World Antiquarianism: Comparative Perspectives. Edited by Alain Schnapp (Los Angeles, Getty Research Institute, 2014) 464 pp. $60.00

This fascinating collection, beautifully produced, offers findings on the origins and evolution of antiquarianism—a deep interest in objects and records from the past—in many different societies. The authors stem from a number of regions, and the collective approach is decidedly interdisciplinary, featuring anthropologists and archeologists along with historians and art historians.

Besides empirical specifics (the list of case studies is too long to detail in a short review), the edition offers data and analysis about the various kinds of settings that have encouraged antiquarianism. An old proposition—that only the West and China generated cultural and institutional frameworks for serious antiquarianism—is significantly modified, though not entirely demolished. The book offers plausible accounts of serious antiquarian interest in the Abbasid caliphate, in early Mexico, in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Japan, and possibly in India, as well as in both Egypt and Mesopotamia, centuries before anything like the West came into being.

A few concerns are not just quibbles. The book suffers from the common fate of collections in not offering real connections among its articles and thus assuring, among other things, a lack of much explicit comparison, despite abundant opportunities. Worse is the outright repetition of themes, particularly in three separate essays that cover the Renaissance, without cross-reference. The introduction is good but also brief, providing no explanation of why certain topics were chosen and others omitted. Despite some discussion of antiquarian interest in preliterate societies, Africa, most obviously, is almost entirely ignored. Moreover, the Buddhist lack of antiquarian interest receives mention but little examination amid a clear neglect of Southeast Asia. Russia is also absent. Although not even a large book can be expected to cover everything, some discussion of the principles underlying the chosen topics would have been revealing.

That said, the collection is consistently interesting. Articles vary in length, but they are all abundantly documented. Several of them detail episodes in Chinese antiquarianism, ranging from early interest to important projects during the Song dynasty and later during the chaotic nineteenth century. Those centered in the West balance an undue attention on the Renaissance with good studies of Rome, the medieval period, and important developments during the eighteenth century. The book’s treatment of India, the Americas, and several projects in Oceania also involve Western antiquarian work but often in interaction with indigenous groups. The final chapter deals with contemporary patterns in India. Many of the chapters convey important debates about specific incidents in antiquarian history as well as the more general issue of comparison between diverse cultures.

The book is clearly earmarked for the antiquarian field, but it will also have considerable value for scholars interested in multicultural insights.
Despite its analytical gaps, the book situates antiquarianism as a valid and engaging topic on a world-historical stage.

Peter N. Stearns
George Mason University


Grossman’s book, as the subtitle indicates, examines nine economic “disasters” and draws lessons from them. *Wrong* is a clearly written work, with none of the jargon that sometimes afflicts economic history. Designed for a broad audience, the work has neither graphs nor tables, and its explanations of difficult concepts are lucid. The book emphasizes a common thread that brings together these case studies: “The main culprits were policy makers who were guided by ideology rather than economics” (xxi). However, Grossman’s approach, which emphasizes certainties rather than debate, does not always prove persuasive.

The emphasis on the dangers of ideology provides valuable insights into several of the episodes that Grossman studies. In his discussion of the British response to the Irish famine of the mid-1840s, Grossman aptly condemns the actions of the Whig government, led by Lord John Russell. The Whigs, who were committed to laissez-faire economics, cut back on relief efforts, exacerbating the misery caused by the failure of the potato crop. Grossman also stands on solid ground in criticizing the nationalist sentiments that led to the imposition of heavy reparations payments on Germany after World War I. These demands led to unsustainable burdens, the instability of the Weimar Republic, and the rise of extremism. Finally, Grossman makes a plausible argument in denouncing the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930, imposed by a Republican party dedicated to protectionism. Economists at the time presciently warned that trade barriers would only worsen the downturn.

The other six episodes that Grossman studies, however, seem less straightforward than his analysis suggests. His argument that the British Acts of Trade helped to cause the American Revolution rests, in part, on a misreading of the Declaration of Independence: The Americans condemned only the more recent punitive measures. Similarly, his strong defense of the national banks established in the United States in 1791, 1816, and 1913 is more debatable than his text allows. Major downturns occurred on their watch, whereas strong growth prevailed between 1836 and 1913 when the United States lacked a central bank.

Questions can also be raised about Grossman’s judgments concerning events in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Was the decision in the 1920s by Britain—and fifty other countries—to return to the gold standard wrong? Retrospectively it might seem that way, but that perspective did
not emerge until the 1930s. The analysis of Japan’s “lost decade” of the 1990s is one of the weaker chapters in the book. Grossman does not make clear what decisions or “ideology” led to slower growth. In discussing the “subprime meltdown” of 2007 to 2009, Grossman singles out President George W. Bush’s ideological dedication to lower taxes as the root of the catastrophe. Other problems, such as weak regulation or greedy institutions, are consigned to a secondary role. Moreover, Grossman’s examination of the current euro crisis lacks a strong point of view. The fate of this currency, he suggests, remains undecided.

In short, this engaging work too often simplifies the past to set forth definitive lessons for modern policymakers. A few of Grossman’s lessons are useful—governments should lower trade barriers and avoid punitive reparations—but in many other cases, the complexities of the real world defy the appealing, ordered analysis that Grossman presents.

Marc Egnal
York University


The Great War of 1914 to 1918 was not only the largest episode of mass killing in world history to that date but also the greatest humanitarian disaster. The war was responsible for the deaths of 10 million soldiers as well as the incapacitation, physical and mental, of a similar number. Its immediate sequelae—including the ethnic re-engineering of central and southeastern Europe, the reciprocal ethnic cleansing of Greece and Turkey, and the Russian civil war—generated an unprecedented flow of refugees and stateless persons. Our view of the Russian famine of 1921 is occluded by the greater tragedy of the Holodomor during the 1930s, but—with a death toll of at least 1.5 million—it was the worst episode of mass starvation in mainland Europe for a century.

Cabanes sets out to fill a gap in this postwar story, in which humane impulses were channeled into ambitious, creative, and ad hoc forms of humanitarian action. The scale and diversity of these responses was such that the humanitarian effort is difficult to categorize. It was a quantum leap from pre-war transnational charity, in both scope and coordination, but it lacked the universal organizing framework of human rights that was to follow in the next war. Cabanes recounts those experiments in their own terms, not just as a prolegomena to the more solid instruments and norms that followed twenty-five years later. He chooses five different individuals and institutions with which to illuminate the diversity, tensions, and paradoxes of the humanitarian initiatives.

Cabanes’ case study of René Cassin and the Conférence Internationale des Mutilés et Anciens Combattants in the first chapter highlights the
tensions inherent in the humanitarianism of the era. The postwar nationalism of veterans’ mobilization, which had its roots in the agitation for disabled soldiers’ rights during the war, sat uneasily alongside Cassin’s efforts to create a transnational organization, often contradicting and undermining his cosmopolitanism.

Cabanes devotes his second chapter to the International Labour Office, headed by Albert Thomas, who sought to link social justice with international peace. He then turns to Fridtjof Nansen, the Norwegian explorer and national hero, who became the world’s first High Commissioner for Refugees. His fourth chapter focuses on the professionalization of famine relief and the birth of emergency population nutrition with the American Relief Administration, led by Herbert Hoover. Finally, Cabanes retells the story of Eglantyne Jebb, who established the Save the Children Fund.

The biographical focus of the five cases provides a helpful context for highlighting the complexities and contradictions of the humanitarian effort—for example, Hoover’s belief that humanitarian relief to Russia would hasten the collapse of Communism rather than consolidate it.

Cabanes’ is a fascinating story, well told. Too often, the story of inter-war humanitarianism is told as a prolegomena to post–World War II institutions and principles. By bringing Cassin’s story to the fore, Cabanes avoids this trap. Notably, the salience of the issue of disabled veterans never again reached the heights of the 1920s. The shadow of the second world iteration of norms and mechanisms that followed World War II does not hang over the account.

Alex de Waal
The World Peace Foundation

*Whales and Nations: Environmental Diplomacy on the High Seas*. By Kurkpatrick Dorsey (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2013) 365 pp. $34.95

*Whales and Nations* examines the efforts of twentieth-century diplomats to regulate the global whaling industry through international conventions. It provides a succinct history of modern whaling from its origins in the fjords of Norway to its demise in the krill grounds of Antarctica. It offers valuable insights into the development of scientific research on cetacean biology and the emergence of scientific techniques for estimating whale populations and numbers, and it provides an in-depth look at the many attempts to create an international regime designed to make the whaling industry sustainable. Dorsey relies primarily on the traditional tools and methods of historians—archival records, government documents, scientific research, journal and newspaper accounts, and public debates.

A pioneer in the field of environmental diplomacy, Dorsey is keenly aware of the difficulties that beset all efforts to protect commercially
valuable resources, especially in the “global commons” of the world’s oceans. He argues that diplomats made significant advances against heavy odds, in that they managed to impose restraints (closed seasons, length and weight minimums, ocean sanctuaries, factory inspectors, and full-use practices) on an industry that was cutthroat, wasteful, and rapacious. Without the international treaties and protocols of the 1930s and 1940s, whalers may well have annihilated the blues, finsi, sei, rights, humpbacks, and other commercially valuable whale species before a global moratorium could come to the rescue in the 1980s. To be sure, this backhanded compliment is an odd way to measure the effectiveness of the International Whaling Commission (IWC), the agency established in 1946 to enforce the conventions; its “success” consisted of protecting remnant stocks after the whaling industry had self-destructed from decades of over-hunting. Nonetheless, it is worth remembering that today’s diplomats have not succeeded in imposing effective restrictions on other fisheries and that, as a result, many ocean species are facing commercial extinction, with little prospect of a global moratorium on the horizon.

The book’s greatest strength lies in its nuanced analysis of the diplomatic interplay among the whaling powers—notably, Norway, Great Britain, Russia, Japan, the United States, France, and the Netherlands—as well as many lesser powers that are often overlooked. Future scholars will be hard-pressed to add anything new to Dorsey’s well-researched analysis of these diplomatic parleys. The book would be stronger, however, if Dorsey had included a chapter devoted exclusively to the economic side of the industry (a topic that he handles only in scattered fashion). One of the chief obstacles to regulation, after all, was the enormous cost of constructing and maintaining a whaling fleet. Since these fleets made money only when they were on the hunt, whalers fiercely resisted all attempts to restrict the hunting season or to cap the annual kill rates, even as they recognized the ecological need for catch limits to secure the industry’s long-term viability.

Commercial whaling was also deeply tied to the fats industry; most blubber was turned into margarine and then consumed by Europeans. There were a wide variety of other oils—coconut, palm, peanut, and soybean, among them—that were just as suitable for margarine production and far more sustainable. But Unilever (the British company that dominated the fats market) liked to have large quantities of whale oil on hand to flood the market whenever the price of vegetable oils began to climb.1 Both the whaling fleets and the fats manufacturers conducted their own economic diplomacy outside the framework of the nation-states (just as the oil-and-gas industry does today on global warming), thus

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1 See Karl Brandt, Whale Oil: An Economic Analysis (Stanford, 1940) (no pagination), which is about whale oil and its alternatives, along with Unilever’s manipulation of the market; Cioc, The Game of Conservation: International Treaties to Protect the World’s Migratory Animals (Athens, 2009), 132–133.
warranting a more central role in Dorsey’s otherwise superb exploration of whale diplomacy.

Mark Cioc
University of California, Santa Cruz

_A Sense of the Enemy: The High-Stakes History of Reading Your Rival’s Mind._
By Zachary Shore (New York, Oxford University Press, 2014) 258 pp. $29.95

This creative and highly readable study defines and illustrates the concept of “strategic empathy,” the ability to think like one’s enemies. The central characters under analysis include some major twentieth-century decision makers—Mohandas K. Gandhi, Gustav Stresemann, Josef Stalin, Adolf Hitler, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, as well as the more obscure Vietnamese strategist, Le Duan. Shore’s analyses demonstrate a deep knowledge of developments in a number of disciplines, including cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, behavioral economics, and political science, and his case studies are based on first-rate archival research.

