Citizenship, Inequality and Difference: Historical Perspectives. By Frederick Cooper (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2018) 224 pp. $29.95

This short book handles a vast topic of contemporary significance. Reading Cooper’s history of contested claims to citizenship is a depressing experience, not because of any failure of his lucid and acute analysis but in response to the political connotations on both sides of the Atlantic—President Trump’s calls to build a wall and corral the children of immigrants into camps or Prime Minister Theresa May’s “hostile environment” for would-be migrants. Cooper’s long historical perspective reflects these current debates about whether citizenship should be inclusive or exclusive and about what threshold of commonality is necessary to allow access to it. This book deserves to be read far beyond academia.

The Nationality Act passed by the British parliament in 1948 made people in the white Dominions of Australia or Canada into “Commonwealth citizens” and people in Jamaica and Nigeria into citizens of “the United Kingdom and the colonies,” alongside the lower category of “British subject.” Cooper refers to these layers of citizenship as “superposed nationality.” When immigrants from the West Indies disembarked from the SS Empire Windrush in 1948, they arrived as citizens with the right to settle and work in Britain; as one government minister claimed, like Romans “they [could] say ‘Civis Britannicus sum.’” Attitudes were destined to change, however, in 1968 when Enoch Powell, classical politician and scholar, warned that like the Tiber, British cities would foam with blood.

Starting in 1962, rights to citizenship became more restrictive, leading to political scandal in 2018 when Prime Minister May’s “hostile environment” denied citizenship to the children of the Windrush generation who had every reason to assume that they were citizens, after living and working in Britain for sixty years. At the same time, 3 million European Union citizens resident in Britain wondered what rights they were to have after Brexit, and 2 million British people living and working elsewhere in the European Union worried that they would lose their citizenship in the European Union—another example of “superposed nationality.” The fantasy of “taking back control” could strip British citizens of their European Union citizenship, and European Union citizens of their rights in Britain. Cooper’s book provides long-run and comparative insights into these deeply felt and highly contentious issues.

Similar issues of superposed nationality arose in the French constitution of 1946. When the French Empire became the French Union, and the colonies became overseas territories, the residents in them became citizens of France. In Algeria, Muslims gained the right to citizenship without renouncing their Islamic status and accepting the civil code. But in 1974, French citizenship became more restrictive, ending the special treatment of former overseas citizens and creating a class of people who were resident in France without legal access to welfare benefits. A distinction emerged between French people with a historical claim to
French heritage and the children of immigrants. Debates over inclusion and exclusion fueled the far-right party of Jean-Marie Le Pen but also the French republicanism and laicisation that marginalized those accused of “communitarianism.” In both Britain and France, inclusive citizenship made sense at the end of World War II as an effort to hold empires together; thirty years later, empires largely disappeared and so did the need to offer inclusivity.

Cooper ranges widely, drawing parallels between the French constitution of 1946 and the Cadiz constitution of 1812, which debated similar issues in the Spanish Empire, leading to the fear among some Spaniards that Spanish citizenship would be diluted if offered to diverse groups in Spanish America. The Cadiz constitution took an inclusive definition, as in France in 1946 and Britain in 1948—at least for indigenous peoples, though not for Africans and their descendants, who were assumed to come from somewhere else. The citizenship that emerged in early modern Spain rested on the criterion of being an active member of an established local community.

Cooper sees the origins of these issues in the ancient world, which often reappeared in later periods. Unlike the closed city-states of Greece, the Roman Empire assimilated conquered people through an offer of citizenship. The edict of Caracalla in 212 extended citizenship to all free male inhabitants, without obliging them to surrender their local patriotism and identity. At the end of the nineteenth century, Indians re-adapted this edict to claim a right to British imperial citizenship—an option that the British government and the Dominions opposed out of the fear that Asians would flood into Australia or Canada. The idea that citizenship should be restricted instead to a white “Greater Britain” impelled India to demand independence.

Cooper shows how claims to citizenship were contested and defined in diverging ways. Was citizenship acquired as the result of birth within a state’s territory (\textit{jus soli}), or was it the result of descent from a recognized citizen (\textit{jus sanguinis})? Both approaches had (and have) their critics, the former for granting citizenship to individuals with a minimal attachment and the latter for denying the rights of long-term migrants. Different regimes handled claims in different ways—the Ottoman Empire, tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and India by creating group-differentiated citizenship, or France’s more universal approach as defined by the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789.

Cooper’s coverage of this vast subject builds on his deep knowledge of France and its empire. The book could have been two or three times as long and could have dealt in more detail with the internal political and cultural debates that led to different outcomes. But the virtue of brevity is that it allows highly complex and contentious issues to be understood and to provide ammunition for those who, like Cooper, wish to counter narrowly inclusive and national definitions of citizenship with a flexible and multilevel formulation. In 2016, Prime Minister May declared to Britain’s Conservative party, “If you believe you are a citizen of the
world, you are a citizen of nowhere. You don’t understand what citizenship means.” Cooper shows that May has no historical or conceptual understanding of what citizenship has meant and can mean.

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**Meat Makes People Powerful: A Global History of the Modern Era.** By Wilson J. Warren (Iowa City, University of Iowa Press, 2018) 264 pp. $75.00

Warren’s comparative history of meat’s mass production makes clear at the outset that meat is an ambiguous foodstuff. In Western cultures, its consumption has always been linked to social status and affluence. Its processing, however, was never able to escape the stigma of killing. Butchers, accused of violent disposition, often found themselves pushed to the margins of their communities. Eastern cultures and religions, most notably Indian (Buddhism) and Japanese (Shinto), mandated compassion for animal life. They limited, even suppressed, meat eating before the second half of the twentieth century. Handlers of dead cattle and horses fell into the lowest caste because of their activity’s perceived impurity. China’s dependence on bovines as beasts of burden had the country steer a middle course. A taboo on beef consumption accompanied otherwise omnivorous, though largely plant-based, foodways. Yet, economic, social, and cultural hurdles notwithstanding, meat production and consumption have experienced tremendous growth throughout the last 200 years. The average American now consumes roughly 250 lbs of beef, pork, mutton, and poultry per year. Yearly per capita consumption in mainland China stands at 120 lbs while the Japanese eat 107 lbs, up from about 17 lbs in 1961. Warren’s aim is to explain how, and at what cost, that expansion came to be.

For meat to occupy a larger slice of the average food basket, it had to become cheaper in the West. In the East, people first had to be convinced of its indispensable contribution to the human metabolism. Science helped both scenarios. The discovery of protein in the 1830s inaugurated what Warren calls the first food regime. Protein, especially of animal origin, appeared as both building block of, and fuel for, the human motor. Red meat, scientists said, was central for human health and productivity. Public policies encouraged its supply in response to the rise in urban demand and to keep up with military rivals. International trade linked the cattle-raising Americas and Oceania to beef- and pork-eating Great Britain. France and Germany protected their markets to bolster self-sufficiency. Governments intervened for hygienic reasons, too, to keep slaughterhouses clean and animal diseases (rinderpest, trichinosis, et al.) away. From 1868 onward, the modernizing impulse of Japan’s Meiji regime fashioned economic and sanitary measures to promote beef consumption according to the Western model, targeting soldiers as their
first beneficiaries, as it attempted to remove prejudice against animal products (fish occupied an altogether different category). East Asian meat consumption remained low, however, and the region evolved by-and-large outside the global meat commerce before 1945.

After World War II, new-world grain and soy fed cattle in Asia and sustained the development of its meat consumption. Warren highlights how governments contributed to this expansion by negotiating trade agreements to boost exchange. In doing so, they also maneuvered states into regulatory passivity as transnational corporations began to run the global political economy. This second, corporate food regime heavily relies on confinement to raise animals, which releases massive amounts of waste into water, soil, and air, placing public health and consumer safety at risk. In a central chapter, Warren demonstrates that the corrosion of state authority has increased industrial hazards in processing plants and reduced meat workers’ salaries across the globe. The influence of science appears less forceful today. To be sure, nutritional recommendations have persuaded consumers to replace beef with chicken (beef’s environmental hoofprint is also more noxious). But scientific solutions to problems of pollution, animal welfare, and public subsidies are contested. Political will tends to melt away when meeting corporate lobbies. It fails to translate into policies and the application of legal norms.

The precept “meat makes powerful” held less sway during the last two centuries than Warren’s brave book implies. The vegetarian and vegan diet has numerous adherents now. However, many physicians and physiologists were touting the easy and, to some, advantageous substitution of vegetable for animal protein well before that doctrine achieved prominence. In France, they were part of the “rational vegetarian” movement. This criticism, however, may be churlish. According to Warren, the only alternative to the current, unsustainable meat economics is to eat less meat.

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Military Anthropology: Soldiers, Scholars and Subjects at the Margins of Empire. By Montgomery McFate (New York, Oxford University Press, 2018) 487 pp. $45.00

McFate came to prominence as an early advocate of U.S. military engagement with anthropologists in order to grapple with “adversary culture” after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. She was an architect of the “Human Terrain System” that embedded social scientists within the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan between 2006 and 2014. She has deplored and sought to reverse what she sees as a historical anomaly of estrangement between the military and academia in the post-Vietnam era. She continues to advocate for this approach as a professor at the Naval War College and as an author of books like this one, which seeks to develop
practical lessons for military anthropology from various historical episodes—ranging from Donald Barrows’ ethnographic work for the U.S. military in the Philippines from 1901 to Don Marshall’s in Vietnam in the 1960s and a half-dozen other examples drawn mostly from British imperial experience. In this way, this book resembles a more sober and extended version of John Nagl’s *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago, 2002), which sought counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam; Nagl and McFate were in fact both contributors to David Petraeus’ *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago, 2007), another quasi-anthropological product of the Iraq War.

Although McFate’s avowed intent is to build bridges between academia and the military, she admits that this book, as “written primarily for a military audience,” is unlikely to contribute much to the bridge-building goal (11). The book is peppered with military acronyms and insider observations; it is also full of capsule lessons in basic social science for those presumed to be unfamiliar with, or indeed hostile to, such an enterprise. It has a military tone, too, given McFate’s technocratic approach to social science, which often feels decidedly less anthropological than reminiscent of economics or quantitative sociology. She regrets anthropology’s failure to develop “a scalable, adaptable theory of society that could be used operationally by the military” (38, 328). In an essay on Ursula Bower’s “military leadership” of the Naga during World War II, she yearns for a neat formula such as Fisher’s “fifty-seven key findings pertaining to cross-cultural military leadership” (106–107). She commends Gregory Bateson’s highly scientistic ideas about the manipulation of cultural pattern as he applied them in service of the Office of Strategic Services. She even inscribes Tom Harrison’s idiosyncratic unconventional warfare in Borneo as a sophisticated species of “qualitative, inductive pattern recognition” (172).

More comfortably for most anthropologists, McFate acknowledges that these unified field theories nearly always break down in practice and that there is no replacement for deep cultural knowledge, a necessary complement to, or often replacement for, “firepower,” and thus alien to the American “way of war.” But although McFate, like any good ethnographer, pays close attention to this kind of context, she gives relatively little credence to the radically different contexts in which military ethnography takes place. She equates anthropologists’ feelings of responsibility for their subjects with the military’s concern for the “host nation,” without taking much account of what being the “host” of a violent military intervention by another nation actually means. When she says that “the social conditions of the host nation must be considered as part of national strategic objectives,” readers can only wonder which

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nation’s objectives are in question (323)—assuming that a unitary nation is to be considered in the first place. Because she deliberately eschews case studies of Iraq and Afghanistan, though constantly seeking lessons for those enterprises, McFate is not able to reflect much upon U.S. military intervention in deeply divided societies.

McFate may or may not be correct to imagine that the military’s objectives would be better achieved with more anthropological awareness. It is at least arguable that deeper cultural engagement in a complex and fractured (not to mention war-torn) society might exacerbate rather than resolve the “morasses” to which recent U.S. military interventions have led. But what is even more puzzling is why she imagines that anthropologists outside the military ought to embrace these objectives. In her view, anthropologists have a role “analogous to that of professional soldiers”; they have “an obligation as citizens to reduce the errors caused by a lack of socio-cultural knowledge and thereby improve their execution” (39–40). Her book shows some anthropologists behaving in just such a way. But apart from the major changes in the culture and politics of academia since the 1960s, which have driven academia and military further apart, her own narrow, technocratic account of what “socio-cultural knowledge” can do, without a proper consideration of the military and political contexts of its application, is unlikely to draw them back together. Quite the contrary.

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Thinking Big Data in Geography: New Regimes, New Research. Edited by Jim Thatcher, Josef Eckert, and Andrew Shears (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2018) 296 pp. $75.00 cloth $30.00 paper and e-book

With the advent of “Big Data” penetrating ever more deeply into the social sciences, this book sets out to explore how the discipline of geography contributes to data science. Big Data presents geography, as well as other disciplines, with a multitude of epistemological, political, technical, and affective questions. Mark Graham’s chapter, the last in the book, effectively summarizes some of these questions, particularly the crucial role of digital labor and its often exploitive working conditions.

Graham’s chapter provides a gentle pushback against the largely critical tone of most of the chapters ahead of it. As he points out, despite repeated calls throughout the book for hybrid qualitative–quantitative work, and the abiding value of small data, the time has probably arrived when geographers need to be contributing empirically. Jin-Kyu Jung and Jung Yeop Shin’s analysis of about 800,000 geocoded tweets in the Seattle area (Chapter 5) attempts to identify spatial patterns of the sentiment expressed about two referenda concerning the legalization of marijuana
and marriage equality. Although hardly Big Data (especially given their 3 percent sample), the results show an interesting disparity between public sentiment and voting outcomes; many more people opposed legal- 
ization of both marijuana and marriage equality in the voting booth than on Twitter. Emily Fekete (Chapter 7) correlates posts on the Foursquare site with urban demographics by census tract. It would be interesting to repeat her empirical work using Cambridge Analytica-style psychographics (not the business practices), or personal information that scales to the population.

The book is organized into five main parts plus a conclusion. Rob Kitchin and Tracey Lauriault (Chapter 1) note that Big Data today goes well beyond the original “three V’s” of volume, velocity, and variety; they add seven other characteristics. The most important is the relational nature of data, which becomes most powerful in the presence of other data. Their own critique centers around how “raw data are always already cooked,” listing four concerns, including “anticipatory governance”—in the form of, say, predictive policing (14)—warning against the potential for misrepresentation and harmful decisions when it is based on citizens’ data shadows.

The chapters by David O’Sullivan (Chapter 2), Ryan Burns (Chapter 11), and Christopher D. Weidemann, Jennifer N. Swift, and Karen Kemp (Chapter 6) also discuss this potential for harm. As O’Sullivan observes, interpretive dangers lurk within processes that are overly mechanistic or that ascribe static attributes to people without accounting for systemic changes or differences at different scales. Burns focuses on the opportunity for geographers to contribute to digital humanitarianism and pays respects to those who do so contribute. He could have provided more discussion about machine learning for object recognition from imagery (or “GeoAI”), such as Microsoft’s recent demonstration, which identified 128 million building footprints in the United States by algorithm. Weidemann, Swift, and Kemp report on a fascinating experiment that revealed users’ “geosocial footprint” or their geographical traces across social media. Exposure to these data increases awareness of oversharing insecurities, pointing to how increased transparency can help to shape user behavior.

