. A minor criticism concerns its length. Although the overall structure of the volume is sound, an edition in two volumes might have been more manageable. Nonetheless, the strong social-scientific methodology of this volume has resulted in a seminal reference book for Central European gender studies and women’s history. One can only hope that it will be translated into English and German soon.

Josette Baer
University of Zurich


This book is characteristic of Norton’s many works—insightful, rich, bold, and lucid. It is the second (though written last) of a trilogy now completed, tracking ideals of femininity and gender from the early colonial period—Founding Mothers and Fathers: Gendered Power and the Forming of American Society (New York, 1996)—to the Revolutionary era—Liberty’s Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750–1800 (Boston, 1980). This trilogy represents an extraordinary lifetime’s work for a prolific, brilliant, and path-breaking historian; it will doubtless remain on reading lists for decades to come.

In Separated by Their Sex, Norton tracks the rise of the idea of “separate spheres” in which women were excluded from the public realm and relegated to the private one. Evidently, the turning point was the early eighteenth century, when English print culture (and its male authors) popularized this bifurcation. Although much recent scholarship has spent time demolishing the walls between private and public, Norton instead focuses on making the separation historically contingent, trying to pinpoint precisely when and how the language of politics excluding women (even elite ones) came to dominate.

To answer the question, Norton consulted a wide array of printed and manuscript sources on both sides of the Atlantic. She also delved into literary works, including notable periodicals like The Athenian Mercury and The Spectator, making her study valuable for literary scholars as well as historians. This book is the most thoroughly and self-consciously centered on the Atlantic of any of her works (notwithstanding the London-based research for her early work about Loyalists). The chapters alternate colonial situations and sources with English ones, moving through time from the pre-watershed seventeenth century into the post-watershed mid-eighteenth century, with interludes that focus on particular women, assessing the “take up” of the new gender regime. This structure generally works well. Indeed, many of the interludes, such as
those about Mistress Alice Tilly and Sarah Kemble Knight, are captivating in themselves.

Chapter 1 focuses on Lady Frances Berkeley’s role in Bacon’s Rebellion in Virginia during the 1670s. Norton contends that, as wife of the governor and cousin of Nathaniel Bacon, she was “an important state actor” (10). Norton uses Lady Frances’ interventions in the rebellion to depict a seventeenth-century world in which rank and status still trumped gender. Although many contemporaries criticized the nature of Lady Frances’ involvement, no one appeared to question whether she should or could involve herself in state politics.

Chapter 2 moves across the Atlantic to women’s novel collective petitioning during the English Civil War. Like Lady Frances, these women provoked criticism but, Norton argues, more because of the substance of their petitions, or their nonelite rank, than for their political action per se. This chapter offers ingenuous and persuasive close readings of women’s petitions and satires about them.

The next two chapters focus on that moment in the eighteenth century when, according to Norton, gender began to trump rank. Exploring the print culture of England at the time—especially John Dunton’s *The Athenian Mercury* (and its advice letters to readers) and Joseph Addison and Richard Steele’s *The Spectator* and *The Tatler*—she contends that “John Dunton thus in 1702 outlined what became the modern Western world’s division of labor between men and women, developing both the public/private split in its modern form and laying out the first definition of separate spheres” [italics in original] (103). She argues persuasively for the prevalence of works like *The Spectator* in the colonies. An interlude on the politically well-connected Lady Chatham, Hester Grenville Pitt, and her correspondents implies that women, taking the lessons of such authors to heart, became increasingly apologetic for even mentioning politics in personal letters.

The final section investigates how both men and women came to emphasize the private sphere as female. This section includes discussions of newspaper articles purportedly written by women, most of which either relegated women to the private sphere or satirized them for leaving it. She also looks briefly at the arrangements of space in elite houses, as well as the ways in which women came to dominate one section of them—the room with the tea tables.

Notwithstanding the elegant readings and the compelling analyses to be found throughout the book, many readers will be left wanting more. Some of them may feel that Norton might have been chosen a wider range of evidence—and women—to flesh out her argument. Historians of Great Britain, many of whom have led the way in studies of masculinity, may desire more coverage of masculine roles, which seem surely to be part of the solution to this conundrum. Doubtless, however, they will learn a great deal about colonial developments. Historians of early America, meanwhile, may be a little sorry that Norton did not pursue further the kinds of issues to which she alluded suggestively in the
first part of the trilogy—“dramatic changes beginning in the mid-1670s, the most significant of which were the rapid expansion of slavery and major alterations in the colonies’ relationships with nearby Indians,” as well as the “growing commercialization of New England” (Founding Mothers, 15). Yet for them, much of the discussion about English developments—with spotlights on women’s Civil War petitions and popular periodicals—will be welcome.

Both kinds of historians can be grateful to Norton for bestowing renewed attention to the critical but neglected period of the early eighteenth century, despite the fact that she does not fully explain what caused the changes that she tracks so adeptly. Given Norton’s extraordinary achievements as a historian, it is curious to find her so reticent. She notes several possible explanations (from Laqueur’s theories about two sexes to controversies surrounding Queen Anne and her female favorites), but she does not firmly advocate any of them. 1 Perhaps her unexpectedly modest approach indicates the wisdom of experience, as well as an understandable unwillingness to enter into complex long-standing controversies among English historians.

Nevertheless, if so marvelous a historian of women and gender as Norton cannot tell us why these changes occurred, who in the world can? Few are better placed to elucidate the why as well as the how, despite the extremely absorbing story that she offers. Maybe this excellent trilogy should become a quartet. The history of women will surely be the better for it. In the meantime, this fascinating book provides a thought-provoking and engrossing interpretation of a critical cultural moment.

Sarah M. S. Pearsall
Oxford Brookes University


When Britain’s Prince William and his wife Catherine, Duchess of Cambridge, visited the United States, the American press leaped to ask, “Are pantyhose back?” First Lady Michele Obama drew criticism for wearing a gown by a British designer to a White House dinner, and the Weatherproof Garment Company launched an impromptu marketing campaign after seeing a photo of President Obama in one of its jackets. Politics and fashion are today deeply intertwined nowadays, but Haulman informs us that fashion and politics were no less braided at the nation’s founding; in fact, this symbiosis was integral to the new republic’s creation.

Haulman’s thoroughgoing look at the place of fashion in public discourse focuses on consumption and display among the urban popula-

tions of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston. She “considers fashion both as a concept, a shape-shifting vessel of an idea that people fill up with various meanings depending on time, place, and circumstance, and as changing styles of personal adornment, whether la mode or other modes of the day” (3).

The volume is arranged in three parts, which together cover the entire eighteenth century. Part I attends to ways in which clothing shaped and reflected “hierarchies of rank and categories of gender” in the early eighteenth century, and offers examples of how people set, enforced, and violated expectations (7). Hoops and periwigs, in particular, marked moments of crisis in gender relations as fashion became increasingly feminized.

