THE POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES OF AMERICAN LAWYERS

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ABSTRACT

The ideology of American lawyers has been a persistent source of discussion and debate. Two obstacles, however, have prevented this topic from being systematically studied: the sheer number of attorneys in the USA and the need for a methodology that makes comparing the ideology of specific individuals possible. In this article, we present a comprehensive mapping of lawyers’ ideologies that has overcome these hurdles. We use a new dataset that links the largest database of political ideology with the largest database of lawyers’ identities to complete the most extensive analysis of the political ideology of American lawyers ever conducted.

INTRODUCTION

Reflecting on the role of lawyers in the early American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville famously wrote, “[i]n America there are no nobles or men of letters, and the people is apt to mistrust the wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest political class, and the most cultivated circle of society” (de Tocqueville 1840, p. 514). Noting their political influence, he further observed that, “[i]f I were asked where I place the American aristocracy, I should reply without hesitation that it is not composed of the rich, who are united together by no common tie, but that it occupies the judicial bench and the bar.”

Nearly two centuries later, de Tocqueville’s observations have largely remained accurate (Posner 2009). In the 113th Congress, 156 of the 435 members of the House of Representatives and 55 out of the 100 Senators elected were lawyers (Manning 2014). Moreover, twenty-five out of forty-three

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Presidents have been lawyers (Slater 2008). Turning to state executive positions, twenty-four out of the current fifty state governors have law degrees.¹ In addition being heavily overrepresented in elected branches of government, lawyers have the privilege of exclusively occupying an entire branch of government. All state high court justices are former lawyers, and thirty-two states explicitly require that their high court justices be former lawyers (Barton 2014, p. 30). All judges currently serving on the federal courts are lawyers, as are all nine justices sitting on the Supreme Court.

The influence of the nation’s bar extends from elected politics into policy making and beyond. For example, by some counts, 8 percent of the nation’s lawyers work in government (American Bar Association 2012). Lawyers are also heavily overrepresented among Fortune 500 CEOs and CFOs (Wecker 2012). Within academia, law schools occupy the “crown jewel” positions at universities such as Harvard, Yale, Berkeley, and UCLA, with large law faculty and revenue-generating streams (Winterhalter 2013). Moreover, the American Bar Association has nearly 400,000 members, making it one of the largest advocacy organizations in the country—behind only the American Association for the Advancement of Science in terms of total number of members (American Bar Association 2015). The ABA is also one of the largest and most powerful lobbying groups in the United States.

Given the importance of lawyers in American public life, the ideologies of lawyers is a constant a source of discussion and debate among both academics and journalists. For example, commentators often discuss whether law firms are liberal or conservative based on the reputations of a few prominent partners, or—in perhaps the most comprehensive analysis prior to this study of the ideology of law firms—based on donations to two candidates in a single election (Muller 2013). Similarly, the ideologies of law schools have been examined using proxies like the breakdown of judges that law students clerk for after graduation (Roeder 2014). As these examples illustrate, the evidence used to study the ideology of American lawyers has mostly been anecdotal or incomplete, and systematic scholarship has remained elusive.

These analyses have remained limited for two reasons. The first reason is that, given the massive number of attorneys in the USA, any study of the legal profession as a whole is a daunting task. With more than 1.1 million law school graduates in America (Brown 2013), conducting a comprehensive analysis of even simple data—addresses, law school attended, practice

¹ Based on the biographies of all sitting American governors from Wikipedia on February 6, 2015.
area, etc.—has been beyond the reach of even sophisticated quantitative scholars. The second reason is methodological: a systematic analysis of the legal profession requires developing a way to place individuals on a single, easily comparable ideological dimension.

We address both of these issues by relying on a new dataset that links the most comprehensive database of political ideology with the most comprehensive database of lawyers’ identities. Our data on ideological leanings is from the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME). The DIME data leverage the vast number of federal campaign contributions made by individuals. By scaling not just whom the contributions were made to, but also by what amount, the DIME data can be used to assess an individual’s ideological leaning. Our data on the identity of American lawyers is from the Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory. Martindale-Hubbell provides the “most comprehensive database of lawyers in the country.”2 By linking the DIME data with the Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory, we therefore have access to the largest and most comprehensive dataset ever amassed on the ideological leanings of the legal profession.

We use this combined data to explore the ideology of American lawyers in five ways. First, we tackle the question of the ideological leanings of the legal profession taken as a whole. Second, we consider the relationship between geography and the ideology of lawyers. Third, we examine the relationship between lawyers’ educational backgrounds and ideology. Fourth, we explore how ideology varies across firms and within firms. Fifth, we look at the ideologies of lawyers by practice area.

We proceed in this article as follows. In Section 1, we motivate our inquiry by expanding on our observations about the importance of the bar and by discussing existing studies that examine its ideological positioning. Section 2 begins the discussion of the two datasets that we use in the analysis, which are (i) the DIME database of campaign contributions for ideological data and (ii) the Martindale-Hubbell legal directory. This section is more technical and explains how the two databases were linked with each other, as well as possible sources of bias. In Section 3, we present our basic findings regarding the overall ideological distribution of attorneys. In the following sections, we disaggregate the legal profession further. Section 4 disaggregates the ideology of lawyers by their geographic location. Section 5 analyzes the distribution of lawyers’ ideology by their educational experience. Section 6 presents the ideology of lawyers

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by the law firms where they work. Section 7 explores the ideology of lawyers by their practice area.

1. STUDYING THE IDEOLOGY OF LAWYERS

We start with the broad issue of the importance of the bar and its role in American politics and society. We explore these issues in this section by examining existing studies that have looked at the ideological composition of the bar. In so doing, we note that much research on this point has suffered from an absence of clear, comprehensive data. We therefore devote some attention in this section to explaining how ideological measures have been developed in this literature as well as in other fields.

1.1 What We Know About Ideology and the Bar

Despite their political importance, we know relatively little about the ideologies of American lawyers. It is worth contrasting this with how much scholars do know about other politically important groups. For example, there is a generally accurate consensus that Congress tilts to the political left or to the political right depending on electoral outcomes and the public opinion milieu. In fact, scholars have been able to determine these ideological leanings very accurately and in a dynamic fashion, enabling us to compare the ideologies of different Congressional sessions and of individual Congressional representatives and Presidents (see, e.g., Poole et al. 1997; Bailey 2007; Poole & Rosenthal 2007; Carroll et al. 2009). When it comes to the media, statistical studies too have quantified political leanings, showing that some news organization are more or less liberal or conservative in their representation of the news (see, e.g., Groseclose & Milyo 2005; Barberá & Sood 2014). More recent work has begun untangling how the public’s ideology varies by jurisdiction; for example, Tausanovitch and Warshaw (2013) develop estimation techniques that rely on public opinion survey data and that place localities on an ideological scale. Perhaps most apropos to the work we do here, research by Bonica has used campaign contribution data to open up the estimation of ideologies across different professions (Bonica 2014). For example, Bonica et al. (2014) looked at the ideologies of the medical profession, finding that some specialties lean more to the left and others more to the right. Given that the American Medical Association is a powerful lobbying and professional organization, understanding the ideologies of doctors gives some insight into the potential lobbying and policy priorities made by that organization. Taken together, this literature is indicative of significant scholarly advances into the exploration of American
ideologies, both of the American public and of American political and professional elites.

However, substantially less is known about the politics of the nation’s lawyers. Instead, the scholarship that does exist focuses on specific aspects of lawyers’ ideology and fails to provide a comprehensive picture of the profession as a whole. For example, within the scholarly literature, some have approached the question via the lens of judicial selection. Most recently, Bonica and Sen (2015) posit that since the nation’s judges are drawn from the nation’s pool of attorneys, they must somewhat reflective of lawyer ideology. They instead find that lawyers tilt to the left, while judges tilt to the right. However, because Bonica and Sen (2015) primarily explore judicial politics, despite using data similar to the data used in this study, they do not explore lawyers’ ideology specifically.

Additional writing on these issues comes from members of the press and other public commentators—particularly when the questions turn to the influence of the bar on national politics. Many conservative commentators have made the point that lawyers—particularly trial lawyers—appear more liberal than the rest of the population.