Britta Ricker (Chapter 4) addresses the theme of reflexivity, or how individuals relate to their own data. As she points out, because data are often unrepresentative of those on the social margins, we need a better understanding of data across the entire stack or assemblage of processes (much of it material in nature). Much of this analysis will be qualitative. Renee Sieber and Matthew Tenney (Chapter 3) make a strong, detailed case for hybrid analyses that move across scales and between big, small, fast, and slow data—a case in which geographers might be able to provide insight, without being accused of special pleading.

Two chapters focus on the urban scene. Jessa Lingel (Chapter 8) provides four short vignettes that highlight the difference between reading the city and (the anxiety of) being read by surveillance, and Matthew Kelley (Chapter 9) usefully revisits digital exclusions and their
consequences. David Retchless (Chapter 10) provides the only case study from physical geography (about climate change). Like many of the other contributors to this book, he considers that data are more effective when both big and small. Moreover, no matter how big, data are always in need of something else, namely, meaning. As an edited collection, the book does no more than begin to sketch out how geographers research Big Data, but at least it gets the question onto the menu.

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_History: Why It Matters._ By Lynn Hunt (Medford, Mass., Polity Press, 2018) 142 pp. $64.95 cloth $12.95 paper

Hunt’s _History: Why it Matters_ takes on the challenge of explaining, in a little more than 100 pages of text, why anyone should consider studying a subject that does not obviously pave the way to a practical career in an occupation like, say, business or medicine. Hunt is an ideal choice for the task both because she has already penned various influential statements about the discipline, most recently _Writing History in the Global Era_ (New York, 2014), and because she brings to these exercises her trademark qualities of clarity, common sense, and fairness.

The book does extremely well what it is designed to do, namely, to lay out in the clearest of terms some of the discipline’s basic epistemological and political issues, making the case for their importance. Its four chapters address, respectively, the current importance of history in the public arena, the question of historical truth, the politics of history in academia and beyond, and how the discipline’s framework will likely evolve in the near future.

Those new to the discipline will probably connect most easily with the first two chapters, which examine issues surrounding the notion of truth and the mining of facts, and the many ways in which controversies about the past erupt in public life. Right out of the gate Hunt galvanizes readers’ attention by evoking Donald Trump and “birtherism”—asking, How do we know Barack Obama’s birthplace as a fact?—before moving quickly to recent controversies about the fate of statues of controversial historical figures. After a quick tour of other history-related, public flashpoints throughout the world—involving textbooks, memory wars, and truth commissions—Hunt shifts into a thought-provoking chapter about “Truth in History.” The third chapter, “History’s Politics” deals mostly with the ways in which the changing composition of the historical profession, primarily in the United States, Britain, and Australia, has driven new agendas. The final chapter, “History’s Future,” mounts an argument about how conceptions of historical temporality have shaped the field in the past and will do so differently in the future.
The last two chapters might be less engaging for beginners, such as undergraduates. The matter of the changing demographics within the profession—the theme of Chapter 3—is certainly vital to understanding how the profession has evolved during the last couple of generations. But how much does an audience oriented largely toward the present want to know about the successive waves of working-class, women, and minority scholars who have entered the field since the 1960s, especially given all of the quantitative material in this chapter?

Hunt’s final chapter, which examines changing conceptions of historical time—the subject of another of her books, Measuring Time, Making History (New York, 2008)—is extremely thought-provoking, though possibly daunting for beginners. What is the alternative, she asks, to modern teleological understandings of history, increasingly viewed as problematical owing to their Eurocentric origins? Hunt envisions a globalized longue durée, a “whole earth time,” as a future context for historical work to break free from “progress” narratives based on a limited purview. Thinking of ourselves historically as a species, she proposes, will enhance solidarity and promote an “ethics of respect” toward the other elements of our anthropocene environment.

Although much of Hunt’s short text covers ground familiar to most academic historians, her work is, as usual, studded with stunning insights and formulations: “Conspiracy theories arise in the space created by the provisional nature of historical facts” (32); “The truest history is often written by people with deep commitments . . . Blandness is not the same thing as truth” (40); “Would a non-teleological history, a history without an inner impulse, even be interesting?” (96). As a primer on what should matter to all of us today, Hunt updates the argument that first appeared in her book, co-authored with Joyce Appleby, Telling the Truth About History (New York, 1994). Whereas back in the 1990s, historians had to reckon only with the solvent of postmodernism, today they have to craft their “true stories” while facing the deeper challenges of the internet and social media. In both instances, Hunt’s clear-eyed recognition of the provisionality of historical truth, along with her passionate belief in the importance of collective professional norms as the gold standard for responsible scholarship, are touchstones well worth keeping in mind.

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European Regions and Boundaries: A Conceptual History. Edited by Diana Mishkova and Balázs Trencsényi (New York, Berghahn Books, 2017) 401 pp. $170.00 cloth $34.95 paper

This book reveals how historical regions in Europe “have been, and are being, conceptualized and delimited over time” (2). As Stefan Berger makes clear in the first chapter, however, it is inevitably about the
establishment of borders, and the struggle to define inclusion and exclusion for various purposes.

Borders have acquired a variety of definitions, from those that emphasize identity and culture to those that focus on social cooperation or territorial control. None of these definitions is mutually exclusive, but as Berezin has written, “territory is inescapable,” primarily because politics and authoritative political decision making is tied to physically bounded space. “Territories and borders are coterminous,” she argues, and “the consolidation of power always requires the closing of frontiers.”¹ But which frontiers must close, how permeable are they, and who (or what) decides where they are?

Scholars have usefully differentiated between territorial, organizational, and conceptual borders. Territorial borders formally separate states, regions, and localities politically. Organizational borders differentiate access to the labor market, as well as welfare and citizenship rights, and distinguish between residents within the territorial borders based on various functions. Conceptual borders separate populations by class, culture, identity, and claims to entitlements, also within the territorial boundaries.² These borders, however, are often sanctioned by state power. Finally, although borders are generally understood in terms of exclusion and inclusion, a variable range of harder and softer borders may be possible, to the extent that states give priority to inclusion, equal standing, democratic accountability, and the effectiveness of meeting needs.³

Therefore, this conceptual history is not just about development; it is also about the use of space and geography to define power, ideas, and identity. In this context, geography has not just been a dependent variable, a result of other factors, but an independent variable, a weapon used to mobilize certain kinds of support and political action and to delegitimize others—a point made conspicuously in the first part of the book that deals with “European Mesoregions.”

The strongest analysis of region as destiny was forged in the early years of the twentieth century. The British geographer Halford Mackinder argued that regional control of Eastern Europe was key to the control of the Eurasian heartland, and ultimately of the world (214–215). Although geopolitics, as causal analysis, has been largely discredited as ideology (258–279), the importance of control over space remains analytically interesting, as the chapters in this book demonstrate.

² For an analysis of the application of these policies to British migration policies, see Andrew Geddes, “Getting the Best of Both Worlds? Britain, the EU, and Migration Policy,” International Affairs, LXXXI (2005), 724–725.
All the European regions discussed in this volume have witnessed considerable debate about how they should be defined and justified, but this “discussion” has not always been academic and gentle. These regions have been areas of struggle within which identities have been forged, but the definition of these identities has been a source cultural ambiguity (the Mediterranean), armed struggle (the Baltic), political struggle (Iberia), academic contention (Southern Europe), cold war (Eastern Europe), and hot war (the Balkans). Furthermore, the idea of Central Europe, having been delegitimized after World War I, and generally abandoned during the Cold War, has since been re-suscitated on the basis of a region built on multicultural compromise (166–187).

The second part of this collection deals with issues of theory that are important for conceptualizing regions. The chapters about European history and political geography (Chapters 11 and 12) review the scholarly debates about how we should conceptualize Europe. They underestimate, as the first section makes clear, how much these debates were also concerned with weaponizing scholarship. These chapters overlap to some extent with those in the first part, but they make no reference to them. The same is true for the otherwise excellent three chapters about economics, historical demography, and linguistics, which are interesting descriptively but weak analytically regarding the dynamics of change. Finally, the chapter about literary history makes a good case for understanding European regions as developing seedbeds of creativity.

For the most part, the important chapters in the second part of the book are not well related to those in the first part. Clearly, this book would have profited from a concluding chapter that integrated the ideas developed throughout this collection.

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This collection maps a rich world of Anglo-Iberian exchange and stands as a notable marker of how far the field has come since Cañizares-Esguerra’s and Gould’s 2007 essays in the American Historical Review forum on “Entangled Empires in the Atlantic World.” In a strident
introduction, Cañizares-Esguerra is straightforward about what he sees as the present-day political importance of this work. After acknowledging the tremendous complexity of the early modern Atlantic world, he notes that the book "studies only the entangled history of the Iberian and British Atlantics because it ultimately seeks to bring into focus the centrality of the Iberian-Latino past to the very constitution of the history of this nation." A historiography (presumably of North America, though Cañizares-Esguerra does not specify) "that brings Latinos into the narrative as 'minorities' whose voices need to be heard, is itself complicit in their marginalization. Amerindians, Blacks, and Latinos ought not to be considered minorities to be incorporated into a larger narrative canvas. This book seeks to demonstrate that without 'Latinos' there is no canvas" (4). This assertion is puzzling given the presence of the continent's numerous and diverse indigenous peoples long before the arrival of anyone who might be deemed "Latino," but it seems safe to assume that Cañizares-Esguerra is making a point about the post-1492 Americas.

This presentist political tone does not characterize the rest of the volume. _Entangled Empires_ offers a rich overview of the field, drawing from the work of emerging scholars as well as established Atlantic world historians to trace, in the words of contributor April Hatfield in the chapter "Reluctant Prisoners," a "political economy of interconnection" (198). The contributions range widely in terms of focus and time period. In Part I, "Severed Histories," Mark Sheaves, Michael Guasco, and Benjamin Breen explore how the entwined Anglo-Iberian Atlantic world came to be understood and remembered as two distinct spheres of activity rather than one. They recover numerous arenas of mutual influence and exchange, ranging from European mercantile networks (Sheaves), the politics of slave trading in Africa (Guasco), and pharmaceutical trades and epistemologies of knowledge within the Lusophone imperial sphere (Breen).

In Part II, "Brokers and Translators," Christopher Heaney shows how printed materials facilitated the exchange and evolution of entwined imperial fantasies. Holly Snyder, Christopher Schmidt-Nowara, and Cameron Strang show how marginalized populations (Iberian conversos, Irish, or European-descended cultural brokers with mixed-race families) navigated shifting political and cultural borders on the ground from Europe to the Americas. The two essays included in Part III, "Possession, Sovereignty, and Legitimacy," explore shared intellectual genealogies and their impact on European and indigenous relations, from critical Iberian-inflected discourses of dominium and sovereignty in the early years of English settlement in Virginia and New England (Cañizares-Esguerra) to the influence of British perceptions of Spanish Indian policy in South Carolina between the mid-seventeenth century and the outbreak of the Yamasee War in 1715 (Bradley Dixon). Part IV, "Trade and War," looks at the compromises and unforeseen consequences that continued to characterize Anglo-Iberian relations throughout the military and diplomatic wranglings of the late seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries, from the Caribbean (Hatfield and Ernesto Bassi) to the Philippines (Kristie Patricia Flannery).

The volume’s only drawback is that a great deal of work has already been done in the last decade on the intertwined nature of the early modern Anglo-Iberian empires; evidence of this shared history no longer comes as a surprise. Furthermore, the ironic effect of the volume’s emphasis on Anglo-Iberian entanglement alone is to reify the binary that the volume seeks to deconstruct. In his afterward, Gould acknowledges as much, pointing out that the collection’s exclusive emphasis on one particular sphere of Atlantic competition inadvertently suggests that no equally rich adjacent (and indeed, entangled) worlds existed beyond the Anglo-Iberian.

This tension, however, does not detract from this welcome addition to scholarship about an enormously complex arena of exchange and mutual influence. If “entanglement” is now widely accepted as a way of thinking about the early modern Atlantic world, the volume’s final chapter about the British occupation of Manila during the Seven Years’ War—the only chapter that looks beyond the Atlantic basin in a sustained way—underscores the utility of moving beyond the Atlantic to consider the global repercussions of the era’s many exchanges and encounters.

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What Nostalgia Was: War, Empire and the Time of a Deadly Emotion. By Thomas Dodman (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2018) 275 pp. $105.00 cloth $35.00 paper $10.00 e-book

Until recently, the concept of nostalgia has been the purview of scholars of literature or sociology. Historians have paid it scant attention, usually relegating it to the wistful, hence less reliable, spectrum of memory. In this meticulously researched work, Dodman argues that the refusal to take nostalgia seriously as a historical category allows its persistence as an ahistorical, universal feeling that overlooks the significant societal role that it plays. He sets out to prove that as a phenomenon grounded in everyday practices, it should be accepted as a viable source for understanding sociological or political developments at any given time. He traces its unusual trajectory from clinical disease, causing some patients to sicken and die, to an emotion that was mobilized to abet settlement in colonial Algeria. This trajectory, he argues, makes it a useful historical concept in understanding how nostalgic sensibilities developed in relation to monumental historical change, notably war and empire.

Dodman’s monograph starts in the seventeenth century when Johannes Hofer coined the work in a medical dissertation about the mysterious disease afflicting Swiss mercenaries far from their homeland.
Although Hofer sunk into medical obscurity, his theory gained traction. Dodman traces the diffusion and impact of the text as the medical profession tried to unravel the dimensions of the disease from the seventeenth century through the Napoleonic wars and into the conquest of Algeria.

The book starts with an introduction that engages with the scholarship and debates about the concept to date to illustrate its historicity. The next seven chapters analyze the different stages of its development from a clinical diagnosis in the treatment of military personnel afflicted with the acute, debilitating maladie du pays to the less enervating mal du pays that was used judiciously as a unifying tactic, whether for the creation of "pal battalions" (battalions comprising friends and neighbors) or colonial communities of settlement. The book ends with a conclusion that situates "nostalgia in history." Throughout the book, Dodman engages with the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings of relevant moments.

The first two chapters examine the impact of Hofer's work and its progression from "medical maverick" status to its acceptance as the source of a valid clinical diagnosis. Dodman emphasizes the agricultural and social crises that beset Europe from the early sixteenth through the seventeenth century. The structural transformations that occurred in the countryside following these disruptions, combined with concomitant wars and civil upheavals, set the stage for nostalgia's clinical dimension to develop. Early patients were Swiss mercenaries engaged in war far from home, but by the mid-eighteenth-century, nostalgia "proper" was being reported in the armed forces across Europe" (59).

The next two chapters treat the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods. Alluding to relevant social theories past and present, Dodman suggests that clinical nostalgia in the armed forces emerged as a result of the clash between the Prussian-style military model and an emerging political culture with an emphasis on patriotism, civic equality, and individual autonomy. He argues that the Napoleonic Wars saw the first attempt by military doctors to understand the psychoneuroses of war.

The last three chapters cover the "golden age" of clinical nostalgia in the 1820s and 1830s through its decline as a medical concept at century's end. Clinical nostalgia reached a peak with physicians such as Philippe Pinel, the father of moral (and more humane) psychiatric therapy, and medical faculties such as those in Paris, Montpellier, and Strasbourg that engaged in treatment of emotional traumas resulting from war and displacement. The least successful chapter in the book deals with "nostalgia in the tropics."

