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WHEN MINIMALISM ISN'T
ENOUGH: AN ARGUMENT FOR
ARGUMENT STRUCTURE
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1 Introduction

A central hypothesis in Chomsky's (1993, 1995) Minimalist Program is that only two interface levels of representation are available on which to state linguistic generalizations: PF and LF. This conceptually appealing simplification of previous versions of transformational grammar (e.g., Chomsky 1981) claims that D-Structure and S-Structure are not needed and thus should not be part of the syntactic architecture. Chomsky focuses on LF, showing not only that constraints thought to hold of D-Structure and/or S-Structure can be stated on LF but also that doing so provides the best analysis of the data. In this squib I will examine the one empirical argument of this type that Chomsky makes, arguing that although conceptually appealing it fails on empirical grounds.

Chomsky's argument involves an analysis of the interpretations of (1) and (2). Both sentences are ambiguous: *himself* can refer to either

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Bill or *John*. What is interesting, however, is that on the idiomatic interpretation of (2), where *take picture* means ‘photograph’, *himself* can only refer to *Bill*.

- (1) John wondered [which picture of himself] Bill saw.
- (2) John wondered [which picture of himself] Bill took.

Chomsky’s claim is that whatever level of representation idiom interpretation takes place on is the level at which reflexive binding is determined. Specifically, he claims that at LF the idiom *take picture* must form a unit for interpretation and that LF is therefore the correct level for the determination of reflexive binding. If reflexive binding were free to apply at other levels of representation (e.g., D-Structure and/or S-Structure), the correlation between binding and interpretation in (2) would not be explained. This suggests strongly that LF, not D-Structure or S-Structure, is the only level for determining binding relations, supporting the basic Minimalist Program architecture.

In this squib I will argue that it is correct that the level at which *take picture* is a unit is the level at which reflexive binding is determined. However, I will argue that the relevant level is not LF, but a level of Argument Structure. My analysis is couched in terms of the sort of Argument Structure proposed in recent work in Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG) but it is hoped that the argument I make here is general enough to extend to other approaches as well. The argument has two parts. First, I show that the idiom *take picture* cannot always be a unit at LF; that is, LF is not the right level of representation to characterize the interpretation of the idiom. Second, I show that the sentences in (1) and (2) are wrongly grouped together: (1) involves a binding theory–‘exempt’ anaphor (Pollard and Sag 1992, 1994), also called a logophor (Sells 1987, Reinhart and Reuland 1993), sensitive to pragmatic conditions, which accounts for the ambiguous binding; the idiomatic interpretation of (2), however, involves a true anaphor, sensitive to syntactic Argument Structure, which accounts for its obligatory binding by its subject *Bill*. Rather than providing an empirical argument in favor of the Minimalist Program, the contrast in (1) and (2) constitutes an empirical argument *against* its basic architecture, suggesting it must be supplemented with at least a syntactic Argument Structure representation.

2 The Idiom at LF

Chomsky’s claim is that at LF the idiom *take picture* must be a unit for interpretation. In this section I will argue that *take* and *picture* can be separated at LF even while maintaining the idiomatic unit interpretation, casting doubt that LF is the level where idiom interpretation takes place.

Let us suppose that the relevant unit is some sort of VP or V’ containing the verb *take* and the direct object headed by *picture*.

- (3) [_{VP} take [_{DP} picture]]

The following examples are based on observations by Diesing (1992), who argues that a DP's position at LF correlates with certain semantic properties. If the structure in (3) is correct, then the idiom's object should have semantic properties associated with being VP-internal only. However, the idiomatic object can pass every test for being VP-external at LF. This strongly suggests that the DP in the idiom may but need not appear in VP at LF.

- (4) a. John took the picture of Mary; Bill took the picture of Sam.
 b. John took every picture you see in the display.
 c. John takes most pictures at night.
 d. John won't take just *any* picture.
 e. John took many pictures inside but some of them outside.
 f. John takes two pictures every day.
 g. John took every picture that Bill did [e].

At LF VP-internal DPs cannot be definite (4a), cannot be headed by strong quantifiers (4b) and (4c), cannot be headed by non-negative polarity item *any* (4d), and cannot receive a "proportional" reading (4e) (see Milsark 1977). Diesing argues that DPs with these properties must undergo Quantifier Raising (QR) at LF to map into the appropriate portion of the semantic interpretation.