Part II turns to the imperial crises of the 1760s and 1770s, when fashion—and the imported goods on which it depended—became a hot-button issue, and mid-century rhetoric around frugality and simplicity became increasingly shrill. As fashion more and more proclaimed political loyalty, hair heaped in the “high roll” and “Macaroni” men (men of high fashion by way of Italy on the Grand Tour) drew especial scorn. In Part III, Haulman turns to Revolutionary Philadelphia, especially the “military mode, where fashion and politics merged most explicitly” (157), and soldiers sought to strike just the right note in appearance, “formidable but not foppish” (161). Americans in the emerging nation struggled to reconcile these and other competing demands—style and substance, luxury and necessity, and emulation and independence.

Finally, as the new polity reached the turn of the century, the “triumph of masculine sartorial simplicity signaled the political emergence of a cross-class coalition of white men, voters and leaders, legitimated through, and yet regardless of fashion.” “Formal politics, at least in theory, became a fashion-free realm of power and legitimacy,” and the “paradox in which fashion was good for a nation’s political economy but bad for society was resolved” (9). Like contemporary calls for energy independence, which seek to disentangle our government and economy from the complications associated with fuel suppliers abroad, these calls for sartorial independence sought to ensure the fledgling nation’s survival.

Specialists in the history of fashion and consumption will encounter much that is familiar in this book, as Haulman capably synthesizes the truly impressive amount of scholarship about clothing, consumption, and fashion produced in recent years. Moreover, her own research generates fresh insights, allowing her to posit new trajectories that, among other things, help to explain the “great divergence” of the early nineteenth century, when elite men’s fashion retreated into the plain dark suits that still prevail today, while women’s fashion continued (and continues) to respond to much broader swings in color and cut.

Though costume historians will question some of the analysis regarding the specifics of construction and materials, Haulman’s engaging approach to a broad range of sources, including visual and material cul-
ture and some particularly intriguing attention to the grammar of advertisements, makes for fascinating reading. Historians of eighteenth-century culture will find much of value to enrich their own scholarship in history as well as gender studies, and, furthermore, they will gain a heightened awareness of the many ways in which fashion has long swirled through American political life before, during, and after the age of Revolution.

Marla R. Miller
University of Massachusetts, Amherst


How did the United States get to be so big? How did thirteen rebellious British provinces, strung along the Atlantic seaboard, create a dynamic union that could expand across the continent? Focusing on the character of the new regime, historians and political theorists have wondered how the founders could have resolved the conundrum of the “extended republic.” Montesquieu had taught them that republics, animated by the “virtue” of an engaged citizenry, had to be small; the larger the polity, the greater was the need for the despotic rule of a powerful monarch. Drake argues persuasively that we have been looking for answers to these questions in all the wrong places. The frustrated imperial patriots who became revolutionaries thought “big” from the outset. North America was “a unified, natural phenomenon, a single and unique geographical entity,” and the destiny of the original thirteen colonies—within or outside the Empire—was to dominate the continent (87). The challenge was not to move from small to big but the reverse: Anglo-American imperialists “had the conceptual grammar to appropriate the continent if only it could overcome their countervailing language of provincialism” (80).

As they mobilized resistance to British authority, patriot leaders turned to the “people,” thus unleashing the radical, democratic impulses that sometimes seemed to threaten their own authority. The solution was to draft new constitutions, grounded in popular sovereignty, at the state and federal levels. Federalists finally triumphed in the ratification debates, despite the Montesquiean concerns of skeptics about the immensity of the union and the danger of “consolidation,” because they had nature—and therefore, perhaps, God—on their side. “Only an ‘unnatural voice’ would suggest that Americans could not have a strong continental union” (295). After all, the states to which fearful

Antifederalists were so attached were mere “artifices of British rule . . . not natural communities” (304).

Drake’s reconstruction of the “geography of the mind” gives us a fresh perspective on the origins and development of American democracy. The meaning of “equality” itself was shaped by geographical understandings, as constitution writers moved toward “apportionment based on population,” displacing the presumably “equal” citizens from their “local circumstances” and making them “interchangeable” (296). Drake characterizes this move from “locally oriented to metageographical conceptions of space” as a return to the “virtual representation” of the old imperial regime; “with the ratification of the Constitution . . . virtual representation became the law of an extended republic” (307). This assumption, however, seems tendentious, suggesting that the founders betrayed the Revolution’s democratic promise of “actual” representation in local, presumably more “natural communities.” For better or worse, Americans’ democratic aspirations would not be contained within little villages or small republics. “Casting themselves during the Revolution as a continent rejecting island rule,” Americans “waged a war not just for colonial liberation; they had fought to assume their master’s imperial mantle” (283). In their empire, mobile, colonizing (white) Americans would certainly be secure in their rights, including the right to actually participate in politics, wherever they came from.2

Drake’s account of the metageographical origins of American nationhood is compelling: The Revolutionaries’ “continental consciousness” enabled Americans to imagine themselves as a single people and the continent as their natural “home.” Drake’s handling of the ratification debates would have benefited, however, from more attention to the Confederation’s geopolitical situation. Revolutionaries may not have feared descending into an anarchic “political state of nature” when they severed “ties with Britain,” as Drake writes, because their continent seemed to have an inherent, natural “order” (155). But North America’s supposed advantages over Europe, where “natural subdivisions” gave rise to “numerous peoples” who were constantly at war, no longer seemed obvious as the Confederation began to collapse and the disunited states faced the prospect of a Europeanized future (34).

In *The Federalist*, Hamilton demolished the idea that republics were naturally peaceful, “the deceitful dream of a golden age,” and that a strong continental government was therefore not necessary.3 Americans needed what Hendrickson calls a “peace pact” to protect the “infant empire” from internal as well as external threats and to guarantee its as-

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3 Jacob E. Cooke (ed.), *The Federalist* (Middletown, Conn., 1961), no. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), 35.
Failing to fulfill nature’s promise, Federalists warned, the new nation would prove to be no nation at all.

Peter Onuf
University of Virginia


The overall aim of this edited volume is to employ a multidisciplinary or “holistic” approach to answer some of the lingering questions surrounding the sensational stories of survival, including cannibalism, associated with the Donner Party. The editors gathered a diverse group of experts—historical archaeologists; social, physical, and biological anthropologists; and historians—to provide a broad, comparative, social and material context with which to gain a new perspective on the people involved. The contributors draw their evidence from material culture discarded during the encampment, faunal remains, and written and oral histories. Much of what is known about the Donner Party rests on hearsay, rumors, and partial memories. Prior to archaeological research, much of the material remains were said to be removed from the camps by what the editors refer to as souvenir hunters and travelers. Thus, a good portion of the book confronts the well-known master narrative of what transpired within the Donner Party.

