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STRUCTURAL RESTRICTIONS ON
COMITATIVE COORDINATION
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Comitative constructions with coordination-like properties have been described for several languages (Spanish, Schwartz 1987a,b, Camacho 1996; Tzotzil, Aissen 1989; Navajo, Hale 1975; Polish, Dylą 1988; Russian, McNally 1993; Catalan, Rigau 1989a, 1990; and Turkish, Kornfilt 1990). Several peninsular and Latin American dialects of Spanish also have this construction (see Kany 1969). These dialects are unique among the above-mentioned languages in restricting comitatives to subject position only. I will show that this restriction can be related to another semantic restriction on comitatives in Spanish: they must be collective.¹ I will claim that there is a subject/nonsubject asymmetry regarding collectivity: purely collective readings are a property of subjects only; apparent collectivity in objects is derived from secondary predication.

1 Comitative Coordination in Spanish

Spanish exhibits a comitative construction with properties of coordination (see Schwartz 1987b, Camacho 1996; also see McNally 1993 for similar properties in Russian), as illustrated in (1):² in its coordination-like reading, (1) involves two participants, Juan and I, just like a coordination. Additionally, the construction shows plural agreement and controls plural anaphors and infinitival subjects (see (2)).

- (1) Con Juan vamos al cine.
with Juan go(1PL) to-the movies
'Juan and I are going to the movies.'

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¹ The term *collective* will be used to mean joint participation in an event, as in (i), not spatial collectivity or temporal collectivity, illustrated in (ii) and (iii), respectively. The three readings are independent, although they are related (see Lasersohn 1991). They all require plural subjects. ((i) and (ii) are from Lasersohn 1995.)

- (i) The workers assembled this car.
(ii) Joseph and Barry sat together.
(iii) Barbara and Janet arrived together.

² There are two types of comitative coordination in Spanish, one with a lexical NP and one with *pro*. Although both are attested, the latter is much more widespread and natural. The relevant judgments are the same for both.

- (2) a. Con el hijo fueron aceptados.
with the son were accepted(MASC.PL)
'She/He and the son were accepted.'
- b. Con el hijo se adoran uno al otro.
with the son CL.REC love(PL) one to-the other
'She/He and the son love each other.'
- c. Con el hijo quieren salir.
with the son want(PL) PRO(PL) go-out
'She/He and the son want to go out.'

In the other reading, parallel to the meaning of its counterpart in English, the construction involves at least three participants—in (1), the speaker, Juan, and someone else. With this reading, none of the properties illustrated in (2) obtain.

2 Syntactic and Semantic Restrictions on Spanish Comitatives

Unlike in other languages, in these dialects of Spanish comitative coordination can only appear in subject position (but see section 4). It cannot appear in direct object (3a–b) or indirect object (3c) position or as subject of a small clause (3d). This subject position restriction is surprising, whether the comitative is a true conjunction as Dyla (1988) and Kornfilt (1990) propose, or whether it is a preposition as Rigau (1990) and McNally (1993) argue.

- (3) a. *Los ví con Pedro.
CL.PL saw with Pedro
- b. *Los ví [a tí con María].
CL.PL saw to you with Maria
- c. *Les_i hablé [a Juan con María]_i.
CL.PL talked to Juan with Maria
- d. *Considero [a Juan con María] disponibles.
consider to Juan with Maria available(PL)

Besides being restricted to subject position, comitative coordination in Spanish is semantically restricted to collective predicates, as Rigau (1989, 1990) observes (see McNally 1993 and Dalrymple, Hayrapetian, and King 1998 for discussion of similar facts in Russian). Thus, comitatives are systematically excluded from contexts that require a distributive interpretation, for example, distributive predicates, as in (4a) (which are incompatible with typically collective modifiers such as *juntos* 'together'; see (4b)), distributive adverbs like *respectivo* 'respectively' (see (5)), or distributive quantifiers like *cada* 'each' (see (6)). A sentence like (7), with a distributive adjective like *distinto* 'different', has only the interpretation that both of us saw several movies together at different times.