At the outset, Dodman adheres to the general schema by examining the nostalgia of the military personnel and the medical physicians' responses to it. Unfortunately, he fails to tease out the differing reasons for military mal du pays. Was the nostalgia predicated on war weariness, the hope of better medical treatment in France, a genuine desire to regain the comforts of home, or a combination of all three? If the
archives consulted did not shed light on such questions, Dodman might have said so.

Dodman examines the way nostalgia was used to encourage individuals from specific areas in France—in some cases, particular villages—to settle in Algeria as a cohesive community once the decision to colonize the region was reached. Although this strategy makes a good deal of sense so far as French settlers were concerned, the majority of settlers were not originally French but from other south Mediterranean countries. How did these individuals fare? Were the efforts to promote French community unity meant to counteract the growing presence of other nationals? Some analysis of the complexity of the settler population and France’s response to it would have been welcome. These quibbles apart, Dodman has made an erudite and engaging contribution to the literature and a convincing case for the importance of nostalgia as a historical concept.

Patricia M. E. Lorcin
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities


This remarkable book is a collection of inspired essays loosely linked to David Livingstone, the explorer of Africa. In the opening and closing chapters, however, it focuses more directly on the ambivalent memorialization of Livingstone’s demise in Britain, and its mixed reception in London, which slighted the contribution of Africans and their loyalty to, and admiration of, Livingstone. The book implies that Livingstone’s sad death and the transport of his body to London somehow captured Britain’s emotional association with its empire but, as Lewis shows later, Livingstone’s accomplishments and his nobility were more celebrated on the eve of World War I, when his Christian humanitarianism and anti-slavery crusade were glorified to justify Britain’s (potentially dubious) colonial accomplishments.

Ultimately, Lewis advances the striking image of Livingstone as “consistently pumping the beating heart of liberal British imperialism” (212). “The death and memorialization of Livingstone,” she writes, “made a powerful contribution to the ideological power of the British Empire . . . and the very Victorian project of an empire in Africa” (246). It took part in the great Victorian “myth-machine” that boosted the “moral–emotional” life of the nation, she writes cynically (246). Indeed, Livingstone came to embody “the heart of the nation,” and those romantic notions of Livingstone’s life and death helped Britons to justify imperialism and to feel much more satisfied with themselves (249). For them, his life embodied “performance heroism” (247). A white man had died for Africans.
An early chapter of this book shifts attention to Livingstone’s death site at Chitambo’s village in an isolated section of Zambia, near the Luapula River (which Livingstone erroneously believed to be the origin of the Nile River) and not far from the modern border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. That event takes Lewis to the brutal battle between Cecil Rhodes and King Leopold II for control over the copper-rich region of Katanga, a contest that involved Plymouth Brethren missionaries; second-rank explorers, such as Joseph Thomson and Alfred Sharpe; and international diplomacy (about which Lewis says little).

From the battle for Katanga it is a short step to a chapter ostensibly about what kind of monument should be erected in Zambia to mark Livingstone’s death place. That theme frames an examination of missionary competition for agency in Zambia, the bullying efforts of the then-administrator of what was North-Eastern Rhodesia, and a fascinating explanation of how Livingstone’s African companions and helpers were mistreated throughout the decades after his demise.

Lewis then plunges into a long, detailed, disquisition on the Zambian town of Livingstone and how it came to be a racist stronghold. She traces the town from its beginnings to contemporary times, informing readers about its reluctant embrace of Zambian nationalism and independence. But the town’s intrinsic relevance to her initial theme of empire and sentiment seems far removed.

A succeeding chapter strays farther, becoming for the most part a critical dissection of the authoritarian one-party state that Zambia’s ruling United National Independence Party and President Kenneth David Kaunda imposed on the country after 1972. But Lewis forgets fully to place the Zambia of the 1960s and 1970s in its perilous place on the front line of anti–South African insurgency. Because Zambia harbored South Africa’s African National Congress and Zimbabwe African National Union and Zimbabwe African Patriotic Front training camps, it had to fend off South African espionage and raids while protecting itself against depredations from Ian Smith’s usurping Rhodesian Front government. However, Lewis soon shifts her focus to the successful attempt by Kaunda to use a centenary celebration of Livingstone’s death to bolster his own Christian–humanist message and legacy. Kaunda declared Livingstone Africa’s first freedom fighter (200), endowing his burial place at Chitambo’s village with an iconic meaning.

Throughout this engaging exercise, Lewis firmly emphasizes how the Victorians and legions of post-Livingstonian explorers, emissaries, and missionaries (nearly all of them white) deprecated and dismissed Africans of all stations when they were not brutalizing them. Lewis’ book might rightly be called a chamber of horrors, though that metaphor might be too restrained a description of Livingstone the town.

Lewis’ other running theme is homosexuality. Sometimes she explicitly labels persons like Charles Livingstone (the explorer’s troubled, hapless brother) and the consummate artist Thomas Baines as homosexuals (6),...
but most of the time she drops dark hints about the “maleness” and male-bonded preferences of explorers like Henry Morton Stanley. But they were not alone. On the expanding African frontier, she suggests, male lust for males was a major calling, and David Livingstone—whatever the legend—may have been one of those comforted and secured by his male attendants. “Livingstone,” she writes, was a “masculine hero” whose life symbolized a “lost’ ideal of manliness” that was appreciated by the men who extolled him and wrote about him (212).

Lewis imaginatively utilized archives, newspapers, pamphlets and books, and a multitude of reminiscences even if her methods of research are hardly interdisciplinary. She is gifted, however, in her fertile linking of events and people rarely brought together historically. For example, she says that Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytical theories were influenced by Central Africa: “Freud’s development of the modern individual as prone to collapse through temptation and transgression” was shaped by the “horror, the horror” of the African interior (22). Her prologue, a recreation of Livingstone’s death drama, is a stirring re-examination of Victorian imagination and deception.

Lewis’ touch is sure when she examines “sentiment” and Victorian dissembling. It is less admirable when she stumbles over African ethnography, erroneously sketches the lives of some of her subjects, miscounts Zambian history, or alters geography. Moreover, the book contains many more misspellings than it should. It is strange, too, that a book ostensibly about Victorian times should be devoted in large part to modern Zambia.

—R. I. R.

Golden Fruit: A Cultural History of Oranges in Italy. By Cristina Mazzoni (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2018) 193 pp. $48.75

Blending art history, literature, and history, Golden Fruit describes the curious gustatory, as well as imaginative, beauty of oranges in Italy. It ends with the crisis in the orange-growing region of Calabria and the paradoxical and contested role of African immigrants who might save what remains of the cultivation and export industry. The book devotes most of its attention, however, to learned Renaissance and Baroque and discourses about oranges, the magical ambiguity of which includes images of health and salvation but also of love, pregnancy, and melancholy. Even the color of this fruit wavers as scholars regarded it as golden, akin (or identical) to the mythical Golden Apples of the Hesperides, whereas in tropical countries, the lack of cold spells renders them green.

Mazzoni’s embrace of what she terms an eclectic approach to the appearance of oranges in Italian art and literature amounts to more than a mere catalog or checklist; the book is organized into ideas, each with an exemplar. Fruit in general was regarded in pre-modern Europe as
gastronomically delightful but medically dangerous because its humoral properties made it hard to digest and subject to rotting in the stomach. Pope Paul II was supposed to have died in 1471 after eating two large melons (17). The opening chapter is about a more healthful gift to a pope, in this case the choleric Urban VI. In 1379, at the opening of what would prove to be the decades-long Great Schism of the western church, St. Catherine of Siena sent Pope Urban some candied oranges that she had made herself. In her cover letter she expressed a desire that the sweetness of the oranges might relieve the pope of his bitterness, turning him toward a sweeter and more constructive disposition. Because all oranges were bitter at that time, to ameliorate this harshness was not to cover it up but to use and transform it in memory of the bitterness of Christ’s crucifixion and the sweet gift of His sacrifice. Catherine’s oranges were at once a recommendation, a prayer, and an admonition.

Until the late Middle Ages, citron was the only known member of the citrus family. Once the new fruit was introduced via the Islamic world, it started to appear everywhere, but seldom conspicuously. Sandro Botticelli’s Primavera (1477–1482) is set in an orange grove, and the fruit is also present in such sober paintings as Quentin Matsys’ The Money Lender and His Wife (1514) and Jan van Eyck’s Arnolfini Portrait (1434).

Oranges were playful objects of desire but also symbols of deformity and monstrosity. The orange is not the only fruit symbolic of the female body, but the Italian narrative that combines botanical science and imaginative discourse associates it with pregnancy. Oranges have been symbols of wealth, but they are also ubiquitous as magical objects in Sicilian fairy tales.

Mazzoni’s accomplishment goes beyond a diverse collection of citations. It traces not only the history but also the representation of what seems like an ordinary edible item through a culture over time. Oranges may not have risen to the level of an obsession, but they were a constant presence, mysterious, ambiguous, and capable of infinite manipulation and variation, their fragrance, color, taste, and perfection denoting graciousness but also danger.

Paul Freedman
Yale University

The Indian World of George Washington: The First President, the First Americans, and the Birth of the Nation. By Colin G. Calloway (New York, Oxford University Press, 2018) 640 pp. $34.95

No one has contributed more to the current understanding of the early formation of U.S. Indian policy than has Calloway. Beginning more than two decades ago with Crown and Calumet, which provided essential
diplomatic context for the period, Calloway advanced his career-long inquiry with many more books exploring how colonial–Indian relations, the Seven Years’ War, the Revolutionary War, and subsequent conflict in the Ohio Valley shaped U.S. policy. Now, an already astonishing record of publication continues with *The Indian World of George Washington*. What could Calloway’s latest work possibly add to our knowledge? The answer is plenty. Persuasively proving that Native Americans were central in shaping the life of George Washington, he shows how this fact about Washington represented the inextricable ties that all of his nation’s founding generation had with Native America, “a reality we have forgotten as our historical hindsight has separated Indians and early Americans so sharply, and prematurely, into winners and losers” (13).

Calloway delivers a detailed but fluid narrative across twenty chapters, neatly arranged into three parts—“Learning Curve,” “The Other Revolution,” and “The First President and the First Americans.” The sequence of events is familiar, beginning with the young colonel Washington’s costly blunder at Great Meadows, followed by the Seven Years’ War, Pontiac’s War, the Cherokee War, Lord Dunmore’s War, the Revolutionary War, and the creation of the United States. It concludes with an examination of diplomacy and war during Washington’s presidency. Calloway exceeds common treatment, however, by tightly weaving into the story Washington’s personal interests in Native land and direct interactions with Native people. He consistently emphasizes how Washington accumulated western property—amounting to tens of thousands of acres along the Great Kanawha and Ohio rivers—and how that speculative activity undermined his own government’s diplomatic and trade objectives. Calloway skillfully brings to life military campaigns, treaty councils, and other encounters along the way in his use of official records, Washington’s writings, and an abundance of material from personal correspondence, travel accounts, and newspapers.

Calloway is also adept at explication through foreshadowing and comparison. He remarks, for example, how Indian nations selected allies and enemies in accordance with their own needs to preserve independence and security, “just as Washington would do when he allied with French enemies and fought against former British comrades to win his fight for independence” (133). Native Americans’ refusal to be subordinate and their demand for generous gifts that Washington encountered during the Seven Years’ War would crop up again for him as commander of the Continental Army and first president of the United States (147).

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Moreover, although his administration in principle recognized Native American sovereignty and respected its territory, it ironically came to resemble the British Crown in its incongruent commitments to both Native allies and land-hungry citizens. Washington’s establishment of a nation-to-nation relationship in U.S. Indian policy is still ostensibly in operation today, but as Calloway observes in his conclusion, “assaults on the rights and resources of Native peoples continue” (492).

At the start of Indian World of George Washington, Calloway identifies a daunting challenge intrinsic to the project: Although Washington’s relationship with Indians was central to his multifaceted career, as this fine work certainly demonstrates, “he operated on the peripheries of the Indian world.” But an understanding of what Calloway wisely sees as “a porous world undergoing profound and far-reaching changes” seems only partly done by the book’s end (10). As a growing cadre of interdisciplinary scholars have recently shown, it takes more than a biographical framework to reach and comprehend all that was happening in and around Indigenous societies during Washington’s lifetime.2

Daniel H. Usner
Vanderbilt University


Hopkins’ sprawling, ambitious, and often delightful tome offers a proudly revisionist history of the United States as written by an “outsider” to American historiography. It is, at turns, enlightening and irritating. This volume is not the first to attempt to fit the United States into global patterns of historical change, but it is undoubtedly among the most successful. Hopkins argues that the rise and fall of the American empire can be best understood within a global framework of worldwide imperial formation driven largely by economic forces: “The trends influencing the course of American Empire were the same as those shaping the other Western empires” (636). But this book deals with more than just empire. Hopkins provides a synthesis of American history and historiographical reviews of dozens of topics that deserve frequent future consultation by both students and advanced scholars.

Hopkins divides the U.S. empire into three phases of globalization, according to specific crises driven by dialectical forces. The initial phase of proto-globalization was, not surprisingly, mercantile in nature. U.S. historians mark the late eighteenth century, when the colonies achieved independence from England, as the end of this era, but from a global perspective, political independence is far less significant than “effective independence”—when the United States became economically separated from England. This independence, Hopkins argues, did not occur until the middle of the nineteenth century.

The second phase of globalization, which lasted roughly until World War II, was characterized by nation-building and industrialization, driven largely by war. During this period, the United States superseded Britain as the leading empire, embarking on colonial rule in island territories to which few people in the continental United States gave much attention. In a particularly strong chapter about the twentieth-century bureaucracy of empire, Hopkins credibly supports his contention that “the disappearance of the insular empire after 1898 is an omission unparalleled in the historiography of modern empires” (498).

The third phase of empire was characterized by decolonization driven by human-rights concerns and the rise of nationalism in colonized territories. Hopkins makes a compelling case that the decolonization of U.S. territories deserves a larger place in reigning Europe-centered narratives. He also argues that the United States ceased being an empire after decolonizing its insular territories, despite popular perceptions otherwise.

Hopkins’ command of detail and historiography is stunning. As a work of synthesis, his volume is unquestionably successful, but his methodology has its limits. Any model-driven synthetic history will inevitably elide certain topics, but Hopkins’ insistence that the United States be understood in a world context leads him to some questionable positions that are asserted rather than argued. Although a generation of historians influenced by Charles Sellers’ *The Market Revolution* (New York, 1991) has documented the extent of market penetration in the decades before the Civil War, Hopkins writes, “The rural order remained the matrix within which all other activities were set, as it was in Europe” [during the mid-1800s], “notwithstanding claims that the period experienced a ‘market revolution’” (144).

Although Hopkins can be charmingly self-effacing about the merits of his own approach, his critiques of methods that do not fit with his own can verge on dismissive. “The cultural approach” to studying the wars of 1898, he writes, “is limited by its own specialization, which rarely engages with the politics and economics of imperialism” (343). The new history of capitalism fares little better. “Some revisionist accounts have gone so far as to portray the relationship between South

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1 It’s worth noting that *Market Revolution* was also a synthesis focused on economics that garnered criticism for over-reliance on a model.
and North [in the antebellum period] as that of two dynamic forms of capitalism. However a line needs to be drawn between industrial and commercial capitalism. If power-driven manufacturing and wage labor are taken to be hallmarks of modern capitalism, as long tradition claims, the South clearly fails the test” (221). Moreover, those of us who have written extensively about nineteenth-century U.S. empire may find his statement that “imperialism and empire make only limited appearances” in studies of the century somewhat baffling (7).

