East Asian relative peace and the ASEAN Way

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Abstract

East Asia has experienced a drastic decline in incidences of warfare and has had exceptionally low levels of battle deaths after 1979. However, East Asian peace had already begun in 1967 inside ASEAN. Is it possible that East Asian peace began in ASEAN and spread to the rest of East Asia? This is the question that this article aims to tackle by showing the association between a reasonable and plausible explanation, the ASEAN Way, and East Asian peace after 1979. The argument about the role of the ASEAN approach in the pacification of East Asia is based on an examination of the patterns of frequency of conflicts, numbers of battle deaths and conflict termination. In this kind of examination, it seems that the recipes for peace in East Asia after 1979 are similar to those of ASEAN after 1967, and that their relationship to conflicts was also very similar.

1 Introduction

East Asia has experienced a drastic decline in incidences of warfare and has had exceptionally low levels of battle deaths after 1979 (Svensson,
Almost regardless of the indicator, those countries of the subcontinent whose capital cities are in East Asia, including current ASEAN members China (and Taiwan and Hong Kong), Japan, Mongolia, and the two Koreas, have had less conflict between states and within states after 1979, and even less after the last inter-state war ended between Vietnam and China in 1988. The decline in battle deaths\(^1\) was marked, especially with regard to inter-state conflicts (99.5% reduction in average annual battle deaths in the time-span from 1980 to 2005, compared with the period 1946–79). In addition, with the exception of the Philippines, there was also a modest (39.6%) decline in intra-state conflict fatalities. Not only were the levels of battle deaths down by 98%, but there was also a drastic reduction in levels of one-sided conflict (conflicts in which the other side is not armed, for example, authoritarian killings during the Cultural Revolution), non-state conflict (conflicts in which the state is not a party, such as the many episodes of fighting between Shan and Pa-o in Northeastern Burma), and criminal mortalities after 1979 (Kivimäki, 2010a). This is what I mean by East Asian peace.

However, East Asian peace had already begun in 1967 inside ASEAN. While ASEAN was initially unable to create peace in all of Southeast Asia, let alone East Asia, it seems that its members have experienced less war after joining the association. In this article, ‘ASEAN peace’ refers to the absence of conflicts (interstate and intrastate) within the area that at each point in time belonged to ASEAN. Originally, this meant just a part of Southeast Asia – Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore – while eventually, since 1997, it came to encompass all of Southeast Asia. By Southeast Asia, I then mean the ten countries that are currently members of ASEAN.

2 Argument

By tracing the origins of a regional phenomenon to its local roots, we may attempt to understand the prevailing cause and effect factors. Is it possible that East Asian peace began in ASEAN and spread, like a

\(^1\) All the battle death data in this article stem from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict data v.4-2008, 1946–2007 (version 2.0), (see Lacina and Gleditsch, 2005; Harbom et al., 2008).
positive disease, to the rest of East Asia? It seems from the symptoms (the end of inter-state war, decline in intra-state conflict, greater decline in conflict casualties than in militarized disputes, inability to resolve conflicts) that the ASEAN disease could provide a diagnosis for the peacefulness of East Asia since 1979. Taken that we have so far only had grand theories about peaceful structures in liberal democracies (Russett, 1993), capitalist countries (McDonald, 2009), and between authoritarian one-party states (Fjelde, 2010), the inter- and intra-state peace of ASEAN and East Asian countries is especially interesting when we take into account the diversity of polities, economic systems, and cultures. Also the fact that, contrary to liberal theory (Gleditsch, 2008), ASEAN peace started within the context of a decade-long decline in objective interdependence (Kivimäki, 2001), and that, unlike in Western Europe, US power does not seem to be correlated with increasing peace in ASEAN or East Asia (in fact, it is negatively correlated with the security of US allies!), the possibility that East Asian and ASEAN peace will form a new model of peace seems interesting.

This article argues that the two processes of pacification (in ASEAN and in East Asia) are interlinked, and that the ASEAN approach to security that has spread to all of East Asia is associated with greater peace on the entire subcontinent. A full explanation of this requires both a disclosure of the correlative relationship between the ASEAN approach in East Asia and its pacific outcome and an explanation of the mechanism by which the ASEAN Way produces a certain profile of pacification, both in East Asia and in ASEAN. However, this article aims only at revealing the correlative relationship between plausible causes and effects. The intention is simply to prove that East Asia has adopted an approach that we call ‘the ASEAN Way’, and that also its security developments after that have been similar to those within ASEAN. This, however, is not yet sufficient to prove the nature of the association

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2 For this observation in East Asian Context, Kivimäki (2010b); The same observation in ASEAN Context, see, Kivimäki (2008). The fact that US power does not correlate with peacefulness, does not rule out the likely possibility that positive relations between East Asian (and ASEAN) countries, especially China, with the United States has contributed crucially to East Asian Peace.

3 Philosophers have different ideas about the primacy of these two elements. The fact that this article focuses on the correlative aspect does not mean that I support the line, which says that explanation requires first and foremost the revealing of the correlative regularity between elements of social systems.
between an approach and the subsequent changes in the security profile. Further research that is outside of the scope of this article will be needed to reveal the contribution of each of the elements of ‘the ASEAN Way’ to East Asian peace. However, before looking at mechanisms of how cause produces effect, the kind of research that this article represents is needed. If one does not first reveal the correlations between cause and effect, one can end up explaining mechanisms that only link cause and effect in exceptional cases.

