

Holy War in Ibn Khaldūn

A Transcultural Concept?[†]

ABSTRACT This article aims to compare the different conceptions of holy war in Islam and Christianity by way of its depiction by Muslim sources, and to examine if the Islamic context would have conceived of a war carried out by Christians, and therefore infidels, as a holy one. This leads to analysis of whether the Islamic idea of holy war could be understood as a transcultural one or if, on the contrary, its sole conception was limited to those actions carried out by Muslims. To that end, Ibn Khaldūn's (d. 1406) *Kitāb al-'Ibar* will be used as a case study, in which his famous *Muqaddima* serves as its introduction. The choice of this source is based on two considerations: it is one of the most important and influential historiographical works of the Islamic world; and Ibn Khaldūn maintains a universalist vision of history and its processes, and therefore specifically aims to be cross-cultural.

KEYWORDS: Ibn Khaldūn, Holy War, Transculturalism, Historiography, Jihad

War, as a phenomenon of institutionalized violence, was an essential part of medieval societies.¹ To justify it, each culture used different discourses, among which the religious one played a key role.² Both Christianity and Islam developed their own theories on holy war, a fight for the faith leading to spiritual rewards that drew more or less directly from the Old Testament conceptions of war and from the Graeco-Latin notions of just war.³ What

[†]Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte of Spain has supported this research under the program "Formación de Profesorado Universitario" (FPU/2015). The present study is part of the I+D research project *Violencia religiosa en la Edad Media peninsular: guerra, discurso apoloético y relato historiográfico (ss. X-XV)*, financed by the *Agencia Estatal de Investigación del Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad del Gobierno de España* (reference: HAR2016-74968-P). PI: Carlos de Ayala and Santiago Palacios; and the European Research Council under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC grant agreement n° 323316, research project *Conversion, Overlapping Religiosities, Polemics and Interaction: Early Modern Iberia and Beyond*. PI: Mercedes García-Arenal.

1. See Philippe Contamine, *La Guerre au Moyen Age* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1980); Francisco García Fitz, *Edad Media. Guerra e ideología: justificaciones jurídicas y religiosas* (Madrid: Sílex, 2003); Hans-Henning Kortüm, ed., *Krieg im Mittelalter* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011); Richard W. Kaeuper, *Violence in Medieval Society* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2000).

2. See Jean Flori, *La guerre sainte. La formation de l'idée de croisade dans l'Occident chrétien* (Paris: Aubier, 2001), and Thomas Sizgorich, *Violence and Belief in Late Antiquity: Militant Devotion in Christianity and Islam* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

3. Frederick H. Russel, *The Just War in the Middle Ages* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Philippe Buc, *Holy War, Martyrdom, and Terror: Christianity, Violence and the West* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 17 ff and 67 ff.

points in common did both religions have on holy war? How did one religious tradition understand the ideas of holy war of another religious tradition? Is the notion of holy war in a religious tradition an exclusivist one or can it be applied to other religions? In this article I aim to establish a comparison between the conceptions of holy war according to Islam and Christianity through Muslim sources, and to study whether it was possible within Islam to conceive of a war carried out by Christians, and therefore infidels, as a holy one. This leads me to analyze whether the Islamic idea of holy war could be understood as a transcultural one or if, on the contrary, it was only conceived of as carried out by Muslims.⁴ To that end, we will use as a case study the *Kitāb al-'Ibar* by Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406), in which his famous *Muqaddima* serves as its introduction. The choice of this source is based on two considerations: it is one of the most important historiographical works of the Islamic world; and Ibn Khaldūn maintains a universalist vision of history and its processes, and therefore aims to be cross-cultural.⁵ That is to say, he intended to draw upon a number of principles intended to be applied generally to all human experiences.

Ibn Khaldūn's life was divided between his political duties and his intellectual efforts, all of them conditioned by the changing North African context in which it took place.⁶ His biography is well known thanks to his own work, especially his autobiography, the *Ta'rif*.⁷ There we are told that his family, of Sevillian origin, moved to Ceuta and later to Tunis after the Christian conquest of the city of Seville in 1248. In the Hafsid sultanate, his family obtained political offices of some relevance, an activity that our author would continue.⁸ Ibn Khaldūn also held important posts in the Marinid court of Fez and in the Nasrid kingdom of Granada, where he became Muḥammad V's ambassador in Pedro I's court at Seville. Meanwhile, eager to devote himself in body and soul to his scientific endeavors and to the writing of his work, he went twice on retreat, once to the *ribāt* of the *walī* Abū Maydan in al-'Ubbād, near Tlemcen, then to the region of the Awlād 'Arif. There he stayed at the Qal'at Ibn Salāma, where he began to write his great universal chronicle, the *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, and managed to finish its introduction, the *Muqaddima*, and several chapters.⁹ Upon the Hafsid sultan Abū al-'Abbād's request to take part in several military campaigns, Ibn Khaldūn headed for Egypt using the pilgrimage to Mecca as an excuse, thus initiating a new period in his life in which he maintained a close relation with Egypt and the Islamic East. His prestige earned him a munificent reception by the sultan Zāhir Barqūq, allowing him to hold numerous offices: as a teacher at the great al-Azhar mosque; as a teacher

4. In the sense that it could be applied to different cultures.

5. Abdesselam Cheddadi, *Ibn Khaldūn. L'homme et le théoricien de la civilisation* (Paris: Gallimard, 2006).

6. For an excellent synthesis of Ibn Khaldūn's biography see Miguel Ángel Manzano Rodríguez, "Abd al-Raḥmān Ibn Jaldūn," in *Biblioteca de al-Andalus vol. 3* (Almería: Fundación Ibn Tufayl, 2004): 578-597. See also Allen Fromherz, *Ibn Khaldun, Life and Times* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010).

7. A good translation is the one published by Abdesselam Cheddadi, *Le Livre des Exemples. T. I: Autobiographie, Muqaddima* (Paris: Gallimard, 2002).

8. See Hasna Trabelsi, "Los zayyanies de Tremecén y los hafsiés de Túnez," in *Ibn Jaldun, el Mediterráneo en el siglo XIV, auge y declive de los imperios*, ed. M^a J. Viguera (Granada-Seville: Fundación El Legado Andalusi, 2006), 82-89.

9. The first integral edition of the *Kitāb al-'Ibar* is from the 19th century, made by Naṣr al-Hūrīnī (Būlāq, 1867-1868). The first modern edition is that of J. A. Dagher (Beirut, 1956-1959). In the present work we will use the following edition: Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'Ibar* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1988). For the *Muqaddima*: Ibn Khaldūn, *Al-Muqaddima* (Casablanca: Bayt al-Funūn, 2005).

at the al-Qamhīya *madrassa*; as a great Maliki *qadi* of Egypt, holding this office in the al-Šālihiyya *madrassa*; as a teacher in Maliki Law at the al-Zāhiriyya *madrassa*; and as a teacher in *hadith* at the Šulḡatmishiyya *madrassa*. Upon the arrival of Tīmūr Lang’s armies, Ibn Khaldūn accompanied the Egyptian sultan Faraj on several defensive campaigns, which allowed him to live the great last episode of his trajectory: an interview with the founder of the Timurid dynasty, in which the latter announced to him his intentions of conquering North Africa.

As we have seen, in the course of his life Ibn Khaldūn had many experiences with war, either during the exercise of his offices in the court of the North African dynasties, especially the Hafsiids, or in the Egyptian sultan Faraj’s campaigns to stop Timur. In the present paper I study a very specific aspect of that war world and the conception displayed by the Ifriqī author in his work: I try to elucidate, as said above, if Ibn Khaldūn conceived the possibility that the Christians carried out and felt compelled to make holy war, understood as religious war, as a spread of religion by arms. To that end I analyse the *Kitāb al-‘Ibar* and its introduction, the *Muqaddima*. In the first place, I show how Ibn Khaldūn conceptualises and theorises on war and its link with different religions, paying special attention to the *Muqaddima*. I later proceed to see how he described certain episodes of the Christian holy war in the *Kitāb al-‘Ibar*. That is to say that I move from “historiographical theory” to “historiographical praxis,” and see what problems this relation brings forth. The truth is that, despite his historical and historiographical importance as one of the great figures of medieval Islam, very few works have set out to study the conception of war and, more specifically, of holy war in Ibn Khaldūn’s writings.¹⁰ Likewise, despite the numerous studies on *jihād* and the notion of holy war in Islam, an analysis of how Christian holy war is conceptualized, if ever, in Islamic sources is still a desideratum.¹¹ Therefore, this brief contribution might open a new line of research.

THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF HOLY WAR BY IBN KHALDŪN

In the *Muqaddima*, Ibn Khaldūn conceptualises war as something natural to the human being (*amr ṭabī‘īyy fi-l-bashar*), from which no nation or generation has been able to escape. In his opinion, it occurs most of the time due to jealousy and rivalry (*ghayra wa munāfasa*). The cause of this, in general terms and depending on the case, is either hostility, zeal in the defense of God and His religion (*ghaḍīb^{an} li-Llah wa li-dīni-hi*), or the eagerness to obtain power and the desire to establish it.¹²

10. Ben Sliman Ferid already made a brief introduction to Khaldūn’s conception of war: Ben Sliman Ferid, “Ibn Ḥaldūn et la guerre,” *Les Cahiers de Tunisie* 169-170 (1995): 179-185.

11. See such splendid works as those by Alfred Morabia, *Le Ġihād dans l’Islam médiéval. Le «combat sacré» des origines au xiii^e siècle* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1993); Michael Bonner, *Aristocratic Violence and Holy War: Studies in the Jihād and the Arab-Byzantine Frontier* (New Haven: American Oriental Society, 1996); Richard Booney, *Jihād: From Qur’an to Bin Laden* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Paul Heck, “Jihād’ revisited,” *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 32/1 (2004): 95-128; Michael Bonner, *Jihād in Islamic History: Doctrines and Practices* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).

12. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 2:55.

Based on these statements, the North African thinker establishes four types of war. The first type is the one that occurs between neighboring tribes or rival clans. The second one generally takes place between savage peoples that inhabit desert and desolate areas (*al-qafṛ*) and obtain their sustenance with their arms. The third one is the call to *jihād* by divine law (*Sharīʿa*), the war for religion or the religious spread through arms. This is an interesting idea, since it illustrates well how the Islamic World considered the notion of *jihād* over centuries: rather than being only a religious justification of violence, it is understood as a legal problem and made more precise in law compendia where certain points were treated in depth. Examples included who had to participate in the *jihād*, what had to be done with the booty obtained, and how prisoners had to be treated. In this sense, it is worth remembering that some of the earliest definitions of *jihād* as war, of martial *jihād*, come from jurists.¹³ In his *Kitāb al-jihād*, al-Sulamī (d. 1106) quoted the following definition by al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820):

That is to say that *jihād* is a type of departure for battle by which it is sought to exalt the word of God, be He praised, to demonstrate His religion, to suppress by it His enemies, the polytheists, and to achieve the reward that God and His Prophet promised to whomever fought the *jihād* in His cause.¹⁴

Therefore, the definition emphasized a fight for the defense and spread of the faith that leads to spiritual rewards. Finally, the fourth type of war in Ibn Khaldūn's classification is the one undertaken by dynasties against those who try to emancipate from them and do not pledge obedience. Within this classification, Ibn Khaldūn describes the first two types as unjust wars and as revolt (*baghī wa fitna*), while the latter two as just wars (*ʿadl*) and in defense of religion.¹⁵ In these lines, Ibn Khaldūn, according to the globalizing conception of history and ethnography of both the *Muqaddima* and the *Kitāb al-Ibar*, intends to consider all religions. It is clear, however, that he uses a discourse and a vocabulary (*sharīʿa*, *jihād* or *fitna*, for instance) which will soon be identified with Islam. In the following pages, I attempt to specify the reason why he uses such a vocabulary, and assess whether it is a purely ideological matter or one of language use and economy.

This kind of war typology, in which the concepts of justice and injustice are of great importance, is deeply rooted in Greek philosophy, and it was introduced into Islamic thought probably due to authors such as al-Fārābī (d. 950).¹⁶ Although the latter never refers to war as *jihād*, but always as *ḥarb*, he also explains the differences in terms of just or unjust confrontation. According to al-Fārābī, a just war is one carried out for the sake of the nation, to demand compensation for damage, to punish a nation for its acts, or to civilise other nations and help them to accept a better life, the latter being the category

13. See Morabia, *Le Ġihād dans l'islam medieval*, 277-287; David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 19-22. For spiritual and martial definitions of *jihād* in early sufi contexts see Harry S. Neale, *Jihad in Premodern Sufi Writings* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 47-74.

14. Niall Christie, *The Book of the Jihād of ʿAlī ibn Tāhir al-Sulamī (d. 1106): Text, Translation and Commentary* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2015), 208.

15. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 2:55 ff.

16. See John Kelsay and James T. Johnson, eds., *Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1991), and John Kelsay, *Arguing the Just War in Islam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

in which war for the spread of Islam would be included. Al-Fārābī explains it as follows: “to lead and force people to what is better and more excellent for themselves, when they are spontaneously unaware of it or are not willing to be led by anybody who knows it and invites them thereto by word of mouth.”¹⁷ This last statement, the resort to preaching, reminds us of one of the conditions of *jihād*: the legal necessity to invite infidels into Islam before initiating armed hostilities against them. A paradigmatic example of this condition in Islamic sources is the conversation between Rabī b. ‘Āmir al-Tamīmī and Rostam, the Persian general, prior to the battle of al-Qādisiyya. Then the Muslim said

God has sent us and brought us here so that we may free those who wish to from slavery (*‘ibāda*) of the earthly rulers and turn them into His servants, change their poverty for wealth and rescue them from the tyranny of religions and bring them to the justice of Islam.¹⁸

Undoubtedly, this discourse is expressed in the same terms as al-Fārābī’s category of just war, as he only speaks of showing the Persians the excellence, Islam.

Turning back to the philosopher, unjust wars are those undertaken only to humiliate, subjugate, and dominate, with no other purpose than that of being obeyed, to remedy wrath, or for the sole pleasure of victory.¹⁹ Even though he does not use the term *jihād*, he calls the warrior that carries out the just wars previously defined a *mujāhid*, thus clearly islamising the meaning. Also, such a fighter is represented as a moral example of personal sacrifice for the sake of a nation. Moreover, in his description of the ideal governor, the capacity of leading *jihād* appears as one of his requisites.²⁰

Another author who explains armed conflict in philosophical terms is al-‘Āmirī (d. 992). According to him, there are three types of war: *jihād*, *fitna*, and banditry (*taṣa‘luk*). The first one is war carried out by rulers in order to preserve religion and social order; the second one is the one undertaken by nations due to their intolerance (*ta‘aṣṣub*); finally, the third one is aimed at looting and plundering. Whereas the first kind of confrontation derives from the faculty of reasoning, the other two proceed from irascible instincts.²¹ Like Ibn Khaldūn, these two authors try to build a universally valid typological framework for war. In my opinion, however, they do not quite succeed at it because of some of the notions they resort to, such as *jihād* or *fitna*, that have very deep connotations in Islamic thought.²²

17. Al-Fārābī, *Obras filosófico-políticas* (Madrid: CSIC, 1992), 162-163 (Arabic text) and 128 (Spanish translation).

18. Hugh Kennedy, *The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live in* (Philadelphia: Da Capo, 2007), 98 ff.

19. Al-Fārābī, *Obras filosófico-políticas*, 163-164 (Arabic text) and 129 (Spanish translation).

20. Al-Fārābī, *Obras filosófico-políticas*, 151-152 (Arabic text) and 122-123 (Spanish translation). For this issue, see Heck, “Jihad’ revisited,” especially footnote 10.

21. Al-‘Āmirī, *Kitāb al-lām bi-Manāqib al-Islām* (Ryad: Dār al-Aṣāla, 1988), 156; Heck, “Jihad’ revisited,” 95-128.

22. For the term *fitna* and its implications in Islamic history and thought see e.g. Hichem Djāit, *La grande discorde. Religion et politique dans l’Islam des origines* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989); Gabriel Martínez-Gros, “Introduction à la *fitna*: une approche de la définition d’ Ibn Khaldūn,” *Médiévales* 60 (2011): 7-16; Heather N. Keaney, *Medieval Islamic Historiography: Remembering Rebellion* (New York: Routledge, 2013).

Continuing with the North African author, we see that religion even facilitates victory²³:

When a religious sentiment aroused by the prophetic mission or by sanctity settles in them (in the arabs), it eliminates arrogance in character and rivalry, and facilitates submission and union. This is a consequence of their acceptance of religion, which causes roughness and pride to disappear and stops envy and rivalry. When a prophet or a saint appears among them urging them to follow the mandates of God, causing them to avoid condemnable actions and to practice commendable ones, and shaping their opinions so that they express truth, perfect union is achieved among them and they achieve thus dominion and sovereignty.²⁴

That is to say, with the establishment of religion and the cohesion it brings along, superiority and victory are attained.²⁵

For Ibn Khaldūn, religious indoctrination eliminates differences among the members of the group through the unification of their opinions: “The feeling becomes unanimous and desire becomes one. They are ready to die for it, whereas, despite they are weaker themselves, the nation they fight against have diverse aspirations, which is typical of falsehood, and tend not to support each other because fear of death dominates them.”²⁶

Our author exemplifies this idea with two historical cases: that of the battles of al-Qādisiyya and Yarmūk, during the early Islamic conquests, and that of the Almohad triumph. In the first example Ibn Khaldūn explains how, thanks to the religious cohesion and the impulse it brings, the Arabs of the first caliphate were capable of defeating much more numerous and better prepared armies.²⁷ Regarding the Almohads, the North African writer states that the religious preaching to follow the *mahdī* Ibn Tūmart received by the *Maṣmūda* (a Berber tribe) multiplied their cohesive strength, enabling their victory over tribes that, at first, were of a braver condition.²⁸ Therefore, religion is not only a justification discourse, but also becomes a social force that enhances *‘aṣabiyya*, another key concept in Ibn Khaldūn, which is usually understood as the fundamental bond of a human group, the basic driving force of society and history.²⁹ This idea of cohesion and religion reminds us of the obsession of jurists and theoreticians to avoid civil war, *fitna*, and the chaos it brings along for the *umma*. *Fitna* is “disorder, riot, sedition.” It is a concept loaded with pejorative meanings, quite the opposite of the potential for social cohesion that religion has. But the *fitna* also derives from illegitimacy. This may be easily seen in Ibn Khaldūn’s war typology already commented on. *Fitna* is a mode of violence lacking in legitimacy and legality, as opposed to *jihād*, the just war that the fight for religion implies.³⁰

23. For the discussion of Ibn Khaldūn’s theory of empire-building through war see e.g. Hamit Bozarslan, *Le luxe et la violence. Domination et contestation chez Ibn Khaldūn* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2014).

24. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 1:250.

25. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 1:266.

26. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 1:267.

27. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 1:267.

28. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 1:267-268.

29. Religious cohesion (*al-ijmā’ al-dīnī*) is superior to *‘aṣabiyya*. Cheddadi, *Ibn Khaldūn*, 303 ff.

30. Martinez-Gros, “Introduction à la *fitna*,” 7-16.

In sum, war for religion is not only just, but also, thanks to the cohesion and the impulse given by religious preaching, is more likely to obtain victory. One must also highlight the role that, in Ibn Khaldūn's mind, charismatic figures play in this process. Prophets and saints are the ones who arouse the religious sentiment that enables cohesion and facilitates victory in battle, as in the case of the *mahdī* Ibn Tūmart, taken as an example by the North African writer. These are the figures that initiate wars of the third kind of the typology mentioned before, since they are the ones who preach the call of the divine law to war.

