Narratives of Kingship in Eurasian Empires, 1300–1800. By Richard Van Leeuwen (Boston, Brill, 2017) 278 pp. $126.00

Van Leeuwen attempts to find parallels in the conceptions of Eurasian kingship during the premodern period, from 1300 to 1800, scouring fictional texts across Europe and Asia for possible “relationships, influences, and patterns of transmission” (3). He argues that these texts helped to integrate the power of a king into the popular imagination, thus enhancing claims to legitimacy. He chose texts that fall between categories—between elite and popular culture, between oral and written, between history and fiction, etc. The stories of the 1001 Nights cycle play an important role in his analysis as an “integrating matrix”—bringing together stories from Indian, Persian, and Arabic backgrounds mediated through medieval Islamic culture and the transmission into nineteenth-century Europe (5).

Van Leeuwen is careful to point out that he presents the texts in their historical context only occasionally. His goal is to analyze the texts as literary narratives, establishing their place in discourses of kingship and focusing on their vision of power and kingship. He warns that his analysis is not meant to be exhaustive but only to emphasize similarities and shared elements. He organizes the book by theme; each chapter examines a variety of sources through a specific type of content. In “Kings, Viziers, Concubines,” Van Leeuwen discusses texts in which two figures—usually a minister and a woman—vie for a ruler’s attentions. In “Gods, Demons, and Kings,” he looks at ideal kings and their power over the supernatural; the figure of the vizier is crucial in these stories. In “Divine Insights, Cosmic Harmony,” he continues the supernatural theme, at the nexus of royal authority, good government, and esoteric knowledge. In “The Knight and the King,” he discusses chivalric romances, or stories of princes learning to be kings, and in “Kingship and Love,” he studies how love leads kings to the perfection of their royal authority. The final chapter, “Unrequested Advice,” concerns critiques of rulers. Throughout, Van Leeuwen reiterates that his aim is to pinpoint similarities in themes and episodes, not connections between the texts themselves.

Van Leeuwen draws his texts from every empire in Eurasia—China, India, Iran, Malaysia, Mamluk Egypt, and the Ottoman Empire, as well as France and Germany. His literary analyses of each text are highly successful. The problems arise when the texts are taken together. No matter how much Van Leeuwen writes that he is not arguing for connection or causality between the texts, his presentation of the common aspects in the narratives is so strong that it suggests some sort of cultural sharing or textual transmission. His choice to leave out historical context for the texts serves only to heighten the sense that they are actually connected in some way, despite his refusal to draw this conclusion. His repeated focus on the 1001 Nights—a text that itself demonstrates many layers of sharing and cross-cultural transmission—further suggests that the narratives presented in this book be considered in such a way.
When looking at individual texts, Van Leeuwen provides interesting insights about the perception and reification of kingship in the literatures of various cultures, times, and places. However, by bringing these texts together into a single analytical context, he ends up doing exactly what he sets out not to do.

Mark L. Stein
Muhlenberg College

*Boundaries of the International: Law and Empire.* By Jennifer Pitts (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2018) 304 pp. $45.00

Traditional histories of international law describe it as the invention of European nation-states who sought to maintain peace among themselves. Such accounts often assume that international law provides a model for justice and equity, even if powerful states have sometimes ignored it.

In the last twenty years, critical histories of international law have undermined such Eurocentric accounts by showing how the discipline emerged from imperial encounters. Pitts’ *Boundaries of the International* offers a new contribution to this literature by focusing on the mostly overlooked transitional period between the late seventeenth and late nineteenth centuries. Pitts shows that during this period, the emerging discipline of international law embraced a “parochial universalism.” European commenters on the law of nations ignored the system’s imperial origins and declared its values universal. Yet, at the same time, they denied that these laws governed Europe’s colonial policies. Non-Europeans might be admitted to the society of nations but only on European terms. Meanwhile, Pitts argues, the idea that international law was a product of enlightened European nation-states allowed Europeans to deploy legal discourse to justify their conquests while obscuring the existence of empire. It eased European expansion by alternatively placing targets outside the protection of the law or incorporating them into legal structures on unequal grounds (as when British officials acquired African lands through treaties with local rulers). These strategies of domination, she contends, persist today.

*Boundaries of the International* is a work of political theory based on close readings of key historical texts. Through analysis and comparison, Pitts emphasizes how visions of international society narrowed over time. For instance, by depicting the Ottoman Empire as an “Oriental Despotism,” Montesquieu distorted the complex history of European-Ottoman relations and supported the exclusion of the Ottomans from the society of nations. Pitt observes that although Emerich de Vattel’s *Droit des gens* (Neuchâtel, 1758) could be read either to include or exclude non-European areas from international law’s protection, later commentators seized on its particularistic features. During the Opium
War, when “the implications of Vattelian universalism” undermined British contentions, “Vattel had to be argued away or dismissed” (138).

Pitts is better at highlighting evidence of changed conceptions of “the international” than at explaining why these changes occurred. Readers of this journal might wish that she had incorporated sociological approaches or pursued archival investigations that might tie together law, ideology, and foreign policy. Yet Pitts notes intriguingly that reading legal texts as political theory “may make possible something like a return to the predisciplinary status of the law of nations as a discourse available to a wider array of writers, thinkers, and publics” (16). Restoring older visions of international law in all their complexity reveals alternative futures.

One of the book’s greatest contributions is its recovery of writers who used the law of nations to criticize European abuses of power. Cases in point are Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron, whose *Législation orientale* (Amsterdam, 1778) maintained that non-Europeans respected the rule of law and should be recognized as equal treaty partners; Robert Ward, whose *Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations* (Dublin, 1795) condemned European pretensions to impose their own values on others; and Edmund Burke, who argued in Parliament that both Indian laws and the law of nations bound the actions of British East India Company officials. Pitts writes of “path[s] not taken” (129), suggesting that these critics show how “international law contains resources for critique and frameworks for envisioning greater justice and equity” (191).

Whether recovering such critiques provides a path forward for reformers today, as Pitts suggests in her epilogue, remains unclear. What seemed to matter for Anquetil, Burke, and others was not so much the content of international law as the possession of a particular set of sympathies—a pluralist acceptance of difference, a humility about the limits of one’s knowledge, and an ability to extend reciprocity to outsiders. Such sentiments might not require a legal framework for their expression, but Pitts demonstrates that international law provided them a platform in the past. Those hoping to do so in the future would be well served to read this erudite, well-written book.

Benjamin A. Coates
Wake Forest University


A global history has much to cover. It requires, as Dickinson explains, a “coherent model of the causes and effects” of global transformations, a framework that identifies “the fundamental forces and developments
that have shaped world history” (1). The great virtue of Dickinson’s new study of the “long twentieth century” is to meet this challenge and to present a lucid and compelling analysis of global developments during the “long twentieth century,” from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. Dickinson locates the motor of global change in the technological revolution that began with high industrialization in Europe and has continued, despite a major interruption in the early twentieth century, to this day. Technological advance resulted first in population growth and then in the greatest migrations of human history into the world’s dry grasslands and beyond. Industrial development followed from a base in Western Europe and North America, as much of the rest of the world became integrated via imperial expansion, whether formal or informal, into a dynamic global economy by the turn of the twentieth century. In what Dickinson calls “the Great Explosion,” an era of global war and revolution followed until the middle of the twentieth century and the onset of what he characterizes as “High Modernity,” when torrid technological, demographic, and economic growth and integration again accelerated.

From this material base, Dickinson seeks to link social, political, and cultural processes globally, from the emancipation of wage labor, global militarization, revolutionary unrest, and modernizing dictatorships to secularization and religious ferment, the increasing political power of women, and growing signs of global democratization after the end of the Cold War. His survey is comprehensive, persuasive, and insightful, not the least in putting events from today’s newspapers, such as the ecological challenges of contemporary global development, in historical perspective.

The parts of the survey that are devoted to political developments are not as persuasive, particularly in the section that analyzes the turbulent politics of the early twentieth century. It lies in the nature of an analytical venture like this one to emphasize the coherence and comprehensive force of the trends that it describes. In this study, “development” flows pervasively from its European and North American core, until it encompasses virtually every region of the world. In ways that are reflected in the statistical tables with which the account teems, the principal units of analysis are global regions, which measure variations in the common theme of development. This approach also sets global terms for the analysis of political change; diversity and conflict among regions become the central themes. In this connection “oil” and “peasants” provide the pivotal metaphors, keying the analysis to issues that pertain to industrial resources and structural obstacles to development, respectively. Emphasizing the centrality of “oil” to the origins of World War I, Dickinson invokes a hoary interpretive tradition, arguing that the basic issue was competition among the world’s developed powers for resources that lay in other regions. World War II similarly grew out of the quest of the Axis powers for oil and, in the case of Nazi Germany, the agricultural bounties of Eastern Europe. The “peasants” metaphor—which now signifies the fate of small-holding, subsistence
farmers—plays an analogous role in the analysis of revolutions, which become a marker of delayed development, as well as the spur to developmental dictatorship in many parts of the world.

In the case of both wars and revolutions, the analytical framework leaves questions open about the mobilization of political conflict. Plotting political strife as the product of developmental disparities among regions, it underplays both the variety and potential for conflict within regions of the globe. Intraregional conflict was a critical element in the origins of both great wars. Peasants were a problem not only in Russia, China, and Togo but also in Germany, France, and Italy. This analytical difficulty becomes more central as the discussion turns to issues of “enclave development” and global inequality toward the end of the twentieth century, noting that social difference has increased everywhere in the world during the last several decades. A sign of the analytical difficulty is the absence of a discussion of global terrorism since the end of the twentieth century.

Demanding a more detailed and probing account of global politics is not entirely fair. The effort to produce one would require another book and would, in all likelihood, result in an account too bulky to serve as an accessible introduction to the main trends in global history during the modern era. As just such an introduction, Dickinson’s volume is an impressive success.

Roger Chickering
Georgetown University


In this clear and compelling book, Acharya examines who makes and manages international order. Like many constructivists, he is interested in the part that norms play in answering these questions. Specifically, how are global norms created, promulgated, resisted, and modified through contestation among interested parties? The book differs from many other accounts of norms by focusing on the role of the global South in this process of contestation. Acharya argues that these developing states and the non-state actors within them have significant agency in shaping global norms. He contends that weaker states can resist and alter norms through appeals to localization and subsidiarity. This simple resistance to norms, however, is the least interesting part of the story. Acharya demonstrates how poor and relatively less powerful states are able to propagate new norms as sources of leverage in disputes with great powers and the global North more broadly, again, by appealing to local conditions. Such changes enacted to fit particular conditions can forever alter a global norm. Acharya also finds that norm creation and implementation is often regional in nature, though regional normative regimes usually support rather than undermine global normative regimes.
Acharya supports his argument in a series of case studies about sovereignty and security: newly independent states in the post–World War II era shaping norms of sovereignty and non-interference; Latin American states incorporating regional institutions, such as the Organization of American States, into the new international-security architecture of the United Nations; the creation of the responsibility to protect norms; and attempts to move away from national-security conceptions based on external threats to the state in favor of human-security conceptions regarding internal threats to individuals. The cases are remarkably detailed given their sweeping nature and the relative brevity of the work. They show that states from the South often successfully shaped norms to fit their preferences or at least achieved serious concessions from states in the North.

This is not to suggest that the cases focus solely on North–South normative conflicts. The South is hardly united when it comes to normative preferences due to varying local conditions, experiences, and threats. Acharya nicely illustrates intra-South contestation, especially between African and Asian states concerning human security and the responsibility to protect. He also shows that norm entrepreneurs in the North and South have at times worked together, such as when they broadened the notion of security to include economic and environmental threats. Although Acharya could have expanded his discussion of Latin America’s distinctive position within the South, given its Western heritage and longer post-colonial experience relative to Africa and Asia, the book is an important contribution to our understanding of how norms are formed and how they shape the global order.

Zachary Shirkey
Hunter College, CUNY

Diet and the Disease of Civilization. By Adrienne Rose Bitar (Newark, Rutgers University Press, 2018) 234 pp. $99.95 cloth $24.95 paper

A historical survey of American diet books has been waiting to happen, and Adrienne Rose Bitar has carried out this project with great success. She finds these books to be in dialogue with American culture and that, no matter which diet book you open, the theme is about civilization in decline. Dieting, whether paleo, devotional or detox, is the body’s struggle against toxic modernity and back to a better, earlier, society. In these books, civilization is a disease and the only way to cure oneself is by going back to a more innocent eating era.

Drawing from utopian scholarship, Bitar argues that these diets present “a tragic vision of a life of hope,” which is constantly disappointed but renewed again. The constant renewal of hope is evident in the long history of books that present a diet plan; it started with William Banting’s Letter on Corpulence, Addressed to the Public (London, 1863), just as
American society was to begin its flight to modernity. However, this work is just the first of the hundreds of diet books that Bitar examines, showing their promise of weight loss and the inevitable disappointments, leading to new diets, from the faddish and silly to the serious and scientifically informed.

The book follows three main diets beginning, fittingly, with the Paleo or “caveman” diet, which promises its followers a body that is “sun-browned, virile, athletic, energetic, loving, clear headed, with a fine-tuned palate and a keen set of instincts” (42). These books claim that by creating such a body, the individual is also able to create “a better world, as the improving self created an improved society, with personal and social transformations that go hand-in-hand” (42). In the next chapter, Bitar introduces the surprisingly-wide literature of devotional diets, marketed to Christians and, like the caveman diet, harkening back to an earlier world, in this case Eden. Finally, she covers the more recent “detox” diets, which were first written by environmentalists as a reaction to the heavily polluted 1970s and 1980s, and later transformed into books giving advice about clean eating.

Bitar tends to argue that diet books have moved from the individual to the collective as an explanation for obesity. The “toxic environment” explanation is that lack of walking, rise of junk foods, and an overall sedentary lifestyle is the reason why one-third of adults are medically declared obese. However, the history of detox dieting appears to run in the opposite direction—from the collectivist activism of the 1970s to the clean-eating narrative that emphasizes individual choice. Neoliberal explanations—the delegitimization of government in favor of individual responsibility and self-control—is a better explanation for the more recent approach to diet.

Bitar mentions Julie Guthman’s book, Weighing In: Obesity, Food Justice, and the Limits of Capitalism (Berkeley, 2011), as well as DuPuis, Dangerous Digestion: The Politics of American Dietary Advice (Berkeley, 2015), but she does not delve deeply into the arguments made in those books. Bitar’s thorough survey of diet books as a reaction to “the disease of civilization” is impressive, but, in the end, she would have done well to engage more with food scholars’ analytical works. Until the very last pages, she even seems ready to contradict her own disease explanation to argue—with Rachel Laudan, Cuisine and Empire: Cooking in World History (Berkeley, 2015)—that civilization and modernity are not so bad after all. Instead, the conclusion takes a quick turn through the foodies and food-activist movements that level their criticism on the toxic environment and a food system in need of reforming.