For example, Trial Lawyers Inc. (2003) put together an online report with the aim of “shedding light on the size, scope and inner workings of America’s lawsuit industry.” The report comments that:

[I]n the 2002 electoral cycle, members of Williams & Bailey, one of the largest personal-injury firms in Texas, gave $2.4 million to federal campaigns; lawyers at securities class action giant Milberg Weiss gave $1.4 million; Baron & Budd, headed by former ATLA president and asbestos class action lawyer Fred Baron, accounted for $1.1 million; and prominent asbestos and tobacco litigator Peter Angelos’s firm gave $1.9 million. Each of these firms’ members gave at least 99% of their contributions to Democrats. All told, the litigation industry has contributed $470 million to federal campaigns since 1990. (emphasis added)

These observations spill over into critiques of the Democratic Party for siding overwhelmingly with the interest of the bar and of trial lawyers. For example, a 2010 editorial in The Washington Times complained that these liberal ties are intimately related to liberal-leaning policies, arguing that “the main reason Democrats don’t include lawsuit reform in their health care proposals is that they are afraid of angering the plaintiffs’ lawyers. And bill after bill after bill in the Democratic Congress, on a bewildering variety of issues, contain hidden provisions that would further enrich those attorneys.”

systematic analysis of Congressional House votes in which “litigious policy was
the main matter of dispute,” Burke (2004, p. 188) finds that Democrats “voted
for the pro-litigation side on an average of 67 percent of the votes” and
“Republicans 17 percent.” In addition, on several of the votes, “the litigious
policy under review served Democratic objectives and so received the vast
majority of Democratic votes.” Burke concludes that it was “an ideological
struggle, in which liberals typically favored litigious policies and conservatives
opposed them.”

Taken together, these scholarly and journalistic accounts paint a picture of a
liberal-leaning bar. However, a limiting factor in all of these analyses appears to
be data availability. This is understandable: it is difficult enough to accurately
capture individual ideology and all but impossible to do so on a scale massive
enough to capture (even a share of) the population of over one million attor-
neys in the USA. We therefore turn to a more thorough discussion of the
methodological issues involved and how the measures used here fit into this
broader literature.

1.2 Methodological Approaches to Ideology

The first hurdle to developing a comprehensive picture of the ideology of
American lawyers is developing a methodology that allows for the comparison
of ideologies across individuals. This requires having a way to compare the
ideology of specific individuals even if they have not voted on the same
issues (the way that members of Congress do on legislation or Supreme
Court Justices do on cases) and even if they have not donated money to political
candidates in the same election cycle. Although there have not been prior efforts
to develop methods to study the ideology of lawyers specifically, thinking
through ways to rigorously measure ideology generally has been one of the
major projects of political scientists over the last several decades. A great deal
can thus be gained by leveraging the insights that have been developed in those
other areas. To do so, it is worth beginning with the area where the measure-
ment of ideology has been primarily developed: the United States Congress.

Scholars have devised several mechanisms by which to estimate the ideologies
of Congressional actors. The most well-known of the mechanisms is DW-
NOMINATE scores (Poole & Rosenthal 1997; Poole et al. 2011). Under the
assumptions that representatives and Senators cast votes that are close
to their true ideological positioning, the DW-NOMINATE methodology lever-
age Congressional roll call votes across different issues to measure ideology of
individuals. The method uses the roll call votes of Members of Congress to
collapse ideology into two dimensions: one is believed to be regarding eco-
nomic issues and the other is believed to be regarding social or racial issues.
These two dimensions appear to go quite far in explaining variance in Congressional votes.

One methodological issue in estimating these sorts of votes is that Congressional representatives need to be compared to each other. That is, viewing Representative Barney Frank’s (D-MA) votes in isolation is meaningless when trying to understand his relative ideology. We can only obtain information about Frank’s ideological positioning once we compare his voting record with other representatives—for example, to those of Representative John Boehner (R-OH). That is, we need multiple representatives to cast votes on the same issue. Lacking this information means that we must search for a bridge to compare people against each other. For example, given that Frank retired in 2007, we can still use votes that he cast along with Boehner, and then use Boehner (and others like him) as a bridge to compare Frank’s record with those of his successors (with whom he did not overlap).

This strategy of “bridging” means that actors from various institutions—for example, the Senate and the House, or the 113th House and the 110th House—can be placed ideologically on a single scale (see, e.g., Bailey 2007). Denoted in the literature as Common Space Scores, these consistently scaled scores allow political scientists to compare political actors across various branches of government. This basic insight—that bridging enables the comparison of individual ideology across time periods and institutions—provides the rough blueprint for how it can be possible to measure the ideology of American lawyers.

1.3 Methodological Approaches to Ideology in a Legal Context

Lawyers present specific challenges when it comes to estimating ideology. So far, academics studying the ideology of lawyers have focused on estimating judicial ideology, most notably the ideologies of U.S. Supreme Court Justices. There are three reasons for this. First, for many, the Supreme Court represents the pinnacle of the American legal system and certainly attracts the most attention from members of the press and the public. Second, as many have observed, ideological rifts are becoming more and more palpable (Devins & Baum 2014). Third, and perhaps most importantly from a methodological perspective, the Supreme Court sits as an en banc panel of nine judges. This allows scholars to compare, for example, how Antonin Scalia has voted on the same set of cases as Ruth Bader Ginsburg. There are consequently fewer obstacles in bridging ideologies because all nine Justices (or some subset thereof) hear the same set of cases.

The literature here is well developed. For example, in an influential paper, Martin and Quinn (2002) developed flexible scores that take into account not only the Justices’ relative voting compared to each other, but also how their
relative ideologies could change over time. These Martin-Quinn scores have shown that justices fluctuate in important ways over the course of their careers, that certain justices tend to occupy the important “median” justice position, and that Court rulings can reliably be predicted on the basis of little else besides the justices’ Martin-Quinn scores. Of course, Martin-Quinn scores are not the only measures of Supreme Court ideology. For example, Segal and Cover (1989) have developed scores that rely on newspaper editorials and other writings at the time of nomination, pinpointing the then-candidate’s (i) qualifications in tandem with their (ii) perceived ideology. These scores have been further combined with DW-NOMINATE scores and re-scaled to test additional theories of judicial behavior (Cameron & Park 2009). Additionally, new research takes voting-based ideological measurements and combines them with issue-area voting and text analysis (Bailey 2013; Lauderdale & Clark 2014). An attractive property of these analyses is that they combine substantive knowledge of legal issue areas and salience with text-based estimation. These studies show that justices’ ideologies vary not just over time, but also across different kinds of legal questions.

The Supreme Court, however, presents an idiosyncratic example within the law. Not only do all nine Justices (usually) hear cases together, but the fact that vacancies are staggered means that we usually have a solid base on which to “bridge” ideologies across natural courts. The absence of these two features becomes a roadblock when we turn to the ideologies of lower court judges or lawyers where there is no bridging to be done. Thus, for lower court appointments—including judges serving on courts such as the Federal Courts of Appeals—a more common strategy for determining judicial ideology is to rely on the DW-NOMINATE score of the appointing actor. This is usually operationalized by using the DW-NOMINATE score of either the appointing President or, in the case where the President and the Senator(s) of the home state are of the same party, the DW-NOMINATE score of the senior Senator (or some combination of the two) (Epstein et al. 2007). However, these measures assume that ideologies across judges appointed by the same Presidents (or same Senators, in some instances) are constant—a fairly implausible assumption.

For state court judges, the question becomes even more difficult, as the “identity” of the appointing actors is a state-by-state patchwork of direct elections, appointments, and elections plus appointments. In this context, the dominant measure of state judge ideology is the PAJID scores developed in Hall, Brace, and Langer (2000). These scores rely on a combination of elite ideological scores combined with public ideology measures. More recently, Bonica and Sen (2015) and Bonica and Woodruff (2015) have made advancements on these measures using the DIME data that we also rely on here.

When it comes to the ideology of individuals neither elected nor appointed to any kind of public office, a common strategy used to estimate the ideologies of
these actors has been to examine campaign contributions. The logic of this approach is that contributions are likely made to ideological allies. Using this method, McGinnis et al. (2005) examined campaign contributions made by law professors and found that they are overwhelmingly made to left-leaning political actors. More recently, Chilton and Posner (2015) found that law professors’ political contributions predict the ideological leanings of their scholarship.

Although using campaign contributions as a proxy for ideology makes it possible to study individuals who are neither judges nor legislators, it is worth noting that concerns have been raised with this approach. Perhaps the primary concern is the possibility of strategic donation—that is, donations that are made strategically for career purposes or for other kinds of non-ideological reasons. We will consider this possibility, as well as other concerns, below as we explain the data we use here and how our measures were developed.

2. DATA AND METHODS

The findings that we present in this article stem from a fruitful combination of two existing data sources: (i) the Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) and (ii) the Martindale-Hubbell legal directory. We discuss each in turn and then explain how we link the two databases together. While doing so, we pay specific attention to the challenges raised by problems with missing data, selection effects, and strategic giving.4

2.1 DIME

As we noted in the previous section, calculating individual ideologies is not only difficult but requires a massive data collection effort. We therefore use a recently developed data source called the DIME, maintained by Stanford University (Bonica 2013a). DIME started with the premise of collecting and standardizing contributions made to campaigns and then ultimately disclosed under FEC laws. As with other studies that examine campaign contributions data, the logic behind DIME is that an individual will “put his money where his mouths is.” That is, we can reasonably expect that an individual will contribute financial funds toward a political candidate, PAC, or other kind of political entity that represents his or her political beliefs. Furthermore, we can also logically expect that the target of donations will be more like their donors—that is, an entity like the NRA will ideologically be aligned with its many donors and vice versa. In addition, we further expect that it is not simply the target of

4 For additional technical details, see Bonica & Sen (2015), Bonica & Woodruff (2015), and Bonica (2014).
the funds, but also the amount, that reflects underlying ideology (within FEC campaign contributions limits). For example, we might think that a $2,000 contribution to Barack Obama indicates a stronger connection with Obama’s ideological positioning than would, say, a $5 contribution to Obama. Thus, contributions can be thought of having both a direction (in terms of the identity of the contributor and recipient) and also a scale (in terms of the amount).