The Gandhi case study shows how the Indian leader discerned that non-violence could be an effective strategy for coping with British colonial rulers. The two chapters on Gustav Stresemann focus on his ability to turn the German Weimar Republic into a nation of growing economic strength and international status by skillfully manipulating its adversaries after the disastrous loss in World War I. Having previously written a book about Germany—_What Hitler Knew: The Battle for Information in Nazi Foreign Policy_ (New York, 2005)—Shore’s archival research in these chapters is especially impressive. Le Duan’s importance derives from his ability to discern the growing domestic constraints on the United States’ ability to persist in pursuing its disastrous policy in the Vietnam War. Hitler plays a central role in two of the studies. Roosevelt used multiple sources of information that enabled him to perceive—well in advance of his domestic critics, including the famed aviator Charles Lindbergh—the threat posed by Hitler’s Nazi Germany. In contrast, Stalin projected onto Hitler his own concept of rationality; he was certain that Hitler would not attack the USSR because he would not want to fight a war on two fronts. Thus, despite ample evidence of massive German military deployments and repeated warnings from British intelligence that attack was imminent, Stalin took no precautionary steps until hours after the onset of Operation Barbarossa. Whereas Gandhi, Stresemann, Roosevelt, and Le Duan were able to able to anticipate their adversaries’ moves—to exercise “strategic empathy”—Stalin failed to read the signs, with almost disastrous consequences.

The key to “strategic empathy” is to search for “pattern breaks” in which an adversary deviates from previous patterns of behavior, especially if doing so entails significant costs. Shore is critical of theories in various
disciplines, especially of quantitative methods, that employ a “continuity heuristic” to understand decision-making behavior. He cites a number of major studies that question the ability to predict. However, which “pattern breaks” are crucial? Moscow’s foreign policy after the death of Stalin provides a case in point. Stalin’s successors reduced Soviet armed forces by 1.2 million men, signed the Austrian State Treaty, and withdrew from the Porkkala Peninsula in Finland ahead of schedule. Some saw a “break point,” but Secretary of State Dulles was having none of it, attributing the Soviet moves to the weakness of a failing regime and to the strength of American containment policy.

Shore asserts that “strategic empathy” can be learned, that it is both generalizable and parsimonious, but he also correctly states that it is not predictive (200). He points out that studies of historical decision making can significantly complement the cognitive sciences. His excellent study provides strong support for the latter point.

Ole R. Holsti
Duke University


The Bretton Woods negotiations are typically described as an intellectual contest between Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes and their rival plans for postwar monetary order. This framing directs attention to the national priorities that the two statesmen sought to advance—an open trading system based on pegged exchange rates and free capital markets in the case of the United States and a full-employment-friendly international system of adjustable exchange rates and inconvertible currencies in the case of Great Britain. The story reaches a climax with the compromise of pegged but adjustable exchange rates and currencies convertible on current but not capital account. Richard Gardner’s Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective: The Origins and Prospects of Our International Economic Order (New York, 1956) is an influential case in point; Benn Steil’s Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White and the Making of a New World Order (Princeton, 2013) is another.

While acknowledging that thirty-two of the forty-four delegations at Bretton Woods were from what we would now call emerging markets, this narrative dismisses their participation as marginal. As a result, their agenda of finance for development was diminished. The International

1 See, for example, Philip Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton, 2005); Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions (New York, 2009).
Monetary Fund, not the World Bank, became the dominant Bretton Woods institution, and the Fund focused on the advanced countries.

Drawing on the ample secondary literature but also on such primary sources as the recently rediscovered transcripts of the Bretton Woods conference, Helleiner challenges this conventional view. Developing countries, far from passive, actively sought to advance their interests. The United States and the United Kingdom embraced their arguments for state-led development and official finance. The New Deal rendered American officials sympathetic to arguments in favor of an expanded role for the state. Already, in the second half of the 1930s, these officials had sought a financial partnership with Latin America under the umbrella of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy. U.S. “money doctors” like White, as well as Robert Triffin of the Federal Reserve Board, had headed technical-assistance missions with a strong developmental component to Cuba and Paraguay. Helleiner rejects Gardner’s argument that the developmental agenda, as symbolized by the Point Four Program of technical assistance announced by President Truman in his 1949 inaugural address, if not also the very concept of international development, were products of the Cold War.

Helleiner makes a compelling case, although he exaggerates the influence of developing countries at Bretton Woods. They attended, to be sure. They offered ideas. But their mere presence does not mean that they significantly influenced the negotiations or the outcome. There was an asymmetry of power, since the United States held the purse strings. Moreover, as Helleiner recounts, disagreements prevented the developing-country delegations from forming a united front.

Nonetheless, development was undoubtedly an important issue at Bretton Woods, and the experience of the preceding decade created fertile soil in which to plant the concept. But this situation raises the question of why earlier historians drew the wrong conclusions. The Cold War, Helleiner suggests, redirected the attention of the United States—and its chroniclers—away from Latin America and toward monetary and economic stability in Europe (he might also have pointed to the Communist takeover of China as further diminishing the salience of the Bretton Woods developmental agenda). Financial interests hostile to the World Bank received a warmer reception from the new Truman administration. Accusations that White was a Soviet fellow traveler diminished the stature of the institutions of which he was an architect. These are intriguing arguments, although at some level they are not entirely satisfactory resolutions of the paradox.

Forgotten Foundations is classic interdisciplinary history, drawing on literatures from political science and economics as well as primary sources. Even if he overstates his case, Helleiner has made an important contribution that will permanently re-frame how scholars conceptualize Bretton Woods.

Barry Eichengreen
University of California, Berkeley

Clifford’s aim in this volume is to consider “indigenous histories of survival, struggle, and renewal” (7), emerging in the context of “decolonization, globalization and indigenous becoming” (8). Clifford’s long career has given him a privileged perspective on how anthropology has changed over the years, especially given its increasing collaborative work with indigenous peoples around the world. Not claiming to produce an entirely coherent narrative, Clifford plays with different literary and ethnographic forms to represent the varieties of indigenous experience and its interpretation. He takes a hopeful stance, writing that indigenous people have emerged from “history’s blind spot” and that they can no longer be considered mere victims of historical forces but actors with agendas and histories of their own. He chooses theoretical approaches from cultural studies and ethnography to structure his analyses, with an emphasis on three main frameworks—multiscalar “articulations” between societies of differential power, Foucault’s ideas about “performance” and empowerment, and “translation” as an incomplete “carrying over” of ideas that permits new meanings to emerge (8, 45–48).1

This volume is the third in a series that Clifford began with The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art (Cambridge, Mass., 1988) and continued with Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1997). It consists of three parts. Part I contains the chapters “Among Histories,” “Indigenous Articulations,” and “Varieties of Indigenous Experience”; Part II the chapter “Ishi’s Story”; and Part III the chapters “Hau’ofa’s Hope,” “Looking Several Ways,” and “Second Life: The Return of the Masks.” Bringing together these disparate chapters are a prologue and an epilogue.

In the first section of the book, which is theoretical and extremely challenging, Clifford seeks a “displaced” and “post-Western” perspective. The first chapter, for example, explores the relationship between an “indigenous cultural politics” that began to emerge the 1980s with “contemporary forms of identity and multiculturalism” (15). Clifford argues that globalization, despite all of its problems, provides new opportunities for indigenous people to gain recognition and preserve heritage. He provides examples of multiple “histories” and indigenous ways of “thinking” historically—including the Hawai’ian sovereignty movement, Australian Aboriginal Dreaming, and Northeastern Canadian Inuit activism—in his analysis of performance and the “commoditization” of identity, which he views as potentially transformative.

The second chapter in Part I pursues the idea of articulation with reference to the work of cultural theorist Stuart Hall, founder of the New

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For Clifford, notwithstanding the great disruptions to which many indigenous peoples have been subject, cultural continuity and authenticity are by no means central issues. What is clear is that “communities can and must reconfigure themselves” in much the same manner as Hall’s “articulated lorry” ensembles sometimes hooked together or sometimes disarticulated and recombined (60).

The last chapter in this section returns Clifford to his earlier interest in diasporas. Given the extent to which indigenous societies have become mobile—members spending part or all of their time in urban centers or in other countries—while still retaining a strong connection to their homelands, Clifford rejects the assumption that such mobility or “traveling” necessarily implies a loss of indigenous identity. He argues instead that this “routing” of cultures can expand what it means to be indigenous.

The second section of this volume, “Ishi’s Story,” is a complex retelling of the life and times of a Yahi native who emerged from the California hinterlands in 1911 to become, under the tutelage of anthropologist Alfred Kroeber, an employee of the Lowie museum in San Francisco. Ishi’s story, initially told by Theodora Kroeber, Kroeber’s second wife, and published under the title Ishi in Two Worlds: A Biography of the Last Wild Indian in North America (Berkeley, 1961) became a bestseller and is still in print. Cleverly interweaving Theodora’s story (drawn in large part from her husband’s memories) with discussions of its influence on the science fiction of Ursula Le Quin, the Kroebers’ daughter, Clifford deconstructs Ishi’s history and interrogates anthropology as practiced during Kroeber’s career, skillfully linking literary analysis with modern native politics in California. Ishi’s story allows Clifford to elaborate the analytical value of the frameworks of articulation, performance, and translation described in the first section.

Part III of the volume focuses on “the Pacific” or “Oceania” as a cultural region, employing a perspective that connects not just the peoples traditionally included there, such as Polynesians and Melanesians, but also Native Alaskans. The chapters explore new imaginings and movements of indigenous peoples in the region—from the utopic writings of Epeli Hau’ofa envisioning a common future for the different Pacific nations and societies and a discussion of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act to an argument for the creation of multiple histories to explicate a capitalist world system that does not yet “claim global reach” (211).

The second chapter in Part III examines the instances of, and the possibilities for, collaborative work between anthropologists and indigenous peoples, including such heritage projects as traveling museum exhibits. It includes a lengthy discussion of the exhibit Looking Both Ways, co-sponsored by the Smithsonian Institution and the Alutiiq Museum on Kodiak Island, as an example of a “multivocal” approach reflective of a resurgent identity among Alaska’s native people.

The final chapter is partly a review of an exhibit and partly an essay about heritage renewal and “rearticulated tradition” (279). It covers the temporary return of nineteenth-century Alutiiq masks to Kodiak Island.
from the municipal museum in the Château de Boulogne-sur-Mer and a visit of Alutiiq artists there. Clifford argues that the masks’ “second life” is a story of both cultural destruction and renewal. The exhibit, its catalogues, and its production provide further examples of articulation, performance, and translation.

Clifford’s volume is difficult to review in a linear fashion because it is deliberately and provocatively nonlinear itself. Clifford argues that we can no longer see the history of native people as a part of a single trajectory. He celebrates the “messiness” of multiple histories but insists that we can still approach them with scholarly rigor. He does not provide answers, only a fascinating collection of questions.

Kathleen J. Bragdon
The College of William and Mary


This book charts a path through the various methodological and theoretical approaches to game studies as they pertain to historians and historiography. The editors argue that history bridges the two theoretical camps that have emerged in game studies—ludology and narratology. Ludology is concerned with games as systems of rules and of the possible actions within those rules (thus, its focus is on the player and agency), whereas narratology explores the narrative that envelops those rules and creates the story. In games concerned with history, players must negotiate complex sets of rules that are bound, in part, by the conventional understanding of the story depicted (the history). By playing with and within a historical narrative, games allow players to engage with the contingency and causality of the past, thus developing the habits of thought that are the hallmark of historical thinking.