The most original part of the book is a separate chapter that focuses less on analyzing diet books than on explanations for the obesity epidemic among Pacific Islanders. In this chapter, Bitar opposes the pervasive idea that innocent non-Westerners are increasingly falling under the spell of the high meat/fat/wheat standard American diet instead of the “primitive,” healthy diet of a more innocent pre-industrial world. Bitar
argues, too briefly, that the changed diet of the “innocent” Pacific Islanders is more a result of the colonializing project—which included the loss of their land, fishing grounds, and other food access—than any preference for the diet of Western civilization.

Although Bitar’s excellent history of diet books is certainly welcome, her most important contribution is the chapter about the Pacific Islanders. Hopefully, she will expand this facet of her work in the future.

E. Melanie DuPuis
Pace University


This book is a welcome contribution to the existing literature on the history of servanthood. As Whittle rightly points out, most studies concern urban domestic service, although historically, the largest share of servants has worked in the countryside. In an excellent introduction, Whittle outlines the theoretical background of the book, in which the work of Hajnal and Laslett play a central role.\(^1\) Hajnal outlined a specific Western European demographical system in which people married late and started new households after marriage. Working as a servant between youth and marriage was, according to Laslett, an integral part of this system because it provided young men and women with the opportunity to accumulate financial and human capital before marriage. The situation was supposedly different in Eastern Europe where the age at marriage was lower and extended families were more common. These concepts of the European Marriage Pattern (EMP) and life-cycle servanthood run as a common thread throughout the volume.

The twelve contributions reveal the many different faces of rural servanthood. Lies Vervaet, Thijs Lambrecht, Whittle, and Jeremy Hayhoe show how local economic structures and the type of farm impacted the size and the composition of the servant labor force in fifteenth-century Flanders, sixteenth-century Flanders, England around 1700, and Burgundy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, respectively. Carolina Uppenberg, Charmian Mansell, and Sarah Holland explore the legal side of servanthood in Sweden (1750–1850) and England (1550–1650 and the mid-nineteenth century). The link to Hajnal and

Laslett is most explicit in the studies of Cristina Prytz, Hanne Østhus, and Raffaella Sarti, who emphasize the many regional differences in rural servanthood in Sweden c. 1700, Norway 1650–1800, and Italy during the past five centuries. They conclude that concentration on the EMP and life-cycle servanthood simplifies reality. Christine Fertig, however, largely confirms Laslett’s concept of life-cycle servanthood for northwest Germany around 1750, and Richard Paping shows how this practice ceased to exist in the Netherlands during the nineteenth century.

The book’s main strength lies in the rich source material, covering six centuries and nine countries, skilfully collected and analyzed by the authors. Few readers will remain unconvinced about the heterogeneity of rural servanthood through space and time by the evidence that the contributors present from farm accounts, court documents, death certificates, and census—enumerator books. Many might even begin to wonder whether we can speak about “servanthood” in the first place, simply because it apparently has multiple meanings. It was much more than part of the EMP, the sanctity of which the book does not entirely support either.

But in its strength also lies the book’s weakness. Most authors let their sources determine the structure of their argument. Consequently, most of the contributions remain largely descriptive, in some cases, failing to move beyond a mere summary of the sources’ contents. The largely descriptive character of the articles makes the absence of a conclusion all the more disappointing; the rich empirical material stands in need of a synthesis to connect the three strands of demography, labor markets, and legal practices expounded in the introduction. That approach would make this book more than a collection of individual articles.

A truly interdisciplinary, comparative monograph about the history of rural servanthood in Europe has yet to be written. Whoever writes it—Whittle or someone else—will find Servants in Rural Europe to be a firm basis upon which to build.

Corinne Boter
Utrecht University


This book is about how people and greyhounds co-evolved in England between 1200 and 1900. Co-evolution means change in the frequency of traits for two or more populations interacting with each other, traits being defined as both physical and behavioral. Humans changed the traits of greyhounds through breeding, and human traits changed in response. Russell uses this case study to make a larger argument—that evolution is integral to history. Historical change in human society is evolution, and historical forces are evolutionary forces for humans and other species.
It is often easier to understand how humans change animals than vice versa. Russell employs the biological concept of _niche_, defined as a job–habitat combination, to explain how co-evolution occurs. “Niches have evolutionary consequences. Every niche rewards a different combination of traits” (3). Greyhounds were bred for niches—to do certain jobs within certain habitats. As niches changed, different physical and behavioral traits of greyhounds became necessary, and people began to breed greyhounds for different qualities.

The behavioral traits of humans underwent change as well. Behavioral traits are based on memes, “instructions for behavior” that are a society’s written and unwritten rules (11). Memes shape people’s behaviors around values, ideas, and choices. Russell believes that memes are as important as genes in the process of co-evolution, because memes affected how greyhounds were perceived, valued, and selected. As niches changed, greyhounds had new jobs and habitats, and developed different physical and behavioral traits (genes and memes). People worked to maintain greyhounds (jobs) in new places (habitats) and developed new behavioral traits (memes) that then altered genes.

Russell examines two broad time periods of greyhound–human co-evolution: patrician co-evolution from 1200 to 1831 and the modern period from 1831 to 1900. He begins in 1200 because it marks the first mention of greyhounds in written records; he ends in 1900 when kennel clubs banned cross-breeding and began to enforce breed uniformity. Until 1831, greyhound ownership was restricted by law to the patrician class, but after 1831, anyone could own a greyhound. Greyhounds were hunting dogs until the late eighteenth century when they were used primarily for racing (coursing). These changes in greyhound occupations and owners changed the niches of greyhound and emphasized different genes and memes. During the nineteenth century, the forces of modernity, capitalism, democracy, and industrialization also shaped the niches for greyhounds and people. The rise of dog shows encouraged a new insistence on breed purity that once again changed the traits of both greyhound and human populations. It gave rise to “the statue theory of breeds,” the idea that breeds are uniform, unchanging, and separate from human history (7).

Russell’s writing style is lucid and the structure of his argument transparent. The book is an excellent introduction to an understanding of evolutionary and co-evolutionary history and to the use of evolutionary thinking as a methodology for historical analysis. Those familiar with Russell’s previous work will appreciate how it advances his arguments for the intertwining of history and biology. The book is a major contribution not only to the field of animal history but also to environmental, technological, legal, economic, sporting, and social history. It demonstrates that following the story of one group of animals can reveal a rich interdisciplinary picture of historical change and the development of modern society.

Ann Norton Greene
University of Pennsylvania
This project narrates the ventures undertaken by merchants in Elizabethan and Jacobean England in search of new opportunities across the Atlantic. Starting with the observation that the initial English interest in colonial North America is usually associated with the voyage of the Pilgrims to New Plymouth on the Mayflower in 1620, an enterprise associated more with piety than commerce, the authors state that the “making of America actually begins in England in the mid-1500s” (xxiv). The implication is that the earlier trading voyages were an important “prequel to the Pilgrims,” embodying many of the elements that shaped modern America (xxv): novel approaches to leadership, techniques for raising funding and spreading risk, and application of the latest technologies “to overcome seemingly insuperable challenges, accept and learn from failure, and cherish the quality that Americans have come to regard as quintessentially their own: perseverance” (xxv). This elegant quotation is indicative of the level of writing in the book. New World, Inc. tells the story of the English entrepreneurs who operated voyages from 1550 to 1620 to establish settlements in North America, emphasizing the commercial origins of the British North American colonies.

New World, Inc. begins with the voyage of the Mysterie from London in 1553 on a mission to Russia that led, two years later, to a royal charter being granted to establish a Muscovy Company in England. It concludes with the voyage of the Mayflower. Between these bookends, the authors cover Martin Frobisher’s three voyages in search of the Northwest Passage from 1576 to 1578; Sir Humphrey Gilbert’s abortive voyage from Devon to North America in 1578; Sir Francis Drake’s circumnavigation of the globe from 1577 to 1580; another voyage by Gilbert in 1583 to Newfoundland; Sir Richard Grenville’s expedition to Roanoke Island, off the coast of North Carolina, in 1585; Bartholomew Gosnold’s exploration of Maine and modern-day Massachusetts in 1602; George Waymouth’s vain search for the Northwest Passage in 1602; the expedition run by the Plymouth Company in 1606; and the voyage promoted by the London Company that led in 1607 to the founding of Jamestown, Virginia, the first permanent English settlement in North America. The motivations and performance of the leaders of these diverse expeditions are discussed. The authors deftly weave together the political, diplomatic, and commercial context of these enterprises, using Richard Hakluyt’s promotional endeavours and writings about North American settlement as an important backdrop to many of the ventures.

Butman and Targett marshal their evidence in a sound and readable way. Their careful research draws from many relevant primary and secondary sources. Readers who know nothing about the subject matter of New World, Inc. will find it to be an enjoyable and informative book. For an academic audience, however, the book falls into the category of an
oft-told tale. Virtually all of the factual material presented in *New World, Inc.* has appeared in print many times before; the book appears to display no originality in either content or interpretation. It has nothing to offer in terms of interdisciplinary perspectives on its topic; nor does it follow through its purported aim to provide effective comparisons with modern American enterprise. Those who have read or consulted David B. Quinn, *North America from the Earliest Discovery to First Settlements: The Norse Voyages to 1612* (New York, 1975) or Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the genesis of the British Empire 1480–1630* (New York, 1984) will have no need to read *New World, Inc.* The claims made in the book’s introduction for an original contribution to the history of North American settlement would not have been plausible if the book had been published in 1918, let alone 2018.

Kenneth Morgan  
Brunel University London

*Calculated Values: Finance, Politics, and the Quantitative Age.* By William Deringer (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 2018) 413 pp. $45.00

Deringer argues that our modern quantitative age characterized by facts, figures, and calculations began in England after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. It was well established in Great Britain by the late eighteenth century. Before 1688, the use of data and calculations was marginal; it had little impact on thinking about anything. A century later, the authority of numbers and calculations became an accepted feature of discussions about almost everything.

Was the triumph of quantitative analysis a product of the so-called scientific revolution or of the eighteenth-century enlightenment? Deringer barely discusses these possible explanations. Instead, he focuses on great political debates in Parliament and the pamphlet literature at the time, which increasingly resorted to numbers and calculations to score debating points.

Far from using data and calculations to get at the truth, as in “numbers don’t lie,” eighteenth-century calculators used them as arguments to advance particular politico-economic stances and policies. The calculators that Deringer studies were primarily “spin doctors” seeking partisan political advantage from their work, and only incidentally seekers after truth. If quantitative reasoning became more authoritative within the century, Deringer hints that it must have happened because the partisan debates led to the creation of better data and more convincing calculations.

Most of the debates that Deringer studies were related to British government finances. Charles Davenant, an early calculator and frustrated politician, estimated what English taxes in the 1680s and 1690s should have yielded in revenue and compared his calculations to what
they actually yielded, which was substantially less. The implication was mismanagement, corruption, or both.

A second debate involved the “equivalent,” a payment that England needed to pay Scotland when the two countries agreed to a union in 1707, because Scots would thenceforth have to pay higher English taxes. Sophisticated calculations led to the present value of Scotland’s future higher tax payments being £3988,085.50. William Paterson, the Scot who founded the Bank of England in 1694, was involved in the calculation; much of the “equivalent” payment went to a bailout of Paterson and other Scottish investors who had lost heavily from the failure of a colony that they had tried to establish in Panama.

A third debate concerned the balance of trade in the early 1700s. Tories performed calculations to show that England gained from its trade with France, whereas Whigs performed them to show the opposite. The freer-trade Tories lost out to the Whigs, who kept high tariffs on imports.

A fourth debate c. 1715 centered on the size of the national debt, which had risen rapidly because of England’s wars. Debt management became a major concern of the government. The South Sea Company in 1720 hatched a plan to absorb the national debt by exchanging its own stock for public debt. Company insiders tried for huge profits by fraudulently pushing up its stock price, the notorious South Sea Bubble, leading to a fifth debate about what the stock was really worth. Some calculators showed it to be worth much less than the Company and the market said. Their analyses were confirmed when the bubble burst.

Sir Robert Walpole’s sinking fund, a plan for ridding Britain of debt, generated a sixth debate. It was a sound and sophisticated idea, but lack of fiscal discipline and poor execution undermined and discredited the program. Richard Price, a devoted calculator, later resuscitated the idea, influencing statesmen in both Britain and the United States.

David Hume, a key Enlightenment figure, was skeptical of the quantitative bent that arose in his lifetime. “Every man, who has ever reason’d on this subject,” Hume said, “has always prov’d his theory, whatever it was, by facts and calculations.” Deringer adds, “You could make the numbers say whatever you wanted them to” (xvi).

Deringer’s study is essentially old-fashioned intellectual history. His message, however, resonates in a modern ear. Calculating has two possible meanings: using data and quantitative methods in neutral ways to derive objective conclusions or shrewdly selecting data and seemingly neutral and objective modes of quantitative analysis to prove a pet theory, as Hume argued, or to advance a pet political, economic, or social policy. Those tensions, which may have started in eighteenth-century England, are still with us.

Richard Sylla
New York University
In this insightful, original, and gracefully written analysis of six iconic English landscapes and their relationship to English (and occasionally British) national identity, Readman brings together art and history with great fluidity. As he points out, the value of landscapes often depends on factors other than their perceived physical properties. Nor do the sources of English identity in the nineteenth century—the focus of this book—lie solely in written histories, the evolution of the historical profession, or state-sponsored events such as world’s fairs. On the contrary, the places discussed in *Storied Ground*—the cliffs of Dover, the Northumbrian borderland, the Lake District, the New Forest, the city of Manchester, and the Thames River—show how landscapes helped to define the cultural boundaries of the nation, provided a sense of connection between past and present, and developed and deepened a sense of Englishness that was urban and rural, national and imperial, local and regional, and, most importantly, popular and democratic.

Starting with the basic premises that all landscapes are human constructs and that all nations claim a homeland or bounded territory, Part I traces the process by which landscape was transformed into heritage. As with the American West and the Swiss Alps, the border landscapes that comprise the book’s first section—the Dover cliffs and the Northumbrian borderland—complicate English identity. The cliffs, which attracted little attention before the middle of the eighteenth century, became “powerful symbols of defense, defiance and difference,” eventually standing for “insular ideas of English nationhood” (26–27). Even as they marked Britain’s separateness from the European continent, they also represented home for weary travelers returning from overseas. More complicated was the Northumbrian borderland, a barren, bleak landscape that was rehabilitated not just in purely visual terms but also as an emblem of British national identity, even though its characteristic speech (the burr) gave it a distinctive regional identity.