Although the machinery of this estimation strategy is described in more technical detail elsewhere (Bonica 2014), a brief orientation is merited. DIME takes the campaign contributions data and rescales them by analyzing distances between various points. The key contribution of the analysis is that it takes contributions data and rescales them into a single, unidimensional scale that comports roughly with the standard common space score scale. These “CFscores” are oriented similarly to NOMINATE scores, with negative values associated with liberalism and positive values associated with conservatism. CFscores are also reported for any individual who has made a campaign contribution from 1979 to 2012, representing some “51,572 candidates and 6,408 political committees as recipients and 13.7 million individuals and 1.3 million organizations as donors” (Bonica 2013b). This means that nearly 5 percent of the U.S. population is captured in the DIME data.

A potential source of concern could be that some donations are made strategically—that is, that individuals could be making contributions in ways that are fundamentally unrelated to their ideological views. This is particularly a concern for those individuals who aspire to occupy a higher office or who view political support as a strategic tool to another position or for personal advancement. While this concern is legitimate, we note that several factors counsel against this substantially biasing our results (particularly when we consider the size of the sample involved). The first is that strategic giving is likely a concern primarily for those who have the most to gain—like those involved in political aspects of the legal system. That is, making a strategic choice in giving might influence how judges, prosecutors, and lawyers interested in pursuing political office decide to contribute. Although this is a sizeable number of lawyers, it is still fairly small compared to the overall number of lawyers. Second, even focusing in on this group, the CFscores are robust to factors known in the political science literature to be related to strategic giving—such as potentially strategic giving to those candidates who are more likely to win (Bonica 2014, pp. 373–76). Third, when we constrain the

5 Concerns about strategic giving are discussed at length in Bonica (2014) and Bonica & Woodruff (2015). Additionally, Bonica & Sen (2015) provide additional discussion of this issue in the context of judicial ideology.
sample to only examine those who both receive and make contributions (e.g., political actors who are eligible to receive campaign contributions), we find that the CFscores calculated using either contributions received or contributions made yield the same inferences. Taken together, these factors counsel against the presumption that strategic giving substantially biases the analyses that we present here. Instead, we believe that the DIME database provides the best possible source of reliable data for studying the ideology of American lawyers.

2.2 Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory

DIME provides a wealth of data relating to Americans’ political ideologies. It does not, however, allow us to identify attorneys or members of the legal profession. Our next task is therefore to try to uncover the identities of American attorneys. This is no small feat. To our knowledge, no national database is kept by the American Bar Association or any other professional organization. In addition, although many states keep good records of individuals who are licensed to practice law in their state, no such national databases exist.

Although it is far from perfect, our solution is to turn to private databases for this information. Specifically, we use the Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory. Founded in 1868, the purpose of the Martindale-Hubbell directory was to centralize lawyers’ information and make it more accessible for clients and private individuals looking for legal representation. Although the advent of the Internet has somewhat obviated the need for the Martindale-Hubbell database, the directory still contains thousands of entries, spanning all fifty states and practice areas. Given the lack of a national lawyers database, many legal scholars and journalists have cited the Martindale-Hubbell database as being one of the more comprehensive directories of American lawyers (see, e.g., Young 2008; Whisner 2015).

All entries included in the Martindale-Hubbell directory contain some basic information. This includes the lawyer’s (i) name, (ii) professional address, (iii) bar state and admission date, (iv) law school attended, and (v) employer type. In addition, nearly all of the listings also include (vi) name of law office/firm or employer, (vii) position/professional title (e.g., partner or associate), (viii) undergraduate institution, and (ix) specialty/practice areas. Additionally, a significant percentage of listings included even more information voluntarily provided by the lawyer, such as (x) detailed employment history, (xi) judicial clerkships along with the name of the judge, (xii) lists of prominent clients, and (xiii) prominent cases argued. Since some lawyers choose to provide more information and others do not, these last four items are incomplete sources of
Furthermore, each listing includes each lawyer’s International Standard Bar Number (ISBN), which is assigned by the American Bar Association and remains the same over the course of a lawyer’s career. This helps assuage concerns that a single lawyer could have multiple entries (and therefore be biasing our findings).

One caveat to relying on the Martindale-Hubbell database is the possibility of missingness in the data. To our knowledge, no comprehensive study has explored the completeness of the data contained or collected in the Martindale-Hubbell directory. Thus, we do not know whether the directory systematically underreports or whether some lawyers are more likely to allow their information to be posted publicly. If data were missing in this way, it could possibly bias in some of our findings. For example, it could be the case that more conservative lawyers routinely eschew or disallow their information to be posted. If this were the case, then our analysis would indicate a liberal bias among the bar even though no bias in fact exists. A similar pattern could be observed if it were the case that individuals avoided publishing their details for reasons that are superficially non-ideological but still vary systematically according to ideology.

Despite these concerns, for the most part, we believe that attorneys in private practice are unlikely to opt against being listed in the Martindale-Hubbell directory. However, we do note that this incentive might not be constant across all practice areas. For example, attorneys who operate within the criminal justice system—for example, public defenders or prosecutors—might have less of a need to keep their information in the Martindale-Hubbell directory updated. Lastly, we note that Martindale-Hubbell does not include in its database those who attended law school but never took the bar exam (in other words, individuals who could perhaps be considered part of the legal profession even if they are not practicing attorneys). We have no reason to believe that this would covary with ideology in a way that would substantially bias our results, but this is an important caveat to our analyses.

2.3 Linking DIME to Martindale-Hubbell

Our next task was to link these two databases—that is, to locate the corresponding CFscore for the Martindale-Hubbell entries. More technical details of the approach are described in Bonica and Sen (2015), but this quick overview will describe our method generally. To link the two databases, we programmed

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6 When available, our record-linkage algorithm referenced these last items as a way to augment our matching algorithm. However, we do not include any information from items (ix) through (xii) in the main analysis.
an algorithm to locate and pair up individuals who were located in both databases.

The algorithm worked as follows. First, the program scanned the DIME records to identify donors who are listed as attorneys—either via (i) self-identification as attorneys, lawyers, etc., (ii) identification of their employer as a recognized law firm or a company or organization identified as “law office,” “LLP,” etc., or (iii) self-identification with a suffix such as “Esq.,” “J.D.”

Second, the algorithm then used this information to search the Martindale-Hubbell directory to search for possible matches, comparing (i) first, last, and middle names, (ii) suffix or title, (iii) address (city, state, and zip codes), (iv) firm or employer, and (v) geographic proximity. The matching algorithm was deliberately calibrated to be “less greedy” so as to minimize the probability of false matches (e.g., including people who were not attorneys). This was a choice we made to minimize the likelihood of systematic bias at the expense of possibly introducing random noise.

We also relied on the Martindale-Hubbell directory information for practice area; these were compiled from written descriptions provided in each individual’s listing. Since these lacked structured categorization, we grouped them into a more general set of distinct categories using automated content analyses techniques. We also note that Martindale-Hubbell includes some additionally potentially useful information. For example, many attorneys in private practice listed notable or important clients in their profiles. However, because these sorts of data were provided apparently at the request of the profiled attorney and not all attorneys provided such data (or did so in a consistent fashion), we did not use them in our analysis.

Again, we note that one potential area of concern here is selection bias—in this context, the possibility that some attorneys may appear in one database but not the other. For example, some attorneys may be active legal professionals but not active campaign contributors. This would mean they would be absent from the DIME database and have no corresponding CFscore. Such a scenario raises concerns not just for the study of lawyers’ ideologies using DIME, but more broadly for DIME’s use in other contexts (see, e.g., Bonica, Rosenthal, & Rothman 2014). Fortunately, attorneys are extremely active contributors: 422 attorneys in Martindale-Hubbell were also listed in DIME. This corresponds to a donation rate of approximately 43.4 percent.