The book is structured with an opening apologia that frames the editors’ and contributors’ approach. Subsequent chapters are preceded by an introduction that highlights how each chapter speaks to the various elements discussed in the opening apologia. The volume concludes by gathering the strands in the introduction and considering them in the light of the individual conclusions, focusing on the intersection between myth and history, in which myth is understood in accord with Lincoln’s formulation of “ideology in narrative form.”¹ Games allow players to create their own ideology in narrative form; “while the facts of any specific game may be erroneous, the experience may enable the player’s engagement with more traditional historical narratives to increase by virtue of their exposure to some of the most important parts of the historians’ toolkit” (363).

¹ Bruce Lincoln, Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship (Chicago, 1999).
For the most part, the individual contributors handle their parts in this ambitious program well. Each chapter involves a kind of ethnographic exploration of its particular game space, often with first-person reports (though not always) about the game, coupled with close readings of the code itself (as in the chapter by Rebecca Mir and Trevor Owens, “Modeling Indigenous Peoples: Unpacking Ideology in Sid Meier’s Colonization”). Contributors come from multiple disciplines—history, media studies, political science, art history, religious studies, communications, and library studies. Individually, the chapters fall easily within the narratology or ludology folds as understood from game studies. Without the tightly knit apologia, the section introductions, and the conclusion, this volume would be an excellent collection of case studies within the wider field of game studies. The editors’ historical overview, however, makes the case for “digital games and the simulation of history” as a crucial locus for playable historiography. Trépanier recently argued (from a perspective that, ironically, recommends games as teaching tools) that “video games are subject to limitations that make them incapable of conveying the full nuance and complexity of good historiography.”2 This volume argues forcefully to the contrary.

Shawn Graham
Carleton University


This book explains the expansion of the British slave trade entirely in terms of politics. For Pettigrew, the key factor was the Glorious Revolution and the smart lobbying of the so-called separate traders in preventing the Royal African Company from winning parliamentary sanction for its slave-trading monopoly after 1689. Consumers of sugar do not appear, and plantations exist only insofar as they had political representation in London. Even Africans are absent except for a celebrated few who interacted with Europeans in Europe when the Royal African Company (RAC) attempted to replace slaves with African produce.

The novelty of the book is its revisionist view of the well-known dispute between the RAC—probably the largest slave-trading operation in history—and the separate traders. Pettigrew sees in this dispute a great ideological clash at the core of which were differing conceptions of freedom and the public good. As an extension of the state and a joint-stock monopolist, the RAC presented itself as maximizing returns for the English

public, promoting English interests overseas, and defining liberty as protection of property. In contrast, the separate traders’ opposition to monopoly in the African trade tied the liberty and self-interest of the individual with the greater good of society—decades prior to Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*. Both positions espoused liberty but not, of course, for Africans. Without the political victory of the separate traders, so the argument goes, the British slave trade could not have expanded.

More controversially, Pettigrew also argues for connections between later RAC policy and the campaign to abolish the slave trade at the end of the eighteenth century. As early as 1709, pamphlets supporting the RAC’s monopoly were linking unbridled competition with unbridled cruelty to Africans. By the 1730s, the debates about its future inclined the company to “nurture anti-slavery sentiments” and emphasize the prospects of trade in produce, rather than slaves, with the interior of Africa. Pettigrew even sees a carryover in petitioning tactics.

Yet the overall argument does not stand up well in the larger context. The British slave trade expanded in lockstep with the plantation sector from 1640 to 1807. Wars and the prices of slaves and sugar had more of an effect on the volume of slaves traded than did political disputes in London (at least prior to the political campaign to abolish the traffic). Despite the emergence of a string of African monopoly companies inspired by royal prerogative before 1672, a de facto free trade in slaves existed for the majority of the years in this era. From 1672 to 1689, a new company—the RAC—was able to enforce its monopoly to some extent. After 1689, however, that mandate was gradually eroded, and by 1712, it had no prospect of ever being revived. But did this development matter? In the absence of the often bitter debates about which Englishmen should be allowed to get access to Africa, the slave trade might not have been any different. The price of slaves was lowest in Barbados and Jamaica when the RAC’s monopoly power was at its greatest during the 1680s, and as the RAC’s position declined thereafter, the price of slaves in the Caribbean steadily increased. The imposition and the removal of a monopoly should surely have had just the opposite effects. Furthermore, the RAC’s monopoly coincided with sugar output in the British Caribbean surpassing that in Brazil.

Looking beyond the British slave-trading sector reinforces this counterfactual critique. The Portuguese (actually the Brazilians) disembarked as many slaves in the Americas as did the British between 1640 and 1807. There, as in the British sector, the trend line of the volume of slaves crossing the Atlantic moved in conjunction with plantation output, slave prices, and war. Prior to abolition, there is no indication of any enduring political influence (except national boundaries) on the business interests of these two dominant slave-trading powers.

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1 Data from this and the preceding paragraph generated from http://slavevoyages.org/tast/assessment/estimates.faces?yearFrom=1501&yearTo=1866&flag=2.3.4.
The central argument of this book may be problematical, but the research is of the highest quality—careful, exhaustive, and comprehensive. It will be a standard source for specialists for many years to come.

David Eltis
Emory University


In this splendid book, Weil focuses on the role of citizen informers in the aftermath of the 1688 Revolution, which saw the deposition of the Catholic James II and his replacement by William III, savior of Dutch Protestantism, and his wife Mary, daughter of James II. Invited by prominent members of the political elite, William came to England at the head of an army of 5,000 for the stated purpose of restoring the “liberties” allegedly imperiled by his predecessor. The major, and absolutely essential, task of the nascent regime was to establish its legitimacy. It would not be an easy sell. For the next decade, the Williamite government struggled to win the trust of English men and women, sponsoring, for example, the writing of tracts favorable to the government and, in a show of equanimity, appointing to high office less enthusiastic supporters of the new regime.

Although scholars have examined these efforts in detail, they have neglected the part played by citizen informers, those men and women who produced evidence—some of it factual and some of it contrived—of the government’s trustworthiness. Weil’s story of their efforts illuminates a critical aspect of this transitional period, when the survival of the new regime was anything but a foregone conclusion. It is a tangled tale of fear and anxiety, of rumored Jacobite uprisings and invasions, of anti- and pro-government plots (real and contrived), and of informers (truthful and mendacious) and turncoats. Weil’s story also conveys the tension between maintaining national security (which in the 1690s entailed suspending habeas corpus and reneging on an earlier government promise to grant defendants greater rights in treason trials), while fulfilling the Revolution’s promise of liberty.

Weil pursues these themes through an introduction and seven tightly argued and gracefully written chapters in which the citizen informers occupy center stage. The richness of this study is exemplified by examples of how informers contributed to the Williamite regime’s struggle for legitimacy. As Weil explains, the new regime valued informers because they produced the material by which the government could gain trust, support, and sympathy. Their evidence of plots against the king, such as those that aimed at assassination, served the government especially well. There was, however, a potentially damaging problem with the testimony of informers in court: What if defense witnesses produced contrary evidence proving that
the government’s informers had lied? When their dissembling became public, as it must, the regime would suffer a loss of credibility. The government needed a means by which to determine the truthfulness of informers.

As it happened, late seventeenth-century intellectual developments—the work of the Royal Society, for one—provided several criteria to ascertain truthfulness, some of which have a modern ring: Testimony for which informers received money or for which they received reduced sentences was sometimes considered suspect. Furthermore, informers’ trustworthiness might be confirmed through the combined evidence of their class, the documentation that they submitted, or their plain speaking. The credibility of women informers was sometimes judged by their sexual behavior; the more promiscuous the woman, the greater was the tendency to doubt her word (not one to forget the ladies, Weil offers considerable coverage of their activities).

As for the conflict between liberty and national security, Weil examines, among other things, the role of the national post office, the duty of which was to serve its subjects. However, government fears of Jacobite uprisings and invasions led it to hijack the postal service for the purpose of spying and opening the mail of ordinary people—a policy that turned the post office into a surveillance arm of the government.

One of the most commendable aspects of Weil’s study is her use of case studies based on a wide variety of sources, including a wealth of archival materials. This methodology allows her to humanize the citizen informers to whom she gives voice with well-selected quotations. Moreover, Weil’s ability to read between the lines provides access not only to the thoughts of these English men and women; it also allows her to access their emotional and affective states. This methodological bent is reminiscent of the “Cambridge School” of philosophy and the linguistic turn of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Alfred J. Ayer, and John L. Austin, who were less interested in what writers or speakers meant by their words than in what they were trying to do with them. Whether or not Weil composed this book with this approach in mind, she brings an analytical depth to her reading of seventeenth-century voices that scholars would do well to emulate.

Finally, although Weil’s book is not always an easy read, her writing is usually accessible, down to earth, and not without humor. Both specialists and non-specialists can learn from and enjoy it.

Janelle Greenberg
University of Pittsburgh


This volume adds a new voice to the discussion of mercantilism in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the period that economic historians call the “mercantilist age.” As opposed to previous generations
of economic historians, who constructed the concept of *mercantilism* and then debated the extent to which the economic theory and practice of the time reflected it, the scholars assembled in this collection set themselves the goal of “re-imagining” mercantilism. As declared in the introduction, they take “an inductive rather than deductive approach, concerned less with determining what mercantilism was and more sensitive to the ways in which the various and sometimes even conflicting categories it conjures up could be approached differently.” Thus, they say, mercantilism, “properly refracted and contextualized,” can still provide valuable lenses through which to see early modern political economy (4).

Viewed in the light of the scholarly literature of the last twenty-five to thirty years, mercantilism reveals itself as an interdisciplinary subject. It becomes clear that it does not belong exclusively to the history of economic thought or economic policy, but is tightly connected to other currents in the intellectual history of the time—in particular, developments in political thought and science. Therefore, it is impossible to explain mercantilism as a reflection of purely rational economic interests of the state and merchant corporations—the chief involved actors; the relationship between these parties also turns out to be more complicated than the earlier model of the “nation-state controlling commerce” presumed.

The volume is full of fascinating historical material, some of it newly brought to light. It will undoubtedly become an important source for students of the period. However, it does not deliver on the promise of its title: It deconstructs, rather than re-imagines, mercantilism. The reason for this failing seems to be the inability, despite the recognition of the necessity, to approach the subject from outside its conventional academic perspective. The contributors still see economic history as a separate sphere of study (more in line with German Cameralism than with British mercantilism, on which most of the chapters focus). Political economy appears as a distinct, universal reality, although it is fundamentally, like “mercantilism” (or anything else in the human, cultural world), a concept, connected to all of the other concepts undergoing change within different societies. Hence, to construct an image of any of its aspects, it must be studied in the proper context. Many of the volume’s topics—the involvement of government, or the church, in commerce, and vice versa; the changing motivation behind wars and foreign policies; the rise of economic competitiveness; the increasing influence of science; and the different form that these conditions took in the societies where they occurred—may be explained by the fact that national consciousness began to emerge in Europe at the time, appearing in Britain at least a century before similar developments could be seen anywhere else. Taking place outside the confines of economic history, this great transformation provides the framework in which mercantilism can be truly re-imagined, in a genuinely interdisciplinary manner.

Liah Greenfeld
Boston University
As any historian can attest, dead men do indeed tell tales. Crafting stories through extant documents of the “very dead” is, after all, what historians do for a living. Things often tell tales as well, and, as Horning’s *Ireland in the Virginian Sea* suggests, one set of tales can be at odds with the other. In this book, she surveys a heretofore conventionally accepted story—that English colonization of Ireland preceded and served as a model for English colonization of the Chesapeake—to make her point. Employing Renaissance humanist ideals of cultural difference that demonized the Irish, English adventurers planted themselves in Ireland. Their task, as they saw it, was to reduce the barbarous Irish unto civility. Many of the projectors of Irish plantation schemes also, or so we have been told, planned American colonization projects, and the ideology that they employed in Ireland to horrifying effect served them well in Virginia in reducing its savages unto civility. Conquest led to conquest. For historians studying the documentary record, this is an axiomatic tale.