The book is divided into four sections; each section has its own theme. The contributors succeed in their intention to humanize the Donner Party, or at least to understand the experiences of, and choices made by, this group of pioneers comprised as it was of men, women, children, immigrants and natives—Catholics and Protestants, as well as members of the middle and laboring classes. The contributors view Victorian etiquette, mores, beliefs, and societal rules as deeply implicated in what happened to the Donner Party. They argue that this context, as well as the Industrial Revolution and the changing market economy, are necessary for a proper understanding of these people. To their credit, the contributors are able to demonstrate the relevance of these cultural trappings to the Party through attention to the material remains. Artifacts like tea cups and dinner plates that might have been found in countless homes across the United States reflect the Party’s typical middle-class domesticity.

Overall, the book is coherent and well written, with something to offer a diverse readership. It does not so much correct the standard legend of cannibalism as provide a broader context for it. The archaeological and historical research reveals the stresses and structures of the people

4 David Hendrickson, Peace Pact: The Lost World of the American Founding (Lawrence, 2003).
in the Donner Party as not far removed from those of Victorian society, helping to explicate their choices when they became stranded in the mountains. On the whole, the book is a great resource for comparative archaeological data, with much of interest about both material culture and theory.

Stephen Brighton
University of Maryland


Women’s movements in the United States have always been plagued by class tensions. As May’s new book vividly illustrates, campaigns for the rights of domestic workers most clearly highlight the conflicting goals and competing values among women. May’s book deftly depicts the contradictions faced by middle-class women who championed labor protections for factory workers but who resisted similar protections for women employed in their own homes. As a consequence, domestic workers were (and still are) largely left untouched by the twentieth century’s social “safety net.” “Women’s organizations’ ambivalence about state regulation of the middle-class home,” she says, “contributed to the failure to bring basic labor standards to domestic workers in the New Deal” (144).

Domestic work was the largest sector of women’s employment until World War II ended, employing large numbers of immigrants as well as African Americans. Middle-class women continually debated the “servant question,” but relatively few of them wanted to address the conditions of work in their own homes. The discussion of domestic service, May argues, turned the middle-class home “inside out” by converting the home into a workplace and threatening even the most intrepid women’s-rights reformers’ notions of what constituted the public (versus the private) realm. Mainstream women reformers, particularly during the early twentieth century, justified their claims to public participation on the basis of their special roles and duties as mothers. This “maternalism,” which informed significant social-policy initiatives even into the time of the New Deal, rested on a notion of the home as a “gendered private space rather than a workplace” (145). Thus, May contends, “allowing the government to regulate domestic service would challenge progressive women’s authority” to advocate for other female workers (145).

Certain Progressive Era reformers, most notably Florence Kellor, tried to address the plight of servants through government regulation. These efforts included the development of licensed employment agencies and domestic training programs, but significantly, they did not go
so far as to regulate conditions within servants’ actual workplace—the middle-class home. Most reform efforts aimed at transforming the behavior of domestics (combining housekeeping skills with deportment, bible classes, and grooming lessons) or the behavior of unscrupulous agents. Kellor pushed for public policies that would regulate employment agencies and mediate disputes among employers, domestics, and the agencies. Although such reforms aided some domestics, they did little to address the balance of power between employers and domestics, and they did nothing to regulate the hours, wages, and working conditions in middle-class homes. Like other Progressive reformers, May argues, Kellor cast the “servant problem” as one of “municipal management and urban reform rather than as a labor problem” (105).

One of the virtues of May’s work is her attempt to give as much voice to domestic workers themselves as to their middle-class employers. Though hindered by significant source limitations, May nonetheless points to important actions on the part of domestics to define their own reform agenda. Despite the fact that they were vulnerable to patronizing employers, the sexual advances of husbands, and unscrupulous employment and “training” agencies, domestic workers formed communities (often aided by new urban transportation systems and the growth of popular entertainments) and found ways to resist exploitation, either by simply quitting or, on occasion, organizing and lobbying for state-based protections. May argues that domestic workers sought, like workers in other industries, to shape and control the conditions of their employment.

Although the focus of May’s book is New York, this study addresses important questions in women’s and labor history, as well as issues in public policy, social reform, and the nature of the American welfare state. It suggests that the omission of domestic service from New Deal reforms had as much to do with the attitudes of middle-class women as with the racist politics of southern congressmen. Furthermore, May suggests that labor reform itself was limited by the reluctance of middle-class women (and men) to count domestic work as real labor.

Susan Levine
University of Illinois, Chicago


Legal scholars of all stripes have already hailed this book, published shortly after the author’s death in 2011. Like a bowler unleashing a strike, Stuntz takes dead aim at the center of conventional wisdom and proceeds to knock all its pins aside. He recounts the antebellum lynchings of some 300 white people (95), the success story of Prohibition (185–186), and the long-term negative effects of the Warren Court’s en-
enforcement of the Bill of Rights against the states (235–236). The problem that the work addresses is that “the criminal justice system is doing none of its jobs well: producing justice, avoiding discrimination, protecting those who most need the law’s protection, keeping crime in check while maintaining reasonable limits on criminal punishment” (2).

The author attributes this collapse to a series of developments in law, demography, and political structure during the last sixty years. In making his argument, he moves carefully through data collections, especially ones involving crime statistics and population trends abroad as well as at home, that too rarely appear in works of legal history. He writes, “Though most of this work is about the past and a few portions of it deal with empirical data, I am neither a historian nor an empirical social scientist as members of those guilds will quickly recognize” (9)—not because of any failure on his part to consult the relevant sources but because of what he does with his data. As a “historian,” he does not hesitate to seek lessons from the past for the present and future, and as an “empiricist,” he is willing “to draw unconfident conclusions based on incomplete evidence” rather than to narrow his temporal focus by making only such claims as high-quality data can prove (10).

This decision to paint in broad strokes both gives the book its iconoclastic strength and leaves it vulnerable to criticisms that the particular historical elements from which the argument is constructed are misleadingly portrayed. Tersely stated, the argument centers on two problems that the criminal justice system faced at the middle of the last century—on the one hand, the problem of government abuse and discrimination (disproportionately in the South) and, on the other hand, the increase in crime. As prior history had shown, the appropriate responses would have been to increase police presence on the streets and to use the court system to enforce substantive limits on criminal law in order to reduce the discretionary power of prosecutors. Those responses would have located the key decisions regarding culpability in the jury—which, being composed of local citizens subject to both the depredations of criminals and the abuses of officials, would have been the proper locus of power (302–304).

But the opposite happened. The courts focused on procedural rights, and legislators took advantage of this orientation to write more and more capacious criminal statutes, with two negative results. First, prosecutors’ legitimate exercise of discretion in bringing charges became so broad that discrimination is almost impossible to prevent ex ante (301). Second, because under such statutes almost every defendant is guilty of something, criminal cases today consist of a preliminary attack on procedural aspects of the prosecution’s case followed by a guilty plea (229;139, 302) rather than a jury trial. Meanwhile, changes in budgetary incentives have smoothed the way to increasing prison populations rather than police forces (253–255).

