
This collection of nine chapters, most of which were published within the last fifteen years, closes with a personal account of how the author’s encounter with German sociologist Norbert Elias determined his intellectual trajectory. Spierenburg has elaborated Elias’ “Theory of the Civilizing Process” in half a dozen books, and the chapters in this book are no departure from that body of work.¹

The introduction emphasizes the importance of studying the relationships between those accused of crimes and their victims, as well as the motivations that lay behind the transgressions. Sex and what Spierenberg calls the gendered body are at the heart of these relations. The male “gender” originally assumed a more active behavior than the female gender, but eventually male honor became subject to a process of spiritualization (by which Spierenberg means that men began to show greater restraint), first in the upper classes and then more broadly across society, until the violent elements inhabited marginal islands of unrest. This process was spurred by the monopolization of force by the state. Spierenburg is not interested in family violence or infanticide, which should comprise a separate category, akin to victims of war. We should construct murder rates with and without the killing of infants.

A chapter about long-term homicidal trends in Amsterdam notes the paradox of how the rate of prosecuted murder tended to remain constant at 1/100,000 from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century. To follow the real decline of violence more accurately, the author uses a register of body inspections, distinguishing homicides from accidents or suicides. Homicide victimization rates (exclusive of infanticide) fell from 47/100,000 in the fifteenth century, to about 23/100,000 in the late sixteenth century, to merely 5 or 6 in the 1670s. After a spike around 1700, the rates continued to decline, reaching their nadir at 1 or 1.5 in the Napoleonic era. The present rate for Amsterdam is several times higher today, concentrated in these “unpacified islands,” but overall, Dutch homicide rates have remained at the Napoleonic level.

Another chapter about homicide and the law in the Dutch Republic examines the phenomenon of impulsive honor-motivated knife fights. People were hesitant to intervene in “fair” fights, often helping the culprits to escape justice, whereas they showed no reluctance to identify thieves. Dutch elites, however, took dim view of these fights and the values behind them. Spierenberg claims that killers who were apprehended faced almost certain execution, but the book says nothing about rates of capital execution before the nineteenth century.

The most recent chapter comes close to admitting that killing and

wounding are universal, common to all known societies. The circumstances of these acts are “embedded” in specific cultures and vary over time. Elias’ theory of civilization helps us to understand the spiritualization of honor, which is “related to” processes of state formation. Spierenberg contrasts Europe, where rates of violence declined most quickly, with the United States, where rates remained stubbornly high in the honor-bound South or the ungoverned West. An ideology extolling self-help and the right to bear arms would naturally have higher rates of violence as a corollary. A quick survey of Asian states claims that China, Japan, and India underwent changes in attitudes toward the body similar to those in Europe, whereas in Indonesia and the Philippines, the macho type of male honor still holds sway.

A fourth chapter compares Elias’ grand narratives of how punishment evolved with that of Foucault. Foucault centered the disciplinary process on the late eighteenth century, when the school, the army, and the factory forced subjects to “internalize” docility and bodily control. Elias extends the same processes over several centuries. Both scholars saw power working from the bottom up as well as the top down. Social historians familiar with their works have been right to be skeptical of their models, since they rely heavily on literary sources. Foucault in particular never systematically studied the records of the institutions (hospitals, prisons, and armies) that he chronicled.

The following chapter examines the various representatives of social control in European society, which ranged from parishes and consistories to guilds and neighborhood organizations. Members of these institutions enjoyed their right of interference into the lives of others. These ties of familiarity were thought to dissipate after 1800, but Spierenberg sees a more decisive moment after World War II, when industrial paternalism and informal social control ceded to geographical mobility and immigration. Yet, the scale of formal control has greatly increased.

Spierenburg examines capital punishment in the sixth chapter, but he does not discuss its declining frequency before the nineteenth century. He dates the advent of the state-sponsored religious interventions that sought to make the ceremony a morality play from the early sixteenth century. This early process of elevating the status of prisoners quickened in the nineteenth century, concurrent with the decline of capital punishment. Nonetheless, rates of incarceration soared, and today they remain exceedingly high.

The final chapters move the focus more to social co-existence. One chapter examines standards of etiquette in the Netherlands, a topic that Elias covered decades ago. New codes of conduct descended the social ladder even though they originated as signs of distinction among the elite; those lower on the social scale adopted them out of the same con-

cern for social ranking. French manners finally seduced them, and peaceful Dutch patricians morphed into French-speaking aristocrats.

These disparate chapters express an academic worldview that was dominant c. 1970. Spierenburg’s discussion of male honor and the body is drawn principally from literary sources and such theoreticians as Elias, Foucault, Peter Burke, and Carlo Ginzburg. Only once in his new material does he seem to acknowledge that human universals exist, only to retreat quickly into nebulous processes of social influence. Spierenberg’s is a world without psychology, without hormones, without a sense of the social behavior of other animal species. He has closed his eyes to the revolution in the behavioral sciences that has transpired during the last forty years. He would do well to consult the relational universe of primates in, say, the studies of de Waal, also from the Netherlands, for a less abstract account of the origin and evolution of human violence.3

Gregory Hanlon
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At the beginning of Conquest, Day claims that the “central argument” of his book is that “a more complete and useful understanding of our world” can be gained by adopting the concept of what he calls “supplanting societies.” This concept, he avers, will reveal that the “history of most societies can best be understood when they are seen as part of never-ending struggle, in a world of shifting boundaries, to make particular territories their own.” It is a intriguing idea. Sadly, however, he offers no further explanation as to what his newly minted term actually means, or what it is intended to supplant.

The book’s eleven chapters offer instances of the means by which “supplanting” was achieved in a large number of widely different cultures and societies from Japan to Denmark, from Anatolia to Australia. Conquering, he makes clear, was by no means a European prerogative. His material ranges over every kind of occupation, from settler colonies (the British in North America and Australia) to mestizo societies (the Spanish in Central and South America) to offshore “factories” leased from indigenous rulers (the Portuguese in parts of Africa and India) to the kind of indirect rule exercised by the British in India and just about every European power in nineteenth-century Africa. Not all of these conquerors were, by any means, equally devoted to “supplanting,” and although the term “supplanting society” crops up from time to through-out the book, it is not accompanied by anything that might count as an

3 See, for example, Frans de Waal, The Bonobo and the Atheist: In Search of Humanism among the Primates (New York, 2013); idem, The Age of Empathy: Nature’s Lessons for a Kinder Society (New York, 2010).
argument—a serious omission for any work trying to unite in 237 brief pages what amounts to the collective political experience of all mankind since 1519.

What Day provides instead is a mass of intriguing and fascinating detail covering many of the more salient aspects of the colonizing (or supplanting) process, from the use of maps—one of the most successful chapters in the book—to the deployment of foundation myths and what he calls, unfortunately, “The Genocidal Imperative.” Each chapter is a separate essay, briskly written and easy to read, but none, except the last, comes to any specific conclusion. Furthermore, most of the chapters skate around, or simply omit altogether, the intellectually more complex aspects of their ostensible subjects. Chapter 1, “Staking a Legal Claim,” despite its title, contains no discussion of the law. Instead, it recounts a number of entertaining, if familiar, anecdotes about what Jonathan Swift called bitterly the erecting “of a rotten Plank or a Stone for a Memorial,” the sometimes absurd rituals of occupation in which conquerors have indulged since the Assyrians—the raising of flags, the felling of trees, the reading of solemn declarations to empty beaches, and so on.

What Day does not discuss are the fierce legal battles about the legitimacy of conquest and supplanting that engulfed, at one time or another, every European colonizing power and that ultimately led to the creation of what today we call “international law.” Similarly, another key chapter, “Tilling the Soil,” does little more than quote two largely disconnected passages from Hugo Grotius and Emer de Vattel, an eighteenth-century diplomat, and cite numerous instances of the argument—widely, and misleadingly attributed to John Locke and frequently invoked by the English settlers in North America—that “unoccupied land” (terra nullius) belongs by natural right to the first person able to cultivate it. Oddly, too, given his constant references to the history of Australia and New Zealand (one of the more original features of the book), Day says nothing about the ruling of the Australian High Court in Mabo v. The State of Queensland in 1992, which conceded that the lands of the Meriam peoples of the Murray Islands in the Torres Straits had been taken from them by the British Crown on legally unsustainable grounds of terra nullius.

Conquest has the laudable intention of demonstrating, in an easily accessible way, that the “history of the world has been the history of wave after wave of people, intruding on the lands of others.” It is a general book written for a wide popular readership. If such a readership still exists, the book deserves to reach it. Yet if a history of any kind is to achieve what, to judge from his closing remarks, Day hopes that this one will—that is, to persuade us “to manage the inevitable movements of peoples with greater sensitivity and more justice to existing inhabitants than has been shown by supplanting societies in the past”—its premises need to be far clearer and argued with a great deal more rigor.

Anthony Pagden
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A significant part of the “military revolution” that swept across early modern Europe was the “gunpowder revolution,” which rested to a significant extent on the supply of saltpeter. Saltpeter (potassium nitrate) was distilled from earth, well saturated with dung and urine—Cressy attributes its power to “the vitalizing power of urine and excrement, and the miracle of nitrous-rich soil” (174)—though it was also found in natural beds. It was the major ingredient in the explosive powder that played a major role in determining the outcome of battles and even the fate of kings and kingdoms.

Cressy follows the desperate search for those precious and vital nitrogenous earths, mostly in England but also with an eye on the American colonies at the Revolution, ending with a brief run into the nineteenth century. His story combines chemical and technological exploration, speculations about nature, the ever-growing needs of armies, the clash between the interests of monarchs and those of citizens displaced by the despised saltpetermen, and the woes of depending on imports. By 1500, guns had become the main weapon of warlike Europe, but the needs of a bellicose ruler like Henry VIII were but early chapters in the story of ever-larger armies and guns supplies, with the requisite saltpeter to sustain them. When Henry VIII laid siege to Boulogne in 1544, his army used thirty-two tons of saltpeter a day for 250 guns, whereas by mid-Victorian times, British fortresses and batteries at home could boast 1,664 guns, with 4,812 more of them scattered across the Empire. Only when cordite became the killer of choice did the saltpeter enterprise come to an end.

But the domestic search for saltpeter also had a contentious and political aspect. Since it gave carte blanche to saltpetermen to go where they chose, they showed no respect for private property; they dug under houses, churches, and public buildings. Young Christopher Wren saw his father’s pigeon house collapse because of such excavations, and many others had worse tales to tell. In Charles I’s day, the need to dig turned many a royalist and high-born property owner against the government’s policy. Those affected by cave-ins and ruined buildings, however, had little hope of recompense legally or financially; sometimes bribery was the only way to escape intrusion. The desperate search for adequate domestic supplies also spawned endless schemes for (cheaper) production, none of them ending in much more than bankruptcy, fraud, and failure. But for the king, the invasion of rights and boundaries was justified by a national crisis at a time when 80 percent of the military’s needs were covered by imports (from Europe and then, successfully, from the East Indies and India).

Cressy explores the foundations on which much military and political history rested. If an army marched on its stomach, it fired—as often as possible—by dipping into its stocks of saltpeter. Many short quotations from all sorts of interested parties help to ground the text, and the
twenty illustrations provide an idea of the distilling technology involved, the increasing size of the guns, and the ubiquitous “how to do it” books that made the creation of gunpowder accessible, at least in theory, to the naïve and the hopeful.

Joel T. Rosenthal
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Keith Thomas might be amused to see some of his ideas about the symbiosis between social history, anthropology, and the study of witchcraft accusations in England recycled more than forty years after their first appearance and published in a highly sophisticated form of samizdat. The book starts with a charming warning on its first page, “the moral right of the author has been asserted.” It may be home-made, but it has been prepared in a state-of-the-art oven and comes replete with eleven color plates, numerous facsimiles of seventeenth-century signatures, and various charts and graphs, including one of recorded visits to Sussex by professional actors between 1460 and 1620 (191). However, its last page (280) reveals that the basic ingredient, a 1985 dissertation in social anthropology at the University of Sussex, is relatively stale.

Gregory’s micro-history unfolds in Rye, one of the Cinque Ports. This small, isolated English seaport nonetheless possessed a rare privilege since the Norman era—full rights of criminal justice over all cases except high treason. Moreover, it had no agricultural hinterland but contained a separate church for Huguenot exiles from Dieppe, the French terminal of Rye’s Channel ferry (181–183). As Gregory suggests, Rye’s peculiarities help to explain why its only known witchcraft episode differs from most British cases; for example, its local testimony includes far more information about fairies than do other such trials held south of Scotland. Gregory’s account thus contains inter alia an excursus on Gillyflowers (127, with illustration), as well as one on the peculiar Cinque Ports privilege of withernam (145).