Thus, this article lays the foundation for an investigation that will also conduct historical analysis and process tracing to reveal the mechanism by which the ASEAN Way produces peace in East Asia. However, so far we will settle for showing the association between a reasonable and plausible explanation, the ASEAN Way, and East Asian peace: this article will not explain the mechanism of the association between the ASEAN Way and East Asian peace, or even claim a causal relationship.

One has to be careful, though, with what is argued in this article. It is not claimed here that East Asian or ASEAN peace would necessarily be durable or stable. East Asia might indeed be ‘ripe for rivalry’ as Fridberg (1994) suggests. While the number of casualties in ASEAN and in East Asia has declined drastically, and development in the area has been very different from that in the rest of the world, one could still imagine a war in Korea or Taiwan that would change the situation drastically.

It is not claimed here that ASEAN as an organization or an actor is the cause of East Asian pacification, but simply that an approach that we call the ASEAN Way was common to both ASEAN and post-1979 East Asia and was correlated with success in the prevention of conflict. One could say that the approach, or elements of it – such as the focus on development rather than revolution – caused the establishment of ASEAN, rather than the other way around. This would not be an argument against my claims in this article. Furthermore, the successful East Asian approach could have spread to East Asia without an agent to disseminate it, in a manner essentially similar to that by which Axelrod and Keohane (Keohane, 1983; Axelrod, 1984, 1986) imagine that all peaceful collaborative cooperation in regimes spreads; that is, through the influence of a successful model. Yet, the reason for East Asia’s turning to the ASEAN Way could just as well have been something else. It could have been the success of newly industrialized countries, the time span since decolonization, the fact that radicalism lost its steam after the immediate
post-colonial times of the 1960s, the fact that regional power struggles between Japan and China prevented both from leading the East Asian regionalism and thus left space for the ASEAN Way, or many other matters.

The ASEAN Way could therefore be the trend itself, or it could be a symptom of another trend, and East Asia’s and Southeast Asia’s turning to similar orientations could have been caused by a third factor. The only thing I will establish in this article is that an orientation that is often called the ASEAN Way was adopted by East Asia just before the area became pacific, and that the type of success in conflict prevention was strikingly similar to the success that ASEAN states had experienced after adopting the ASEAN Way. Why East Asia (or the ASEAN countries for that matter) adopted the ASEAN is not in focus here. This belongs to a research program aimed at verification of the correlative relations.

The argument about the role of the ASEAN approach in the pacification of East Asia is based on an examination of the patterns of frequency of conflicts, numbers of battle deaths, and conflict termination, which, in this article, are all based on the Uppsala conflict data. Conflict, according to this data, is defined as ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.’ The concept of conflict termination in the data focuses on at least one year of non-activity – or more specifically, the point in time at which the conflict ceases to be registered in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Data. This data will be used to show the similarities between the East Asian and ASEAN approaches to conflicts and the similarities in the outcomes of these approaches. Both the approaches and the outcomes will be contrasted with approaches and outcomes: (i) before ASEAN members joined ASEAN; (ii) in East Asia before 1979; and (iii) approaches outside East Asia. This is to rule out the possibility that Asian approaches were there already at the time of war and instability, as well as the possibility that ASEAN and East

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5 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict data v.4-2008, 1946–2007 (version 2.0), codebook.
Asian pacifications are just global trends that cannot be explained from the point of view of East Asia’s own approaches.

I will first define what we mean by the ASEAN Way, and then operationalize it (by defining it into measurable components). Then I will look at statistics of conflict and conflict termination in East Asia and ASEAN and see whether the pattern defined by ASEAN documents, declarations, and praxis as the ASEAN Way can be found in East Asia, and whether this way is somehow unique to the area. Then we will compare the outcomes of this approach in East Asia and ASEAN, and compare the outcomes to other areas where the ASEAN Way was not adopted. Finally we take a look at alternative explanations of East Asian peace and see whether, instead of the ASEAN Way, the phenomenon could be explained from outside the subcontinent, thus making references to subjective approaches in the region unnecessary.

3 The ASEAN Way

The ASEAN Way is not totally unique in all of its elements. However, despite standard references to common diplomatic principles, the core elements are different from security orientations of other areas. I have shown the difference between the East Asian/ASEAN approach and the Western principles used elsewhere (Kivimäki, 2009b) there is an ongoing debate on whether the East Asian approach actually mainly reflects Chinese strategic tradition or regional culture instead of the ASEAN Way.6 In this chapter I will define into measurable components the orientation that we call the ASEAN Way and its reflections on the profile of security. This way the claim of an association between the ASEAN Way and positive security developments can be made verifiable. Later I will show that it is exactly those principles that are generally known as the ASEAN Way that have spread to East Asia.

According to the ASEAN declaration of 1967 (ASEAN, 1967), ASEAN’s two main goals are economic development (growth, cultural development and social progress) and regional peace and stability. While this sounds very trivial, the developmentalist undertone of the declaration clearly contradicted the earlier revolutionary approach of some of the countries in the region, most distinctively Indonesia. It also

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6 The former claim is made by Kang (2007) and the latter by Shambaugh (2004/2005).
contradicted the approaches of those Southeast Asian countries that did not join ASEAN, as well as the approaches of many other developing countries in the revolutionary 1960s. ASEAN practice has verified that these two objectives, economic development and regional stability, were the main goals of the organization. The latter objective was previously interpreted in an elitist manner almost identical with the stability of the regimes themselves, while after the democratization of much of Southeast Asia, peace and stability have attained new meanings, some of them now coming closer to the concept of human security.  