Part II deals with efforts to preserve the Lake District and the New Forest. In the late nineteenth century, just as the Lake District’s appeal as a tourist destination was widening, it became the focus of an emerging preservationist movement. But this change was not solely for the sake of aesthetics; the area came to be seen, in the words of William Wordsworth, as “national property” for people of all social classes who traveled there for rest and recreation at a time when the Third Reform Act of 1884/5 was producing a more democratic national identity. Readman argues that the National Trust’s campaign to purchase land in the Lake District was not animated by Tory paternalism so much as by popular patriotism. Meanwhile the New Forest lost its relevance as a crown game reserve and a source of timber for Britain’s navy, and came to be viewed instead as a “freely accessible historical landscape of liberty” (179). The
Rufus Stone, which marked the spot where the unpopular King Rufus had been killed in 1100, and the ruins of Beaulieu Abbey, helped to link the forest to England’s medieval past as well.

Part III, especially the chapter about Manchester, enriches the story even further. In every way the antithesis of rural England, the dark, dirty, dystopian “shock city” of the Industrial Revolution nonetheless became a popular tourist destination, its factories eliciting expressions of wonder and awe not least because they were seen to be doing “patriotic work” (206). Readman highlights the Italianate designs of its warehouses, which led to Manchester’s reputation as “the Florence . . . of the nineteenth century,” and the Gothic Revival public buildings, which combined “modernity and historicity” (231), preserving the past even as urban development was laying it to waste. The final chapter traces the Thames River’s growing association with commerce, culture, and the course of history as it meandered its way from rural Gloucestershire through London to the North Sea, connecting “countryside and capital, backwater and bustling port” (252), the national and the imperial. It became a matter of pride that the fine houses and country estates, which symbolized inherited wealth and beautified the riverside, could coexist, although not always comfortably, with mass tourism.

No mere summary of this book can do it justice. The forty aptly chosen and carefully analyzed illustrations include engravings and photographs as well as oil paintings and even Punch cartoons. This book should be of great interest to historians and art historians, as well as those interested in tourism, historical preservation, and the construction of national identities. It is both scholarly and accessible, a model of interdisciplinary scholarship.

Jeffrey Auerbach
California State University, Northridge


Chapman’s exemplary monograph begins with a familiar but necessary survey of a ruined France. There was a widespread agreement that recovery from war and occupation would require “modernizing” but no consensus on what that meant. Charles De Gaulle had one set of ideas, but the Resistance had a different set. Socialists, progressive Catholics, and Communists all had their own visions, which overlapped in some ways but conflicted in others. Moreover, as those who sought to rebuild the country groped their way toward a better future, they did so in the face of substantial dangers—austerity, inflation, and the incipient threat of a popular uprising. Social peace, economic prosperity, and political stability were no sure bet in the late 1940s.
Chapman offers four chapters that focus on four different policy domains—immigration, “shopkeeper turmoil,” family policy, and nationalizations. At the first moments of recovery, France needed workers. The place of women in the postwar economy remained ambiguous. Would they serve the future better as productive laborers or by staying at home nurturing the next generation of producers? For immigrant workers, the French preferred white men but could not attract a sufficient number of them. Until economic growth accelerated during the 1950s, however, the need for immigrants remained moderate. By that decade, immigration issues mixed with issues of war and national security.

Naturally, faster economic growth sunk some boats and lifted others. In the mid-1950s Pierre Poujade became the emblematic figure in the revolt of the “losers.” Yet the episode also demonstrated that the Fourth Republic, though it favored the most productive elements of the economy on one side, also responded to angry shopkeepers and small business owners with conciliation. More surprisingly, Chapman suggests, so did the more vigorously modernizing Fifth Republic.

The last two thematic chapters follow the evolution of family policy, driven by a belief that healthy families were both the foundation of a thriving society and the engine of population growth. Accordingly, despite a spirited national debate about the details, the French commitment to help families remained the strongest in Europe. The next chapter, a close look at nationalizations, may be the best of the book. Whereas we often think of this topic as lending itself to a coherent story, Chapman breaks the process down into its particulars. Nationalizations in different sectors came at different times and reflected different motives. The process went more smoothly and produced better outcomes for workers and consumers in some sectors than in others—difficult for coal, for example, but easier for electricity. Chapman does not make a point of it, but the process also illustrates enduring French suspicions about the ability of free markets to deliver both wealth and liberty.

Chapman’s two concluding chapters examine, first, the careers of two of the Republic’s most important architects, Pierre Mendès-France and Michel Debré. Similar in their training, both men were critical of the Fourth Republic’s weakness and instability. Whereas Mendès-France sought to change the system by creating more knowledgeable and responsible voters and politicians, Debré set his sights on constitutional change. Mendès-France’s moment came and went in the mid-1950s. Debré’s arrived when the death of one republic allowed him to write the constitution of the next one. Yet, notwithstanding its reputation for technocratic dirigisme, the Fifth Republic remained a lively political culture, in which the state usually negotiated with, and often acceded to, other interests.

Chapman concludes that the Algerian War proved to be the crucible of the new regime, as conflict and the economy’s pressing need for workers turned a gentle tide of Algerian immigration into a huge and
disruptive wave. Equally important, the need to make critical decisions under pressure from every direction drove the centralization of political power in the Élysées Palace. At every moment, Chapman’s smooth and professional narrative emphasizes two continuing points of tension—between state authority and popular participation and between rupture and continuity. The road between 1945 and 1962 was a rocky one. Nonetheless, the Fifth Republic has worked well enough that no one now talks about a Sixth.

Steve Zdatny
University of Vermont


This beautifully illustrated book examines the extraordinary body of art work commissioned by male members of the patrician Tornabuoni family in late fifteenth-century Florence. The objects that they intended for domestic and religious spaces were impressive in both number and form, ranging from portraits, medals, and panel paintings to frescoes, intarsia work, and stained glass. Marking this collective patronal oeuvre was a fascination with portraiture, a passion for classical learning, a concern with salvation, and “a dedication to celebrating and remembering their female relatives” (204). By gathering the artistic commissions of three generations of Tornabuoni men into a comprehensive study, the author attempts to advance Renaissance patronage studies beyond the Medici, who have dominated Florentine inquiries of this type, and to highlight familial works of art honoring women. The latter of these two claims is more significant: Art patronage by affluent Italian families abounded, whereas works celebrating women of the family are relatively rare. The book highlights eight art works that memorialized Tornabuoni female relations—wives, sisters, and daughters—within a larger corpus of commissions.

The chronological organization of material across nine chapters demonstrates how members of each generation built on the precedents established by their forebears. DePrano begins her analysis with the patronal activities of Giovanni Tornabuoni (1428–1497), the family patriarch, a wealthy banker with close ties to the city’s leading families. Among his principal commissions was a now-lost funerary chapel and tomb for his wife Francesca Pitti (d. 1477). DePrano argues that her death may have inspired Giovanni to memorialize other family members through portraits executed in different media: for instance, the painted portrait by Domenico Ghirlandaio purportedly honoring his older sister Lucrezia Tornabuoni, now in the National Gallery of Art, Washington; a pair of classicizing medals depicting his daughter Lodovica and son...
Lorenzo; and the extravaganza of family portraits populating the walls of the Tornabuoni chapel in Santa Maria Novella.

Giovanni’s son followed suit by commissioning art works that marked important moments in his marital life cycle. Lorenzo celebrated the virtues of Giovanna degli Albizzi, his new bride, by having two medals depicting her likeness struck in 1486. He also ordered panel paintings depicting Renaissance ideals of female beauty and fertility for their private rooms, and commissioned an exquisite commemorative portrait when Giovanna died two years later. Similarly, Lorenzo paid homage to his second wife Ginevra Gianfigliuzzi by engaging Sandro Botticelli to create fresco portraits of the couple at the Tornabuoni villa in 1491. Both of Lorenzo’s sons continued the family tradition of art patronage, although with them it seems to have acquired a greater religious bent.

Throughout the volume, DePrano situates diverse classes of objects in relation to classical art and literature, as well as Renaissance humanism and contemporary social practice, skillfully putting visual and textual evidence in conversation with each other. DePrano offers substantive visual analyses of individual works, deftly analyzing the literary motifs and symbolism underpinning their imagery. DePrano’s handling of conjugal relationships and gender constructs, however, remains less satisfying. Because the analysis sidesteps tensions within gendered representations and household dynamics, as well as issues of women’s structural vulnerability, it tends to reinforce rather than challenge prescriptive views of Renaissance family life.

One question that looms large is why the Tornabuoni— unlike other Florentine patrician families comparable in wealth, reputation, and sense of corporate identity— took such a strong interest in celebrating their female kin. Why did these men adopt seemingly distinctive strategies for representing the family, especially compared to the Medici? Some additional informed hypotheses about the family’s motivations and objectives would have been welcome.

Sharon Strocchia
Emory University

*The Frigid Golden Age: Climate Change, the Little Ice Age, and the Dutch Republic, 1560–1720.* By Dagomar Degroot (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2018) 364 pp. $120.00

The Dutch Republic was something of an outlier in the seventeenth century. Compared to its many neighbors struggling with demographic, economic, and political turmoil, the Dutch enjoyed relative stability and strong economic growth. Golden Age success seems all the more notable because it occurred during the coldest decades of the Little Ice Age (LIA). Scholars are increasingly connecting the variability and extreme weather of the LIA to social disorder across Europe; more recently this discussion
has assumed global proportions. Dutch success has never fit neatly into this narrative, however. “There was something about the Dutch Republic,” Degroot argues, “that let its citizens thrive during the coldest decades of the Little Ice Age” (5). Employing an impressive range of documentary sources and drawing from the most recent work in historical climatology, this book demonstrates that climate and weather were very much a part of Dutch Golden Age success.

In a thorough and highly readable first chapter, Degroot introduces the science of climate and the historical climatology underpinning the LIA. This discussion, useful for specialists and non-specialists alike, informs the remainder of the book, grounding his innovative use of documentary sources to connect climate, weather, and Dutch society. For instance, Degroot employs a vast trove of Dutch East India Company data from ship logbooks in his first two chapters about Dutch commerce to reconstruct historical wind velocity and direction. Prevailing winds, he finds, favored quick voyages during the two coldest phases of the LIA. Although LIA climate exacerbated some challenges for Dutch commerce, on balance the Dutch Republic coped more successfully than its rivals and enjoyed disproportionate benefits because of its maritime economy.

The following two chapters, which focus on Dutch military conflicts between 1564 and 1688, evaluate the impact of weather on important battles. These chapters reveal the care that Degroot takes to characterize climate as a causal agent. They methodically move from descriptions of large-scale climatic conditions through their relationships with localized weather to their potential impacts on military outcomes. Ultimately, however, the human element remains central. Frigid weather typical of the LIA froze rivers and facilitated Spanish assaults during the Dutch Revolt, but it also undermined the resolve of invading forces. Prevailing winds during warmer and colder decades of the LIA presented Dutch and English fleets with tactical advantages, but officers often failed to capitalize on them. Many of the book’s conclusions about climate’s effects are thus expressed in degrees of influence rather than outright determinations. Climate never caused military victories or defeat, but certainly made outcomes more likely.

In his final two chapters, Degroot tackles the broad subject of Dutch cultural response to climate. This shortest section stands apart from the rest of the book because it relies less on quantifiable data and considers a much broader range of documentary sources. The changing content of paintings, the language of pamphlets, and the popularity of technologies like ice breakers revealed the complicated ways in which the Dutch rendered, interpreted, and adapted to a shifting climate. Some sources reveal clearer relationships than others. The Dutch genre of “winter landscapes” are now iconic representations of the LIA, but they are often poor

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1 Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven, 2013).
sources for climate reconstruction because they rarely documented actual weather. Winter landscapes of Dutch work and play nevertheless remain valuable, Degroot argues, because they reveal cultural perceptions of weather. Like maps of new resource frontiers and new technologies to cope with the cold, paintings reflected an underlying cultural resilience to the LIA.

These final chapters reinforce the book’s unique contribution to the debate about the origins and character of the Golden Age during an era of crisis. The Republic thrived not only despite climatic changes but oftentimes as a result of them. Relative to their rivals, the Dutch more effectively capitalized on favorable climatic conditions and more resiliently weathered challenges. The Frigid Golden Age demonstrates that climate should play a larger role in Golden Age historiography, and the book’s interdisciplinary approach, its clear and careful methodology, and diverse use of sources establish an effective approach.

Adam Sundberg
Creighton University

Imagining Russian Regions: Subnational Identity and Civil Society in Nineteenth-Century Russia. By Susan Smith-Peter (Boston, Brill, 2018) 328 pp. $147.00 cloth $133.00 e-book

In this study of nineteenth-century rural society, Smith-Peter examines the ways in which provincial elites in Russia tried to carve out a separate identity for themselves, drawing on Western ideas of “civil society,” particularly those of Smith and Hegel. The initiatives undertaken ranged from the formation of local societies to bolster trade and development to the establishment of local newspapers and public spaces like museums. The book creates an impression of lively regional subcultures within the empire, many of which have been largely overlooked by the historical literature. Smith-Peter also argues that these subcultures formed the basis for local political engagement—to differing ends—with the tsarist administration during the era of the great reforms, particularly the agrarian reform of the 1850s and 1860s.

Methodologically, this book is a kind of Kulturgeschichte. It relies primarily on primary and secondary texts related to various aspects of provincial politics, economy, and society, especially those for Vladimir province, the main focus of the book’s first three chapters (the last two include evidence from Riazan’ and Tver’ as well). In order to “imagine” subnational identity and the formation of civil society in these provinces, Smith-Peter draws from the writings of provincial elites

1 For the Western ideas of civil society, see Adam Smith, Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (London, 1776); Georg W. F. Hegel (trans. S. W. Dyde), Philosophy of Right (London, 1896; orig. pub. in German, 1820).
themselves (the avid consumers of Smith and Hegel), alongside more descriptive nineteenth-century regional histories. She uses them, in conjunction with primary documents and secondary texts related to initiatives from the crown, to indicate the ways in which the provincial nobility attempted to shape their identity vis-à-vis the center in the period leading up to, and immediately following, the abolition of serfdom.