- (4) a. *Con Daniel somos de Bogotá.
with Daniel are(1PL) from Bogota
- b. *Daniel y yo somos de Bogotá juntos.
Daniel and I are from Bogota together

- (5) a. Juan y yo vimos dos películas respectivamente.
 Juan and I saw two movies respectively
 b. *Con Juan vimos dos películas respectivamente.
 with Juan saw two movies respectively
- (6) a. Mi primo y mi prima vieron un programa cada uno.
 my cousin and my cousin saw one program each
 one
 'My two cousins saw a program each.'
 b. *Mi primo con mi prima vieron un programa cada uno.
 my cousin with my cousin saw one program each
 one
- (7) a. Marta y yo vimos distintas películas.
 Marta and I saw different movies
 b. Con Marta vimos distintas películas.
 with Marta saw different movies

The collective interpretation usually targets the event as a whole, even if subparts of the event are not necessarily collective. McNally (1993) suggests that this is an indication of a highly contextually dependent implicature, as illustrated in (8), which mirrors one of McNally's Russian examples. (8b) in Spanish and its counterpart in Russian are contradictory because the collectivity of the first conjunct is denied by the second conjunct. The Russian counterpart to (8a) is not contradictory, according to McNally, because the togetherness of the first conjunct can be denied. This conclusion cannot be extended to Spanish (8a) itself, however, because the togetherness of the first conjunct in (8a) does not disappear; it simply affects a different part of the event. Thus, if the collectivity of each part of the event is denied the contradiction resurfaces, as in (9).

- (8) a. Con Marta fuimos al cine pero no fuimos juntos.
 with Marta went to movies but not went together
 together
 'Marta and I went to the movies but did not go together.'
 b. *Marta y yo fuimos al cine juntos pero no fuimos juntos.
 Marta and I went to movies together but not went together
- (9) *Con Marta fuimos al cine, pero no fuimos juntos ni a la misma película.
 with Marta went to movies but not went together nor to the same movie
 'Marta and I went to the movies together, but we didn't go there together and we didn't watch the same movie.'

The same explanation holds for the ungrammaticality of (10). Suppos-

ing that the AIDS virus had been simultaneously but separately discovered by Robert Gallo and Luc Montagnier, (10) would still be ungrammatical because it entails some collaboration in the discovery, which did not exist.

- (10) *Montagnier con Gallo descubrieron el virus del
 Montagnier with Gallo discovered the virus of-the
 sida al mismo tiempo.
 AIDS at-the same time
 'Montagnier and Gallo discovered the AIDS virus at the
 same time.'

Another type of coordination in Spanish analyzed by Rigau (1989a,b, 1990) also displays the collectivity restriction and the subject position restriction. The former can be seen in (11b), the latter in (12). Even the quasi-distributive readings mentioned for the comitative (see (8)) are available precisely in the same contexts for this coordinated structure (see (13)). Thus, (13b) is only grammatical if in the total lifting event, María and Marta were so strong that they could lift what would amount to three pianos each, although they did not lift them separately.³

- (11) a. Entre Marta y María levantaron el piano.
 between Marta and Maria lifted the piano
 'Marta and Maria lifted the piano together.'
 b. *Entre Marta y María son de Cartagena.
 between Marta and Maria are from Cartagena
- (12) a. *Más de mil sopletes fundieron a entre la
 over of thousand welds fused to between the
 viga A y la viga B.
 beam A and the beam B
 b. *Mil millas de carretera unen entre Tunja y
 thousand miles of road link between Tunja and
 Buga.
 c. *Les presenté el premio (a) entre Miguel y
 CL.PL offered the prize (to) between Miguel and
 Doris.
 Doris
- (13) a. Entre Marta y María levantaron pianos.
 between Marta and Maria lifted pianos
 'Marta and Maria lifted pianos (together).'

³ The semantic constraints for *entre* . . . *y* are more stringent than those for *con*, as an anonymous reviewer points out. There is an aspectual restriction (as Rigau (1989b) suggests); in particular, *entre* is also incompatible with achievements.

- (i) *Entre Juan y Marta reconocieron al sospechoso.
 between Juan and Marta recognized to-the suspect

- b. Entre Marta y María levantaron tres pianos
 between Marta and Maria lifted three pianos
 cada una.
 each
 'Marta and Maria lifted each three pianos.'

The proposal I will advance is that there is a strict correlation between the positional restrictions on both *entre . . . y* and *con* and the readings they allow (with the clarifications stated earlier). This correlation stems from the hypothesis that true collectivity is a property restricted to subject positions.

3 Deriving the Semantic Restriction from a Structural Asymmetry

3.1 Neo-Davidsonian Semantics

In order to formalize the correlation I have suggested, I will be assuming a semantic representation in which verbs have an argument position for events, following Davidson 1967 and much subsequent work (e.g., Higginbotham 1983, 1996, Schein 1993). In this system the semantic representation of a sentence like (14a) is (14b).