*American Empire* leaves no doubt that the global approach can be remarkably fruitful in the hands of an accomplished author. Most of the historians who finish this book will be either enlightened or entertained. But the volume’s vision and erudition are often overshadowed by authorial indulgence. There is simply no reason why this book needs to be so long. Extended discussions of individuals and companies, including a digression about Tarzan, do nothing to advance Hopkins’ thesis, and the ample historiographical material, though informative, might better have been banished to already weighty endnotes or published in article form. *American Empire* is nonetheless a remarkable achievement.

Amy S. Greenberg
Penn State University

*Environmental Disaster in the Gulf South: Two Centuries of Catastrophe, Risk, and Resilience.* Edited by Cindy Ermus (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2018) 216 pp. $45.00

This interdisciplinary collection of seven chapters, with an introduction by Ermus and an afterword by Ted Steinberg, employs theories and methodologies from multiple disciplines to investigate natural hazards. The unifying theme is geography. All of the essays examine some aspect of the Gulf South, and Ermus establishes at the outset that “environment defines the region’s identity” (3). The chapters cover a limited selection of natural events (floods, hurricanes, epidemics, and invasive species), leaving other hazards—droughts, earthquakes, and man-made catastrophes, such as oil spills—uninvestigated. Ermus acknowledges that the Gulf South may not be unique or any more vulnerable than any other region, but decades of neglect combined with harmful decisions have aggravated the area’s natural hazards.

Although the title suggests a wide geographical scope, four of the seven chapters deal with New Orleans. Refreshingly, however, Katrina and post-Katrina events do not completely steal the show. Environmental humanities serve as a tool to investigate the hurricane of 1849 in Greg O’Brien’s chapter, which employs popular culture, especially satire and humor, to show how residents criticized government failures and effected change in the post-hurricane administration. Epidemiology and medical history combine in Urmi Engineer Willoughby’s study of yellow-fever
eradication and public-health programs at the end of the nineteenth century in the “military-medical complex” (53). Her study establishes the transnational origins of the yellow-fever eradication campaign by showing how the U.S. Public Health and Marine Hospital Service relied upon the research of scientists in the United Kingdom, India, Cuba, and Brazil. Such international collaboration helped to ensure that the 1905 New Orleans epidemic was the last major epidemic to affect the city.

Roberto E. Barrios employs an anthropological and sociological approach in his study of New Orleans’ Lower Ninth Ward that was “inundated by multiple drainage levee failures” (139). Barrios emphasizes the historic engineering mistakes that led to the creation and the failure of the New Orleans Industrial Canal (begun in 1918) and the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (begun in 1958). The consequences of both mistakes fell hardest on the marginalized occupants of the city. In the fourth chapter dedicated to New Orleans, Kevin Fox Gotham continues the examination of the inadequate levee system in a historical summary of government failures. Although aware of the danger as early as the 1950s, predictions of risk were based on a flawed hypothetical model, and a scandalous failure to maintain the levee system further exacerbated the problem. Responsibility was shared among agencies (local, state, and federal) in their “Financial Noncommitment” (168); the risks remained until the aftermath of Katrina.

Two of the remaining essays examine catastrophic hurricanes. Andy Horowitz revisits the Great Galveston Hurricane of 1900 from the perspective of race and class. Challenging one of the tenets of disaster studies—that catastrophe can become a unifying factor in certain post-disaster situations—Horowitz argues that punishment for lawlessness fell disproportionately on the African-American community. Christopher M. Church shows how human decisions, particularly the destruction of the Everglades to develop South Florida into a traditional plantation economy, worsened the devastation of the 1928 Lake Okeechobee hurricane.

The two contributions that stand out are Abraham H. Gibson and Ermus’ chapter about invasive species and Steinberg’s afterword. The chapter about invasive species begins with a comprehensive review of the theoretical foundations of the subject and then moves onto animal invasive species, starting with the Spanish introduction of pigs in the sixteenth century and concluding with the arrival of the Burmese pythons in the twentieth century. It also covers such other unlovable creatures as large rodents (nutria), fire ants, and the boll weevil. An aquatic invader, the lionfish, rounds out the analysis. The authors qualify their conclusions by admitting that invasive species were not responsible for human deaths; the culpability for the negative environmental consequences belongs to humans. The authors conclude their chapter by asserting, “Humans . . . [are] the most invasive species of all” (120–121).

Steinberg’s afterword juxtaposes the threats to the two major metropolitan areas in the region—New Orleans and Miami—offering a
A concise history of the risks threatening both cities and reiterating the theme that human actions are to blame for exacerbating natural hazards. Notwithstanding New Orleans’ longer history of settlement and exploitation of the natural environment than Miami’s, Steinberg identifies the common source of the problems in both regions: “The driving force behind the Gulf South’s vulnerability . . . is the capitalist state” (192).

For the most part, the chapters are theoretically and methodologically rigorous. A minor issue is the subtitle that promises to include resilience. Although the contributors aptly describe the natural hazards present in the Gulf South and the decisive role of humans in turning natural events into catastrophes, they have little to say about resilience. Few chapters envision a positive outcome that demonstrates inhabitants’ adaptability to the ever-present risks. Such criticism does not detract, however, from the value of this book, which will be useful to scholars of the region and of disasters in general.

Sherry Johnson
Florida International University


Berenson argues that the fight for suffrage began in Massachusetts, and she traces the origins of the Bay State’s women’s rights movement to the compelling anti-slavery lectures by the Grimke sisters, Sarah and Angelina, in 1837. Daughters of a South Carolina slave owner and eyewitnesses to the degradation and cruelty of the institution that was southern slavery, the Grimkes defied the conventions of their era by traveling widely and speaking publicly about a highly charged political subject. Farmer’s daughter and Oberlin College graduate Lucy Stone picked up where the Grimkes left off. By 1850, Massachusetts had hosted the first national Women’s Rights Convention; the reformers there became synonymous with the national movement. Berenson concurs with Tetrault that the significance of the 1848 Seneca Falls Convention is exaggerated.¹ The convention was the first of its kind, exclusively held to discuss women’s rights and call for women’s enfranchisement, but according to Berenson, it did not mark the beginning of the women’s rights movement; “it had already been born in Massachusetts” (34).

Berenson offers a comprehensive chronological account of the attempt to gain woman’s suffrage in Massachusetts. She devotes a generous portion of the book to explaining the origins of Massachusetts’ associations and highlighting the parts that their respective leaders played. Although a leader of the National Association of Woman Suffrage, Carrie

¹ Lisa Tetrault, The Myth of Seneca Falls: Memory and the Women’s Suffrage Movement, 1848-98 (Chapel Hill, 2014), 13.
Chapman Catt’s ascension infused both national and state associations with new energy. Berenson credits Burns and Alice Paul with utilizing the British tactic of holding political party leaders responsible for their inaction on the suffrage amendment. Berenson also acknowledges lesser-known leaders and organizations. Although initially welcomed into the predominantly white suffrage movement, Josephine St. Pierre Ruffin broke with white leaders after they tried to relegate her to a subordinate status due to her race. Berenson explains why St. Pierre Ruffin and other African-American women had little choice but to found their own separate organizations; they had to fight against both racial and gender discrimination.

Most impressive is Berenson’s ability to convey the multiple ways in which astute suffragists tailored their strategies to attract the broadest possible audience. In addition to recruiting new women—such as Florence Luscomb, a newly minted MIT architectural school graduate—suffrage leaders experimented with new technologies and tactics. Open-air speeches from never-before-seen automobiles and trolley tours crisscrossed the state, commanding the attention of potential male voters. Berenson is at her best when analyzing laws and policies pertaining to women’s rights. She discusses the New York State Married Woman’s Property Act, which gave married women limited rights to property, tracking the law until its repeal in 1862. Berenson impressively navigates between state and national suffrage stories to offer an accurate depiction of the historical context surrounding both.

Berenson might have provided more detail in the case of certain citations. Those who are inspired to inquire further will need to know which archives and/or collections of individual papers contain certain letters. Berenson complements her command of the sources with an attorney’s ability to synthesize. Overall, the book is deeply researched and concisely written—a welcome addition to the history of women’s political activism in Massachusetts.

Karen Pastorello
Tompkins Cortland Community College (SUNY)


The Ford Motor Company was not only a leader in the adaptation of assembly-line technologies to auto production; it was also unusual in several dimensions of its approach to labor relations. Esch examines the interplay of Ford’s technological practices and its broader labor policies, giving particular attention to Ford’s approach to race, ethnicity, and immigrant status in forming its workforce. Although she provides a thorough discussion of Ford’s plants in Detroit, a major goal of this
volume is to extend the Ford story by examining the company’s labor practices outside the United States, especially on its rubber plantations in Brazil and in its production facilities in South Africa.

Esch makes much use of quantitative studies of Ford by economic historians, as well as archival material. Her discussion repeatedly calls back to Gramsci’s writing on Ford and on the interplay between technology, culture, and politics in getting workers to produce under Ford’s intense system.

Chapters 1, 2, and 3, which focus on Ford’s activities in the United States, are the most thoroughly developed. Esch begins with an examination of Ford’s use of immigrant workers, particularly at the Highland Park plant. Ford’s establishment of the $5.00 day wage, in part to stymie organizing efforts, was tied to a program of “Americanization” through Ford’s Sociological Department and English School. Esch’s discussion of this program is thorough and vivid, including a description of the graduation ceremonies at the English School in which immigrant workers emerged from an actual “melting pot” waving American flags.

As production moved from Highland Park to Rouge, Ford began to draw from different labor supplies, and the company’s methods of extracting effort also changed. Rather than focusing on “making [American] men” out of an immigrant workforce, this new approach established order through both the pace of the assembly line and the harsh, sometimes arbitrary, discipline meted out by supervisors. Esch emphasizes that the role of the foreman as a driver of labor was a constant in Ford’s modern production methods, and she connects this system of labor control to Ford’s expressions of support for emerging Fascist movements.

Esch highlights the role of the “color line” in her extended discussion of the use of African-American labor at Rouge. She aptly applies the work of Whatley, Wright, and their co-authors in creating and analyzing data sets based on personnel records from Ford’s Detroit plants in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. The main lesson is that Ford was effective in exploiting the limited outside options of African-American workers by concentrating them in difficult and dangerous jobs that white workers would not tolerate for long, particularly in the foundry.

Chapters 4 and 5 deal with Ford’s rubber production facilities in the Amazon and auto plants in South Africa. In Brazil, Ford applied aspects

2 The school’s focus was on language in an attempt to reduce workers’ desire to return home and to improve communication in the plant, but the language lessons were tied to instruction in “productivity and efficiency” and assimilation into American culture.
of both its “making men” and foreman-driven methods of extracting effort at rubber-production facilities at Fordlandia and Belterra. In neither case was Ford able to adapt its established methods to this new context. Esch’s discussion of South Africa focuses on the 1920s and 1930s, well before the formal establishment of apartheid. She notes that “company records on Ford in South Africa are scarcely available” for this period (152). She instead highlights analysis and recommendations in the 1932 Carnegie Commission Report about the conditions of the white poor in South Africa. The Carnegie Report emphasized themes similar to those characterizing labor relations at Highland Park—the reform of the white poor through factory discipline and mass consumerism. Although these ideas apparently influenced government and business leaders in pre-apartheid South Africa, concrete evidence about Ford’s “specific impact” is, as Esch admits, “fragmentary” (181).

In a substantive concluding chapter, Esch takes a look at the operation of new Ford facilities around the globe and the firm’s continuing practice of identifying vulnerable groups of workers that might be susceptible to intense production methods. Her discussion of the use of migrants from the countryside in urban auto plants in China, in particular, draws interesting and surprising parallels to Ford’s use of migrant black workers at Rouge.

Esch’s discussion of Ford’s practices outside the United States is less detailed than her discussion of Detroit, but she provides a useful starting point for examining Ford’s adaptation of its labor practices to differing national contexts. Historians and historically minded social scientists will find this book to be an accessible, informative, and engaging contribution to the literature about Ford.

Thomas N. Maloney
University of Utah

*The Desegregation of Public Libraries in the Jim Crow South: Civil Rights and Local Activism.* By Wayne A. Wiegand and Shirley A. Wiegand (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 2018) 280 pp. $38.00

We know the stories, or at least we think that we do—the Greensboro sit-ins, the bombing in Birmingham, the Freedom Riders, and the “I Have a Dream” speech. We have seen the images of protests and violence. We know the all-too-familiar casualties of the civil-rights movement—Martin Luther King, Jr., John F. Kennedy, Malcolm X, Andrew Goodman, Michael Schwerner, and James Chaney. Yet, countless unsung heroines and heroes put their lives on the line for desegregation in venues other than lunch counters, public schools, and universities. Wayne and Shirley Wiegand’s study of the integration of public libraries in the Jim Crow south is a worthy contribution to a little-explored body of work related to American library history.
Their book is organized in nine chapters accompanied by an appendix and illustrations. The first chapter, which offers context for the study, introduces a discussion about the history of services in southern public libraries prior to the landmark *Brown v. Board of Education* decision. The authors argue that only after the ruling did Black activists become emboldened to challenge Jim Crow through a systematic approach that was comprised of litigation and public library sit-ins. Chapter 2 begins with a description of one of the first public-library sit-ins, led by lawyer Samuel William Tucker in 1939 in Alexandria, Virginia (48–49), and then describes the growing frustration of African-American library patrons about their treatment in the years before the 1960s.

The core of the study is in Chapters 3 through 8, which focuses on protests and desegregation efforts in several cities in the deep south: Memphis, Tennessee; Greenville, South Carolina; Petersburgh and Danville, Virginia; Mobile, Birmingham, and Montgomery, Alabama; Albany, Georgia; Jackson, Mississippi, as well as public libraries in the rural Louisiana region. Each case is well documented, revealing an impressive and effective use of primary sources. The authors claim to have been “drawn to stories that primary source documentation could support that also generated headlines (national, state and local), and contained colorful (and some now famous) personalities” (16). The Wiegands use of periodicals and newspapers to obtain contemporaneous accounts of events substantiates this assertion and adds to the veracity of the research design.

The final chapter is a discussion about how the American Library Association (ALA), the oldest professional organization for librarians, failed to address the injustices of segregated library services until the 1960s despite the exhaustive efforts of individuals like E. J. Josey, Clara Stanton Jones, Albert P. Marshall, and Virginia Lacy Jones. Josey introduced a historic resolution to the ALA Council in 1964 that ultimately led to dismantling segregation in southern-state library associations. On June 24, 2018, the ALA Council passed a resolution honoring Josey and other African Americans who fought library segregation, offering a long-overdue recognition of the injustices faced in segregated public libraries and apologizing for the wrongs committed. The authors would have done well to incorporate this critical information about the desegregation of public libraries earlier in the book for contextualization.

*The Desegregation of Public Libraries in the Jim Crow South* is an important and timely contribution to the literature. The book not only covers an unexplored topic in public-library history, but it also highlights the contributions of lesser-known individuals during the civil-rights movement.