Smith–Peter’s approach has its limits. The study is at least implicitly interdisciplinary; intellectual history, political and cultural history, and economic history at the local, regional, and imperial levels are all part of the larger narrative. Yet, a more consistent attempt to link the ideas with realities on the ground might have shed interesting light on the appeal of Smith and Hegel, two highly individual thinkers, for Russians. Moreover, network analysis could have helped to show the extent to which the circles of educated elites overlapped, as well as the paths via which their chosen ideas spread. A deeper discussion of the Russian interpretation of these ideas would also have been helpful for understanding what made them so compelling. Were the proponents of Smith and Hegel aware that the philosophies of these two men were conceived in social circumstances much different from those in Russia? What was it about their particular conceptions of civil society that resonated with provincial elites?

Related to a broader Smithian theme of political economy, an explicitly political-economic framework for thinking about elites’ motivations for adopting certain ideas or rhetoric about civil society could help to explain the projects and political stances that elites selected, as well as the apparent contradictions between their words and deeds. It might also help to identify the concrete interests motivating their various political outlooks relative to the center, which have been attributed, in Smith–Peter’s approach, mainly to abstract ideas about the role of elites in government and society.

Smith–Peter’s book treats an important subject relevant to historians working in a variety of subfields, including intellectual history, political thought, social and economic history, and the history of localities and regions. It does not, however, engage all of these aspects consistently; its natural interdisciplinarity remains undeveloped, in a way bound to frustrate readers of this journal. But the interdisciplinary questions that it raises provide fertile ground for future research.

Tracy Dennison
California Institute of Technology

Stalinist Perpetrators on Trial: Scenes from the Great Terror in Soviet Ukraine. By Lynne Viola (New York, Oxford University Press, 2017) 268 pp. $29.95

The apogee of Stalinist violence in the interwar Soviet Union occurred in 1937/8, during what historians usually term the Great Terror. Studies of this remarkably violent time are legion, especially since the availability of
previously declassified archives in the 1990s. Although it might seem that there is little new—or substantively new—left to be written about it, original and insightful scholarly work continues to appear. Viola’s new book, the most detailed and significant examination of the rank-and-file perpetrators of Stalinist violence during the so-called “mass operations” of 1937/8, is one of the most important publications about Soviet mass violence and the functioning of the Stalinist system more generally.

This portrait of the Terror at the local level, the first volume of an international collaborative project about Stalinist perpetrators, is based on a “unique source”—the testimony of operatives (investigators, interrogators, and executioners) from the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) at the closed trials who became the scapegoats for the excesses of the Terror. Viola draws from case files located in the security policy archives of Ukraine (SBU), which, unlike similar archives in Russia, are now readily accessible to scholars. Although her sources are exclusively from Ukraine, the picture that emerges, according to Viola, is broadly representative of the Terror in the USSR more broadly. Utilizing these documents, she brings readers into the interrogation rooms, prison cells, and execution sites, thus populating the Stalinist policing apparatus (under the NKVD) and showing “how the terror was implemented, what happened, and who was responsible” (171).

What emerges is an extraordinary and novel portrait of the individual perpetrators of Stalinist violence, a study hitherto not possible. The significance of this work is that it demonstrates at close quarters and in great detail the “illogical logic” of the Terror and Stalinist policing. In the process, Viola skilfully and thoughtfully extracts broader themes, such as the “grey areas” between perpetrators and victims of Stalinist violence; the political culture of the ruling regime and the institutional culture of the NKVD; the relationship between center and periphery in the Stalinist state; and, most profoundly, the factors that combine to make possible a dysfunctional paroxysm of massacre.

The book is structured as a series of microhistories. Each chapter focuses on a particular NKVD operative’s case file, but the interconnectedness of the individuals—from the head of the Kiev NKVD to lower-level district investigators in urban and rural settings—is cleverly revealed as the book progresses. Viola’s purpose is to excavate the dynamics of the Terror on the ground, away from Moscow, but her microhistory is consistently conversant with the larger narrative. She accepts the dominant scholarly view that the Terror was a purge in preparation for war. However, she stresses the idea of an “incomplete civil war,” locating the roots of the Terror in the Russian Civil War twenty years earlier (similar to Harris’ recent book). The political and institutional culture of the Communist Party and the security police were strongly informed by the ethos of struggle against enemies, contrived though the security threats often were.

1 James Harris, The Great Fear: Stalin’s Terror of the 1930s (New York, 2016).
Perhaps the principal sub-theme of the book is the tension between center and periphery, and the nature of their interactions. Viola treats it with great nuance, stating unambiguously that the Terror originated in Moscow but also underlining the agency of lower ranks within the NKVD apparatus. As she puts it, “‘local artistry’ combined with higher orders to create the . . . circumstances in which the mass operations unfolded” (98).

The book captures the operatives’ use of torture to extract confessions vis-à-vis the enormous and unrealistic arrest quotas determined by Moscow and the pressures exerted on investigators. Viola leaves little doubt that torture was sanctioned from above, even though it was one of the charges that operatives frequently had to face on trial. The book’s themes converge neatly through the examination of torture: the bizarre logic of the “mass operations”; operatives’ later defense that they risked arrest themselves if they did not deliver enough confessions; and the police culture “shaped by war, revolution, and terror” that encouraged abusive and arrogant actions. Hence, the book’s fundamental point about Stalinist perpetrators is framed with a good deal of balanced consideration. The importance of individual agency and character dispositions should not be exaggerated; the Stalinist system shaped perpetrators’ conduct and the likelihood of torture and murder. Nonetheless, the NKVD operatives profiled in this book demonstrated the brutality, disregard for life, and military discipline that were “crucial characteristics required of their profession” (178).

For the most part, the young men involved were from humble backgrounds in their twenties and thirties, “children of the Revolution” who had risen to positions of power. Yet they were not “ordinary men.” They had formative experiences from extraordinary times, having either fought in the Civil War or participated in the dekulakization of the peasantry during the early 1930s. Some of them may have had sadistic traits, but not all of them. In their trials, they were charged with abuses of authority and violation of socialist legality, against which their defense was typically that they were following orders. Most of them clearly believed in the party and the necessity of their work, but at least some of them reported that they had little choice but to believe (140). The trials—which, according to Viola, were Stalin’s “gift” to the party in order to re-assert and re-legitimize its authority—show the Revolution enveloping some of its most loyal children in “an invisible vortex of nightmarish logic” (143).

The book has few shortcomings. Viola treats her sources impeccably, and she is at pains to point to their limitations and biases as well as their value. Occasionally she makes a slightly confusing statement, such as the suggestion that the trials would “publicly” scapegoat elements within the NKVD, even though they were not public (167). Although this work does not fundamentally reinterpret the Terror, it elucidates its mechanics and the people who carried it out in an original manner that

enhances our understanding of the Stalinist system and the fate of the October Revolution. It is a must-read for anyone interested in Soviet history and mass political violence.

James Ryan
Cardiff University


Fraser re-tells the story of the Pilgrims, giving special attention to the Winslow family, and expanding her view beyond the history of the Pilgrims and their colony. In addition to considerable detail about Winslow family connections in England, she includes much about the Massachusetts Bay Colony’s involvement with political upheavals in England, as well as anecdotal discussions about many aspects of ordinary daily life. Unlike Nick Bunker’s Making Haste from Babylon: The Mayflower Pilgrims and Their World: A New History (New York, 2011), which overwhelms the Pilgrim story with interesting but extraneous contemporary topics, Fraser keeps either the Pilgrims generally or the Winslows and their political or family connections as her focus.

Beginning with Edward Winslow’s upbringing in a Worcestershire family on the edge of the gentry—farmers investing in a variety of commercial enterprises—she rapidly surveys his participation in Pilgrim activities in Leiden, where Winslow, who had left his unfinished apprenticeship to a London printer, assisted William Brewster and Thomas Brewer in the Pilgrims’ clandestine publishing activities. After ten pages about the voyage of the Mayflower (which gives the book its title), she discusses the beginning of Massachusetts Bay Colony and the Pequot War of 1637. The book’s strength is twofold: (1) Fraser’s exploration of the currently popular topic of networking, as exemplified in Winslow’s career and his family’s marriages, and (2) her analysis of tribal rivalries and interactions in chapters about Massasoit Ousamequen (whose friendship with Winslow and other colonists was essential to the uneasy peace that lasted about thirty-five years), about the Pequot War, about the attempt by Miantonomo to inspire other sachems to unite against the English during the 1640s, and about the tensions leading to King Philip’s War in 1675. After Edward Winslow’s death in 1655, Fraser’s attention shifts to Edward’s son, Josiah, who became Plymouth Colony’s governor from 1673 to 1680, and to the complicated careers, politics, and legal history of the family of his wife and widow, Penelope Pelham Winslow, who died at the end of 1703.

As a boy, Edward Winslow studied at the King’s School, Worcester, where, according to Fraser, his headmaster Henry Bright instilled him with a fervent Protestantism. Fervently or not, the Winslows were already Protestant. To explain Winslow’s premature departure from his
apprenticeship and arrival in Leiden, Fraser asserts that Winslow’s “faith was a matter of such urgency he was willing to throw away his professional career” (8). A scholarly history might have mentioned the alternative suggestion that Winslow might have been induced to leave for the Continent by the last book that his master produced while Winslow was working in London, *An Itinerary written by Fynes Morison, Gent . . . containing his Ten Yeeres Travell Through the Twelve Dominions of Germany, Bohmerland, Switzerland, Netherland, [etc.].*¹

Fraser has neither footnotes nor endnotes. Instead, a brief and unspecific general source note is provided at the end of the book, chapter by chapter. Curious readers will not be able to link sources to particular statements. This approach may be sufficient for a general readership unfamiliar with the story; Fraser, however, nowhere clarifies why she chose her various sources and opinions. Why, for example, does she ignore the fact that Plymouth Colony did not participate in the Pequot War, to which she devotes a chapter?

Fraser makes a number of statements that warrant further scrutiny:

1. In her account, Edward, in his journey from London to Leiden, was “wrapped in the sort of thick serge mantle that England and the Netherlands were celebrated for manufacturing” (16). “The Brewster Press had a distinctive logo, a bear with heraldic plumes” (20). Leiden’s siege in 1574 “was the city’s defining event . . . the subject of hundreds of paintings and tapestries” (20). Edward was “full of energy”; and his “charming qualities” combined enthusiasm and impulsiveness. He was “almost overwhelmed by the warmth, kindness and strength of belief of the community he joined.” Living in a “haze of religious excitement” and “[i]ntoxicated by the intense atmosphere,” Edward married “a devout, gentle young woman named Elizabeth Barker. His parents might have dreamed of their eldest son marrying a daughter of one of Mr Winslow’s wealthy patrons, but Edward insisted on being joined to an unknown woman he barely knew” (23–24). Edward’s brothers Gilbert and John, “probably lived in the same boarding house” in Leiden with Edward and Elizabeth (24). Edward had a “tendency to grandiosity” and a “need for a father figure” (128, 132). Despite his intensive education in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew at the King’s School and his years in London and Leiden, Edward showed himself in the colony to be an “autodidact who was thirsty for knowledge, and slightly in awe of the more sophisticated colonists” of Boston (6–7, 153).

2. What Edward’s clothes were in 1617 is unknown, but Fraser’s guess might be correct. The common bear logo was proven in 1987 not to have any significance with respect to Brewster’s publications.² The siege inspired

¹ For this alternative suggestion, see Bangs, *Pilgrim Edward Winslow—New England’s First International Diplomat, a Documentary Biography* (Boston, 2004), 4.
² J. A. Gruys, “Ornamental Bears and Other Animals,” in Ronald Breugelmans (ed.), *The Pilgrim Press, A bibliographical & historical memorial of the books printed at Leyden by the Pilgrim Fathers by Rendel Harris and Stephen K. Jones, With a chapter on the location of the Pilgrim Press
at least two paintings and one tapestry (not hundreds). Edward’s psychological response to his surroundings is nowhere recorded. Whether he or his family were acquainted previously with Elizabeth Barker, whose will shows her to have been wealthy, is currently unknown. Where Edward and Elizabeth lived after their marriage is unrecorded; boarding houses did not exist. Notes from Winslow’s psychiatrist have gone missing.

Fraser equivocates and/or speculates about multiple points: Brewster “may have had misgivings” about Isaac Allerton. Elizabeth Barker Winslow “may have had concerns” about not being pregnant. Mary Brewster “barely concealed her poor spirits at this voyage to the unknown,” accompanied by, among others, “the outrageous Mrs Chilton” (32–33). During the crossing, the “absence of Dorothy and William Bradford’s three-year-old son left behind in Leiden may have contributed to Dorothy’s increasingly desperate mood” (49). “[O]n board there was a passenger who was sinking into a depression under the cold snowy light and the mysterious backdrop of the new continent. She could not find a way back from her despair and she could not talk about it. . . . William Bradford’s wife Dorothy was becoming unreachable. . . . Was it thoughts of her own young son, left behind? All we can guess is that the thought of the isolation of America terrified her. . . . Perhaps the frightening atmosphere—God was not reaching out His arms to save them—and the tragic deaths were the last straw that tipped Dorothy into preferring to die rather than to live. On 7 December, . . . her body was found floating beside the ship. . . . There is no evidence to show she committed suicide, but equally no evidence to say that she did not. It is hard to believe she did not plan her death” (60–61).

Fraser’s unsupported psychological characterizations and her frequent use of “may have” and “perhaps” reach a climax in those sentences. A historian providing footnotes might at least have mentioned that Austin first floated the idea of Dorothy Bradford committing suicide in her story, “William Bradford’s Love Life,” published in 1869.3 Austin acknowledged the suicide as her own invention to advance her romantic plot. Repeating and accepting this spurious myth serves as one simple gauge for the quality of any Pilgrim history.

But what is Fraser’s story? It is not about the Mayflower or “the Families” etc. Fraser does not retell what has been known since 1904 about the early career of the ship.4 Nor does she offer much information about

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4 For the ship, see Reginald Godfrey Marsden, “The ‘Mayflower,’” English Historical Review, XIX (1904), 669–680.
many of the most important families in Plymouth Colony’s history—the Bradfords, the Hatherlys, the Allertons, or the Prences, to mention only a few. For a history of Plymouth Colony that focuses on the families, Eugene Aubrey Stratton’s *Plymouth Colony: Its History & People, 1620–1691* (Lehi, Utah, 1986) is far more comprehensive. Fraser’s commentary on the “founding of America” lacks any discussion of the development of democracy and law in Plymouth colony, or the growth and structure of churches there. Nor does Fraser explore agriculture, infrastructure, town development, or households and furnishing.