Horning views the matter differently. “Ireland,” she argues, “did not serve as a model for early Virginia” (277). Relying on archaeological discoveries at sites in Ireland and the Chesapeake, she maintains that the evidence for acculturation and co-existence is equally as strong as that for conquest and exclusivity. Even in forts, places explicitly meant to exclude, unearthed artifacts point toward cooperation or, as she puts it, “mutual accommodation and negotiation” (363). Horning argues that the established narrative of conquest in Ireland has been fueled by presentist concerns, serving only to escalate animosity.

In the American case, although the traumas of colonization have in some ways been underplayed, the idea of two mutually exclusive communities perpetually at war with one another is another mythic conception that obscures more than it enlightens. She reports that material evidence, particularly in Jamestown, seems to contradict the documentary record. Evidences of “syncretic practices undermine the stark narratives of planter-versus-Gael, just as they complicate understandings of the relationship between English settlers and New World Native” (vii). In this regard, Horning is following on the heels of a number of scholars on both sides of the Atlantic who have softened the conquest motif for early modern Ireland or who have argued that colonists and Indians in some parts of America were able to construct a “middle ground” of understanding.

This is a provocative argument. The question is whether Horning places too much stress on the tale of material “accommodation and negotiation” in the face of a great deal of documentary evidence to the contrary. But she challenges us to revisit or qualify the stark model currently entrenched. As she argues throughout the book, we have to tell tales that make room for “ambiguities.” At its best, her book usefully encourages us to add complexity to often-simplified understandings of cultural conflict. In fact,
neither conquest nor co-existence was always a straightforward business. Negotiation and accommodation frequently transpired against a backdrop of hate and appalling violence, on the one hand, and mutual understanding rooted in cooperation, on the other. After all, the past, whether we find it in excavations or in archives, has a penchant for confounding the tales that we tell.

Patrick Griffin
University of Notre Dame

_Homicide in Pre-Famine and Famine Ireland._ By Richard Mc Mahon (Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2013) 256 pp. $74.95

Both contemporaneous and modern commenters on pre-Famine and Famine Ireland often assume a high level of background violence. Mc Mahon’s impressive data set of information about homicides for much of the first half of the nineteenth century, however, shows this picture to be incomplete at best. Homicide in Ireland was not much different from that in England at the time, and it compares favorably with that in the modern United States. Methodologically, the book supplements various time series of homicide rates with numerous case studies of individual homicides, providing a great deal of background and breadth.

Nineteenth-century studies of crime often focus on homicide counts because they are usually the most reliable data available. Mc Mahon supplements police reports with newspaper records and grand-jury accounts from selected counties, collecting demographic information as well as information about motives and even weapons. The nationwide estimates are most reliable from 1837 to 1850, but the evidence for some counties reaches back to 1800.

Ireland suffered a substantial increase in homicide rates during the Famine. These killings were usually not directly over land. Some of the increase came from robberies, but the bulk were due to “personal disputes” and from an incidence of inter-family homicide that more than doubled. As Kelly has shown for the modern United Kingdom, personal violence responds much more to “social disorganization” and “strain” than to economic conditions, although the Famine was a calamity in both dimensions. The increase in homicides during this period might not have been so startling as it appears on first glance. Mc Mahon’s long time series shows that the spike during the Famine marked the return to a pattern that existed in the 1830s before a downturn in the early 1840s.

Quantitatively oriented social scientists will be drawn to the time series observations and the decomposition of homicides into different types, but a substantial fraction of the book is devoted to detailed narrative evidence

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about particular cases. Although these observations may not lend themselves easily to firm conclusions, they enrich the understanding of violence at the time. For example, the fact that a substantial proportion of the recorded deaths resulted from injuries that would not have been fatal today strengthens McMahon’s argument against Ireland as a violent society; even with these homicides included, Ireland’s homicide rate was not high. Furthermore, fatality numbers alone do not always reveal the entire story about violence in this society. Sectarian violence in particular resulted in low numbers of deaths, but the trial accounts of them reveal them to be merely the sporadic effect of a more frequent disorder.

As McMahon recognizes, the use of homicide data to measure violence has limitations. Despite this minor restriction, however, his book serves as an invaluable resource for historians interested in violence in historical societies, as well as a useful corrective to a flawed characterization of pre-Famine Ireland.

Chris Vickers
Auburn University


This thought-provoking study engages with a hidden dimension of the great Parisian revolutionary upheavals of the first half of the nineteenth century—the extent to which insurgent successes and failures were shaped by the fluctuating strength of their opponents, the official forces of order. Paris was a remarkable testing-ground for the efficacy of popular insurgency during this era, having both the memory of the revolutionary republicanism of the 1790s and a rapidly growing population of discontented workers on which to draw and a backdrop of various political elites stirring unrest and provoking uprisings. Widespread possession (or at least availability) of firearms allowed insurrectionaries to stand up to government forces in the street-level tactical combat of revolt. With barricades in place to slow down the movement of troops and to impede the use of artillery, soldiers had little more than their discipline to distinguish them from their adversaries.

These insurrections have attracted attention from both historians and social scientists for many years. House is careful to engage with, for example, Tilly and Traugott, both of whom have had a great deal to say about the “repertoires” of action undertaken by insurgents. ¹ However, as this book clearly demonstrates, military authorities were also

aware of those repertoires, and the quality of their response to them could be decisive.

In July 1830, a weak garrison was first distributed piecemeal across an increasingly enraged city but later concentrated into columns for a second phase of fighting. This strategy was sound; it succeeded in cutting paths through the tangle of barricades. But the limited number of troops involved, and shortages of ammunition and food, led to the columns being surrounded and rendered helpless, even though they had managed to inflict hundreds of casualties on the insurgents. Eighteen years later—despite the instability of the new Second Republic, daily political interference, and serious misgivings about troop morale and reliability—military authorities used much larger forces to crush the “June Days” and end the prospect of radical insurrection for a generation.

In the end, discipline, loyalty, and weight of numbers are the factors that House finds to have been decisive in successful military resistance to insurrection, undergirded by the quality, and unity, of the officers, their staff, and the politicians to whom they reported. Although this conclusion might seem to be disappointingly conventional, House solidly supports it with an impressive archival research base, allowing almost minute-by-minute reconstructions of key episodes.

The Parisian revolutions of 1830 and 1848 have long fascinated scholars, who have read into them many reflections of the politics of social class and ideological mobilization. This work does not add significantly to that literature, but it does effectively demonstrate that revolutionary situations are, above all, confrontations of force, and that in such situations, the circumstances and motivations of both sides need to be taken into account in explaining their outcomes.

David Andress
University of Portsmouth


In the spring of 1793, the French revolutionary Pierre Vergniaud famously predicted that “the Revolution, like Saturn, would devour its own children” (20). Within a few months, he would join twenty other Girondins on the scaffold. During the Terror, dozens of leading revolutionaries—including Maximilien Robespierre and more than 100 of his followers—would fall beneath the guillotine, accused by former friends and allies. But why? Why did Jacobin leaders denounce some of their closest allies as traitors and send them to their deaths?

To tackle this question, Linton traces the twists and turns of high politics in revolutionary France from 1789 through the fall of Robespierre. We can understand the Terror as a whole, she asserts, only by first analyzing the “politicians’ terror” at its heart. For Linton, no inherently flawed
ideology produced the Terror. Rather, individual Jacobins made a series of contingent choices as they faced the crushing circumstances of war, invasion, counter-revolution, and civil war. Whereas other historians have also highlighted the pivotal impact of these circumstances, Linton more explicitly emphasizes the individual “agency” and “choices” of politicians. She seeks to foreground “personal” matters—personal choices, personal networks and friendships, and personal emotions, especially fear. To build her case, Linton offers a finely textured and compelling play-by-play, as figures like Jacques-Pierre Brissot, Georges Danton, Robespierre, and Jean Tallien wrestle over each other’s fates and the future of France.

Yet, Linton also sees their choices embedded in a crucial, broader dynamic that dated to 1789 but had roots in Old Regime political thought: The revolutionaries aspired to produce a politics of virtue, but that goal created a dangerous gap between the ideal and the possible. In opposition to the secretive and corrupt politics of the Old Regime, the revolutionaries idealized open discussion among virtuous leaders who would act for the public good. This model of politics held tremendous power, but it also set the bar impossibly high for politicians. They always had to act with virtue and authenticity, and their personal lives and friendship networks remained fearfully open to scrutiny and accusations of self-interest, inauthenticity, or cupidity.

To illustrate how the Terror took shape through “a gradual process…[as] a collective choice” (188), Linton recounts how this ideology of virtue informed evolving revolutionary politics. Already in 1789, the zeal to embody virtue shaped leaders and their actions. The liberal nobles who demonstrated self-sacrifice by pushing to abolish feudalism on August 4, 1789, epitomized this new political culture. But from the outset, politicians could also wield the language of virtue against one another. In 1791, for example, when early Jacobins (notably, Antoine Barnave and Charles and Théodore Lameth) accused Mirabeau of conspiracy and inauthenticity, they spoke a language of virtue and denunciation that prefigured the Terror.

In Linton’s account, paradoxically, the Girondins bear particular responsibility. Although they would become victims of the Terror in 1793, they played a critical role in spinning this pursuit of virtue/authenticity into a treacherous new register. When they pressed successfully for declaring war in 1792, they introduced “a new stage in the tactical deployment of the ideology of political virtue” (119). Leaders began to accuse one another openly of corruption and conspiracy. And war upped the ante: A man without virtue now could easily be accused as a traitor, an enemy within.

Even though Linton deftly narrates how Robespierre and his allies faced off against the Dantonists and the Hébertists, as the book progresses,
the title “choosing terror” and the introduction’s emphasis on individual agency and choice seem to recede from the account. The language of virtue becomes more constraining and more dangerous, and friendships become more easily open to suspicion. Because others have extensively examined the broader framework of crisis, counter-revolution, and war, Linton chooses not to emphasize this important context. Arguably, these factors need more analysis, because she does not make fully clear how to weigh these contextual forces against her twin themes of authenticity and choice. Perhaps in the end, it is all the more powerful that Linton never fully demonstrates her bold title. For the Terror cannot be understood without recognizing the tension between choice and constraint, between contingency and impossible context. Linton has given us a potent account of how individual revolutionaries faced the Terror.

Suzanne Desan
University of Wisconsin, Madison


Phillips has produced an excellent survey of slavery as practiced in Iberia (with an emphasis on Spain) for nearly a millennium. Ranging from the Roman period to the nineteenth century, Phillips offers a thematic, rather than an argument-driven, overview of the contours of the institution within Spain and Portugal. His synthesis of existing scholarship, including a helpful bibliography, will be of great use to (Anglophone) scholars less familiar with published work in Spanish, Portuguese, Catalan, and French.

The book opens with a concise but rich historiographical introduction followed by six chapters—“The History of Slavery in Iberia,” “To Become a Slave,” “To Traffic in Slaves,” “To Live as a Slave,” “To Work as a Slave,” and “To Become Free”—and concludes with a brief epilogue entitled “The Wider Extensions of Iberian Slavery.” As Phillips acknowledges in the introduction, “The history of slavery in Spain is complex and lacks a clear narrative line” (9). The looping chronology of the work, a product of its thematic organization, sometimes makes it repetitive and hard to follow. Readers might not always be able to keep track of what happened when and why. Although Phillips’ stated focus is the variability of life under slavery, his tendency is to highlight the institution of slavery rather than the changing experiences of slaves. Although Philips includes profiles of enslaved individuals when he is able to do so, the particular cultural, intellectual, and material concerns of slaves are not part of the story.