Renate L. Chancellor  
Catholic University of America


Despite a title that implies a broad-based history of the Citizens’ Councils in the South and in the nation as a whole, this book focuses largely on the Association of Citizens’ Councils of Mississippi, the Jackson Citizens’ Council, and the Citizens’ Councils of America that, apart from its early years in the Delta, operated from headquarters in Jackson, Mississippi, until closing its doors in 1989. Rolph aims to build on Neil R. McMillen’s southern-wide study, The Citizens’ Council: Organized Resistance to the Second Reconstruction, 1954–64 (Urbana, 1994; orig. pub. 1971). She asserts that McMillen and other “historians have, for the most part, ignored the Council’s later years,” prematurely ending their accounts with its “ultimate failure” to prevent the civil-rights movement’s success in ending de jure segregation and African-American disenfranchisement. Continuing her study through the 1980s, Rolph finds that “the Council’s unwavering commitment to white supremacy ensured its continued relevance” and “ultimately saw success in its convergence with mainstream political ideology” (3).

Rolph researched extensively in personal papers, Citizens’ Council materials, the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission papers, newspapers, and oral histories. Her sources and methodology do not cross disciplines; Resisting Equality is a conventional history focused mostly on the Councils’ top leadership. She adopts a chronological organization, but given her emphasis on the importance of addressing the Citizens’ Councils after 1964, the fact that she covers that twenty-five-year period in just one of her six chapters is disappointing.

Rolph argues that the Councils in Mississippi enjoyed a unique degree of local white support. Local Mississippi councils “acted more or less independently” and, especially during their peak popularity between 1954 and 1964, used “economic and physical intimidation” that amounted to “racial terrorism” to dissuade African Americans from challenging racial discrimination (5, 6). In Yazoo City, for example, the council ensured that notices in the local white-owned newspaper and various other outlets publicized the names of African Americans who signed a public-school desegregation petition, thereby inviting retribution, such as loss of employment.

Without evidence, Rolph argues that local Councils were violent toward African Americans. She cites the claims of contemporary journalists but concedes that they also lacked proof of council violence. Discussing the murder of civil-rights activist George Lee in May 1955, Rolph writes, “The Council’s involvement with his murder seemed well known,” but she offers no substantiation, noting, “No one was ever convicted of his murder” (45, 46). Rolph mentions Emmett Till’s murder, also in 1955, but admits that “Till’s murderers had no clear ties to the Citizens’ Council” (46). Rolph’s only evidence of Citizens’ Council
violence is the murder in June 1963 of Mississippi civil-rights leader Medgar Evers by Byron De La Beckwith, a council member in Greenwood, who was eventually convicted in 1994. Prominent Council members condemned Evers’ murder, and Rolph admits that “Beckwith could have been acting on his own” (143).

Rolph’s main focus is the Citizens’ Councils’ higher echelons and their efforts to cultivate connections with conservatives and the radical right in the United States and South Africa through a weekly television program called Citizens’ Council Forum broadcast between 1957 and 1966 and through speaking engagements, correspondence, and networking. Such efforts assumed increasing importance as the Council lost influence among Mississippi’s political leaders when civil-rights successes marginalized unrepentant, militant segregationists. Rolph’s own evidence contradicts her argument that the Citizens’ Councils remained relevant; they became increasingly peripheral, even to the private schools that they had founded in Mississippi to evade public-school desegregation. Without offering evidence, Rolph claims that white supremacy “became enshrined within” the Republican Party under Ronald Reagan. The councils did not endorse Reagan for president but celebrated his victory, while remaining “much more comfortable within Radical Right networks” (185).

Apart from its evidential shortcomings, the book lacks a list of abbreviations as well as a sufficiently inclusive index to aid readers. Sometimes, Rolph fails to make clear which of the Citizens’ Council organizations she is discussing, especially because of her tendency to refer to “the Council.” Her contention that by 1963, William J. Simmons “was the Citizens Council” also conflicts with her claim of local chapter autonomy (127). Chapter epigraphs often lack manifest significance or dates, which are left buried within the endnotes.

Mark Newman
University of Edinburgh


In the contentious historiographical debate about whether the Vietnam War was winnable, orthodox historians contend that the American effort was doomed to fail, whereas revisionists maintain that alternative strategies to General William Westmoreland’s “search and destroy” would have led to victory. Echoing arguments dating back fifty years, revisionists are divided about whether Vietnam was fundamentally a conventional war requiring massive military force or an unconventional conflict necessitating concentration on “hearts-and-minds.” The Psychological War for Vietnam, 1960–1968 provides one of the most
complete and well-documented studies of the latter revisionist interpretation.

As a conventional historical narrative, based on extensive primary sources about U.S. psychological warfare, Roberts’ study is basically American-centered; it views the Vietnamese principally from the perspective of the outsiders. Roberts, however, gives the Vietnamese as much agency as the available documents permit; he discusses the psychological warfare of both the North Vietnamese/National Liberation Front, on one side, and the South Vietnamese, on the other.

Beginning in 1960, when the government of South Vietnam started to unravel, the United States increased its advisory function, including the introduction of psychological-warfare units. Thus, by the time that U.S. combat forces were deployed in 1965, the agencies responsible for psychological warfare had gained sufficient experience to facilitate the program’s dramatic expansion to historic proportions by 1968. Its output—distributed by leaflets, handbills, loudspeakers, and films—reflected careful preparation, including attention to consistency in messaging and adherence to a doctrine that specified different audiences based on strategic, tactical, and consolidation objectives. In this complex process, “white” messages left their American authorship open; “black” messages were attributed to another party; and “gray” messages offered no authorship. Roberts superbly explains the bureaucratic development as psychological warfare moved beyond “hearts-and-minds” to play an important role in support of military missions.

Despite its undeniable strengths, The Psychological War for Vietnam disappoints in two ways. First, Roberts ends the narrative with the Tet Offensive, which he justifies by attributing the loyalty of the South Vietnamese people during Tet, as well as the robust increase in “ralliers” rejecting the communist side, to the effectiveness of American psychological warfare. As he acknowledges, the “victory” of 1968 was misleading and short-lived. Terminating the story with Tet ignores the truly decisive period from 1968 to 1973. Westmoreland’s successor, General Creighton Abrams, undertook a “take and hold” strategy that elevated the commitment to pacification, thus giving greater prominence to “hearts-and-minds” and the importance of psychological warfare. Some revisionists contend that this belated change, as well as other initiatives, led to a decisive “victory” that was squandered by irresolute leaders in Washington.

Second, Roberts implicitly downplays the enormous challenge of transforming Vietnamese society. The imbalance of political power between the Viet Cong and the Saigon government in rural efforts undermined pacification efforts. With increased support since World War II and a defeat of the French under its belt, the communist movement had a legitimacy in most areas that the Saigon government lacked. Moreover, its connection with, and dependence on, the American outsiders further eroded its credibility. Several well-documented studies—notably the books by Elliot, Bergerud, Trullinger, Andrews, Race,
Hunt, and Hunt, among others—cover the struggles for influence in various parts of South Vietnam and tell a story of inevitable American “hearts-and-minds” frustration.¹

These reservations aside, the material covered in *The Psychological War for Vietnam* is important. Both revisionist and orthodox Vietnam War historians will benefit from Roberts’ thorough and thoughtful analysis.

Gary R. Hess
Bowling Green State University

_Historical and Archaeological Perspectives on the Itzas of Petén, Guatemala.
Edited by Prudence M. Rice and Don S. Rice (Boulder, University Press of Colorado, 2018) 504 pp. $95.00

_Historical and Archaeological Perspectives_ is one of few books about the history and archaeology of the Itza Maya of Peten, Guatemala—the last Maya peoples conquered by the Spaniards. Rice and Rice have dedicated much of their careers to researching the Itza Maya and building multidisciplinary perspectives, particularly through ethnohistory and studies of material culture. The authors of the book’s eighteen chapters focus on colonial-period Itza, not the few contemporary Itza people now remaining in the region, though they do weave modern linguistic material into their discussions. Archaeology receives slightly more treatment in the volume than does history. The authors consulted mainly published documentary sources to compile their useful historical information. The editors have extensive practice with intertwining historical with archaeological data from their previous companion volume about the Kowoj Maya, the Itzas’ rivals—*The Kowoj: Identity, Migration, and Geopolitics in Late Postclassic Petén, Guatemala* (Boulder, 2012). We have more documents and literature about the Itza than about the Kowoj Maya.

The Itza Maya maintained an indigenous kingdom centered on the politico-religious capital of Noh Peten (Flores Island) before and after the Spaniards arrived. This indigenous group raided and traded with Maya under Spanish rule, drawing the attention of the Spaniards for pacification and religious conversion. The historical interest in the Itza Maya (also Itzá, Peten Itza, and Itzaj in the literature) is also related to their independent economic, political, and religious organization on the colonial frontier. Most works published on the Itza are in Spanish. Many

of the studies in English appeared twenty years ago or even earlier. Yet, scholars know little about Itza Mayan history and culture when compared to other Maya, such as the K’iche, Kakchiquel, and Yucatec peoples. Because of this book, however, we know more about the past Itza Maya than about their neighboring Maya—including the Yucatec and the Ch’olti-speaking Lacandon, Mopan, and Ch’ol—due to the dearth of historical and archaeological research about them.

Previous work focused on Itza Maya culture and the conquest through the use of primary and secondary Spanish and indigenous sources. This book synthesizes the historical information related to Itza Maya origins, ethnic identity, political structure, and population distribution and presents material evidence about these topics. The editors have extensive knowledge of the ethnohistoric record compiled by their colleagues, which they include throughout the volume. However, archaeologists (mostly the editors) wrote the majority of the book’s chapters with contributions from a linguist. Historians will be interested in the discussion of the written accounts and how archaeological evidence can help to reconstruct Itza history and society. Archaeologists will appreciate the utilization of material remains—mainly architecture, ceramics, and stone tools—together with written sources to learn more about Itza Mayan ethnicity, population movements, social structure, and political factionalism.

The first part of the book provides an introduction to the environment and geography of the Department of Peten in the southern Maya lowlands, where the Itza kingdoms were located, and describes neighboring Maya groups. The editors lay out the theoretical and historical underpinnings of Itza history, society, migrations, and identity. In his linguistic comparisons, Charles Andrew Hofling shows that Itza Maya have a deep history of interaction with other Yucatec-speaking peoples, in addition to sustained contact with Ch’olan speakers surrounding them to the west and south. Mark Brenner’s chapter discusses the geology, sedimentation, natural history, and origins of Lake Peten Itza, the human impact on and around the lake, and the evidence for climate change from lake sediment data.

The second part of the book addresses issues regarding the origins of the Itza Maya in Peten. Prudence Rice succinctly summarizes previously published hieroglyphic, archaeological, and historical research and explores Itza migrations from and to Peten and the northern part of the Yucatan Peninsula, supplemented with comparative information, using published native Maya texts, including the Chilam Balam books from colonial Yucatan. She examines the mixture of history, myth, and perspectives about time and events in Maya narratives, correctly noting their political content, including alliances and the glorification of ancestors, lineages, and the places associated with them. The second half of this section, also written by Prudence Rice, covers the archaeological evidence for migrations and origins—art, hieroglyphic writing, settlement types, building typologies, burial patterns, and diagnostic pottery—in great detail.
Part III treats Spanish views of Itza Maya religion, political organization, settlement, interaction, and eventual conquest. It also revisits the well-known extensive documentation and research about Fray Avendaño y Loyola, providing an interesting overview of the friar’s narratives and an anthropological/archaeological map of spatial relations, travel, and Itza buildings and sites. The authors in this section primarily look at Itza territory, trails, political organization, and ethnic factionalism through the written sources.

Part IV provides archaeological information about Itza Maya settlements, buildings, and artifacts. Prudence Rice and Leslie G. Cecil describe and analyze Itza ceramic types, the sorting of which helps archaeologists to determine ethnic identities, polities, and interactions. Timothy W. Pugh and Yuko Shiratori’s description of buildings and their layouts results in similar insights. Nathan J. Meissner’s thorough study of arrow heads demonstrates that Maya groups in Peten utilized stone obtained both locally and through trade. The chapters by Prudence Rice about the history and archaeology of Flores island, the location of the Itza capital, illuminate work from less accessible publications about the architecture, monuments, burials, and artifacts—especially Itza ceramics—found on the island. Some of the (thankfully, not too lengthy) information about the modern occupation of Flores after the Itza Maya may be out of place in this volume, but in its favor, it contributes to an understanding of past habitation on the island and the modifications that affected the archaeological record. That said, the preservation of Itza architecture and the archaeological contexts of Itza artifacts is not as good as that at the Kowoj Maya sites.

The final sections, by the editors, which explicate how archaeology advances understanding of Itza identity and lifeways, are crucial for studying the social and political organization of the contact-period Maya. The bibliography of the Itza Maya, which closes the volume, is more or less comprehensive, although it does not contain a few studies by contemporary ethnographers and linguists that treat historical Itza place names, sacred landscapes, oral history, identity, myth, and material culture.

Overall, this volume, with its in-depth discussions and detailed tables and illustrations, is the best analysis of historical Itza Maya culture and archaeology to date and an excellent synopsis of perspectives from previous scholarship. Importantly, the contributors subject the abundant archaeological data to careful scrutiny, providing introductions to, and concluding summaries of, each section and chapter, aptly placing evidence and analysis into historical, archaeological, and theoretical context. Their volume is a model for other research teams to analyze and publish historical records jointly with archaeological findings to reconstruct past cultures and social processes.

Joel W. Palka
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Crafting a Republic for the World: Scientific, Geographic, and Historiographic Inventions of Colombia. By Lina del Castillo (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2018) 402 pp. $50.00 cloth $30.00 paper

Crafting a Republic for the World is a work of great ambition. It reconstructs how a host of postcolonial elites attempted to create a pioneering, modern republic in the former territories of the Viceroyalty of New Granada. To do so, these elites not only daringly advocated for the creation of a modern republic in a hostile world of empires and monarchies but also led the way in using science, cartography, political economy, and multiple modes of sociological analysis to assemble a coherent republican nation in which commodities and people circulated freely. This development ultimately enabled a vast array of former subjects of the Spanish monarchy to become citizens of a worldly Colombian republic.

This bold argument leads del Castillo to several important historiographical interventions. First, she pushes against the commonly held trope among historians that the nineteenth century was an unfortunate period besieged by caudillismo, regional strife, and never-ending political clashes between liberals and conservatives. In its stead, Castillo demonstrates the innovative, if not always successful, nature of Colombia’s nineteenth-century republican experiment. Second, she questions the notion that the new Latin American republics were overwhelmed by colonial legacies. In fact, she argues, the very idea of “colonial legacies” that historians take for granted today was a concept developed by nineteenth-century political leaders in order to bolster their own republican project.

Marshaling evidence to demonstrate this bold argument is a tall order, but in general, Castillo succeeds in delivering. Chapter 1 begins by focusing on how early political leaders invented the idea of “colonial legacies” to support a new republican project. She pays particular attention to how a group of political elites re-imagined, perhaps distorted, through print the writings of Francisco José de Caldas (1771–1816) to support independence and republicanism. As a man who came of age during José Celestino Mutis’ scientific research expedition in Nueva Granada, Caldas’ early writings more appropriately belonged to the eighteenth-century context of intellectual dynamism in the Spanish monarchy. But the aforementioned group of Colombian political elites appropriated Caldas’ writings to portray him as a martyr whose scientific genius was destroyed by Spanish ignorance and tyranny.

