

## Reviews

**Eugene Rogan, Editor: *Outside In: On the Margins of the Modern Middle East*. London/New York: I. B. Tauris, 2002. 263 pages. ISBN 1-86064-698-0. \$65.00. Reviewed by Robert J. Pranger.**

This book is part of a series published by I. B. Tauris on the Islamic Mediterranean. As described by the publisher, “This series, involving some of the leading experts on the Middle East, focuses on the relationship between the individual and society in the Islamic Mediterranean, covering everything from literature to economics and casting its methodological net wide across the humanistic disciplines.” One can hardly think of a more important region for discourse today, no more so than because it is the publisher’s aim to tap a “hitherto overlooked area of scholarship,” as well.

*Outside In: On the Margins of the Modern Middle East*, edited by Eugene Rogan of St. Antony’s College, Oxford, is published in association with the European Science Foundation at Strasbourg, which has organized various workshops and conferences in a project on “Individual and Society in the Mediterranean Muslim World.” This volume, focusing on “marginality derived from a broader discussion of norms and resistance in law and society and our shared interest in those who did not fit within the parameters of accepted social norms” (Rogan’s introduction), has been produced by ten participants in these study programs.

Marginality is an important division of what is called “history from below,” historical research into the lives of common people—grassroots or non-elite social history.

An illustrious catalogue of historians, social and political philosophers, novelists, and others have worked in this area since the French Revolution. In the course of just over two hundred years, important subdivisions within this historiography have appeared—among others, Marxism and socialism more broadly, women’s history, post-colonial “subaltern” studies, and that research influenced by Michel Foucault.

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The essays in this volume, according to Rogan, “fall into four thematic fields”: (1) patterns of consumption (evolution of drinking habits in Istanbul in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries); (2) institutions of state, law, and society that confine special types of persons outside normal community interactions (prisons in nineteenth-century Egypt, the Cairo poorhouse, prostitution in nineteenth-century Egypt, and the introduction of modern Western psychiatric asylums into Egypt and Lebanon); (3) port cities and their populations (migrant workers in Salonica during the eighteenth century, European social outcasts in precolonial Tunisia, and the relations between public morality and marginality in Ottoman Beirut); and (4) entertainers (in Baghdad in the first half of the twentieth century and Cairo in the second half of the same century).

As one might imagine from scanning the above list of themes and subject matter, any reader will immediately encounter more feast than famine, thereby running the risk of serious intellectual indigestion. Five of the ten contributions were of special interest to me for reasons connected with my own intellectual interests or with something that seemed quite unusual:

1. chapter 5, “Madness and Marginality: The Advent of the Psychotic Asylum in Egypt and Lebanon,” by Rogan;
2. chapter 6, “Migrants and Workers in an Ottoman Port: Ottoman Salonica in the Eighteenth Century,” by Eyal Ginio of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem;
3. chapter 7, “Marginality and Migration: Europe’s Social Outcasts in Precolonial Tunisia, 1830–81,” by Julia Clancy-Smith of the University of Arizona;
4. chapter 8, “Public Morality and Marginality in Fin-de-siècle Beirut,” by Jens Hanssen of the University of Erlangen; and
5. chapter 10, “Shifting Narratives on Marginality: Female Entertainers in Twentieth-Century Egypt,” by Karin van Nieuwkerk of the University of Nijmegen.

“A new notion of madness,” writes Eugene Rogan, “was introduced to the Middle East towards the end of the nineteenth century. European missionaries and medical practitioners, caught up in the enthusiasm for the new branch of medicine known as psychiatry, were appalled by the treatment of those who fitted their definitions of insanity.” Modern psychiatric asylums were introduced in Egypt and Lebanon under the norms of European medicine rather than through local normative guidance by religious leaders. Men of science replaced men of religion in the problems of mental illness. Asylums became a lasting legacy of European rule.

In his essay on migrants and workers in eighteenth-century Salonica, then part of the Ottoman Empire and in close geographic proximity to the seat of government in Constantinople, Eyal Ginio points to an imperial headache in the strained relations between migrant port workers, most prominently Albanian dockworkers, and the townspeople. To be sure, a lower strata of Salonica’s long-time residents were also employed

as laborers in the port, but Albanians were favored because of their low-cost skills and their tendency to group together in a solidarity that encouraged adding more and more of their kinsmen. Under these circumstances, as in other instances covered in this volume of essays (in Beirut, for instance), Ottoman authorities resorted to certain tactics for maintaining stability, while at the same time accommodating that complex pluralistic universe encompassed by the term Ottoman Empire. In Salonica's case, the problem of town and port was solved by the enforced segregation of the port from the city and by control of the behavior of foreigners through surety bonds.