The principles of the ASEAN Declaration were further elaborated upon by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) of 1976. The emphasis on non-interference was clear, as the three first principles out of the six somehow related to the principle. According to the TAC, ASEAN principles are the following: mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, or coercion; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; renunciation of the threat or use of force; and effective cooperation among the regimes. Instead of intervening in problems and supporting conflicting parties against each other, the ASEAN approach has been to allow states to deal with their problems, even if this is done by means of violent repression. According to Singapore’s former Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar, ‘ASEAN countries’ consistent adherence to this principle of non-interference is the key reason why no military conflict has broken out between any two ASEAN countries since the founding of ASEAN. . . . Let us maintain it in the twenty-first century.’ (Jayakumar, 1997).

There is qualitative research available on the impact on the level of political action of the principle of non-interference, and even if the desirability of this principle and the recent interpretations of it are under

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7 ASEAN elitism during its first decades is best revealed by statements of the New ASEAN leaders who want to contrast the old elitist ASEAN with the New ASEAN. For example, Indonesia’s president Susilo Bambang Yudhyonon has gone public in saying that ‘We have to listen to them [people] and that is actually the spirit of the ASEAN charter, where ASEAN should show that it is no longer elitist but cares for not only matters of government but also civil matters in all ASEAN nations,’ cited in Abdussalam (2009). For the concept of human security, see Kaldor and Glasius (2006).
debate, scholars are relatively unanimous in agreeing that during the first decades of ASEAN, the principle managed to translate into reality.\textsuperscript{8} ASEAN is still unanimous about the minimum conditions of non-interference: ASEAN countries should not use troops to support rebels or other countries that are in conflict with the government of another ASEAN state. Before the ASEAN declaration such support was common, as exemplified by the Malaysian confrontation and several colonial and post-colonial struggles.

If one looks at conflict statistics, it is clear that the tendency to hesitate in taking a stance in favor of rebels in another country’s internal conflict has been translated into actual reality: there has not been a single case of one ASEAN country using troops to support an organization fighting the government of another ASEAN country. Out of 139 conflict dyads (years of conflict between two conflicting parties) between ASEAN countries and their domestic challengers, there has not been a single dyad where another ASEAN country has supported the rebel side with troops. While there are no reliable statistics on economic support to rebels, it seems that aside from Malaysia’s safe haven for Pattani and Aceh rebels, and probable Indonesian safe havens for Pattani, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and Abu Sayaaaf Group soldiers, there have been no clear cases of either voluntary economic or political support for rebels fighting an ASEAN government. It seems that, in addition to not supporting rebels in other ASEAN countries, ASEAN countries have not even been eager to support rebels in countries outside of ASEAN. Original members of ASEAN have not, for example, participated in Burma’s conflicts with its ethnic and political opposition. This explains Burma/Myanmar has been able to focus on its domestic enemy (in its 267 conflict dyads) without the fear of external involvement. Before joining ASEAN, current ASEAN countries had supported insurgents in 29 Southeast Asian conflict dyads. The support by US allies of counter-revolutionaries in Indochina is a prominent example registered also by the Uppsala data, but the Indonesian military action against Malaysia

\textsuperscript{8} For a view that the principle will survive political practice, see, for example, Ramcharan (2000). For view that it is about to, and should, change, see Hourn (2000). Both scholars accept the fact that non-interference has been an important principle that has also in reality guided the working of ASEAN countries.
soon after the Azhari revolt of December 1962 should also be seen as an example of support of insurgents of fellow Southeast Asian regimes.

In promoting peace and stability, the strategy of ASEAN has not been to address problems head-on. To use Deutsch et al. (1955) terms, ASEAN has an element of a ‘no-war community’, which, rather than resolving conflicts, just avoids them. The long Jakarta Process related to the management of disputed territories in the South China Sea exemplifies this very well, as this process contributed to the avoidance of war, but it did not even try to resolve the sovereignty disputes. However, this does not necessarily mean that ASEAN would not aim at the permanent end of war from the Southeast Asian side (as the original concept of a ‘no-war community’ assumes), but instead, cooperation for long-term peace has focused on building the constructs that unite the nations, so that interests for peace would permanently become stronger than interests of war. Acharya tried to prove the utility of ASEAN as an emerging security community, not simply as a myopic ‘no-war community’ (Acharya, 2000). However, I would maintain that Acharya’s argument did not consider all options. Even though a ‘simple, no-war community’ might not seem durable, a community that does not resolve disputes can also transform conflict structures and thereby permanently remove the risk of wars. This is the type of security community I see in ASEAN. The fact that ASEAN fails to resolve conflicts while still addressing long-term needs of conflict transformation was acknowledged even by Leifer, who did not otherwise see a lot of value in ASEAN (Leifer, 1996). Thus, instead of conflict resolution, the focus of this approach has been to ‘try to build up something that unites us, and cope [note: not resolve, but cope] with all the problems that separate us.’9 According to Narine (2002, p. 31) and Askandar et al. (2002, pp. 21–42), conflicts are dealt with by postponing difficult issues (such as territorial disputes) and compartmentalizing issues so that they do not hamper diplomacy and trade. Furthermore, the ASEAN Way aims at downplaying, by means of disallowing public debate, the divisive issues for the sake of harmony. This approach of not getting involved in difficult issues resonates with the approach of not getting involved in other countries’ wars.