Let us now analyse how Ibn Khaldūn specifies such a bond between war and religion in Islam and in Christianity. According to the North African writer, in Islam *jihād* is a divine obligation that allows all men to embrace this religion either by consent or by force.³¹ In this sense, he follows the classical legal Islamic conception of the world, which is divided mainly into two areas: on the one hand, the abode of Islam (*dār al-islām*), where Muslims held political and religious supremacy; on the other hand, the abode of infidelity (*dār al-kufr*), where Islam had not yet extended and was therefore a territory susceptible of being attacked—thus becoming the *dār al-ḥarb*, the place of war—and conquered.³² In order to bring the spread of Islam through arms to completion, says Ibn Khaldūn, Muslims established a spiritual sovereignty and a temporal one subject to the former.³³ That is to say, he links the duty and capability to carry out war for religious expansion to the model of authority, to the relationship between spiritual and temporal authority. On the other hand, the North African writer claims that in the other religions, such as Christianity, not destined to the totality of men according to his opinion, people do not have the obligation to battle against the others, except in cases of legitimate defense.³⁴ This is why the temporal power is dissociated from the spiritual one: their members do not have the obligation to conquer other peoples in the name of religion, as is the case of the Muslim community, but they are simply urged to keep their religion within their own territory.³⁵

31. “. . . wa al-millat al-islāmiyya, lama kāna al-jihād fi-ha mashrūʿan lo-ʿumūm al-daʿwa wa ḥaml al-kāfa ʿalā dīn al-islām ṭawaʿan aw karḥan.” Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 1:388. As already rightly explained by Alejandro García Sanjuán, we must not understand this passage as a defense of mandatory conversion of non-Muslims, but of the obligation to extend the territorial domains of Islam all over the world. Alejandro García Sanjuán, “Bases doctrinales y jurídicas del yihad en el derecho islámico clásico (siglos VIII-XIII),” *Clio & Crimen* 6 (2009): 243-277 (see especially n.76).

32. See for examples the works of Noor Mohammad, “The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction,” *Journal of Law and Religion* 3/2 (1985): 381-397; Roy P. Mottahedeh and Ridwan al-Sayyid, “The Idea of the Jihad in Islam before the Crusades, in *The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World*, eds. A. E. Laiou and R. P. Mottahedeh (Washington DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection, 2001), 23-29; Diego Melo, “El concepto de yihad en el islam clásico y sus etapas de aplicación,” *Temas Medievales* 13 (2005): 157-172; Bonner, *Jihad in Islamic History*, 92-93; Giovanna Calasso, “Constructing and Deconstructing the Opposition *dār al-islām* / *dār al-ḥarb*: Between Sources and Studies,” in *Dār al-islām / dār al-ḥarb. Territories, People, Identities*, eds. G. Calosso and G. Lancioni (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 19-47. There is a third area called *dār al-sulḥ* or *dār al-ʿabd*, the abode of the covenant, mainly non-Muslim territory that has concluded a treaty with a Muslim government, agreeing to protect Muslims and their clients in that territory.

33. Ignacio Saadé, *El pensamiento religioso de Ibn Jaldun* (Madrid: CSIC, 1973), 217; Walter Fischel, *Ibn Khaldun in Egypt: His Public Functions and his Historical Research* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 135.

34. “. . . fa-lam takun daʿwatu-hum ʿama wa lā al-jihād ʿinda-hum mashrūʿan ilā fi al-mudāfaʿa faqaṭ.” Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 1:388; Cheddadi, *Ibn Khaldūn*, 347 ff.

35. Saadé, *El pensamiento religioso de Ibn Jaldun*, 217.

The final aim of expanding the *dār al-islām* around the world leads our author to articulate a political system and a theology of power for Islam according to which the spiritual and temporal authorities are intertwined. In the classical Islamic political thought of the caliphate and imamate, the caliph is the supreme temporal authority as well as the leader of the Muslim community, the *umma*, whose task it is to keep and regulate the Qur'anic prescriptions and doctrines, to apply and defend the *sharī'a*, to lead the community prayer and expand faith. He is therefore forced to lead legitimate war, *jihād*, and to prevent illegal violence, the *fitna*.³⁶

Other earlier thinkers who also tried to present a universally valid perspective in their works, such as al-Mas'ūdī (d. 956), had already emphasized the importance of the bond between the temporal authority and the spiritual one. The Iraqi author claimed that the relationship between power and religion was essential to maintaining the well-being of social order. To illustrate this relationship of necessity, he tells the story of a Chinese king who told his subjects that he had the intention of establishing a religion (*diyāna*) that would keep them together and regulate their lives, because without the law (*sharī'a*) corruption would settle in the kingdom. Certainly when the bond between power and religion is broken, rebellion appears *fitna*.³⁷ Thus, we see how, despite his attempt to establish a theory with universal validity, al-Mas'ūdī islamises his arguments through the terminology he uses, just like Ibn Khaldūn.

But let us turn back to our author and focus on the case of Christianity. Ibn Khaldūn affirms that spiritual power, dissociated from the temporal, lies in the hands of the so-called patriarch. He is the head of this religion, is in charge of its prescriptions, is also the successor of the Messiah, *khalīfat al-masīḥ*—an idea that is close, even identical, to the idea of the pope at Rome as the Vicar of Christ—and is the one who sends his representatives and delegates to the most remote regions under Christian control.³⁸ After the schism of Christianity, each region chose a patriarch, the one at Rome later called the pope.³⁹ He also describes him as a follower of the Melkite ritual, something that shows that for Ibn Khaldūn the doctrinal division between the Eastern and the Western churches never took place. Interestingly, this also exemplifies that the very term Melkite was stripped of its original meaning to prove the union between spiritual and temporal power at Constantinople.⁴⁰

Among the Islamic authors, the figure of the pope was gaining importance during these centuries, especially after the Gregorian Reform initiated by Pope Gregory VII (d. 1085) and the Latin expansion that began in the 11th century.⁴¹ Until that time, authors like Ibn

36. For further information see: Patricia Crone, *God's Rule: Government and Islam* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 286 ff; Anthony Black, *The History of Islamic Political Thought: From the Prophet to the Present* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 81 ff.

37. Tarif Khalidī, *Islamic Historiography. The Histories of Mas'ūdī* (Albany: SUNY, 1975), 75 ff.

38. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 1:392.

39. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 1:394.

40. See Ignatius Dick, *Melkites: Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics of the Patriarchates of Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem* (Boston: Sophia Press, 2004).

41. Giuseppe Mandalà and Adalgisa Simone, *L'immagine araba di Roma. I geografi del Medioevo (secoli IX-XV)* (Bologna: Patron Editore, 2002), 58 ff. For Pope Gregory VII and the Gregorian Reform see e. g. Herbert E. J. Cowdrey, *Pope Gregory VII, 1073-1085* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).

Rustah (d. 913) had described him as the local king of the city of Rome. Already in the 13th century, Yāqūt (d. 1229) and Ibn Wāṣil (d. 1298) defined the pope as a religious leader whose authority widely exceeded the frontiers of the pontifical city. And later on, the Egyptian al-Qalqashandī (d. 1418), Ibn Khaldūn's contemporary, compared him to the caliph, describing him as he who enthrone the kings of Christianity.⁴²

As for the political role played by the pope, Ibn Khaldūn seems to believe that it is minimal when he claims that Rome belongs to the Franks and that it is their king who controls this region.⁴³ Therefore, it seems that the Franks would occupy the temporal power, whereas the spiritual one, dissociated from the former, would be in charge of the pope. Undoubtedly, the crusader period seems to have reinforced, in the view of Muslim authors, the notion of European unity under the appellation of Franks, something that can already be observed in previous authors such as al-Maṣ'ūdī. Descriptions of the rise of a strong Frankish power as a successor of the Roman or the Byzantine Empire, which we see in works like those of Ibn al-Athīr (d. 1233), may actually respond to the necessity of explaining European expansionism.⁴⁴

However, the temporal and the spiritual do not always appear wholly unconnected. Even al-Maṣ'ūdī claims that all Frankish peoples, including Galicians, Germans, Bulgarians, and Slavs, acknowledge the authority of Rome, which since then has been their capital.⁴⁵ Likewise, Ibn Khaldūn establishes some kind of connection between both powers by means of the figure of the emperor. The Maghrebi author claims that it was the norm for the pope to encourage Christians to accept the power of a king and to submit to him, despite their likes and dislikes, in order to prevent disunity, an idea that reminds us again of the Islamic obsession of preventing *fitna*. This king, continues Ibn Khaldūn, they call emperor, and it is the pope himself who personally places the crown on his head to beg for blessing upon him.⁴⁶ We see how the spiritual power is not only bound to the temporal, but it also legitimates and blesses it, and religion remains the reason for cohesion.

42. Daniel G. König, "Arabic-Islamic Historiographers on the Emergence of Latin-Christian Europe," in *Visions of Community in the Post-Roman World: The West, Byzantium and the Islamic World, 300-1100*, eds. C. Gantner, R. Payne and W. Pohl (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 427-445.

43. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 1:393. On the term "Frank" in Arabic sources see Daniel G. König, "L'Europe des Francs et l'émergence de la France. Le terme 'Franc' et son évolution sémantique dans les sources arabomusulmanes médiévales," in *Rerum Gestarum Scriptor: Histoire et Historiographie au Moyen Âge*, eds. M. Coumert, M.-C. Isaïa, K. Krönert and S. Shimahara (Paris: Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2012), 669-677.

