RECENT BOOKS

HEARD NOTHING, SEEN NOTHING


Reviewed by Salim Tamari

Of all the major issues surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict (territory, settlement, refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and border delineation), the fate of landed property seized by the Israelis in the war of 1948 has been the least examined by scholars of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is also the most neglected of the final status issues addressed in the course of fifteen years of protracted negotiations since the Madrid Peace Conference was convened in 1990. This is rather perplexing, considering the amount of documentation about the millions of dunams of refugee farmland and urban real estate that was taken by the nascent Israeli state and then utilized to absorb hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants from Europe and the Middle East.

More shocking is that this neglect applies equally to both the Israeli and Arab parties, including the Palestinians. While Israel has been evading the issue for the obvious reasons of accountability, the explanations for Arab reticence are more obscure. It seems to be related by the Palestinians (at the official and popular levels) to a fear of appearing to negotiate anything less than the repatriation of refugees to their homes and restitution of confiscated property. It is as if the mere creation of an inventory of lost lands, their location, size, categories, and monetary value would automatically be followed by a willingness to accept a monetary compensation for their loss. But this stance has changed drastically in the last decade, at least at the level of open debate of the issues involved—partly because there is a new recognition that the compensation clause in UN Resolution 194 is no longer seen as a package in lieu of the right of return, but as supplementary to repatriation; and partly because international precedents have been created (particularly in the case of Bosnian and Croatian refugees following the Dayton Accords) in which refugees succeeded in achieving, under international support and supervision, both the right of return to their homeland, as well as a choice of compensation or restitution for their lost property.

The recent publication of Michael Fischbach’s Records of Dispossession is an important event because it meticulously documents the evolution of the Palestinian property issue over the last half-century, including its resurfacing since the Oslo Accords in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations. The “records of dispossession” of the title refers to the vast corpus of ownership and other records painstakingly collected over a ten-year period (1951–61) by the UN agency in charge of classifying and monitoring the fate of refugee property. The contribution of this volume is the unprecedentedly detailed account of the workings of that important body (the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine—UNCCP). As advisor to a project for computerizing and digitizing the UNCCP archives, overseen by the Institute for Palestine Studies, the author had full access to these records that had never been open to the public. Fischbach shows the utility and limitations of the UNCCP database against the backdrop of other comparable refugee situations. The book should be read in conjunction with two earlier books: Sami Hadawi’s Palestinian Rights and Losses (Saqi Books, 1988), and Don Peretz’s Israel and the Palestinian Arabs (Middle East Institute, 1958)—both dealing with the fate of confiscated Palestinian property from first hand experience by the authors.

One of the most poignant (and indeed appalling) episodes narrated in this work addresses the manner in which the victorious Haganah and other Jewish irregular militias dealt with deserted Palestinian dwellings in the major cities of Jaffa, Haifa, and Jerusalem. Priority was given to senior administrators of the new state and senior officers in the army to occupy “abandoned” homes. In Jaffa, Ramlia, and Lydda where an almost
total ethnic cleansing of the Arab population took place, a pecking order of “occupancy right” was given to the waves of early Jewish immigrants. Displaced persons from European camps and Bulgarian refugees were given first choice. Jews from North Africa were next in line and were given homes in Jaffa and Haifa. Holocaust survivors played a prominent role in these acts of displacement: “having found their barracks-like accommodation in the kibbutzim too similar to those they faced in Nazi concentration camps, they broke into Palestinian homes in Haifa. They took over well-appointed homes in such Palestinian quarters of the city as Wadi Nisnas and along Abbas Street. While the homes taken over in Qatamon had been abandoned, many of these dwellings were in fact still occupied by Palestinians who had remained [in Israeli territory]. Some Jews simply evicted the owners by force” (pp. 7–8). It is obvious from the manner in which squabbles (and sometimes violent fights) broke out in the ranks of the IDF and senior state officials that the spoils included choice villas and possessions of the departed Palestinian upper classes in Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Haifa. These acts of collective looting did not spare Jewish citizens either. Fischbach reports how Jewish residents of Talpiot and Sanhedriya in Jerusalem “submitted a bill to the Israeli government for the contents of scores of their homes looted by Israeli troops” (p. 9).

In rural areas the kibbutz movement, aided by Israeli troops, spearheaded the move to seize abandoned peasant farms. Those communal settlements, which became a symbol for Zionist utopianism in the West, included the whole spectrum of ideological currents, from the leftist ba-Shomer ha-‘Tsair and Mapam to the religious Agudat Yisrael. It is clear in the author’s narrative that the plunder of Arab property was an act in which the whole of Jewish society—left, right, and center—was engaged. Altogether Fischbach estimates that one-third of all immigrants in the late 1940s and early 1950s found accommodation in deserted Palestinian refugee homes. A much larger operation of property transfer involved the takeover of abandoned lands. Most of those plots that remained within the reach of Palestinians who were not expelled were seized anyway under the legal fiction of “absent-present”—the convoluted legal term for those refugees who stayed in the country but left their immediate residences temporarily during the fighting and were not allowed to return to them. One of the most successful operations of clearing peasants from their land was articulated by Yosef Weitz, the director of the Jewish National Fund. He proposed after the end of the 1948 war what became known as a policy of “retroactive transfer,” in a memorandum appropriately entitled “A Scheme for the Solution of the Arab Question in Israel.” The memo summarized measures which essentially would “prevent the return of Palestinian refugees [to their homes]; prevent Palestinian farmers from cultivating their abandoned fields; and settle Jewish immigrants in 90 abandoned villages; and destroy the remainder of the abandoned villages.” When Ben-Gurion agreed to all these measures but objected to the last clause (apparently for utilitarian reasons), Weitz carried them out anyway (pp. 12–13).