Slavery in Medieval and Early Modern Iberia will be required reading for scholars of Iberia and for those interested in European slavery, but it will be most useful when considered in conversation with emerging
scholarship about slavery throughout the Americas. Masterful work of synthesis though it is, the book might have engaged more with new scholarship that examines slavery throughout the Iberian and Atlantic worlds. Phillips offers no substantive consideration of how American slavery and resistance might have influenced the Iberian version of the institution—intellecually, culturally, or demographically. He alludes to this scholarly discussion only fleetingly in the text and offers only a brief overview of slavery in the Americas in the epilogue. The thoughts and actions of the enslaved do not figure largely in his account of the rise and fall of the institution. In a telling omission, his short closing discussion of the emancipation era fails to mention the Haitian Revolution. Similarly, the tone of master narrator that Phillips employs sometimes prevents him from capturing the contested nature of slave regimes. For example, his references to slavery in Iberia dying “a natural death” and “slavery’s peculiar development in the Americas” distance the reader from the contingent, lived realities of enslaved people (143, 160).

Molly A. Warsh
University of Pittsburgh

Smolensk under the Nazis: Everyday Life in Occupied Russia. By Laurie H. Cohen (Rochester, University of Rochester Press, 2013) 364 pp. $99.00

What did the Soviet citizens of Smolensk experience when the Nazis occupied their city for twenty-six months between 1941 and 1943? In this micro-history, Cohen examines the quotidian endurance and tribulations of those who remained trapped in the city (the population plunged from 156,000 before the war to about 30,000 at its conclusion). During the war, 87,000 persons, including children, were deported to Germany to serve as forced laborers (Ostarbeiter). Flight and war casualties also removed a significant number. Those who remained were chiefly women, children, and the elderly. The relatively few employable men who remained were generally forced to serve in the local administration, including the police force.

Cohen argues that the occupied population defies easy categorization. For the most part, they were neither open collaborators nor clandestine members of the resistance. They were simply too young, old, poor, weak, confused, sick, or apathetic to embrace or reject the Nazi ideology. In short, they had neither the means nor the inclination to flee or resist.

The expression “everyday life” in the title might convey a certain humdrum quality generally associated with normality. But as Cohen richly documents with original research and without hyperbole, life under occupation was rife with horrors. The population suffered bombardment from the Nazis, heavy casualties, and the destruction of homes and possessions. More than 90 percent of the city was destroyed. Routinely raped, abducted, and forced into hard labor, the people in occupied Smolensk...
experienced fear, despair, humiliation, and even starvation. About 2,000 Jews arrested and confined to a ghetto were executed.

To be sure, as Cohen relates, the harsh realities of occupation were occasionally punctuated by brighter moments. Some people were able to attend Orthodox Church services or enjoy musical concerts, cinema, and cultural magazines. Friendships, even romance, blossomed. A number of local women fell in love with enemy soldiers, a surreal development against the backdrop of a grim existence.

At last, in 1943, the Soviet Army liberated the city. For the populace of Smolensk, however, the ordeal was far from over. Many of those who managed to survive the occupation were convicted of collaboration with the Nazis, often on scant evidence, and sentenced to hard labor; others were barred from membership in the Communist party. Relatively few were exonerated outright. Moreover, to be hailed as a partisan often amounted to a mandatory conscription in the Red Army.

In 1985, the Soviet regime proclaimed Smolensk a Hero City in recognition of the hardship and injustice that its citizens had endured under the occupation and its aftermath. For most of the victims, however, who were either dead or at the end of their lives, that recognition came too late to offer any solace.

In addition to mining Russian, German, Austrian, American, and French military archives, Cohen consulted newspapers, memoirs, and diaries. She also drew heavily on oral histories that she and others compiled. Her methodology is modeled on that commonly used by anthropologists and sociologists, an interdisciplinary approach that she defends as complementary to the written record. Her objective is “to contextualize the memory, to integrate the how and the why something is remembered, forgotten or left unaddressed” (21). Her desire to let the voices of women be heard on their wartime experiences makes her work relevant to gender studies. Indeed, the “voices” of her interviewees put a human face on the necessary but numbing barrage of statistics that she uses to define the occupation.

An important contribution to the study of the home front during World War II, this book reminds us that those who chose to “stand and wait” while the Nazis occupied their homeland suffered severely nonetheless, even after liberation, when Stalinist authorities eyed them with open scorn and suspicion.

Patricia Herlihy
Brown University


Blood Ties is an extremely important and insightful look into the processes that led to the division of Macedonia, and indeed all of Rumeli (the
European part of the Ottoman Empire), into nationally defined states. Yosmaoğlu first shows how the Great Powers viewed the region as unnatural, primitive, and disordered because it had no clear ethnic definition. “Balkan national elites…imported and internalized [these perceptions],” resulting in “carefully strategized methods used to substantiate one ethnic group’s claim to territory over another’s” (90). With the beliefs and norms determined by the Great Powers in the background, events in the Balkans took a predictable turn.

The battle for territory became a battle to impose ethnic identities, in one way or another, on populations without any. Yosmaoğlu devotes individual chapters to the way in which cartography, the educational system, statistics and censuses, and church rivalries entered into the larger attempt to match ethnicity with territory. The battles over religion are telling—particularly the struggles between the (Greek) Patriarchate and the (Bulgarian) Exarchate Churches involving church buildings and schools as well as people. Often local communities devised their own arrangements—for example, the sharing of a church building or the holding of simultaneous services—though such compromises were not always consonant with the clear lines and boundaries that the nationalists favored. Indeed, the “ethnicization of religious identity”—“a process that is not derivative of preexisting categories of collective identity, but, rather, imbibes those preexisting categories with new meaning” (171)—included a new policy of excommunication for those who patronized a shop owned by someone from the “wrong” church.

The culmination of this policy came in the form of violence, the focus of Yosmaoğlu’s last chapter. Yosmaoğlu convincingly demonstrates that violence was not the result of local-level disputes but of external force tending toward the construction of nation-states and national identity. Such violence was “a necessary condition for, and not a natural by-product of, a strong ethnonational consciousness among the rural population…. Violence…rendered impossible the option for individuals to remain bystanders by creating an atmosphere of inescapable terror” (217).

Yosmaoğlu draws mainly from Ottoman archives as her main source, using them effectively to provide a detailed picture of local communities. The reports of conflicts and other occurrences in these archives allow her to capture the dynamics of relationships within villages and to portray the situation of local people caught in the crossfire of competing nationalist agendas. Yosmaoğlu also draws on a wide range of contemporary sources based on the reports of Western travelers, foreign consuls, etc. She also consults the Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British Foreign Office. Unfortunately, she does not access Bulgarian language sources, which would have added depth to her analysis.

Yosmaoğlu relies on theoretical literature in sociology and political science about the use of violence to frame her arguments and to comprehend the patterns of mayhem that marked late Ottoman Macedonia. Hence, her
study is an important contribution to a range of literatures in history and the social sciences. It sheds much light on the antecedents of violence in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.

Chip Gagnon
Ithaca College

Becoming Turkish: Nationalist Reforms and Cultural Negotiations in Early Republican Turkey, 1923–1945. By Hale Yılmaz (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 2013) 328 pp. $39.95

The reforms of the 1920s and the 1930s constituted a comprehensive effort to remake the people of Turkey in the image of a modern, Western society. By passing a series of laws and creating new institutions, the early Republican government regulated people’s dress, language, public behavior, and even their religion. Yilmaz examines the formulation and especially the implementation of several of these reforms. Rather than spending time discussing how these reforms were conceived in Ankara, Yilmaz takes a non–state-centered approach to examine what happened when these measures crossed the imaginary line dividing the state from society and intervened to alter people’s lives.

Yilmaz’s decision to de-center this history is more than just a methodological choice. Focusing on that uncertain zone in which state power and social forces interact allows her to show that the Turkish reforms were more than a one-way imposition on a passive society. Yilmaz discovers that the government had willing allies across the country who helped not only to enforce but also to enhance the effectiveness of these initiatives. In fact, some private individuals were even more zealous than the public officials, often devising their own ideas of reforming Turkish society—for example, the owner of a rice factory in Finike who “opened a war on mustaches” (59).

It is just as misleading to think of the state as acting in unison as it is to see the people who were on the receiving end of the reforms as uniformly passive or thoroughly antagonistic. Yilmaz effectively demonstrates the various divisions and conflicting ideas within the state. More often than not, the reforms were the result of the compromises reached among the elite. Furthermore, these measures continued to change as they came into contact with various layers of local elites and various communities across the empire.

In addition to its novel perspective, Becoming Turkish also contains new information derived from the author’s research in Turkish archives and her interviews. For example, in discussing dress reform, Yilmaz reports that contrary to the general assumptions that dominate the field, the early Republican regime targeted women’s dress as much as it did men’s, although given the sensitivity of the topic, the reform of women’s clothing attracted less formal legislation and hence more variation in
its implementation at the local level. Yilmaz also notes that women participated in local elections during the 1930s, even in the distant province of Hakkari in southeastern Turkey (104).

Alphabet reform was the most crucial and, in many ways, the most consequential reform undertaken during the early years of the Republic. Its comprehensive nature, and especially the speed with which it was conceived and executed, suggests that it was intended to cut the ties between the people of Turkey and their history once and for all. Yilmaz’s lively account about the implementation of this reform reveals the difficult issues that literate Ottomans had to address during this period.

By highlighting the complexity of relationships on the ground level, Yilmaz demonstrates that Turkish reform did not have to contend with antagonists who uniformly disagreed with the state elite about the direction of the new Republic. Occasionally, however, Yilmaz overlooks the very power dimension that was embedded in these policies. When all is said and done, people in Turkey were forced to dress, behave, and speak in a certain way during these years. Resistance to these impositions was often strong and the reaction to the resistance often harsh. The remaining non-Turkish and non-Muslim minorities as well as pious Turks were in a vulnerable position as the secularism of the Republic, the new Turkish alphabet, and the public celebration of national holidays began to play prominent roles in cultivating a Turkish national identity. That a number of local public figures and private individuals were willing to carry out the reforms does not necessarily mean that the display of power disappeared completely.

The Turkish reforms of the 1920s and 1930s aimed to create a national community and foster an emotional attachment to it. These policies have been long regarded as a central component of Turkey’s experience with modernity in the twentieth century. Yilmaz’s book is a worthy addition to the growing body of scholarship that has adopted a new critical viewpoint on this era. Other countries went through similar phases of state reform and re-organization. Yilmaz’s intricate narrative not only helps to broaden our understanding of twentieth-century Turkey; it also provides an original and dynamic perspective on the problems of modernity in general.

Reşat Kasaba
University of Washington, Seattle

Bourbon Street: A History. By Richard Campanella (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2014) 351 pp. $35.00

Bourbon Street, one of the four original streets in the city of New Orleans, has evolved over more than three centuries from a middle-class mix of homes and schools to a center of entertainment ranging from the bawdy
to the elegant. In this role, it has come to represent, in the mind of many, the city itself.

Geography, as Campanella shows, shaped history. First staked out by France in 1682, La Nouvelle-Orleans was designed and built between 1717 and 1722, angled to follow the Mississippi River and to provide a sound defense against other colonial powers. Rue Bourbon, named for the French royal House of Bourbon, was the fourth street from the river; as the settlement grew, it fell between the busy docks and the elegant Royal and Chartres Streets near the Mississippi River and the less affluent backside of the town, mired in swamps, at the far end. For most of a century, including sixty years of Spanish rule and the eventual Louisiana Purchase, it remained the community’s most populous street, a mixture of residential and commercial properties, of all classes and many ethnicities, including slaveholders and slaves.