Again, the approach of not focusing on disputes and problems, but instead just working for common interests is clearly reflected in the

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9 President Fidel Ramos, quoted by Soedjati (1994, p. 49).
ASEAN peace-making record. The number of cases in which conflict has been terminated is low – only 18 – because of the difficulty in tackling these conflicts. Less than 13% of the conflicts in ASEAN have been terminated, whereas the global figure is almost double that (21%). However, the special character of the ASEAN Way and the effort to shy away from divisive political disputes shows in the rarity of peace agreements.\textsuperscript{10} Only once has a conflict been ended by a peace agreement (Aceh Memorandum of Understanding in 2005), while globally, 14% of terminated conflicts end in a peace agreement. The share of peace agreements dropped from 14% (seven successful peace agreements) to 6% (just one) with Southeast Asian countries joining ASEAN. The numerable efforts to resolve the Malaysian Confrontation by inviting external help and explicitly focusing on the disputes in talks of Manila (July to August 1963), Bangkok (February 1964), and Tokyo (June 1964) clearly demonstrate that the Southeast Asian tendency of not focusing on divisive issues did not exist before the emergence of ASEAN. In the ASEAN Way, conflicts are terminated without settling the divisive political disputes. The dominant manner of terminating conflicts within ASEAN clearly does not involve any focus on the conflict as such (not even a ceasefire), but simply allows the conflict to fizzle away by means of inaction. Over three-quarters (14 out of 18) of terminated ASEAN conflicts end this way, thus testifying to the effectiveness of tackling conflicts indirectly by not directly touching upon any of the conflict-causing issues. Indonesia’s conflict episodes with separatist Acehnese and Papuans before the Henry Dunant Centre and Helsinki Process in Aceh were all terminated this way, as were many of those conflicts in Myanmar involving ethnic minorities (many of these were episodes with Karen groups, for instance) which did not end in ceasefires. Less than half (22 out of 49) of Southeast Asia’s conflicts were terminated in this way before nations joined ASEAN, but within ASEAN, this form of conflict termination became prominent.

Instead of focusing on head-on disputes, ASEAN countries have focused on building conditions of order and peace. The common ASEAN commitment to economic development, ‘ASEAN developmentalism’, is often mentioned as the main tool in constructing a harmonious ASEAN community of nations. This was not the case before ASEAN.

\textsuperscript{10} This peculiarity in the East Asian context has been revealed by Svensson (2008).
According to President Sukarno, for example, ‘Indonesian people can take everything for the sake of revolution’. 11 After the establishment of ASEAN, Indonesia’s new president, General Suharto, silenced any voices advocating policies that did not serve economic development. This economic emphasis quickly became the founding principle of the new ASEAN cooperation. 12 Developmentalism has three kinds of plausible conflict effects:

1. Conflict fatalities might have declined because economic roots of intra-state conflicts were now dealt with by means of development.
2. Inter-state conflict declined as states no longer needed to seek legitimacy from expansionist and adventurist revolution.
3. Focus on development might have created a sense of positive interdependence that positively affected the relations between states and peoples. 13

Consensual decision-making involving maximum efforts to save face for everybody involved characterizes ASEAN’s diplomatic approach. This can be done in (a) lengthy negotiations and (b) quiet, (c) non-legalistic, (d) personal (e) confidence-building aimed at (f) gradual down-playing and prevention (or sometimes resolution) of disputes (g) by means that can be accepted unanimously, (h) using the principle of the lowest common denominator. 14 The idea of seeking consensus, no matter how watered-down and no matter how much time and personal persuasion it takes, overrules any attempt at majority decision-making.

All this is reflected in conflict statistics in the disappearance of conflict terminations by victory. Since the ASEAN Way is about avoiding loss of

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12 For the view that developmentalism still is important in ASEAN and in East Asia, see Beeson (2008). For an opposing view, see Dittmer (2007).
13 Developmentalism did not necessarily mean objective development or interdependence. It seems that at least the Philippines and Myanmar have not developed as fast as the rest of the world during their membership in ASEAN, while new members of Indochina developed faster before than after joining ASEAN. Calculations are based on World Bank annual World Development Indicators database.
face, it rules out forcing ones opponents to capitulate, and this is also what the statistics show. Not a single victory has been recorded in ASEAN countries, compared with the situation before joining ASEAN, when 11 out of 49 terminated conflicts, or 22%, ended in that way. To some extent, the decline of conflict termination by victory conforms to the global pattern, but at the same time, the global decline is less drastic and, as a matter of fact, during the past three decades the global share of conflicts ended by victories has been 22%.

In summary, the ASEAN Way of managing conflicts can be presented in the following manner:

1. Conflicts are managed by honoring the sovereignty and non-interference of other ASEAN countries. This is reflected in the reality of the ASEAN approach of avoiding support to rebels in conflict with other ASEAN governments. This is unique compared with the situation in the pre-ASEAN period and in other parts of the world.