Virtually all of this plunder was carried out under the cover of meticulous legal procedures. A whole army of lawyers attached to the Jewish Agency, the state, the office of the chief of staff, and the Justice Ministry—together with a retinue of international “legal experts”—labored on the issue of confiscated lands. The most effective tool of this conquest was the Emergency Regulations for Absentees’ Property of December 1948, drafted by the Justice Ministry. These regulations, we are informed, “shifted the legal definition of what constituted abandoned land from the land itself to its owner: instead of declaring land to be ‘abandoned,’ people were now declared ‘absentees’ whose property could be seized by the state” (p. 21). And when people were not absent, they were ‘absented’ on behalf of the state, as happened to thousands of Palestinians who remained in Israel but escaped from the fighting arena for safety, as civilians do everywhere, and subsequently found that their land officially sequestered. Another “legal” tool of dispossession, not covered by Fischbach here, was to declare public land as belonging to the “Jewish public” and therefore inaccessible to Palestinians. Both these measures were applied vigorously over the years to territories conquered after 1967, in the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights. With few exceptions the Israeli High Court of Justice became a rubber stamp for these measures. When challenged, as in several cases of settlement activity in the occupied territories, the court would avoid taking the issue since these cases were deemed to be mostly of “political nature,” outside the domain of the court’s jurisdiction.
Fischbach describes at length the extensive efforts undertaken by Israeli officials to document the uses and disposition of refugee property; yet their obsession came to naught when the issue came up for permanent status negotiations in Camp David (1999) and in Taba (2000). Israeli chief negotiator Elyakim Rubinstein (who was also Israel’s Attorney General) made the remarkable disclosure that the records of the Custodian of Absentee Property [of Palestinian refugees] were no longer available, and that the money generated by these assets over the last five decades “no longer exists. We have used them up. It is up to the international community to create funds for this” (p. 348). That in effect has become the Israeli strategy of negotiations over refugee assets under the administration of the Israel Land Administration and before that of the Custodian for Absentee Property.

The logic behind this line of thinking is to create a paradigm of reciprocity, in which the Israeli claim to have absorbed a large number of Jewish immigrants from Arab countries, some of whom had their property confiscated by the Arab states in which they lived, is now advanced as an act of exchange for the property of Palestinian refugees evicted in the 1948–1951 period. Since this notion of “exchange” is applied by current Israeli advocates specifically to Jewish property in Iraq for 1951 and in Egypt for 1956 (where Jewish property was taken over by the state), it leaves the bulk of Arab-Jewish immigrants to Israel (particularly those who came from Morocco) outside the sphere of reciprocity since it could not (and cannot) be subsumed under the rubric of confiscated property. The Palestinians in their turn have insisted that these claims must be dealt with bilaterally between the Israelis and the respective Arab governments concerned. Since November 2001 the Israeli government has come out publicly with the position that the issue of Jewish property will be its chief tool of negotiating with the Palestinians. (Fischbach cites a calculation to the effect that the value of Palestinian property sequestered is 22 times greater than the value of Jewish claims [p. 353].) Both the Clinton administration (in Taba) and the current Bush administration have come out in favor of the idea that compensation for Palestinian refugees should be dealt with “through an international organization that will be established for this purpose,” presumably with European and Japanese funding. As in the case of settlement activities the Americans have come around to adopt a position of faits accomplis for refugees—an exceptionalism that seems to operate only in the case of Israel.

Fischbach’s work is breathtaking in its scale and attention to details. He goes to extreme lengths to expose the historical evolution of international and national (particularly Israeli) institutions dealing with the fate of refugees and their property. Whenever possible he also provides the reader with extensive alternative surveys for the properties in question, their values, and estimates of the number of people affected, discussing the strengths and pitfalls of each. While the main focus of this study is the records of UNCCP property records in New York, the book provides several other studies that supplement those records. It also provides an essential source for comparison with other international cases involving refugee restitution in Cyprus, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda. The main missing component in his research are the records of UNRWA—the UN Agency for Palestinian refugees—which includes the Unified Registration System and the family files of some 4 million registered refugees in the Arab host countries—a surprising omission since the author refers at length to other UNRWA documents and its early rivalry with the UNCCP. This point notwithstanding, the work of Michael Fischbach is bound to be a standard reference for the issue of Palestinian refugee property for scholars and policy makers alike.

**REFUGEES WITHOUT RIGHTS**


Reviewed by Naseer H. Aruri

This book examines the impact of the refugee issue on the larger Palestinian political picture. It seems to have been inspired by a need to record as much of the Palestinian refugees’ political history as possible. It demonstrates from beginning to end that

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the refugees never have lost their ability to influence the course of Palestinian history.

The book does not argue the legal and moral rights of the refugees as dispersed people, but rather attempts to “draw the general outlines of the history of the refugees as refugees and not as guerrillas or transformed Palestinian elite” (p. x). It demonstrates quite convincingly that the valiant struggle of the refugees will not be declared a failure until they are obliterated, or if they themselves succumb to a liquidationist resolution outside the framework of international law. The Palestinian refugees are almost unique in that, unlike other refugees throughout the world, they are not entitled to international protection, are denied their right of return, and are denied civil rights in the host countries. They even are excluded from most refugee studies because they lost their eligibility for inclusion in the 1951 Convention and also were kept out of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Instead, the United Nations Relief and Work Agency (UNRWA) caters to their basic survival needs. Much of the recognition accorded to them as a nation and a people with inalienable rights is anchored in the general instruments of international law rather than refugee law.

In addition to all these impediments, Professor Talhami shows that the refugees have been subjected to further setbacks by a variety of actors, including the Arab states, the PLO, the United States, and Israel—collectively, strange bedfellows. Hence the subtitle of the book: Pawns to Political Actors. Initially, Israel had linked any negotiations to resolve the refugee issue to a comprehensive settlement with the Arab states. It also succeeded in evading the issues of restitution and reparations, despite its success in receiving compensation and restitution on behalf of Jewish victims of German Nazi atrocities.

The author devotes an entire chapter to U.S. attempts to offer resettlement plans on Arab lands as a substitute for repatriation, schemes that are outside the framework of international law but were devised in pursuit of normalization with the Arab states. Despite the potential economic benefit for some Arab states, the overall Arab reaction has been negative. Washington’s so-called development plans, such as the one advanced by Eric Johnston, were perceived as economic solutions to a political problem.

Talhami devotes a chapter to the discussion of the refugees’ ordeal and the poor conditions under which they live in Arab countries. A dismal picture is revealed in Lebanon, where the refugees are denied the most basic rights, including employment and freedom of movement. Only Iraq and Syria diverged from the pattern in the Arab world, due largely to their pan-Arabist ideology, while Jordan is a special case because of its mass naturalization of all Palestinians residing there.