44. König, "Arabic-Islamic Historiographers," 427-445; König, "L'Europe des Francs et l'émergence de la France," 669-677; Daniel G. König, "Arabic-Islamic perceptions of Western Europe in the Middle Ages," in *Christian-Muslim Relations 600-1500*, ed. D. Thomas (Leiden: Brill Online, 2016) http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/christian-muslim-relations-i/arabic-islamic-perceptions-of-western-europe-in-the-middle-ages-COM_25756 (accessed 4 January 2017). See also Aziz Al-Azmeh, "Barbarians in Arab Eyes," *Past and Present* 134 (1992): 3-18; Paul E. Chevedden, "The Islamic Interpretation of the Crusade: A New (Old) Paradigm for Understanding the Crusades," *Der Islam* 83 (2006): 90-136.

45. König, "Arabic-Islamic Historiographers," 427-445.

46. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 1:394. The term "emperor" is not equivalent to that of the ancient Roman emperors, *qaysar* in Arabic. It seems to be a term created in the context of the Crusades which normally occurs as a name for the Franks. Authors like Ibn Sa'īd al-Maghribī (d. 1286), Ibn Wāṣil, or Abū al-Fidā' (d. 1331) describe him as the governor of the Germans, the king of the Franks, the governor of princes, and the sultan at the head of forty princes, and translate it as the king of kings. König, "Arabic-Islamic Historiographers," 427-445.

With these last images it is apparent that Ibn Khaldūn is coming closer to an understanding of the pontifical institution by comparing it to Islamic categories such as the caliphate itself. The emperor, the “crowned one” (*al-mutawwaj*) as termed by Ibn Khaldūn in an attempt to give a meaning to this term, obtains unity from the *‘aṣabiyya* obtained in turn by the pope and his religious authority.⁴⁷ In addition, it is likely that the pope, the *khalīfat al-masīh*, was conceptualised sometimes as a figure analogous to that of the caliph, namely as the title bearer of political and religious authority. Yāqūt, for instance, claimed that the Franks considered the pope the *nā’ib al-masīh*, the representative of the Messiah, and compared him to the *amīr al-mu’minīn*, the “commander of the believers” of the Muslims, a term interchangeable with that of caliph and which included both kinds of authority.⁴⁸

In sum, as opposed to the Islamic case, where, according to Ibn Khaldūn, the *jihād* is mandatory in order to achieve the spread of Islam all around the world and to facilitate the subordination of the temporal power to the spiritual one. Within Christianity, war for religious expansion is not possible, as there is no room for legitimacy or for justification of the war act through religion because of the dissociation between the spiritual and the temporal power. However, as we have seen, the Maghrebi author does describe some kind of relation between the pontificate and the empire.

Ibn Khaldūn is, therefore, establishing in his *Muqaddima* three main elements that underlie the connection between war and religion: cohesion bestowed by religion, increasing the capacity of victory; the duty of spreading religion by force; and the possibility and capability of carrying out such an expansion through the mechanism of authority—that is, of the relation between the spiritual and the temporal power. These are the characteristics that determine that a war is religious; a type of confrontation that the Maghrebi author calls *jihād* and that is, according to him, possible and—more important—mandatory due to divine law in Islam but not in Christianity.⁴⁹ This is to say, a war carried out for the defense of God and the spread of His religion, sanctioned by it and, consequently, holy. In this sense of war—which we will understand as holy war—we now look for transcultural functionality.

NARRATING THE CHRISTIAN HOLY WAR

After analysing how Ibn Khaldūn conceptualises and theorises on war and its relation with religion as a means of expansion of faith, let us now see, following the *Kitāb al-Ibar*, how he describes and tells several episodes known to be conceived of as holy war by Christians, as the defense and spread of faith through arms. We will explore if any of those three elements that connected war with religion and that determined whether a war was religious or not are visible in his narration of the wars led by Christians.

Specifically, due to the length of the *Kitāb al-Ibar*, we will focus on three events. The first of them is the crusader conquest of Jerusalem, selected because of its historical and

47. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 1:394.

48. Yāqūt, *Muʿjam al-Buldān* (Beirut: Dār Sādir, 1957), 1:323.

49. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 1:388.

symbolic importance in the course of the Christian holy war.⁵⁰ The second episode is the battle of Rio Salado, chosen due to its direct relationship with Ibn Khaldūn both in its geographic and chronological aspects. And, in addition, it was also classified as a crusade. The third event is Louis IX's expedition to Tunis, selected because of its consideration as a crusade, its contextual relationship with Ibn Khaldūn, and because, as we will see, the way in which this episode is narrated by the Maghrebi author challenges his conceptual framework about war for religion.

Ibn Khaldūn, in two sections of his long book, tells in detail the story of the conquest of Jerusalem during the First Crusade, one he dedicates to the Seljuks and the other dealing with the Fatimids.⁵¹ The North African writer begins his story by referring to the fact that the front of expansion of the Franks did not only extend along Holy Land, but also along other regions of the Mediterranean, like Sicily.⁵² He mentions as well how the crusaders received help from the Byzantine emperor to cross the Strait of the Bosphorus and how, after going through Acre, they besieged the city of Jerusalem for 40 days until they managed to break in through the northern part, looting (violating, desecrating) the city for an entire week.⁵³ Its inhabitants sought protection in David's *mihṛāb*—possibly the citadel—and remained there three days, until the conquerors offered them safeguard up to Ascalon. In the [plain of the] mosque, continues Ibn Khaldūn, they murdered 70,000 citizens or more, among which were scholars, ascetics, and pious peoples, and they took uncountable riches by force. The clamour for help, Ibn Khaldūn tells us, even reached Baghdad, where the caliph ordered the sultan Barkiyārūq to carry out the *jihād*

50. For the Islamic views and responses to the Crusade see e. g. Javier Albarrán, *El sueño de al-Quds. Los musulmanes ante la conquista cruzada de Jerusalén (1099-1187)* (Madrid: La Ergástula Ediciones, 2017); Michael Brett, "The Fatimids and the Counter-Crusade (1099-1171)," in *Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Eras*, ed. U. Vermeulen (Leuven: Peeters, 2007), 15-26; Chevedden, "The Islamic Interpretation of the Crusade," 90-136; Paul M. Cobb, *The Race for Paradise: a Islamic History of the Crusades* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Hadia Dajani-Shakeel, "A Reassessment of some Medieval and Modern Perceptions of the Counter-Crusade," in *The Jihad and its Times*, eds. in H. Dajani-Shakeel and R. Messier (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 41-70; Taef El-Azhari, *Zengi and the Muslim Response to the Crusades: The Politics of Jihad* (London and New York: Routledge, 2016); Nikita Elisséeff, "The reaction of the Syrian Muslims after the foundation of the first Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem," in *Crusaders and Muslims in Twelfth-Century Syria*, ed. M. Shatzmiller (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 162-172; Yehoshua Frenkel, "Muslim responses to the Frankish dominion in the Near East, 1098-1291," in *The Crusades at the Near East. Cultural Histories*, ed. C. Kostick (New York: Routledge, 2011), 27-54; Carole Hillenbrand, "The First Crusade: The Muslim Perspective," in *The First Crusade: Origins and Impact*, ed. J. Phillips (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 130-141; Carole Hillenbrand, *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999); Yaacob Lev, "The Jihad of Sultan Nur al-Din of Syria (1146-1174): History and Discourse," *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam* 35 (2008): 227-284; James E. Lindsay and Suleyman A. Mourad, *The Intensification and Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period: Ibn 'Asākir of Damascus (1105-1176) and His Age, with an Edition and Translation of Ibn 'Asākir's The Forty Hadīths for Inciting Jihad* (Leiden: Brill, 2013); Emmanuel Sivan, "La genèse de la Contre-Croisade: Un traité damasquin du début du XII siècle," *Journal Asiatique* 254 (1966): 197-224; Emmanuel Sivan, *L'Islam et la Croisade, idéologie et propagande dans les réactions musulmanes aux Croisades* (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1968).

51. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, 5:23-25 (part in which he discusses the Seljuks), and 4: 85-86 (part in which he discusses the Fatimids). There exists a Latin translation of the episodes relating to the crusades in the *Kitāb al-'Ibar* made in 1840 by Johannes Tornberg, *Ibn Khalduni. Narratio: De Expeditionibus Francorum in terras Islamismo Subjectas* (Uppsala: Leffler et Sebell, 1840).

52. Gabriel Martinez-Gros, "Ibn Jaldun y la expansión franca," in *Ibn Jaldun, el Mediterráneo en el siglo XIV, auge y declive de los imperios*, ed. M.ª J. Viguera (Granada-Seville: Fundación El Legado Andalusi, 2006), 142-145.

53. The version corresponding to the chapter on the Fatimids mentions the construction of siege towers.

to regain Jerusalem, but his differences with his brothers—described by the Maghrebi writer as *fitna*, as unjust war according to his theoretical typology—prevented him from doing it.⁵⁴ Thus, their lack of cohesion bought them their defeat. On the contrary, the united Franks gave the government, says Ibn Khaldūn, to Godfrey from among their kings.