The French Opera House, which opened in 1859 and survived for sixty years, was the first outpost of entertainment on the street. For decades, it was the site where the kings of Mardi Gras, Rex and Comus, would meet. The tawdry zones of the city splayed out in a crescent around it. As Campanella points out, the city was destined for wildness, its economy driving its personality. As a port city, it was subject to transience; as a Latin Catholic city, it provided tolerance, in the same manner as its South American and Caribbean basin cousins Havana, Rio de Janeiro, and Vera Cruz. The upward mobility of immigrants drove economic growth, though, in the case of Bourbon Street, it excluded African Americans as well as free people of color.

Bourbon Street as we know it today had its origins during and after World War II, when servicemen from the many camps around the region embarked and disembarked in the city, visited it on leave, and then returned home with tales of its fascination. Drawing from a wide variety of sources, including oral histories, newspaper accounts, and personal conversations, Campanella describes the seedy strip clubs, the jazz-based nightclubs, and the fine restaurants that dotted the street, which, like the city’s economy, rose and fell throughout the decades. In the 1980s, economic stability and increased tourism enabled the street to become the singular mix of bars and restaurants that exists today.

The flaws in this well-researched, well-presented book are few. More footnotes would have been welcome, especially regarding Huey P. Long’s relationship to organized crime (158). One quibble: The Jaffes took over Preservation Hall in 1961, not 1966 (I was an habitué when I lived on Bourbon Street from 1962 to 1963) (284). But, on the whole, Campanella provides an entertaining but still profound historical, geographical, and economic tour of a street that he portrays as vital not only to the prosaic development of New Orleans but also to its more fanciful image—an image that historical and cultural preservationists strenuously oppose. Nonetheless,
as Campanella illustrates vividly, in bars around the world and even in Disney parks, Bourbon Street has come to define New Orleans.

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*Between Raid and Rebellion: The Irish in Buffalo and Toronto, 1867–1916.* By William Jenkins (Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press, 2013) 511 pp. $100.00 CAD

Jenkins’ book is an interdisciplinary, comparative study of Irish immigration to North America focusing on two cities on the Great Lakes fewer than 100 miles apart—Buffalo, New York, and Toronto, Canada—both of which served as “gateways” to the West but individually provided vastly different conditions for Irish immigrants. Jenkins describes the changes in Irish experience between 1866, when the Canadian branch of the Fenian Brotherhood—a group dedicated to the independence of Ireland from Britain—raided Ridgeway, Ontario, and 1916, the year of the Easter Rebellion in Ireland.

Jenkins’ geographical skills highlight some of the similarities between the Irish in Toronto and Buffalo. Scouring city directories and censuses, he provides valuable maps outlining the primary areas of Irish settlement and innovative diagrams highlighting Irish intergenerational residential mobility between 1880 and 1910. Irish Catholic migrants in both cities formed their own ethnic neighborhoods close to their workplaces and centred on their churches. There they found shelter, employment, and an entrée into politics. Concentrating in certain wards, even after many had moved out of the old neighbourhood, the Irish vote was important in both cities, though it was “coherent” only in Buffalo (173), where the Irish were largely Democrats. In Toronto, the Catholic Irish leaned toward the Liberal party, mainly under the guidance of clergy, but the Protestant dominance of politics in general and the local dominance of the Conservatives in “Tory Toronto” in particular meant that Irish vote was by no means a given at election time (161).

Complicating the contrast between the two cities was the large contingent of Irish Protestants in Toronto. They had little in common with their Catholic countrymen, since most of them were active members of the Orange Order. Indeed, Toronto’s Orange Order determined the city’s politics for years, preventing the Catholic Irish from gaining any significant power. The fact that Buffalo’s few Orange lodges remained insignificant left the Irish there vulnerable to criticism about their loyalty to Canada, and thus the British Empire. Memories of the Ridgeway raid were fresh in many loyal minds; the Fenians’ insurgency in other parts of Canada during the 1870s only served to increase it. Across the border in Buffalo, Fenians regarded attacks against Britain on Canadian
soil as badges of honor; in Toronto, as Jenkins reports, “moderation” was the norm (363).

Nonetheless, the Irish, from both the Green and Orange traditions, remained highly interested in Irish affairs. Even as they and their children integrated and became more American/Canadian, they still “linked the local with the diasporic” (364). The chronicling of how the Irish maintained this connection is a distinct strength of Jenkins’ work. This constant attention toward Ireland was certainly re-imagined as circumstances changed, but it was not invented out of whole cloth.

The other element of the Irish experience that Jenkins vividly develops in this work is the importance of political context. Notwithstanding the two cities’ geographical proximity and similarity in size, the status of Buffalo as a city in a republic and of Toronto as a city in a dominion of the British Empire had profound effects on Irish integration. For example, despite some nativist criticism, the loyalty of Irish Catholics in Buffalo to their new home was never as much under question as was that of their countrymen north of the border. Jenkins’ social history, based on a strong geographical methodology, and a commendably transnational comparative approach, makes the reality of Irish immigration crystal clear.

David T. Gleeson
Northumbria University

_Empire of Vines: Wine Culture in America._ By Erica Hannickel (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013) 298 pp. $39.95 cloth

This provocative book analyzes the pre-Prohibition history of American grape growing and winemaking in the context of imperialist expansion. It does not break new ground; other books—particularly Thomas Pinney, _A History of Wine in America, From the Beginnings to Prohibition_ (Berkeley, 1989) and Lukacs, _American Vintage: The Rise of American Wine_ (New York, 2000)—cover much the same territory. Instead, it shifts focus away from the story of wine per se to an account of wine as one example in a larger, more complex story of national identity. Unfortunately, Hannickel subverts her project by treating interpretations of that identity as unquestioned facts, and by inventing facts to fit her interpretations. Her argument becomes increasingly predictable; it is as much about her own political views as about wine.

Those views see American history as a record of imperialist conquest disguised by rhetoric upholding various myths of nature’s beneficence in a new world Eden. Hannickel contends that the ways in which people talked about grapes and wine contributed to the attractiveness of this rhetoric. Whether in New York, the Ohio Valley, or California, the language used to describe grape growing “was generative of nineteenth-century American national identity and ideal visions of urban and rural life” (17). It was, however, always a masquerade. Such language failed to depict reality; in fact, it deliberately hid reality from view. To Hannickel,
what really happened was simply violent conquest and exploitation, and she is most interested in the reasons why Americans did not see what was happening all around them.

The problem with this view is not just that other interpretations of American history are equally plausible but also that Hannickel distorts the story of American wine in order to make it fit her political viewpoint. Viticulture in nineteenth-century America was largely a series of failures; only California wine near the close of the period could even approach the style and quality of European wine. Most other American wines were unpleasant to drink. The literature of American wine is replete with questions about why a land filled with so much natural bounty yielded such bad wines (the answer concerns vine diseases against which fragile European grape varieties never developed an immunity). Hannickel ignores this issue, instead arguing that wine and grapes became symbols of American efforts to justify an empire of bourgeois consumerism.

Three of the myths of American identity that Hannickel sees as implicated in the wine industry are the Dionysian myth of nature as alternately bountiful and wild, the imported myth of terroir (the interaction of environment with plant genetics), and the Jeffersonian myth of an agrarian republic. Not surprisingly, she thinks that all three of them served to conceal the realities of empire building. Whether or not she is correct (the story appears to be much more complicated), the specifics of her argument do not work. Although certain American writers, including early winemakers, described the country in Edenic terms, no one envisioned it as a locus for a new Dionysus. Similarly, early grape growers paid attention to locale, but they did not focus on terroir, as that word had not yet acquired its contemporary meaning in French, let alone English. Moreover, Thomas Jefferson certainly tried to grow grapes for wine, which he praised as a gift of nature, but he, like many others, failed. For that very reason, he ended up with a collection of European, not American, wines at Monticello.

In Empire of Vines, Hannickel advances an intriguing, though flawed, thesis that is as much about American politics as American wine or wine culture. She wants to give the wine grape in nineteenth-century America a cultural significance that far exceeds its actual social or economic significance. Wishing for something, however, does not make it so, and a great deal of this book is just that—wishful thinking.

Paul Lukacs
Loyola University Maryland

Dangerously Sleepy: Overworked Americans and the Cult of Manly Wakefulness. By Alan Derickson (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014) 222 pp. $49.95

In Dangerously Sleepy, Derickson provides a guide to decades of insufficient sleep among American men across three industries—steel, railroads, and
long-haul trucking. Although certain notable elite males—including Thomas Edison and Charles Lindbergh—highlighted in the first chapter were promoters of their own superiority as short sleepers, working-class men have at best been kidnapped into this “cult of manly wakefulness.” In comprehensive and exhaustively referenced chapters drawing from a broad range of sources—conference and convention minutes, hearing transcripts, judicial opinions, government reports, union records, books and memoirs, and even a vintage movie—Derickson repeatedly demonstrates that when no risks to the public health could be claimed, concern for the health and safety of individual workers was dismissed.

Steel workers and Pullman porters were completely at the mercy of the work hours and sleep conditions that management mandated for them, and independent truckers were pushed by economic realities to stretch well beyond safe driving limits, often working interminably long hours to pay for their own rigs. Providing decades of historical context, Derickson reveals stunning daily and weekly work-hour requirements, forced overtime, rotation transitions with double shifts, and inadequate rest periods too often interrupted. Not only was the time allotted for sleep dramatically insufficient and frequently ill-timed for these workers, resulting in shift–work sleep disorders, but sleep environments, when available, were appalling. The Pullman porters, nearly all of them black, slept in “hot beds”—beds shared by more than one person on a rotating basis according to their work shifts. Long-haul truckers regularly resorted to strong stimulants called “road aspirin” to stay awake, usually sleeping in their truck cabins as time permitted.

Derickson’s most salient message is that even though the now-confirmed health and safety risks of limited sleep were suspected for a long time, the government long failed to impose work-hour restrictions on employers. Although regulations covering duty hours in some industries—trucking, for one—eventually improved, Americans in general have not made progress in protecting sleep. Notwithstanding the contract concessions that unions have managed to win, survey data from The National Sleep Foundation indicates that by the turn of the millennium, Americans were sleeping a mean of seven hours, 1.5 hours less than they did in 1960.1

Given his stated emphasis on manly wakefulness, Derickson does not aim to describe the work lives of women during these same decades—for example, as garment makers or factory workers during World War II. He does say, however, that women were excluded from certain industries based on the idea that their stamina had to be preserved for reproduction, which was perceived as their primary social occupation. He also remarks

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that companionship and shared parenting were hardly possible when husbands and fathers were continually absent or exhausted.

In his concluding chapter, Derickson describes the modern “flexibility” regime, the ambiguity of which is emblematic of the blurred line between hours spent working and hours spent not working. Today’s well-paid knowledge workers often suffer from a lack of sleep despite resulting decrements in creativity and productivity, amid such other negative impacts as obesity, hypertension, and cardiovascular disorders. Thankfully, napping, an option mentioned with regard to the American military, has become increasingly welcomed in forward-looking work environments. The time has come for “sleeping on the job” to be viewed as a salutary activity rather than as a trigger for disciplinary action.

Derickson does a laudable service in writing this history of sleep deprivation among male workers in the steel, railroad, and trucking industries. Future work in this arena would do well to apply these rigorous methods to other industries, including health care. Historical context for the sleep heroics required of physicians in training and nurses, the majority of whom work shifts of twelve hours or more, is desperately needed. In his venture into the domain of sleep medicine, Derickson could have been more accurate regarding his use of the word unconscious as a signifier for sleep. In the 1920s, electroencephalography (EEG) confirmed that considerable brain activity occurs during sleep—a natural state preserved across species that is distinct from such pathological unconscious states as coma or the condition induced by general anesthesia.