The author even sees the PLO as having let the refugees down when it set aside its program of a democratic secular state in all of Palestine in the early 1970s and opted for an unwritten agreement with the Arab states. The quid pro quo was to drop the armed struggle slogan in exchange for a diplomatic campaign supported by the Arab states on behalf of a mini-state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This arrangement gave the pursuit of statehood and self-determination for the Palestinian people precedence over the right of return. By the time the Oslo package was concluded, the refugee issue was deferred to an indefinite future date. In an entire chapter, the author rightfully takes to task the Palestinian negotiators for agreeing to negotiate under unfavorable conditions and ignoring their internationally recognized rights. “The Oslo DOP [Declaration of Principles] only specified the need to ameliorate the condition of Palestinian refugees in their current locations and to open negotiations regarding the admission of displaced Palestinians of 1967” (p. 173).

Talhami contrasts the failure of the negotiators with the tenacity and resolutness of the refugee activists and the worldwide movement of solidarity they were able to build during the 1990s. So effective and determined was this movement that the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) resorted to cooption techniques and other means to safeguard its own legitimacy. “The movement sought to create a popular refugee lobby capable of influencing, if not directing, the PNA’s policies on the refugee question . . . [By] publicizing these issues, [it] reawakened public consciousness and made it difficult for the PNA and its negotiators to continue operating in the dark” (p. 203).

The concluding chapter examines the forces that shaped the refugees lives over the past 45 years. It shows that the refugees themselves, more than anyone else, have rescued the national project from the various actors who presumably were trying to ease their plight, but who in fact came
to surrender their rights without their consent. The refugee movement continued to dominate the political imagination of the segmented Palestinian community, reminding it that the refugee issue is the heart of the Palestinian problem. Talhami's work is an excellent and much needed addition to the growing literature on the refugees and the right of return. It is a thought-provoking, well-researched, well-written book that reveals the failure of governments and international organizations and the corresponding vitality of a people's movement supported by an international solidarity campaign.

LIVES OF THREE SHIBAB


Reviewed by John Collins

In this slim but engaging volume, French political scientist Laetitia Bucaille skilfully navigates a path between macro-level political analysis and micro-level human stories. The result is a fascinating account that takes us well beyond cliché frameworks, introducing us to the deep social and political contradictions that have marked Palestinian society, beset by continuing Israeli repression, in recent years.

Bucaille, author of Gaza: La violence de la paix (Presses des Sciences Politiques, 1998), focuses her ethnographic attention on three young men from Nablus who grew up during the first intifada and became prominent fighters in the second. Using the experiences of Bassam, Sami, and Najy as a recurring touchstone, she aims to “explain the tilt away from the peace process toward the implacable logic of war” (p. xix) that has characterized Palestine's latest uprising. Such an explanation is no small task, but Bucaille possesses a sophisticated grasp of the relevant political, historical, social, and economic issues. The quality of her structural analysis allows her to make the most out of the personal stories she features.

The first intifada provides a crucial backdrop for Bucaille’s narrative. In addition to the high levels of popular mobilization, she argues, the uprising was a simmering mix of internal class and other social conflicts. These divisions put the increasingly powerful shibab (young men) “who had nothing to lose” on a collision course with the middle and upper classes, “who needed to survive the devastating consequences of Israeli repression” (p. 25). Early experiences of activism and imprisonment led Bassam, Sami, and Najy to form their own armed cell in 1991. Almost immediately they were targeted by Israeli military intelligence and eventually deported to Jordan in 1992 after surviving a four-day siege at al-Najah University. As the intifada wound down, the three were in Baghdad, ironically enjoying a freedom they never had known under Israeli occupation.

The creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the return of the exiled national leadership, Bucaille maintains, brought further social tensions to the surface, especially between the shibab and the traditional elite who were reconsolidating their power. Faced with their declining political influence and the need to make a living, many former intifada activists found themselves pursuing a volatile and contradictory mixture of “legitimate” security employment and off-the-books activity (e.g., car theft, credit card fraud). In chapter 3, Bucaille details the equally troublesome contradictions confronting all Palestinians, from PA security officials and Legislative Council representatives to merchants and ordinary camp residents.

The remainder of the book explores the aforementioned “tilt” toward violence in the context of the “new containment” that Israel has gradually imposed on Palestinian communities (p. 84). As the unequal economic realities created by Israel’s security strategy emerged, and with Israel’s policy of “repression-by-anticipation” (p. 121) providing an added push, the shibab faced a stark choice: leave the country or rejoin the increasingly violent struggle against the occupation. Here Bucaille provides a sensitive discussion of suicide bombings, demonstrating that such phenomena only can be explained with reference to the social and political environments that produce them. In this case,
she argues, seemingly irrational violence is animated by a “simple pragmatism” (p. 136) rooted in confinement, hopelessness, and a perceived lack of effective tactical alternatives. The second intifada thus appears as an index of all the (largely negative) developments of the 1990s: continued structural violence, a deteriorating relationship between young people and their leaders, the growth of gangsterism and corruption, and the creeping bantustanization of Palestine.

Bucaille’s spare, journalistic style eschews many traditional markings of scholarly work, combining unsentimental vignettes and straightforward (but incisive) analysis. Some readers might prefer a fuller version of one or the other, and it is worth noting that the hybrid nature of Bucaille’s enterprise does bring certain problems. The narrative doesn’t always flow as freely as it might, and the episodic approach sacrifices the potential benefits of a sustained, uninterrupted look at a particular individual’s life story. In addition, the absence of any discussion of the author’s own positionality and methodology occasionally leaves the reader wondering whether Bucaille actually witnessed the vignettes or whether she is relying on first- (or second-) hand testimony. In general, however, Growing Up Palestinian achieves its dual goal of contextualizing the second intifada and illustrating the shifting travails of the intifada generation. Scholars who are conversant with the literature on contemporary Palestine undoubtedly will find familiar details and lines of argumentation here. Relative newcomers (e.g., undergraduates) will find an account that concisely opens up whole tableaus of recent Palestinian history and provides a rich basis from which to delve further into that history.