Although this giving rate is very high—about ten times higher than the general U.S. population—it could be the case that those attorneys who donate differ systematically from those who do not. To test for this possibility,

7 Records with titles associated with paralegals or office clerks were screened out.
we performed several additional analyses that take into account the probability that an attorney identified in Martindale-Hubbell also appeared in DIME, comparing the results using selection corrections with results that do not use such corrections. Although those results are not presented here, they show that the substantive inferences associated with a larger or smaller CFscore are substantively identical when using a selection model versus not using one. We therefore move forward noting that many concerns should be mitigated by (i) the extremely high donor share in the population and (ii) the fact that selection models show substantively similar results to what we present here.8

3. BASIC DISTRIBUTION OF LAWYERS’ IDEOLOGIES

We now turn to exploring the basic data structure and patterns for the overall population of American lawyers. We do so in three parts. First, we present data on the overall distribution of the ideology of American lawyers. Second, we put this information in context by showing the distribution of lawyers’ ideology in comparison to other well-educated professions. Third, we go further in depth by showing how various factors—like gender, experience, and practice type—predict the ideology of American lawyers.

3.1 Overall Distribution of Lawyers’ Ideology

Figure 1 displays the ideological distribution of all American lawyers, oriented from most liberal (negative on the CFscore scale) to most conservative (positive on the CFscore scale).9 The histogram bars here—and in subsequent figures presented in the article—represent frequencies. Taller bars mean that more lawyers fall within a given ideology, and shorter bars mean that fewer lawyers fall within a given ideology.

To ground the discussion and to provide additional context, Figure 1 includes the CFscores of several well-known political figures. On the far left is Alan Grayson—a Congressman from Florida know for his outspoken liberal views. On the far right is Ron Paul—a former presidential candidate and Congressman

8 Additional analyses that we do not report indicate that some traits are linked with a higher probability of being identified in the DIME database. These include, for example, an attorney being older, male, and being a partner (as opposed to an associate). If anything, these are traits that lead to attorneys being more likely to be conservative. Because the data show that lawyers tend to be liberal, this means that, if anything, we are underestimating the degree of liberal bias in the attorney population. A fuller test of selection bias via Heckman selection corrections can be found in Bonica & Sen (2015).

9 A total of 395,254 lawyers are included in Figure 1. The reason that the full 422,362 set of lawyers in our dataset are not included in Figure 1 is that we excluded lawyers who only gave to corporate or trade groups. For more informaiton on this decision, see Bonica & Sen (2015).
Figure 1. Overall Distribution of Lawyers' Ideology.
from Texas known for his libertarian positions. The political figures placed in between include Barack Obama, Bill Clinton, Hilary Clinton, Chris Christie, and Mitt Romney.

Figure 1 reveals four important facts about the ideology of American lawyers. First, American lawyers lean to the left of the ideological spectrum. To help place this in context, the mean DIME score among the attorney population is –0.31 compared to –0.05 for the entire population of donors. Moreover, some 62 percent of the sample of attorneys are positioned to the left of the midpoint between the party means for members of Congress. Moreover, the modal CFscore is in the center-left. This places the average American lawyer’s ideology close to the ideology of Bill Clinton. To be more precise, the modal CFscore for American lawyers is –0.52 and Bill Clinton’s CFscore is –0.68. This confirms prior scholarship and journalism that has argued that the legal profession is liberal on balance. To our knowledge, however, this figure represents the most comprehensive picture of the ideology of American lawyers ever assembled.

Second, although American lawyers lean to the left, there is a (slight) bimodality to the distribution. Although there is certainly a peak of observations located around the center-left, there is also a second, smaller peak in the center-right. In other words, the ideology of American lawyers peaks around Bill Clinton on the left and around Mitt Romney on the right.

Third, there is a relative scarcity of observations at both ends of the ideology spectrum. As Figure 1 clearly shows, very few lawyers are as far left as Alan Grayson or as far right as Ron Paul. This, of course, does not mean that there are no lawyers who hold extreme ideological views. In fact, Alan Grayson is a graduate of Harvard Law School, and Michelle Bachmann is a graduate of the O.W. Coburn School of Law.

Fourth, although the fact that few American lawyers hold extreme ideological positions may suggest that lawyers are generally moderate, it is worth noting that there are relatively few lawyers in the middle of the distribution. In fact, there are fewer lawyers who have an ideology around Olympia Snowe (a former Senator from Maine known for her centrism) than there are around Bernie Sanders (a Senator from Vermont known for being very liberal) or Paul Ryan (a Congressman from Wisconsin known for being very conservative).

3.2 Comparing Lawyers to Other Well-Educated Professionals

Although Figure 1 presents how the distribution of the ideology of lawyers compares to the ideology of prominent political figures, it is difficult to know exactly how to interpret that information without understanding how other professions fare on this same scale. In order to provide more context to the ideology of lawyers, we present the same information alongside the
distributions for donors from other well-educated professions in Figure 2. The six other groups of professionals we include here are technology workers; journalists; academics; accountants; bankers and financial workers; and medical doctors.10

Figure 2 orders the professions from most liberal (technology workers) to most conservative (medical doctors). Most obviously, the data presented in Figure 2 show that there is substantial ideological heterogeneity in the donor populations across these seven professions. That is to say, there are well-educated professions—like journalism—that skew to the left, and there are well-educated professions—like medicine—that skew to the right.

Figure 2 also reveals two facts about the ideology of American lawyers that are worth noting. First, the ideological distribution of lawyers falls exactly in the middle of these seven professions. The distributions for technology workers, journalists, and academics are skewed further to the left. This perhaps confirms existing beliefs about the types of individuals who are attracted to these professions (see, e.g., Mariani and Hewitt 2008). Lawyers as a whole are much more liberal, however, than three of the professions presented. Indeed, the median lawyer is well to the left of the respective medians for accountants; bankers and financial workers; and medical doctors. The difference between those in the legal profession and those in the banking or finance industry is particularly revealing, as corporate law firms and finance firms tend to be centered in comparable metropolitan areas and perhaps draw from the same underlying pools of potential candidates.11

Second, a smaller percentage of lawyers are at the extreme end of the ideological spectrum compared to the other professions shown in Figure 2. For example, technology workers, journalists, and academics are all professions with a sizable percentage of members with a CFscore of less than –1.0. The legal profession on the other hand, albeit liberal overall, has a much lower percentage of outlier members who are extremely liberal or extremely conservative.

3.3 Comparing Lawyers Across Other Characteristics

We now turn to examining our subset of lawyers more closely via a simple regression analysis. Figure 3 graphically presents a regression using a number of important characteristics of each lawyer to estimate that individual’s CFscore.12

10 All professional information is from the DIME database. That is, the information on an individual’s profession was taken from that individual’s campaign contributions disclosure forms. For additional information on this process, as well as robustness checks, see Bonica (2014).

11 These differences are demonstrated to be significant using a series of Kolmorov-Smirnov tests, which check that the shape of the distributions are more different than would be expected due to chance (Bonica & Sen 2015).
Figure 2. Overall Distribution of Well-Educated Professions.
The outcome variable—the individual’s \( CFscore \)—is stylized so that a greater value corresponds with the individual being more conservative. The sample for this regression includes all those individuals from whom we could reliably extract both the \( CFscore \) as well as these various characteristics.\(^{12}\)

\(^{12}\) To be more exact, there are 393,240 observations included in this regression.
In Figure 3, each row represents a different variable included in the regression. The specific variables that we included in this regression are: (i) gender; (ii) the number of years since the individual was admitted to the bar; (iii) whether the individual is identified as a government lawyer, (iv) in-house counsel, (v) Big Law practitioner, (vi) solo practitioner, (vii) a partner in a law firm, (viii) a prosecutor or defense attorney, (ix) a public defender, or (x) a law professor; and (xi) tier of law school attended. Finally, we also include an additional control in the analysis—CD Rep. Pres. Vote Share—which is district-level 2008 Republican presidential vote share and serves as a proxy to control for how conservative (or liberal) a particular jurisdiction where the lawyer lives happens to be.

For each variable, the dots represent the point estimates from the regression (i.e., the coefficients), and the lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval. When a dot is to the left of the vertical zero line, it means that the variable is associated with lawyers being more liberal on average; when a dot is to the right of the vertical zero line, it means that the variable is associated with lawyers being more conservative on average. All of the estimates are precisely estimated and are statistically significant at the 0.00001 level (due in part to the large sample size), meaning that the null hypothesis of no relationship is rejected for all of the variables.

The results in Figure 3 reveal substantive, meaningful differences even within the attorney pool. For example, several groups are significantly more liberal than the average attorney. First, we see the clear pattern that women are more liberal than men (even when controlling for a number of other salient characteristics like years since bar passage and type of legal employment). This is consistent with the more general observation that women in America are on average more liberal than men. Second, government lawyers are more liberal than non-government lawyers. This difference is comparable in magnitude to the difference found for gender and is consistent with expectations that government service attracts those who are more sympathetic with the reaches and aims of government. Third, law professor are more liberal than the attorney population. This effect is slightly smaller in magnitude than gender or government service but fully consistent with earlier studies on the topic (McGinnis et al. 2005; Chilton and Posner 2015). Additionally, public defenders are more liberal than other attorneys.