Ibn Khaldūn follows here very closely the same story that recent researchers have termed the “Islamic narrative” of the conquest of Jerusalem and made popular by Ibn al-Athīr.⁵⁵ This consists of three main elements: the great massacre of 70,000 Muslims, the sacking of al-Aqṣā and of the Dome of the Rock, and the request for help to Baghdad. Like Ibn al-Athīr and al-Sulamī, who wrote a forerunner to this story, Ibn Khaldūn, as already seen, refers to a Frankish front of Mediterranean amplitude and to crusader cohesion as opposed to the disunity of the Muslims as one of the causes of their defeat.⁵⁶ Al-Sulamī and Ibn al-Athīr also presented the crusader campaign as *jihād*, yet, in the case of Ibn al-Athīr, as a *jihād* somehow delegitimised by looting.⁵⁷ Ergo, they describe the Christian offensive as a war of religious expansion, as did an anonymous poet later quoted by the historian Ibn Taghrī Birdī (d. 1470). That poet speaks of the Frankish campaign as an attempt to spread an impure form of Christianity by force;⁵⁸ or Saladin in some letters transmitted by Abū Shāma, who would not have spoken of *jihād*, but rather of *ijtihād*, of the effort and sacrifice of the Franks to defend their religion.⁵⁹

However, far from presenting the crusader campaign as a war of religious expansion, Ibn Khaldūn describes it as an impious war, an episode in which a holy city was desecrated and violated. In this sense, he uses the verb *istibāh* in speaking of the crusader actions after their entry into the city, which does not only denote “sacking,” but also “desecrating, sully-ing honor.” Other previous authors did not describe this episode as a war of religion either: al-‘Azīmī claims it was a campaign in revenge of the impediment allegedly imposed on the Christian pilgrims to visit Jerusalem, while Usāma b. Munqidh believed that the only objective of the crusaders was to increase their wealth.⁶⁰

54. By means of several prominent scholars, according to the ‘Fatimid’ version.

55. Ibn al-Athīr, *Al-Kāmil fī al-Tā’rikh* (Beyrut: Dar Beyrouth, 1966), 10:272 ff. Translation in Ibn al-Athīr *The Chronicle of Ibn Al-Athir for the Crusading Period from Al-Kamil Fi'l-tarikh*, trans. D. S. Richards (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010), 1:21-22. This discursive tradition has its origins in Iraqi historians such as Ibn al-Jawzī. Konrad Hirscher, “The Jerusalem Conquest of 492/1099 in the Medieval Arabic Historiography of the Crusades: From Regional Plurality to Islamic Narrative,” *Crusades* 13 (2014): 37-76. See also Chevedden, “The Islamic Interpretation of the Crusade,” 90-136.

56. Sivan, “La genèse de la Contre-Croisade,” 197-224; Niall Christie and Deborah Gerish, “Parallel Preachings: Urban II and al-Sulamī,” *al-Masaq. Journal of the Medieval Mediterranean* 15/2 (2003): 139-148; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī al-Tā’rikh*, 10: 272-273. Translation in Ibn al-Athīr, *The Chronicle of Ibn Al-Athir*, 1:13-14; Christie, *The Book of the Jihād*, 206-207.

57. Al-Sulamī: “In fact, they even led with zeal the *jihād* against the Muslims.” Translation from Christie, *The Book of the Jihād*, 206-207; Sivan, “La genèse de la Contre-Croisade,” 197-224; Ibn al-Athīr: “Roger says to Baldwin’s envoy: ‘if you are determined to make *jihād* against the Muslims, then the best way is to conquer Jerusalem.’” Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kāmil fī al-Tā’rikh*, 10:272-273. Translation from Ibn al-Athīr, *The Chronicle of Ibn Al-Athir*, 1:13.

58. Niall Christie, *Muslims and Crusaders: Christianity’s Wars in the Middle East, 1095-1382, from the Islamic sources* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 22.

59. König, “Arabic-Islamic perceptions of Western Europe.”

60. Ibn Munqidh, *Lubāb al-ādāb* (Cairo: Dār al-Kutub al-Salafiyya, 1987), 132.

In the Battle of Rio Salado in October 1340, Castilian and Portuguese forces confronted a Marinid-Nasrid coalition in the context of the Strait of Gibraltar war. Pope Benedict XII became remarkably involved in it by providing the battle on March 7, 1340 with the *Exaltamus in te*. In this *papal* bull, he raised the event to the category of crusade and gave the participants numerous spiritual and economic benefits.⁶¹ The Vatican archives preserve more than 100 documents directly and indirectly related to the Battle of Rio Salado. This is good proof of the great interest and support displayed in the fight against the Marinids by the pontiff, who was moved by “the victory against the enemies of the Catholic faith.” The pontiff presents the war laid as saving, freeing and defending the Church while extending the cult of Christ in the occupied territories.⁶² He also took the required steps for the Iberian Christian Kingdoms to reach peace, and thus made possible a great alliance against the infidel. Benedict took part in the various disputes that Castile had with the Navarrans and Aragonese and, especially, with the Portuguese. He also addressed the city of Genoa to send galleys to Castile and to withdraw Genoese support from the Marinids. However, the Genoese fleet arrived late to the battle.⁶³

Ibn Khaldūn points out that the Castilian king met the Christian nations (*umam al-nasrāniyya*) before the battle, especially the lord (*sāhib*) of Lisbon and of Gharb (west) al-Andalus. However, he says nothing of the pope’s intervention or of a possible religious motivation for the campaign, and the vocabulary he uses to speak of the Christian advance and attack does not evoke religious war either.⁶⁴ Moreover, the fact that he repeatedly calls the Castilian king a “tyrant,” despite being a common term used in the Islamic chronicles to refer to Christian kings, signals a high degree of illegitimacy. A tyrant is one who oversteps the limits of justice, an oppressor, and a rebel. The term (*ṭāghīya*) derives from a root occurring frequently in the Qur’an with a connotation of insolence and arrogance, of contempt of the law of God and hostility towards the apostles of God. It implies, therefore, an excess of infidelity.⁶⁵ It is always a negative religious-political term, describing somebody who does not have Islamic legitimacy in the exercise of power, somebody who governs without the Islamic law. As already mentioned, it has the semantic image of overflowing, something that is not surprising if we take into account that the term occurring in the Qur’an to refer to laws created by God is *hudūd*, “borders, limits.”⁶⁶ In the Andalusī chronicles, the term ends up being a synonym of “Christian king,” while yet used to designate

61. Joseph O’Callaghan, *The Gibraltar Crusade: Castile and the Battle for the Strait* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 173 ff.; José Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia de la bula de cruzada en España* (Vitoria: Editorial del Seminario, 1958), 282-289.

62. Goñi Gaztambide, *Historia de la bula de cruzada en España*, 282-289. See also Rogelio Pérez Bustamante, “Benedicto XII y la cruzada del Salado,” in *Homenaje a fray Pérez de Urbel* (Silos: Ediciones de la Abadía de Silos, 1977), 2:177-203.

63. Wenceslao Segura González, “El desarrollo de la Batalla del Salado (año 1340),” *al-Qantir. Monografías y documentos sobre la Historia de Tarifa* 9 (2010): 1-44.

64. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘Ibar*, 7: =347. Translation in Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères et des dynasties musulmanes de l’Afrique septentrionale*, trans. Baron de Slane (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1956), 4:234.

65. El Said M. Badawi and Muhammad Abdel Haleem, *Arabic-English. Dictionary of Qur’anic Usage* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 566 ff.

66. E. g. Q. 9:97 and Q. 65:1. See Badawi and Abdel Haleem, *Dictionary of Qur’anic Usage*, 195.

those Muslims that rebel against the established Islamic power.⁶⁷ Thus, in principle, a tyrant could never conduct just, and therefore holy, war.

Conversely, Ibn Khaldūn always qualifies Marinid actions as *jihad*.⁶⁸ He says that the sultan Abū al-Hasan was convinced that, despite their defeats, God would finally reward them with victory, invoking the verse Q. 61:8: “They want to extinguish the light of God with their mouths, but God will perfect His light, although the disbelievers dislike it.”⁶⁹ Naming the Marinid acts as *jihād* is in line with the description of al-Andalus made by the North African writer in a brief summary of Andalusī history placed at the beginning of the section on the Marinids, explained in terms of constant conflict between Christians and Muslims.⁷⁰ The land of al-Andalus is represented as a frontier (*thaghr li-l-muslimīn*), a place of *jihād*, of *ribāt*, and of martyrdom and happiness for the Muslims (*madārij shahādati-him wa sabīl sa‘ādati-him*), likened to a constant blaze, where the faithful stood between the claws and the jaws of the lions of infidelity. Ibn Khaldūn is following a tradition that was already settled—and widespread, especially after the 13th century, due to the Christian advance—originating in certain *hadīths* of the Prophet, in which al-Andalus is described as the last land to which the Muslim religion will propagate and also as the first one from which it will disappear. These texts reflect the “feeling of precariousness” of Muslim presence in the Iberian Peninsula, the idea that such a domain is doomed to end sooner or later due to prowling dangers, chiefly those represented by the Christians. Hence, al-Andalus also remained in the Muslim imagination, as we have seen in Ibn Khaldūn’s text, shaped since the earliest times as a land of *ribāt*, namely as a place of congregation of pious peoples that combine prayer and other religious acts with the fight against the infidels.⁷¹

After analysing these two examples, it seems that the historiographical practice begun by Ibn Khaldūn in his *Kitāb al-‘Ibar*—how he actually narrates the facts—is in agreement with his theory—his *a priori* cultural and ethnographical vision of Christianity—on the bond between war and religion in Christianity formerly presented by the North African writer in his introduction, the *Muqaddima*, as pointed out by most authors.⁷² That is to

67. See Eva Lapiedra, *Cómo los musulmanes llamaban a los cristianos hispánicos* (Alicante: Instituto de Cultura Juan Gil Albert, 1997), 176–188.

68. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘Ibar*, 7:347. Translation in Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères*, 4: 234. The same conceptualisation of war appears in all the Marinid dynastical chronicles. See Maya Shatzmiller, *L’historiographie mérinide: Ibn Khaldūn et ses contemporains* (Leiden: Brill, 1982) and Miguel Ángel Manzano Rodríguez, *La intervención de los Benimerines en la Península Ibérica* (Madrid: CSIC, 1992).

69. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘Ibar*, 7:348; translation in Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères*, 4:236.

70. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘Ibar*, 7:250; translation in Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères*, 4:71.