The next two chapters reconstruct how, starting in the 1840s, liberal and conservative political leaders attempted to create a new political economy for Colombia based on internal economic integration. Using science and cartography, a number of intellectuals and politicians re-drew Colombia’s map to facilitate the erection of a political economy of circulation, thus surmounting the legacy of fragmentation that many identified with Spanish colonialism. In a similar vein, many of these political leaders also sought to incorporate indigenous peoples within Colombia’s modern republican project by abolishing resguardos, or
communal lands, which were often seen as a barrier to progress. Provincial governors enthusiastically deployed an arsenal of surveyors to take stock of the resguardos and subsequently redistribute land among indigenous people in a manner compatible with a modern republic. The project was not always successful, as continuous litigation and delays hampered the redistribution of land. But rather than a failure, Castillo portrays these delays as evidence of the republic’s legitimacy as a mediator between multiple competing regional and local interests.

The next three chapters continue to reconstruct how Colombian political leaders sought to overcome “colonial legacies” in order to create a modern republic. They did so by organizing a Chorographic Commission to take stock of the colonial mindset among Colombians, by creating a new constitution that included universal male suffrage, and by debating the relevance of the Catholic Church to Colombia’s modern republican project. Throughout these last three chapters, Castillo insists that though liberals and conservatives often disagreed, sometimes violently, they shared nonetheless a vision for Colombia that placed science, economic development, legal equality, and progress more generally at the forefront.

Castillo’s account is convincing, but a couple of points are worth raising. First, because she insists on the innovative and pioneering quality of Colombia’s republican project, the book would have benefited from a discussion of how the case of Colombia differed from that of the United States and other Latin American republics. In what ways was Colombia more innovative than the United States? Was Colombia unique in Latin America? Was Colombia’s uniqueness a function of the dynamic botanical expedition of New Granada directed by Mutis, or was Colombia simply one example among many in Latin America?

Last but not least, Castillo’s suggestion that nineteenth-century Latin America had no colonial legacies may not be completely accurate. It is true that historians have often abused the idea of “colonial legacies” by reducing the region’s history to caudillismo, political factionalism, and corruption. Likewise, Castillo’s point that the idea of “colonial legacies” was a strategic invention to portray Spain as a backward, tyrannical monarchy and thus bolster the project for an independent republic is well taken. However, it would be wrong to suggest that there were absolutely no colonial legacies in nineteenth-century Latin America; the indigenous communal lands alone represent clear evidence of a genuine colonial legacy.

These minor shortcomings notwithstanding, this ambitious and invigorating book will incite discussion for years to come. It sets an important precedent for describing nineteenth-century Latin America as a period of immense political, economic, scientific, and even cultural creativity rather than as a period consumed by caudillismo, corruption, and political fragmentation. In this sense, the book is tremendously successful.

Fidel J. Tavárez
Freie Universität Berlin

Long a center of human habitation, the Basin of Mexico has undergone a profound environmental change since the pre-Hispanic era. The Spanish colonial and post-independence governments, seeking greater resources to sustain growing populations and at the same time to control the level of the basin’s lakes to prevent flooding, accelerated the region’s ecological transformation. The resulting strain on local resources, especially forests and water sources, has proven to be one of Latin America’s, if not the world’s, greatest environmental stories. In A City on a Lake, Vitz explores the interactions between presidents, engineers, planners, private developers, and ordinary Mexicans over the ecological direction of the city during the first half of the twentieth century, a period of rapid technological and demographic growth. Vitz demonstrates that these interactions produced the social and environmental inequalities that have come to define one of the largest megacities of the world.

These inequalities, as Vitz shows, have roots in the late nineteenth-century Porfirian government’s quest for the sanitary city, which led to a hierarchy of inclusion and exclusion (41). Despite the revolutionary program proclaimed after 1920, the Mexican State continued this policy, applying it to some regions and groups but excluding others. Nonetheless, a remarkable tale emerges: The dedicated group of planners who tried to cope with political changes witnessed the full onslaught of the demographic growth that ultimately deprived the basin of much of its ecological livability. Important figures such as Miguel Angel de Quevedo, the forest conservationist whose career spanned several decades, and Manuel Marroquín y Rivera, architect of Mexico City’s water system, provide a human picture of successes and failures. However, this story also includes the actions of numerous politicians, peasants, and developers who sought their own goals within the political and environmental framework of a basin seemingly rich in resources and opportunities but also fraught with vulnerable links on the verge of collapse.

The book is divided into two sections. The first sets the stage, discussing in detail the lacustrine and forested landscape as well as the increasing influence of a cadre of planners and scientists whose expertise outlasted the Porfirian era and continued well into the violent years of the 1910 Mexican Revolution, albeit under increasing state authority. The second part, the majority of the study, concentrates on the tensions about the environmental spaces in the urban ecology of Mexico City. As interest groups demanded the spoils of revolution, planners struggled to deliver water and land resources. The post-Revolutionary state, mindful of the demands of its constituents, sought to balance their needs with the goals of conservationists and the interests of developers. Vitz elaborates the consequences of uncontrolled demographic growth and development—desiccated lakebeds, dust storms, and the increasing demand for housing.
Mexico City clearly functioned as the Mexican state’s experiment for national growth, a project with mixed results at best.

Vitz draws from a rich collection of archival sources to illustrate a metropolis caught between a growing population extracting more and more resources from a still-viable ecosystem and a government increasingly run by technocrats. Although the study would benefit from a brief comparative analysis with other global cities encountering the same issues, it lays out a satisfying and up-to-date chronology of Mexico City’s post–World War II environmental development, including plans for sustainability to address the ecological problems that have bedeviled the capital city since the 1970s. Given current global concerns about climate change, this interdisciplinary volume is a welcome and valuable addition to environmental histories of Latin America and the world, as well as the history of inequality, which cannot be divorced from ecological perspectives.

James A. Garza
University of Nebraska, Lincoln


Brennan has written a timely account about the troubled past of the last dictatorship in Argentina. The recent “human rights” politics of Néstor and Cristina Kirchner’s administrations (2003–2015) have generated an important shift in the enduring memory, truth and justice practices in Argentina that now allow original materials about the crimes of the Dirty War (state repression in Argentina from 1976 to 1983) to emerge. The most important are the court testimonies of relatives of the disappeared and survivors of the clandestine detention centers and (the albeit few) state documents that have been offered as evidence in the renewed trials for crimes against humanity. Brennan has sensibly utilized these personal and institutional archives in his well-researched and original historical study, which places the Dirty War in a regional framework.

In contrast to many scholarly works about Argentina and the dictatorship that mostly concentrate on Buenos Aires and the surrounding provinces, Brennan provides a thorough analysis of the violence and the truth and justice practices in Córdoba, the second-largest city in Argentina. Through this case study, the book seeks to reconsider the underlying causes for the brutality and scale of the state repression in Argentina. One great strength of this book is its break from the revisionist notion that Argentina’s Dirty War was a by-product of a global Cold War. Brennan by no means ignores the ideological influence of the United States within the Argentinean armed forces during the twentieth century. However, his combination of transnational and regional approaches demonstrates that the
ideological and practical underpinnings of the state terrorism was an “amalgam of influences, drawn from Argentina’s history and the military’s own institutional culture as well as diverse foreign sources” (7).

Brennan brilliantly demonstrates that in the military’s view, the subversive forces in Córdoba—a highly politicized youth culture, a socially activist Catholic Church, and an extremely committed militant union movement—were more radical than those elsewhere in the country. The particularly brutal nature of the Dirty War in Córdoba was therefore not accidental or indiscriminate but carefully targeted by the armed forces (74). On a transnational scale, Brennan focuses sharply on the Argentinian–French connection to analyze the adaptation of the brutal postcolonial counterinsurgency in Algeria to local tactics and general strategies intended to annihilate dissidents in 1970s Argentina.

Brennan uses a historiographical paradigm to demonstrate that the brutalities of state repression in Argentina cannot be thoroughly understood through the lens of societal trauma and personal memories of the victims alone. His claim that memory is fundamentally different from history is not new, but in the context of the last dictatorship in Argentina, it is a welcome observation. To revise the history of the Dirty War with all its complexities and contradictions, the book examines the perpetrators of the violence to elucidate the military government’s understanding of what constituted war. Unfortunately, Brennan’s views of the perpetrators remain shallow. He later acknowledges the challenge that this methodology presented, because historical records about the state’s repression had either been destroyed or never written; the military commanders gave their orders orally. Brennan had to rely on fragmentary information from military sources and the scattered declarations of a few indicted generals at the court of Córdoba, the majority of whom maintained a “stony silence” (84). Because of the fundamental lack of historical evidence, compiling the history of the Dirty War in Argentina remains largely a matter of memory.

Overall, Brennan convincingly analyzes how remembering the Dirty War in Argentina is not only an individual or private matter but also encompasses an institutional memory fomented and fashioned by the policies of the Kirchner governments (96). By focusing on Córdoba, Brennan successfully captures the role of the state in constructing public memory of the Dirty War.

Eva van Roekel
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam


The role of Latin American activists and thinkers in shaping international human rights ideas, politics, institutions, and rules has interested several
scholars writing about the emergence of human-rights issues in the 1970s. Like most accounts, Kelly’s spotlights the Southern Cone, maintaining that the multiple encounters between domestic and transnational activists occurring in the 1970s proved fateful for new ideals and practices of human rights. In one of the book’s most interesting lines of arguments, Kelly tells the story of the complex process that led socialist activists from Brazil, Argentina, and Chile to abandon their projects of distributive justice and to embrace a minimalist utopia based on the invocation of an international platform of human rights. Activists’ political transformation occurred as a result of violent actions perpetrated by military governments of the three countries addressed in the book. The withdrawal from the pursuit of revolution to a modest goal of rights protection in light of the urgencies of the time was a “shift . . . from the politics of revolution to a politics of emergency” (7).

Kelly views his methodology for analyzing this politics of emergency, which ultimately turned into a permanent and long-term initiative for the left, as novel because it “provide[s] a model for transnational and global history” of human rights “based on multi-state, multi-archival research [drawing] on oral interviews” (12–13). More valuable than the painstaking documentation that underlies the book, however, is the heuristic device that Kelly employs to tell a compelling story about the different meanings that human-rights ideals had at the local, national, international, and transnational levels. Kelly focuses on specific encounters between local activists from the Southern Cone and individuals working in transnational organizations to construct his narrative about the nascent politics of human rights. Sometimes he underscores the voice of transnational activists as a means to understand the implications of the interaction; in other instances, he privileges the view of domestic activists. He also follows the path of Southern Cone exiles who moved to other countries, especially to the United States and Western Europe, carrying their political agendas to international arenas.

Tracing individuals and encounters, Kelly offers a model to deal with the challenges of salience and scale in human-rights historiography. A human-rights agenda can comprise the panoply of ideals, institutions, rules, practices, and politics that activists embrace to advance their purposes. But because human rights can occur simultaneously at a regional, national, and international scale, their full implications can be difficult to grasp. Kelly’s heuristic strategy effectively acknowledges and neutralizes these complications. Kelly’s history of human rights implies that a grandiose coherent narrative is less important than a multiplicity of perspectives that can illuminate the contested processes of making meaning in transnational contexts.

The multiple meanings of human rights become clear in Kelly’s narrative, especially in his provocative epilogue. But readers may also notice the last-utopia approach that underlies the book’s story line. Kelly’s heuristic devices allow him both to give prior works their due and to distance himself from their main conclusions. His third chapter, for example, shows that the retreat of socialism was not as simple as the last-utopia narrative suggests. Latin American activists at the alternative international tribunals in the 1970s (for instance, the Russell Tribunal, named for Bertrand Russell who organized it to investigate war crimes and human-rights violations), explicitly pursued a politics of solidarity close to socialism. Kelly might have discussed what happened at these forums, and how and why they became less important for Southern Cone activists vis-à-vis other opportunities.

Overall, Sovereign Emergencies is a rich kaleidoscope that emphasizes the importance of writing histories that underscore plurality in the formation of the ideas and practices that animate international politics. In doing so, Kelly offers a new view of global politics as a process that does not occur top-down but in a multitude of directions that can be grasped only by portraying diverse encounters.3

Jorge González-Jácome
Universidad de los Andes (Bogotá)


Ibhawoh has produced an integrated and post-revisionist historical survey of how the African continent might fit into the history of global human rights. It is an excellent book. He protests Western stories that assign credit for human rights to ancient sources, such as the Greek miracle and the Christian religion, or modern sources, such as the French Revolution or the founding of the United Nations—which would make Africa any more than a belated affiliate with human rights, whether conceived as a set of morals, laws, or practices. Instead, Ibhawoh pleads for enlarging our sensibilities; Africa was always part of the story.

According to Ibhawoh, if human rights are defined not as international prerogatives of individuals or as entitlements against states but instead as “a range of ideas and practices relating to human dignity and liberties,” as well as “notions of altruism, justice, and fairness,” Africa has its fair share of traditions with cognates and contributions to human rights (19). On this basis, Ibhawoh generates a beautifully wide-ranging

3 For perspective, see Chris Tomlins, “After Critical Legal History: Scope, Scale, Structure,” ibid., 31–68.
survey ranging from pre-colonial “sages” to campaigns against the slave trade and from anti-colonialists to dissidents. At every turn, his coverage is interesting, literate, and responsible.

It is often convincing, too, but not always. To this reviewer (who happens to be one of the chief targets of the book), *Human Rights in Africa* is persuasive to the extent that its timeline approaches the present. If abstract ethical and humanist commitments are part of a deep history of human rights, every place in the world and every era is fodder for it, converting the field into a history of philosophy and religion in general. Moreover, the deep history of African ethical notions, most of which justified or masked extraordinary domination (like the deep history of ethical notions everywhere in the world) has been mobilized for many projects other than “human rights,” notably as part of nationalist mythmaking or a supranationalist ideology oriented around global equality.

Ibhawoh reveals how far abolitionist zeal bolstered and justified the expansion of European empires in Africa, without allowing this fact to swamp the real contributions of local and global critics of slavery to human–rights traditions. Even more convincing, though still contentious, are Ibhawoh’s superlative chapters about rights under empire—both their advancement and their violation—and about whether anticolonialism in the twentieth century ought to be considered a “human rights movement.” What makes this book “post-revisionist” is Ibhawoh’s reasonable and sober decision to avoid extremes in a debate that he effectively puts to rest. “There are obvious analytical pitfalls,” he plausibly says, “in any blanket inclusion or rejection of human rights within anticolonialism” (136). Ibhawoh accurately stresses the United Nations trusteeship arrangements as a sensible place for historians to look for the incidence of human–rights politics.

On the brink of the present, nobody would deny Africa’s inclusion in human–rights history, given its late turn to a regional charter (the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights, 1981), participation in the launching of the International Criminal Court, and so forth. If Ibhawoh’s study has a shortcoming, it is the failure to pose hard questions about Africa’s place in the global order and about the role of nongovernmental organizations in outsourcing local control of human–rights concerns. Gregory Mann, *From Empire to NGOS in the West African Sahel: The Road to Nongovernmentality* (New York, 2015), has highlighted this core reality of the postcolonial African experience. Ibhawoh, however, adopts a more familiar frame in asking how dissidents deployed human rights against despots, and how they brought the issue to endemic local and regional warfare. Nonetheless, *Human Rights in Africa* is the finest book on its subject and an enormous contribution to thinking about the past and future of human rights and of Africa alike.