On the other hand, several traits are associated with attorneys being significantly more conservative. For example, the number of years since being admitted to the bar appears to have a strong conservative pull on attorneys. We also see more conservative individuals being drawn to a career at a Big Law firm (although the effect is small compared to other effects). Further, being a law firm partner is associated with being more conservative. This comports with
what we see for age, which is that, as people advance in their careers, they tend to be more and more conservative.

In terms of education, the patterns are a bit more mixed and implicate our next topic, geography. Figure 3 suggests that attending a top fourteen law school is associated with an individual being more liberal and attending a law school ranked outside of the top 100 is associated with an individual being more conservative. However, geography could play an important role with regard to law schools, with some states’ law schools being more conservative and other states’ law schools being more liberal.

To assess this, we include district-level 2008 Republican presidential vote share in the analysis. This variable serves to control for how conservative (or liberal) a particular jurisdiction happens to be. Including how conservative a potential district is changes the sign on some of the variables in important ways. This is most apparent for Big Law attorneys, who cluster in democratic strongholds like Los Angeles, Washington, D.C., New York City, and San Francisco. Once we condition on how liberal the district is, however, it becomes clear that Big Law attorneys are actually more conservative than those around them, rather than more liberal.

4. IDEOLOGY BY GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION

Our regressions results revealed that the congressional district where an attorney lives is an extremely important predictor of that lawyer’s ideology. This suggests that there is important geographic heterogeneity in the ideology of lawyers, and perhaps that the liberal leaning of American lawyers can be explained in part by where they live. In fact, 65 percent of Big Law attorneys and 44 percent of graduates of elite law schools are located in a select group of ten congressional districts with Democratic presidential vote shares ranging from 74 to 89 percent.13 We explore how the ideology of American lawyers varies by geographic location in two ways. First, we examine the ideology of lawyers by state. Second, we examine the ideology of lawyers in major legal markets.

4.1 Ideology by State

We begin by examining how lawyers’ ideological distributions vary from state to state. A graphical representation of our analysis is presented in Figure 4. All

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13 Those ten congressional districts are DC-01, NY-14, IL-7, NY-08, CA-34, CA-08, GA-05, PA-02, MA-08, and CA-14.
fifty states—as well as the District of Columbia—are presented in alphabetical order.

The plots in Figure 4 demonstrate some substantial geographic sorting, one that belies the idea that the legal profession is a monolithic liberal group. Indeed, we see that lawyers skew strongly to the left in a number of states. For example, in California, the District of Columbia, Michigan, Massachusetts, and New York, the bulk of the ideological distribution lies substantially to the left of the $CFscore$ scale. In addition to these states that are associated with liberal political leanings, there are a few states where the left-leaning tendencies are perhaps surprising. These include a number of Western states, such as Alaska, Colorado, and New Mexico. In these states, as in California or New York, the bulk of the ideological mass lies to the left of center. This perhaps suggests a more liberal role of the bar in those states.

However, the more interesting patterns develop elsewhere, particularly in states where the bar is actually quite conservative. In states such as Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Texas, the average lawyer is conservative. In some states, such as South Dakota, the pattern is quite extreme. In these states, the mass of the ideological distribution lies to the right, with fairly little variance in some cases (e.g., in Oklahoma). These are conservative states to begin with, and the data suggest that the bar might be quite reflective of the general ideological distribution of the state of origin.

We also note a handful of states that display genuinely bimodal ideological distributions. Consider, for example, Arizona. Arizona displays a classic bimodal distribution, with approximately half of the “mass” (e.g., number of observations) over the liberal center and the other half over the conservative center. The same bimodal distribution is also seen in Ohio and Virginia. Interestingly, these are also states that are considered to be solidly bellwether states in terms of Congressional and Presidential elections. The bars in these states, which are ideologically mixed and bimodal, appear to reflect these patterns.

We also note one further pattern, which are the handful of states that appear to conform to a more traditional unimodal ideological distribution. These include Florida, West Virginia (slightly to the left), and possibly Oklahoma (slightly to the right).

### 4.2 Ideology by Major Legal Market

In addition to examining the distribution of lawyers’ ideology by state, we also examined the distributions by major legal market. We constructed geo-coordinates based on addresses in the Martindale-Hubbell directory. We then mapped the geo-coordinates onto the Current Metropolitan Statistical Area
(CMSA), which are census-defined geographic regions based on urban areas with populations of at least 10,000.

Figure 5 reports the ideological distributions of the eight largest legal markets based on the number of attorneys present in our database. In descending order based on the number of lawyers in our database, those eight legal markets are
Figure 5. Lawyers’ Ideology by Major Legal Markets.
New York, NY; Los Angeles, CA; Washington, D.C.; Chicago, IL; Boston, MA; San Francisco, CA; Atlanta, GA; and Philadelphia, PA. To be clear, we define legal markets by metropolitan regions and not city limits. This means that, for example, lawyers who work in Cambridge, MA, are included as part of the Boston legal market.

The most important thing worth noting about the data displayed in Figure 5 is that, of the eight largest legal markets, seven have distributions that skew to the left. The sole exception is Atlanta, GA. In fact, of the top twenty-five largest legal markets in the USA, only three have more conservative lawyers than liberal lawyers. Those three markets are: Atlanta, GA; Dallas, TX; and Phoenix, AZ.

5. IDEOLOGY BY EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE

We also examined the ideology of American lawyers by their educational experience. First, we explore the ideology of lawyers who graduated from elite law schools. Second, we expand our analysis and present the ideology of lawyers who graduated from fifty prominent law schools. Third, we examine the ideology of American lawyers based on the undergraduate institutions from which they graduated.

5.1 Ideology of Elite Law Schools

To explore the patterns of lawyers’ ideology by educational experience, we first disaggregate the data by the law school that each attorney attended. This information is identified on all Martindale-Hubbell entries. As there are more than 200 accredited U.S. law schools, we begin by limiting our analysis to “elite” law schools.

Figure 6 presents the ideological distributions for the top fourteen (T-14) law schools based on the 2015 U.S. News and World Report rankings. Those law schools (in order of their ranking) are: (i) Yale Law School; (ii) Harvard Law School; (iii) Stanford Law School; (iv) Columbia Law School; (v) University of Chicago Law School; (vi) New York University School of Law; (vii) University of Pennsylvania Law School; (viii) University of Virginia School of Law; (ix)

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14 A complete list of the mean CFscores of the 200 law schools with the largest number of alumni included in our database is presented in Appendix A. These are based on self-reported names of law schools in the Martin-Dale Hubbell Directory. While compiling APPENDIX A, we excluded cases where there was ambiguity about the identity of the law schools.

15 The “Top-14” is a commonly used definition of “elite” law schools. Although the rankings have changed, the same fourteen schools have occupied the top fourteen spots every year since the U.S. News and World Report started ranked law schools in 1987. See Law School Rankings, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_school_rankings_in_the_United_States#Schools_that_rank_in_the_top_14_28aka_22T14.22.29 (last accessed August 7, 2014).
University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law; (x) Duke University School of Law; (xi) University of Michigan Law School; (xii) Northwestern University School of Law; (xiii) Cornell Law School; and (xiv) Georgetown University Law Center.

The analyses in Figure 6 are again presented as frequency counts, meaning that some law schools have more graduates than others, and this is reflected in the heights of the various plots (compared against each other). Importantly, these represent all the graduates of the various law schools who are in both the Martindale-Hubbell directory and the DIME database. As a result, to our knowledge, Figure 6 is the most comprehensive representation of the ideology of elite law schools that has ever been compiled.

The most striking result in Figure 6 is that all fourteen top law schools have distributions that lean to the left. That is, there are more liberal alumni from those schools than there are conservative alums. Not only do all of the schools lean to the left, the skew is fairly extreme in several of the schools. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the University of California, Berkeley has the most liberal leaning distribution of alumni of all the elite law schools. That said, although the ideology of Berkeley graduates skews the furthest to the left, it is obviously not the only school with a heavily left skewed distribution. In fact, all of the top six law schools—Yale, Harvard, Stanford, Columbia, Chicago, and NYU—have a relatively small number of graduates with conservative CFscores.

Of course, there are a few schools with a sizeable percentage of their graduates with conservative CFscores. Both the University of Virginia School of Law and Duke University School of Law have a sizeable number of conservative alumni. To be exact, 37 percent of UVA law alumni have conservative CFscores, and 35 percent of Duke Law alumni have conservative CFscores. The fact that these two schools have the largest percentage of alumni with conservative CFscores is perhaps predictable: UVA and Duke are the only top fourteen law schools that are located in states—Virginia and North Carolina, respectively—that have voted for Republican presidential candidates in the last decade (although Obama did narrowly win both states in 2008 and won Virginia in 2012). Finally, although the University of Michigan Law School certainly leans to the left, it does have a bimodal distribution that reveals a sizable number of conservative alumni.