The solution, as envisioned in this book, lies in returning to the policy path that should have been taken six decades ago. It would in-
volve a series of fundamental legislative and judicial reforms, the effect of
which would be to locate all decisions regarding criminal law at the level
of the constituencies affected—for instance, jury trials for alleged crimi-
nals rather than plea bargains—and to institute fair and effective policing
practices that would minimize excessive, knee-jerk incarceration (283).
“Could all these changes happen? Yes. Will they happen? Probably not” (307). But all future debates about criminal-justice reform will be deeply
indebted to this book for its analysis of the situation.

Eric M. Freedman
Hofstra Law School

DDT and the American Century: Global Health, Environmental Politics, and
the Pesticide that Changed the World. By David Kinkela (Chapel Hill, Uni-

The chemical pesticide DDT is hardly new to environmental history. Born
of the mid-twentieth century and used as an insecticide to fight
malaria and to protect agriculture, DDT became infamous as one of the
antagonists in Rachel Carson bestseller Silent Spring (New York, 1962),
considered by many historians as the seminal event in popularizing ecol-
ogy and launching the American environmental movement. Indeed,
scholars such as Russell and Dunlap have explored the rise of DDT and its
eventual fall, the chemical finally banned domestically in the United
States in the early 1970s. 1 Like the work of these earlier scholars,
Kinkela’s new book recognizes that the story of DDT combines eco-
nomic, political, and social forces with science. Kinkela agrees that the
tale, though significant historically, hardly lends itself to easy interpreta-
tion or conclusion. The value of his book—and its point of departure
from earlier works—is that it places DDT in a broader context, adding
more about DDT’s international impact. In short, Kinkela injects some
diplomatic history into the already complex story, noting DDT’s impor-
tance, both practically and symbolically, for America’s standing in the
world. Although Kinkela is by no means a revisionist downplaying DDT’s
negative ecological ramifications, his more global perspective implies to
a greater degree the positive impact of DDT, suggesting that properly
controlled—and with the lessons of the past firmly in mind—DDT will
have at least some value in the future. In fact, it has been re-introduced
in Africa to control malaria.

DDT, KInkela argues, was an important part of America’s Cold War
efforts to promote prosperity and freedom. With an unbridled faith in
technological innovation, America embraced the “Green Revolution” (61),
which promoted science as key to improving crop yields in the

1 Edmund P. Russell, War and Nature: Fighting Humans and Insects with Chemicals from World
War I to Silent Spring (New York, 2001); Thomas Dunlap, DDT: Scientists, Citizens, and Public
Third World and even eradicating malaria. This faith that through a process of destruction and renewal, American science and technology promised a more prosperous future came to symbolize the United States and its role in the international postwar community. It defined what author Henry Luce labeled the “American Century.” The emergence of Carson and environmentalism, however, threw this dominant ethic into doubt. Although Carson did not dismiss the use of chemical pesticides per se, her criticism seemed to question American ideology and its standing in the Cold War. Her arguments simplified, Carson became a divisive figure as the momentum grew for the domestic ban. The ecological reality now dawning, the American-promoted Green Revolution had failed, and the American Century had ended.

Kinkela is at his best noting the complexity behind this apparent evolution. Readers, for example, will probably be surprised to find that America continued to sell DDT abroad even after the domestic ban, some questioning whether regulations for environmental impact statements applied internationally. That organizations both public and private reacted differently around the world is hardly surprising given the varying conditions. With widespread DDT use, mosquitoes eventually developed resistance and, in recent years, cases of malaria have rebounded, suggesting limits to DDT’s value. In the end, Kinkela’s story is detailed and well sourced while remaining a relatively accessible narrative. It is a welcome addition to the literature not only for scholars across many disciplines but also general readers.

J. Brooks Flippen
Southeastern Oklahoma State University


In 1994, Soares was amazed to discover a reference to the “Statutes of the Congregation of the Minas-Makii Blacks in Rio de Janeiro” (1786). Written by a congregant from the enslaved and subsequently freed Africans of the “Kingdom of Makii” (modern-day Benin), the nearly seventy-page document situated the group in Rio de Janeiro. Theretofore, slave populations in colonial Rio de Janeiro were believed to have been almost exclusively of Bantu origin. Thus began the research that culminated in this book.

The methodology is particularly interesting. Soares searched for traces of the Mina-Makii in every possible type of documentation. Within Africa, she investigated the slave trade on the Mina Coast and looked in vain for evidence of slaves exported to Rio de Janeiro in the seventeenth or eighteenth century. However, she managed to find slave baptism records for the Rio parish of the Se that listed slaves whose
mothers’ port of departure from Africa was Mina. Marriage and burial records and wills also yielded slaves and ex-slaves identified as Mina. Soares also found documents indicating that by 1740, at least four established lay Catholic brotherhoods existed among the Mina blacks in Rio. She surmised that membership in a brotherhood was the principal route to social prominence for African slaves or ex-slaves. Hence, brotherhoods became the focus of her research.

A central concept in this work is *provenience*, which refers to places or social groups from which African people were taken as slaves; “provenience” is an attribute of identity. Soares investigated how the Mina constructed their group experience in a state of captivity, using provenience as an anchor. The analysis also centers on social groups (brotherhoods) that reflect the deliberate choice of Mina to be associated with others of similar origin (thus differentiating her approach from that of Rodriguez, Bastide, or Herskovits).

In the second half of the book, Soares combines the search for Mina with an urban history of Rio de Janeiro during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. She pays particular attention to the numerous chapels connected to small black brotherhoods in the urban periphery. Although never more than 10 percent of the slave population in Rio, the Mina-Makii had a strong presence. Church burial records surprisingly indicate that about half of the Mina burials were women. Since about two-thirds of imported slaves were male, women apparently had a special prominence in the urban black churches. Wills from the Mina demonstrate that many women were remarkably successful in accumulating property and active in promoting the brotherhoods. Black lay brotherhoods in Rio de Janeiro engaged in elaborate festivals, processions, and funerals; the election of kings and queens; and the organization of royal courts. This book about a minor group of slaves and ex-slaves provides considerable insight into the social organization and customs of slaves in the colonial city.

Elizabeth Kuznesof
University of Kansas

*Diseased Relations: Epidemics, Public Health, and State-Building in Yucatán, Mexico, 1847–1924.* By Heather McCrea (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 2011) 288 pp. $27.95

In this study of the history of public-health campaigns in Yucatan, Mexico, McCrea provides the historical background for an understanding of the limitations that physicians and health-department officials faced while confronting a series of “disease moments” in the nineteenth and

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The focus is on epidemics of smallpox, cholera, and yellow fever from the 1840s to 1924, the year in which the socialist government of the state was overthrown and public-health policies connected to political mobilization were abandoned.

McCrae positions her study within the historiography of Mexico and of public health, comparing and contrasting Yucatan with other well-studied places, such as Hamburg, New York City, and Mexico City. She does not claim to be a historian of science, although she emphasizes that medical science was for a long time confused and contradictory regarding the etiology of disease. The book therefore is not truly interdisciplinary in nature but falls squarely within the regional Mexican historiographical tradition.