A disarming style helps Gregory to sell her product: “If this were a historical novel, I might have been advised to start differently” (108). “At which point I give up all attempts at interpretation” (132). “I will admit at the outset that I have a problem with Anne Taylor” (her leading protagonist), because of “a cultural prejudice that clouds my vision . . . relating to her Puritanism” (70). Her perplexity with Taylor—a Puritan who seems deeply involved with fairies and treasure hunting—is further complicated by the attempts of Taylor’s neighbor—Susan Swaffer, an illiterate clairvoyant—to frame her after Rye’s magistrates imprisoned her in 1607 for practicing illicit magic. Taylor fled Rye. Forced to return after her well-connected gentleman-businessman husband failed to have
her case transferred to a higher jurisdiction, Taylor then refused to plead before a hostile jury in December 1608 (143–144). Further legal maneuvers delayed Taylor’s trial until July 1609, when a different jury declared her not guilty of both the magical murders charged to her (a maidservant and a former mayor), and its foreman even stood surety for her future good behavior (153–155).

Witchcraft left no tragic consequences in Rye’s records, although Swaffer remained in prison (where she bore a daughter in 1608) until released in 1610 through a general English pardon (199–200). She disappears from Rye’s records after 1612, but her daughter married there in 1633. Taylor’s husband became a freeman of Rye in 1612 and died in 1628; his widow lived until 1644 (200).

Beyond this point, this home-made product becomes less enticing—not merely because my review article published in this journal receives a wry quotation (215). Gregory garnishes her account with a rambling essay “in a lighter, more discursive style” (222). This farrago includes a discussion of “Islamic fundamentalism” during the age of French and British colonialism (245–248), introduced by some highly British academic legerdemain: “There are of course broad similarities between 16th century protestant (small p; it’s ours) godliness and early 20th century Islamic (capital I; not ours) reformism” (245).

William Monter
Northwestern University


Why did the Industrial Revolution begin in eighteenth-century England? Which factors or policies promote societal innovation? In Mothers of Innovation, Dudley unravels these far-reaching questions in a fittingly bold and interdisciplinary manner, reminiscent of ambitious works such as Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel (New York, 1997), David Landes’ The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (New York, 1998), and Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson’s The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York, 2012). His conclusions emphasize the connection between innovation, collaboration, and social networks, with both historical and present-day implications. Dudley’s means are as important as his ends; he offers readers a confident, compelling illustration of the value of multidisciplinary analysis.

Dudley’s argument builds upon a thorough review of existing scholarship. Prior attempts to explain the timing of the Industrial Revolution typically placed emphasis on one of two factors—institutions and

ideas that increased the supply of key innovations (for example, judicial systems that protect private property or the British Enlightenment’s emphasis upon useful knowledge); or conditions that increased the demand for innovations (for example, abundant coal and scarce labor that encouraged labor-saving inventions). Dudley acknowledges that both sets of factors are relevant, but even taken together, supply and demand arguments for innovation do not fully explain the Industrial Revolution’s genesis and evolution.

Mothers of Innovation forges a new path, connecting innovation to the collaboration of multiple practitioners—primarily inventors but also managers, investors, and entrepreneurs—willing and able to bring multiple perspectives to bear on complex challenges. This form of collaboration depends upon mutual trust, the ability to communicate effectively, and access to necessary knowledge and experience. Dudley’s model predicts the onset of innovation and industrialization by seeking societal precursors of successful collaboration, such as large populations that share a common language, high literacy rates, and open societies that tolerate diversity.

Dudley’s emphasis upon collaboration and communication offers rewards to readers from all disciplinary backgrounds. He sheds light on a critical historical question but also suggests policies to promote modern-day technology transfer, collaboration, and innovation. Even better, in the course of proving his thesis, he creates a versatile historical data set, a list of 117 major technological innovations during the decisive time period from 1700 to 1850. He categorizes these innovations into individual versus collaborative efforts and highlights “super” technologies that represent both radical technical ideas and the ability to fulfill a variety of applications. This data set, which can fuel a range of history or economics research projects, cries out for expansion into other time periods. Dudley also introduces and blends concepts drawn from disciplines such as cultural history, the history of technology, economics, psychology, linguistics, and policy studies. By the end of the study, readers have experienced both the theory and application of multiple analytical frameworks, including recombinant growth models, distributed network theory, the concept of conceptual blending, game theory, and many others.

Dudley practices what he preaches. His final product qualifies as an innovation because of its creative integration of theory and content from different perspectives. Moreover, in the true spirit of “super” technologies, Mothers of Innovation offers the world both an insightful new idea as well as its ensuing practical applications.

Robert Martello
Olin College

The Ardennes forest proves a fruitful location for a case study about the use of environmental elements in the construction of monastic identity. This interdisciplinary survey investigates how the monks of the twin houses of Stavelot and Malmedy were influenced by the experience of their environment, from the mid-seventh-century to the mid-twelfth century. It also explores the ways in which the monks manipulated their environment, both physically and imaginatively, in order to achieve the goals of these communities.

The first four chapters present various aspects of monastic involvement with the natural world. Chapters 1 and 2 explore monastic representations of the forest environment, both as an isolating and threatening wilderness and as a nurturing and productive resource. The third and fourth chapters consider conflicts about land and the stories that the monks employed to bolster their claims, which emphasized the morality of monastic land use. The fifth chapter pulls together these strands to argue that the monks of Stavelot–Malmedy consciously constructed a religious landscape in order to serve both their economic and spiritual needs, and in the process created a communal identity tied to the land that they occupied.

The study utilizes a variety of sources, including property charters, the correspondence of Abbot Wibald (fl. 1130–1158), and, above all, hagiographical accounts, which Arnold explores “as a historian interested in the construction of cultural identities” (12). Her approach is informed by ecocriticism, a form of literary criticism that focuses on textual expressions of cultural values and perceptions related to the environment.

Arnold’s theoretical stance in regard to the relationship between nature and culture is not fully explicated. The terms environment, nature, wilderness, and landscape are sometimes used interchangeably; a clearer definition of these terms would have better elucidated her position. However, Arnold challenges the paradigm, established by White, that medieval Christianity fostered an attitude of dominion over nature. She stresses that monks were not constrained by a stagnant religious stance but exercised great latitude in the use of religious texts and in their representations of the natural world. The forest location of Stavelot–Malmedy enabled monastic authors to employ a trope of isolation and to emphasize the real and imagined dangers that allowed them to exercise their spiritual strengths. Thus, the protection and improvement of the natural surroundings of the monasteries assumed a religious meaning.

The appreciation of natural beauty and abundance was also tied to an idea of holiness. The natural world represented paradise, envisioned as the “pasture of heavenly life” (104).²

In addition to literary exegesis, Arnold details the economic and agricultural management of the land that the monasteries possessed. Of particular interest are her discussion of the terms applied to woodlands in various contexts—such as saltus, silva, and the legal designation forestis—and her investigation of the measurement and valuation of land as property. Chapters 3 and 4 concern conflicts about property and forest rights that Stavelot and Malmedy negotiated with Merovingian, Carolingian, Ottonian, and Salian rulers, as well as with the local aristocracy, the bishops of Cologne, other monastic houses, their tenants, and even with each other.

In the context of these conflicts, the hagiographies created by the monks established their authority by connecting saints to places in the surrounding region and sacralizing local landmarks. For example, Arnold contends that the fictional elements of the Passio Agilolfi served as an appeal to Henry IV to remove Malmedy from the control of Archbishop Anno II, who had translated the saint’s relics to Cologne. The Passio reworked an account from the ninth-century Liber Historiae Francorum into a story that associated royal power with the forest surrounding the monastery (159). In the new version, Charles Martel disguised his troops with branches to attack his enemies, who were under the impression that the forest was attacking. The monks inserted Saint Agilolf, the former abbot of Stavelot-Malmedy, into the account, claiming that he was murdered for his support of Charles Martel. Charles obtained the idea for his forest disguise after praying that Agilolf would help him to victory, thereby linking the body of the saint in situ with the good of the kingdom. Monastic activities created sites in the physical landscape, but it was monastic stories such as this one that created the correlated imaginative landscape. Arnold thus demonstrates the construction of landscape as a creative political process. The theoretical insights of cultural geographers such as Cosgrove could usefully expand her premises.³

By suggesting new approaches, this perceptive study encourages further work on topics of environmental perception and the construction of medieval cultural landscapes.

Leanne Good
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In his Life of Filippo Maria Visconti, written around 1447, Pier Candido Decembrio recounted how Gian Galeazzo Visconti, the first duke of Milan, became convinced that his younger son Filippo Maria would make a better leader of his territories than his elder brother Giovanni Maria. Gian Galeazzo’s preference for his younger over his older son was based not just on his personal knowledge of his sons’ characters but, even more importantly, on the opinion of his court astrologers, who asserted that Filippo Maria would bring glory to the family name. If Filippo’s rule over Milan was written in the stars, it was, as Monica Azzolini’s finely crafted book demonstrates, only one of many instances in which court astrologers played key roles in Renaissance Italian politics.

Burckhardt famously argued that the despotism of the dukes of Milan “shows the genuine Italian character of the fifteenth century”—by which he meant ruthless, calculating, and pragmatic rulers of states “depending for existence on themselves alone, and scientifically organized with a view to this object.” Such despots, who mastered the politics of “the state as a work of art,” were supposedly confident that they held their destiny in their own hands. In light of Burckhardt’s characterization of these Italian Renaissance princes—a view endorsed by subsequent political historians—it is jarring to discover that the ducal court in Milan was a major site of astrological patronage. Astrologers, such as Ludovico Maria Sforza’s court astrologer Ambrogio da Rosate Varesi, could amass a huge fortune and wield extraordinary influence, rising to spectacular heights in their respective courts.

The dukes of Milan used astrology for a host of different purposes. Astrologers determined the most propitious times to administer medicine, to marry and lie with one’s bride, to travel, and to wage war. They even cast nativities and horoscopes to predict when an enemy would die. For almost every significant decision, whether personal, political, military, or diplomatic, the dukes of Milan consulted their astrologers and sought their prognostications.

But did they actually believe in astrology? Azzolini ponders this question on a number of occasions in her book, and her answers are uniformly balanced and revealing. The matter of belief, Azzolini observes, is reductive in the case of astrology and, in the final analysis, impossible to assess. As a pragmatic science, astrology competed with other sciences in what she calls the early modern “predictive market” (66). The dukes of Milan were not blind believers in astrology; they were avid consumers...

of astrology. The “science” of astrology was one among many forms of expertise that gave rulers a sense of control over an uncertain future. As Ash pointed out, the notion of expertise was in flux during the early modern period. Traditional practitioners might know how to do things, but early modern experts could claim even more—to know how and why things worked. The dukes resorted to their advice, as they did to that of other counselors, in spite of often imperfect results. Although Azzolini does not press the point, the court astrologers could well have been the victims of their own success. As princes demanded increasingly precise predictions for particular events, astrologers faced the dilemma of honoring their patrons’ requests while risking predictions that fell short of the mark.

Previous histories of astrology tended to concentrate on the intellectual and scientific foundations of the art, ignoring astrology’s application in everyday life. Political historians have traditionally considered astrology to be a mere superstition, largely ignoring it. Azzolini’s book provides a needed corrective to both tendencies. Utilizing a vast range of archival and published sources, Azzolini ventures deep into the culture of the Renaissance court. Weaving together the methods and interests of the history of science and of Renaissance political and cultural history, Azzolini has produced a sophisticated, interdisciplinary analysis of a science and a profession that played a key role in the political life of the Renaissance, challenging current assumptions about Renaissance politics and making important contributions both to the history of science and to early modern political and cultural history.

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*Was Hitler Ill? A Final Diagnosis.* By Hans-Joachim Neumann and Henrik Eberle (Malden, Mass., Polity Press, 2013) 244 pp. $25.00

Much has been written, almost all of it speculative, about whether, or to what extent, Adolf Hitler suffered from chronic diseases or psychiatric disorders. Eberle, a historian, and Hans-Joachim Neumann, a distinguished medical expert from Berlin, have joined hands in a fruitful interdisciplinary exercise to put an end to the perennial effort to link Hitler’s aggressive nationalism and genocidal racism to some kind of physical or mental condition. The result will be welcomed by all serious scholars of the Third Reich, though the authors’ conclusions will probably do little to dent the faith of those with a commitment to explaining Hitler’s actions as the product of medical dysfunction.