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Making Rocky Mountain National Park: The Environmental History of an American Treasure. By Jerry J. Frank (Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2013) 272 pp. $34.95

Making Rocky Mountain National Park questions both the assumption that tourism provides western states with a harmless alternative to extractive industry and the presumption that the science of ecology is a force for restoration and regeneration. In his historical study of Colorado’s iconic national park, Frank finds both ideologies flawed in practice. The tourist culture that touts the experience of “pristine” nature in Rocky Mountain National Park (RMNP) also permits extensive harm to the Park’s natural resources. The ecological outlook has emerged as an alternative to tourism, though in Frank’s view, its proponents have neither defined their goal of “restoration” with any clarity nor offered certain steps toward reaching it. According to Frank, Park managers have largely sidestepped this conflict of ideologies, especially since the 1960s, by managing the Park’s front country for tourists and the backcountry for ecologists. Frank views the stewards of
RMNP as failing to “come to terms” with the competing and problematical interests at work within the Park’s borders (205).

The first chapter of this book examines the rise of tourism in Colorado and the founding of RMNP (1915) in an area accessible to people who took urban amenities for granted. Subsequent chapters explore key human activities in the Park—hiking, horseback riding, wildlife viewing, fishing, skiing, and, with increasing importance, driving—and the issues related to resource management that each of these activities provoked. The earliest supporters of the Park—members of the business community in Denver and Estes Park—believed the preservation of nature to be fully compatible with urbanization and tourism (25). When Trail Ridge Road was completed in the 1930s, visitors could enjoy spectacular vistas while sitting comfortably in their cars, oblivious to the fact that the road’s view sheds had been produced through the manipulation and destruction of nature. Similarly, the Park reduced the risks for hikers, climbers, and horseback riders in the backcountry by providing trails, signs, rescue caches, phones, privies, and emergency shelters to protect them from encounters with “wild” nature. All the while, the feet, hands, horses, campsites, and waste of these would-be adventurers wreaked havoc with the Park’s fragile biomes.

Eager to satisfy visitors, the National Park Service instituted a policy of total fire suppression in the RMNP from the 1920s to the 1960s. It also restored the elk population and showed favor to other large ungulates that were popular with tourists (such as bighorn sheep and deer) by eliminating their predators; stocked streams and lakes with nonnative species; and established a ski resort, complete with rope tows and ski lifts. By the 1960s, escalating resource degradation impelled scientists and rangers to challenge all of these decisions. Yet, solutions have been difficult to implement, given that resource protection in accord with sound ecological principles is often perceived as undermining visitor satisfaction, at least in the short term.

Frank indirectly challenges Richard Sellars, whose Preserving Nature in the National Parks (New Haven, 2009; orig. pub. 1997) faults the National Park Service for investing insufficiently in the scientific and ecological management of Park resources. Frank’s claim is that the cultures of tourism and ecology were both flawed. “Both shared the belief that humans were not a part of nature. The proponents of tourism sought to hide the human hands that had shaped the park to maintain a façade of the pristine; the ecologists sought to still those very same hands” (56). Unfortunately, because Frank never fully develops this argument, his examination of ecology is superficial, and his methodology falls short of genuine interdisciplinarity. His environmental history of the RMNP offers valuable evidence of the many missteps in resource management, and of competition between tourist and ecological viewpoints. But he does not provide adequate analysis of park managers’ recent substantive efforts to develop a system of ecosystem management that accepts humans’ presence in the park, acknowledges the necessity of adaptation to environmental change, and
places greater emphasis on resilience and sustainability than on “restoring” nature to a primitive or pristine past.

Ruth M. Alexander
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*Ethnic Historians and the Mainstream: Shaping American’s Immigration Story.* Edited by Alan M. Kraut and David A. Gerber (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 2013) 208 pp. $85.00 cloth $28.95 paper

Kraut and Gerber have assembled chapters by an impressive range of scholars, who reflect on how their own lives and experiences and those of their ancestors have informed their academic work. With few exceptions, the authors are second- or third-generation immigrants; their ancestors hail from across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. Describing the shared efforts of these scholars to “overcome marginality,” the editors work to fit these historians into the ethnic-assimilation narrative. Gerber asserts that “the trajectory of the histories, the organization of daily individual and group life, and the aspirations of the various peoples are more similar than different” (13).

There is much that unites these scholars. The importance of place looms large, for example, in Dominic Pacyga’s upbringing in the Back of the Yards (New City, Chicago), in Deborah Dash Moore’s childhood in Greenwich Village, and in Eileen Tamura’s life and work in Hawaii. Social class is central to a number of these scholars, among them María Cristina García, the child of Cuban refugees in Miami, and Timothy Meagher, raised by wealthy parents of Irish descent in Worcester, Mass. The complications negotiating religious identity and faith for non-Protestants are evident in John Bodnar’s Slovak Catholic family, Moore’s Jewish roots, and Theresa Alfaro-Velcamp’s Muslim heritage.

The editors acknowledge the difficulty of fitting all of these histories into the classic assimilation narrative. They identify gender as one complicating issue. A number of women historians—Virginia Yans, Barbara Posada, and Judy Yung among them—relate their battles to gain purchase in academia and to focus on gender-based research agendas. The editors also note a generational divide between scholars who completed their doctoral work before and after 1990. Those in the earlier generation, they argue, tend to focus on issues of ethnicity, religion, place, race, class, and gender, whereas those in the later generation frame their studies in transnational or diasporic terms.

The editors also nod toward the importance of racial identity, the issue on which the ethnic-assimilation model falters. Its enduring salience is reflected by scholars writing about their struggles to create successful careers in the United States as rooted in their often complex racial identity. Posada gives a heart-rending account of her mixed-race parents’ decades-long fear of being seen in public together. Violet M. Showers-Johnson,
born in Nigeria and raised in Sierra Leone, writes of the ways in which the racial identity imposed on West Indian and African immigrants conflated their experiences with those of African Americans. She discusses how two women, one her mother, described having “become Black” in the United States. When asked how she identifies herself, Velcamp, the great-granddaughter of a Lebanese Shi’a Muslim and the granddaughter of a Mexican bracero, stated, “For me, it all depends on the context” (177).

Though it is weighted a bit heavily toward the earlier generation and could have been strengthened by addressing a broader range of Latin American immigration experiences, this collection presents compelling and revealing work from an outstanding group of scholars.

Michael Topp
University of Texas, El Paso

*Buying into the Regime: Grapes and Consumption in Cold War Chile and the United States.* By Heidi Tinsman (Durham, Duke University Press, 2014) 363 pp. $94.95 cloth $26.95 paper

*Buying into the Regime* is a fascinating history of grapes and consumption during the Cold War, focusing specifically on the close relationship between the United States and Chile. That single export tied the two countries together in numerous and sometimes counterintuitive ways from the 1960s to the 1980s. The result, in Tinsman’s hands, is a narrative of dictatorship, democracy, and contestation.

That the book consciously avoids simple answers makes it an especially welcome addition to the literature on the Cold War in Chile. Consumption is not simple. For example, many labor activists in the United States and Chile decried globalization and market-driven economic policies. Yet, those in the United States believed that local producers, not large firms, should grow grapes. A labor leader in Chile who recognized that small Chilean farms could not produce enough for export, however, remarked, “Workers need to get together and let their voices be heard. But I hope Americans are still planning to eat Chilean grapes” (261).

Tinsman details many such contrasts and contradictions. For example, inter-class connections did not foster straightforward protests against the military government even though the rationale of human rights was universally accepted. The United Farm Workers and Chilean organizations were often at cross-purposes: “Chile solidarity activists understood theirs as a fight against authoritarianism abetted by U.S. foreign policy and neoliberal capitalism. Members of the UFW saw theirs as a fight for civil and labor rights within an existing U.S. capitalist democracy” (204–205).

Academics from the United States have a place in this variegated history. The Chilean grape industry grew substantially under the market-driven economy of the military government, but it owed its existence
to the state-driven policies of the Eduardo Frei and Salvador Allende administrations. Universities in the United States played important roles in both governments: Researchers from the University of California, Davis, gave Chile extensive agricultural assistance during the 1960s, and economists educated at the University of Chicago created the policy architecture for Chilean grapes to be exported during the 1970s and beyond.

As Tinsman points out, consumption was central to the historical development of the grape export industry and the long-term responses to it. Depending on vantage point, eating (or choosing not to eat) grapes could denote support for a government, opposition to a government, general nationalism, protest against a repressive global economic system, support for labor, and/or recognition of the human costs of feeding the United States. Those perspectives shift if you are a Chilean or if you are a U.S. citizen, and if you are eating fruit from Chile or from the United States.

Tinsman concludes the book with reference to the present, the Occupy movement in the United States and the election of Michelle Bachelet in Chile reviving a focus on inequality as a pressing problem. Given the book’s lessons, we should expect activists in both countries to struggle in their attempt to maintain substantive connections.

Gregory Weeks
University of North Carolina, Charlotte

_Immigration, Ethnicity, and National Identity in Brazil, 1808 to the Present._
By Jeffrey Lesser (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2013) 219 pp. $80.00 cloth $26.99 paper

Lesser’s book is an ambitious, commendable effort to explain the complex evolving relationships between immigration, ethnicity, and national identity in Brazil since 1808. Over that period of time, 6 million immigrants entered Brazil. The large majority of them were of European descent—slightly fewer than one-third of them from both Portugal and Italy, 13 percent from Spain, and 4 percent from Germany. Non-Europeans comprised nearly 20 percent of the total—Japanese about 5 percent, and Middle Eastern Jews and Arabs, Chinese, Latin Americans, and Americans the remainder. The flow of each group varied in intensity over time. Most of the immigrants settled in the southern part of the country and in the state and city of Sao Paulo, but others spread into other areas as well. Lesser seeks to analyze the impact of migration both on the immigrants themselves and on the evolving meaning of Brazilian national identity.

As daunting a task as Lesser’s may seem, the topic is further complicated by the fact that approximately 30 percent of Brazil’s population at the time of its independence in 1822 were African Brazilians, who served
as the primary workforce for the colonial economy. Thus, race became intimately linked to immigration, to ethnicity, and ultimately to definitions of national identity. Immigrants did not provide labor in Brazil alone; they did so in the United States as well. But conceptions of immigrants’ standing in these two societies differed considerably. The United States saw itself as the “promised land” where immigrants could immediately improve their prospects, whereas many of the people who constituted Brazil’s host society hoped that immigrants, by virtue of their physical and cultural presence, would gradually improve an imperfect nation by ameliorating its mixed racial composition. They adopted a “whiteness model” of development. Lesser correctly insists that immigration and national identity cannot be understood separately from the broader context of race.

The book includes many important statistical tables and interesting illustrations (postage stamps, postcards, maps, photos, magazine ads, and cartoons, among others). At the end of five of the six chapters are appended relevant short primary documents related to the topics that they discussed. The work also includes a useful, comprehensive historiographical essay on Brazilian immigration, ethnicity, and national identity, but also sufficient citations to facilitate comparisons with the United States, Argentina, and other New World countries that experienced major immigrations.

Lesser previously published three books on major aspects of his current subject—one about Jewish migration to Brazil, the second about negotiating national identity in Brazil, and the third about Japanese Brazilians. In the present volume, he builds skillfully on this foundation of primary data and analysis to deepen our understanding of these complex issues. He organizes his book in loose chronological order beginning with a chapter about Central European and Asian migration schemes (1822–1870), followed by chapters about mass European migration (1880–1920), Middle Eastern migration (Arabs and Jews) (1880–1940), and Asian migration (especially Japanese) (1900–1955). The epilogue focuses on the post–World War II period, bringing the story to the present day. All of these chapters examine the evolving patterns of national identity, but Chapter 4 is specifically focused on the creation of Euro-Brazilian identities.

Lesser’s book has much to offer to both specialists and general readers. His overview carries profound insights about the problems of national identity in Brazil and elsewhere. One of Lesser’s greatest contributions is his effective use of comparative methodology. He clearly delineates the similarities and differences between the specific European, Middle Eastern, and Asian groups within Brazil regarding such important matters as intermarriage with Afro-Brazilians, “whiteness,” the relationship with country of origin, et al. His revealing comparisons between Brazil, the United States, and Argentina provide an important

international perspective on immigration and the evolution of national identity.