5.2 Ideology of Prominent Law Schools

Of course, there are interesting patterns in ideology outside of the top fourteen ranked law schools. In Figure 7, we expanded our analysis to the fifty schools with the most alumni in our database of political donors. The additional law schools in Figure 7 include many state flagship law schools and other
Figure 6. Ideology of Alumni from the Top Fourteen Law Schools.
Figure 7. Ideology of Alumni from Fifty Prominent Law Schools.
well-known law schools. We have plotted the schools from most liberal (UC-Berkeley) to the most conservative (University of Alabama).

The more liberal schools comprise several of the top ranked (T-14) law schools that were presented in Figure 6. These include UC-Berkeley, NYU, Yale, Stanford, Harvard, Chicago, Northwestern, University of Pennsylvania, and Georgetown University. This suggests that many of the elite law schools are more liberal than law schools on average. Of course, as previously noted, many elite law schools are located in exceptionally liberal locations—like New York, San Francisco, Boston, and Chicago—and their graduates largely work in those same locations after graduating, so it should perhaps not be surprising that these schools also have the most liberal alumni.

The most conservative law schools are predominately located in the South. The two most conservative law schools in Figure 7—Cumberland School of Law and the University of Alabama—are both located in Alabama. Schools from South Carolina, Texas, and Georgia round out the top five most conservative schools.

Although most of the prominent law schools shown in Figure 7 skew to either the left or to the right, there are a few law schools with notably bimodal distributions. For example, the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law has a near perfectly bimodal distribution with both center-left and center-right peaks. This perhaps reflects the state of Ohio’s status as an evenly divided swing state in the past several presidential elections.

5.3 Ideology of Undergraduate Institutions
The Martindale-Hubbell directory also lists where all of the attorneys in their directory received their undergraduate degree. In Figure 8, we present the distributions of lawyers’ ideology disaggregated by undergraduate institution attended. We specifically provide data on the fifty institutions that appear most commonly in our dataset. These institutions are then ordered in Figure 8 from most liberal (Harvard University) to most conservative (University of Texas).

Of the fifty institutions shown in Figure 8, only five have an average CFscore that is conservative: University of Oklahoma, Texas A&M University, University of Georgia, Louisiana State University, and Brigham Young University. All of the other schools have both average liberal CFscores and median liberal CFscores. There are, however, a number of schools with a sizable percentage of their graduates that have conservative CFscores. These schools include Michigan State University, University of Notre Dame, University of Florida, Indiana University, and Ohio State University.

Another interesting pattern is that the four most liberal universities on this list are also some of the traditionally highest ranked undergraduate
Figure 8. Ideology of Lawyers by their Undergraduate Institutions.

CFscore (Conservatism)
institutions: Harvard, Stanford, Cornell, and Yale. In other words, regardless of what law school they attended, lawyers who attended these undergraduate institutions are much more liberal than conservative on balance.

6. IDEOLOGY BY LAW FIRMS

We now turn to examining the heterogeneity of lawyers’ ideology by the law firms at which they work. Perhaps unlike firms in other professions, law firms are often perceived to be liberal or conservative. These perceptions emerge both from the clients and cases that firms take on as well as from the political affiliations of the firms’ high-profile attorneys. As a result, one incredibly useful outcome from our efforts to combine the DIME dataset of political ideologies with the Martindale-Hubbell directory of lawyers is that it allows us to generate rigorous estimates of the ideologies of major law firms in the USA.

We use our data to explore the distribution of lawyers’ ideology by the law firms they work at in three ways. First, we explore the ideology of lawyers by the size of the law firm at which they work. Second, we examine the ideology of specific law firms. Third, we investigate the differences in ideology between associates and partners at major law firms.

6.1 Ideology by Firm Size

Figure 9 presents the ideology of lawyers based on the size of the law firm at which they work. The figure is broken into five categories. The first three categories are all attorneys who work in “Big Law”\textsuperscript{16}: attorneys who work at one of the twenty-five largest law firms in the USA, attorneys who work at law firms that are 26th through 100th in size, and attorneys who work at law firms that are 101 through 200th in size. The fourth category shown is lawyers who work in small practices\textsuperscript{17}. The final category shown is lawyers who work in solo practices\textsuperscript{18}.

The first thing to note is that, like the population of lawyers overall, all five categories have liberal-leaning distributions. The most liberal leaning of the five categories is the first: attorneys who work at one of the twenty-five largest law firms.

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\textsuperscript{16} Law firms are ranked by the number of attorneys who list the firm as their employer in the Martindale-Hubbell directory. The rankings are consistent with other rankings of the largest U.S. law firms based on the number of employees. See e.g., Internet Legal Research Group, America’s Largest 250 Law Firms http://www.ilrg.com/nlj250 (last accessed February 17, 2015).

\textsuperscript{17} Small practices are defined as private law practices where two or more lawyers list as an employer but are not large enough to be included in our list of the 350 largest law firms.

\textsuperscript{18} Solo practices are identified as law practices that are listed as employers for no more than one lawyer in the database.
Figure 9.  Ideology of Lawyers by Law Firm Size.

- **Big Law (top 25)**
  - CFscore (Conservatism) range from -1.5 to 1.5
  - Number of Donors distribution for different CFscore categories

- **Big Law (26–100)**
  - CFscore (Conservatism) range from -1.5 to 1.5
  - Number of Donors distribution for different CFscore categories

- **Big Law (101–200)**
  - CFscore (Conservatism) range from -1.5 to 1.5
  - Number of Donors distribution for different CFscore categories

- **Small Practice**
  - CFscore (Conservatism) range from -1.5 to 1.5
  - Number of Donors distribution for different CFscore categories

- **Solo Practice**
  - CFscore (Conservatism) range from -1.5 to 1.5
  - Number of Donors distribution for different CFscore categories
firms. Attorneys in this category have a mean \( CFscore \) of −0.49 and a median \( CFscore \) of −0.74. It is worth mentioning that of these twenty-five law firms, twenty-two are headquartered in states where Obama won in the 2012 presidential election.19

The second most liberal category is attorneys who work at the 26th through 100th largest firms. In fact, attorneys who work at these firms have a nearly identical distribution of ideologies to attorneys who work at the twenty-five largest law firms. The mean \( CFscore \) for attorneys who work at the 26th through 100th largest firm is −0.45, and the median \( CFscore \) is −0.68.

Attorneys who work at the 101st through 200th largest law firms still lean to the left, but the distribution is closer to bimodal. The mean \( CFscore \) for these attorneys is −0.27, and the median \( CFscore \) is −0.47. Moreover, while the top twenty-five largest law firms are overwhelmingly concentrated in large, liberal cities like New York and Chicago, the 101st through 200th largest law firms have headquarters spread across the country in both liberal and conservative cities.

Finally, attorneys who work in small practices or have solo practices have fairly similar ideological distributions. Both lean to the left but also have a number of attorneys with center-right \( CFscores \). The mean \( CFscore \) for attorneys in small practices is −0.29, and the median \( CFscore \) is −0.49. The mean \( CFscore \) for attorneys in solo practices is −0.30, and the median \( CFscore \) is −0.51.

### 6.2 Ideology of Specific Firms

To further explore the ideology of attorneys working in private practices, we examined the ideological breakdown of American lawyers by specific law firms. The Martindale-Hubbell directory includes the law firm that lawyers listed within their directory listing. This then allows us to estimate the ideology of specific law firms by aggregating the \( CFscores \) for all of the attorneys who have made political donations who work at that firm.

There are, however, a few caveats that should be noted. First, the ideology of specific law firms that we report on is the mean \( CFscores \) for all attorneys listed as working at that firm by the Martindale-Hubbell database when we compiled our dataset.20 This means that the ideology score for each law firm is based on the \( CFscore \) for attorneys who worked at that law firm at that specific point in time. Second, the ideology reported for each firm is the mean \( CFscore \) for all

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19 The three firms headquartered in states that Obama did not win in 2012 are Bryan Cave (St. Louis, MO), King & Spalding (Atlanta, GA), and Vinson & Elkins (Houston, TX).

20 The data we use from the Martindale-Hubbell directory are based on the information listed in the directory for 2012.
attorneys who work at that firm. We do not weigh the relative seniority of the attorneys in any way, which means that 100 associates are counted the same as 100 partners in determining a firm’s ideological ranking. Finally, the ideology score we present does not represent the official ideology of the firm, or the ideology of clients that they represent. It is possible that a firm could appear as having a liberal ideology based on our rankings due to a large number of liberal associates despite having conservative firm leadership and a conservative client base.

With those caveats in mind, we turn to presenting the ideology ratings of major law firms within the USA. To our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive ideological picture of American law firms ever developed. In Appendix B, we present the mean $CFscore$ for all of the 350 law firms with the most attorneys in our dataset. In the following tables, however, we present the results for four groups of firms that may be of particular interest: (i) the twenty most prestigious firms; (ii) the twenty largest firms; (iii) the twenty most liberal firms; and (iv) the twenty most conservative firms.