The most important theme of the book is that public health was not simply a matter of the government trying to save lives. In Mexico, as elsewhere, modern medicine was seen by elites as a means of advancing civilization and eliminating “barbarism”—in this case, a struggle to impose Western culture on an indigenous people who had every reason to distrust their traditional ruling class, even in matters of health. The elitist public-health campaigns frequently sought to save the upper class first by concentrating resources on Mérida, the state capital. Medical efforts declined with distance from the capital. Failures were often blamed not just on political instability—especially on the effects of the civil war referred to as the Caste War—but also on the ignorance and backwardness of the Maya. McCrae demonstrates that the yellow-fever campaign succeeded because it was implemented by a socialist government willing to mobilize the masses and to collaborate with the Rockefeller Foundation.

Unfortunately, the first half of the book is based on a weak documentary base since the archives apparently did not yield a great deal of information about most of the nineteenth century. McCrea therefore fills out the first several chapters with extended summaries of the Caste War, the Church–state conflict, the henequen boom, and public health in Mexico as a whole. She was better able to study yellow fever, the last disease addressed, because of the extensive archival holdings of both the Rockefeller Foundation and the state government.

The book inadvertently demonstrates that vague statistics are not useful. A table purporting to reveal the discrimination that certain areas faced with respect to the distribution of smallpox vaccine is spurious because the data do not distinguish between cities and the political districts containing those cities (27). An analogy would be the failure to specify whether a certain set of statistics pertained to New York City or New York State. McCrae also makes mistakes about Mexico that are extremely disconcerting: for example, that Coahuila is a state in central Mexico and that Carmen (a town and capital of a political district in Campeche) is in Quintana Roo (24, 78–79). In addition, she betrays a lack of understanding of Hispanic culture by frequently using the maternal rather than the paternal surname of historical personages and authors. The accumulation of errors (such as accidentally referring to Salvador
Alvarado as Salvador Allende) undermines the overall value of the book (242).

Robert W. Patch
University of California, Riverside


Armus has written a fascinating story about the ways by which people tried to deal with tuberculosis in Argentina from 1870 to 1950. He is adamantely modest about what he covers in the book: “I seek to provide . . . a record of the images, implications, and concrete experiences that were the stuff of a subculture which . . . gave tuberculosis its meaning and defined its role. . . . [and became] a way of speaking not only about biomedical issues but also about other matters.” Thus, he sees the book as simply portraying how porteños experienced and thought about tuberculosis (tb), but it is much more. Well steeped in the international literature about the history of tb and aware that it rarely appears in cities and countries beyond Europe and North America, he claims to make no direct comparisons, but he can hardly avoid it. Similarly, he eschews many theoretical interpretations, preferring the evidence to speak for itself, but, again, he protests too much.

Armus skillfully reveals the complex social milieu of Buenos Aires at a time when doctors reveled in notions of eugenics and contagion and the hopes of cures, while everyday people struggled to deal with illness informed by notions of race and gender, bewildered by the new world of advertisements that promised cures. In the first three chapters, he focuses on documents that explain how those who had the disease coped with informal as well as institutional approaches to treatment at a time when cures were uncertain, and no one understood how to prevent the disease from infecting others. Armus refuses to interpret these documents himself, even though the selection of cases implicitly involves value judgments on his part.

Chapter 4 deals with public policies and the quest of public-health physicians to guarantee a healthy city in the midst of massive European immigration and internal migration. Chapter 5 focuses on the prejudices based on the fear of contagion and the eugenic desire to promote the ideal family. Gendered differences in the experiences of patients, as well as the effect of immigration and the desire to raise healthy children, frame the next four chapters.

Whereas public-health physicians, eugenicists, and politicians tended to blame both the poor and the tenement houses (conventillos) for the increased incidence of tuberculosis, Armus shows that statistics prove no such correlations. Indeed, tuberculosis was an indiscriminate attacker
of urban inhabitants, and the tremendous growth of the urban population and the general expansion of Buenos Aires contributed to its ability to attack individuals. Furthermore, people tended to resist the kinds of public-health campaigns designed to limit the spread of contagious diseases, such as the prohibition of spitting in the subways and on the streets, the formulation of strict guidelines to care for infants and young children, and efforts to separate families from ill loved ones. These stories are poignant and resonate today regarding the efficacy of behavior modification for contagious diseases.

This work is rich in personal anecdotes and depth of field, showing the resonance of disease in music, theater, poetry, and sports. Although not a book for those unacquainted with the history of Buenos Aires, it is most welcome for those interested in the social history of disease, and specialists in the history of Argentina.

Donna J. Guy
Ohio State University

**The Spirits and the Law: Vodou and Power in Haiti.** By Kate Ramsey (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2011) 425 pp. $45.00

Anthropological studies of Haitian popular religion are legion, but few of them deal with its history other than to claim for it an important role in the revolution of 1791 to 1804, which ended slavery and made Haiti the Americas’ second independent state. This impressive book provides an ethnologically informed history of Vodou with a particular focus on the politics of law. In four chapters of increasing length, Ramsey deals with the colonial and revolutionary periods, the nineteenth century, the U.S. occupation from 1915 to 1934, and the debates of the following decade surrounding an emergent cultural nationalism. Ramsey’s central problem is to explain why the state only intermittently enforced the laws that criminalized popular ritual practices from colonial times until the 1987 constitution. The plasticity of the term *vaoudou* and the vague wording of the laws, which failed to distinguish sorcery from familial and communal religious practice, provide much of the answer. The likelihood that state agents at the local level participated in such practices was another factor, as was the incorporation of elements of Catholicism into Vodou.

The first, briefest chapter is a solid and judicious overview of magico-religious practices during the period of slavery. Relying on printed, mainly secondary, sources, Ramsey surveys the development of legal prohibitions and the controversy regarding Vodou and the Haitian Revolution. The focus is political rather than cultural. In the post-independence period, the state continued to fear the subversive potential of popular religion and perhaps the detrimental influence of its celebrations on agricultural productivity, but new motives also inflected its
criminalization. Although denigration of popular culture underpinned the new elite’s claim to power and its exploitation of the masses, the sensitivity of this elite to foreign opinion reinforced the state’s desire to condemn “barbarous” practices that increasingly shaped Haiti’s international image. Ramsey stresses that such restrictions often had broad popular support when they targeted sorcery or, as in the notorious Bizoton case of 1864, reputed anthropophagy. Yet most of the major campaigns against popular religion were spearheaded by foreigners—the French-dominated Catholic Church or the American occupying forces.

The two twentieth-century chapters, which draw on various archives and Ramsey’s oral interviews, are the most deeply researched and original. Ramsey highlights the American military’s discursive use of “voodooism” in justifying at different levels its actions in Haiti and in depicting the varied ways in which Haitians responded. The book climaxes with the development of the black-nationalist indigenist movement of the 1920s and 1930s and the state’s diverse reaction to it, which included more precisely worded legal prohibitions, the last of the drum-burning anti-superstition campaigns, and official efforts to package popular religion as folklore. These years also saw an upsurge in U.S. anthropological interest in Haiti, as well as the appearance of the “zombi flick.” An epilogue briefly extends the narrative into the era of the Duvalier governments.