In this day of massive emigration out of North Africa into Europe, produced by high birthrates and high unemployment, it is useful to remember that the current South-North pattern of migration was preceded a century earlier by a North-South movement of populations, from a Europe with high birthrates and high unemployment. Julia Clancy-Smith examines the migration of Maltese to Tunisia in the period from 1830 to 1881, before French colonial rule. After colonies came into being in North Africa, the same North-South flow out of Europe continued. "The truth of the matter of nineteenth-century European imperialism/colonialism," writes Clancy-Smith, "is that North Africa became a dumping ground for political undesirables and ne'er do-wells as well as social groups unable to cope with dislocations of nation-state building and industrial capitalism in Western Europe." The author spends some time examining the strong role of European diplomatic consuls in North Africa in matters governing persons of their home country—these North African destinations were, after all, hardly established nation-states with their own laws of citizenship. Finally, Clancy-Smith notes that Maltese women at times thought they could live more happily with Tunisian men than with their Maltese husbands. The patriarchal prejudices of Malta could be more sexist than those in Tunisia. In matrimonial tangles such as these, the intrepid European consuls also played a role as implicit sex police, with "sexual border patrols" operating as informants to bring the alleged misconduct of their nationals (male and female) to the consuls' attention.

Jens Hanssen's contribution on public morality and marginality in fin-de-siècle Beirut describes ways in which the social order of this highly cosmopolitan city threatened Ottoman rule there and was deemed to need considerable regulation from authorities. At the same time, however, the Ottomans saw Beirut as a ready source of badly needed revenue, a good deal of which could be derived from socially marginal activities. The tension between social order and public revenue led to constant negotiations between the authorities and marginal elements, with inevitable redefinition of what constituted socially acceptable activity in Beirut, given the perennially cash-strapped condition of the Ottoman Porte.

Last but not least is Karin van Nieuwkerk's splendid essay on female entertainers in twentieth-century Egypt. Her work is based on oral history interviews conducted in

Cairo during 1989 with three generations of women—mother (Umm Nawal), daughter (Nawal), and granddaughter (Bint Nawal). These women share their views about female dancers. Both Umm Nawal and her daughter had been dancers, but Bint Nawal was adamantly opposed to this business. As the interviews moved back and forth among the three women, with Umm Nawal having had the most involvement in the dancing business, something became evident that should make people not well grounded in the Islamic Arab world careful about making generalizations regarding this civilization. In terms of Western time, the clock is going backwards in these interviews, since the grandmother's generation in Egypt was more secularized than her granddaughter's in 1989. Umm Nawal was at ease with her former life as a dancer, as was her culture. On the other hand, Bint Nawal “forcefully expresses the opinion of most middle-class Egyptians. . . . [M]oral terms like corrupt, indecent, immodest, immoral, deviant, outrageous and seductive were often used to describe the business.” And when Bint Nawal emotionally presses them, both her mother and grandmother will tend to agree that the profession of dancer is harmful, shameful. All three seem now to view themselves as members of a new Egyptian middle class more traditionalist in its values than earlier in the twentieth century.

There is also a lesson in methodology here. The use of oral history can be deceptive, because the interviewee always has an audience, sometimes only an interviewer but other times not only the interlocutor but others who may be present. In this case, when Umm Nawal first began her life story about dancing, a friend who had also been in the entertainment business was the only person present besides the interviewer—so Umm Nawal's judgment about dancing as a profession is more positive. As the interview continues, however, Umm Nawal's daughter and granddaughter join the group, and Umm Nawal changes her tone somewhat about professional dancing to accommodate the views of her kin, most notably the adamant rejection of the entertainment business by Bint Nawal. This tendency for interviewees to modify versions of their stories depending on their audience is well known in police work and gives rise to the caution with which criminal defense attorneys approach so-called confessions. But oral history is also confession. The above tendency to change publicly expressed moral positions to fit the audience one addresses is not confined to an older Egyptian lady in today's Cairo, nor is it endemic only in the Arab and wider Islamic world. It does mean, however, that those who speak—and preach—are sensitive to those who listen. In other words, the underlying historical tendencies of Islamic civilization go beyond rhetoric that varies from audience to audience, caught up as these longer term trends are in the deep-running currents of other civilizations as well. To posit some “clash of civilizations” based on the declamations of zealots or even the views of ordinary citizens found in “scientific” public opinion polls misses this point.

Umm Nawal had lived past the prime of her life, which had come during a period in

Egypt when secularism—and modernism—was strong in her culture. She now confronted what appeared to be a reaction, if not revolution, against “older” times! Her grandchildren are more religious than their parents or grandparents, and their puritanical morality is the prevailing ethos of the “modernizing” Egyptian middle class. Is the Mediterranean coming full circle? Hardly. Zealous religious fundamentalists are not the bedrock of Mediterranean civilization, but Socrates is, and he was publicly executed because his “business” offended the traditionalists. He was corrupting youth, it was charged, just as the public dancers are now considered haram.