The first part of the book, which explores the current mythology surrounding Hitler’s physical and mental state, is generally, and sensibly, dismissive of almost all of it—any hint of recurrent genetic conditions in

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Hitler's family, of Hitler's alleged homosexuality or sexual perversity (though it is probably unprovable), of his contracting venereal disease, and of his having only one testicle. The discussion of possible pathological states that have usually been ascribed rather than proved is full and convincing, though the authors might have given some attention to the current interest in the idea of “the Nazi mind,” as explored in Pick’s recent study.¹

The rest of the book examines in close detail, using the surviving evidence, the history of Hitler's health throughout his public political life. The principal source is the diary of Theodor Morell, his personal physician, who kept careful notes on Hitler’s illnesses, treatments, and medicines. The evidence shows that Hitler was not always well, suffering from chronic irritable bowel syndrome, exacerbated by periods of stress, and other stomach conditions the origin of which appears to have been psychosomatic. He also suffered from insomnia, again prompted by stress. Neumann suggests that Hitler almost certainly suffered some effects of Parkinson’s disease, visible in the tremors in his left arm, though other aspects of the condition seem to have been absent. The gastric conditions were treatable, though tension must account for many of them. In terms of possible psychiatric conditions, the authors freely admit the difficulties in reconstructing the mental state of someone long dead with any clinical precision, but they find no evidence that Hitler suffered from any form of serious psychological disorder. He was, they suggest, throughout the dictatorship “healthy and accountable” (190).

These conclusions certainly reinforce what most common-sense analyses of Hitler’s physical and mental state have suggested. But the willingness of the two authors to throw out the most fantastic or speculative theories about Hitler’s psychiatric health leads them to abandon any attempt to describe his mental state. Even without any psychoanalytical presuppositions about the influence exerted on him by a dotting mother and a harsh father (since millions of Europeans had the same inheritance), Hitler surely had a specific psychological make-up, elements of which may well have determined how he behaved, waxing and waning according to circumstances. Hitler may not have been insane in any scientific sense, but his personality was hardly irrelevant to his actions.

This matter raises a more serious problem, which the authors consider more fully in the last third of the book. Those who make a serious study of Hitler’s physical and mental states are usually looking for a connection between these states and his drive for war and genocide. It is by no means foolish to deny that Hitler’s genocide of the Jews was a by-product of a chronic mental disorder. Neumann and Eberle argue that antisemitism was a cultural-historical construct in Germany of which Hitler was as much symptom as cause. They find little connection be-

tween Hitler’s actual ailments (particularly the gastric problems) and the course of the war. The same argument can be made for Winston Churchill or Franklin D. Roosevelt. Decisions in war are usually the result of ongoing discussion and planning often long in the making. The time involved, even for someone as self-absorbed as Hitler, usually allows for temporary bouts of illness, or even for more serious medical conditions; changes in operational planning are just as likely to result from external circumstances as from anything else.

Neumann and Eberle make a convincing case that Hitler was not chronically ill or mentally deranged at any time. They make clear that the crimes of the regime were deliberate, not the product of bouts of psychopathic rage or persecution mania. In the process, they leave open the question of exactly how historians should understand the way in which Hitler’s personality might have guided not only the affairs of his dictatorship but also his private personal life.

Richard Overy
University of Exeter

Medicine, Law and the State in Imperial Russia. By Elisa M. Becker (Budapest, Central European University Press, 2011) 399 pp. $50.00

In recent years, law and medicine in Russia have attracted a great deal of critical scrutiny from historians pursuing a range of topics in the imperial period. Powered by the mounting prestige of science, medical and legal experts made influential interventions into the functioning of the imperial judiciary and were influential in shaping the popular understanding of pressing contemporary concerns—crime, sexuality, political extremism, suicide, and bio-psychological decline. Setting aside these broader questions and the historians who pursue them, Becker offers a conventional institutional history of the discipline of forensic medicine, told from the perspective of disciplinary elites.

Becker argues that in contrast to Western Europe, which saw an incremental development of separate guilds, the Russian medical occupation was an eighteenth-century creation of the state. Becker shows how in Russia “all medical functions (forensic, police, and therapeutic) were combined in one and the same state physician who was legally obliged to perform them all.” Thus, forensic medicine in particular “reflected the autocracy’s approach to the social and material realities it faced: the effort to structure and manage society through legal-administrative categories” (269).

Medicine, Law and the State is centrally concerned with how the medical and legal professions shaped, and were in turned shaped by, the Great Reforms. In a field that too often treats the reform era as if it were a frontier demarcating two completely different periods, Becker’s spanning of the nineteenth century is welcome. She shows how medical ex-
perts, supported by military statutes dating back to the reign of Peter the Great, participated in the pre-reform legal system as powerful administrative officials whose evidence served the inquisitorial needs of the courts and was largely beyond contestation. When this established system began to erode in the wake of legal reforms, the medical experts found their evidence subject to critical scrutiny in the combative arena of the jury trial. Their response was struggle for wider recognition of their authority as both empirical and analytical experts in the field of jurisprudence.

Given the dynamism in the field of social, cultural, and intellectual history of the late imperial period, Becker’s reluctance to engage seriously with the work of historians of psychiatry, criminology, and the legal profession is regrettable. She repeatedly sets up straw men before proceeding to knock them down. Her claim that “historians have generally associated the ideology of science, and its philosophical offshoot scientific materialism, with the so-called alienated intelligentsia of the 1860s” shows scant regard for a range of publications during the last two decades (12). She argues that her “study shows that reformers operating within the government . . . sought to employ the empirical methods of science in order to improve and transform the state system, rather than undermine or topple it.” Yet the argument that not all members of the professions were sworn enemies of the autocracy has been long advanced by a number of historians, including Hutchinson, Solomon, Frieden, and Adams.¹

These scholars have also stressed the close dependence of the medical professions on the state for financing and support and explored how liberals within the medical and legal professions offered a series of prescriptions for managed reform of the state. Given the proximity of these arguments to her own, Becker might usefully have engaged explicitly with their work rather than consigning it to a few brief references in her notes.

The greatest flaw in Becker’s study—a central argument of the book—is a failure to examine in any detail how forensic medicine actually worked in the courtroom. She mentions influential trials, such as that of the attempted regicide Dmitrii Karakozov or that involving the young murder victim Sara Bekker, in passing but provides no sustained analysis of how medical experts operated in trials. Becker’s material is overwhelmingly drawn from the articles that appeared in journals published by the legal and medical elite. In the absence of a close examination of how medical expertise interacted with the legal authority of the

court and with the emerging culture of the jury trial, many of Becker’s arguments appear excessively nominalist.

The relentlessly institutional focus of this study tends to flatten the medical and legal experts into little more than discipline builders concerned with autonomy and authority in the imperial period. In this sense, Becker’s analysis is a return to a dated form of institutional history in which the concept of “professionalization” elides the ideas that are at stake in the elaboration of expert opinion and its deployment within the judiciary as well as beyond it, in the public sphere. Morrissey, Oberländer, Engelstein, Sirotkina (only one of whom is cited), and others have all shown that debates about the power of medical science to understand human behavior, about the conflict between religious and secular understandings of crime, and about the relationship between the criminal and wider society raged during the late imperial period. Yet Becker paints a picture of medicine and law abstracted from these wider concerns, their practitioners not reflecting the wider anxieties of their own society but focused narrowly on asserting and consolidating their own institutional standing.

Daniel Beer
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This imaginative study explores various dimensions of the lives of a middling, serf-owning noble family in mid-nineteenth-century Russia. The family—Andrei Chikhachev, his wife Natalia Chernavina, their children, and other relatives—resided on estates centered in a relatively nonagricultural district of Vladimir province, approximately 250 kilometers northwest of Moscow. Sources about such gentry are extremely scarce. Antonova’s main contribution is to mine the uniquely interlinked diaries, correspondences, and published writings of this family, with a focus on the period from 1830 to 1860. Though primarily a work of social micro-history organized into thematic chapters, the resulting study makes important contributions to our understanding of gender roles, intellectual debates, and cultural values among Russia’s provincial nobility during the last decades of serfdom.

2 Susan Morrissey, Suicide in and the Body Politic in Imperial Russia (New York, 2006); Alexandra Oberländer, “Shame and Modern Subjectivities: The Rape of Elizaveta Cheremnova,” in Mark D. Steinberg and Valerie Sobol (eds.), Interpreting Emotions in Russia and Eastern Europe (DeKalb, Ill., 2011), 82–101; Laura Engelstein, The Keys to Happiness: Sex and the Search for Modernity in Fin-de-Siècle Russia (Ithaca, 1992); Irina Sirotkina, Diagnosing Literary Genius: A Cultural History of Psychiatry in Russia, 1880–1930 (Baltimore, 2002)
Antonova relies heavily on a sporadic series of detailed diaries by Chikhachev, Chernavina, and their son Alexei Chikhachev, along with a set of message books that were passed back and forth between the household and their neighbor Yakov Chernavin (Natalia’s brother). These sources, which resulted from Andrei’s interest in self-critical writing, differ from the standard set of documents on which scholars have relied to study much larger serf estates. Their use has costs and benefits; as Antonova acknowledges, it leads her to focus on particular aspects of gentry life, significantly limiting her consideration of others.

Nevertheless, a major finding of Antonova’s research is that the gender roles within the Chikharev/Chernavina household were reversed from Western ideals: Chernavina was in charge of the day-to-day management of the estate, while Chikharev dedicated himself to educating their children, pursuing intellectual pursuits, and participating in local civil society. The analysis of gender roles in the middle chapters of the study (concentrating on the village, estate management, local society, illness and health, and domestic arrangements) constitutes the strongest part of the book, making an important contribution to the growing literature on the surprisingly empowered positions of many female elites in imperial Russia. Chikharev describes his activities well in his voluminous private and public writings, but Chernavina’s terse (and temporally limited) diaries leave little material for Antonova to investigate estate management. Indeed, economic and social historians interested in how smaller quit-rent serf estates actually functioned will be left with many unanswered questions.

The relative richness of Chikharev’s diaries, essays, and letters leads Antonova to dedicate the last three chapters of her study to his interest in moral education (vospitanie) as an organizing principal behind his daily activities and intellectual life. Chikharev was not only heavily involved in the instruction of his children; he also wrote a series of essays in local and national publications about how the gentry could exercise a healthy influence on serfdom and estate management in their role as locally oriented moral educators in service to the Tsarist state. These essays apparently had little significance for the debates about serfdom and agricultural development that gripped Russia during the mid-nineteenth century, but Antonova argues that Chikharev gave voice to a poorly understood conservative mid-level gentry who constituted a key source of support for serfdom and the imperial regime. These nobles held viewpoints that embraced certain progressive ideas from the West, but they were often more sympathetic to Russian Orthodoxy, traditional rural life (borrowing from Romanticism), and the social stability of the Slavophile movement. Antonova’s argument is mostly convincing, but her fixation on one relatively obscure rural gentry writer raises doubts about the representativeness of the examples, as well as about any

1 See, for example, Tracy Dennison, *The Institutional Framework of Russian Serfdom* (New York, 2011).
broader conclusions that might be drawn from them regarding the intellectual climate at the time.

Throughout her study, Antonova provides wonderfully detailed depictions of the internal life of the Chikharev/Chernavina family in a variety of contexts. Notwithstanding a few unfortunate repetitions across the chapters, her study is exceptionally well written, providing a useful complement to the rich fictional literature about serfdom and the serf-owning nobility. However, two areas are problematical. First, the lives of the serfs owned by this family remained hidden due to the sources that Antonova consults. Although she mentions a serf school supported by Chikharev and briefly notes that the peasants paid quit-rents to the family, her discussion of the interaction between serfs and their masters is limited and one-sided. Second, her chosen sources cannot provide a sufficiently detailed picture of the local socioeconomic context. Although she dedicates the first two chapters to this very topic, she musters relatively little information about the distribution of estate sizes, economic activities, and organizational styles, or about the relationship between private estates and local authorities in this part of Vladimir province. By focusing on the micro-history of a family, Antonova sacrifices comparative perspectives that would enhance the importance of her findings.