Samuel Moyn
Yale University

This carefully constructed and exhaustively researched account about the formation of the conflicting political beliefs held by four well-known influential colonial figures in the Buganda Kingdom of Uganda deepens our understanding of tensions within Ganda tradition—a culture that has often been misunderstood as homogeneous. In addition, these actors’ beliefs show that both the Kingdom and its relations with Uganda contained political possibilities never realized. In three ways, Earle modifies conventional notions that academics regularly draw as sharp distinctions in explaining Africa’s history and particularly that of Buganda. Instead, his broad purpose is to show, first, that the actors in question reconceptualized Western antinomies between sacred and secular perspectives; second, that they also rethought antimonies between forward and backward-looking perspectives; third, that they combined both reconsiderations, though in different ways. His narrower purpose is to reexamine historical issues that occurred shortly before and during British rule over Buganda.

Earle’s use of interdisciplinary methods mostly involves joining insights taken by the intellectuals that he covers directly from European philosophical writings and from Christian and Muslim religious writings with conventional historical sources, primarily written, about precolonial and colonial Buganda. He opens by declaring his book “an intellectual history” (1). He joins the small group of historians who have traced the impact of both European political philosophies and religious texts on the thought of African public figures.

To account for the surprisingly dissimilar visions for Buganda found in the writings of Ignatius Musazi, Eridadi Mulira, Abu Mayanja, and Benedicto Kiwanuka, Earle examines the religious and Ganda beliefs held in their natal areas within Buganda, as well as their educations at home and abroad. He intends to show how the ideas that these four Ganda thinkers culled from books or from their own writings helped to form their mature views. His methods for treating his four subjects differ, at least partly because he could not locate comparable materials about each of them.

One of Earle’s contributions to the study of African history is his use of insights discovered in the personal libraries of three of these four Ganda activists, not only from the books that they owned but even more precisely from their annotations and marginal notes in them. This innovative methodology allows him more closely to consider the influence of European literature, as well as the Bible or the Koran, on their intellectual thought and political practice. In addition, Earle relies on their own letters, newspaper articles, pamphlets, novels, and plays. In their writings, we see alternative, though never achieved, futures for the relationship between the Buganda Kingdom and Uganda.
Earle’s most spectacular discovery was to locate Kiwanuka’s library, which was hidden after his assassination. Earle’s examination of his books and manuscripts allowed him to show “how Kiwanuka wove Europe’s classical liberal histories with Catholic theology to recast Buganda’s vernacular historiographies” (4). From Musazi’s library, Earle found Biblical annotations and references showing how Emile Zola and Harold Laski had influenced him. Earle’s discussion of Mulira, the most prolific writer among the four, concerns, among other topics, his pamphlets, which urged federalism as a solution for Buganda’s place in Uganda. Earle also analyzes Mulira’s novels and plays. In discussing Mayanja, Earle concentrates on his “logic of criticizing patriotism in Buganda . . . tied to a much longer history of trying to create political space for the kingdom’s Muslim community” (170). In Earle’s view, all four writers insisted that Buganda remain part of Uganda after independence, opposing those who wanted it to secede, though they differed on how the kingdom should relate to the country.

Earle’s focus on Buganda leads him to place little value on the radical activism of Musazi and Mayanja (and the liberalism of Mulira) as central to their intellectual principles. The conventional view is that all three reversed their larger commitments as independence neared. In a book that concentrates mainly on the origin and development of ideas, Earle needed to show either that these activists always placed Buganda above radicalism or at least that they were not opportunists who simply changed their minds to protect their careers.

The fundamental contribution of this fine book lies in its demonstration of the different cosmopolitan political visions of these Ganda intellectuals in colonial Buganda. It encourages further investigation into contingent paths that neither Buganda nor Uganda took.

Nelson Kasfir
Dartmouth College


The history of financial managers and state accounting might seem dry and daunting, and only marginally significant, but Young argues that from such apparently little things big political trends can stem. Of interest to readers of this journal is the way political, administrative, and, to a lesser extent, intellectual history and economics are interwoven.

The Sudan is well suited to plotting the intersection of quantitative and qualitative forces, having been a colony under Ottoman–Egyptian rule and later the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium until independence in 1956. Young focuses on the late colonial/early independence periods from the 1930s to 1960s and on colonial and Sudanese economists,
accountants, and auditors, allowing a useful comparison of oft-neglected officials. The wide span facilitates analysis of the origins of decolonization and ideas about the policies of development and (postcolonial) state formation. He uses a range of printed and archival sources in Khartoum, Cairo, Britain, and Washington, including World Bank and International Monetary Fund archives, the John Carmichael Papers at Durham University, Sudanese economic periodicals, and Arabic sources. He does not make use of interviews, though surely some of the major players would still be alive.

Treating the origins of the Sudanese Ministry of Finance and its growing economic and political clout, Young draws from Mitchell’s work on Egypt and Jerven’s revisionist economic history on how African economic performance data varies widely because of historically contingent bias, adding his own original ideas. Young details the growing role of the state in data collecting, budgeting, and economic projections to argue persuasively, and against much of the extant literature, for the crucial importance of the decolonizing moment with regard to state-building. He also challenges an extensive body of literature that ascribes ongoing conflict in the Sudan to deep fractures over race and religion. He recasts colonial influences as economic policies rooted in colonial days, widened during decolonization to create a situation in which the government directed its energy to the central cotton triangle (epitomized by massive funding of the Gezira Scheme). Profound economic neglect alienated southerners and fed civil war.

Young links the rise of the nation-state to national income and the governing elites’ use of financial planning to marginalize people, a thesis well explicated in case studies of cotton schemes—the favored one in Gezira, and neglected ones in the Nuba Mountains and Equatoria. He makes connections between the “cognitive infrastructure of developmental economists” and the power elite, although he does not actually explore whether political/state “imaginings” produce economic activity or vice versa. Nor does he explore the precise relationship of this cognitive infrastructure to the ruling class (6).

Central to the narrative is the Ministry of Finance and how its officials drove the conceptualization, and eventually the realization, of the Sudan as a single unit; “ultimately, the mundane tasks of creating budgets and dealing with the existing financial infrastructure of the State determined how Sudanese independence was formulated” (46). The planning process increased the power of officials who advanced their position by advocating a single territorial unit, which emerged through the budget process to displace imperial and regional perspectives decisively by the 1950s. Symbolically, the cattle herds of the South did not figure into the quantifiable estimates rooted in counting cotton bales. Through the 1950s and 1960s, the Ministry ruled out regional autonomy, making

use of limited data that overrepresented cotton just as officials made little
effort to collect data on so-called traditional sectors. As the postcolonial
state grew, the World Bank and Khartoum became complicit in an exag-
gerated attention to a cotton monoculture that fed debt and led to the
failure of developmental plans. Military and civilian regimes alike won
praise from foreign investors for stability and surpluses, but blind faith in
aggregate indicators such as gross domestic product created a “uniform im-
age of economic progress despite the presence of stark inequality” (126).

Young usefully broaches intellectual history through a brief analysis
of debates in economic-planning journals, notably the Sudanese Econo-
nist. By the 1960s, inflation, debt, transparency, and statistics had be-
come topics of public and professional conversation. Young highlights
one debate in 1966 about the right of the public to accurate economic
information that shows how little government knew about its own
economy. Although he adduces limited evidence about who pulled
the strings in the journal, its circulation, funding, or influence, he makes
a good start along the road to a richer intellectual history.

Young adds the empirical weight of the archives of finance officials
to a literature hitherto dominated by political scientists and economists
who largely eschew such sources. He is thus in a position to force a re-
thinking of the history of state institutions. He makes the claim that post-
colonial Sudan existed largely due to budgetary planning and that the
nation-state became predominant via national accounting. In the pro-
cess, he discloses the economic causes behind political events, such as
the rise of the cotton elite to power and its part in the 1958 military coup
to explain the continuities and disjunctions of imperial and early post-
colonial policymakers. By the late 1950s, officials and ministers saw the
nation as a single unit opening the way for Khartoum’s push for a place
in the global economy.

Young’s basic argument about the common interest of late imperial
and early postcolonial political and financial elites is convincing. Yet he
prefers to collapse complex intellectual ideas into such terms as “the
imaginary” that tell us little about the breadth or depth of ideas. It is easy
to concur that “the economic imaginary of their country that Sudanese
officials possessed guaranteed that the peripheries would continue to be
neglected,” but to claim further that their ideas “propelled the political
conflicts that have dominated Sudanese history since independence” seems
an exaggeration (17, my emphasis). He could have said more about the lives
and political connections of officials to add flesh to the dry bones of
accounting. Nowithstanding a few typographical errors and repetitions,
he explains policy continuities well, and his approach becomes more
attractive when we add to it recent research, such as Verhoeven’s on
the nexus between state, ideology, and water in following decades.

Bringing together history, economic history, economics, and studies
in statistics, planning, and bureaucracy, Transforming Sudan is a useful

survey of the close interaction between the forces of decolonization, development, and state formation. It should stimulate further interdisciplinary work on political-economy networks between the North and Africa, as well as within the South.

Peter Limb
Michigan State University


The provocative short title of Antov’s book conjures up the image of a region only recently settled and still subject to the pervasive threat of hostile attack. Its more descriptive subtitle implies Antov’s intent to cover a 200-year span from 1400 to 1600. In reality, its most substantive part treats the period from 1480 to 1580 when the region of the lower Danube selected for study (see his map, xvi–xvii), already in the Ottomans’ more or less secure and continuous possession since the 1390s (107), had already undergone extensive colonization and settlement and was arguably no longer “wild.” What the book studies in greatest detail is the process of population growth through rural migration to, and investment in, the existing urban centers in the northeastern Balkans, such as Shumen, alongside the foundation and rapid expansion of new urban centers such as Hezargrad. Both cities served as supply and distribution hubs along the principal routes of passage between the southern Balkans and the Danube waterway.

From the 1530s onward, the region studied by Antov gained renewed importance in the context of Sultan Süleyman I’s reorientation of Ottoman strategic objectives away from the Asian sphere and his re-focusing on the Habsburg-held lands in East Central Europe. As Antov points out (19), the Ottomans’ interest in consolidating their control over this region had gained momentum with Bayezid II’s conquest of Kilia and Akkerman in 1484, but internal problems and Selim I’s pre-occupation with his Muslim dynastic rivals in Iran and Egypt had prevented and postponed sustained state-sponsored interest in the northern frontier for nearly half a century.

Antov’s book gives priority to imperial expansion, colonization, and (to a lesser extent), conversion to Islam, devoting detailed chapters to each of these themes. A substantial portion of Chapter 2 and all of Chapter 6 summarize the hagiographic texts about the exploits of babas (religious elders) and dervishes revered in heterodox circles, especially in rural parts of the Balkans (61–93, 205–254). Antov attempts to link information gleaned from the quasi-historical, quasi-mythological, literary sources about the heroes and spiritual leaders who opposed the “worldliness” of Ottoman state officialdom to the statistical data derived mainly
from the Ottoman revenue and census registers (tahrir defterleri). This approach leads him to the view that the Ottomans’ principal motivation in settling the frontier and contributing to its security and well-being was their overriding preoccupation with stamping out sectarianism, heterodoxy, and religious non-conformity. This research paradigm seeks to connect the Ottomans with their European contemporaries in the Age of Confessionalism and “confessionalization” (274–281, 285–287).

This battle to win the confessional loyalties of new subjects in eastern Anatolia and the Arab provinces remained a vital concern for Selim I (r. 1512–1520) and Süleyman (r. 1520–1566) during his first decade on the throne. It had to be adjusted, however, when Süleyman began to promote and defend Ottoman imperial interests in the far north where such a confrontationist policy would have been not only impractical and difficult to realize but virtually impossible to enforce.

Much of the book’s argument is predicated on the assumption that state-financed development and urban investment in pious endowments were one-dimensional, designed to act as “a counterweight to the influx of heterodox Muslim migrants” (170). For this insight regarding Hezargrad’s urban development and for his understanding of the “vision” behind Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha’s 1533 endowment, Antov is indebted to Kiel’s detailed case study.1 However, Antov fails to take into consideration the other part of Kiel’s argument that the founding of such a center made practical sense in that it shortened the travel time and ease of access particularly for merchants and traders moving between Shumen and Ruse.

Defending Muslim orthodoxy in the northern Balkans in the middle decades the sixteenth century forms only one, and arguably not the principal, dimension of Ottoman efforts aimed at securing their control over the region. On the whole, Antov’s insistence on a single issue (sectarianism) as the dominant feature to the exclusion of economic and geo-strategic concerns seriously distorts the process of Ottomanization in the Balkans. In the conclusion, Antov refers in passing to the Ottomans’ “accommodationist approach” and refers even to the “Ottoman state’s limitations in terms of both resources and vision to pursue confessional homogeneity,” but elsewhere he stresses the state’s anti-sectarian animus and its determined pursuit of a policy of “Sunnitisation” (286, 287).

In the balance, the book overstates the case for the state’s unswerving determination to “tame” and “discipline” nomadic rural Muslims in the name of spiritual renewal and sedentarization (2, 3, 124). By adopting this interpretive framework, Antov has understated or ignored the Ottomans’ use of various forms of co-optation, including short-term tax incentives and longer-term economic opportunities for both urban and rural residents of the region.

Antov’s treatment of the derbendci villagers who guarded the mountain passes and invasion routes in the Deliorman region is problematical. He fundamentally misunderstands the function and purpose of the

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derbend institution when he insists that it was designed to prevent internal migration on the part of Turcoman pastoralists rather than to serve as a bulwark against opportunistic attack by neighbors to the north in Wallachia and Moldavia (153–157). Noteworthy in particular is his extraordinary conspiracy theory that derbend villages situated on the banks of the Danube, near the heavily fortified positions defending the frontier, “could be meaningfully viewed as a counter-measure against the influx of nomadic and semi-nomadic settlers and the latter’s being a potential source of instability and disorder” (156). Likewise, Antov insists that a prevailing concern motivating Ibrahim Pasha’s decision to fund his pious foundation in Hezargrad was the “development of an outpost of Ottoman imperial authority as well as Sunni orthodoxy” (179). Thus does he characterize the grand vizier’s principal motivation, almost in the same breath as he concludes his detailed account of the town’s rapid commercial and economic development between its founding in 1533 and the tax registration of 1579 (176–177).

By neglecting the material and economic dimensions, as well as the geopolitical imperatives that lay behind the Ottomans’ drive to settle the northern frontier, in favor of identity politics and religious conformity, Antov ignores features of the regional economy that would have made dogmatic pursuit of such goals damaging to the careful balance that existed between pastoral and agricultural pursuits in this region of northern Bulgaria. Antov shows an awareness of how important animal husbandry was in its transregional context (117), but he makes no effort to assess its importance as a mainstay of the local economy. Antov could (arguably should) have referred to the statistics compiled by Cvetkova more than four decades ago that show that in 1576 Shumen alone boasted 446 registered sheep drovers charged with providing 16,430 head of sheep.2 A few years later, in 1580, aggregate statistics for all kazas (township districts) of the sanjak (administrative division) of Niğbolu indicate that the wider region supported the activity of 3,513 registered sheep drovers who supplied 135,370 head of sheep.3

Had the Ottomans been successful in a mission to transform pastoralists into “obedient” tillers of the soil, as Antov maintains, they could hardly have sustained their profitable trade. Nor would the tanners, saddlers, shoemakers, and other related craftspeople of Shumen and Hezargrad have been able to contribute to the burgeoning city-based industries to which Antov also makes repeated reference (158–204).