BRUTALITIES OF OCCUPATION


Reviewed by Adam Shapiro

Mitri Raheb’s dignified cry out to the world in Bethlehem Besieged operates on different levels as a means of understanding the intimacies of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It is simultaneously a personal diary of a typical person caught up in this protracted conflict; a form of witness to the daily effects of occupation on a civilian population; and a decisive act of resistance in its defiance of the standard presentation of the Palestinian people and the conflict that continues in Palestine. Throughout, Raheb maintains a sense of civility and absurdity that should provoke any reader to ask why such policies continue and how the international community can continue to stand by as the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem expands.

As a personal diary from a Lutheran pastor ministering in Bethlehem, the book offers glimpses into the daily trials and tribulations confronting all Palestinians in each detail of their daily life. Of course, coming from a Palestinian Christian, many in the United States certainly will be surprised to learn of the existence of this community and its ongoing suffering. Raheb’s detailing of the work of the church and its significance in the life of the community during the intifada offers unique insight into life in Palestine and the sentiment of the people. The gripping drama of the blow-by-blow siege of Bethlehem in the spring of 2002, augmented by the personal danger Raheb faced by just living in the city, is underscored by the humanity of the narrator: “Perhaps our humanity is a mirror that shows them who they have really become” (p. 23). From the details emerges a sense of the exasperation of a people living under occupation for decades, at a time when the world seems to understand less and less what that means.

Raheb’s witness plays out on two levels—as a witness in the Christian sense, Raheb brings a profound spiritual approach to understanding the events going on around him and his ministry, while he is also a witness in the sense of living on the front lines of a war unleashed upon the Palestinian civilian population, in their homes and city streets, and ultimately in their places of worship. Coming through clearly and strongly in Raheb’s accounts is a sense of complete outrage, though told from a dignified and proud standpoint, as well as a deeper sense of sadness at the state of humanity he is observing.

Finally, through his writing, Raheb is acting defiantly against the bonds of his oppression and the massive attempt to silence the Palestinian people. This simple,
individual act of resistance is strikingly important in countering the dominant narrative normally unquestioned by mainstream media representations of the conflict and of the Palestinians. As a Christian, as a community leader, as a father, as an activist, and as a writer, Raheb represents the most powerful challenge to the decades-long efforts to deny the Palestinian people their human and political rights. Raheb is acutely aware of this, and yet does not wish to be cast simply as a Palestinian with a gripe: “[Hope] is no longer something we see but something we advocate, something we plant” (p. 157). The stories he details are proactive accounts of the people in his world seeking to make change out of the painful environment and circumstances, and as such he cannot be categorized or marginalized easily.

Bethlehem Besieged is an important contribution to an emerging first-person literature coming from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Dissatisfied with accounts by visiting journalists and diplomats who do not have to live with the full impact of occupation, Palestinians, international peace activists, and Israelis are writing more in an attempt to shift the discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Books such as Peace Under Fire edited by Josie Sandercock et al. (Verso, 2004), The New Intifada edited by Roane Carey (Verso, 2001), When the Birds Stopped Singing by Raja Shehadeh (Steerforth, 2003), and Refusenik! edited by Peretz Kidron (Zed Books, 2004) join Raheb’s work in painting a far more compassionate picture than what is standard fare for politicians and journalists. Raheb’s work stands out among these others in both the spirit underlying the narrative and the significance of the events he describes. Undeterred by the reality of the situation, Raheb’s work is one of hope and of strength, and of course, infused with the spirit of resistance by a man living under the brutalities of occupation and repression: “Rightly understood, hope is nothing less than gaining control over one’s own destiny” (p. 153).

POSTMORTEM


Reviewed by Ilana Feldman

The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process is a collection of essays, written from very different perspectives, and originally presented at a Colgate University conference. All the participants had been involved in one way or another with the Oslo process, and their analyses reflect both their locations in that process and their particular disappointments with its failures. A greater sense of the interesting discussions that must have followed the presentation of papers would be illuminating. As it stands, it is not clear to what extent the original papers were revised in light of such discussions.

As Robert Rothstein notes in the book’s preface, any work that seeks to take stock of the state of affairs in Israel and Palestine, of the status of Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, and of the possibilities for the future is in a very difficult position. It seems almost impossible not to be “overtaken by events” (p. vii). Reading the essays that make up this book, one is certainly cognizant of the fact that they were written less than a year into the al-Aqsa intifada. Nonetheless, their lack of immediate currency does not render them either uninteresting or irrelevant. Seeking to evaluate the already-over Oslo process, the essays offer important insights into the dynamics of that period.

Given the disparity in viewpoints expressed in the essays, and the lack of an overarching analysis tying the pieces together, this book succeeds more as a collection of material about the Oslo accords than as a coherent whole. To give just one example of the differences among the essays, the right of return for Palestinian refugees is described in one as “controversial” (p. 64) and in another as “inalienable” (p. 80). While these different points of view in and of themselves are illuminating of some of the problems with Oslo, without an analysis that evaluates and contextualizes these different positions, a reader uninitiated in the intricacies of Israeli and Palestinian history is likely to have trouble making sense of the arguments. Although

the book opens and closes with essays by one of the editors, these do not really serve this function. The preface, in particular, is replete with discussions of “hysterical mobs of Islamic extremists,” the alleged Palestinian “joy at inflicting pain,” and the inevitable claim about the “very generous offer by U.S. President Bill Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak”; these remarks serve more to obscure than to illuminate.

Nevertheless, there is much of interest in the essays that make up the body of the book. Some of the most illuminating discussions are less about what caused the Oslo process to fail and more about its “successes”: the ways that it changed the dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian relations even as it failed in accomplishing its stated goals. Khalil Shikaki suggests that Oslo transformed both the strategic and psychological environment in which these relations take place. Aaron Miller argues that “the legacy of Oslo, for good or for ill, has shaped the pursuit of Israeli-Palestinian peace in a way that will be very hard to reverse” (p. 31). It should be noted, even though I think this basic insight is correct, that some things which Miller identified as irreversible in fact have been reversed since 2000, for instance, the removal of Israeli troops from Palestinian cities in the West Bank and Gaza and Israel’s claim that there is no negotiating partner as an excuse for refusing to talk with the Palestinians.