Fraser is probably not responsible for the misleading title. In England, the same book is called *The Mayflower Generation—The Winslow Family and the Fight for the New World*. But if the Winslow family is at the center of the story, Fraser should have made a place for Edward’s brother Kenelm, and the supposition that as a cabinetmaker, he was responsible for designs characteristic of Plymouth Colony furniture. Fraser’s bibliography shows extensive research in published sources. Samuel Deane’s *History of Scituate: From Its First Settlement to 1831* (Boston, 1831), however, is not the best discussion of William Vassall and the second church in Scituate. The Winslows settled in Marshfield in Plymouth Colony. More than 300 documents refer to them in the Marshfield town records, publication (2015) of which is missing in Fraser’s bibliography.

Fraser’s book recurrently attempts to explain actions as arising from psychological characteristics that are fictitious; the result in this conjunction of historiography and creative writing goes beyond what might be expected in a book of history.

Jeremy Bangs
Leiden American Pilgrim Museum Foundation

*The Heart of the Constitution: How the Bill of Rights Became the Bill of Rights.* By Gerard N. Magliocca (New York, Oxford University Press, 2018) 248 pp. $29.95

Prominent critics of the Constitution drafted in Philadelphia in 1787 objected to its lack of a bill of rights. Alexander Hamilton’s answer in *Federalist* no. 84 was that a bill of rights was not only unnecessary but dangerous, since it would “afford a colorable pretext to claim more [powers] than were granted” in the Constitution. Conventional wisdom is that the Federalists relented and passed a bill of rights in the first legislative session to placate critics of the proposed Constitution. As Magliocca demonstrates in *The Heart of the Constitution*, however, “It turns out that for more than a century after the first ten amendments were ratified, hardly anyone called them a bill of rights, let alone the Bill of Rights” (5).

The first ten amendments did not look like other eighteenth-century bills of rights. Bills or declarations of rights written during the revolutionary period contained broad philosophical claims about
equality and natural rights, and they were distinct from the constitution of government. In June 1776, for example, Virginia adopted the Virginia Declaration of Rights before adopting the Virginia Constitution. If the United States had anything akin to a national bill of rights, preceding the national constitution, it was the Declaration of Independence (58). The first amendments, by contrast, were tacked onto the end of the constitutional text and were not prefaced with any broad philosophical statements. Significantly, James Madison, who introduced the amendments in the first Congress, never referred to them collectively as the bill of rights. Neither did John Marshall, Abraham Lincoln, nor most anyone else.

In the thirty-ninth Congress (March 4, 1865 to March 4, 1867), Rep. John Bingham called the first eight amendments the Bill of Rights, insisting that the Fourteenth Amendment empowered the federal government to enforce compliance with these amendments at the state level. Bingham’s usage, however, was historically idiosyncratic. Even as late as 1880 Supreme Court, Justice Samuel Miller could say flatly, “Our Constitution, unlike most modern ones, does not contain a formal declaration or bill of rights” (5). Not until the first half of the twentieth century did the 1791 amendments become identified consistently as the national Bill of Rights, usually in the service of growing and consolidating federal power.

After the Spanish-American War, for example, William Jennings Bryan and other critics of U.S. imperialism warned that the Philippines would be “governed without the protections of the ‘Bill of Rights’” (75). President McKinley soon promised basic protections for civil liberties to the inhabitants of the Philippines, and Congress codified colonial rule in a statute known as the Philippine Bill of Rights—a significant expansion of federal power “in exchange for modest limits on that power” (83).

Similarly, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, addressing critics of the New Deal in a 1934 fireside chat, urged his listeners to “turn to the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, which I have solemnly sworn to maintain and under which your freedom rests secure” (93). As long as the national government did not violate the Bill of Rights, Roosevelt argued, it could legitimately engage in central planning of the economy without violating the Constitution. After his deft call for a “Second Bill of Rights” in his 1944 State of the Union address, Roosevelt turned his rhetorical invocation of the Bill of Rights toward the creation of positive welfare rights in the United States.

After the War, the Supreme Court increasingly appealed to the Bill of Rights “as a justification for their authority to strike down legislation as unconstitutional” (115). Although invoked in the name of limited government, the new doctrine of incorporation greatly empowered the federal judicial officers of the United States. By the end of the Cold War, however, Roosevelt’s vision for a Second Bill of Rights waned, and Republicans appealed to the federalism principles in the Bill of
Rights to roll back the New Deal and consolidate control in national political life.

As Magliocca suggests in his introduction, a historical perspective on the Bill of Rights produces “two powerful conclusions”—first, that the very concept of the Bill of Rights is dynamic and, second, that it has been a “powerful tool” for those who “seek constitutional change” (7). The Heart of the Constitution delivers more than promised; it highlights Hamilton’s prescient warning that a bill of rights would provide a colorful pretext for the expansion of government power.

Justin Buckley Dyer
University of Missouri

Maternal Bodies: Redefining Motherhood in Early America. By Nora Doyle (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2018) 271 pp. $32.95

The ideal of woman as mother changed between the colonial era and the period following the Revolution, shifting from the image of the fecund woman bearing many children to the sentimental image of the responsible mother nurturing her children. Doyle’s discussion of “Maternal Bodies” does not discount the social and ideological issues behind that development: Enlightenment thought, republican ideology, evangelical religions, and a more diverse and market-driven society. Her focus, however, is the changing concept of the female physical body or corporeality (a word used throughout the book) during that time.

Probably the most important influence in this shift from maternal fecundity to sentimentality was the intrusion of the male midwife into the birthing process. The presence of female midwives made birth a social activity, a shared experience of friends and family who took care of one another. The entry of men into the event brought the possibility of sexual misconduct into the viewing of the female body. In the attempt to reduce the possible element of sexual intimacy in the birthing room, male midwives focused on the internal organs of the women, the uterus specifically. Childbirth in the hands of men became “dissociated” from the body of the mother in a mechanical process guided by a physician (41). To bypass the idea of sexual impropriety, medical books concentrated on the womb as the most important object in the process. To justify the intrusion of a physician, pregnancy was turned into a medical pathology associated with pain that emphasized women’s moral qualities.

All the prescriptive and descriptive sources followed those medical themes, changing the white mother into an “ethereal creature” defined by “tender emotions and moral strength” (51). Thus the sentimental mother imbued with moral spirituality became the ideal depicted in both visual and literary sources of the time.

The enslaved woman on the other hand retained her “corporeality” in the visual culture, her body often deprived of modest clothing. The
anti-slavery poetry and the visual sources designed to evoke the horror of the system highlighted the violence and brutality of slavery and, by implication, the physicality of the female body. It is not surprising that the birth rate of slaves and poor white women continued to grow as that of privileged white women declined during the nineteenth century.

The main limitation of this study is its focus on only two social classes—privileged middle- and upper-class white women and enslaved black women; it devotes little attention to lower-class white women and free blacks. That limitation is partly a reflection of available sources. Most of the information about becoming a mother comes from the letters of privileged white women, the print culture that focused on them as mothers, and the medical works that catered to them as patients. For the slaves, the sources are mostly the anti-slavery literature written by both former slaves and the abolitionist societies that emphasized the cruelty and inhumanity of the system, as well as the memories reported to WPA interviewers during the 1930s. They tended to stress the physical abuse of the women rather than their humanity. The medical literature describing experiments on the female slaves also contributed to the idea that black women were insensitive to pain and lacked the moral qualities of white women.

Throughout the period, however, the reaction of women to the process of pregnancy, giving birth, and tending to children has remained constant, regardless of the descriptive and prescriptive literature and regardless of social class. Giving birth, breastfeeding, and taking care of small children were always messy, time-consuming, and painful experiences. Doyle notes this continuity in how women felt about bearing children and its disconnection from the literary sources. It was always a physical experience fraught with danger and pain regardless of race or social class.

Elaine G. Breslaw
University of Tennessee, Knoxville

A Biography of a Map in Motion: Augustine Herrman’s Chesapeake. By Christian J. Koot (New York, New York University Press, 2018) 283 pp. $35.00

Before Chesapeake City at one end of the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal was named in 1839, the plantation site had been known as Bohemia Manor for more than two centuries, under the ownership of Augustine Herrman, a Bohemian who worked for the Dutch West-Indische Compagnie (WIC) in both Amsterdam and later New Amsterdam. Herrman marked its location on his magnificent map Virginia and Maryland as it is Planted and Inhabited this present year 1670. Koot explores the multiple intentions of the Herrman map from its origins as a manuscript initially commissioned by Philip Calvert in 1659 delimiting the boundary between Dutch New Netherland and colonial Maryland to
a far different map printed in London in 1673 as a piece of imperial pro-
paganda celebrating possession of the broader Chesapeake.

Koot first tells the story of this “map in motion” in three chapters that trace its journey through Herrman’s work as a merchant and then as a mapmaker and as a planter before shifting to England for two chapters. One chapter centers on Cecil Calvert (Lord Baltimore), the map’s patron, and William Faithorne, its engraver; the other chapter discusses map consumers, starting with map printer John Seller, who was associated with the network of bookstores and coffee houses around the Royal Exchange, and extending to Samuel Pepys, who owned a copy of the Herrman map.

In 1612, John Smith made a map of *Virginia Discouvered and Discribed* that was printed with west at the top, thus permitting the riverine complexity of Chesapeake Bay to be read horizontally. Hermann used the same orientation, but his map (in four segments) has a navigational emphasis on soundings, typical of a cleaner Dutch cartographic tradition based on maritime trading routes— in contrast to the English bias for property and the identification of landed estates. Koot draws out these differences across an array of contemporary maps by other cartographers. Herrman spanned two worlds—as a Dutch trader who sailed to the Caribbean from his New Amsterdam base and especially to the tricky waters of the Chesapeake where he traveled for twenty years to acquire tobacco but also a planter in English Maryland. He cultivated and profited from what Koon terms the “interimperial” Anglo-Dutch trade, but in the end, his cartographical masterpiece was coopted by the English who were keen to stamp it as unambiguous evidence of their colonial space. One of the more interesting parts of the book is how, with the aid of absentee proprietor Lord Baltimore’s patronage and Faithorne’s engravings, the Chesapeake-originated Herrman map was reframed and re-annotated into a metropolitan London statement of ownership befitting the atlases of possession inventoried by the Lords of Trade and Plantations.

Koot spins a wider web of comparison using secondary sources to compensate for the lack of precise details regarding Herrman’s efforts. However, his frequent resort to speculation about Herrman and others—marked by such qualifiers as “may have,” “most likely,” “perhaps,” “probably,” “might very well have,” etc.—become tiring, despite the support of his extensive and thorough secondary-source citations. In the end, the book is slighter than it might have been, notwithstanding its sixteen color plates and thirty-five smaller black and white images, in part because of the difficulty of deciphering them. Readers might need to view the map on an enlargeable digital version (https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3880.ct000766/) to get a proper sense of the map and to appreciate both Herrman’s talents and Koot’s scholarship.

Deryck W. Holdsworth
Pennsylvania State University

In no part of the U.S. South is the historiography regarding slavery and emancipation as rich, deep, and impressive as in the low country of South Carolina and Georgia. For decades, scholars have worked assiduously on this region, which comprises the outer coastal plain of these two South Atlantic states, along with numerous barrier islands adjacent to the coast. Although the region was more diverse than is sometimes believed, the standard depiction of the area during the time of slavery as a region dominated by large capitalistic plantation enterprises with large numbers of African and African-American slaves—producing sizable quantities of rice, supplemented early by indigo and later by Sea Island cotton, mainly for sale in foreign and extra-regional markets—is generally sound. So, too, is the view that after the demise of slavery, the area’s plantation sector declined dramatically before collapsing altogether.

What followed this collapse is more difficult to explain succinctly. Most scholars would probably agree, however, that another economic regime gradually emerged in the low country. This regime was still largely agricultural; it was characterized not by size and scale but by tiny productive units, operating under a bewildering complex of landholding patterns and labor arrangements. For a variety of reasons—ranging from productive inefficiency to political repression to some of the population’s partial to almost total withdrawal from commercial activities—the regime so constructed left the still largely African-American population of the region in parlous economic straits for generations after slavery’s death.

Such is the region and the historiography that Bell engages in Claiming Freedom. At a general level, her approach and argument are unobjectionable. She uses (some) standard sources and conventional historical methods to make the now-standard and conventional case for African and African-American agency both under slavery and during the transition to freedom. In so doing, she argues that, despite the horrors of bondage, enslaved African and African-Americans in coastal Georgia successfully retained and developed cultural traditions originating in Africa, and that through language, religion, kin relationships, and property accumulation and assignment, they were able to gain some autonomy and to establish viable and surprisingly enduring communities on the area’s rice and cotton plantations. Indeed, such communities—and the cultural complexes inspiring them—provided the foundations needed by African Americans successfully to navigate through the difficult shoals of emancipation and the emergence of new forms of economic organization in the postbellum decades. However much they struggled economically after the Civil War, African Americans in the low country, who had often “claimed” their own freedom during the...
war itself, succeeded in retaining and expanding the spheres of autonomy and independence that they had carved out even while enslaved.

As the above description suggests, Bell attempts to cover a lot of (low country) ground in *Claiming Freedom*, the text of which is only ninety pages. Unfortunately, the book’s “thinness” extends to its coverage and grasp of both historiography—many important books and articles on the history of the region are missing—and source materials. For example, why use Elizabeth Donnan’s outdated numbers for slave imports into Georgia rather than the (larger) figures available in the justly praised *Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database* (http://www.slavevoyages.org/)? The study is further marred by its meandering mode of presentation, opaque language—“diagnostic, layered backstory” and “ontological praxis” are two cases in point (29, 19)—and factual errors, some of them minor (Daniel Heyward rather than Duncan Heyward as the author of *Seed from Madagascar* [Chapel Hill, 1937]) and some of them major. Contrary to Bell’s assertion, the Georgia low country was not “the principal area for antebellum rice production” (7). Georgia accounted for 18.1 percent of U.S. rice production in 1849 and 28 percent in 1859; South Carolina accounted for 74.3 percent in 1849 and 63.6 percent in 1859.1

Bell has lit on a great topic and guided readers through some interesting narrative material relating to utterly fascinating historical terrain. Nonetheless, *Claiming Freedom* represents a missed opportunity.