2. The formula for ASEAN peace has been based on a strategy that does not focus on conflict issues. This has been reflected in low levels of conflict termination and a high share of conflicts being terminated by no visible action, and a low share of conflicts terminated by peace agreements. This, too, is unique when compared with pre-ASEAN times and to other parts of the world.

3. Downplaying conflict the ASEAN Way is a developmentalist approach. This element of the ASEAN Way is reflected in public discourses emphasizing development. The subjective valuation of economic growth differs from pre-ASEAN periods, as well as from other parts of the developing world of the 1960s.

4. Finally, the ASEAN diplomatic style avoids situations where one of the conflicting parties would lose face, and thus it is reflected in a conflict termination record with a low frequency of defeat of one of the parties.

15 Indonesia defeated the anti-communist Darul Islam revolt (1959–62) and the separatist campaign of the “Republic of Southern Maluku”, while Malaya managed to defeat its communist challengers (until year 1960) and the Azhari Revolt (1962). Myanmar defeated the Mon resistance, and made a ceasefire with the New Mon State Party just before joining ASEAN, and the Vietnam War ended in the defeat of South Vietnam in 1975.
4 East Asia and the ASEAN Way

The four characteristics of the ASEAN Way were also adopted by East Asian states around 1979. The first of the four characteristics of the ASEAN Way was the adoption of the Westphalian idea of recognition of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference and non-support for forces fighting governments of other East Asian nations. This change as a rhetorical principle began in East Asia at the end of the 1970s and translated into a course of action in which China, especially, gradually stopped its subversive support to regional communist insurgencies and the US allies stopped their support against counterrevolutionary groups. All of the East Asian nations interpreted the agent structure of East Asian security in a same manner despite power political rivalries, conflicts of interest and ideological differences in domestic approaches.

In East Asia literature, the prominence of the principle of non-interference in East Asian diplomacy is not disputed. The debate is more one of whether these principles will or should lead inter-state relations in the future. Acharya’s theories on the emerging East Asian security community do not seem to suggest that this cluster of principles will be seriously threatened (Acharya, 2004), while according to some, non-interference will not play a central role in future East Asian diplomacy (Chalermpalanupap, 2009). Yet, regardless of different interpretations of the role of the non-interference principle, no one seems to be claiming that the principle of avoiding support with troops to rebels that are fighting against another East Asian government (minimal non-interference) has been compromised.

If one looks at the change from the viewpoint of conflict statistics, it is seen that before 1979, East Asian States were engaged in 35 conflict dyads after the Second World War in which they supported, with military troops, the enemy (domestic or international) of another East Asian state. China’s support of various communist groups as well as allied Western support against communist-nationalists, especially in the context of Indochina wars and the Korean War, was the dominant form of external interference in internal conflicts. However, after 1979 this stopped, and there was no longer a single dyad in which one East Asian State lent military support to an enemy of another East Asian state. This cannot be explained as a global trend, since in the rest of the world, there have been 27 conflict dyads involving external support for groups fighting a
government, constituting a decline (from pre-1980 to post-1979 periods) of only 35%. The total support of military non-interference promoted by the ASEAN Way seems to characterize post-1979 East Asia, too.

However, until the end of the 1980s, China did sponsor some communist parties in East Asian countries economically and politically. There are no reliable statistics on this, except for the fact that China’s support of the Burmese Communist Party contributed to a great deal of conflict in Burma until 1987. However, after that China ceased this support, and by the end of the 1980s, neither China nor any other East Asian state supported any group fighting another East Asian state. Thus, from this perspective, the approach of East Asia was very similar to that adopted in Southeast Asia on the establishment of ASEAN.

The principle of non-interference indicated by the statistics of non-support for enemies of neighboring countries also had some declaratory expressions. As in Southeast Asia earlier, the principles of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation also became central to East Asian diplomacy, and therefore the formal adoption of the document as the foundation of ASEAN-led cooperation was not difficult. The close similarity between the East Asian and Southeast Asian approaches was also emphasized by the ease with which the ASEAN-based institutions – ASEAN Dialogue mechanisms, APT, East Asian Summit, ARF, CSCAP, etc. – were adopted in East Asian diplomacy. While efficient in the prevention of violent conflict, this common approach and orientation was not particularly suited for the prevention of authoritarian violence in Southeast Asia or in East Asia, as the experiences of Tiananmen Square in 1989, transitional violence in Indonesia in 1965–67 and the last years of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines from 1981 to 1986 testify. Thus, ASEAN and East Asian profiles of pacification were, in this respect, very similar. East Asia was not very efficient in resolving conflicts either, as can be seen in the continuing high number of militarized disputes. The record of East Asian conflict termination after 1979, therefore, is also quite similar to that in ASEAN.