### 6.2.1 The Twenty Most Prestigious Law Firms.

Table 1 presents the results for the firms that Vault ranked as the twenty most prestigious law firms in USA for 2015. Each year, Vault releases rankings of law firms based on surveys of attorneys who work at firms that have been highly ranked in previous years. For the 2015 edition of the rankings, over 17,000 attorneys participated in Vault’s anonymous survey. Although the Vault rankings have been criticized, they are widely viewed and discussed by both the popular press and legal scholars (see, e.g., Ciolli 2005; Aronson 2007; Estlund 2011).

As Table 1 shows, all twenty of the law firms ranked as being the most prestigious by Vault have a mean $CFscore$ that is liberal. The most liberal of these twenty firms is Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, which has a mean $CFscore$ of –0.953. This is roughly comparable to the $CFscore$ of Hilary Clinton (–1.16). This perhaps comports with the popular perception of Quinn Emanuel—the firm is known for having a unique culture that embraces wearing flip flops and working remotely from around the world.

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21 This means that our list is not identical to a ranking of the 350 largest law firms by either total attorneys or total revenue. Instead, our list is the 350 law firms that have the most attorneys who appear in both the DIME database and the Martindale-Hubbell directory.

The most conservative law firm in Table 1 is Jones Day, with a $CF_{score}$ of $-0.213$. Even though this is the most conservative $CF_{score}$ of the Vault Top 20 most prestigious firms, it is still a (slightly) liberal score that is roughly comparable to that of Democratic West Virginia Senator Joe Manchin ($-0.13$). Although Jones Day is listed as having its largest office in New York, Jones Day officially does not have a headquarters. The firm’s moderate ideology can perhaps be in part explained by the fact that Jones Day was founded in Cleveland, and the firm maintains a strong presence there, as well as having offices in many traditionally moderate and conservative states.

It is worth noting that all twenty of these prestigious law firms have their largest offices in one of four cities: New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, or Washington, D.C. In fact, the largest office of fifteen of the twenty prestigious law firms is located in New York. Given the fact that all four cities are overwhelmingly Democratic, it is thus perhaps unsurprising that these firms all have liberal average $CF_{scores}$ as well.

### Table 1. Ideology of the “Vault” Top Twenty Law Firms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Firm Name</th>
<th>Largest Office</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &amp; Katz</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Cravath, Swaine &amp; Moore</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &amp; Flom</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sullivan &amp; Cromwell</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Davis Polk &amp; Wardwell</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Simpson Thacher &amp; Bartlett</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cleary Gottlieb Steen &amp; Hamilton</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Weil, Gotshal &amp; Manges</td>
<td>New York</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kirkland &amp; Ellis</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>-0.363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Latham &amp; Watkins</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Gibson, Dunn &amp; Crutcher</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>-0.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Covington &amp; Burling</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>-0.612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Boies, Schiller &amp; Flexner</td>
<td>New York</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &amp; Garrison</td>
<td>New York</td>
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</tr>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &amp; Sullivan</td>
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<td>Debevoise &amp; Plimpton</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Sidley Austin</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Williams &amp; Connolly</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Jones Day</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>White &amp; Case</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.494</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2.2 The Twenty Largest Law Firms.

In addition to analyzing the most prestigious law firms, we also analyzed the data for the largest law firms. To identify the largest law firms, we relied on the
list of the largest U.S. Law Firms published in 2014 by Law360.$^23$ To be included in the list, the law firms must be based in the USA. The rankings are based on the total number of attorneys working for the firm within USA, and the number of attorneys are taken from either the firms’ websites or the Martindale-Hubbell directory. Table 2 presents the mean $CFscores$ for the twenty largest U.S. law firms according to Law360.

Although there is some overlap, fourteen of the firms in Table 2 did not appear in the list of the twenty most prestigious firms listed in Table 1. The lists are similar in one important respect though: all have a liberal mean $CFscore$. With a score of $–0.837$, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr is the most liberal firm on the list. Once again, Jones Day is the most conservative firm on the list with a score of $–0.213$.

It is also worth noting that the firms represented in Table 2 are from a more diverse set of cities than the firms listed in Table 1. In fact, the firms in Table 2 have their largest offices in twelve different cities. That said, although these cities are more diverse, Obama won the states in which all twelve cities are located in the 2012 presidential election.

6.2.3 The Twenty Most Liberal Law Firms.

Table 3 presents the results for the twenty law firms that have the most liberal mean $CFscores$. To be clear, these twenty firms are not necessarily the twenty most liberal in the country. Instead, of the 350 firms that have the most attorneys in our database, these twenty have the most liberal $CFscores$.

Of these twenty firms, only three appear in Table 1 or Table 2: Quinn Emanuel and Cleary Gottlieb appeared in the list of the twenty most prestigious firms presented in Table 1, and Wilmer Hale appeared in the list of the twenty largest law firms presented in Table 2. The most liberal firm in Table 3 is BuckleySandler. With a mean $CFscore$ of $–1.193$, BuckleySandler has a similar ideology score to Hillary Clinton (who has a $CFscore$ of $–1.16$). The twentieth most liberal firm in the list is Foley Hoag. With a mean $CFscore$ of $–0.819$, Foley Hoag has a similar ideology score to Bill Clinton (who has a $CFscore$ of $–0.68$).

6.2.4 The Twenty Most Conservative Law Firms.

Table 4 presents the results for the twenty law firms that have the most conservative mean $CFscores$. Once again, just like with the liberal firms, these are the

---

Table 2. Ideology of the Twenty Largest Law Firms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lam firm</th>
<th>Largest office</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Jones Day</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Greenberg Traurig</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.426</td>
</tr>
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<td>3 Sidley Austin</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>-0.608</td>
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<td>4 Latham &amp; Watkins</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Chicago</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 DLA Piper</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>-0.674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &amp; Flom</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.629</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 K&amp;L Gates</td>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
<td>-0.562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Morgan, Lewis &amp; Bockius</td>
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<td>10 Reed Smith</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Gibson, Dunn &amp; Crutcher</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>-0.837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Holland &amp; Knight</td>
<td>Tampa</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Bryan Cave</td>
<td>St. Louis</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Hogan Lovells</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Littler Mendelson</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>-0.502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Perkins Cole</td>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>-0.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Ropes &amp; Gray</td>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>-0.711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 McGuireWoods</td>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td>-0.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &amp; Smith</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>-0.417</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Ideology of the Twenty Most Liberal Law Firms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lam firm</th>
<th>Largest office</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 BuckleySandler</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>-1.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Farella Braun + Martel</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>-1.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Quinn Emanuel Urquhart &amp; Sullivan</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Morrison &amp; Foerster</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>-0.943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Cleary Gottlieb Steen &amp; Hamilton</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Robbins Geller Rudman &amp; Dowd</td>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>-0.939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Hanson Bridgett</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>-0.937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Fenwick &amp; West</td>
<td>Mountain View</td>
<td>-0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Goulston &amp; Storrs</td>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>-0.919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Segal McCambridge Singer &amp; Mahoney</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>-0.917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Davis &amp; Gilbert</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Wiggins and Dana</td>
<td>New Haven</td>
<td>-0.885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Munger, Tolles &amp; Olson</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>-0.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Arnold &amp; Porter</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>-0.868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 Orrick, Herrington &amp; Sutcliffe</td>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>-0.853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Kenyon &amp; Kenyon</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-0.853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 Schiff Hardin</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>-0.839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>-0.837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Leonard, Street and Deinard</td>
<td>Minneapolis</td>
<td>-0.824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Foley Hoag</td>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>-0.819</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
twenty firms that have the most conservative CFscores of the 350 firms that have the most attorneys in our database.

None of the twenty firms listed in Table 4 appeared in the list of the most prestigious firms in Table 1 or the largest firms in Table 2. Additionally, these firms are from a different set of cities than the firms from Tables 1–3. The firms in Table 4 are overwhelmingly from states that Obama lost in the 2012 presidential election. The four exceptions are the two firms located in Michigan (#2 Warner Norcross and Judd and #7 Varnum) and the two firms located in Ohio (#16 McDonald Hopkins and #20 Taft, Stettinius and Hollister).

It is also worth noting that the most conservative firm in Table 4—Butler, Snow, O’Mara, Stevens & Cannada—has a less extreme average CFscore than the three most liberal firms presented in Table 3. Additionally, the twentieth most conservative firm in Table 4—Taft, Stettinius, & Hollister—has a much more moderate CFscore than the twentieth most liberal firm in Table 3. In fact, with a mean CFscore of 0.31, Taft, Stettinius, & Hollister has a mean ideology comparable to that of centrist Republican Senator Olympia Snowe from Maine (0.29).