Peter A. Coclanis
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

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The “soul of journalism” is the elusive subject of Rodgers’ exploration of Protestant criticism of the press. By *soul* Rodgers means the principles that animate news organizations beyond the profit motive. The book is a rhetorical and philosophical analysis of commentary by mainstream Protestant thinkers gathered from almost a century of their writing. Rodgers offers what he calls an “originalist” interpretation of their criticism, claiming at the end to have penetrated to its core meaning. The soul of journalism wants news professionals to be “free moral agents,” “prophets,” “teachers,” and “citizens” who work for “human welfare” and “social justice” beyond market constraints (200). Rodgers hopes that

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this mission, which was first defined more than a century ago, can remain vital today: “Before we continue to transform our present news ethic in the midst of contemporary digital-driven disruption, we need to understand the past in order to discover and save what is fundamental about the mission of journalism” (200).

Rodgers places the Protestant discourse about the press within the specific historical context of the commercialization and industrialization of news. Market forces encouraged a variety of sins in newspapers, which critics identified as giving the people what they want instead of what they need. Professionals within the news industry responded to criticisms of sensationalism and irresponsibility by crafting an ideology of political neutrality, which came to be known as objectivity in the twentieth century. For Rodgers and the critics that he admires, objectivity ate away at the soul of journalism.

The critics that he admires most identified themselves with the Social Gospel movement. Five ministers—Lyman Abbott, Washington Gladden, Josiah Strong, Charles Sheldon, and Walter Rauschenbusch—plus the economist Richard T. Ely elucidated a coherent criticism of the modern daily press that will remind specialists of the more familiar Progressive-era critiques of Will Irwin and Upton Sinclair. Strong, in particular, noted how the industrial daily press allowed millions of people to experience a sense of simultaneous awareness, an insight that anticipates Benedict Anderson’s argument in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York, 1983). All of these critics shared a notion of an organic society and considered the press the nervous system of the social body. They also shared a quasi-Marxist critique of the “capitalistic” nature of press organizations and the way that they ignored the working class while exploiting their own workers (49).

Much of the language of these critics seems to have been adopted by reformist movements within the news media. Rodgers notes the ways in which the codes of ethics of organizations like the early professional group Sigma Delta Chi and the American Society of Newspaper Editors reflect this battle for the soul of journalism. Indeed, when working journalists try to address the ethics of a situation, as they often do, the terms in which they discuss it are deeply informed by this older tradition. Rodgers deserves credit for recovering this neglected discourse and arguing for its continuing relevance.

The book could have explored in more detail the transatlantic nature of this discourse; many of the texts that Rodgers cites are British. It could also have explored in more detail the relationship of the Protestant discourse to changes in the news workplace. During the period under discussion, “reporters,” “correspondents,” and “editors” came to think of themselves as “journalists,” a term that was rarely used at the beginning of the period. Underlying this change in nomenclature was a great change in both the arrangement of newsrooms and the operation of national and international news systems.
Readers might also notice some absences in the cast of characters. Much more could have been said about women and their specific struggle for journalism’s soul. Rodgers mentions the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) in passing but could have written much more about its active press organization. Likewise, more sustained attention to Jane Addams, African-American activists, and labor activists could have added nuance to this story, revealing possible divisions between mainstream Protestants, as well as between Protestants and other religious pundits.

Contemporary observers of Protestantism’s media commitments might be surprised by what they read in this book. The association of Protestantism’s social valence with conservative evangelical voices has become commonplace since the 1950s. Rodgers probably would not include ministers like Jerry Falwell as allies in the struggle for the soul of journalism; in fact, on the present-day right, a term like “social justice” signals decadent liberalism. The story of that shift within Protestantism invites a sequel to this stimulating and worthwhile book.

John Nerone
University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign


The history of political science as a discipline has been an established field of scholarly examination for a long time. As Blatt notes in this thoroughly engaging and provocative book, leaders in this field, especially Gunnell, have recently shifted its focus from “events in the history of political science” to treatments of that history.”

The history of political science eventually began to put the discipline into historical perspective, mapping its evolution and assessing its status as it changed over time. Blatt uniquely places that mapping under a microscope to examine the role of racism and racialized thinking in that evolution. What she finds is a devastating indictment of the discipline’s failure to examine and overcome the embedded racial biases in its approaches to the study of politics.

Highlighting the historical role of race in U.S. institutions and politics is a little like shooting fish in a barrow, except for the fact that people are often reluctant to pick up the gun and start shooting. Everyone knows that the U.S. Constitution was constructed in no small part to accommodate those who wished to perpetuate the institution of slavery. Reluctantly or not, the framers to varying degrees acceded to the task, building a political society simultaneously and contradictorily committed

1 See John G. Gunnell, Imagining the American Polity: Political Science and the Discourse of Democracy (University Park, 2004).
to both equality and inequality in the most profound way possible. Slavery marked the U.S. political system as founded on racism—a stain that persists as the nation struggles to adapt its political institutions to a world that seeks to overcome that legacy. Blatt joins with Gunnell and others to show that American political science, instituted during the late nineteenth century by white people, included out-and-out racists in their ranks, most prominently John W. Burgess, a constitutional theorist who famously characterized Reconstruction as “the most soul-sickening spectacle that Americans had ever been called upon to behold” (13). Blatt reminds us that racism did not stop Woodrow Wilson, the most politically prominent American political scientist in history, from becoming president of the American Political Science Association, let alone president of the United States.

Even though people like Burgess and Wilson were eventually to become a distinct minority, embedded racism in the thinking and analytical approaches of political scientists still significantly shaped how the study of politics unfolded. Blatt joins Smith to underscore that by the 1920s, explicit consideration of race had become basically verboten in American political science, the topic consigned to the category of the “pre-political,” which unfortunately made it seem natural and immutable rather than an artifact of political practice. The race making of the state, via the census and its Jim Crow policies, was exempted from political analysis. In this context, Blatt’s argument is at its strongest: American political science as a discipline had racist roots (much like the American politics it so often examined), but its legacy was sustained in large part by its denial to examine race as a political phenomenon. “Explicit disciplinary racism” gave rise over time to a latent racism sustained by denying the need to examine how racialized thinking had infiltrated political analysis. As Blatt shows, this racism haunted political scientists when they turned to the study of international relations and how the United States should interact with other countries, peoples, and states. The extended example of note in the book is about the now long-forgotten Journal of Racial Development, which re-inscribed notions of the white man’s burden and racial uplift.

Blatt follows this formative period in detail by tracking closely how Charles Merriam, the leader of the pioneering Political Science Department at the University of Chicago, sought to find a way to make political science both a science and an area of study that could better realize the ideals of American democracy. Blatt notes Gunnell’s observation that Merriam joined with others to emphasize “pluralism” as the focus for the study of politics centered on the examination of intergroup relations and conflict. Yet, even this context, in which pluralism posed as a possible forerunner to what today we would call multiculturalism, betrayed the implicit racial biases of American political science, as in the scientism that

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made Merriam at best a subdued critic of race science. Blatt sees this scientism becoming deeply entrenched in the mainstream analytical approaches of the discipline, especially the behavioralism of the 1950s and 1960s, and subsequent variations, that tend even today to individualize race as a personal characteristic and further remove it from analysis as a political achievement often the result of state practices.

The race making of the allegedly neutral state continues to go unexamined in the mainstream even today, although it may be subject to change as a more diverse professoriate begins to subject the racism of state practices to political analysis. Given what President Trump and political leaders like him are doing today to foment ever more racial hostility, the re-awakening of a racially conscious political science is urgently needed now.

Blatt effectively underscores that this re-awakening did not happen earlier by showing how a failure of disciplinary imagination at a critical moment sustained racial bias in American political science, and how it haunts the discipline even today. Political scientists, and others concerned about the status of the social sciences, should take serious note of this most cautionary tale.

Sanford F. Schram
Hunter College, CUNY


The notion that America, like the Lannisters from Game of Thrones, always pays its debts is subject to several caveats. In American Default, Edwards describes the most controversial and complex example of a possible U.S. federal government default, the demonetization of gold, the devaluation of the dollar, and the abrogation of the gold clause in bonds issued both governmentally and privately during the New Deal. His methodology entails old-school narrative history of economic thought and economic history, with much attention to descriptive statistics and to who said or did what and when. Although Edwards mentions regression results, he does not present any. Edwards clearly took pains to write an engaging narrative for a general audience, even supplying a lengthy timeline and dramatis personae in the front matter. During the book’s “long gestation,” he also interviewed monetary history luminaries Milton Friedman, Anna Schwartz, Allan Meltzer, and Michael Bordo, among others (xviii).

Despite the book’s subtitle, the story is hardly untold, but it bears brief repetition for the uninitiated. On April 5, 1933, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) issued an executive order that required Americans, under the threat of serious penalties, to sell all of their gold, with some minor exceptions, to the government at the official rate of
$20.67 per ounce by May 1. On May 12, the Thomas Amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act gave FDR discretion to increase the official price of gold up to $41.34 per ounce. On June 5, Joint Resolution No. 10 (JR10) annulled the gold clauses in all contracts. On January 31, 1934, FDR fixed gold at $35.00 per ounce, a massive devaluation of the dollar that would have quickly ended America’s depression had not abrogation of the gold clause, and many other even more dubious New Deal policies, caused enough uncertainty to stymie significant increases in new business investment until World War II.

At that point, few people doubted the constitutionality or efficacy of the government’s ultimate control of monetary policy, but the decision to abrogate the gold clause raised a ruckus. Under JR10, the holder of a “gold” bond due $35.00 was entitled to receive $35.00 in paper dollars, not the 1.69 ounces of gold (35/20.67) that s/he/it could have received under the original contract terms and not $59.15 (35*1.69) in paper. Because the government argued that gold was no longer a lawful domestic medium of exchange, the gold payment option was void. Moreover, gold clauses were meant to protect lenders from inflation, not the deflation then ravishing the economy, from which borrowers, not lenders, needed protection.

Four conservative members of the Supreme Court disagreed on general moral grounds, declaring the Constitution “gone” in their dissent against their court’s decision, which astutely held that abrogation in the case of government debt was unconstitutional but caused bondholders no loss (178). Edwards agrees with the dissenters, but his justification is normative, not positive. Although the dust-jacket photo shows Edwards standing next to a stack of books taller than he is, the bibliography, just eight pages long, disappoints. A convincing narrative would seem to require a much larger listing of primary and secondary sources. Had Edwards consulted widely enough, he would have encountered Richard Timberlake’s Constitutional Money (New York, 2013), which makes clear that the effect of U.S. policy from 1933 to 1935 was opposite that of Argentine policy in 2002 and other cases mentioned, in which creditors, unlike those in the United States during the New Deal, were demonstrably hurt. Markets responded favorably to the decision of the Supreme Court not because the default was “excusable” as Edwards argues but because no actual default occurred (198).

That conclusion does not render American Default valueless; most of the day-by-day narrative reads well and true. However, it does mean that Edwards should not have positioned the book as the untold story of a sovereign default. It is really the story of the death of the retail (classical) gold standard in the United States and the extremely tricky constitutional, moral, and political problems that its demise entailed—the price, as it were, of countenancing Leviathan.

Robert E. Wright
Augustana University

In a sense, privacy is a medium, like air; we live within its embrace, to varying degrees, from our earliest days until our last. Its existence allows us to negotiate and contextualize our political and personal connections—in our relationship with the state as citizens, and with each other in our day-to-day dealings. It is a barrier that mediates the extent to which each of us is known or unknown to those around us.

Moreover, like the air itself, we rarely see privacy, or its value, clearly. As Jerome observed, it takes a mountain view to confirm the existence of air, by providing a perspective that forces us to account for it.¹ Similarly, statutes, judicial rulings, and technological and commercial innovations implicating privacy each allow us a perspective on the extent to which we actually control information about ourselves. Such are the benchmarks that Igo has selected to chart the shifting views of privacy in modern American life, and she has chosen wisely.

At bottom, privacy for Igo is a vehicle for exploring the historical development of Americans’ sense of themselves vis-à-vis others. Though the full dimensions of privacy may remain elusive, she notes that “the same imprecision that vexes theorists [has] proved to be privacy’s true political value” over time (12). Her aim is to trace the way in which privacy has served as a “highly flexible container for social thought” (12), from elite society’s late nineteenth-century call for new legal rights to protect against intrusion by a public seeking to know through later efforts to curb invasive commercial marketing to the modern anxieties about the extent to which the government knows us.

Igo chronicles the shifting attitudes toward privacy in the United States across the last dozen decades. She begins with the technological innovations in surveillance that led Warren and Brandeis to advocate in the pages of the Harvard Law Review for a “right to be let alone.”² She then proceeds apace through the decades to the journalistic exposure of the behavioral marketing techniques of the 1960s, and, ultimately, the civil rights efforts of more recent years, aimed at making minorities of all kinds known to the public.

Throughout, Igo gives due attention to U.S. Supreme Court decisions like Griswold v. Connecticut, which deemed the marital bedroom a constitutionally protected “zone of privacy,” and Katz v. United States, which extended the constitutional protection against governmental searches and seizures to all reasonable expectations of privacy. But, unlike other developments that she discusses, these cases were not simply emblematic of attitudinal changes about privacy; rather, they literally changed the rules. Legislative responses to perceived privacy intrusions,

like the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, may have attracted popular attention, but their actual effects were negligible. The courts, however, have taken a longer view, crafting rules sufficiently capacious to allow individuals to make nearly any privacy issue a legal one. Their influence arguably privileges judicial decisions among the modern benchmarks of the metes and bounds of privacy that Igo chooses to highlight.

This minor criticism aside, the great contribution of this survey is to reveal our changing attachments over time to the quality and quantity of personal privacy. Indeed, Igo’s history is, in itself, a means of gaining the perspective needed to see privacy more clearly. After all, as she concludes, the most pressing privacy issues today have some analogue in the past: “A sense that Americans are known too well by government and corporate entities alike is not unprecedented. It was a discovery of the 1890s and then again of the 1930s and the 1960s” (357).

In the end, Igo helps us to appreciate that privacy is, and has been, a function not just of the efforts of others to know us but also of our own competing desires to be both known and unknown beyond the ways in which we expose ourselves through our words and actions. We always seem to have had some interest in being known—just not too well or all of the time.

Lawrence Friedman
New England Law | Boston


In March 2018, American conservative politicians used racialized rhetoric to describe a caravan of Central Americans traveling toward the U.S.—Mexico border as a threat to national safety. Their tone was eerily similar to nativist attempts to prevent “Chinamen” crossing from Chihuahua into El Paso “in herds and droves” during the 1890s (103). Given the recent politicized rhetoric describing the border as unsafe and lawless alongside the vitriol surrounding immigration reform, Lim’s Porous Borders provides a timely history of the racist ideologies behind these standpoints. Bridging immigration and borderlands history, Lim asks how the multiracial landscape of the El Paso-Ciudad Juárez region affected the national identities and immigration policies of both countries. Using a transnational lens, Lim argues that the United States and Mexico were in a “shared venture” of “controlling race, immigration and the border” from 1880 to 1930 (14).