One thing is clear in this seeming paradox about tradition and modernity being interchangeably before and after: the Mediterranean, including the Islamic Mediterranean, provides us with a full picture of the human condition in its cyclical not linear history. The great medieval Islamic scholars were attracted to this point of view in ancient Greek philosophy and historiography and proved grateful enough to preserve for posterity the written work of their predecessors in a far different cultural tradition. This is what I mean by each civilization being caught up in deep-running currents of other civilizations. To stand in the way of such spontaneous crosscultural interaction is ultimately futile, although in the short run great damage can be done to the human condition by isolation and demonization of other cultures. The innate cosmopolitanism of Mediterranean civilizations around this inland sea has powerful enemies in the region and beyond it.

**Raju G. C. Thomas, Editor: *Yugoslavia Unraveled: Sovereignty, Self-Determination, Intervention*. New York: Lexington Books, 2003. 400 pages. ISBN 0-7391-0517-5. \$85.00. Reviewed by Christopher Preble.**

*Yugoslavia Unraveled* is a welcome and important work that reviews the international community’s policies toward Yugoslavia in the 1990s. It is welcome because dispassionate analysis of these policies has been superseded in the West by triumphalism, and especially, in editor Raju G. C. Thomas’s words, the “triumph of a new moral liberalism, which emphasized global humanitarianism over the old, cynical, state-centered realism.” This book is important both for what it teaches us about the conduct of foreign policy during the 1990s and for what it tells us about policy in the twenty-first century, because the authors understand that a fundamental transformation in the conduct of international relations has taken place. On balance, the authors believe that this new system will lead to more violence and ethnic strife.

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As is often the case with edited collections, the essays in this volume vary widely in language and approach. Credit goes to Thomas, Allis Chalmers Professor of International Affairs at Marquette University, for setting the overall tone as well as the direction for the volume in his prologue and introductory chapter. The contest between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, led by the United States, and the Serbs, led symbolically at least by Slobodan Milosevic, was often conceived as a struggle between good and evil, between enlightened Westerners committed to protecting human rights and a man portrayed as a hateful bigot who practiced ethnic cleansing against (especially Muslim) populations in Bosnia and Kosovo. In fact, as Thomas and nearly all of the other contributors to this volume show, both sides—both the West and its allies in Yugoslavia (including the Croats, the Bosnian Muslims, and the Kosovar Albanians), and Milosevic and the Serbs—are to blame for the horrific violence and massive population shifts that took place in the ten years following the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Several of the authors go one step further. “The fundamental problem was not what the Serbs did,” Thomas writes, “but what the Western powers did: namely, the violation of Yugoslavia’s territorial sovereignty, the rush to advance the principle of self-determination, and the reckless use of massive force in violation of the UN Charter on humanitarian grounds.” Similarly, Gordon Bardos concludes that the “international community” is to blame for much that is wrong in southeastern Europe. The West’s “perfect failure” (a phrase coined by Michael Mandelbaum) derived from “a fundamental misdiagnosis of the prerequisites for stabilizing” the region, and he likens “international (and especially American) policy in the region” to “using sledgehammers to kill mosquitoes.”

Other essays in the volume include P. H. Liotta’s study of the religious components that contributed to Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Milica Bookman’s economic analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia is both refreshing and original in providing a unifying approach to understanding the entire region. Edward Herman notes the systemic bias of the media’s coverage and charges that the media itself played a crucial propaganda role. Meanwhile, Satish Nambiar’s experiences as the first military commander of the United Nations Protection Force deployed in Yugoslavia may help to assess operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Maya Chadda’s chapter on intervention in ethnic civil wars and exit strategies is also relevant for Iraq, where there is no clear exit plan, and where the risks of an ethnic civil war persist.

The most important chapters are those that transcend a narrow focus on southeastern Europe in the 1990s and include important lessons for current policies throughout the world. For example, borrowing a phrase from Geoffrey Blainey, Alan Kuperman argues that the West’s policies are the main source of “optimistic miscalculation” in the post-Cold War world, creating the expectation that the international community will aid ethnic minorities in secessionist struggles. Kuperman concludes that “a declared

policy of nonintervention could discourage uprisings by weak subordinate groups and thereby—counterintuitively—reduce ethnic cleansing and genocide.” On the other hand, Kuperman warns, “a declaratory policy of routine intervention such as the Clinton Doctrine is likely to be counterproductive, inadvertently spurring the very violence it is intended to stop.” Kuperman’s strong case is supported by several of the other essays, including that of Kelly Greenhill, who sees in the West’s treatment of the Serbs an incentive for other groups to agitate for Western recognition backed by force.