The essays also provide an important record and reminder of the details of the Oslo years. Given the speed of events in Israel and Palestine and the seeming inevitability of the failures of the “peace process,” it is easy to lose track of the conditions that precipitated each failure. While the authors disagree about responsibility for the particular failures of Oslo, most agree (Ron Pundak is an exception) that the accords themselves had inherent problems and that the ultimate failures were not due simply to their manner of implementation. For example, the lack of clarity about “final status”—which was billed as a strategic plus for the accords—proved to be a significant problem. Almost all the authors agree, as well, that the personalities of leaders contributed significantly to the failures in implementation. While the book could have been improved by a synthesizing analysis of these interpretations, Oslo and the Lessons of Failure will be of considerable interest to readers who are interested in the details of Israeli-Palestinian relations and who are knowledgeable enough about the subject to provide their own evaluation.

**NEW GAME OR NEW NARRATIVES?**


**Reviewed by Samir Awad**

It is no surprise that since the collapse of the Camp David II peace talks in July 2000, the so-called “peace camp” in both Israel and the Palestinian street have been sidelined by the ensuing turmoil. The outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada on 28 September 2000 and Israel’s draconian measures against the whole Palestinian society in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip brought the terminology and dynamics of animosity and conflict back to the forefront. Against this background came the well-organized and publicized event bringing the Palestinian and Israeli “peace camps” in a ceremony to sign the Geneva Accord. This was in spectacular contrast to developments in Palestine, where bloodshed and deadly clashes were the order of the day; hence the notion “a new game in town.”

The authors of the books under review embark on and accomplish—for the most part—markedly differing missions, but their pathways coincide in their attempt to explain why and how such an agreement has been reached. The two books have different scopes, perspectives, and styles and tell somewhat contradictory stories. For example, Yossi Beilin, a self-proclaimed political “dove,” presents in his authoritative narrative an account of the many travails in which he was intimately involved as part of the “quest for permanent peace” during the period 1996–2004. The co-author and signatory of the Geneva Accord, Beilin is the most visible “peacenik” in Israeli politics. The goal of his book is to understand “what went wrong (in the course of the peace process) . . . [and how to] overcome the very

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different readings of reality by each of the two sides" (p. 19). He provides his "personal breakdown of the actual origins of the Middle East peace process" (p. 19), which is extremely important, because he had a privileged position in the highest echelons of Israeli politics during this period. Although Beilin's credentials are well known, he seems eager to establish his authority by profusely using such phrases as: "I initiated what was to become known as the Oslo process" (p. 15); "I created the Movement for Withdrawal from Lebanon" (p. 17); and "I helped draft the Beilin–Abu Mazin understandings" (p. 36). Beilin's chronicles are evidently comprehensive, and he leaves no one who was involved in the Middle East "peace process" unmentioned, whether negatively or positively. However, his narrative is not free of bias. This is nowhere clearer than in his explanations of the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada—which he repeatedly refers to as the "violence" (pp. 190–93); his arguments regarding the unenacted Palestinian "incitement" (pp. 279–80, 294); or his propagation of the official Israeli account of Sharon's provocative visit to al-Haram al-Sharif and the ensuing events (p. 271). Beilin's book is rich with information and analysis of the prelude to Geneva and of the peace initiatives accompanying that journey. It is not a textual analysis of the document, although the complete Geneva Accord is included as an annex. He leaves some questions and remarks that call for a Palestinian response. For example, he contends that "it was only after Israel had shown its willingness to make a fair compromise that violence broke out" (p. 271); and he claims that the Palestinians' explanation of their resort to violence is "one that was never given." These minor problems notwithstanding, Beilin shows his consistent opposition to the official government stand, especially during the Netanyahu tenure when he was in opposition (pp. 61–71, 90–105). Beilin was also a vocal critic of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians and toward the settlements and the settlers during the Barak government (pp. 181, 281–91). He asserts, for example, that the number of settlers in the West Bank and Gaza doubled "in the six years between 1994 and 2000" during the Oslo implementation period (p. 278). He admits that the Israeli governments "were not sufficiently aware of the significance of the closure, the many barriers, the restrictions in the Palestinians movements... the Palestinians humiliation and despair" (p. 281). Perhaps this is not an explicit claim of responsibility for the continued confrontation, but it is enough to stand in a court of law.

Kardahji offers a counter narrative to Beilin. Kardahji sees his book as an "overview of the details and context of the [Geneva Accord] document" and a political critique of it (p. 3). He employs a comparative analytical technique to examine the agreement and its competitors, such as the One Voice and the People's Voice initiatives. Indeed, he asserts that, generally speaking, negotiations never change the imbalance of power (as between the Israelis and the Palestinians) but rather reflect it, a phenomenon that is not confined to the Palestinian-Israeli case. The author also is preoccupied with the idea that in the future it will be difficult to reverse the unreciprocated concessions offered by the Palestinian team in the accord (pp. 11, 89).

Kardahji is categorical in his criticism of the accord. He presents two "good" arguments to show that the approach of the Geneva team was "flawed": First, "Israelis would regard the conflict as over once the Palestinians signed the accord" (p. 11), which, in retrospect, is not the case; and second, his prediction that "international interest in the Palestinian Question would decrease dramatically" (p. 12) once the accord is signed, which again is not supported by evidence. Attributing this negative causal power to the agreement is questionable; the author asserts at the same time that when it was signed, the accord faced indifference or even opposition in both the Israeli and the Palestinian street.

Despite his critical stance, Kardahji does provide a powerful analysis of the accord's terms, as he stresses the centrality of the refugee issue (the right of return) and its incompatibility with the two-state approach (p. 27). Nonetheless, he occasionally states that the accord is probably "the best deal offered to the Palestinians by the Israeli political establishment, since the creation of the State of Israel" (pp. 2, 90, 94, emphasis added). This view is echoed inexplicitly by Beilin who also adds that the accord is "perhaps the last opportunity to realize the Zionist dream" of maintaining a Jewish majority in the state of Israel (Path to Geneva, p. 265).

Kardahji comes across as an observer who is quite ambivalent about the way forward, at least with regard to the strategy he advocates. In chapter 1 he claims that the "international community is virtually the
only factor that the Palestinians have in their favor” (p. 12). However, in chapter 6 he suggests that “the Palestinians lack any kind of bargaining chip . . . they have no allies in the international community” (p. 90). In either case, he stops short of presenting a possible alternative to a negotiated settlement.