Rhoads Murphey
University of Birmingham

When the War Came Home: The Ottomans’ Great War and the Devastation of an Empire. By Yiğit Akın (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2018) 288 pp. $90.00 cloth $27.95 paper

The Great War came home in the late summer of 1914. The inhabitants of Istanbul, Izmir, Aleppo, and the smallest of Ottoman villages all felt it coming. At times it made itself known by creeping slowly into the every day, and at other times it appeared with great fanfare, violently disrupting normalcy. In a matter of months, the Ottoman state mobilized hundreds of thousands of civilians, emptying fields, stores, and homes of their men. The state froze bank accounts, requisitioned grain, confiscated livestock, and censored the press. These violent state interventions were “shrouded in an all-encompassing discourse of duty (vazife).” In time, the state’s mandated “sacrifice” (fedarkalik) grew to unimaginable proportions (95). No war had ever demanded such extraordinary tributes. In fact, “by the end of the war virtually every family, village, and neighborhood would be touched by [the war’s] terrible effects” (9). Despite the war’s extensive reach and the fact that European historians long have considered the home-front experience to be an essential aspect of the “total war,” it took professional Ottoman historians a hundred years and a centenary to acknowledge the importance of the war’s civilian dimension.

Instructed by nationalist histories and deterred by the taboo of a genocidal past, Ottoman historians have avoided, if not obscured, the wartime story of families, villages, and neighborhoods across the Empire. Akın’s When the War Came Home is an important historical revision that fully portrays the imperial home front for the first time. Moreover, this unique interdisciplinary work reconsiders existing temporal, geographical, and methodological approaches to the study of World War I in the Middle East.

Expanding the temporal scope, When the War Came Home foregrounds the Balkan Wars’ (1912–1913) importance in shaping the Ottoman home-front experience between 1914 and 1918. Akın argues that the Ottoman defeat exposed the Empire’s political and military weakness, its diplomatic isolation, and its ethnic groups’ growing demands for reform. Raising “the specter of imperial collapse,” the Balkan debacle generated an existential crisis among the Ottoman leadership. The fear of a repeat failure led not only to total mobilization but also to plans aimed at eradicating all possible threats to the survival of the Empire. Both these policies resulted in suffering, violence, and displacement beginning in 1914 (9).

When the War Came Home is the first comprehensive history of what we might call an Ottoman home front. Sensitive to the differential experiences of Ottoman subjects mediated by gender, class, ethnicity, and religion, Akın skillfully integrates the vast geographical scope of the Empire into his narrative guiding his readers into urban and rural spaces and across provincial boundaries. His archival depth and analysis
is impressive, showcasing his grounding in historical method. A combination of state correspondence, national and international newspapers, petitions, folklore, and lamentations paint an intimate picture of how Ottoman subjects experienced living at the “limits of the possible” (9). Herein, the voices of Akın’s rich archive claim their position in the war’s history like never before—from Ihsan Bey’s skeptical reaction to the mobilization in the eastern Anatolian city of Harput, the U.S. consul’s reports of inadequate provisioning of the Mesopotamian divisions, and the laments of Bethlehem’s women as they saw their men conscripted to collect garbage (52, 86, 91).

Akın’s interdisciplinary approach is most notable in his attention to gender and mass migration. Drawing on works from the field of gender studies, he creatively combines Turkish laments and folklore with women’s petitions to the central government. The sources, which reveal the deep resentment and sorrows of those affected, leave no doubt that the war “altered the circumstances of Ottoman women beyond all recognition” (145). Countless middle- and lower-class urban women entered the workforce. Forced by wartime deprivations and the “disappearance” of their breadwinners, women worked long hours in unfamiliar jobs at low pay. For rural women the mobilization of the men not only meant backbreaking fieldwork but also generated a “new stratum of traders composed entirely of women” (146). The state became evermore prominent in women’s lives, as wartime policies abolished conscription exemptions for sole breadwinners and introduced a monthly allowance for their families. The allowance, according to Akın, turned the state into a “surrogate husband” that monitored and regulated women’s behaviors, eroding the distance between the government and Ottoman female subjects (153). Nonetheless, Akın asserts that women were not passive objects of wartime policies; they negotiated their “rights and privileges” with Ottoman officials, as prices and inflation rose (157).

When the War Came Home significantly changes the conversation about the Ottomans’ deportation and refugee policies. Depicting displacement and the accompanying trauma as a common experience, Akın exposes the nature and intention of wartime violence and displacement. Therein, Ottoman citizens who were “forcibly deported by the state,” he concludes, had a vastly different experience from those who fled enemy advances (163). Drawing on individual and collective experiences of deportees and refugees, Akın juxtaposes the “sporadic and uncoordinated violence” against Muslim refugees from the Balkans with the “sustained and systematic atrocities against Armenian deportees (164).” Whereas Muslim refugees could settle in regions of Anatolia that offered the opportunity of a decent livelihood, Armenians, perceived as the internal enemy, were directed into remote and inhospitable areas. Most importantly, deportation of, and violence against, Armenians resulted in a genocide that “brought a practical end to the Armenian presence in the Ottoman empire (164).” Many Muslim refugees, however, were
able to return to their homes after the war ended. Akin’s direct contrast within the “cruel world of mass migration” definitively contests the claims that Armenian deaths and displacements were the outcome of wartime upheavals and thus similar to the plight of Muslim refugees.

*When the War Came Home* is an important book that spans the broad geography of the Ottoman Empire, presents a unique focus on gender, and brings the discussion of the regime’s demographic engineering policies into the broader history of World War I. This exciting new book will interest scholars and students of Ottoman history in general and for years to come will be a must-read for those who study World War I in the Middle East. It provides a productive framework, exemplifies historical methods, and, in its attempt at interdisciplinarity, opens new paths of enquiries for future researchers. Moreover, its integration of the Ottoman home-front story into the “growing body of comparative analyses of the belligerents in World War I” renders it indispensable for anyone interested in the individual and collective everyday experiences of total war.

Melanie S. Tanielian
University of Michigan


Between 1840 and 1940, more than 20 million Chinese emigrated to various places around the world, comprising the third largest diaspora in modern world history after the migrations of 56 million Europeans and 30 million Indians. Unlike most studies focusing on migrants’ impacts on host societies, Chan’s book examines a critical question: How did Chinese mass emigration change China?

The book is divided into five chapters that examine (1) the coolie trade between 1847 and 1874; (2) the scholars at Jinan University during the 1920s and the 1930s studying Chinese migrants in Nanyang (the South Seas); (3) a creole intellectual known for his Confucian Revivalism who served as the president of Xiamen University (1921–1937); (4) the Land and Marriage Reforms in the early 1950s, when the socialist policy coexisted with migrants’ globally oriented family structure and economic practices; and (5) the resettlement in the 1950s and the 1960s of Chinese refugees returning from the newly independent and politically turbulent Southeast Asian states. Chan argues that “through recognizing, protecting, and mobilizing the emigrants, Chinese leaders and thinkers entered complex dialogues over slavery and free labor, overseas migration and colonization, Confucianism and Christianity, family and gender roles, and socialism and capitalism.” Such global engagement “pulled China’s center of gravity outward and created fields of
intense activity,” and in this sense, “mass migration helped create modern China” (2–3).

Chan’s book bridges three fields often not well connected—overseas Chinese history, Chinese American history, and modern Chinese history. As Chan points out, while the “transnational turn” has opened new opportunities for studying these different fields in a common global context, scholars have largely focused on the spatial turn rather than the temporalities of transnational histories. Chan’s study thus makes a key contribution, both theoretically and methodologically, by proposing and studying “diaspora time” and the “diaspora moment.” She defines “diaspora time” as “the diverse, ongoing ways in which migration affects the life worlds of individuals, families, and communities.” As for “diaspora moment,” it “erupts and recurs when diaspora time interacts with other temporalities and produces unexpectedly wide reverberations.” The interactions of these different temporalities and spaces resulted from the “uneven process of globalization” and were both embodied and spearheaded by migrants: With their departures, returns, and networks, migrants became part of the histories “from Cuba and Peru to the US, Canada, and Australia to the Dutch East Indies and the British Empire,” melding such varied histories with China’s own process of transformation and modernization. Together these different times and spaces intersected and compromised with each other under the multilayered forces of industrial capitalism, colonial empires, and nation-states in the modern world (12–13).

Studying such intricate transnational histories naturally requires broad reading and the incorporation of studies in different disciplines, both geographically based (such as China studies, American studies, and Southeast Asian studies) and thematically and methodologically based (such as cultural studies, gender and class analysis, religious studies, and Cold War studies). Chan’s book represents both the need and the merit of such interdisciplinary study. It reinvigorates diaspora studies as an essentially interdisciplinary field examining the mobile human world based on knowledge accumulated in various disciplines. Ultimately, the broadened framing of time and space helps to “bring together multiple historiographies for a new global history” (194–195). More than a decade ago, McKeown keenly pointed out the rightful position of Chinese and Asian migrations in the world and challenged the Western-centered framework of world history; Chan’s study further shows that Chinese migration, and migration in general, remains a fertile ground for theoretical innovation and for a much-needed reconceptualization of national and world histories.1

The transnational and interdisciplinary nature of this study also leads to the collection of sources in different languages and regions.

Particularly useful and eye-opening are the archives from mainland China. Chan displays her remarkable skills in critically engaging these official documents, reading against the grain, and uncovering migrants’ own experiences and perspectives. Chan’s keen historical perspective often produces surprising but enlightening historical connections and comparisons. For example, she discusses how the promotional brochure of the Guangzhou Huaqiao New Village in 1959 portrayed the new life of returning migrants as the symbol of socialist achievement. She compares such portrayal with the better-known “kitchen debate” between President Richard Nixon and Premier Nikita Khrushchev in the same year, illustrating both the indispensable position of China in the Cold War and the significant role that diaspora politics played in modern China.

Chan offers sharp observations of the current relationship between China and Chinese diaspora in light of her creative historical analysis. According to Chan, “decades of bold, experimental market reform have caused Chinese spaces and times to proliferate,” a sign of the deepening global engagement of China that “would not only aid but also limit its assertions of power.” China will be further transformed by the many possibilities of “juggling and reorganizing fragments,” and diaspora “will remain such a possibility” (189, 193).

Though creatively conceived and solidly researched, the book might have benefited from tying the different “diaspora moments” closer together, as each of them now seems to be on its own. How did the three states (the late Qing, the nationalist, and the communist) connect with, inherit, and transform each other’s policies and ideologies? The study could have also provided more background information about the diverse group of Jinan scholars in Chapter 2 to illustrate how personal and institutional histories had shaped their perspectives. Moreover, the colonial narrative was not necessarily the only perspective that these scholars took. In fact, some of the Jinan scholars themselves were critical of it. Although including all of the important “diaspora moments” would have been difficult, one episode of Chinese migration should have been in the discussion, even if briefly—the 140,000 Chinese laborers recruited during World War I to work on the Western Front. This episode would have been particularly useful since it took place at a critical juncture of China’s involvement in the world and provided a case of Chinese diaspora in a region not covered in this study.

Overall, Diaspora’s Homeland is a groundbreaking study that will surely establish Chan as one of the leading specialists in the field. Her interdisciplinary approach and broad theoretical contribution make the book a critical reference for scholars in various disciplines. The light that it sheds on contemporary issues about China’s rise renders it useful for policy makers and the general public alike.

Lisong Liu
Massachusetts College of Art and Design

Documenting the changes to public life in Chengdu since the communist takeover on the eve of 1950, Wang regales readers with a feast of vivid details about the social dynamics within the teahouse in relation to state power among diverse actors, from owners and staff to patrons, entertainers, fortune tellers, and earwax pickers. Complementing his earlier work, The Teahouse: Small Businesses, Everyday Culture, and the Public Politics in Chengdu, 1900–1950 (Stanford, 2008), the current book continues to treat the teahouse as a microcosm of urban society not only to delineate the decline and renewal of public life under socialism but also to compare it with the pre-communist era to reveal the persistent elitist views of teahouse culture and the unceasing state efforts to reform it throughout the twentieth century.

Wang’s research about Chengdu draws from new Maoist-era archives and his own ethnographical observations and interviews in the reform era to contextualize everyday life within the larger political economy. In an age of rapid urbanization, when cities are becoming more alike in look and sensation, Wang adopts the mission of a social, cultural, and urban historian to recover and restore the historical legacies of a medium-sized inland city that bore a resemblance to many other major cities in China. In the process, he significantly expands and enriches the field of urban history beyond the well-studied largest municipalities such as Shanghai and Beijing.

This book is divided chronologically into two parts—early socialism (1950–1976) and late socialism (1977–2000). Each part contains three chapters that tackle similar aspects of the teahouse during those two eras in a parallel structure. Chapters 1 and 4 focus on the teahouse as a small business suffering drastic decline in the time of nationalization and collectivization (1950–1976) but reviving and flourishing since the onset of the period of economic reform (1977–2000). Chapters 2 and 5 examine the teahouse as a cultural space where public entertainment was redefined and politicized as a propaganda machine in Maoist China only to come back strong during the late socialist era with traditional, even vulgar, art forms. Chapters 3 and 6 look at the teahouse as a social space where public life unfolded. Wang convincingly argues that the state’s agenda of transforming consumers into producers in early socialism dramatically reduced the number of teahouses and patrons. By the 1960s, guests were serving themselves to demonstrate socialist equality between customers and waiters in the few remaining teahouses owned by the collective. Yet by the reform era, the distinctive ambiance of low-end street-corner teahouses and high-end balconies had become a prominent marker signaling social status and wealth at a time when the word class had disappeared from the political lexicon.
Although the temporal structure of the book seemingly dichotomizes the early and late socialist periods, Wang clearly demonstrates the historical trajectory by connecting the dots across the twentieth century. For example, the teahouse guild, which emerged in 1929 to protect the interests of business owners, albeit with limited resources under the growing state control before 1949, re-appeared as a tool for policy implementation in 1950 before finally vanishing in 1956 when the state claimed to have released small businesses “from the control of feudal guilds” (37). However, without the guild’s control of the number of teahouses and the price of tea to prevent serious competition in the trade, easy entry and uncontrolled competition in late socialism made it harder for small businesses to survive.

Wang defines public life literally, treating the teahouse as the physical place where urban life outside people’s private spaces occurred (11). This space, which was predominantly a man’s world before 1950, became gender-neutral in the reform era, as women have actively participated in every aspect of teahouse life ever since. As Wang reveals, under the state’s watch (though its power to penetrate society varied over time), the “public sphere” as a discursive site of public power vis-à-vis the state rarely applies to twentieth-century Chengdu.

Written in plain language, this book is easily accessible to non-professionals interested in Chinese urban culture. Meticulously researched, it also offers new material and insights to scholars in modern Chinese history, urban studies, cultural anthropology, and the sociology of leisure.

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