This richly detailed and sophisticated study, supported by 150 pages of notes, extends the work of Hurbon and makes an original argument about the interaction of law, culture, and development.¹

David Geggus
University of Florida


The marked interdisciplinary flavor of this innovative and important book makes it particularly appropriate for engagement by readers of this journal. Landau’s research design focuses on intensive scrutiny of the origins of southern African languages and political alliances, using mission records, early travelers’ accounts, and correspondence, as well as oral traditions and interviews and archeological evidence. He deploys research techniques from history, historical linguistics, and religious and mission studies. By centering on the southern highveld (South Africa, Lesotho, and Botswana) and the Moroka clan in particular, Landau is able to use his Setswana language skills to draw wide comparative lessons. European missionaries from the early nineteenth century onward encountered people who had joined together politically despite their differing ancestry. Analysis of names strongly suggests “tribal” words were, in fact, situ-

¹ See, for example, Laënnec Hurbon, *Le Barbare imaginaire* (Paris, 1988).
national indicators of political affiliation, intimating even wider patterns of amalgamation.

In six concise yet amply sourced chapters, Landau traces the “birth of the political” from 1400 through the onset of apartheid. He begins with “eyewitness engagements” seen through political discourses of the 1800s before visiting earlier centuries to trace the “history before tribes” via the evidence of alliances and finally undertaking an analysis of the role of translation. Three chapters then follow the Morokas and others from independent reign to colonial subjection and thence to the twentieth-century formation of “tribes.”

Landau’s flair for intellectual and religious history and historical linguistics has long been apparent, but this book is far more ambitious in its interdisciplinary and longue durée scope. Previous attempts at unraveling the complex meaning of precolonial terminology of identity have often been at the expense of simplicity. This book, however, makes clear how Bantu language speakers indicated such identity. Drawing on prior research by Vansina, Ranger, and others, Landau re-asserts African agency by highlighting the resilience of their political cultures and their adeptness at incorporating diverse peoples.

The effect of Landau’s approach is persuasive, and his conclusions are startling. Africans across the sub-continent already had amalgamated before arrival of missionaries. “Tribes” did not exist in the precolonial era; missionaries invented them. Politics made ethnicity, not vice versa (41). Africans were tribalized, not de-tribalized, in missions as they faced loss of power, land, and livelihood, weakening an earlier matrix of hybridity that was more integrating of outsiders. Landau also questions the obligatory attribution of religiosity to past polities by archeologists, historians, and anthropologists. He stresses shared influences across large spaces and prioritizes partnerships over centrifugal forces. His rethinking of ritual vis-à-vis rational behavior is refreshing, opening new pathways for the exploration of African secularism, or at least the relationship between secularity and ritual.

Landau’s conclusion that “hybridity lay at the core” of African “subcontinental political traditions” and his emphasis on the resilience of alliances that re-appeared in different forms raise interesting questions (xi). What were the attitudes and other forms of political, intellectual, and social consciousness and organizational structure in precolonial times and what respective weight should we place on continuity or change? Less satisfying in Landau’s broad treatment of territory and time

is the relatively scant attention paid to disjuncture. For twentieth-century politics, Landau focuses on the Samuelites (supporters of deposed chief Samuel Moroka), with some attention to other influential political movements. But closer consideration of the intersection of politics with religion would have been instructive. Moreover, the tight regional focus begs the question of what was happening elsewhere. The argument that the old traditions of alliance never died is convincing, but there were new external and internal forces at play.

Nonetheless, this book is a breakthrough in African historiography with wide comparative value; its re-conceptualizing of changing organizations, discourses, and likely intellectual histories will force scholars to rethink great swathes of history. Landau shows that the critical analysis and imaginative use of historical sources, together with a close attention to language, can resolve seemingly intractable historical problems.

Peter Limb
Michigan State University


Mustafa Kemal, later M. Kemal Ataturk, became a surprisingly consummate nation-builder as he rescued the remnants of the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia and Eastern Thrace from destruction and dismemberment. His efforts enabled the resurrection of the Turkish state and the restoration of Turkish society after the losses and disgrace of the Balkan Wars and World War I. Many authors have explored Turkey’s rise from the ashes of empire; this book by Hanioglu is among the very best examinations of Ataturk and the Turkish founding period in English.

Other scholars have looked at Ataturk’s psychodynamics or at the details of his accomplishments. Many of them have indulged in hagiography. Among the numerous virtues of Hanioglu’s clear-eyed dissection of the Ataturkian legend is its refusal to regard Mustafa Kemal as wholly exceptional. Although Hanioglu wisely appreciates everything that Ataturk did to set Turkey on its modern course, he is less overwhelmed than earlier writers by the sheer glamour and domineering qualities of the man, the leader, and the lawgiver. Hanioglu understands better than most of his scholarly predecessors the deep Ottoman and European origins of many of Ataturk’s revolutionary ideas and ideals. He sets the making of Ataturk firmly in the Balkan ferment of Salonica, where Ataturk lived and was schooled, and in Macedonian cities like Montasir (modern Bitola), where he was a military cadet. Ataturk was not alone among young Turks and young officers in wanting to be Western. But he was rare in biding his time, soldiering on the periphery of empire, and avoiding the German involvement that ensnared so many of the official Young Turk movement before and during World War I.
The Gallipoli campaign in 1915 was Atatürk’s unexpected triumph. As Hanioglu reports, the young Col. Kemal was distinctive in being able to convert his defense of the Dardenelles, and his protection of the motherland against superior Entente forces, into a catapult to national notice and prominence.Later Kemal was successful on the eastern and Mesopotamian fronts, skillfully seizing control of the embryonic Turkish national movement in Anatolia after the Armistice of Mudros in 1918. Hanioglu shows how Atatürk maneuvered himself and others to achieve dominance and finally realized that he could in fact become the legitimate “savior” of the Turkish people. “The key to Atatürk’s success,” reports Hanioglu, was not the “originality of his ideas but . . . the singularity of the opportunity he seized” (228).

This is hardly an interdisciplinary study. Nor does it break new methodological ground. But it is more than a narrative. Hanioglu weaves the intellectual strands of Atatürk and Turkish nationalism into a convincing fabric that is less biography than explanation. Hanioglu rightly emphasizes Atatürk’s “scientism” and his determination to force the triumph of reason over religion. Atatürk was a civilizer and a social engineer who believed that Ottomans and Turks had long been held back by Islam—an Arab faith and “a vehicle for Arab domination” (132)—by clerics, by the caliphate, by Eastern rather than Western headgear and garments, by a serious lack of education, and by a religiously inspired narrowness. Atatürk was among the twentieth century’s most dramatic modernizers and micromanagers. Hanioglu suggests that Atatürk reformed Turkish society but, paradoxically, that his reforms did little for the masses; Atatürk’s reforms, Hanioglu says, hardly penetrated below the level of the elite (222).