Despite these concerns, Antonova’s study makes important contributions to our understanding of nineteenth-century Russian society that will appeal to students of that time and place, as well as to scholars with comparative interests in European elites, contemporary gender roles, and the use of private diaries and correspondences as historical sources.

Steven Nafziger
Williams College

Smuggler Nation: How Illicit Trade Made America. By Peter Andreas (New York, Oxford University Press, 2013) 454 pp. $29.95

Andreas’ well-written study aimed at a popular audience argues that smuggling was, and remains, an engine of economic and political development in American history. He seeks to challenge whiggish historical narratives of national development, such as the rule of law, the rationalization of the marketplace, and the centralization of state power. Andreas builds on interdisciplinary scholarship devoted to uncovering the logistics and significance of the market’s peripheries—for example, works by Mihm, Halttunen, and Balleisen that study such marginal practices as counterfeiting, confidence schemes, and failure itself, as well as others by Portes, Castells, and Benton that illustrate the structural significance of informal economies on a globalizing world. But scope and

1 Stephen Mihm, Nation of Counterfeiters: Capitalists, Con Men, and the Making of the United
scale are the distinguishing marks of *Smuggler Nation*. For Andreas, colonial settlement, the American Revolution, the development of the early republic, the Civil War era, the so-called Gilded Age, the age of immigration, and the war on drugs are not merely case studies about illicit activity. Rather, they are chapters in a history of American central government that treats the relationship between markets, morals, and police. “Illicit trade,” Andreas explains, “challenged but also empowered the new American state” (7).

Andreas’ point is not controversial from the vantage point of the early twenty-first century, given the U.S. society’s ongoing struggle to police controlled substances along national borders. Andreas’ concluding chapters about these topics contain some fascinating stories—for instance, how the Coast Guard’s enforcement practices accelerated the consolidation of rum running and how NAFTA spurred the Mexican-American drug trade (241, 317). But these chapters are unsurprising and breezy in comparison to the weighty and analytically sharpened discussions of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century smuggling that constitute the heart of *Smuggler Nation*. In Andreas’ argument, smuggling during the Seven Years’ War, the American War of Independence, Jefferson’s Embargo, white westward expansion, and the late nineteenth century are interconnected episodes in a centuries-long history of market opportunity, central-government enforcement, and smugglers’ evasions, rather than discrete examples of statelessness or incapacity.

*Smuggler Nation* is a fine interdisciplinary history that will find its mark among scholarly and popular audiences. Greater engagement with the market itself would have further improved this excellent book. Why, for instance, did one species of illicit trade drive shadow economics and state policy at a particular time? Why did it suddenly give way to another? What happened to the cultural and geographical pathways that undergirded these economies? Coping with these questions would have allowed Andreas to pinpoint more explicitly the role and importance of smuggling within the shift from commercial revolution to industrial capitalism and beyond. The fact that readers will be informed sufficiently to ponder such questions after reading *Smuggler Nation* attests to the value of its scholarly contribution.

Gautham Rao
American University

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Republic of Nature: An Environmental History of the United States. By Mark Fiege (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2012) 584 pp. $34.95 cloth $24.95 paper

An environmental history of the Salem witch trials; an examination of the idea of nature in the Declaration of Independence; an analysis of how America’s natural environment shaped slavery, the Civil War, and civil rights; a story about how a love of the great outdoors led to the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—these are just a few of the remarkable topics in Fiege’s Republic of Nature. What is even more surprising, and refreshing, is that the likes of Henry David Thoreau and John Muir (let alone Hetch Hetchy and Earth Day) never make an appearance in the book.

This different sort of environmental history is not a textbook covering the grand sweep of America’s past. Instead, Fiege has consciously chosen nine iconic historical moments from United States history—witch accusations in colonial New England, the American Revolution, slavery, Abraham Lincoln’s political ideology, the battle of Gettysburg, the construction of the transcontinental railroad, the Manhattan Project, Brown v. Board of Education, and the 1970s oil crisis—to illustrate the central role that nature often played in American history. As a result, readers learn that a scarcity of farmland in Salem fueled cultural anxieties that resulted in witchcraft accusations, that the ecologically unstable life cycle of the cotton plant both intensified brutality by masters toward slaves and provided opportunities for slave resistance, that victory in the Civil War depended as much on mud and mules as on guns, and that scientists built the atomic bomb, in part, because they loved hiking in the mountains around Los Alamos, New Mexico.

The Republic of Nature weaves together an amazing variety of historical approaches, in part because Fiege had to master several distinct historiographies, one for each of his nine chapters spanning the colonial era through the twenty-first century. Legal and gender history, for instance, inform his analysis of the Salem witch trials; intellectual history is central to his examination of both the Declaration of Independence and Abraham Lincoln’s political ideology; and economic and labor history shape his critique of the building of the transcontinental railroad. Yet Fiege is also not afraid to borrow alternative methods. Like many environmental histories, The Republic of Nature combines familiar historical source materials with scientific data. The book’s chapter about the OPEC oil embargo of the 1970s relies on biology, geology, and physics to tell the long history of fossil fuels on planet Earth. Most interesting, however, is Fiege’s fearless “reading” of nontraditional sources. In one of the most fascinating chapters of the book, he undertakes a cultural geographical analysis of the Topeka, Kansas, landscape, including a block-by-block mapping of Linda Brown’s daily walk to her school-bus stop, to provide a convincing environmental context for the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education.
Fiege also takes visual culture seriously. In three “galleries” inserted between chapters throughout the book, he includes short, one-paragraph essays that analyze groups of images. “Gallery No. 1,” for instance, juxtaposes photographs tracing the construction of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C., with others depicting laborers in Georgia and Colorado quarrying the Memorial’s shining white marble. “Connecting the Lincoln Memorial and other shrines to their material sources,” Fiege argues, “reveals the richness, diversity, conflict, and unity at the heart of American nature—and at the heart of American history” (15). Additional gallery essays discuss colonial farm-animal illustrations; land surveys from the early republican period; sketches of technologies used in antebellum cotton production; mid-nineteenth-century photographs showing the environmental impact of the transcontinental railroad; and political cartoons, from the post-World War II era, lampooning American’s addiction to foreign oil.

The book is vulnerable to two criticisms. First, the chronology of The Republic of Nature leapfrogs over nearly the entire first half of the twentieth century. Second, Fiege’s definition of nature is extremely broad, encompassing not only familiar material objects such as natural resources but also what some readers might see as less tangible “natures”—related to, for instance, the built environment of African-American neighborhoods, the labor of human and animal bodies, and the ideas that informed colonial politics. Are “natural rights” and “natural law” really related to the nature that informs environmental history as a field (60,70), or was this language instead deployed by colonists to signify a special case of objective, legal truth? Fiege’s point is well taken; his big-tent definition pushes all historians to see “nature,” in its varied and complex forms, in the nooks and crannies of our past. But it also raises questions about the very usefulness of the term as an analytical category.

These quibbles aside, Republic of Nature is one of the most important environmental histories of the last decade, as well as one of the most beautifully written.

Neil M. Maher
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Frontier Cities: Encounters at the Crossroads of Empire. By Jay Gitlin, Barbara Berglund, and Adam Arenson (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013) 296 pp. $45.00 cloth and ebook

Frontier Cities is a well-researched collection of twelve chapters (including an introduction and epilogue by the editors) exploring the myriad ways in which various cities, mostly in the United States, functioned as “crossroads of empire” from the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries. More specifically, this volume reassesses Richard C. Wade’s The Urban Frontier: The Rise of Western Cities, 1790–1830 (Urbana, 1959),

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which described towns as “spearheads of the frontier” (2), thereby challenging historians to consider the importance of urban forces in the growth and development of the American interior. The volume’s authors confirm Wade’s basic premise—that cities were central to frontiers—by focusing on such cities as New Orleans, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Seattle, and Montreal.

Frontier cities, the authors generally argue, were places where commerce, imperial politics, transportation and communication infrastructures, and culture (especially religion) converged or collided with both Native peoples and newcomers. Yet, as they also make clear, no aspect of this convergence was simple or easily predictable. Indeed, with analyses indebted to recent works in colonial, cultural, environmental, and borderlands histories, as well as the older “New Western History,” the authors largely take issue with Wade’s sometimes ethnocentric, top-down assumptions about frontier city-making, substituting their own idiosyncratic but complex discussions of the dynamic interplay between urbanization and the frontier process. Frontier cities, as they make clear, were hybrid places where rules coexisted with disorder; elites intermingled with rogues; and whites intermarried with Natives to create distinctive métis kin groups, and where the lines between commerce, culture, and diplomacy were difficult to distinguish.

The volume as a whole should be of particular interest to urban historians, early Americanists, and western historians. Yet, some of the contributions are stronger than others. Those by Brett Rushforth, Karen Marrero, and Matthew Klingle are standouts; they offer especially nuanced examinations of the often uneasy convergence of peoples, cultures, commerce, and politics in Montreal, Detroit, and Seattle.

The volume’s interdisciplinary perspectives, however, are limited. To be sure, most of the authors make use of literary, visual, or geographical sources. But only Peter J. Kastor’s “Mapping the Urban Frontier and Losing Frontier Cities” and John Neal Hoover’s “Private Libraries and Global Worlds: Books and Print Culture and Colonial St. Louis” take an explicitly interdisciplinary approach. Moreover, although the editors’ definition of frontiers as “zones of interpenetration” reflects current scholarship (208), it cannot always distinguish the frontiers discussed in this volume from the borderlands or colonies discussed in many other current works. Nonetheless, Frontier Cities rightly urges us to pay closer attention to the role that urbanization played in the making of the interior.

Judith A. Ridner
Mississippi State University

Between 1790 and 1860, the Charleston Orphan House—the nation’s first public orphanage—housed more than 2,000 poor white children, most of them between the ages of six and twelve. By plumbing the extensive records of the orphanage—including admission applications, board minutes, physicians’ reports, apprenticeship indentures, financial records, and physicians’ reports—Murray is able to offer statistical data about, and qualitative evaluations of, multiple facets of poor children’s lives, not only during their tenure at the Orphan House but also prior to their admission, during their apprenticeships, and, in some cases, well into their adult lives.

One of the most valuable aspects of this data set are letters from family members and other adult caretakers, which detail the circumstances that led them to surrender children to the Orphan House, to request their return, or to intervene on their behalf. Because cost-conscious commissioners with strict definitions of what constituted the “deserving poor” conducted individual investigations, including house visits, before responding to such requests, the authors of the letters had a strong incentive to offer factually accurate information about themselves and their charges, knowing that any falsehoods would likely be discovered and held against them. “The sum total of all these inquiries and responses,” Murray asserts, “may be the single greatest collection of first-person reports on work and family lives of the poor anywhere in the United States that covers the entire period between the Revolution and the Civil War” (4).

Combining quantitative methods with qualitative analysis, Murray is able to offer scholars of family life and gender roles much more plausible generalizations about poor Americans’ family dynamics than previously has been possible. For instance, a statistical shift from the pattern in the early decades, when most children left the orphanage for apprenticeships, to the later decades, when most children left the orphanage to be reunited with their families, supports the contention that poor white southerners, like their more fortunate neighbors, adopted the modern ideal of a child-centered family in the nineteenth century. The increasing centrality of mothers to family life likewise seems to characterize poor families as well as privileged ones. Mothers sponsored the vast majority of the orphanage’s inhabitants, and most of the orphans who returned to their families did so in accord with their mother’s wishes—and increasingly, during the period, with the support of stepfathers.

Historians of social welfare and social policy, who know much more about Victorian- and Progressive-era institutions in New England and Midwestern cities, will be intrigued to learn that even before the Civil War, the term orphan was a misnomer, since the vast majority of
orphanage residents had at least one living parent, usually a widowed and destitute mother. The same readers may be surprised to learn that the Charleston Orphan House required relatively little labor from its male occupants (the girls, as in other institutions, were responsible for sewing and laundry) and provided remarkably good education and health care for both boys and girls. Most striking is that the institution offered both so-called orphans and surviving parents a high degree of agency, including veto power over undesirable apprenticeships. Although readers may not be fully convinced by Murray’s explanation that white Charlestonians’ desire for racial unity contributed to the relatively benevolent, noncoercive nature of the Charleston Orphan House, there certainly seems to be something regionally distinctive about the nation’s first public orphanage.