In five chapters, Porous Borders traces how racially “open borders” eventually became “more racially discriminating” (5). The book begins with the arrival of the railroad, which connected the capitalist dreams of
the Gilded Age and Porfiriato. The railroad facilitated the movement of people escaping segregation and seeking labor opportunities in the booming hub of El Paso. The book closes in 1930 when both nations’ immigration policies were strictly defined to discourage undesirable bodies from crossing the border in either direction. For example, the 1930 U.S. census removed “mulatto” and added “Mexican” to the racial category. Lim argues that this substitution erased “suggestions of racial mixing” in the populace, which also erased the multiracial borderlands from the national identity (5). At the same time, Mexico constructed their national identity around mestizaje (racial intermixing), which created a “color bar” that blocked the immigration of African Americans and Chinese (158).

Lim’s strength lies in how she weaves together the methodologies of transnational, legal, and borderlands studies to understand the development of each country’s immigration and border policies. In Chapter 1, she argues that when the railroad and capitalist ventures brought African Americans, Chinese, and Mexicans to the region, the United States and Mexico closed the indigenous borderlands via reservations and extermination campaigns. Her astute observation that Anglos collapsed Tigua identities into Mexican-ness explains why indigenous people often appear invisible in the archives. However, Lim should nod to the fact that indigenous peoples succeeded in usurping attempts at extermination and erasure. Scholars of the Sonoran and Chihuahuan borderlands, such as Guidotti-Hernández, Jagodinsky, Meeks, and Shepherd, have documented how indigenous peoples continue to negotiate their own understanding of borderlands into the present.1 Moreover, scholars of urban indigenous studies, such as Rosenthal, Vicenti Carpio, LaPier, and Beck, provide useful models for analyzing indigenous agency.2

Chapter 2 documents how El Paso lacked the strict color lines of the U.S. South, which allowed African Americans, Mexicans, and Chinese to cross social and intimate boundaries. These multiracial social relations fueled Anglo reformers’ concerns about miscegenation and, worse, the degeneration of national identity. Lim uses city directories to provide a spatial analysis of race and class in El Paso. One of her more interesting findings was the existence of a bordered barrio, Chihuahuita, where multiracial social relations blossomed within the borderland city. This barrio, which belonged almost exclusively to working-class nonwhites,

1 See, for example, Nicole Guidotti-Hernández, Unspeakable Violence: Remapping U.S. and Mexican National Imaginaries (Durham, 2011); Katrina Jagodinsky, Legal Codes and Talking Trees: Indigenous Women’s Sovereignty in the Sonoran and Puget Sound Borderlands, 1854–1946 (New Haven, 2016); Eric Meeks, Border Citizens: The Making of Indians, Mexicans, and Anglos in Arizona (Austin, 2007); Jeffrey Shepherd, We Are an Indian Nation: A History of the Hualapai People (Tucson, 2010).

2 See, for example, Nicolas Rosenthal, Reimagining Indian Country: Native American Migration and Identity in Twentieth-Century Los Angeles (Chapel Hill, 2012); Myla Vicenti Carpio, Indigenous Albuquerque (Lubbock, 2011); Rosalyn LaPier and David Beck, City Indian: Native American Activism in Chicago, 1893–1934 (Lincoln, 2015); Beck, Seeking Recognition: The Termination and Restoration of the Coos, Lower Umpqua and Siuslaw Indians, 1855–1984 (Lincoln, 2009).
became the site of white ire and blame. A similar spatial mapping of race and class in Juárez provided a point of comparison for how Mexicans responded to multiracial relations south of the line.

In her best chapter, Lim uses legal history and ethnic studies to reveal the stories of indigenous, Mexican, African-American, and Chinese men’s deliberate negotiations with state policies. She analyzes legal and government archives to demonstrate the various ways in which Mexican laborers, Apache scouts, African-American soldiers, and Chinese refugees harnessed “the power of the state for their own interests” and made claims to citizenship (127). For example, in 1917, the United States admitted 522 Chinese as refugees because they assisted in the Punitive Expedition and made pleas to humanitarian action despite exclusion policies. Lim’s discussion of Apache scouts leaves readers questioning, again, whether the indigenous borderlands were shut. Nevertheless, Lim effectively uses ethnic-studies approaches to analyze the intricacies of policing, racial boundaries, and state building in the borderlands.

Lim’s greatest contribution is her discussion of how the U.S. and Mexican immigration systems worked in tandem to create a “transnational construction of race and nation” (13). In Chapters 3 and 5, she uses her legal background to trace the hardening of the border as both countries “developed stricter border control policies and immigration exclusion programs based on race” (158). In Chapter 3, Lim uses spatial theory and transnational history to place the El Paso-Juárez borderlands into the broader Pacific World. Because U.S. exclusion policies were unsuccessful in stopping Chinese immigrants, both governments enlisted cartographers and geographers to map the demographics of border crossers and monitor immigration from the Pacific. In Chapter 5, Lim combines a transnational analysis of immigration policies with a discussion of white reformers’ concerns about miscegenation. She explains how by 1917, both the U.S. and Mexican immigration systems had converged in their resort to racial and national identities to define their exclusionary policies and regulate the border. Border policy served to police not only bodies moving in either direction but also any multiracial social relations that challenged the ideal racial order.

Lim’s research methodology firmly sits within social and legal history in her mining of government records, personal papers, oral histories, newspapers, city directories, maps, census records, and legal records. The majority of her primary sources come from U.S. archives with the exception of Mexican government and legal records. Lim addresses the silence of the archives in capturing a multiracial landscape in which segregation and passing functioned daily. Given her goal of creating a transnational analysis, the lack of Mexican newspapers, personal papers, and city guides is noticeable. These sources, if extant, would add voices from non-Anglos and offer a comparison of how Juarenses negotiated racial boundaries and immigration policies.

Lim’s findings will be familiar to scholars of the U.S.–Mexico borderlands, especially recent scholarship on policing bodies by Lytle
Hernández and McKiernan-González, and recent work on Asian immigration across the Canadian and Mexican borders by Chang, Peña Delgado, and Hu-DeHart. Lim’s strongest methodological contribution is the way in which she brings the fields of borderlands and immigration history into a much-needed conversation. She moves the El Paso–Juárez borderlands from the periphery to the center of our understanding of how the United States and Mexico constructed their ideal racial orders and national identities. Porous Borders is an immensely useful addition to the literature about borderlands, Pacific World, and immigration history. Moreover, Lim’s writing style and comparative methodology provide a beneficial model for scholars of transnational history.

Katherine Sarah Massoth
University of Louisville


In The Road to Inequality, Nall examines how the post-1945 development of the American federal highway system led to political polarization between (Republican-leaning) suburbs and (Democratic-leaning) cities and, in turn, how that geographically based polarization influenced transit policy, stunted the mobility of poor and working-class urbanites, and “undermined cities.”

Nall’s findings are straightforward: (1) Postwar highway construction facilitated outward metropolitan growth into previously rural areas; (2) those who left for the suburbs were disproportionately Republican, especially in rapid-growth metropolitan areas in the South; (3) as Republican suburban growth increased, partisan geographical divisions between cities and suburbs did, too; (4) decisions about highway placement and metropolitan transportation devolved to state and metropolitan planning boards, which leaned heavily Republican; (5) the result was more funding for highways (disproportionately used by suburbanites) at the expense of mass transit (disproportionately used by urbanites); and (6) these investment priorities stunted the physical (and thus economic) mobility of poor city dwellers, exacerbating inequality in America.

Historians of postwar urban America will probably not find Nall’s findings especially surprising. His specific focus on highway policy adds depth to the political-science literature about metropolitan inequality.

and urban/suburban political division, but it does not fundamentally challenge or meaningfully enrich the histories of those subjects as already written. Indeed, *The Road to Inequality* is not a work of history informed by political science nor a true hybrid between the two disciplines. Rather, it is strictly a work of political science that draws from specific historical data sets and a limited historical literature. If historians do not approach the book with this caveat in mind, they will come away disappointed.

Nonetheless, Nall’s methodological approaches are intriguing. He and his team conducted large-scale contemporary opinion surveys to gauge partisan attitudes about residential and commuting preferences and political attitudes about transit investment. He uses the resulting data sets to illuminate how partisans align within metropolitan geographies and diverge in their politics. The sheer scale of that research, as well as its deployment, is impressive (though not historical). Nall also makes use of data that are more historical in nature. Among his most compelling are the GIS (Geographic Information System) data that map how highway placement shaped partisan geography. He also pulls information from urban-planning documents, and, interestingly, Rand McNally road atlases that show how intercity travel speeds increased with highway construction, thus facilitating commuting at longer distances over time. He also cites real-estate advertisements from metropolitan newspapers that touted easy access to highways from suburbs, which became a selling point to commuters who worked in the city.

Historians will likely take issue with some aspects of the book, especially Nall’s failure to provide context for the dynamics that he observes or to situate them within history’s longer arcs. It is, for instance, striking that a book about Republicans’ growing physical distance from cities during the past half-century and suburban Republicans’ opposition to programs benefiting the urban poor has nothing to say about the larger anti-urbanism that has been central to the party’s politics since the 1960s. The book makes no mention of the tax revolts of the 1970s, the stripping of federal urban funding by the Reagan and Bush administrations, or the caricaturing of cities as places of crime and disorder. The implication is that the issues of highways and suburbanization unfolded in the absence of larger (and more important) historical processes. Nall also repeatedly downplays race in a way that almost all serious historians of postwar America would probably find unconvincing.

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In the end, *The Road to Inequality* is a fine work of political science that offers useful data about geographical political distance, politics, and inequality. Fairly or not, however, historians are likely to find it wanting.

Simon Balto  
University of Iowa


*Before Mestizaje* is a major contribution to an increasingly sophisticated literature about racial mixture in colonial Latin America with its critical scrutiny of the “sistema de castas” and the political, legal, social, and cultural variables that shaped its development. Such studies have challenged the very existence of such a “sistema” and a top-down imposition of its political logic. Rather, socioracial hierarchies in colonial Latin America were characterized more by flexibility and malleability than by stasis and immobility, varied widely within and across regions throughout the Spanish Empire, and were shaped as much as by accident as design.¹

At the core of this richly textured work is Vinson’s determination to write a social history of what he refers to as “the forgotten castes” or “extreme caste groups of Mexico,” racially mixed offspring of unions among Spaniards, Indians, and Africans, categorized with exotic labels such as *lobos*, *moriscos*, *coyotes*, and *salto para atrás* (“jumps backward”). As he points out, such castes are routinely cited as examples of seemingly infinite racial mixtures and amply represented in the eighteenth-century genre of casta paintings. Much less is known, however, about the forgotten castes’ experiences and grounded histories. As Vinson astutely observes, it is “at its extremes, [that] caste’s fluidity became most apparent” (202). At a broader level, Vinson uses his analysis of the forgotten castes to reflect on the caste system’s origins, development, and legacies in order to rethink our understandings of mestizaje. He argues that “Before mestizaje existed casta, morphing through a conduit of change called castizaje” (69). In his view, *castizaje/castagenesis* provides a more nuanced concept through which to understand racial mixture in the colonial period. He builds on earlier works by Sánchez and Morales Cruz who argued for castizaje’s ability to capture the granularities and fluidity of caste interactions in ways that mestizaje did not.² Vinson emphasizes,

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however, that it is precisely the fluidity of castizaje that requires deeper interrogation. By reconstructing the patterns of caste pluralism and caste shifting experienced by the forgotten castes, he contends that “colonial racial mobility likely extended deeper and proved more socially profound than we might have initially imagined” (63).

Although the main focus is on Mexico City in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Vinson also comments on trends throughout the colony. Drawing on ethnohistory, anthropology, and demography, Vinson deploys an impressive range of primary sources that includes censuses, notarial records of slave sales, baptismal and marriage registers, and bigamy and inquisition cases. By tracing individuals categorized as lobos, moriscos, mulatos, coyotes, and pardos, the racial demographics that he reconstructs for these groups are revealing of previously unknown trends. For Mexico City, extreme castes accounted for less than one-half of 1 percent of the sampled population. Moreover, children accounted for a significant number of extreme castes in Mexico City. Vinson interprets this evidence to suggest that extreme caste categories did not follow individuals into adulthood. The 1791 census data also points to a low level of cross-racial/intercaste interaction: African-based populations had minimal impact on the family structure of whites/mestizos and vice-versa. Although contact between the white/mestizo sector with Indians was more significant than with blacks, it was still low, whereas contact between blacks and Indians occurred more frequently.

Also suggested by the 1791 census sample is that black households provided the main spaces for the generation of caste complexity. The category of mulato encompassed not only the offspring of blacks and whites but also of blacks and chinos or of blacks and Indians. Classifications of morisco, mulato, and mulato blanco substituted for one another, and in the eighteenth century, pardo became synonymous with mulato. Vinson posits that as large numbers of light-skinned individuals such as mulatos and pardos were incorporated into black households, “Mexican blackness itself was effectively transformed. . . . [T]he physical and phenotypic configuration of blackness was simultaneously whitening, as lighter and lighter hues slipped and became enveloped into black categories” (123).

Vinson also draws attention to recent scholarship about Afro-Mexican history that suggests the emergence of what can be termed a black cultural sphere or that of a “third republic,” which provided a space for blacks, similar to that of the “republics” of the Spaniards and indigenous communities. Vinson also points to the emergence

3 Vinson draws from Jane G. Landers’ discussion of a “third republic” as outlined in “Cimarrón and Citizen: African Ethnicity, Corporate Identity, and the Evolution of Free


3 Vinson draws from Jane G. Landers’ discussion of a “third republic” as outlined in “Cimarrón and Citizen: African Ethnicity, Corporate Identity, and the Evolution of Free
of a paradox. Given the growth of new caste categories created from what he terms compound or composite castes that combined two or more caste categories as well as physical descriptors, the colonial population should have demonstrated increasing caste complexity over time. The 1791 census, however, manifests less complexity in comparison with the 1777 ecclesiastical census. Vinson’s resolution is that the Spanish colonial state cared more about demarcating differences between pure blackness and black mixtures, as well as maintaining accurate records of white purity and of castizos (Spanish-mestizo mixture).