The patterns of conflict management in East Asia have also changed along lines similar to those in ASEAN. Disputes and divisive issues are not tackled directly. As in the case of ASEAN, slightly more conflicts are being terminated in post-1979 East Asia than in pre-1979 East Asia. In addition the new approach to conflict termination is very similar both in ASEAN and in East Asia. What is surprising is that in neither of these
areas is conflict terminated by resolving the dispute behind the violence. Only 3% (one case: Aceh peace agreement) of terminated conflicts has ended in a peace agreement in post-1979 East Asia, whereas the percentage before 1979 was 16% (7 cases out of 45 terminated conflicts). The ‘disappearance of peace agreements’ in East Asia and in ASEAN is special and cannot be explained away by referring to global trends. It seems that, globally, the share of peace agreements as a method of terminating conflicts has increased from 7 to 10% if one compares pre-1979 averages to post-1979 averages. Clearly, reluctance to focus on politically divisive issues is common to both ASEAN and post-1979 East Asia. This also testifies to the fact that East Asia has followed the ASEAN Way in its transformation. The tackling of difficult political issues has become less important for conflict termination in East Asia as well, just as had happened previously within ASEAN.

ASEAN’s developmentalist path was eventually adopted by the entire East Asia about a decade later. The transformation of China into a developmentalist state after more than a decade of a power battle between developmentalist and revolutionist forces happened at the time when Japan and Korea were developing their doctrines of comprehensive security in the latter half of the 1970s. Economic grievances were explicitly tackled, while revolutionary discourses blaming others for the lack of economic performance became unpopular. Development became the prime declared objective and rationale for states, and the rationales of nationalism and revolution were put in the back seat. Subjective focus on development also translated into impressive objective economic progress with the exception of North Korea, Burma/Myanmar, and the Philippines.

Finally, it seems that the priority of saving face has also been adopted from the ASEAN Way by East Asian governments. The effort to defeat ones enemies no longer belongs to the code of conduct. Instead, efforts are made to at least try to conceal victory by offering ceasefire

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16 All of them were in Southeast Asia. However after 1979 peace agreements cannot be found in those countries that were not yet ASEAN members, whereas before 1979 there were plenty of peace agreements in those countries.

17 For this development, see, for example, Lo (2001, pp. 253–264). For analysis that associates developmentalism with East Asia in a more global investigation, see Robinson and White (2007). For analysis that argues for the link between East Asian developmentalism and success in conflict prevention, see Goldsmith (2007).
agreements to the losing side. While the share of victories out of all conflict terminations East Asia declined from 10 (out of 45) to 3 (out of 34 terminated conflicts)\textsuperscript{18} after 1979, the pattern was the same, but less drastic than in ASEAN, where victories disappeared entirely. While this corresponds to the global pattern to some extent, it is clear that both East Asia and ASEAN declines were more drastic, and in the end the share of victories declined to a much lower level than the global one. While the global share of victories declined to one half, it remains in the post-1979 situation at 22\%, whereas in ASEAN victories had disappeared totally and their share in East Asia is slightly less than 9\% (the share has declined to one-third of what it was before 1980).

5 Consequences of the ASEAN Way in ASEAN and in East Asia

The claim that the ASEAN Way may be the reason behind East Asian pacification seems to be supported by a comparison of East Asian approaches to security after 1979 and the ASEAN Way. However, the argument also requires that the consequences of this approach are similar. Both areas have to be successful, and the profile of their successes has to be similar: they have to be successful in similar issues and perhaps less successful in other similar issues.

The first issue when looking at the outcomes of East Asian and ASEAN security approaches is that the similar approaches used by the original ASEAN members since 1967, the late-comers since 1997 and East Asia since 1979 have managed to reduce battle deaths and conflicts causing casualties in both places. In both cases, success has been measured by ability to avoid conflict escalation, and, to a lesser extent, by the ability to prevent disputes from turning violent. The success of the ASEAN Way has definitely not been a question of the ability to avoid or resolve disputes. As shown in Kivimäki (2008), despite the reduced number of battle deaths and conflicts, the number of militarized disputes was not reduced.

In terms of the type of violence, it seems that the ASEAN Way has especially managed to prevent inter-state conflicts. In the case of

\textsuperscript{18} Both victories took place in Myanmar, which to some extent has stayed outside the realm of East Asian Peace.
ASEAN, there has been no interstate conflict involving casualties between two ASEAN members, despite the fact that some ASEAN members have been traditional enemies since before joining the organization. This is the case also in East Asia: inter-state war has almost disappeared after 1979, and especially after 1987.

The success of ASEAN peace can be seen in the difference between conflicts and battle deaths before and after joining the organization. We can see that the number of battle deaths has not decreased systematically on joining ASEAN, as both Thailand and the Philippines have had more battle deaths per year after joining ASEAN. For Thailand, this is explained by the continuation of the Vietnam War and the instability which spilled from it over to the Thai side. The decline in conflict fatalities in Thailand was delayed because of that. However, all in all, the average annual number of casualties ASEAN nations have experienced compared with what they had earlier is just 6.7% (Table 1).

The decrease in battle deaths between ASEAN countries cannot be seen as a global or a regional trend, but must be seen as something specific to ASEAN countries. In fact, as Fig. 1 demonstrates, ASEAN is an exception even in its own area, where the number of battle deaths was on the rise at the same time that ASEAN countries experienced increasing peace. Dissimilarly, global (excluding East Asia and ASEAN) numbers of annual battle deaths increased substantially after the establishment of ASEAN as well as after 1979, and did not start to decline before 1992.

The emergence of the ASEAN Way is also associated with a reduction in the number of conflict dyads that claim lives. Again, the pattern is not without exceptions, as Indonesia and the Philippines had more conflicts after joining than before. Yet the average annual number of conflicts involving ASEAN countries dropped from 1.2 to 0.5, 45% of the earlier figure. This is convincing, but not as convincing as the decline in battle deaths (Table 2).