Anya Jabour
University of Montana

City Water, City Life: Water and the Infrastructure of Ideas in Urbanizing Philadelphia, Boston, and Chicago. By Carl Smith (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2013) 344 pp. $35.00

Crisp, clean, and occasionally sparkling, City Water, City Life offers a cultural history of waterworks in Boston, Chicago, and Philadelphia from about 1790 to 1870. Arguing that “cities are built out of ideas,” Smith constructs his narrative using urban ideas about water and public waterworks (2). As city leaders struggled to slake the thirst and quench the fires of their growing cities, they diverted the stuff of lakes and rivers into tunnels and pumps and hydrants, compelling residents to confront the idea of water as a public good.

In the words and imagery of observers, public water became an impetus for collective action, evidence of human ingenuity, a purifier of social contamination, and a blessing for posterity. The development of waterworks forced city dwellers to re-evaluate their interdependence and their relationship to the environment. Urban reformers argued that water had the power to heal, cleanse, and detoxify in a world of disease, filth, and intemperance. Smith explores city leaders’ assertion that urban debt from public waterworks was a civic duty to future generations that held the promise of enduring greatness. Nevertheless, Smith shows, as users of city water multiplied, squandered, polluted, and sinned, their public works recurrently pointed up the fundamental folly of city life—the illusion of control.

Given the anxiety of nineteenth-century New Englanders about civic matters (Bostonians were especially slow to solve their water problems), Smith gives their valuations more space. Smith excels in his close reading of printed texts, paintings, sculpture, and public architecture, using the tools of cultural anthropology, art history, and literary criticism.
to explore abstract concepts alongside feats of engineering. Smith’s interpretation of Philadelphia artworks, for instance, reveals how city leaders celebrated water’s purity and power even as they reveled in their triumph over nature by diverting water from its natural courses. The book succeeds in its rendering of urban infrastructural history through insightful conclusions about prevailing ideas that were often in tension with one another.

In his introduction, Smith is forthright about his circumscribed research methods. First, he eschews manuscript sources, relying mainly on the voices of the elite. Evidence from public celebrations gives a fleeting sense of the broader populace, but some historians may be disappointed by the narrowness of his source base. Furthermore, Smith’s declaration that he “largely avoids retrospective evaluations” of historical actors accurately reflects the tone of the book (9). Nonetheless, the narrative unmistakably raises questions about social inequality and environmental disruption that are as relevant to current debates as they were in the past.

The tight structure and style aid the book’s clarity, though the organization also forces it into some repetition. Urban historians may already know a great deal about the construction of waterworks in individual cities, but this collective examination of three cities allows for a broader understanding of the meanings that American city-dwellers attached to their aqueducts, pipes, pumps, and faucets, and the water that these public works delivered.

Benjamin L. Carp
Tufts University

Ma‘i Lepera: Disease and Displacement in Nineteenth-Century Hawai‘i. By Kerri A. Inglis (Honolulu, University of Hawai‘i Press, 2013) 268 pp. $62.00 cloth $24.00 paper

The basic story of leprosy on Hawaii is well known. As leprosy rose to prominence in the nineteenth century, the kingdom established a settlement on Molokai where Father (now saint) Damien (born Jozef De Veuster) cared for the suffering victims. Inglis renders this story obsolete. She provides a fascinating and nuanced mo‘olelo—a “history, story, tale, myth, tradition, literature, legend, or record”—that puts Kānaka Maoli (Native Hawaiians) at the center of the drama (1). Practicing “ethnographic history,” Inglis sets out “to search for voices yet unheard, to translate the silences, and to find meaning in those past experiences” (5, 6). She mines sources that previous historians neglected and makes powerful use of Hawaiian language letters, petitions, complaints, and newspaper editorials to reveal a world of suffering and resistance. The result is an important book for anyone interested in the history of disease and colonialism.

Each chapter leads with a brief summary of Hawaiian political his-
tory that situates the discussions that follow. When haole (outsiders) arrived, they introduced a flood of epidemics that decimated the native population. Although other diseases killed more people, “it was leprosy that was visually the most disturbing and lingered the longest” (33). When the presence of leprosy was confirmed in 1848, King Kamehameha III moved quickly to establish the Board of Health. Early efforts culminated in the 1865 “Act to Prevent the Spread of Leprosy,” which established a settlement/prison on Molokai’s Malanalua Peninsula. By the time that the isolation policy was rescinded in 1969, approximately 8,000 people had been sent there.

For many Hawaiians, who named leprosy ma’i ho’oka’avale ‘ohana (“the disease that separates family”), banishment to Malanalua was as bad as the disease itself. Despite the hopes of the Board of Health, the settlement never became self-sufficient. The inhabitants suffered from inadequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care. They, however, pushed back. They refused to be ignored and sent petitions to anyone who would listen, asking for shoes, clothes, mail service, and coffins for their dead. They argued that if the Board of Health could not meet its obligations to provide promised care, then it had no right to enforce detention and quarantine. Inglis sees parallels between the experiences of people with leprosy and the broader population of Hawai’i. Leprosy displaced its victims from their land and families just as colonization displaced and marginalized native Hawaiians throughout the archipelago.

Ma’i Lepera covers many aspects of leprosy on Hawaii. It situates the disease history of Hawaii in broad narratives of biological exchange. It describes how Hawaiian and Western therapeutic systems interacted and how public-health policies went awry, stigmatizing and criminalizing thousands of people. It adds more exemplars to the troubling history of human experimentation, documenting how doctors inoculated infectious material into dozens of so-called volunteers to understand the transmission of leprosy. The book also explores Malanalua’s representation in American literature, as exemplified by the rosy account of a character in one of Jack London’s stories, who maintained that patients/inmates had “‘nothing to do but have a great time’” and enjoy the “magnificent” scenery (106).1 Throughout, Inglis shows herself to be sensitive to the problems of race and discrimination in colonial medicine, as well as to the resilience and agency of an oppressed population.

The book has some frustrations. Inglis’ reliance on Hawaiian vocabulary, even if justifiable, is often a hassle. The fact that the chapters do not adhere closely to a linear chronology often obscures the narrative, and Inglis has a tendency to repeat key points time and time again. Moreover, she seems uncertain about the fundamental causes of Hawaiian de-population, especially the roles of natural selection or colonization (compare pages 21 and 180). But these concerns are mostly minor.

Ma‘i Lepera makes an interesting and important contribution to the history of medicine in Hawaii.

David S. Jones
Harvard University

Peacekeepers and Conquerors: The Army Officer Corps on the American Frontier, 1821–1846. By Samuel J. Watson (Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 2013) 688 pp. $49.95

This second volume in Watson’s impressive study of the U.S. Army’s officer corps’ critical role in the nation’s volatile frontier zones—following Jackson’s Sword (Lawrence, 2012)—charts the emergence of a professional and nationally orientated managerial class, the first in the nation’s history. Watson places particular stress on West Point in the socialization and education of an officer corps committed to gentility, legalism, and subservience to civilian authority. Drawing on extensive archival research and a wide reading of the secondary literature, Watson borrows perspective from sociology, particularly regarding his understanding of professionalism, and political science in his telling critique of the notion that the nineteenth-century liberal state was, perforce, a weak state.

On the northern and southwestern frontiers, army officers operated in complex constabulary and diplomatic, as well as purely military, roles. Frequently caught in an uncomfortable position between local priorities and national imperatives, they mediated relations between non-state actors (white filibusterers, Native Americans, maroons, and runaway slaves) and between state governments and Washington. Watson acknowledges that, as a class, army officers broadly shared the ethnocentric and racial prejudices of their civilian compatriots and their commitment to territorial expansion. Yet their actions were frequently restrained by a sense of duty to the public good, a respect for legal process, a distaste for belligerent frontiersmen and their demagogic leaders, and a degree of empathy for Native Americans.

Watson maintains that the regular army was far less likely to commit atrocities against Native Americans during this period than were poorly disciplined state volunteer formations. Indeed, the army frequently protected Native Americans from the depredations of white settlers and squatters, although, ultimately, the army was used in a coercive fashion against native peoples who became the main victims of state-sponsored violence. Watson covers the federal removal policy and the Second Seminole War in much detail. Army officers did their duty but saw little justice, not to mention honor or glory, in these miserable endeavors.

War against an international opponent offered soldiers a better opportunity for personal advancement, but, even when facing the British on the northern frontier or Mexicans in Texas, army officers displayed an admirable resolve to operate for the public good. Their prompt ac-
tions against filibusterers on the Canadian border from 1838 to 1842 were instrumental in preventing a potentially ruinous clash with Britain. In Texas, the professionals had no mania for war, but, despite the disdain that many officers felt for the Democrats who had orchestrated the conflict with Mexico, they followed their orders.

Watson’s sympathetic portrayal of a professional, publicly minded, and statist officer corps is compelling and, for the most part, convincing. Yet his explanation for the split in loyalties evident in 1861 on the eve of the Civil War (not a lingering sectionalism among West Pointers but rather a choice between two distinct nations) may overstate the reality of Confederate nationalism. His conclusion, the most audacious chapter of the book, moves beyond the evidence presented earlier, stating (1) that regular soldiers were the most important instrument of Western expansion, (2) that officers trained at West Point were the key to victory in the Civil War, and (3) that the officer corps was pivotal to the “Market Revolution” and even to the emergence of Progressivism. One can only hope that Watson will return to these bold claims in a future work to substantiate them more fully.

Gervase Phillips
Manchester Metropolitan University


Consequential political debates—about everything from regulating genetically modified foods to reining in climate change—often pivot on competing claims to scientific authority and expertise. According to Jewett, grappling with such debates requires a more thorough historical examination of the relations between science and politics. Drawing primarily on the published remarks of selected American intellectuals from the 1860s through the 1950s, Jewett’s sweeping account focuses on the history of a single tenacious idea—that the practice of science somehow conveys the personal virtues and ethical values requisite for democratic citizenship. This belief, which Jewett labels “scientific democracy,” views science less as a source of technical knowledge than as a resource for intervening in the cultural substrate of the nation.

The “scientific democrats,” historical proponents of this belief, did not necessarily favor direct participation by citizens in decision making. Jewett’s introduction explains that the use of the term democracy in this context is “colloquial” rather than technical (9). Indeed, although the scientific democrats sought to cultivate any number of civic virtues, they appear collectively to have ignored the actual procedural work of “empowering citizens to voice their will effectively” (370). Nor are these scientific democrats drawn from the familiar roster of eminent figures.
Louis Agassiz, Asa Gray, and Clarence King, for example, are conspicuously absent from Jewett’s study, and the eugenics movement is briskly dismissed (169). Instead, Jewett discusses thinkers not commonly included in histories of American science, such as William Graham Sumner, Richard T. Ely, and Charles Ellwood. In this account, literary criticism, moral philosophy, and linguistics are as central to the history of science and democracy in America as are physics, engineering, or biology.

Jewett’s novel reading of the history of science in American thought is organized into three parts, each marked with an epigraph from Alexis de Tocqueville (none include Democracy in America’s famous reflections on science and American culture). Part I, “The Scientific Spirit,” suggests that the “twin shocks of civil war and pell-mell industrial expansion” led academicians to rethink “the cultural effects of their knowledge practices” (22), providing the impetus for scientific democracy. Part II, “The Scientific Attitude,” addresses the first three decades of the twentieth century—when scientific democrats like John Dewey stressed the “constructed, contextual, and dialogic character of scientific knowledge” (110). This section of the book convincingly challenges received histories of the human sciences, which instead generally emphasize the period’s deepening commitments to scientism. Part III, “Science and Politics,” which centers on mid-twentieth century conflicts about value neutrality, describes how long-running visions of democratic engagement fell subject to narrower conventions after World War II, with widespread consequences.

The book’s conclusion rebukes twenty-first century thinkers, whether positivist scientists or their post-positivist critics, who continue to ratify the “narrow, value-neutral conception of science” crafted in the postwar period (367). Jewett writes, “[W]e could, if we desired, adopt a more expansive meaning” of science “than has prevailed in recent decades” (369). His book certainly helps to expand conceptions of scientific expertise, while cataloging remarkably conflicting ideas about the place of science in democratic culture.

Rebecca Herzig
Bates College


Early settler economy in the Pacific Northwest thrived on forest products, fisheries, mines, and agriculture. Yet, the region’s water power resources held far greater potential for economic growth when hydroelectricity appeared on the scene in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Electricity from the dynamo offered infinite possibilities, but its accompanying turbines required a source of power. In the Pacific
Northwest, according to Hirt, abundant power flowed in “the region’s prodigious and ubiquitous rivers” (132). Hydroelectrical power brought modernity to the Pacific Northwest sending its economy into an upward spiral, especially from World War II onward.