71. The Prophet said: “Gabriel has informed me that in the remotest part of the Maghreb there is an island called al-Andalus that will be conquered by my people (*Umma*) upon my death and that will be inhabited by men who, when they die, will die as martyrs, but who, while they live, will live in a continuous and joyous *ribāt*; these will be congregated by the clouds and conducted before the Assembly (*maḥshar*) on the Day of Resurrection (*yawm al-qiyāma*).” Anonymous. *Dhikr bilād al-Andalus* (Madrid: CSIC, 1983), 10–11. See Maribel Fierro, “Cosmovisión (religión y cultura) en el Islam andalusí (siglos VIII–XIII),” in *Cristiandad e Islam en la Edad Media hispana: XVIII Semana de Estudios Medievales, Nájera, del 30 de julio al 3 de agosto de 2007*, ed. J. I. De la Iglesia Duarte (Logroño: Instituto de Estudios Riojanos, 2008), 31–80. See also Hanna Kassis, “Roots of Conflict: Aspects of Christian-Muslim Confrontation in Eleventh-Century Spain,” in *Conversion and Continuity: Indigenous Christian Communities in Islamic Lands: Eight to Eighteenth Centuries*, eds. R. J. Bikhazi and M. Gervers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990), 151–160.

72. See e. g. Fischel, *Ibn Khaldun in Egypt*, 135, and Saadé, *El pensamiento religioso de Ibn Jaldun*, 217.

say, there existed in the Christian world no religious justification for the spread through arms, and there was no room for the war for religion, for holy war as Ibn Khaldūn viewed it. But if we pay attention to other passages of this long work, does this conclusion still stand? We find out immediately that it does not. Throughout his work we find evidence that Ibn Khaldūn perhaps did conceive, at least indirectly, the Jerusalem and the Battle of Rio Salado episodes as campaigns of religious expansion, as religious wars.

According to the section of the *Muqaddima* in which the Tunisian author describes the naval power, after the demise of the Fatimid and Umayyad dynasties, the Christians opened a battlefront. That reminds us of the one already mentioned in the “Islamic narrative” popularised by Ibn al-Athīr—against islands like Sicily, Crete, and Malta. This later took them to press on to the Syrian coasts and seize Tripoli, Ascalon, Tyre, and Acre, taking over all of the strategic points, and finally to enter Jerusalem and built a church inside as a manifestation of their religion and faith.⁷³ That is to say, Ibn Khaldūn leads the reader through a discourse that seemingly points out that the final goal of the campaign was the conquest of Jerusalem and the establishment of Christian religion there by means of the construction of a church. Such an idea is confirmed by another passage very similar to that of the *Muqaddima*, where it is also specified that the church, which they revered with great devotion and were very proud of, had been erected upon the Holy Rock, the mosque of al-Aqṣā according to another passage of the *Kitāb al-ʿIbar* summarising the history of the Franks.⁷⁴

Such an ecclesiastical construction represented, therefore, the triumph of Christianity over Islam, and its well-chosen location seemed to confirm it. The descriptions of the reconstructive efforts of Saladin point towards a similar strategy. According to Ibn Khaldūn, when he had regained the city after the Battle of Hattin, the sultan proceeded to demolish the church and rebuild the mosque, purifying al-Aqṣā (*tahhara al-masjid al-Aqṣā*) of the false doctrines of the infidels.⁷⁵ The purifying element in war actions against Christians is always present in Islamic chronicles, thus stressing the religious character of those campaigns. Without a doubt, church buildings themselves played an important role in such cleansing works. A clear example of this discourse of conquest and purification may be seen in the chronicles relating the Almohad campaigns, in which the seizing of a town is always succeeded by the transformation of its church into a mosque or by its demolition.⁷⁶ It is also interesting to observe how al-Sulamī chose for the reading of his *Kitāb al-Jihād* a mosque in Bayt Lihya, near Damascus, built upon an older Christian church.⁷⁷

This procedure was also usual among Christians, who transformed mosques into churches. Mosques were viewed as symbols of Islam and the effective conquest of a town

73. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 2:30-31.

74. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 2:30-31; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ʿIbar*, 6:425; translation in Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères*, 2:360.

75. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 2:32-33 and 195; Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-ʿIbar*, 6:425; translation in Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères*, 2:360.

76. See Javier Albarrán, “De la conversión y expulsión al mercenariado: los cristianos en las fuentes almohades,” in *La Península Ibérica en tiempos de Las Navas de Tolosa*, eds. C. Estepa and M^a A. Carmona (Madrid: Sociedad Española de Estudios Medievales, 2014), 79-91.

77. Christie, *The Book of the Jihād*, 21 ff.

was usually signaled by placing a banner in the minaret of the central mosque, as in Seville after Ferdinand III's conquest of the city.⁷⁸ In Cordoba, besides the banner, a cross was also exhibited. Thereafter, the monarch took part in a victory parade that ended up with a mass in the recently converted church, as in Cordova (1236), Jaén (1246), Seville (1248), and Murcia (1266).⁷⁹ Hence, the conquest-purification-conversion narrative used by Ibn Khaldūn to describe the crusader conquest of Jerusalem suggests that although Ibn Khaldūn, as we have seen, saw this action as impious, he did understand it as a war for the spread of religion and apparently comprehended *de facto* the religious component of this Christian campaign. Although this type of speech is a *topos* that aims to show the contamination caused by the infidels, it does highlight that the purpose of the enemy's campaign is the expansion of their religion, of infidelity.

In the context of the Battle of Rio Salado, this kind of evidence for wars for the spread of Christian religion is difficult to find, although it is easier if we enlarge our focus to the entire Strait of Gibraltar war. A few verses of a poem, quoted by Ibn Khaldūn and allegedly recited by the secretary of the Nasrid sultan Muḥammad II to the Marinid sultan Abū Yūsuf Ya'qūb in the year 1275-1276, seem to request the help of the Marinids against the Christian advance. The underlying idea is that the Christian campaigns had as a first consequence the spread of that religion at the expense of Islam, and that such a religious zeal turned into a form of cohesion that made coreligionists, brethren of religion, help one another. The Muslims, on the contrary, had lost this virtue of solidarity.

That the mosques of this land have been turned into churches! This pain is killing me.

Don't be insensitive!

One may see the priest and the bell upon the minaret, and the wine and the swine in the middle of the mosque.

Brethren! Are your hearts not grieved by pain when we see ourselves decimated by death and apostasy?

Is it not true that the Christians (*rūm*) help their brothers?

Why is it that in this land Muslims are divided and Christians live in a perfect unity?⁸⁰

Moreover, according to Ibn Khaldūn, for the Christian kings anything that did not lead to the continuation of the war against the Muslims was humiliating for their religion: allegedly, Sancho IV had sent envoys to negotiate peace with the Muslims despite it being "humiliating, dishonest and unjust for his religion (*al-khasf wa al-baḍīma li-dīni-hi*)."⁸¹ It seems therefore that Christianity needed that confrontation, which became, as in the Islamic case, a divine duty.

78. Carlos de Ayala, "Fernando III: figura, significado y contexto en tiempo de cruzada," in *Fernando III: tiempo de cruzada*, eds. C. Ayala and M. Ríos Saloma (Madrid: Sílex, 2012), 17-91.

79. See José Orlandis, "Un problema eclesiástico de la Reconquista española: la conversión de mezquitas en iglesias cristianas," in *Mélanges offerts à Jean Dauvillier* (Toulouse: Centre d'Histoire Juridique Méridionale, 1979), 595-604; Julie Harris, "Mosque to Church Conversions in the Spanish Reconquest," *Medieval Encounters* 3/2 (1997): 158-172; Pascal Buresi, "Les conversions d'églises et de mosquées en Espagne aux xie-xiiiè siècles," in *Religion et société urbaine au Moyen Âge. Études offertes à Jean-Louis Biget*, eds. Paul Boucheron and Jacques Chiffolleau (Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne, 2000), 333-350.

80. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, 7:263-264; translation in Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères*, 4:92-96.

81. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, 7:276; translation in Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères*, 4:116.

However, without a doubt, the story that most clearly indicates that our author perhaps did conceive of the possibility of a spread of Christianity through arms in similar terms to that of *jihād* and, therefore, that his concept of holy war could be transcultural, is the third of the episodes that have been selected as case studies. Following the summary of the history of the Franks mentioned earlier in relation to the conquest of Jerusalem and its reconquest by Saladin, Ibn Khaldūn focuses on the Eighth Crusade. This expedition was the second one by Louis IX of France and the campaign by which he tried to conquer Tunis. Supposedly, he wanted to establish an operating base there from which he could attack Egypt and the Holy Land, as suggested by the North African author:⁸²

The king of the Franks, Saint Louis Ibn Louis, sent all the Christian kings an invitation to take part in this expedition [to Tunis]. He also transmitted a message to the pope, a figure that the Christians view as the vicar of the Messiah, and this dignitary encouraged all the other kings to support the efforts of the Frankish king. He even allowed taking the money of the churches (*amuāl al-kanā'is*) as needed. This news extended throughout Christendom and many of its princes responded to the call.⁸³

Many points in this fragment are worth analysing in detail. Just as in the episode of Rio Salado, here is an example of union between Christian kings to fight against the Muslims. However, as opposed to the Iberian case, here the pope comes directly into play by seeking, encouraging, and obtaining such an alliance, and even the benefits given by the pope for taking part in the campaign are detailed, something quite unusual in the Islamic chronicles. Therefore, it seems that the absence of a bond between spiritual and temporal power, which in the *Muqaddima* justified the non-existence of Christian holy war, is proven false here. But, above all, the term used by Ibn Khaldūn to refer to this campaign is worth noting: *ghazwa*. A few lines earlier the North African writer had used this word along with that of *jihād* to describe the campaign of Saladin to regain Jerusalem, a combination our author resorts to on more than one occasion.⁸⁴ In fact, when Ibn Khaldūn uses this term, he always does so to refer to the conquests of Christian territories by Muslims, often in a usage similar to, or a substitution of, *jihād*.⁸⁵ He also employs it to refer to the Islamic conquest of al-Andalus as a synonym of *fath*, a term that, as proven by Alejandro García Sanjuán, has clear religious connotations of war sacralisation in one of its multiple meanings.⁸⁶

82. For Louis IX, his crusade and the Arabic sources see Claude Cahen, "Saint Louis et l'Islam," *Journal Asiatique* 257 (1970): 3-12, and Anne-Marie Eddé, "Saint Louis et la Septième Croisade vus par les auteurs arabes," *Croisades et idée de croisade à la fin du Moyen Age, Cahiers de Recherches Médiévales (XIIe-XVe s.)* 1 (1996): 65-92.

83. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, 6:426; translation in Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères*, 2:361-362.

84. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, 6:425. Translation in Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères*, 2:360; e.g. in Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, 4:211, or in the Marinid context: Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, 7:344; translation in Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères*, 4:229.

85. E.g. when he speaks of the campaigns of Zenkī, Nūr al-Dīn and Saladin. See Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, 5:215, 266, 341 and 345.

86. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-'Ibar*, 6:281; Alejandro García Sanjuán, "La noción de *fath* en las fuentes árabes andalusíes y magrebíes (siglos VIII al XIII)," in *Orígenes y desarrollo de la Guerra Santa en la Península Ibérica: palabras e imágenes para una legitimación (siglos X-XIV)*, eds. C. Ayala, P. Henriot and S. Palacios (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2016), 31-50. See also Fred Donner, "Arabic *Fath* as 'Conquest' and its Origin in Islamic Tradition," *Al-'Uṣūr al-Wustā* 24 (2016): 1-14.

This is already so in the Qur'an itself: chapter 48, narrating, according to the exegetes, the conquest of Mecca by the Prophet after the al-Ḥudaybiyya pact, is called *Sūrat al-Fath*. This means that the most important Muslim victory in the time of the Prophet, the regaining of the most sacred city, belongs to that category.

Even though this term *ghazwa* originally meant nothing more than a hostile raid, in the course of time it acquired a religious meaning and, above all, designated attacks against non-believers.⁸⁷ We must not forget either that the campaigns carried out by the Prophet were named *maghāzī*, a word derived from the same root. In fact, the only time a derivative appears in the Qur'an is in verse 3:156, criticising those who disown the fighters (*ghuzāt*) who leave on a raid in the path of God and die in it. This verse clearly refers to holy war, to the path of Allāh.⁸⁸ Therefore, the term *ghāzī* was reserved to those who took part in a *ghazwa*, understood as a raid against the infidel. The Turkish poet Aḥmedī, a contemporary of Ibn Khaldūn, gave the following definition of *ghāzī*:

It is an instrument of God, a servant of God who cleans the Earth of the dishonour of polytheism. It is the sword of God, it is the defender of the shelter of the believers. If he becomes a martyr while following the path of God, do not think of him dead, since he is alive with God as one of the blessed. He possesses eternal life.⁸⁹

In the Islamic West, one can detect a similar evolution. Already in the early 11th century, the term was applied to designate all soldiers native to North Africa, and more specifically to the western Maghreb, who arrived in the Iberian Peninsula to make the *jihād*.⁹⁰ In addition, however, within the Marinid and Nasrid context in which Ibn Khaldūn developed part of his activity, there existed a military body, the *shuyūkh al-ghuzāt al-mujāhidīn*, “sheikhs of the *jihād* fighters,” that strengthened the link between this root and holy war. This implied the arrival into al-Andalus of Maghrebi soldiers, *ghuzā*, who came to increase the ranks of the Nasrid army. Having authority over them, there arrived a member, usually a dissident, of the Marinid royal family—a descendant of the emir ‘Abd al-Ḥaqq Ibn Maḥyū, founder of the dynasty, according to Marinid chroniclers—who was considered a *shaykh al-ghuzāt*.⁹¹ This way the sultans of Fez delegated their obligation to intervene on the other side of the Strait of Gibraltar to elements of which affinity with the dynasty was purely nominal, and, simultaneously, they reduced tensions and potential riots in their

87. John Penrice, *A Dictionary and Glossary of the Kor'an: With Copious Grammatical References and Explanations of the Text* (Delhi: Adam Publishers and Distributors, 1873), 104; Badawi and Abdel Haleem, *Dictionary of Qur'anic Usage*, 665, and David Cook, “Ghazw,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, III, 2013. http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/ghazw-COM_27455 (accessed 6 August 2016); Alexios Savvides, “Notes on the Ghazi Warriors of the Muslim Faith in the Middle Ages,” *Journal of Oriental and African Studies* 11 (2003): 211–214.

88. “You who believe! Do not be like those who rejected and spoke of their brothers when they left on an expedition around the land or made incursions (*ghuzāt*): if they had stayed with us, they would not have died nor would have been killed. (That they said) and Allāh made of it anguish for their hearts. Allāh gives life and gives death. Allāh sees what you do” (Q. 3:156); “And if you are killed in the path of Allāh or die, the forgiveness of Allāh and his mercy is better than whatever they accumulate” (Q. 3:157).

89. Irène Mélikoff, “Ghāzī,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/ghazi-SIM_2489 (accessed 6 January 2017).

90. Manzano Rodríguez, *La intervención de los Benimerines*, 323.

91. Manzano Rodríguez, *La intervención de los Benimerines*, 325.

own territory.⁹² Apparently, this institution has its origin in the period of the Marinid sultan Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf (d. 1307), under whose regime the Marinids experienced a period of weakness in al-Andalus and in the Maghreb. This could fit perfectly with the creation of the *shiyākha*, since the attraction and employment of dissident and rebellious elements could actually become an efficient Nasrid political instrument against the rival North African dynasty.⁹³ Despite this Granadan interest, what stands out is the special autonomy and political independence acquired by this institution inside the Nasrid monarchy, not to mention tax and economic benefits. In theory, the Nasrid sovereign had absolute authority over his army, but in practice, the *shaykh al-ghuzāt* mobilized his troops, something that gave the latter a high degree of power with which he could put pressure on the sultan in favor of his own interests.⁹⁴ Their hypothetical function and their relation to holy war interests us most at this point. Ibn Khaldūn himself describes them as those in charge of making the *jihād* along with the Nasrids of Ibn al-Aḥmar, and affirms that al-Andalus “would have known weak conditions, had it not been for the divine inspiration of these *zanāta* to make the *jihād*.”⁹⁵

Therefore, the fact that our historian uses the term *ghazwa* to refer to Saint Louis’ Tunisian crusade is still meaningful, all the more so if we take into account the commentaries he himself makes, as we have seen, regarding the pope’s intervention: the pope asked the Christian kings to support the French monarch and even gave them economic benefits. He no doubt conceived of this campaign as a war for religion, using, as we have seen, specific holy war terminology—which he only uses to refer to expeditions carried out by Muslims against infidels—with clear implications in the Islamic world. The fact that it is so explicitly characterised as a war of religious expansion, whereas in previous campaigns it is made more subtly, may have to do with his relation with the Hafsiids. This dynasty, a victim of the Eighth Crusade, always remained very close to the Banū Khaldūn.⁹⁶ Moreover, the North African writer could have better access to sources and witnesses of this episode in Tunis and, above all, this initiative had a greater repercussion in the Mediterranean, if compared, for instance, to the Battle of Rio Salado. We must not forget that the propaganda campaign for this crusade was very active, despite the fact that only the eldest son of the English king took the cross together with the Capetos, or that Louis IX’s reputation as terribly pious and devout probably added sacrality to the campaign in the eyes of many of his contemporaries.⁹⁷ A few days after his death in Tunis, the body of the French king was already working miracles, and 27 years later he was canonised, finally appearing in the *Kitāb al-‘Ibar*, as we have seen, as Saint Louis.⁹⁸

92. Miguel Ángel Manzano Rodríguez, “Apuntes sobre una institución representativa del sultanato nazarí: el šayj al-guzā,” *al-Qantara* 13/2 (1992): 305-322.

93. Manzano Rodríguez, “Apuntes sobre una institución representativa del sultanato nazarí: el šayj al-guzā,” 305-322.

94. Manzano Rodríguez, “Apuntes sobre una institución representativa del sultanato nazarí: el šayj al-guzā,” 305-322.

95. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘Ibar*, 7:485; translation in Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères*, 4:459.

96. Manzano Rodríguez, “Abd al-Rahmān Ibn Jaldūn,” 578-597.

97. Jacques Le Goff, *Saint Louis* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 222 and 609 ff.

98. Le Goff, *Saint Louis*, 223-231.

The rest of the narrative does not give us many clues about whether Ibn Khaldūn thought that Louis IX and his martial actions had a greater religious component or were better suited to the category of holy war. However, it does show that the Maghrebi author held Louis IX in greater consideration than the rest of the Christian leaders, since he repeatedly called him “sultan,” something that is not usual in the work of the North African historian when referring to an infidel ruler, usually called *malik* (king) or *amir* (prince).⁹⁹ In fact, in this same passage he calls the king of Aragon “*malik* Barcelona.” The term “sultan,” which appears in the Qur’an 37 times, literally means “authority.”¹⁰⁰ In its Qur’anic use, it usually seen as granted by God. While the title of *malik* had a pejorative connotation, that of “sultan,” since the change in its use by the Seljuks, constituted a usurpation not only of the title but also of the substance of caliphal political authority: the caliph was limited, therefore, to spiritual authority.¹⁰¹ Was Ibn Khaldūn, by calling Louis IX a “sultan,” describing the relationship established by the French king with the pope for the passage of his expedition to Tunis? Louis would exercise political authority while the pope, called *khalifat al-masih* in the passage, would be in charge of the spiritual one. The parallelism between caliph and pope proposed by Yāqūt would make sense here. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the role played by the pontiff in that campaign, according to Ibn Khaldūn, was very active, which made it possible for both authorities (political and spiritual) to go hand in hand and granted to this episode, characterized as *ghazwa*, an indisputably religious nature.