In summary, despite significant bias both works are welcome contributions to the historiography of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the myriad attempts to forge a permanent resolution to it.

FAILURE OF LEFT ZIONISM


Reviewed by Gil Z. Hochberg

The personal note with which Michel Warschawski opens his new book sets the tone for the entire text:

I often wrote with tears in my eyes. Sometimes these were tears of rage at the boundless violence of repression and the dehumanization of other human beings. But sometimes they were tears of sorrow at the degeneration of a society that is my society, too, in which my grandchildren are going to grow up. (p. 7)

Warschawski has written this book not as an objective observer, a journalist, or political activist but, first and foremost, as an involved Israeli Jew who painfully witnesses the moral degradation of his people. One of the most prominent figures of the Israeli radical Left, his involvement in political activism began with his participation in the post-1967 anti-Zionist Israeli-Palestinian group Matzpen. He later founded and chaired the Alternative Information Center in Jerusalem.

Toward an Open Tomb accounts for the gradual self-destruction of the Israeli Jewish society. It is Warschawski’s first book to appear in English, although an English translation of his earlier memoir, On the Border, published in French in 2002, has recently been published. In this book, Warschawski states his main argument explicitly: “Systematic dehumanization of a colonized people inevitably leads to dehumanization of the colonizers and their society . . . .Like pollution, violence does not stop at the Green line” (p. 30). Within the limited space of one hundred pages, Warschawski attempts to demonstrate and partly explain the ways by which Israel’s increasingly brutal occupation of the Palestinians has returned to haunt the Israeli-Jewish society from within, leading to a process of political, social, legal, and ethical destruction.

The initial chapters of the book concentrate on the atrocities committed by the Israeli army and government in Gaza and the West Bank under the leadership of Ehud Barak and more recently Ariel Sharon. With the collapse of the Oslo negotiations, Warschawski notes, the Palestinian people as a whole have been demonized and the Israeli occupation, accordingly, has “stopped [even] pretending to be liberal.” Here Warschawski is alluding to the popular Israeli oxymoron, which has been used for decades to describe the presence of the Israeli army in the Palestinian territories as “an enlightened occupation” (Kibush na’or). The subsequent and more innovative chapters of the book focus on the deterioration of Israeli society, which, Warschawski notes, “by totally dehumanizing the adversary, is rapidly losing everything that made it—despite everything, despite the plundering and institutionalized discrimination—a relatively civilized society” (p. 33). Within the space of a few years, the author notes, Israel has gone through a complete collapse of any seeming normality:

Without critical media, without a High Court ensuring respect for basic individual rights and democratic norms, with omnipresent police surveillance, Israeli society no longer has the brakes to stop it from sliding down the slippery slope from the rule of law to a gang culture ruled arbitrarily by violence. (pp. 62–64)

To anybody closely familiar with the reality in Israel for the last several years, Warschawski’s bleak depiction will not seem exaggerated. Yet, one wonders why the author, a well known political activist and anti-Zionist, presents this recent reality of social, moral, and political degradation, in terms of a sudden rupture, or a “crisis,” which has dramatically transformed Israel from a “relatively civilized society” into a
“seriously sick society... out of control on a lunatic scale” (p. 66)? There is no doubt that for both Israelis and Palestinians, the present looks much worse than the past, but does this mean that “a genuine break has occurred in the evolution of the Israeli society” (p. 76)?

Warschawski’s attempt to identify a specific moment in which a radical social transformation took place within the Israeli society is, to my mind, the least satisfying aspect of the book. If the author first associates this transformation with the failure of the peace negotiations and the Israeli response to the second intifada, he later locates the actual “moment of crisis” at “the night of November 5, 1995, when religious far-right activist Yigal Amir fired three revolver shots at Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin” (p. 76). This date, Warschawski tells us, marks the failure of the Israeli Zionist Left to confront the extreme Jewish right, a failure that resulted in the legitimization and dispersal of religious fundamentalism and has driven “the last nail into the coffin of a certain kind of Israel [which] gave way to a new kind of country” (p. 84). The “new Israel” Warschawski describes is controlled by the army and religious parties and combines “national militarism” with “a die-hard spirit impregnated with messianism” (p. 93).

But why is this reality a new Israel? How different is this new country from the secular-Zionist society that Warschawski describes as the “other kind of Israel”: the “relatively civilized society,” whose loss he seems to mourn? After all, Israel’s harsh occupation, militaristic culture, and discriminatory separatist practices did not begin in 1995 but about thirty years earlier. In light of Warschawski’s own strong and compelling argument about the contagious nature of violence and the co-dependency between the Israeli-Jewish society and the Palestinians it dehumanizes, one wonders whether the crisis of the Israeli society actually took place at such a late historical moment or has it been there all along, hidden behind a screen of shady democracy and false normality.

HISTORICAL SOCIOLOGY OF ISRAEL


Reviewed by Ahmad H. Sa’di

Widely regarded as Israel’s leading sociologist, Baruch Kimmerling places his book within the third generation of socio-historical research on Israeli society. He views this book as continuing a series of previously published works by S. N. Eisenstadt, the founder of the discipline, and those of second generation sociologists and political scientists, who were overwhelmingly Eisenstadt’s followers. By and large the differences between these cohorts are based on age and perspective.

According to Kimmerling, the first period was dominated by the publication of Eisenstadt’s classic Israeli Society (Basic Books, 1967), which was perceived for many years in Israel and the United States and among considerable numbers of West European scholars as a credible analysis of Israel’s social structure. Written in the mold of the American functionalist sociology, it depicted Israeli society as a melting pot, in which traditional groups were being guided to modernity by the socializing institutions of the state (primarily the educational system and the army) and the Ashkenazi ethnic group. A simple polarity of traditionalism versus modernity was employed to describe the absorption of the oriental migrant Jewish communities, the development of the various ethnic and status groups, and the ascendancy of bureaucratized social institutions and universalistic norms. As a follower of the functionalist school, Eisenstadt characterized social relations in terms of harmony. Social conflicts or resistance to the melting pot policy were depicted as signs of abnormality or alienation.