Hirt’s earlier book, *The Conspiracy of Optimism* (Lincoln, 1994), charted the downward spiral of the Pacific Northwest’s logging and lumbering industry under the improvident policies of the United States Forest Service during the latter part of the twentieth century. *The Wired Northwest*, however, is decidedly upbeat except in its frank assessment that dams destroyed the salmon runs and that neither hatcheries nor fish ladders can bring back the anadromous fishery to anywhere near its previous scale. The Columbia and Snake Rivers dominate the book’s narrative; its scope extends (with some effort) to the British Columbia side of the Pacific Northwest.

Although hydroelectricity brought technological marvels to the region, political struggles raged concerning public versus private power. The fight began with the early municipally owned power systems of Tacoma and Seattle, continuing through the New Deal into the 1950s (about the one high dam in Hells Canyon on the Snake River) and beyond. The production of millions of kilowatts from the harnessing of the Columbia River—first by the Bureau of Reclamation’s Grand Coulee Dam and later the Army Corps of Engineers’ Bonneville Dam—during the New Deal tipped the scales in favor of public power. Hirt does a yeoman job following the debates through the twentieth century. He notes that since no Pacific Northwest state opted for a state-owned or sponsored power system (like Nebraska’s), the way was open for an eventual partnership between private and public power production and delivery.1

Hirt’s views are decidedly in favor of public power. He dismisses the validity of private power arguments: “It is hard to see how taxpayers and electric consumers were harmed by public ownership” (289). Both public utilities and regulatory agencies during the Progressive Era (1900 to 1917) made possible what he calls a “democratized electrical service” (267).

In the case of British Columbia, private power prevailed until well after World War II, the Province not experiencing the wartime growth that occurred to its south. BC Electric was “expropriated” by the Provincial Government during the 1960s, but too late for the Province to have the kind of low rates that once provided the American portion of the Pacific Northwest with “an economic stimulus somewhat akin to the Federal Reserve System’s lowering interest rates” (360).

Hirt’s final assessment asserts that neither public nor private power won the long struggle despite charges of “creeping socialism” on the part of private power. What occurred on both sides of the international boundary in the Pacific Northwest was “a curious, hybrid system of

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publicly owned and privately owned utilities sharing the electricity supply sector, with private utilities embedded in a strongly regulated environment” (99).

This impressive book is a case study in progress (with the exception of salmon runs)—generally a success story about the democratic development of an essential resource upon which modernity rests.

William D. Rowley
University of Nevada, Reno


C. Vann Woodward’s The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York, 1955), which Martin Luther King, Jr., called the civil-rights movement’s historical bible, demonstrated that the segregationist laws passed by many southern state legislatures relatively late in the nineteenth century were not inevitable. Yellin makes an equally compelling case that President Woodrow Wilson’s riding the Jim Crow wave and segregating the federal civil service was not inevitable either. Wilson intended, Yellin argues, “not just racial separation but the limitation of black people to a controlled and exploitable class of laborers” (2). Some might call this viewpoint redundant Marxism. Whether it portrays black people as enslaved in the bad days or free at last in the thank-God-Almighty days, the entire point of capital and the power that it represents is to exploit labor. White over black and all the other colors merely establishes a pecking order.

By focusing on how the state assimilated racism into the bureaucracy, Yellin makes an important contribution to our understanding of “white supremacy” as “a necessary precondition if the United States was to be a model nation, if the federal government was to be a model employer, and if Washington was to be a model city” (3, 6). If that story were not ugly enough, Yellin further demonstrates how Wilsonian segregation “undermined the claims to citizenship and economic security of all African Americans.” In effect, Yellin has constructed a banality of evil tale explaining how and why “the American state has been complicit in racism and black poverty” (4, 8).

Segregation often became the default position regarding “managerial questions of efficiency” for Wilson and other progressives who leaned in that direction (7). Yet Yellin makes it clear that “Wilsonian discrimination was not based upon an explicit set of policies and principles. Instead, [it percolated from] the patronage demands of white Democrats, the howls of white supremacists, the needs of a modernizing governmental bureaucracy, and, indeed, the desire of some managers to feel
they were being fair” (115). Few attitudes are as strange as this pretension to fairness on their part.

Three of Yellin’s seven chapters cover the forty-five years before Wilson’s election. Chapter 5 analyzes what nonspecialists might consider a paradox: Why did so many otherwise honorable progressives champion segregation as a rational and supposedly scientific response to problems along the color line? Chapter 6 chronicles the resistance to Wilsonian segregation organized by black civil servants (especially those who worked in the Treasury Department and the Bureau of Engraving and Printing) and civil rights activists (especially William Monroe Trotter and Archibald Grimke).

President Wilson allowed his senior political appointees free rein, regardless of their intent. It is not clear whether those who justified their decisions on the grounds of good government or the unabashed racists did the most damage. Regardless, Wilson counseled patience and resignation. “We must treat this thing with a recognition of its difficulties,” he said (161). In his epilogue, Yellen ventures five years later—to August 8, 1925—when 35,000 Ku Klux Klansmen paraded down Pennsylvania Avenue and then another sixteen years to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Executive Order 8802 of June 25, 1941, prohibiting, among other things, discrimination in federal agencies.

Both Franklin and his wife Eleanor, in fact, had their Wilsonian moments in 1919. Besides an English nurse and Scottish governess, Eleanor “acquired . . . a complete darky household [staff].” That summer, when a black scare brought interracial violence to more than a dozen cities, Franklin, then an assistant secretary of the Navy, told Eleanor that the four-day Washington, D.C., riot should have been stopped “quicker,” further giving his approval to the “handling of Africans in Arkansas”—a reference to the riot in Elaine where roving bands of whites drove past the fields and shot at cotton pickers.1 The Roosevelts had time to create a better color-line legacy; Woodrow Wilson did not. He died eighteen months before those men in white sheets walked past the White House.

Kenneth O’Reilly
University of Alaska, Anchorage

Why We Fight: Congress and the Politics of World War II. By Nancy Beck Young (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2013) 376 pp. $39.95

In this thoughtful monograph, Young casts our attention toward the legislative politics that rendered judgment—or, more accurately, judgments—on President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. Between 1941 and 1945, Young argues, White House cabinet meetings and inter-

national summits were not the only stomping grounds for high-stakes politics. Rather, political fervor could grip members of Congress, and with consequences that persisted long after armistice.

Young’s project has more than a passing resemblance to Robert David Johnson’s excellent Congress and the Cold War (New York, 2005). Like Johnson, Young underscores the partisan and ideological battles that not only persisted but thrived during a period of American history often characterized by broad-based consensus. Moreover, like Johnson, Young pays tribute to the enduring importance of Congress in an era of rising presidential power. But whereas Johnson focused on foreign policymaking during a period of peace, Young writes about domestic policymaking during a period of war.

Young sees a very different wartime Congress from the one depicted in most presidential and military histories of the era—a Congress chastened by a prior isolationist stance that, after Pearl Harbor, was permanently discredited; a Congress bowed before a popular, liberal president who, just a month into his historic third term in office, plunged the nation headlong into war. Young’s World War II Congress is neither demur nor apologetic, and its members betray little sense of obligation to extend and consolidate the New Deal experiments that, during the 1930s, had revolutionized the relationship between the individual and the state.

Young’s World War II Congress is ground zero for extraordinary political fights that feature entrenched partisan and, at times, geographical divisions. It also is the source of inter-branch struggles about the fate of highly contested domestic policy initiatives. While the nation waged military campaigns in the Pacific Region, North Africa, and Europe, members of Congress fought furiously about the fate of Roosevelt’s New Deal at home. The outcome of these political battles, Young argues, would be decided not by the staunchest liberals or conservatives then barnstorming the country but by moderates with center-right dispositions concerning economic and social policy.

On economic policy, New Deal initiatives were, if not enlarged, then at least preserved. Over three chapters, Young traces the legislative histories of prominent resource management, tax, and labor laws then circulating through Congress, the results of which “sustained the core of the New Deal Economic Order.” The story of wartime social policies, however, looks much different. With the president shunning the causes of civil liberties and civil rights, liberal advocates of social justice experienced profound setbacks to their agenda. Like Katznelson, Young sees the most liberal dimensions of New Deal social policy in decline and moderates and conservatives in ascendance just as soon as the nation set off to war.1

The telling of this history is not especially elegant. Young’s writing can be clunky. Her prose slashes between grand thesis statements and

minutiae of congressional debates about congressional matters large and small. To this political scientist, Young’s statistical analyses of roll-call voting appeared crude and inflexible.

But these flaws, for the most part, are matters of presentation. On matters of substance, Young offers some valuable lessons that we all—historians and political scientists alike—would do well to ponder: Major wars implicate domestic policy just as much as they do foreign policy; during war, multiple political cleavages can define domestic policy disputes; and the pivotal players in these pitched politics often are a forgotten group of individuals toiling in a much-maligned institution—namely, moderate legislators in Congress.

William G. Howell
University of Chicago

The Local Church and Generational Change in Birmingham, 1945–2000. By Ian Jones (Rochester, N.Y., Boydell Press, 2012) 208 pp. $90.00

The Local Church and Generational Change is not only a good book; it is also an ambitious one. The persuasive force of the concept of secularization has led historians to underestimate the importance of Christianity in the recent history of Europe. It has been widely taken for granted that late twentieth-century Europe was “a secular age” in which Christian ideas and institutions, and Christian faith and practice, were marginal to the mainstream of history, however defined.

Thanks to the empirical and statistical work of many historians of postwar Europe, notably Brown and McLeod on Britain and Cholvy and Hilaire on France, the 1950s and 1960s have been brought into focus as a period of Christian revival.¹ This revival resembles the many revivals of Christianity throughout history, for which the appropriate metaphor is a bell-shaped curve of growth and decline. As the postwar revival of the 1950s and 1960s entered a period of decline in the 1980s and 1990s, historians began to apply promiscuously the theory of secularization, mapping a short-term, historically specific decline onto the long-term downward slope of secularization stretching back to the Enlightenment.

Jones cannot make up his mind about secularization; he tries to have it both ways by referring to “religious change and secularization.” When he focuses on religious change, and resists allowing the theory of secularization to answer questions for him, he provides important insight into the workings of religion. Focusing on the institutions that most Christians regard as the fundamental to their religion, the local parish or congregation, he chooses seven congregations as “case studies” in the

metropolitan area of Birmingham—two parishes from the established Church of England, three from the Nonconformist denominations (Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian/Congregationalist), one merged ecumenical Protestant church, and a Roman Catholic parish.

Although the terms teenager and generation gap date from the mid-twentieth century, the Christian churches have regarded the religious socialization of the young as one of their fundamental tasks for many centuries. As the churches of Great Britain, including the state churches of England and Scotland, began to come to terms with the need to act as voluntary bodies rather than merely as agents of state or elite power, they began to pay more attention to new methods to recruit and socialize the young. In the Victorian Age, the great innovation was the Sunday school, which was still important in late twentieth-century Birmingham, but the churches also attempted to attract and retain young people through a variety of strategies, including youth clubs and new forms of church music that they hoped young people would find more “lively.” Nonetheless, evangelical congregations tended to retain the younger generation better than the more liberal ones did.

Jones is at his best when employing congregational and parochial records and publications to provide detailed documentation about the ways in which churches attempted to negotiate a growing generation gap, especially during the 1960s and 1970s. Understanding the centrality of music in church life, he describes the passions involved in debates about changing the musical environment of the churches. Congregations risked alienating an older generation by introducing new forms that appeared to be irreverent or even secular. When discussing the Protestant introduction of popular forms of music and the “happy clappy” praise hymnals favored by charismatic and evangelical Christians, as well as the Roman Catholic reaction to the theologically charged liturgical changes in the post-Vatican II age, Jones’ key word is “compromise.” Congregations and parishes attempted to satisfy old and new generations at once, not to mention the West Indian migrants whose forms of worship were vastly different from theirs. No one has better documented and explained the grassroots religious changes in the music of public worship in Britain than Jones does in this book.

Congregations had to adapt not only to generational issues but also to broad social changes—depopulated inner cities, declining working-class neighborhoods, growing postwar housing estates, etc. The range of the churches’ strategies is impressive, but more work remains to be done in analyzing what worked and why. For example, it was often unclear to religious activists at the time why a youth club would work for certain churches in some neighborhoods but not in others. Jones demonstrates the importance of immigration for church vitality during this era. Some white congregations lamented their inability to attract West Indian immigrants, but others were successful. The churches, however inadvertently racist they might have been in practice, were bastions of opposition to racism in principle, strongly opposing the openly racist politics.
practiced in the Birmingham region by Enoch Powell and others. When the postwar religious revival began to wane during the 1980s and 1990s, and young people began to regard older congregations as unwelcoming, West Indian immigrant families continued to find their way into historically white churches, as well as predominantly black congregations (the Catholic Church could count on Irish and later Polish immigrants to attend its services).