It is clear that the Vietnam War has a great influence on the difference between ASEAN and pre-ASEAN violence. Yet, even if we subtract the effect, not only of the great Vietnam war from 1965 until the mid-1970s, but of all Vietnamese wars (and there have not been wars in Vietnam after the country joined ASEAN), the difference would still be great. Without all Vietnamese conflicts, ASEAN battle deaths have still been reduced to just 35% compared with the time before the countries joined ASEAN.
Table 1  Average annual battle deaths before and after joining ASEAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Before joining ASEAN after independence or WW2</th>
<th>After joining ASEAN</th>
<th>Reduction (as % of the original no. of fatalities)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei(^a)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
<td>1452</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>6706</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>99.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2322</td>
<td>1740</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>1274</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>2439</td>
<td>-469.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore(^b)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-189.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>54758</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN average</td>
<td>7525</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>93.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Here, Brunei’s existence is already assumed from 1959. This is due to the fact that Brunei was already party to the Malaysian Confrontation in 1963–1965, even though it received formal independence no earlier than 1984.

\(^b\)Singapore was also an independent actor with casualties in the Malaysian Confrontation of 1963–1965, even though it formally gained independence in 1965 (Turnbull, 1977). Moving a number of casualties from Malaysian battle deaths to Brunei and Singapore does not, naturally, affect the conclusions regarding ASEAN or East Asian battle deaths, as battle deaths are then simply moved from one ASEAN country to another.

Figure 1  Southeast Asian battle deaths.
However, it seems that the most drastic contribution ASEAN has made in Southeast Asia is to inter-state relations. ASEAN members have not yet fought a single war, despite the fact that they were often in conflict before their membership (Table 3).

The pattern has been the same in all of East Asia. The fact that battle deaths fell more drastically than conflicts can be seen in Figs. 2 and 3.

To make the presentation comparable with that of ASEAN peace, we can also calculate the average numbers of battle deaths for the period from the Second World War to 1979 and compare it with the average number of battle deaths from 1980 to 2005.

Table 4 shows that the number of battle deaths dropped rather drastically in all but one East Asian country, the Philippines. The average decrease was even more drastic than that among ASEAN countries. The average annual number of battle deaths in East Asia after 1979 fell by 98% compared with that before 1979 (while the drop in ASEAN

20 The Philippines is also the one country that has not managed to focus on development as much as the other original members of ASEAN, and as a result, its development record is less impressive. Furthermore, the approach of the Philippines has not always downplayed divisive issues as much as the other countries have. For an analysis of this, see Kivimäki (2002).
countries after membership was ‘just’ 93.3%). At the same time, the average national number of conflicts after 1979 was 68% of the levels up until 1979. Thus, common to ASEAN and East Asia was the decrease in the number of conflicts and the even more drastic decrease in battle deaths.

While ASEAN’s most spectacular achievement was that of ending conflicts between member states, the trend was the same in East Asia.

Table 3 Inter-state conflict and the ASEAN Way

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>All conflict dyads</th>
<th>Conflicts with future ASEAN member</th>
<th>Conflicts with ASEAN member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 Battle deaths in East Asia.
There has been only one inter-state war since 1979 in East Asia (China–Vietnam 1987), with something between 300 and 4000 battle deaths, whereas before 1979, China was involved in 13 interstate war dyads with Vietnam, Taiwan, the Soviet Union, and India with a total of almost 140,000 battle deaths, and the Koreas fought five war dyads with almost 1.3 million casualties.

The explanation in East Asia is neither a global trend nor a pacification of a greater region (Fig. 4). While East Asian battle deaths dropped by 98%, the global average of battle deaths excluding the East Asian figures increased 2.8 times. The number of East Asian battle deaths as a percentage of the global number clearly shows that East Asia is outstanding in its pacification.21

6 Conclusions

It seems that the recipes for peace in East Asia after 1979 are similar to those of ASEAN after 1967, and that their relationship to conflicts was also very similar. The ASEAN Way is, indeed, practiced in post-1979 East Asia, and the developments in the realm of security after the adoption of this approach are the same. Thus it seems possible that the origin of East Asian peace could be found in the collectively shared approaches

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21 The reason for presenting East Asian change as a figure and ASEAN change as a table is because of the fact that different nations joined ASEAN at different times.
There is a need to look at the various components of the ‘ASEAN Way’ to see whether and how they cause or contribute to pacification of domestic governance and foreign relations before one can be sure that similar approaches and similar outcomes are not a result of intervening phenomena. However, the correlative relationship is there and the ASEAN Way is associated with success, also in East Asia. Future research should then prove the nature of this association and perhaps draw conclusions that could be generalized.