- (14) a. Jane rose this morning.
 b. $\exists(e)$ rise(Jane, e) & this morning(e)

Following Pustejovsky (1992) and Higginbotham (1995), I will assume that the aspectual properties of a verb are represented, at least in part, through event decomposition. Thus, following Higginbotham, the argument structure of an accomplishment has at least two ordered event positions; the first one is (sufficiently) like the process part of the verb and the second one is (sufficiently) like the result part. A verb like *eat* (in its accomplishment meaning) would be represented as EAT (Agent, Theme, e, e'), where *e* represents the process and *e'* the result.

There is evidence that these subevent arguments (e, e') can be mapped to specific syntactic arguments in certain cases. For example, Dowty (1979:69) has observed that intransitive verbs cannot be verbs of accomplishment. This observation can be explained in a principled way if we assume that the subevents in the argument structure represented above must be associated with unique arguments in the sentence. Thus, the first subevent, which represents the process, will typically be associated with the subject; the second one, which represents the result, will be associated with a direct object (although it may be associated with other constituents, as Tenny (1987) has argued). If this is correct, then lacking an object or any other constituent associated with the second subevent position entails that the result part of the VP cannot be licensed. Hence, intransitives cannot be verbs of accomplishment because part of the argument structure required for an accomplishment is not licensed.

The relationship between the two subevents e and e' will depend on the type of verb. I suggested above that for verbs of accomplishment the first subevent represents the process and the second subevent the result; but other types of relationships are possible, such as inclusion or cause and effect (with causative verbs).

3.2 Collectivity and Subjects

How are the restriction on collectivity and the constraint against non-subjects related? First of all, notice a basic asymmetry between collective subjects and collective objects. When an object is interpreted collectively, it is interpreted this way as a result of some event. However, the event itself is not conceived of as collective.⁴

When two subjects collectively participate in an event, collectivity is an intrinsic part of that event, as the following contrast suggests.

- (15) a. The enemies met.
b. The welds fused the beams.

In (15a) the notion of collectivity is an intrinsic part of the definition of meeting: in order for a meeting to take place, the participants must collectively participate in some action that amounts to a meeting. In (15b), on the other hand, collectivity is not in the nature of fusing (in fact, there could be a single weld doing the fusing), but in the result. As a result, (15b) allows a continuation such as *but the welds did not fuse*; however, in the case of (15a) the same type of continuation (*but the enemies did not meet*) is contradictory. It seems, then, that there is an intrinsic difference in the way ‘‘subject’’-oriented and ‘‘object’’-oriented events are construed: only the former can be truly collective.

I take this contrast to mean that collectivity is associated with the first subevent of the argument structure. By assumption, this first subevent is not linked to objects (in the general case); therefore, objects cannot be truly collective.

⁴ An anonymous reviewer suggests that this statement is not correct because a group-type construal is possible for the object in examples like (i), which ‘‘can be true if John and Mary each read one book . . . this is the hallmark of the so-called ‘group’ reading of the object.’’

- (i) John and Mary read two books.

It should be clarified, however, that group-type objects are not the same as the collective interpretation of an object (see Taub 1989). Examples (ii) and (iii) show a contrast based on Lasnik 1991:66.

- (ii) John lifted the piano and the rock together.
(iii) John lifted the piano and the rock.

In both examples there is a group-type construal according to the reviewer’s definition, but only the first one necessarily involves a collective event. Thus, the fact that in (i) John and Mary each read a different book does not entail a collective reading of the object. I will return to apparently collective object readings in section 4.

The fact that passives (see (16)), even participial passives (see (16b)), are grammatical with comitatives suggests that the process subevent must be present in those cases. In other words, passives do not only denote results. Support for this conclusion comes from the contrast between two sets of participles in Spanish (see Bosque 1990), illustrated in (17). Truncated participles like *seco* 'dry' have perfective aspect (that is why they appear with modifiers of perfective aspect like *ya* 'already'); according to Bosque, they denote result states without a process. On the other hand, the process part is still available for true participles like *secado* 'dried'. The comitative is only available with the true participle, (17b).