Samuel L. Baily
Rutgers University

Omens of Adversity: Tragedy, Time, Memory, Justice. By David Scott (Durham, Duke University Press, 2014) 219 pp. $84.95 cloth $23.95 paper

Scott’s Omens of Adversity is primarily interested in the collapse of the Grenada Revolution (1979–1983) and the repercussions of that tragedy. Scott examines texts and phenomena germane to the Revolution to investigate issues of political action, memory, justice, and forgiveness. Using the Hegelian theory of tragic action, he describes the Revolution’s collapse as a tragic collision of two substantive positions, “neither of them altogether unjustified but each pursued with a heedless and mutually reinforcing blindness to the validity of the other” (38). The major players’ blindness helps to explain each faction’s claim to an exclusive legitimacy or intelligibility as the denouement approached.

Issues of memory and mourning among generations of Grenadians are addressed in the reaction to the disposal of the remains of Maurice Rupert Bishop—prime minister of Grenada and commander in chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces. According to Scott, the disappearance of Bishop’s remains disabled any prospect of mourning and denied Grenadians of the Revolutionary period the opportunity to put closure to his horrific killing. A number of high-school students, however, undertook a largely oral history project in an attempt to understand the circumstances of the disposal and disappearance of people’s remains. Although their parents had remained relatively silent on the subject, these students, who had not lived through the Revolution, engaged in a “speech act” by intervening in the memorial space and the “temporal dispositions toward the past and future in the present” (104). Scott views the students’ efforts to locate and possibly provide a decent burial for the bodies as a reflection of unfinished mourning and the inchoate nature of the Revolution’s end. Ironically, only a small memorial to Bishop exists, but a monument with two plaques commemorating the U.S. soldiers who contributed to the Revolution’s destruction is prominently displayed on the island.

By focusing on the accusation, trial, conviction, and imprisonment of the “Grenada 17” for the killing of Bishop and his colleagues, Scott shows that certain forms of justice might be “morally deaf to some experiences of injustice” (132). The systematic legal irregularities that characterized the trial foreshadowed the eventual guilty verdict, which was necessary to make the defendants liable for the coup and the U.S. invasion of October 1983. Scott argues that we should entertain some doubt over the “ideological self-understanding of transitional justice and its relation to the circumstances of a liberalizing global order” (135). The accused had consistently
maintained their innocence and had characterized the trial as a travesty of justice.

The 2001 Truth and Reconciliation Commission that was normally helpful in reconstructing social and political order added little new information. The government evidently intended it to be mere window dressing. The report’s appendixes indicate that the commissioners had access to material that could well have resulted in a different conclusion. Despite the eventual re-sentencing and later freeing of the Grenada 17, the scars of the killings probably remain unhealed. One of the lasting lessons of October 1983 is the need to recast our assumptions about that past. In Scott’s words, tragic action “relies on forgiving to preserve the possibility—the freedom—of new action” (171).

Edward L. Cox
Rice University


Medicine and the Saints is an intriguing and innovative study of colonialism in Morocco that explores an array of “medical encounters” between the Moroccan state and the French colonial administration (2). The bulk of the book narrates the period from pre-Protectorate Morocco in the late nineteenth century until 1956, the year of Morocco’s independence. Amster challenges the view that colonial modernity displaced Islamic epistemology and indigenous approaches to healing and replaced them with a liberating and egalitarian positivist knowledge and medical science. Instead, she suggests, Moroccans digested “the experience of French colonialism and its forms of modernity” (5), ultimately elaborating a modern knowledge system to understand health and healing that “expresses different and layered ways of knowing” (209). This book offers a careful and engaging exploration of the negotiations between French and Moroccan knowledge systems.

Amster employs a wide range of disciplinary approaches and analyzes an impressive variety of primary sources consisting of Arabic manuscripts, French and Moroccan archival records, medical journals, and oral narratives. The book is organized into six chapters in addition to an introduction and an epilogue. The first three chapters effectively address the Moroccan digestion of French positivism and modernity in the pre-Protectorate period. In Chapter 1, Amster explores Moroccan Islamic conceptions of political sovereignty and legitimacy. Drawing on the work of Cornell, she identifies a uniquely Moroccan model of leadership that united sultanic and saintly authority, connected material and divine worlds, and was grounded in Sufi knowledge.¹ This Islamic idea

¹ See Vincent Cornell, Realm of the Saint: Power and Authority in Moroccan Sufism (Austin, 1998).
of sovereignty and polity, she argues, disappeared in the early twentieth century. In order to defend his rule against the charismatic Sufi critic and rival Muhammad al-Kattani, Sultan ‘Abd al-Hafiz adopted scientific modernity and salafiyya—modern Islamic thought rooted in positivist knowledge from the Arab East. Amster suggests that positivism was strategically used by the Moroccan sultan and the ruling elite to discredit Sufism and Sufi knowledge.

Chapter 2 examines the French civilizing mission as a construct based “upon both a racial theory of the sciences and an idea of epistemology itself” (61). Amster notes that Auguste Comte, Ernest Renan, and Émile Durkheim provided the scientific language for conceiving of the conquest of North Africa as a civilizing mission. In Morocco, French physicians, informed by positivism and its civilizing orientation, “saw Islamic belief itself as a pathology of mind and society” (74); to them, republican science and colonial clinics offered a way to regulate and improve Islamic society. However, Amster suggests that Moroccan salafis who embraced scientific modernity “in order to purify religion and reform society” also absorbed the French positivist theory of knowledge and made Sufism and Sufi knowledge the target of their war (80).

In Chapter 3, Amster focuses on French medicine in Morocco on the eve of military occupation and colonization. She skillfully makes the point that “French medicine did not provoke a ‘clash of civilizations in Morocco’” (108). Rather, Moroccans were interested in Western science and adopted new technologies, while French physicians strategically adapted French medicine to elements of saintly healing. However, because of the co-optation of saints and Sufi brotherhoods by the Protectorate, Moroccan sainthood and the idea of Sufi saints protecting and healing the Moroccan umma disappeared. Subsequently, “Salafiyya became the only viable language of Moroccan political opposition, and the sultan became a new locus of Moroccan sovereignty” (109).

Chapter 4 considers French welfare in Protectorate Morocco from 1912 to 1937. Amster explores the internal contradictions of French colonialism, focusing her attention on four diseases. She meticulously demonstrates that colonial welfare fractured the population by race, provoked native resistance, and privileged ever-increasing colonial interests at the expense of Moroccans and that medical technologies often exacerbated disease. She maintains, however, that although French colonial welfare did not always improve Muslim health, “It did provide tools for Moroccans to critique French rule and to imagine a new political society” (111–112). In Amster’s view, French colonial welfare was “an incubator and catalyst for popular nationalist consciousness” (112). She finds that the promises and failures of the French colonial health service mobilized the Moroccan public behind a nationalist agenda.

In Chapter 5, Amster examines “the gendered nature of medical knowledge in Morocco” (142–143), in particular the role of Muslim women as medical experts and French women as medical intermediaries.
She compellingly depicts colonial medicine as an encounter between different systems of medical knowledge and healing practices, viewing Moroccans themselves as the agents of the expansion of colonial power: “As Moroccan men and women visited the laboratory for medical testing, they introduced positive knowledge of the Muslim body to Islamic courts, jurisprudence, and the family” (165).

Chapter 6 investigates the struggle between the Protectorate and nationalists to define the Moroccan nation and the modern Muslim family. According to Amster, even as nationalists attacked the Protectorate as a great lie and hypocrisy, “they adopted French definitions of sovereignty, citizenship, and scientific modernity” (203).

Amster could have gone further in her explication of Salafism. Islamic modernism and the work of such reformist thinkers as al-Afghani and Abduh differs radically from present-day conceptions of Salafi Islam. She could also have avoided the misleading assertion of a continuity between turn-of-the-twentieth-century Moroccan reformist thought and the nationalist Salafiyya that emerged in the late 1930s. Although she rightly observes that in pre-Protectorate Morocco, many religious scholars criticized European science and technological reform as an illegitimate way of strengthening the state, she incorrectly represents a treatise by Ja’far al-Kattani as an example of this discontent (87). In fact, al-Kattani wrote this treatise in defense of goods manufactured by non-Muslims. These criticisms asides, Medicine and the Saints is a rich and engaging study and an outstanding contribution to the scholarship on Morocco during the little-studied Protectorate period.

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Apartheid originated as populist Afrikaner endeavor to regain hegemony for poorer and less favored whites in a South Africa dominated by wealthier English speakers and their moderate Afrikaans-speaking allies. In time, leaders such as Premier Hendrik F. Verwoerd created a rationalized ideology in an attempt to justify legislated segregation, the denial of human


3 Terem, “Consuming Anxieties: Mobility of Commodities across Religious Boundaries in Nineteenth-Century Morocco” (article in preparation).
rights, the end of free speech, extreme separation of the “races,” and much more. President John B. Vorster and ruthless seurocrats, such as General Hendrik van den Bergh, fashioned a security apparatus to maintain apartheid through repression. President Pieter W. Botha, later, tried to buttress the hegemony conveyed to Afrikaners and other whites through apartheid while simultaneously recognizing and coping with the realities of South Africa’s status as an international pariah, its fundamental economic decay, and its need to find a satisfactory way forward.

Giliomee is a trusted guide through these convoluted waters, drawing effectively on his earlier acclaimed *The Afrikaners: A Biography of a People* (Cape Town, 2009; orig. pub. 2003). But he is even better in his analysis of apartheid’s end game. In the best manner of contemporary history, he shows why and how President Frederik W. De Klerk, Botha’s almost happenstance conservative successor, was able—much like Richard Nixon in his dealings with China—to accomplish the unthinkable. De Klerk, ahead of others, understood that since Nelson Mandela was not so much South Africa’s prisoner as South Africa was his, he had to release Mandela from his long imprisonment. De Klerk also knew that Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) were the rightful majority inheritors of power in a South Africa that could no longer play Canute against the powerful tides of time and humanity.

Giliomee’s strong narrative and his intimate knowledge of how his fellow Afrikaners operated and what they believed, sought, and feared in the 1980s and 1990s is authoritative. He has no intent to be methodologically innovative or draw on cognate disciplines, but his solid research utilizes the written record in two languages and employs revealing interviews with many of the major figures of the era.

Giliomee’s focus on the role of Afrikaner leaders in making and breaking apartheid is appropriate, if employed much more as an organizing than a theoretical rubric. In addition to the prime ministers and presidents that orchestrated apartheid, he also sketches in some detail the bright political rise of Frederik van zyl Slabbert from academic sociologist to leader of the Progressive Federal Party, South Africa’s liberal opposition. He credits Slabbert, crucially an Afrikaner with the character traits and athletic prowess beloved by Afrikaners, with undermining the very moral and theological credibility of apartheid that Verwoerd had labored to create and Vorster and Botha diligently to maintain. Giliomee also attempts to explain how Slabbert came to believe in the good intentions of the ANC after visits to their bases elsewhere in Africa—how he was gulled and mesmerized by the bonhomie and artful promises of future president Thabo Mbeki and others. Giliomee portrays Slabbert as a tragic Icarus.

Those *JIH* readers who know South Africa will find all kinds of interesting new nuggets of political information, and some speculation, in *The Last Afrikaner Leaders*. They will also discover that Giliomee is an unusually fluent guide to how Afrikaners, a people of whom he is proud, were misled by a set of domineering leaders, how the infernal edifice of
apartheid proved a cruel and paralyzing detour in the maturation of South Africa, and how Slabbert—a potential savior of Afrikanerdom and South Africa—was himself out-maneuvered by Mbeki and the ANC—to South Africa’s great loss.

—R. I. R.