For Kimmerling, the second generation of socio-historical research was dominated by the works of Eisenstadt’s faithful disciples such as Dan Horowitz, Moshe Lissak, and Rivka Bar-Yosef, who continued to present the ideology of Labor Zionism as an “objective” sociological analysis. Yet, a few scholars opted for alternative models. Jonathan Shapiro was the foremost academic among his peers who deviated from the dominant functionalist paradigm and opted for a critical alternative. Relying on the power elite model, which the American sociologists C. Wright Mills developed, he unveiled the

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skin-deep nature of Israeli democracy. Instead of consensus, modernization, and democracy as the overriding features of Israeli reality, Shapiro highlighted the operation of the Labor party’s (historical Mapai) machinery of control, which functioned to ensure the continuity of Ashkenazi domination (particularly those who lived in the Yishuv and established the state), and the rule of Labor Zionism. Yet, as Kimmerling has rightly observed, Shapiro did not analyze the intergroup relations and the impact of the ideology and practice of Labor Zionism on the various groups.

The third period was marked by the decline of both Labor Zionism and its minstrels. Since the early 1970s this elite has used its claims for Palestine. Consequently it gave a certain space for Jewish symbols and sets of belief in the public sphere. Moreover through its zeal of colonization in the occupied territories, this group (Gush Emunim) presented an alternative that could revitalize the declining power of the state.

The challenge that national Zionism posed to the Israeli-ness was followed by less powerful ethnic/national groups that represent cultures, subcultures and countercultures. The end result was the segmentation of Israeli society. According to Kimmerling, seven cultural groups have inherited the declining Israeli-ness: the national religious; Orthodox nationalist (Jewish but not Zionist); Sephardic traditional; Israeli Arab; middle-class secular; Russian speaking; and Ethiopian. However this reality of fragmentation has not led to the disintegration of Israeli society. Two important codes continue to hold the Jewish groups together: the cultural code of Jewish-ness and the code of security. Of the later code Kimmerling writes:

In his lifetime Kimmerling has witnessed the rise and decline of the veteran Ashkenazi elite and its failure to establish an Israeli society in accordance with its vision. Relying on the myths it has constructed around its experience, this elite tried through the policy of melting pot to convert the other Jewish groups into its constructed image of Israeli-ness. Thus Kimmerling writes: “The purpose was . . . to create a new collective identity or nationalism—shaped by a model that firmly fix [sic] the original Yishuv culture as the only legitimate model within the collectivity and as a source of cultural capital. Central to this new identity was the idea of the state . . . or ‘state-ness’ and the melting doctrine” (p. 97). The constructed image of Israeli-ness is an ideal type (to use Max Weber’s term), which encompasses various characteristic of individual identity such as being secular, cultured, muscular (which includes readiness to do physically demanding work and to fight), ready to be recruited for the fulfillment of collective goals, and educated.

Since the early 1970s this elite has been challenged by the national religious sub-culture. This group was the first to rise against the decadent regime of Labor Zionism due to its ambiguous attitude toward religion. While constructing itself as a liberal movement guided by the principle of the Enlightenment, Zionism needed Judaism to gain legitimacy among Jews and to bolster its claims for Palestine. Consequently it gave a certain space for Jewish symbols
In my opinion, Kimmerling successfully integrates various themes and theses that have been advanced by students of Israeli society, particularly among the third generation social scientists. This includes his discussion of topics and issues that are considered “radical” in the Israeli academic discourse, such as the characterization of Israeli society as a colonial settler one, his incorporation of militarism as an essential determinant in the development of Israeli society, and the major role that the Israeli-Arab conflict has played in the changes in Israeli society and Israeli-ness.

Although Kimmerling soberly composed a disillusioned study of his society, he failed to take notice of some essential determinants in his narrative such as demography and globalization. After all, one should bear in mind that the failure of the melting pot has to do in part with the demographic inferiority of the declining elite. Moreover, globalization directly challenges Israeli-ness since Israeli-ness is self-portrayed as part of “Western civilization.” At the theoretical level, Kimmerling bases his study mostly on conservative sociological theories, and he writes in a positivistic style, two features he inherited from the first and second generations of Israeli sociologists. Thus, his book is plagued with jargon that renders it inaccessible to a wider audience.

Kimmerling, like most of his Israeli-Jewish colleagues across the generations, is inattentive to the bulk of research that the Palestinians have produced. Moreover, his decision to discuss the Palestinian citizens of Israel in chapter 5, which deals with “the newcomers,” is puzzling. Also, there are various inaccuracies and misrepresentations of historical events, particularly in chapter 1. Overall, however, the book constitutes a significant scholarly achievement, and it is doubtlessly the most sober and penetrating socio-historical analysis of Israeli society available to specialists and students. I highly recommend it for those who are interested in Israeli society and the Israeli-Arab conflict.

**PAPAL COURTING OF ISRAEL**


**Reviewed by George Emile Irani**

This edited book is an interesting and useful compendium of analyses dealing with the historical, sociological, religious, and legal dimensions of the “Fundamental Agreement between the Holy See and the State of Israel” signed on 30 December 1993. Editor Marshall Breger, professor of law at the Catholic University of America, has authored several publications dealing with the question of Jerusalem and the holy places, and most of the contributors are well-known experts either directly or indirectly involved in influencing Israeli and Vatican policies. In this volume, they deal with key issues in bilateral Vatican-Israeli relations, such as the legal dimension and implications of the accord; the status of the holy places and the future of Christian presence in the Holy Land; Catholic-Jewish relations; issues of religious freedom; and the still controversial and unresolved issue of Israel's fiscal policy toward Catholic ecclesiastical property in Israel and occupied Jerusalem.

The subtext of this book is that the Holy See's agreement with the Jewish State is hostage to the ebbs and flows of internal Israeli politics and the tactical realities spawned by the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, including Jerusalem. Those who thought the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Israel would be an important watershed leading to better understanding and more cooperation have been proven wrong by events on the ground. That is, Israel's constant expropriation or acquisition of Church-owned property, its harassment of clergy, its manipulation of inter-Palestinian politics for political purposes as exemplified by the Nazareth mosque controversy (1997–1999), and its 2002 siege and occupation of the venerated Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem, all contributed to continuing tension in Vatican-Israeli relations.

Since the early days of the Zionist movement and its stated aim to establish a homeland for the Jews in Palestine, reactions by the Holy See have been mostly negative.