Further, (4f) and (4g) more generally suggest that QR is possible for this DP at LF: (4f) can have a reading in which *two pictures* takes scope over *every day*; and (4g) shows that the DP can license antecedent-contained deletions (ACDs), also believed to correspond to a VP-external position at LF (see, e.g., May 1985).¹

Chomsky (1995) suggests that LF movement is formal feature movement, which leaves behind "semantic" material. One might suggest that the relevant semantic features of *take picture* are left behind after LF QR, thus allowing for idiom interpretation of VP. There are two reasons to doubt that QR is formal feature movement only. First, from a conceptual point of view it is not clear what QR is if it does not affect "semantic" material, since the motivation for QR in the first place is to rearrange syntactic material in a way that "feeds" the semantic interpretation. Second, with respect to ACD examples like (4g), if QR (or raising to [Spec, Agr_O]; see Hornstein 1994, Runner 1995a,b, 1998) moves only quantificational features (and not the whole DP), then infinite regress will not be avoided.²

¹ As a reviewer points out, the wide scope interpretation of (4f) entails a reading that means something like 'John takes the same two shots every day'.

² However, Fox and Nissenbaum (1999) outline a view of QR that may be extendable to examples containing ACD. Danny Fox (personal communication) has been developing such an analysis, which would make different predictions with respect to the analysis of (4g). It is beyond the scope of this squib to critique this work (now being published as Fox 2002).

I conclude, then, that the claim that the idiom *take picture* is a unit at LF is untenable.

3 “Exempt” Anaphors

Before considering what level of representation is right for idiom interpretation and reflexive binding, I will turn to the second part of the argument, that the nonidiomatic ambiguous readings of (1) and (2) are not due to syntactic binding. Including these examples says nothing one way or the other about the relevant level of representation for syntactic reflexive binding.

It has been recognized for some time that many languages have reflexive noun phrases that seem to be “exempt” from Condition A of binding theory. Usually, nonsyntactic, pragmatic factors like “point of view” and “source” are relevant for their licensing. The examples that most convincingly show that Condition A is not relevant involve binding across clauses, strongly suggesting that extrasyntactic conditions play a role. Icelandic *sig*, exemplified in (5), has been extensively discussed in the literature (Thráinsson 1976, Anderson 1982, Maling 1984, Sells 1987, Sigurðsson 1990). Japanese *zibun*, exemplified in (6), has also received considerable attention (Kameyama 1984, 1985, Kuno 1986, Sells 1987, Iida and Sells 1988, Iida 1992).

- (5) Formaðurinn_i varð óskaplega reiður. Tillagan
the-chairman became furiously angry the-proposal
væri avírðileg. Væri henni beint gegn
was(SUBJ) outrageous was(SUBJ) it aimed at
sér_i persónulega.
self personally
‘The chairman_i became furiously angry. The proposal was
outrageous. It was aimed at self_i personally.’
- (6) Taroo_i wa totemo kanasigat-tei-ta. Yosiko ga Takasi
Taroo TOPIC very sad-PROG-PAST Yosiko NOM Takasi
ga zibun_i o hihansi-ta noni bengosi-nakat-ta
NOM self ACC criticize-PAST but defend-not-PAST
kara da.
because COPULA
‘Taroo_i was very sad. It is because Yosiko did not defend
(him) though Takasi criticized self_i.’

Pollard and Sag (1994) argue that some English reflexives are likewise exempt from Condition A. The most notorious cases involve “picture” noun phrases. Again the most convincing examples involve cross-sentential binding. That point of view is relevant is illustrated by the following contrast:

- (7) John_i was really going to get even with Mary. That picture
of himself_i in the paper would really annoy her, as would
the other stunts he had planned.

- (8) *Mary was quite taken aback by the publicity John_i was receiving. That picture of himself_i in the paper had really annoyed her, and there was not much she could do about it.

Even some of the classic examples that have been used to argue that Condition A applies at a level other than S-Structure (e.g., Belletti and Rizzi 1988) have cohorts that cannot be given such an account. The contrast in (9) cannot be due to c-command since the examples in (10), with similar structures, are all fine.

- (9) a. The picture of himself_i in *Newsweek* bothered John_i.
 b. *The picture of himself_i in *Newsweek* bothered John_i's father.
- (10) a. The picture of himself_i in *Newsweek* dominated John_i's thoughts.
 b. The picture of himself_i in *Newsweek* made John_i's day.
 c. The picture of himself_i in *Newsweek* shattered the peace of mind that John_i had spent the last six months trying to restore.

Reflexives in picture NPs like those in (9) and (10) contrast sharply with examples like (11), where the NP has a subject. Compare (11) with Pollard and Sag's example (7) above. The presence of the subject of NP removes the possibility that the reflexive is bound cross-sententially.

- (11) John_i was going to get even with Mary. Sam_j's picture of himself_{j/*i} in the paper would really annoy her, as would the other stunts he had planned.