Previous biographies may have showed us how Kemal became Atatürk, but Hanioglu tells us much more about the forces that shaped him and his powerful ideas. Yet, there is little in this book, or in others, about how Atatürk exercised mastery over his compatriots. A full study of Atatürk’s leadership abilities and quality would be welcome.

—R. I. R.


One of the toughest nuts to crack for students of women and gender in the Middle East is whether or not to describe a modern policy or movement as “feminist.” Could a state effort at improving women’s literacy be inspired by genuine feminist commitment to sexual equality? Sure. Could it also be a half-measure, cynically designed to co-opt an equal-rights feminist agenda? Of course. In short, a confident assessment of continuity and change in cultural attitudes toward gender has been
elusive—especially in the case of modern Iranian society. In 1995, Parvin Paidar asserted that there was no essential difference between the misogyny of leftists, nationalists, and Islamists. How can a society commit to both the forced unveiling of women (from 1936 to 1941) and forced veiling of women (since 1979) under the general rubric of women’s progress?

Kashani-Sabet brings three important contributions to the problem. First, her analysis is carefully rooted in a superb review and synthesis of scholarly literature through 2010. Second, she incorporates two important cultural primary sources. Her analysis of late nineteenth-century treatises on public health illustrates how their concerns helped to set the framework for discussions of “the woman question” in the twentieth-century popular press and in policy circles. Her skillful selection of images from the press fully displays the cultural divide between Pahlavi Iran and Islamic Republican Iran, as well as the key continuities in their maternalist discourse. Indeed, Kashani-Sabet’s transposition of “maternalism” from the Western to the Iranian context is her third contribution, providing explanatory coherence to the good, the bad, and the ugly aspects of Iran’s experience of feminism.

Maternalists, in Kashani-Sabet’s analysis, “did not at all wish to establish gender equality or to combat patriarchy. . . . [Maternalist] priorities for Iranian policy makers mattered because they advanced the state’s political ideology (5).” Framing the analysis this way occasionally causes Kashani-Sabet to elide the mix of feminist and maternalist ideas that a society or individual may have at any given historical moment. This drawback is apparent in her discussion of women’s suffrage from the 1940s to the 1960s. But the sources themselves do not disclose the full extent of an individual’s commitment to maternalism or feminism, partly because maternalism does not exist as a formal ideology separate from other intellectual and political commitments. One context that shows the viability of Kashani-Sabet’s thesis about Iranian maternalism, however, is the constitution of the Islamic Republic—notably, Articles 20 and 21.¹ Though it is not the focus of her study, Kashani-Sabet’s analysis of Iranian maternalism reveals these articles less as shallow window dressing than as an Islamist expression of maternalism.

The Islamist strand of maternalism that now forms part of the legitimacy of today’s Islamic Republic was not in evidence before 1940. It has

¹ Article 20: “All citizens of the country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection of the law and enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, in conformity with Islamic criteria.” Article 21: “The government must ensure the rights of women in all respects, in conformity with Islamic criteria, and accomplish the following goals: (1) Create a favorable environment for the growth of woman’s personality and the restoration of her rights, both the material and intellectual; (2) protect mothers, particularly during pregnancy and childbirth, and children without guardians; (3) establish competent courts to protect and preserve the family; (4) provide special insurance for widows, aged women, and women without support; and (5) award the guardianship of children to worthy mothers in order to protect the interests of the children in the absence of a legal guardian.
stretched over time to allow for some important women’s rights (partic-
ularly, suffrage) without ever approaching a feminism of equal rights.
Yet, as the epilogue of the book notes, the One Million Signatures
Campaign of 2006 and the Green Movement of 2009 show that an Ira-
nian Islamist equal-rights feminism has, in fact, emerged in opposition to
a maternalist Islamic Republic. Thus, with this more complete picture,
Khashani-Sabet’s book is able to recount the historical changes in cultural
attitudes about gender in modern Iran more definitively.

Camron Michael Amin
University of Michigan, Dearborn

Colonialism and Christianity in Mandate Palestine. By Laura Robson (Aus-
tin, University of Texas Press, 2011) 239 pp. $55.00

As Islamist politics continues to assume greater prominence throughout
the Middle East, the sectarian diversity of the area’s Arab peoples is fre-
quently overlooked. The work under review constitutes an important
intervention in a modest but growing literature that seeks to document
the modern experience of Arab Christians, and, broadly, how both the
Ottoman Empire and Western colonial powers influenced the develop-
ment of sectarian identities in the Middle East during the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.

Robson’s focus is the Palestine Mandate, namely, the British colo-
nial authority that governed Palestine during the interwar period and
was ostensibly intended to facilitate the rise of democratic self-govern-
ment in the area. In fact, as Robson seeks to demonstrate, the Mandate
authorities consciously fostered sectarian institutions within Palestine
that would undermine efforts to develop an Arab Palestinian polity. By
preventing solidarities that might extend across sectarian lines, the Brit-
ish made themselves, to their thinking, indispensable mediators of en-
demic conflict among Muslims, Christians, and Jews.

What makes this work so valuable is the skill with which Robson
demonstrates that the sectarian spirit of the governing institutions devel-
oped by the British was, in fact, a departure from past practice in the
area. Similar to recent Indian historiography with reference to British
rule in the subcontinent, Robson establishes that British “respect” for
sectarian divisions was not so much a “concession to native sensibilities”
as an “invented tradition” that was deployed in an effort to divide and
rule. Hence, British support for such institutions as the Supreme Muslim
Council and such positions as the Grand Mufti of Palestine tended not
so much to preserve a purported “delicate sectarian balance” as to create
and exacerbate sectarian tensions.

However, as Robson importantly illustrates, sectarianism was not
simply a colonial imposition on Palestine. Rather, Palestinian Christians
reckoned with the state-supported Supreme Muslim Council by devel-
oping distinctly Christian movements that had no precedent in the area. Indeed, the book chronicles the rise and struggles of the Arab Orthodox movement, which sought to wrest control of the Greek Orthodox patriarchate from Greek nationals and deliver it into Arab hands, as well as Christian efforts to secure greater representation on municipal councils.

Both English- and Arabic-language sources contribute to the development of a nuanced portrait of the rise of sectarian politics under the Palestine Mandate. As one would expect, the papers of the Mandate authorities play a vital role in constructing this portrait, but Robson extends her purview well beyond the British National Archives to include such newspapers as *Filastin* and *Al-Karmil*, as well as the writings of such Palestinian Christians as Khalil al-Sakakini and ‘Izzat Tannus.