Jones grapples with the difficult problem of assessing the importance of institutions in decline. He provides evidence to sustain Brown’s argument that the influx of women into the workforce in the 1960s meant that the churches were no longer as useful to them as they had been in the 1950s, but his database is not really suited for a systematic treatment of that topic. In The Religious Crisis of the 1960s, McLeod identified multiple social currents that were working against the churches, making a definitive explanation of the decrease in church membership difficult to produce. Congregational members quoted in Jones appear to echo McLeod’s finding, complaining about a general loss of interest among the young without being able to identify a single cause. Jones shows that the crisis of the churches in the 1980s and 1990s was more a British generational crisis than a local manifestation of a global process of secularization.

Notwithstanding his focus on congregations, which is finer-grained than histories that concentrate solely on public debates about religion or the history of denominational bureaucracies, Jones ignores two important ways in which British youths entered the world of Christianity—religious education in state schools and via the BBC. Historians of religion have generally ignored the effects of Britain’s 1944 Education Act—particularly the introduction of compulsory Christian religious education and daily worship in state schools. The upshot was that more young people said daily prayers modeled on the Book of Common Prayer, and sang Christian hymns, during the 1950s than at any other time in the entire history of England. For a time, the BBC’s Sunday evening hymn program, Songs of Praise, became the most widely watched television program in Britain, and it was popular elsewhere in the world as well.

Jeffrey Cox
University of Iowa

Sharing the Prize: The Economics of the Civil Rights Revolution in the American South. By Gavin Wright (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2013) 368 pp. $35.00

The Civil Rights Movement has been criticized on the one hand as a governmental initiative that did not go far enough and on the other hand as a governmental initiative that failed because it went too far. Drawing on the growing, largely quantitative literature in economics
and other social sciences examining the effects of Civil Rights era programs and policies, Wright builds a compelling case for the middle ground. Notwithstanding a “Revolution” that dramatically improved the economic conditions of African Americans, racial inequality persists. Sharing the Prize also highlights why economics needs economic history: The story is far richer and more complete than mainstream empirical micro-economists would tell.

The title points to two key ideas that frame Wright’s argument. First, the Civil Rights revolution benefited not only African Americans but also whites. Second, the gains of the Civil Rights revolution were concentrated in the South, just as the racial inequality and injustice had been before. The often-overlooked substantial net migration of African Americans into the South during recent decades may well be the best summary measure of how much progress has been made in the region. The evidence that Civil Rights–era policies did not harm whites, relative to a counterfactual situation with no Civil Rights movement at all, is far less strong than the evidence that African-American health, schooling, occupational opportunities, and voting outcomes improved, in some cases dramatically. But there is no evidence that whites were harmed; a convincing study of the effects of these policies on whites has simply proven difficult to produce. Whites might have done even better in the absence of the revolution, but Wright at least shows that an expanded labor market for blacks was not inconsistent with rapid economic growth in the South and improving circumstances for the majority of whites.

Wright argues that by the time whites, particularly those in the business community, showed their support for the movement, it was already well underway. Only belatedly did they come to realize that it would benefit them. They believed that integrating lunch counters and textile factories would reduce their profits. They were unaware that customers would adapt or that African-American workers were actually more productive than their typical white counterparts because segregation prevented them from learning about whites’ preferences and blacks’ abilities. These circumstances do not necessarily contradict the standard view in economics that businesses will make changes on their own if those changes are in their interest, though businesses may not always know what will increase profits.

Although there are moments when the book seems too optimistic in its interpretation of the revolution’s successes, those moments are followed by evidence and convincing argument. Continued racial inequality is among our nation’s most vexing problems, and Wright by no means argues that the work is either finished or irreversible. Sharing the Prize tells the important story of the progress made on this front, reminding us in the process that government can accomplish a great deal under the right circumstances.

Sarah Reber
University of California, Los Angeles
Pre-Columbian painted manuscripts or codices have fascinated Mesoamerican scholars for more than 100 years. Of the likely thousands that existed at the time of European contact, less than ten prehispanic examples are known to have survived. The interpretive argument presented in *Heaven and Earth in Ancient Mexico* focuses on only one of the extant manuscripts painted in the Mexican tradition known as the Codex Borgia. In her preface, Milbrath states, “[T]his book proposes a new interpretation that emphasizes natural history, synthesizing data from the fields of ethnohistory, anthropology, art history, and archaeoastronomy to explore these complex images” (xi). The images to which she refers are those contained on pages 29 through 46 of Codex Borgia. Milbrath asserts more often than she argues throughout the book’s five chapters that (1) much of the iconography and calendrical information recorded in this section of the Borgia encodes a specific 365-day cycle of 18 seasonal festivals spanning the years 1495 and 1496, and (2) that these pages record a series of observable planetary bodies and astronomical events, most notable of which was a solar eclipse visible, weather permitting, across the central Mexican highlands.

The methodology that Milbrath employs was forged in similar, groundbreaking research conducted on almanacs in the Maya codices. Mesoamerican codices are comprised of highly condensed calendrical instruments called almanacs that place events of a secular and sacred nature into a 260-day ritual calendar. Maya codices contain explicit information (hieroglyphic texts and mathematical notations) that helps to elucidate an almanac’s function and calendrical structure. Expanded almanacs concern such natural events as the movement of astronomical bodies, the prediction of solar eclipses, and the commemoration of seasonal cycles. These instruments also include information that allows their calendrics reckoned in the ritual calendar to be situated into real time via the Maya Long Count and correlation to our Gregorian calendar. In a seminal article, the Brickers explain their method of triangulation: “[A]t least three different kinds of cycles are necessary in order to determine a unique date for an almanac. The first cycle is always the 260-day tzolkin [ritual calendar], and the second is usually the 365-day haab [solar year]. The third cycle must be astronomical.” Epigraphical and iconographic references to seasonal stations or astronomical events provide the key to situating the calendrical cycles that are explicitly recorded or implied by imagery into real time.

The challenge of applying the Brickers’ triangulation method to
Mexican almanacs requires inferring two of the three key pieces of information: Which of the multiple 365-day calendars used across central Mexico prior to European contact, if any, was used in Borgia almanacs, and which astronomical cycles, if any, is encoded in the imagery and calendrical structures of almanacs? Milbrath attempts to answer these questions for the Codex Borgia in the first half of her volume. Her arguments in Chapters 1 through 3, however, leave far too many possible alternatives, dangling issues, and unsubstantiated assertions.

Milbrath’s analysis depends on descriptions and explanations of Mexican calendar systems and an annual festival (veintena) cycle by Spanish clerics writing in the early colonial period. Scholars like Aveni question the accuracy of this data because of their Eurocentric influences. It is not so much the contents of these festivals as their ordering and rigid calendrical scheduling that are suspect. The reader arrives at the model for the Borgia’s “astronomical narrative” (76)—and its summation as presented in Chapters 4 and 5—with weak premises for dating and consequently for many of the iconographic and astronomical interpretations. Additionally, the presentation of results from astronomy software as though it were beyond dispute lends a false sense of precision not only for the interpretation of the Borgia imagery but also for the reconstruction of ancient cultural practices. The one big question left unanswered is why would the scribe of the Codex Borgia commit 18 precious pages of a sacred manuscript to a single, mostly mundane 365-day period?

Milbrath’s model for this undoubtedly special section of the Codex Borgia flies in the face of certain accepted notions about how the Borgia Group codices in particular and pre-Columbian codices in general were composed for divination and prediction, as well as for the scheduling and organizing of rituals. Unconventional conceptualizing and multivariate-style analysis of the codices have often led to key breakthroughs in our understanding of these documents. Unfortunately, the model proposed by Milbrath in *Heaven and Earth in Ancient Mexico* falls short of achieving her goal.

Christine Hernández  
Tulane University


The consumer economy has become a topic of interest throughout the world. Retail commerce and its component parts have become well in-

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tegrated into historical studies—from new emporiums devoted to shopping (such as department stores, malls, and electronic commerce) to the ways by which governments promote the expansion of credit, devise new laws to make goods more affordable, and develop infrastructure to facilitate the shipment and availability of foodstuffs and durable goods. Many of these new studies focus on Latin America, especially Mexico and Argentina.

Milanesio’s work on the rise of working-class consumerism in Argentina is one of several books linking consumerism to the first two terms of President Juan Domingo Perón (1946–1955), providing fresh approaches to this complicated topic. Eduardo Elena’s *Dignifying Argentina: Peronism, Citizenship and Mass Consumption, Workers Go Shopping in Argentina* (Pittsburgh, 2011) traced the beginnings of mass consumerism to governmental policies during the 1940s. Milanesio goes beyond that work to focus on advertising that targeted the working class in Argentina and other Latin American countries and on Argentine postwar surveys of consumer habits that examined how working-class housewives decided which household items to buy—refrigerators, radios, phonographs, and dress suits. Milanesio also covers the reaction of the middle classes to the assumption that better-paid workers could afford to purchase items previously identified only with the upper classes. Although most of the written sources focus on Buenos Aires, Milanesio draws her conclusions about the working class from the twenty-five oral interviews that she conducted in the port city of Rosario in the province of Santa Fe.

The section about advertising and consumer interviews reveals insights into the involvement of sociologists. Most specialists of Argentina are familiar with Gino Germani’s anti-Peronist study, *Política y sociedad en una época de transición* (Buenos Aires, 1962), but few are aware of his work with advertisers in 1954 (59), or his collaboration with a psychologist analyzing dreams of lower-class women in a popular magazine (167). Letters to the magazine *Idilio* afforded insights into consumerist desires, but since they were published anonymously, they could have been written by shop clerks, bank tellers, and teachers, as well as factory workers. How does the author define working class? Milanesio’s analysis of the 1947 national census, rarely examined by historians, helps to link consumerism with demography.

The argument that higher wages and Peronist laws alone could expand consumer credit to the working class is perhaps the weakest in the book; it is difficult to determine how commerce implemented Peronist laws and exactly how merchants defined credit. Was it a layaway plan in which purchasers received an item only after paying all or part of the payments, or was it an installment plan that implied possession of an item even before payments were made? We also need to know exactly who purchased what to confirm that the working class could benefit from credit, as well as whether they paid their cuotas (payments) to the store or an agency. Although some of the people interviewed in Rosario claimed
to have been able to save for a refrigerator, which cost a year’s salary, most workers probably would not have been able to do so, particularly outside the capital and provincial cities. Nonetheless, that likelihood, along with the prospect of going to theaters and restaurants, inflamed the imagination of the middle class.

Despite minor issues, Milanesio offers a fascinating and well-written account of consumerism and its effect on class during Peronism. It remains the work of other scholars with more data to confirm her ideas.

Donna J. Guy
Ohio State University


Richards’ core argument is that although the Chilean government has promoted multiculturalism, in the context of a neoliberal economic system its policies entail no structural changes that would actually alter the severe power imbalance between the Mapuche and the non-Mapuche populations. Instead, the state’s commitment to the indigenous people became a matter of promoting their economic productivity rather than providing them any substantive rights. Furthermore, the economic model is based largely on the export of raw materials, which includes timber found in Mapuche communities. Thus, the “Chilean Miracle” meant “massive outmigration, dispossession, lands depleted of water and nutrients, lack of control over natural resources, inability to contribute to decisions that affect them, criminalization of demands” (215).

Richards’ methodology is qualitative sociology, and her analysis is founded on seventy-five in-depth interviews with farmers, activists, local elites, and state officials in four comunas (municipalities) of the Araucanía region in central Chile. She provides an insightful discussion of methods and shows a laudable self-awareness as a researcher by generating responses from her interviewees that reflect their race and class position: “More than once I was told that maybe Chile should have done what the United States did and just kill all the Indians” (29). The narrative is well-crafted, effectively capturing the different positions of relevant actors.