The central concern of the Papacy was and still is the status and fate of the Holy Places and the Catholic presence and interests in the Holy Land. Since 1948, there has been an evolution in the attitude of the Holy See toward Israel. Silvio Ferrari, professor of ecclesiastical law at the University of Milan, paints an excellent and objective vista of the evolution of Vatican-Israeli relations, especially after 1967, when the holy places of Christianity in the Old City of Jerusalem fell under Israeli control and the Vatican opted for informal talks with the Israeli government in order to work out a modus vivendi regarding the status of Catholic interests in Palestine. This evolution can be characterized as having a mixture of theological prejudice and political pragmatism.

The other contributors help the reader to understand the historical and legal context in which the “Fundamental Accord” was negotiated. Between 1989 and 1993, major historical events took place on the world scene: the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the return to democracy in many Central European states; the U.S.-led Gulf War against Iraq (1990); and the beginning of the Middle East peace process (1991) and the Oslo accord (1993). The Vatican was concerned not to be left out of the “peace process,” especially when the issues related to the future of Jerusalem were to be discussed as part of the U.S.-brokered Israeli-Palestinian final status negotiations. A major objective of the Holy See was protection of the religious rights of non-Jewish communities living in Israel and the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories; given that human rights cannot be divided, this concern pertained to the rights of Muslims, as well as to those of Christians (see further the studies by Michael Dumper: The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967 [Columbia University Press, 1997], and The Politics of Sacred Space: The Old City of Jerusalem in the Middle East Conflict [Lynne Rienner, 2002]). The Vatican, according to the chapters by David-Maria Jaeger and Ferrari, adopted the same process used in the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which made human rights a litmus test in East-West relations. The Papacy hoped that a similar process could be extended to the whole Middle East because peace and security cannot be consolidated without ironclad guarantees for the respect and protection of human rights, foremost the right of worship and belief (chapters by Giorgio Fallback and David Rosen).

One major lacuna in this volume is its failure to include any Arab and Palestinian perspectives. For example, there is a chapter on the agreement between the Holy See and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), but it was written by an Israeli lawyer. In this case, it would have been more valuable to present a Palestinian perspective, especially by an official such as the PLO representative in the United Kingdom and the Holy See. In hindsight, ten years after the signing of the Vatican-Israel “Fundamental Accord,” the relationship between the two is still determined by theological prejudice and political pragmatism. The symbolism surrounding Papal statements and actions cannot overcome realpolitik. Was Stalin right, then, when he asked his famous question: “How many divisions has the Pope?”

SAID’S HUMANISM


Reviewed by W. J. T. Mitchell

Of all the sides of Edward Said’s multifaceted career as a musician, music critic, intellectual historian, autobiographer, public intellectual, and polemicist, his life as a scholar was perhaps the most quiet and conservative. Although Said was a literary theorist and a pioneer in the use of Michel Foucault’s methods, he never was identified with the vanguard of French theory. And although he often was called a founding father of “postcolonial” theory, he never really felt comfortable with the implications of the “post-” and regarded colonialism as still (unfortunately) alive and well in the late twentieth century. The fact is that he had an ambivalent relationship with some of the most innovative trends in recent criticism, often deploring its use of rebarbative language, urging on younger scholars the importance of remaining committed to old-fashioned institutions such as “literature,” including (but not restricted to) the great writers of the Western canon. Said remained pretty much unmoved by

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those forms of radical or “progressive” criticism that denounce the “elite,” or “Western,” or “phallocentric” literatures produced by “dead white males.” He was at home with Swift and Austen and Conrad and loved the masterworks of the Western canon despite their sometimes undeniable complicity in imperialist ideology. Said was a devoted formalist in an age that thought it had gone beyond formalism, an aesthete in an age of ideology critique, and a humanist in a time of post- and anti-humanism.

Yet it would be a drastic mistake to think of Said’s conservative commitments as retrograde or reactionary. He was in dialogue with the literary masters of the past, not on his knees before them. And his humanism was anything but a reflexive return to the past. If anything, it was a scholarly posture that grounded his critical stance toward the present and toward possible futures both in culture and in politics. Humanism and Democratic Criticism is the closest thing I know to a gathering and recounting of what I have been calling Said’s conservative scholarly principles. He explores here his debts to the great tradition of European philology, particularly the work of Leo Spitzer and Erich Auerbach. He traces the lineage of humanism to Vico’s insistence on secular and historical explanations of cultural monuments and explores the “tragic flaw” of radical incompleteness that he finds “constitutive” of the “whole idea of humanism” (p. 12). Above all, he tries to disentangle an authentic core of humanism—dialectical, restless, and contrapuntal—from the misuses that have been made of it in the service of racist forms of Eurocentrism, neoclassical polemics against critical innovation, and the hollow puffery of “canonical humanism” represented by Harold Bloom.

In response to Saul Bellow’s mean-spirited challenge—“Show me the Zulu Proust”—Said offers the openness and curiosity of the intellectual who is prepared to find value, and new kinds of value, any place that the human imagination is at work.

Said’s book walks a tightrope, in other words, between the latest rages in academic criticism and the conservative reactions to them. He steers his own perilous course, mobilizing the historical and archival resources of a universal and inclusive humanism (one which also grounded his political writings and made it possible for him to see beyond separatist and nationalist “solutions” to the Israel/Palestine conflict). To this he adds the imperative of what he calls “democratic criticism,” a critical practice that is ceaselessly in ferment, engaged in debate and dialogue, and not merely exercising fixed canons of judgment to issue “rulings” or fatwas based in doctrine. This side of his work reminds me of the great art historian, Leo Steinberg, who insisted that true criticism is based, not only in the imperative to make a judgment, but in the need constantly to interrogate the grounds of judgment and to ponder the possibility that “other criteria” besides the ones with which one has grown comfortable may be pressed upon us by the emergence of new writers and artists and new frames for thinking about culture as such. A democracy for Said is a place where power grows out of arguments, knowledge, language, eloquence, and reason—in short, out of the resources made available by humanism and criticism. “Democratic criticism,” then, means the right to dissent and the obligation to dissent. It is the refusal to be passive or silent, the insistence on “speaking the truth to power.” Death will not silence his voice, and humanism of the sort he espoused will never die.