The similarity of the ASEAN and East Asian approaches after 1979 was expressed in the fact that conflicts were managed by honoring the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Conflicts Before 1979</th>
<th>Conflicts After 1979</th>
<th>Decline (as % of the original no. of conflicts)</th>
<th>Battle deaths Before 1979</th>
<th>Battle deaths After 1979</th>
<th>Decline (as % of the original no. of fatalities)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>38444</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>18468</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>19387</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamsa</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>73132</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>99.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>-12.9</td>
<td>46241</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>97.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>-30.8</td>
<td>2659</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>90.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>98.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>1728</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>62.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>-109.2</td>
<td>817</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>-133.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>-68.1</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia, Total</td>
<td>10.32</td>
<td>7.85</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>12651</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

awe The two Vietnams have been calculated together throughout the period for the sake of simplicity. Naturally, this does not affect the conclusions on the effectiveness of the ASEAN Way in East Asia.
sovereignty of other ASEAN countries. This was reflected in non-interference in the internal conflicts of other countries; an element which can be seen on the levels of declarations, policy practices and outcomes. Non-interference was a central part of both ASEAN’s founding declarations and of East Asia’s policy declarations after 1979. On the level of policy output, security-related non-interference could be observed in the drastic reduction in support given to forces challenging governments.

Second, ASEAN and East Asian approaches are similar in that they do not focus on conflicting issues. Efforts to play down divisive issues and avoid divisive declarations are an expression of this similarity on the level of policy, while the relatively low number of terminated conflicts as well as the decrease in peace agreements testifies to this on the level of policy outputs.

Both ASEAN and post-1979 East Asia emphasize developmentalism as a means of creating common interests in avoiding war. This, too, can be seen on the level of declarations that in both areas turned from anti-colonialist or communist revolutionary ideology to an emphasis on the priorities of economic development. On the level of policy, this was reflected in an equally intensive focus in East Asia and in ASEAN on business and market-friendly foreign policies. On the level of policy outputs, developmentalism resulted in greater economic growth with only a few exceptions (some were cases that failed both in development and in conflict prevention), both in East Asia and in ASEAN.
Finally, the East Asian and ASEAN similarity in security approaches was reflected in similar diplomatic codes of non-confrontational treatment of disputes based on personal, informal, quiet diplomacy which uses plenty of time on the buildup of consensus and refuses to bring divisive issues to the surface, let alone out into the public forum. This similarity could also be verified on various levels using both qualitative and certain quantitative strategies of testing. Both ASEAN and East Asia became reluctant to end conflicts by humiliating their enemies with a military victory. Instead, solutions were sought that would save face for both conflicting parties.

Believable results of the ASEAN Way were also identified both in ASEAN and in East Asia: drastic reductions in battle deaths, despite the smaller reduction in the number of conflicts, could be identified in both cases; in both cases, pacification especially affected the relationships between countries in the two pacific areas – East Asia and ASEAN. While ASEAN conflicts ended completely between member states (while disputes remained), the tendency was the same even though the degree was less drastic in East Asia. Clearly, the striking characteristics of ASEAN pacification could also be detected in East Asia, and thus, in addition to the security approach, also the consequences of the approach are the same in East Asia as in ASEAN. However, although roosters crow the same way in Mexico as in Thailand – and after that the sun rises in very similar ways – this does not mean that we can conclude that the roosters’ crowing causes the sun to rise in both countries. The causal connection between an approach to security and security itself is perhaps more plausible than the causal connection between the roosters’ crowing and the rising of the sun. Also, the fact that different approaches to security in other areas mostly do produce a different outcome seems to make the proposition that the ASEAN Way is the reason for East Asian peace more plausible. Still, a systematic tracing of the process from approach to peaceful outcome is needed before we can fully conclude that the ASEAN Way has caused East Asian peace after 1979.

Whether this conclusion has any implications outside the East Asian and Southeast Asian region remains unresolved. How much the ASEAN Way could be further emulated is an interesting question that should be studied. What the ASEAN and East Asian experience shows, at least, is
that the preference for focusing on problems and trying to solve them is not the only possible way of avoiding conflict.

It is also possible to successfully tackle security issues by focusing on positive and commonly shared elements of security and by building structures of peace rather than expanding divisive issues by putting them under a magnifying class.

In addition to the question of emulation of the ASEAN Way elsewhere, it would also be important to investigate whether some of the limitations of the East Asian approach could be remedied by recipes from outside. It is possible that the inability of ASEAN and the East Asian approach to tackle difficult issues contributes to the fact that despite a reduction in battle deaths, a low-level arms race and the risk of nuclear holocaust continue to haunt the area. Can it also be that the strict elitist non-interference policy contributes to the difficulty in limiting authoritarian violence and one-sided conflict, both in ASEAN and in East Asia? Could the ASEAN Way be complemented by something that has already been experienced in the Aceh Peace Talks: a sensitive tackling of political disputes in a way that settles some of the remaining political disputes in East Asia? Territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the dispute regarding Taiwan’s status, the disputes over the Korean peninsula and many others still cast their shadow on East Asian peace and cause risks. Might it be possible to complement the ASEAN Way by democratic control over state authority, and thereby to limit authoritarian violence without risking the effective ASEAN control of conflict violence? Finally, since many of the orientations have been originally fitted into an authoritarian political setting, one could ask whether or not East Asian or ASEAN peace can survive the democratization of East Asia. In addition to the authoritarian undertone, the ability of East Asian countries to focus on development could be challenged by the emergence of a generation which takes prosperity for granted and tends to focus on the values of self-expression rather than the survival-oriented values of developmentalism. All of these questions will be crucial to the security of East Asia, but also to the general theory of conflict.

22 I have looked at the challenges of democratization and the challenge of prosperity to the ASEAN Way elsewhere (Kivimäki, 2010b).
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