### 6.3 Ideology of Partners versus Associates

Of course, not all of the attorneys who work at a given law firm have ideologies that match the firm average. In fact, within many of the firms there are likely to be cleavages along a number of key dimensions. One key dimension we further
explore in this section is the ideology of law firm associates compared to law firm partners. Figure 10 shows the disaggregated average ideology for associates and partners at 30 major law firms.24

There are three patterns worth noting in Figure 10. First, at all thirty of these law firms, the partners are more conservative than the associates on average. This can likely be explained at least in part by the fact that partners are more likely to be older, richer, male, and white than the associates at their firms. All four of these characteristics are associated with conservative political leanings.

Second, the differences between the average CFscores for associates and partners at these thirty law firms are relatively small. There are several possible explanations for this phenomenon. First, law students may choose to go work for law firms where the partners’ political leanings are close to their own. Second, law firms extend offers to law students who they believe share their views (either based on the activities listed on their resumes or the views the student expressed during interviews). Third, new associates may adopt the views of other attorneys at their law firm over time. Fourth, both partners and associates have political ideologies that reflect the cities where they live—either because of selection bias or acculturation—and associates and partners in the same city are likely to share similar views. We believe that all four of these explanations are plausible and not mutually exclusive.

Third, very few of these firms have conservative partners or associates. There are only three firms where the partners have an average CFscore that is conservative. Those firms are Baker Botts, Fullbright & Jaworski, and Vinson & Elkins. Notably, all three firms are based in Houston, TX. Moreover, there are only two firms where the average CFscore for associates is conservative: Baker Botts and Vinson & Elkins. Even though these firms are conservative on average, their CFscores are still fairly moderate. To put things in perspective, there are eleven firms whose partners have an average CFscore more liberal than –0.50, but not a single one of these firms has a CFscore more conservative than 0.50.

7. IDEOLOGY BY PRACTICE AREA

There are likely considerable differences in the ideologies of lawyers based on the type of law that they practice. For example, it would be reasonable to hypothesize that, on average, lawyers who specialize in mergers and acquisitions

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24 The firms studied are the thirty firms that have the most lawyers included in our database. There are two reasons for focusing on the firms with the largest number of lawyers in our database. First, our estimates are likely to be more reliable when they are based on a larger number of observations. Second, firms with larger numbers of attorneys in our database are also well-known firms that are likely to be of interest to readers.
have different political views than lawyers who specialize in immigration law. We explore the ideological distributions of lawyers based on the kind of law they practice in two ways. First, we explore the ideology of lawyers based on the area of law in which they claim to specialize. Second, we examine the ideology of lawyers who work as public defenders and prosecutors.

7.1 Ideology by Practice Area Overall

We begin by examining the ideology of lawyers based on their practice area. To do so, we rely on the practice areas that are listed on attorneys’ profiles in the
Martindale-Hubbell directory. It is important to note that some lawyers in the directory do not have any practice areas listed while other lawyers in the directory have several listed. Moreover, the available categories may not be consistently used. For example, even if two lawyers both work on the same deals, the practice area for one attorney may be listed as “Mergers & Acquisitions” while another may be listed as “Corporate Law.” Finally, it may be the case that missing practice area information is not random. In other words, our data on practice areas may be biased because this information may not be equally likely to be available for all attorneys.

With these caveats in mind, examining the relationship between practice area and lawyers’ ideology can still reveal interesting—although imperfect—information. Figure 11 presents the regression results that estimate the CFscores of lawyers while including variables for the forty-eight practice areas that appear most commonly in the Martindale-Hubbell database. In addition to the variables for practice areas, the regression also includes all of the variables included in the regression presented in Figure 3 as controls. As with Figure 3, the regression results presented in Figure 11 are presented graphically—the dots for each variable are the point estimates and the line is the 95% confidence interval. Variables where the confidence interval does not cross the vertical line are statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Estimates to the left of the vertical line mean that the variable is associated with more liberal CFscores, and estimates to the right of the vertical line mean that the variable is associated with more conservative CFscores.

It is important to note, however, that Figure 11 reports regression results that control for a number of key characteristics of the lawyers included in the regression. In other words, a practice area with a negative (positive) coefficient means that lawyers with that practice area listed on the Martindale-Hubbell directory are likely to be more liberal (conservative) than a similarly situated lawyer who practices in another area. What it does not mean is that the lawyers working in that practice area are all liberal (conservative).

In Figure 11, the forty-eight practice areas included in the regression are listed from most conservative to most liberal. Seventeen of the practice areas are associated with more conservative CFscores in a statistically significant way. The most conservative of which is oil and gas law. Additionally, sixteen of the practice areas are associated with more liberal CFscores in a statistically significant way. The practice that predicts the most liberal CFscore is entertainment law.

### 7.2 Ideology of Prosecutors versus Defense Attorneys

As a final examination of the ideology of American lawyers, we explored the political leanings of individuals who are either public defenders or prosecutors.
Figure 11. Ideology of Lawyers by Practice Area.

OLS, CFscore as outcome variable
To do so, we subset our database based on how the lawyers identified their title or employer. Public defenders were identified as anyone who listed their profession as being a “defender.” Prosecutors were identified as anyone who listed their profession as being related to a district attorney, state’s attorney, or attorney general. Although this process is not perfect, it did produce a sample of over 1300 public defenders and a sample of over 6000 prosecutors. The ideologies of these two groups of attorneys are reported in Figure 12.

There are several things worth noting about the patterns revealed in Figure 12. First, unsurprisingly, public defenders lean far to the left. The mean CFscore for public defenders is roughly –1.00, which is comparable to Hillary Clinton CFscore. Additionally, there are many public defenders who have views that are on the extreme end of the distribution. In fact, the modal CFscore for public defenders is greater than –1.5 (roughly comparable to the ideology of liberal congressman Alan Grayson). That said, there are some

Figure 12. Ideology of Public Defenders and Prosecutors.

To be more precise, we searched our combined dataset for the following phrases: “Defenders A,” “Fed. Def,” “Capital Def,” “Federal Defenders,” “Defender,” or “Capital Def.”

conservative public defenders. To be exact, roughly 17.5 percent of public defenders in our dataset have $C$Fscores that are to the right of center. Although there are very few conservative public defenders, the fact that it is not a null set may be surprising to some readers.

Second, although they do not lean as far to the left as public defenders, prosecutors are still liberal. In fact, prosecutors are more liberal than lawyers overall. The mean $C$Fscore for prosecutors is roughly $-0.50$. This is slightly to the left of lawyers overall ($-0.31$), which is perhaps surprising given the contrast that is often drawn between public defenders being liberal and prosecutors being conservative (see, e.g., Smolla 2005; Folsom 2013). This complicates any narrative that suggests that conservatives are drawn to prosecution while liberals are drawn to public defense. It is also worth noting that the ideological distribution of prosecutors is closer to being bimodal. In fact, 34 percent of prosecutors have $C$Fscores to the right of center (compared to just 17.5 percent of public defenders). Taken together, our data reveals that although public defenders are more liberal than prosecutors, both groups are still more liberal than lawyers overall.

**CONCLUSION**

We conclude where we started, with the idea that lawyers occupy an extremely prominent role in American politics and society. As a result, how the bar operates—its partisan inclinations and ideological proclivities—is especially important. In total, lawyers control two-thirds of the three branches of the federal government. Understanding how this population as a whole behaves is not only descriptively interesting, but also illuminating in terms of understanding the influence wielded by this very significant group.

In this article, we have leveraged two massive datasets to offer a comprehensive analysis of the ideology of American lawyers. The first dataset is the DIME database at Stanford University. The DIME database uses data on campaign contributions to place individuals on a single ideological scale. We then linked these data to the second dataset, which is the famous Martindale-Hubbell directory, which captures a comprehensive snapshot of the nation’s attorneys. Doing so enables us to explore in a systematic fashion the ideological leanings of nearly half a million U.S. attorneys. We do so using one consistent scale ($C$Fscores), which places these attorneys on a single, ideological dimension and allows us to compare attorneys as a whole to other political actors, attorneys to other professions, graduates of various law schools to each other, and within and across law firms.

Using the novel dataset we created by combining the DIME database and the Martindale-Hubbell directory, we have completed what we believe to be the most comprehensive look into the ideology of American lawyers ever
conducted. Our results not only confirm existing conventional wisdoms, but also reveal heterogeneity within the profession that previously has gone unexplored. In short, our results reveal the political ideologies of America’s “highest political class” (de Tocqueville 1840, p. 514).

REFERENCES

Barberá, Pablo, & Gaurav Sood. 2014. Follow Your Ideology: A Measure of Ideological Location of Media Sources. Unpublished manuscript.


### APPENDIX A: IDEOLOGY OF THE 200 LAW SCHOOLS WITH MOST DONORS

Appendix A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Law school</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albany Law School</td>
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</table>

(continued)
## Appendix A. Continued

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<th>Law school</th>
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APPENDIX B: IDEOLOGY OF 350 LARGE AMERICAN LAW FIRMS

Appendix B.

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### Appendix B. Continued

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## Appendix B. Continued

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