Vinson confirms much of what we understand about the caste system’s internal contradictions, mobility, and instability, but he advances our knowledge of the forgotten castes in significant and surprising ways. Yet, although Vinson includes examples of the casta genre—an anonymous eighteenth century casta painting adorns the book cover and four examples of casta paintings are included in both black and white and color plates—he does not engage with them as substantive evidence. That lack of attention to the casta genre results in an important oversight. Vinson’s comment that “caste paintings [were] produced in Latin America during colonial times” is not entirely accurate (xiii). With the exception of one series from Peru, all of the other extant casta paintings (more than 100 complete or semi-complete series) were produced only in colonial Mexico. An explanation will have to await future research, which will also surely shed more light on the particular combination of anxiety, scientific curiosity, racial politics, patronage, and artistic enterprise that arose in a particular part of the Spanish Empire.  

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The Crime of Nationalism: Britain, Palestine, and Nation-Building on the Fringe of Empire. By Matthew Kraig Kelly (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2017) 250 pp. $85.00 cloth $29.95 paper

Who decides when political opposition becomes a crime in a colonial context? How are such determinations made and implemented? These questions lie at the heart of Kelly’s engaging study about the Great Arab Revolt in Palestine from 1936 to 1939, in which thousands of Palestinians undertook various forms of protest against the British Mandate government and the Zionist settlement that it enabled. Kelly notes that many of the English-language studies “have tended, often

4 The key study of the casta genre is Ilona Katzew, Casta Painting: Images of Race in Eighteenth-Century Mexico (New Haven, 2004).
unwittingly, to reproduce the British and Zionist crimino-national framing of the revolt” (4). He deconstructs this framing to show how British violence played a causative role both in the outbreak of the revolt from April to October 1936 and in its recommencement in July 1937.

The book’s eight main chapters take readers through the chronology of the revolt, analyzing British, Zionist, and Palestinian Arab perspectives along the way. Through a careful analysis of open statements and private correspondence, Kelly demonstrates that even as British and Zionist leaders were publicly declaring that the rebels were nothing more than “criminal gangs” and “terrorists,” privately they recognized the nationalist impetus and popular support behind the uprising. Moreover, Kelly shows through a detailed chronology of events how specific acts of British brutality and policies of “vicarious punishment” were preconditions for the rise of Palestinian Arab violence (93).

The majority of Kelly’s findings are based on an extensive array of documents from the British and Israeli archives. But unlike other scholars who have made use of these collections, Kelly casts a critical eye on Zionist and British rhetorical devices that work to obscure both the nationalist dimensions of the revolt and the criminal dimensions of Zionist and British actions. He also shows how incidents of Palestinian criminality, particularly attacks against noncombatants, reified British and Zionist views. Kelly’s careful attention to the discursive aspects of these narratives implicitly draws from methodologies in rhetorical studies, allowing him to provide a fresh reading on a relatively well-studied historical episode.

In his attempt to consult Palestinian sources, especially published memoirs by participants in the revolt, Kelly confronts one of the biggest challenges that historians of Palestine face—namely, the lack of Palestinian archival material from this period. Most of the private book collections and journals written by Palestinian Arabs during the Mandate period were either confiscated by Israel in 1948 or lost during the Palestinian Arab exodus of that year. As a result, historians of the revolt can obtain source material that adequately represents the Palestinian perspective only with great difficulty.

Nonetheless, certain Palestinian sources could have enhanced Kelly’s study. A number of Arabic newspapers published in Palestine during this period could have provided additional details about both British violence and other Palestinian Arab nationalist activities. Admittedly, relying on the Arabic press from this time period is risky because the British authorities frequently shut down Palestinian newspapers during the revolt, citing security concerns. Even when papers could print, they were subject to heavy British censorship.

A more glaring omission relates to Arabic poetry, which was an especially popular way for Palestinian Arab narratives and framings of the revolt to be articulated and circulated. Two of the most famous poets from this period—Abu Salma and ‘Abd al-Rahim Mamhud—not only participated
in the revolt but also composed verses about it that were published in the local press (when possible) and circulated orally among Palestinian Arabs. Given Kelly’s careful attention to British and Zionist rhetorical framing, using insights from rhetorical methodologies to examine Palestinian poetry from this period would have greatly enriched the project.

Overall, Kelly’s study makes an important contribution to our understanding of how imperial discourses shape contemporaneous understandings of historical events as well as historians’ renderings of these events. More broadly, his book sheds important light on how nation-states define violence as legitimate. Histories of imperialism and nationalism, particularly in their intersection with studies of criminality, will all benefit greatly from this work.

Maha Nassar
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*Tracing Language Movement in Africa.* Edited by Ericka A. Albaugh and Kathryn M. de Luna (New York, Oxford University Press, 2018) 448 pp. $99.00

Interdisciplinary methods involving language have become nearly indispensable for some historians of Africa, particularly those working on the distant past, for whom comparative historical linguistics and oral traditions offer glimpses of a time without written forms of record keeping. Especially during the past half century, both approaches have opened up new possibilities for recovering reliable narratives throughout sub-Saharan Africa for periods before the nineteenth-century advent of colonial rule. As more disciplinarians embraced nontraditional methods, *longue durée* approaches spanning millennia became common and, to some extent, familiar. By necessity, however, the use of language-centered methods require proficiency in multiple disciplines. Those already committed to mixed methods frequently work with archaeological and climatological evidence as well. These scholars tend to be, in the words of Albaugh and de Luna, “unrepentant disciplinary appropriators” (5), sampling what they need to construct the most complete and informative histories possible.

The use of language-centered methods for deeper histories has generated a fair amount of controversy; Albaugh and de Luna draw

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attention to some of the unproductive, or damaging, assumptions inherent in research focused on the more recent past as well. Of particular value is their discussion of language use as an uncritical index for identity (8–12), and the “fiction of language as a bounded, single entity” when treated as an analytical unit (12–13). Tensions in the use of language across various disciplines inform the organization of the volume, highlighting the consequences of approaching language in parts or as a whole, as fixed or fluid, and as fragmenting or consolidating.

The goal of *Tracing Language Movement in Africa*—to present the approaches of various disciplines and facilitate scholarship across boundaries, and to explore questions that arise in the wake of juxtaposing perspectives and assumptions—is most welcome. For readers interested in surveying the variety of approaches and perspectives that scholars take in the study of language change, the volume can serve as a reference guide or introductory text. Chapter 1 by Albaugh and de Luna and Chapter 2 by Derek Nurse provide excellent examples of the comparative method, and Chapter 4 by Scott MacEachern provides an accessible discussion of the challenges and possibilities of bridging language data with archaeology. For those interested in specific case studies, each contribution discusses methods and then puts them in practice, permitting readers to glean information about diverse regional, national, and temporal categories.

Language variously emerges as a lens for observing the context and outcome of conquest, conflict, and contact in the contributions by Maha Ennaji (Chapter 6), Fallou Ngom (Chapter 7), and Albaugh (Chapter 9); popular politics by Derek R. Peterson (Chapter 8); pragmatism and creativity in changing national and urban spaces by Fiona McLaughlin (Chapter 10), Philip W. Rudd (Chapter 13), and Nico Nassenstein (Chapter 14); and the ideas and relationships that allow the large-scale circulation of vocabulary by David M. Gordon (Chapter 12), Maureen Warner-Lewis (Chapter 15), Robert W. Slenes (Chapter 16), and Hanétha Vété-Congolo (Chapter 17). Individual contributors ground themselves primarily in the standards and methods of their own disciplines; much of the interdisciplinary conversation emerges between, rather than within, chapters.

As the editors note, Western ideas about language and language change in Africa tend to be constrained by their Enlightenment origins (13). The treatment of languages as singular, bounded, and stable either synchronically or over time is a misleading premise that ignores the fluidity and permeability of language in action (16–17). By placing scholars of many disciplines in conversation, *Tracing Language Movement in Africa* exposes some of the pitfalls and possibilities of language-based research, sparking important debates for which future work must be held accountable.

Raevin Jimenez
University of Michigan
Colonial Suspects: Suspicion, Imperial Rule, and Colonial Society in Interwar French West Africa. By Kathleen Keller (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2018) 243 pp. $55.00

Keller’s well-written book examines the history of colonial surveillance in interwar French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française, or AOF), with an emphasis on Senegal and Dakar, the capital of AOF. Based on a large number of archival sources from Senegal and France, her study is situated primarily within the historical literature about French imperialism, occasionally taking into account works in political, social, and literary theory.

One of the great contributions of Keller’s book is its demonstration of the extent to which Dakar became a node in various global networks. People from France, other European countries, and French and British colonies beyond AOF, such as Vietnam and Gambia, all moved through Dakar, sometimes to find wealth or adventure but most often to extend political networks. In that context, Keller adds to our understanding of the pan-African and communist groups that attempted to challenge colonialism worldwide, including political associations in the French metropole, such as the Paris-based Ligue de Défense de la Race Nègre. She takes a middle position regarding the effectiveness of these networks: Although their members were successful in smuggling their journals into AOF and in creating pockets of political activism there, they never came close to influencing a sufficiently broad segment of the African population to endanger the colonial government.

Nonetheless, the colonial authorities kept a watchful eye on those who seemed to defy their vision of a stable, static, and “legible” society—that is, a society structured in such a way that authorities could “read” it in accord with their interests. In addition to foreigners and Frenchmen whose behavior the government saw as morally and socially disruptive, they regarded as inherently dangerous anyone who frequently moved from place to place or might have connections to global radical networks. Under a system created by Colonial Minister Albert Sarraut in the early 1920s, information about such individuals traveled back and forth between the French metropole, AOF, and other French territories. Thus, as Keller convincingly shows, they fostered a culture of intense fear and paranoia that assigned a wide range of individuals to the category of “suspects.”

The book is divided into five chapters. The first two examine the institutional development of surveillance institutions in AOF and their day-to-day operations from the point of view of the authorities; they show surveillance to have been concentrated primarily in urban areas, especially in the European quarter of Dakar. The remaining chapters each study one of three groups that became targets of surveillance in AOF—foreigners, metropolitan Frenchmen, and Africans from AOF. Keller’s decision to structure this part of the book around legal categories allows her to investigate carefully the scope and limits of surveillance.
Authorities were especially successful in undercutting the political activities of foreigners from areas beyond the French Empire because they could expel these activists relatively easily. Keller also acknowledges, however, that in people’s everyday lives, racial categories often had considerably more influence than these legal ones.

Keller might have pursued certain questions further. The importance of the shared category of “suspects” would have become even clearer if she had been able to link it to the emergence of a shared sense of identity among the various groups subjected to surveillance. A more systematic analysis of the widespread French fears, even after 1918, of German-government intrigues and left-wing anticolonial movements centered in Germany would have been useful, as would have been a more detailed discussion of how the book contributes to a broader understanding of the end of French imperialism. Nevertheless, Keller’s study is an important and insightful addition to a growing field of works that bring together the history of colonialism and that of global surveillance.

Daniel Brückenhaus
Beloit College


Tackett ingeniously explores the political and cultural space of the Northern Song period (960–1127 C.E.) to demonstrate the rise of a new Chinese identity remarkably similar to the early nationalisms of the Atlantic world. He succeeds in demonstrating the emergence of a national consciousness in the late eleventh century through careful use of textual and archaeological sources.

Tackett’s basic argument is that the interstate diplomacy governed by the Chanyuan Oath (1005), which, in the case of eleventh-century China, created a once-only ongoing exchange of embassies between Song China and the Khitan people’s Liao dynasty for close to 100 years (1005–1110s). Embassy exchanges exposed Chinese officials to the landscapes, ecologies, and culture of the Khitan (29–73, 246–275, 293–294).¹ Not only were ambassadorial exchanges required by the treaty regime, but bilaterally agreed-upon borders were also created, both of which generated a national consciousness among the political, cultural, and social elite of China, who came to refer to themselves as shidafu (“literati”). Although largely a cultural identity that potentially connected them to all men of China, as well as Chinese officials serving the Liao, it also

¹ A database of diplomats and ministers of state is available at www.ntackett.com.
developed an ethnic component, whereby Chinese came to think of themselves as the *Han* people and as belonging to the monoethnic country of *Zhongguo*.

Tackett’s analysis converges from two directions: (1) the literature and thinking on nationalism and (2) his own research. Conceptually, he divides the book into two parts—political space and cultural (sinic) space—to explore the wider implications of the East Asian world order created by the Chanyuan Peace Accords of 1005. Uniquely for Chinese imperial history, the Song and the Liao agreed to diplomatic visits with each other two or three times a year for slightly more than 100 years (51–53, 250, 251). Those who served as ambassadors or associates formed a high proportion of the four senior-most ministers of state in the Northern Song. Through their influence as the pinnacle of political status (often also of cultural status), their new vision of the world spread throughout the elite class, which referred to itself as shidafu and came to see themselves as *Han* people of the Chinese state and bearers of Chinese “civilized” *hua* culture (14–15, 159–166).

Policy statements, memorials, embassy reports, travel writings, poetry, and other literary sources collectively reveal the emergence of this national consciousness among the elite. Furthermore, defending themselves against two northern steppe-based states (Khitan Liao and Tangut Xia), as well as fulfilling border demarcation provisions of the Chanyuan Oath with the Khitan Liao, sharpened the Song Chinese sense of themselves as Chinese.

On the cultural side, Tackett shows that by the late eleventh century, the Chinese shidafu elite generally believed that the “lost” territory of Yan was Chinese and should be within the boundaries of the state. As a consequence of the diplomatic exchanges, Song officials passed through the Yan mountains to and from their visits to the steppe capital of the Liao rulers where ecology, ethnicity, culture, and economy all changed from Han style to nomad style north of Yan. Hence, Song officials easily came to understand the geographical boundedness of Chinese culture and the Song state, as well as the ethnic nation and its identification with farming and farming villages (246–275).

The penultimate chapter presents the evidence of 947 tomb reports describing more than 1,000 individual tombs in the area centered on the North China plain during the long eleventh-century. The distribution, contents, and arrangements of these tombs show a strikingly clear dividing line between two different cultures—Chinese and Khitan (211–245, esp. 235). Tackett observes that some of this sharp demarcation between cultures was the result of the Liao policy of separating ethnic groups from each other (239–243). In the last chapter, Tackett returns to embassy reports, travel literature, and poetry to establish that the “lost” territory of the Yan region was considered to be within sinic space, that its inhabitants were truly Han people, and that in the best of worlds it would lie within Chinese national territory.

Tackett’s major argument—the idea that a Chinese national consciousness arose among the literati in the Northern Song as a result of historical contingencies similar to those of early nationalism in eighteenth-century Europe—is also the most delicate part of his book. Interpretive comparisons across cultures and time are difficult, but Tackett brilliantly applies hitherto underutilized primary sources to make his case for the Song. In the same vein, he effectively draws from archaeological records to nail down his argument for a Chinese form of nationalism within a geographically bounded monoethnic state.

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