HOLY WAR AS A TRANSCULTURAL CONCEPT AND THE MONOPOLY OF THE RELIGIOUS LEGITIMIZATION OF VIOLENCE

After this analysis of Ibn Khaldūn’s work, there is an evident difference between Ibn Khaldūn’s “historiographical theory” in the *Muqaddima*, where he develops his conceptualisation of holy war as an absolute notion, and his “historiographical praxis”—how he actually describes historical events. We can draw several conclusions in an attempt to explain this apparent incoherence.

The Maghrebi writer established in his *Muqaddima*, as we have seen, three main elements underlying the connection between war and religion: cohesion bestowed by religion, increasing the capacity of victory; the duty of spreading religion by force; and the possibility and capability of carrying out such an expansion through the mechanism of authority—that is, the relation between the spiritual and the temporal power.

The first element is found in the examples we have collected. In the Holy Land, the crusaders’ cohesion allowed their victory over the Muslims, who were unable to carry out the *jihād* because they were in a state of *fitna*; in the battle of Rio Salado and in the Eighth Crusade, Ibn Khaldūn tells us of the union of the Christian kings; and, in addition, the poem of the Nasrid secretary praises the help that the Christians brought to

99. Ibn Khaldūn, *Kitāb al-‘Ibar*, 6:426; translation in Ibn Khaldūn, *Histoire des Berbères*, 2:361-362.

100. Badawi and Abdel Haleem, *Dictionary of Qur’anic Usage*, 448 ff.

101. Vladimir Barthold, “Caliph and Sultan,” *The Islamic Quarterly* 7 (1963): 117-135; Deborah Tor, “Sultan,” in *The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought*, ed. G. Bowering (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 532-534.

their brothers of religion. Despite the opinion expressed by the Maghrebi author in his introduction, the second element also occurs in the selected fragments. He represents the building of a church in the *Haram al-Sharif*, and the consequent spread of Christianity, as the goal of the conquest of Jerusalem, something that filled the crusaders with pride and devotion. It was the objective of the entire Mediterranean front of the Franks. But, in addition, to avoid confrontation with the Muslims was understood by the Christians, according to Ibn Khaldūn's episode on Sancho IV, as a source of humiliation for Christianity: in other words, Christian religion recommended, and approved, war against the infidel. Lastly, the close link between spiritual and temporal power, which would facilitate such a religious spread through arms, may not only be sensed in his description of the relationship between the pope and the emperor in the *Muqaddima*, but also in the pontiff's intervention in favor of Louis IX's plans in the narrative of the Eighth Crusade. Moreover, there appears an additional element to which Ibn Khaldūn gave importance when he linked war with religion in the *Muqaddima*: that of charismatic figures. Let us not forget that they—prophets or saints, as the North African writer said—were the ones who infused people with the religious sentiment necessary to attain cohesion and, consequently, victory. In this sense, such religious leadership, such charismatic domination, is the one exercised by the pope in the episode of the Eighth Crusade, who is described, it must be reminded, as the successor of the Messiah (*khalīfat al-masīh*), and Louis IX, already characterised as a saint in the *Kitāb al-Ibar*.

Therefore, after analysing these elements throughout the *Kitāb al-Ibar*, we may conclude that Ibn Khaldūn did actually consider, even within his own conceptual limits, the possibility, duty (for Christians), and existence of a Christian holy war, and of a religious discourse of justification for the expansion of Christianity through arms. The concept of holy war our author had previously developed in the *Muqaddima* as unique to Islam through specific elements (cohesion bestowed by religion capable of increasing the chances of victory, the obligation of armed proselytism, and the need of a link between religious and political authority) becomes transcultural in the narrative of the events in the *Kitāb al-Ibar*, as it is also applied to Christianity, even though terms like *ghazwa*, that, throughout his entire work, appear to be reserved only to Islamic holy war.

Thus, in his “historiographic theory” Ibn Khaldūn, as other authors such as al-Mas‘ūdī and al-Fārābī had done, islamised through terms (*sharī‘a*, *jihād*, *fitna*) and through arguments a conceptual framework and a set of categories that were intended to be universal, but ended up becoming plausible only in their application to the Islamic reality. Quite the opposite happened, however, in his “historiographical praxis.” The employment of “Islamic” concepts (like *ghazwa*) led him to apply such a conceptual framework, which had been theorised as unique to Islam, to Christian experiences, thus somehow acknowledging an idea of holy war that surpassed religious barriers, becoming transcultural. It would be interesting to analyse if the Christian conceptualisation of holy war also crossed frontiers and was applied to Islamic realities. Given the nature of this article, here we can only recall the case of the anonymous Christian author who, on the siege of Acre carried out by Saladin, ascribed religious motivations to Muslim warriors. He claimed that the caliph of Baghdad had promised remission of all sins to those Muslims who joined the

campaign.¹⁰² No doubt, he was transferring to the “caliphal world” a pontifical prerogative.

Turning back to Ibn Khaldūn and to the conclusions, what is the reason for such a tension between the conceptual and theoretical framework he developed in his introduction, which only conceives (Islamic) *jihād* as a holy and therefore just war, and his historiographical genre, in which he narrates and explains several Christian military campaigns within the limits he had drawn for the *jihād* and defines them as holy? Despite its singularity and personality, which endows it, as acknowledged, with its own entity, one cannot forget that the *Muqaddima* is still the introduction to Ibn Khaldūn’s historical work. The differences we find between it and the remainder of the *Kitāb al-‘Ibar* respond to the difficulties that the historian, then and now, is confronted with when trying to adjust his historiographical narrative to the theoretical framework that he has previously sketched out.

We could seek an answer to the question that concerns us in a decision of linguistic pragmatism. The selection of images and terminology typical of holy war in the description of certain Christian campaigns could respond to an attempt to be understood by his audience—Arabic, Islamic, and those familiar with such language—and not to highlight the religious aspect of those military actions. However, it is highly unlikely, since on most other occasions he uses neutral terms in the religious sphere—such as *ḥarb*—to describe wars conducted by Christians, which are perfectly understandable to his readers. Hence, in these cases Ibn Khaldūn consciously stresses the religious element in those campaigns, thus sacralising them. The breach and the tension that exists between his theory and his historiographical praxis must then be explained in different terms, ideological in our view.

To admit the existence of a Christian holy war meant that the war carried out by the infidels against the Muslims and the religious expansion they could obtain at the expense of Islam was a just war. That is why Ibn Khaldūn, who nevertheless ended up admitting this fact later in the course of his historiographic work, denied such a possibility in his theorisation. In theory, the war typology of armed proselytism was a privilege unique to Islam and to its status of perfect religion, something that, according to Ibn Khaldūn, the founders of Christianity themselves, the apostles, had rejected, as they instead tried to evangelise exclusively through words.¹⁰³ Something similar was argued by Ibn Taymiyya in the letter he sent sometime between April 1303 and May 1304 to a Cypriot crusader. In it he requests the release of the Muslim prisoners, captured, with all likelihood, in some of the crusader raids upon the coasts of the Eastern Levant during the Syrian campaigns of the Ilkhanid Ghāzān Khān in 1299, 1300, and 1303.¹⁰⁴ The letter, accompanied by a long exposition of history of religions in an attempt to convince his interlocutor of the

102. Benjamin Kedar, “A Western Survey of Saladin’s Forces at the Siege of Acre,” in *Montjoie: Studies in Crusader History in Honor of Hans Eberhard Meyer*, eds. B. Kedar and J. Riley-Smith (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997), 113–122.

103. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 1:390.

104. King Peter I of Cyprus (d. 1369) had carried out a crusade shortly before Ibn Khaldūn arrived in Egypt in which, despite his defeat, he devastated Alexandria. See Peter W. Edbury, *The Kingdom of Cyprus and the Crusades: 1191–1374* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 151 ff., and Vassilios Christides, “Chipre entre Oriente y Occidente. El reino francés de los Lusignan, apéndice del Reino Latino frente a los mamelucos,” in *Ibn Jaldūn, el Mediterráneo en el siglo XIV, auge y declive de los imperios*, ed. M^a J. Viguera (Granada-Seville: Fundación El Legado Andalusi, 2006), 98–105.

supremacy of Islam, claimed that Jesus and the apostles had opposed armed proselytism, and that, therefore, there existed in Christianity no such possibility, whereas that had been actually ordered by God to the Muslims through the Prophet.¹⁰⁵ In other words, it did exist in Islam such a model of just and licit war that Ibn Khaldūn had classified in the *Muqaddima*, as there was a call of the divine law to holy war after Muḥammad's revelation, whereas in Christianity such a reality, such a legitimization of violence, could not exist on account of Jesus's opposition to it.¹⁰⁶ ■

105. The letter says: "God and His messenger ordered to combat such people until they entered the religion of God or paid the capitation. This is Muḥammad's religion, may God protect him and save him. Nor the Messiah nor the apostles after him ordered the combat, especially the combat against the nation (Q. 44:54) that follows the pure cult. How then, oh sovereign, do you consider licit to spill blood, capture women and seize the goods without a justification from God or His messengers?" in Dario Sarrió Cucarella, "Carta de Ibn Taymiyya a un cruzado en Chipre," *Collectanea Christiana Orientalia* 8 (2011): 109-164. Ibn Taymiyya, influenced by the context of threat that the eastern Islamic world was living mostly due to Mongol expansionism, devoted part of his work to try to revitalise the *jihād* and to insist on the need to make it—also against other Muslims—and on the Quranic obligation, describing it as one of the pillars of Islam. Ibn Taymiyya, *The Religious and Moral Doctrine of Jihad* (Birmingham: Maktabah al-Anṣār Publications, 2001), 24-25. See also Bonney, *Jihād. From Qur'ān to bin Laden*, 111-121.

106. Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 2: 55 ff.