Robson’s approach to sources, though meticulous, is excessively cautious: Her announced concern is as much with cultural as it is with political developments, but the text is overwhelmingly concerned with detailed political narrative. What might Robson have made of her sources had she adopted an anthropological sensibility in examining them and extended her focus beyond the machinations of the Arab Christian elite? Yet, of greater concern is the puzzling absence among her references of two pivotal dissertations, intimately linked to her topic—Campos’ “A ‘Shared Homeland’ and Its Boundaries” and Roberts’ “Rethinking the Status Quo.”

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Paul Sedra
Simon Fraser University


For many years, one of the biggest questions mulled over by economic historians has been why Europe rather than Asia first came to dominate the global economy. The bulk of the ruminations on this issue have focused on the superiority of early modern European, and especially British, institutions, whether they be legal arrangements that protected individual property rights, a more enlightened and rationalistic belief system that emerged from the Protestant Reformation, a marriage and kinship structure that delayed fertility, or some other structural arrangements that, theoretically, furthered economic development in the West but had no equivalent in other societies around the globe.

During the past decade or so, the “California school” of East Asian historians, particularly Pomeranz, has changed the terms of the debate.

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Rejecting the notion of a stagnant, traditionalist Asia, they have pointed out the vibrancy of the pre-nineteenth-century Chinese economy and the relatively similar levels of consumption between its most developed regions and their counterparts in Western Europe. The “great divergence,” as Pomeranz has termed it, occurred later, during industrialization. It is best studied by looking not only at what blocked Asia from following in Europe’s footsteps but also at why Europe deviated from successful methods of production pioneered in Asia.\(^1\) Parthasarathi’s intelligent new book continues in the same vein but focuses primarily on the divergence between Britain and India from the 1600s, when India enjoyed considerable prosperity, to the early nineteenth century, when the subcontinent’s economy failed to grow.

Parthasarathi argues that, as happened in China, the silver that entered India as payment for its manufactures, principally cotton textiles, placed it in an enviable position throughout most of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Indian property rights, the caste system, and birthrates have been erroneously cast as major barriers to economic growth during this period. Rather than obsessing about the cultural differences between India and Europe, Parthasarathi directs attention to the economic problems in Britain—namely, competition from Indian cottons and deforestation—that led ultimately to the adoption of new processes. Britain’s first response to the threat that calico posed to its light-weight woolens was to ban it for domestic consumption, hardly a forward-thinking or proto-Smithean reaction. Only much later in the century did mechanical innovation in spinning result in the production of a rival cotton cloth. Parthasarathi notes that textile manufacturers in the Ottoman Empire also faced the problem of Indian calicos flooding their markets, but its government did not act against the commodity’s invasion as Britain’s and France’s did. The substitution of coal for wood also benefited from government intervention, eventually playing a role in industrial development that few foresaw initially. Because India had no energy crisis and was in the cat’s seat so far as textile sales were concerned, it had no incentives to follow the path of the British. The change in India’s circumstances came after 1780 when the East India Company and then the imperial authorities began to tighten their grip on the Indian economy, and the British cotton mills began taking market share from their weaving establishments.

Using the research of other economists and historians as well as his own, Parthasarathi contends that Indian technology did not stand still during the early modern period; nor did Indians ignore scientific information from Europe. Indian princes sponsored research and established libraries at their courts, and artisans adopted new industries, including the building of ships for the East India Company. British imperial policy,

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however, worked against these efforts. In his last chapter, Parthasarathi documents this thwarting of Indian manufacturing.

This book contributes significantly to the project of de-traditionalizing the Asian economy of the early modern period by demonstrating the strength of Indian manufacturing in the global economy and the inadequacies of theories about institutional barriers to development. It also raises questions about the direct role of the government and military in the so-called European miracle of economic growth. The point at which Parthasarathi’s argument seems most vulnerable is in its failure to confront how Western European dominance in oceanic trade, and consequently its ability to set many of the terms of that trade, represented a problem for Asian economic development, regardless of how superior its manufactures might have been. Parthasarathi offers fragmentary evidence on the proportion of the population engaged in non-agricultural activities and on the rise of a shipbuilding industry (70), but India appears not to have possessed a maritime sector at all comparable to that of early modern Western Europe.

Carole Shammas
University of Southern California

Empire’s Garden: Assam and the Making of India. By Jayeeta Sharma (Durham, Duke University Press, 2011), 324 pp. $94.95 cloth $24.95 paper

In this path-breaking study, Sharma traces the transformation of Assam during the colonial era from “jungle” to “garden,” and from a remote backwater to a lively participant in a modern India. Since Assam is almost never included in the larger histories of India, this careful and thoughtful study is especially welcome. Sharma imaginatively integrates the growth of the plantation economy with the growth of a distinctive modern culture. Indeed, she argues, Assam’s distinctive identity cannot be separated from the tea industry; the colonial economy effectively dictated the path of cultural development in the province.

The first three chapters, collectively entitled “Making a Garden,” provide the reader with a succinct and compelling account of the rise of tea in Assam from the 1850s, and why it took the shape that it did, on British-owned plantations staffed with Bengali clerks and migrant laborers recruited as “coolies” from distant Central India. Local Assamese elites, initially educated in Calcutta, though reluctant to submit to the regimen of the plantation, nevertheless applauded the industry as “the model for Assam’s progress” (48).

At the heart of Sharma’s account is the struggle of the province’s newly educated class to exclude immigrant “coolies” and local hill people alike from an emergent Assamese identity, as well as to shake off the dominance of Bengalis who saw the Assamese as uncultivated rustics. This concerted effort incorporated late Victorian racial theory to argue
that high-caste Assamese were, in fact, ancient Aryan settlers, and, as such, heirs to the larger Hindu culture of northern India. The indigenous hill peoples by contrast were racially “Mongoloid” (198). To bulwark their claims, these elites insisted that because the Asomiya language had emerged directly from Sanskrit, it was not a local dialect of Bengali. As a result, as Sharma points out, much of Assamese cultural activity was directed toward the revitalization of Asomiya as a literary language, with the aim of securing a “higher status” for the language and its speakers (173).

Despite the distinctive path to modernity produced by Assam’s isolation, and the overwhelming presence of the tea industry, much of the story that Sharma recounts is a familiar one. As in other regions, including Bengal itself, Christian missionaries played a critical role in sparking the creation of an educated elite. When educated converts were not forthcoming, they shifted their activities to the tribal people of the remote hill areas, where sizable Christian communities exist to the present. Subsequently, a “new Assamese public” gradually took shape; its publicists “wrote and imagined into existence a new Assam.” As elsewhere, their instruments were the “voluntary associations, clubs, public meetings, petitions and pamphlets” of the modern print culture (147–148). Over time, into the twentieth century, previously marginalized lower castes and tribal communities began to secure education and set out to contest the predominance of the high castes and their “Hindu narrative of racial preeminence and superior entitlement” (207).

The end result was an Assam of “contesting publics,” as Sharma entitles her final chapter, riven, even in the postcolonial era, by enduring tensions. Empire’s Garden provides a rich set of reflections on regions, regionalism, and the growth of nationalism in the modern world.

Thomas R. Metcalf
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