On the basis of facts like these Pollard and Sag suggest that the presence of the NP subject or less oblique coargument is the crucial distinction between real reflexives and exempt anaphors.³ They propose that the Argument Structure is an ordered list of a predicate's arguments, in order from least oblique to most oblique. Condition A of their binding theory is stated in (12) (Pollard and Sag 1994:254).

- (12) A locally o-commanded reflexive must be locally o-bound.

Local o-command is defined as precedence on an Argument Structure

³ Reinhart and Reuland (1993) also argue for a distinction between structurally and pragmatically bound (logophoric) reflexives. While Reinhart and Reuland's definitions for determining what counts as a structurally bound reflexive (see section 5 below) differ from Pollard and Sag's, the distribution ends up being almost the same for the two approaches, including the claim that a reflexive in an NP containing a subject of NP will be structurally bound while a reflexive in an NP without a subject will be a logophor. Determining exactly which set of definitions, if either, is correct is a matter still under investigation. See Runner, Sussman, and Tanenhaus 2000 and Keller and Asudeh 2001 for some evidence from psycholinguistic studies that even reflexives in NPs containing subjects may be exempt anaphors.

list, and local o-binding is defined as local o-command with coindexing. What this means is that if a reflexive has a coargument that could potentially bind it (i.e., it is locally o-commanded), then that reflexive must be locally bound by something (i.e., it must be locally o-bound). In other words, an anaphor is subject to binding theory if it has a less oblique coargument; if it does not, it is exempt and will be licensed by other (pragmatic) means. Anthropomorphizing a bit, we can say that the anaphor “searches” for an antecedent among its coarguments. If it has no coarguments, as in the case of the picture NPs in (7), (9), and (10), it is subject to pragmatic licensing. If it does have a coargument, as in the case of the picture NP in (11), it is subject to syntactic binding theory and must find an antecedent among its less oblique coarguments. The important observation is that the reflexive is sensitive to its coarguments, providing initial support for the claim that Argument Structure is relevant to binding theory. Consider the argument structures of the picture NPs in (7) and (11).⁴

- (13) a. *picture* [*of*-NP]: the picture of himself
 b. *picture* [NP₁, *of*-NP₂]: Sam’s picture of himself

In (13a) the reflexive has no coargument and is not subject to binding theory. In (13b) the reflexive does have a coargument; binding theory applies and the reflexive must find a syntactic antecedent, forcing *himself* to be bound to *Sam*.

We can now return to (1), repeated here as (14).

- (14) John wondered [which picture of himself] Bill saw.

This example involves a picture NP of the type in (13a), without a subject. This means that the reflexive is exempt from binding theory. It should be sensitive to pragmatic considerations. Consider two contexts: (A) Poor John! If Bill finds those nude shots of him on the Internet, he’ll never get that job offer Bill has been hinting at. (B) Poor Bill! If he searches the Internet carefully enough, he’ll find those nude shots of himself, which John realizes would just kill him. Context A, which takes John’s point of view, highly favors the reading in which *John* binds the reflexive; context B, which takes Bill’s point of view, highly favors *Bill* as the binder. In context the sentence is not ambiguous. This behavior of the reflexive is predicted if it is sensitive not strictly to syntactic configurations, but to pragmatic factors as well.⁵

⁴ The argument structures in (13) are only schematic. For more details, see recent work on Argument Structure in HPSG such as Manning 1995 and Manning and Sag 1999.

⁵ A reviewer points out that *wh*-movement appears to extend the binding possibilities in an example like (ia).

- (i) a. Which picture of himself did John regret that Mary had bought?
 b. *John regretted that Mary had bought that picture of himself.

The coreference in (ia) follows from the fact that a reflexive is an exempt anaphor and thus searches the discourse for an appropriate antecedent, which

The readings available for (14) contrast, of course, with the readings available if the extracted phrase has a subject.

- (15) a. John_i wonders which of his_j pictures of himself_{i/*j} Bill_j saw.
 b. John_i wonders which of his_j pictures of himself_{j/*i} Bill_j saw.

The subject of the NP determines the binding of the reflexive, apparently irrespective of context.

I conclude, then, that example (1) illustrates a reflexive in the class of exempt anaphors, which are not subject solely to syntactic factors, but to pragmatic ones as well. What this means is that (1) is not the right example to look at to determine the *structural* conditions on reflexive binding.

4 The Argument Structure of *Take Picture*

What, then, accounts for the contrast between (1) and (2)? Let us return to example (2), repeated here as (16).

- (16) John wondered [which picture of himself] Bill took.

On the idiomatic ‘take picture’ interpretation this example requires *Bill* to bind the reflexive. It is unclear what sort of context, if any, could be added to (16) to shift the reading. This suggests that the reflexive in this example is not an exempt anaphor and must abide by binding theory. The question is, why?