- (16) a. Fuimos expulsados con Pedro.
 were expelled with Pedro
 'Pedro and I were expelled.'
- b. Expulsados del colegio con Pedro, fuimos al
 expelled from school with Pedro went to-the
 cine.
 movies
 'Having been expelled from school, Pedro and I went to
 the movies.'
- (17) a. *Una vez secos con mi hermano, nos fuimos.
 once dry with my brother CL left
- b. Una vez secados con mi hermano, nos fuimos.
 once dried with my brother CL left
 'Once my brother and I had dried off, we left.'

The proposal predicts that nonsubject comitatives will not necessarily be collective. As a reviewer points out, this is confirmed by Hausa (Schwartz 1989). Similar confirmation comes from the Spanish examples in (18) (due to Ignacio Bosque, personal communication). (18a) can be classified as a case of spatial simultaneity, since the object must be plural (cf. (18b)). However, it clearly does not involve a collective reading in the sense defined above, since it does not involve joint participation in the event (see footnote 1).

- (18) a. Puse la carta entre la Odissea y el Quijote.
 put the letter between the Odyssey and the Quixote
 'I put the letter between the Odyssey and the Quixote.'
- b. *Puse la carta entre la Odissea.
 put the letter between the Odyssey

4 Apparently Collective Objects

Examples like (19a–b) (from Lasersohn 1991) seem to run counter to the proposal that objects cannot be collective.

- (19) a. Jenny gathered the sheep.
 b. John lifted the piano and the rock together.

First, note that very few verbs force a collective interpretation on

objects, compared with the number of verbs that force a collective interpretation on subjects. Second, although some predicates show a collective/distributive ambiguity with respect to subjects, very few do with respect to objects. Third, most examples of object collectives involve spatial or temporal collectivity, not true collective action, as the examples in (19) show. Fourth, collective interpretations of objects are generally productive only when a collectivizing adverb like *together* is added. These facts suggest that objects are not interpreted collectively (in the sense of joint participation in the same event). Purported cases of object collectivity can be seen as cases of secondary predication; thus, (19a) is interpreted as ‘Jenny did something to the sheep; as a result they are together’, where the secondary subject is collective.⁵

Similar reasoning applies to (20a). (This example, from Peruvian Spanish, is modeled after a sentence suggested by an anonymous reviewer.) *Invitar* has two possible interpretations: one with an implicit event argument, (20a), correlating with an accusative clitic *los*, and another with no event argument, (20b). The comitative is ungrammatical with the second type (see (20c)), suggesting a small clause structure for the first type where the object is an underlying subject.

- (20) a. *Los invito a tí con María.*
 CL.2PL invite to you with Maria
 ‘I invite you and Maria (to do something).’
 b. *Les invito café.*
 CL.2PL invite coffee
 ‘I’ll buy you coffee.’
 c. **Les invito a tí con María café.*
 CL.2PL invite to you with Maria coffee

5 The Togetherness Implicature Revisited

The analysis presented above offers the beginning of an explanation for the observation that the togetherness meaning (what I have called the collectivity restriction) looks like an implicature. Recall that this meaning cannot be canceled (see the discussion of (8)–(10)); rather, it can apply to different parts of the event described by the predicate. If lexical aspect is decomposed into subevents that map to different syntactic positions, then these facts follow. The collective interpretation brought on by comitative coordination may be linked to one of the subevents in the sentence, not forcing the other subevents to be interpreted collectively. For regular coordination, collectivity must apply to the whole event.

⁵ The fact that in languages like Spanish both collective elements like *juntos* ‘together’ and secondary predicates can show agreement is evidence for a secondary predication analysis of collectivity.

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A PREFERENCE FOR MOVE OVER
MERGE
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1 Introduction

Chomsky (1995, 1998) claims that Merge is preferred over Move and gives both conceptual and empirical arguments for this claim. A conceptual argument is this: Move (a) establishes agreement between a lexical item α and a feature F, (b) selects P(F), and then (c) merges P(F) to α P, where P(F) is a phrase determined by F and α P is a projection headed by α . Since Move involves the extra step of selecting P(F), Move is more complex than its subcomponents Merge and Agree, or even the combination of the two. Given that simple operations preempt complicated ones, Merge is preferred to Move. Chomsky argues that the preference for Merge over Move is empirically supported by the contrast in (1).

- (1) a. There seems to be someone in the room.
b. *There seems someone to be in the room.

Suppose that the computational system C_{HL} constructs the following structure:

- (2) [_{TP} to [_{VP} be someone in the room]]

The next step is to fill the specifier position (Spec) of the nonfinite T^0 . Given the initial numeration with *there*, there are two possibilities:

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