The “Chilean miracle” has come under fire in many works that focus on how inequality, military autonomy, police brutality, lack of protection for labor, lack of educational opportunity, environmental degradation, and gender discrimination have posed serious obstacles to democratization. Many of these problems stem directly from a market-oriented economic model. That facet of Richard’s argument is not especially novel. More valuable is her detailed discussion of the pervasiveness of the economics model. Ironically, even though the Mapuche suffer
from its effects, the government’s response (whether the left or right is in power) remains fundamentally economic. The problems of the Mapuche are viewed narrowly as a result of poverty, not as a lack of rights to land, representation, self-governance, and formal recognition. Multiculturalism is top-down and inflexible.

Since the state views the Mapuche primarily in economic terms, it quickly labels them as terrorists whenever they assume an activist role. “Bad Indians” are not “authentic”; “good Indians” work with the state by participating in, among other things, ethnotourism. Richards’ study reveals how racism reinforces the economic model. Although the literature about Chilean democratization often centers on poverty, rarely does it focus specifically on race. The state’s use of anti-terrorist legislation to justify detentions of Mapuche—while targeting no one else—underlines that reality.

Gregory Weeks
University of North Carolina, Charlotte

Britain’s Black Debt—Reparations for Caribbean Slavery and Native Genocide. By Hilary McD. Beckles (Kingston, University of the West Indies Press, 2013) 292 pp. $70.00 cloth $30.00 paper

This volume of Caribbean economic history argues the case for reparations from Britain on the basis of the wealth created from the exploitation of enslaved African labor and native genocide, as well as an enduring negative influence on the region. Beckles makes use of the fact that Britain paid compensation to the slave plantation owners in 1834 on the eve of the abolition of slavery. Slavery relegated enslaved Africans and indigenous peoples to the status of non-persons or property with no right to life (15). The case is also made on behalf of the indigenous populations of the region and the genocidal wars that were conducted against them. Drawing on the work of Craton, Beckles points out that “between 1492 and 1730, the native population of the Lesser Antilles fell by as much as 90 per cent” (24).1

Beckles updates with current economic research the work of Eric Williams, whose Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill, 1944) helped to provide a framework for Britain’s Black Debt. Beckles also cites Randall Robinson’s The Debt: What America Owes Blacks (New York, 2000), as well as the writings of Lord Anthony Gifford, member of the British House of Lords, who has argued the moral and legal case for reparations.2

Beckles details the growth of the British economy, the development

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1 See Michael Craton, Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies (Ithaca, 1982), 23.
of the British financial and insurance systems, and genealogical evidence concerning the growth of the British bourgeoisie and their links with the royal family through marriage. Indeed, the cover of the book has a photograph of Queen Elizabeth II “with her cousin, the 7th Earl of Harewood, at his sugar plantation (the Belle) in Barbados in 1966. This plantation was bought by the earl’s ancestor in 1780 with 232 slaves” (frontispiece). The earls of Harewood also had plantations in Jamaica and the third earl was a British member of parliament (130). In 1776, “some forty members of the British parliament were making their money from West Indian [slave] plantations” (131).

In 2007, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair expressed regret for slavery during the events marking the bicentennial anniversary of the abolition of the slave trade by the British Parliament. But he stopped short of an apology, which could have led to discussions about remedial measures. The church was also deeply implicated in slavery. A total of 128 clergy are listed as having received compensation for the abolition of slavery (110). The Anglican Church, which was also a major proprietor in the Caribbean, tendered an apology in 2007 for its involvement with slavery.

Demographic studies show that during the eighteenth century, British ships carried 3 million Africans out of Africa, bound for one place or another in the Americas, twice the number of Africans that other nations relocated (83). By 1775, the British West Indian plantations “were valued at £50 million (£ 71.7 billion in 2010)” (91). Beckles argues that this past experience has had negative psychological, material, and social consequences for the descendants of the enslaved.

Beckles led the Caribbean lobby for reparations at the 2001 conference on racism in Durban, South Africa. The position taken by government delegations from the United States and the European Union was that slavery should have been a crime against humanity, though it was not considered so at the time. Beckles draws on the anti-slavery movement in Britain as well as the liberal philosophical, religious, and legal traditions of Europe, however, to show that the institution and practices of European slavery in the Caribbean were highly contested and that a considerable body of opinion opposed slavery on moral grounds.

Beckles still leads a campaign in the Caribbean, Europe, and Africa to gain public support for reparations. He is also advising prime ministers of the Caribbean Community to adopt a common position regarding reparations the better to continue the discussion with the British government that began in 2007.3

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3 In June 2013, after a High Court hearing, the British government agreed to compensate 5,000 Kenyans for physical and psychological damage inflicted by the colonial regime during the 1950s.
In this ambitious book, Brett attempts to cross a comprehensive survey of African history with a historiographical review. The book’s organization and themes suggest an overview of African history, covering all regions from 10,000 B.C.E. to the present, whereas the attention to individual historians and quick summaries of their views and controversies takes the work toward historiography.

Brett addresses themes that anyone teaching African history would recognize, starting with the problem of a thin (if not completely absent) written record for most of the continent for an extended period of time, encouraging historians to become multidisciplinary—that is, to use ethnographic analogy, archaeology, and oral tradition—to compensate for it. His view of African nationhood, especially the relationship between external trade (trans-Saharan at one point and seaborne with America at another) and African politics intersects with a discussion of empires, not just those of the Western Sudan but also smaller ones like Mwenemutapa or Kongo, followed by an account of how the slave trade figured into commerce as a whole.

Brett’s close treatment of the nineteenth-century departs, to a large extent, from the survey form that he employs for earlier decades. He analyzes the colonial period from the perspective of a still-evolving post-colonial one, which retains much of the atmosphere of the African history that predated it. In between these well-worn topics, Brett inter-sperses an interesting and fruitful discussion of the scale and scope of African societies, of regional boundaries, and particularly of chronology and periodization.

Brett’s background in North African history lends his book its greatest distinction; his chapters about the northern, northeastern, and Islamic parts of Africa put a distinctive spin on the usual way that African history is taught. Even new textbooks rarely deal with the super-Saharan section of Africa, certainly not with the depth that Brett achieves.

Brett’s predominantly survey-style approach to historiography sometimes misses the mega-themes that some scholars view as shaping the development of African history. His adherence to this model cannot gracefully incorporate an engagement with the developing historiography, which, in this case, sometimes loses the historical thread, and a presentation of current debates, which is sometimes truncated, almost rushed, in the interests of keeping the story moving forward. He does not trace the mega-questions of historiography that determined which periods and regions were to be considered—questions about African agriculture, iron working, or state formation, especially in West Africa, which yielded to the trade-and-politics fad that highlighted the pre-colonial period’s contact outside the continent. Theoretical Marxism in the late 1970s quickly gave way to post-colonialism flavored with post-modernism, at the same
time driving investigation into more contemporary periods and highlighting southern Africa.

In the end, Approaching African History seems torn between dual aims. As Brett himself acknowledges, his approach produces a final work that is faithful neither to one nor the other.

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Shanghai Sanctuary: Chinese and Japanese Policy toward European Jewish Refugees during World War II. By Gao Bei (New York, Oxford University Press, 2012) 204 pp. $74.00

In Shanghai Sanctuary, Gao narrates the pragmatic approaches of Chinese and Japanese military and diplomatic officials toward the Jews of China. She argues that the presence of European Jewish refugees in Shanghai complicated diplomatic relationships between China, Japan, Germany, and the United States during the 1930s and World War II (3–4). Her analysis concerns Chinese and Japanese individuals’ vested interests in the Jews of China, particularly their attempt to exploit the extensive financial and diplomatic ties of Shanghai’s Baghdadi Jewish community with the United States to advance the military and economic welfare of their respective nations. Gao investigates and compares the processes of Chinese and Japanese policy toward the Jews against the backdrop of rising nationalism, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and World War II.

Gao uses her focus on the Jews to uncover disconnections between the Chinese and Japanese authorities in their struggle for power in China. First, she provides a succinct but excellent account of divergent Chinese and Japanese encounters with, and perspectives on, the Jewish people during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Second, she analyzes the development of policymaking in China and Japan regarding the established Jewish community in Shanghai throughout the 1930s. Finally, she re-examines the history of Japanese occupation of Shanghai constructed by previous scholars, identifying historical inaccuracies and offering fresh insights based on her analyses and new evidence.

This deep but concise study draws from compelling archival sources in China, Taiwan, and Japan that truly sets it apart from previous scholarship about the Jews of Shanghai. Gao’s engagement with Chinese archival sources in China and Taiwan explains how Zionism inspired the Chinese authorities to sympathize with Jews’ nationalistic quest in the face of their own problems with Western imperialism. Additionally, the sources expose the Chinese policymakers’ formulation of settlement plans for Jews in China to strengthen national economic and military interests. They believed that these Jews’ connections with influential
American Jews would encourage the American government to aid China.

The integration of Chinese and Japanese primary and secondary sources also allows Gao to advance new information about the Chinese and Japanese interactions with Shanghai Jews. For example, Gao challenges the notion of Shanghai as an open port that did not require an entry visa. She found that the Chinese consulates across Europe encountered nearly 500 European Jews per month requesting entry visas. Diplomats issued them on the order of the national government. The Chinese government saw this action as a way to maintain its sense of control while facing the Japanese invasion at home. Meanwhile, the Japanese began restricting Jewish immigration to Shanghai for those without entry visas, though many Jews had them. Refugees arrived nonetheless because of their Chinese visas. Jews with Chinese entry visas could remain in Shanghai but not in the Japanese occupied areas.

Gao utilizes materials from the South Manchurian Railway (smr) and the Office of Army and Navy to highlight the Japanese investment in solving the “Jewish Question.” The smr, home to Japan’s premier economic-research institutes, provided “Jewish experts” in the military with data. Its research revealed the expanse of international Jewish networks—including those in Washington. Gao claims, however, that when relations between Japan and the United States deteriorated, the Jews of Shanghai lost their importance and became a burden to the authorities.

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Hughes’ stimulating volume explores the ties that linked India’s princes to sport hunting (*shikar*), and how this practice shaped their relations with the colonial government, their own subjects, and the environment. Hughes argues that, in the jungle (in this context, any uncultivated land), princes “could commune with tigers” and even “assimilate the animals’ vitality into their own bodies” (45, 47). In so doing, they could at once reclaim their martial heritage, assert an enduring masculinity, and validate their sovereignty.

Three fascinating case studies of individual Rajput princes illuminate Hughes’ argument. Based on rarely examined source materials—including game diaries, the memoirs of huntsmen, and even Rajput miniature paintings—these accounts provide a unique insight into how princes saw themselves and their role in Indian society. Princes targeted whatever animals roamed their states. Tigers were always the most
prized, but wild boar, grouse, and other wildfowl also fell to princely guns. The total number of kills could be enormous. By the end of his life, Ganga Singh of Bikaner, who kept meticulous records, had accounted for 25,000 sand grouse and nearly as many duck. Killing wild boar was central, Hughes argues, to the construction of Rajput identity; the boar was a tenacious opponent, especially when fought on horseback. Moreover, gifts of pork enabled a prince to “assert his superior status and political authority” over his nobles (124).

On a hunting expedition, a prince could also join with the British in a common endeavor. By hosting shooting parties, a prince could visibly proclaim his loyalty and announce his ability as a “modern administrator” (184). At the same time, as in the miniature paintings hidden in Mewar’s shooting boxes, princes could mock the British for their lack of skill, thus re-affirming their own “honor and independence” (135). But the restraints of the colonial order could never be wholly eliminated; nor was “directing shooting campaigns against birds” ever the same as “leading soldiers in battle against other men” (220).

In her final chapter, entitled “Threatened Kingdoms of Dwindling Beasts,” Hughes endeavors to assess the social and ecological consequences of setting aside large tracts of “jungle” for hunting purposes. Although acknowledging that the “conservation of princely environments and royal beasts” sometimes subjected villagers to attacks by tigers and the depredation of their crops by wild boar, Hughes nevertheless insists that subjects conceded a prince’s right to hunt, and even “celebrated their prince’s sporting successes” (266). The development of irrigation facilities in desert Bikaner, which jointly announced the prince’s “modern credentials” and extended his shooting opportunities by providing water and forage for wildlife, was “culturally intelligible and comparatively acceptable” (181).

Hughes concludes the book with a plea for a conservation model in the India of today, where only 1,706 tigers remain. What is required, she argues, are not fenced preserves but “parks with people” who take responsibility for their wildlife (274). This policy, she says, was a “defining feature of princely ecology” and remains well worth sustaining (274). Students of wildlife management and ecology, as well as historians of India and the British Empire, will welcome this thought-provoking study.

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