The account I propose is this. Let us assume that the idiom is a predicate, *take picture*, with two arguments: X takes a picture of Y. Thus, at the level of Argument Structure X and Y are coarguments.

- (17) *take picture* [NP₁, of-NP₂]: Bill takes a picture of himself

If NP₂ is a reflexive, it will be a structural (not exempt) anaphor and will be constrained by structural binding theory: it has a coargument potential antecedent. This forces NP₂ to be coindexed with NP₁, leading to the binding observed in (16).

The intuition guiding this approach takes advantage of HPSG’s dissociation of valence features and Argument Structure: the anaphor appears on the Argument Structure list but is embedded syntactically within the direct object NP (*pictures of himself*); this would be an exceptional mapping between valence and Argument Structure licensed by the lexical requirements of the idiomatic predicate itself.

in this case is *John*. But why is the same binding not possible in (ib)? Elaborating on work by Grinder (1970) and Jacobson and Neubauer (1976), Pollard and Sag (1994) suggest that another factor that exempt anaphors are sensitive to is the Intervention Constraint, which they view as a processing constraint. See Asudeh 2000 for an argument that the Intervention Constraint is actually a grammatical constraint that exempt anaphors are categorically sensitive to. Either approach correctly rules out the binding in (ib).

Some independent evidence for treating *take picture* as a predicate comes from extraction facts. In (18) and (19), the (a) examples involve extraction of the PP complement of the predicate *take picture*; the results contrast with the (b) examples, where the PP complement of the noun *picture* is extracted.

- (18) a. ?Of whom did you wonder whether Bill took a picture at school?
 b. ?*Of whom did you wonder whether Bill took a picture to school?
- (19) a. ?It was of John that I took a picture at school.
 b. ?*It was of John that I took a picture to school.

Extraction of the PP complement seems sensitive to the character of the selecting head, as either a “verbal” predicate (i.e., *take picture*) or a nominal one (i.e., *picture*).

5 More on Argument Structure

What sort of Argument Structure representation is relevant for binding theory? I have referred to this several times as a *syntactic* level of representation. If Argument Structure is to be the structure on which binding theory is stated, then it must be a syntactic, and not solely semantic, level of representation. The example in (20), from Reinhart and Reuland 1993, requires *himself* to be bound by *Max*, suggesting that they are coarguments in the relevant sense.

- (20) Max expects himself to pass the exam.

The level at which binding theory is determined must recognize that *himself* and *Max* are coarguments. This is straightforward in the Argument Structure approach assumed here and in work on HPSG. This is because HPSG (and a number of other nontransformational approaches) is not constrained by the standard transformational stipulation that the thematic subject of an infinitival complement to a verb like *expect* not be the verb’s syntactic object. And it is these examples that best illustrate the syntactic nature of Argument Structure. Semantically, *himself* is the subject of the embedded infinitival. But syntactically, it is the complement of *expect*.⁶ It is examples like (20), in fact, that prove the most challenging for an approach like Reinhart and

⁶ There have been a number of Minimalist Program “raising to object” proposals according to which the subject embedded below a verb like *expect* is semantically associated with the embedded clause, but raises in the syntax to a functional specifier associated with *expect* to check its Case features (Lasnik and Saito 1991, Koizumi 1993, Runner 1995a, 1998). However, this derived structure, which might correspond roughly to Van Riemsdijk and Williams’s (1981) NP-Structure, is not a distinguished level of representation in the Minimalist Program on which binding can be stated. Even if it were, it is not clear how appropriating such a level would account for the arguments discussed in the text for treating *take picture* as a predicate.

Reuland's (1993) in which binding is determined at LF alone. Their analysis requires an otherwise unmotivated rule of LF V-movement in English in order to create an LF predicate in which *himself* is indeed, technically at least, an argument of the main verb.

6 Concluding Remarks

Treating *take picture* as a predicate with an Argument Structure containing its subject and the prepositional object of *picture* as its object, combined with an account recognizing exempt and structural reflexives, straightforwardly accounts for the contrast in (1) and (2), which was used by Chomsky to argue for the basic Minimalist Program architecture.

The account rests on Chomsky's claim that the level at which the idiom is interpreted as a predicate is the level at which structural binding theory holds. However, I have shown that LF cannot be that level. I have tried to show that rather than supporting LF as the only level of representation available, the contrast in (1) and (2) in fact undermines such an account. I have suggested that besides LF the syntactic architecture that best characterizes the interaction of idiom interpretation and anaphor interpretation must posit something like a level of syntactic Argument Structure.

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