The West’s approach toward secessionist ethnic groups in Yugoslavia was doubly problematic because it demolished the notion of state sovereignty but at the same time applied the principle of ethnic self-determination in a highly selective and subjective manner. By supporting self-determination for Slovenes, Croats, and Muslims, the West implicitly encouraged Albanians in Kosovo to follow suit. Meanwhile, the West denied the right of self-determination to Serbs living in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

A number of other contributors worry about elevating the principle of self-determination to a core object of international relations. Michael Mandelbaum notes both the historical and practical limits of self-determination. Using ethnic and/or cultural homogeneity and self-determination as the primary factors in determining national borders would convert the current world map of approximately two hundred nation-states to as many as five thousand entities based on the sheer number of distinct groups.

The Yugoslav wars revealed an important political realignment in the United States. This book, and the wider scholarly reinterpretation of NATO’s Yugoslavia campaign, poses a special challenge to many of the current critics of the Bush administration’s foreign policies. The neoconservatives were among the most vocal proponents of military action against Serbia and have likewise supported President Bush’s Iraq campaign. On the other hand, foreign policy realists who question both the morality and efficacy of waging war against states that do not pose a military threat have divided over the question of whether Saddam Hussein posed such a threat, but they remain united by their conviction that Milosevic’s Serbia did not.

Bill Clinton couched his policy toward Yugoslavia in strictly humanitarian terms. Now, having failed to find evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and having similarly failed to link Iraq’s former regime with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, the Bush administration has also fallen back on a humanitarian justification for removing Saddam from power. Liberals, including some of the most enthusiastic of the NATO bombers from the 1990s (for example, Wesley Clark), must confront the inherent inconsistency in their approach to foreign affairs by explaining how the Clinton administration’s attacks against a sovereign state can be differentiated from the Bush administration’s attack on Saddam’s regime.

This volume also reveals another important continuity between the Clinton and Bush administrations. For all of the criticisms of American unilateralism since 2001,

and of the Bush administration's supposedly unique disdain for the United Nations, it is helpful to remind ourselves—as Thomas does—of the Clinton administration's decision to circumvent the Security Council twice in the span of six months in 1998 and 1999. These actions spurred worries in the international community long before the Bush administration promulgated its national security strategy in September 2002. In an editorial written in the midst of the NATO bombing campaign over Serbia, the *Times of India* called for the restoration of a balance of power to reign in American power and pointed to the “deep resentment” that was “bound to unleash various terrorist activities by nonstate actors” against the United States. Meanwhile, at about the same time, Chinese scholars spoke of the rectitude of “unrestricted war”—including terrorism—to relevel the playing field.

Realists have argued for decades that power is the determining characteristic of the international system and that international law ultimately can be made to serve the wishes of those with power. Nowhere is this clearer than in the discussion of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Robert Hayden found that the ICTY “delivers a ‘justice’ that is biased, with prosecutorial decisions based on the national characteristics of the accused rather than on what available evidence indicates that he has done.” Michael Mandel repeats this theme, finding the tribunal to be no more than a “propaganda arm” for NATO. Beyond this observation, however, Mandel's essay is the weakest of the volume, a diatribe that ultimately descends into an anti-American rant. The shrill tone can serve only to repel those who should pay heed to the important lessons of this book.

By contrast, notwithstanding his occasional resort to emotionalism, Robert Hayden's “Biased Justice: ‘Humanrightism’ and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,” is an extremely important essay for what it teaches about Yugoslavia and because of its broader implications.

Reading at times like a legal brief (Hayden holds both a law degree and a doctorate in anthropology), this well-organized chapter focuses on Human Rights Watch and others who have advocated the use of violence to punish human rights abuses. Hayden decries “the transformation of human rights concepts, from protesting the application of state violence on nonviolent dissidents to demanding the application of massive violence on states deemed to be inferior.” His most important point is “that humanitarian intervention requires the committing of humanitarian war crimes.” As such, “humanitarian intervention,” which has been celebrated as the greatest triumph of the human rights movement, is revealed as its greatest defeat, “because it transforms what had been a moral critique against violence into a moral crusade for massive violence.”

Add to this Thomas's indictment of humanitarian military interventions. Traditionally, Thomas notes, aggression is quite clear-cut: Italy's attack on Ethiopia in 1935, for example, or Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. But humanitarian intervention in civil



war is more subjective. Thomas finds that international recognition of secessionist states (Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia) turned a civil war into a war of aggression, and his prediction that “the likelihood of military interventions against weaker and defenseless states will increase” given that “NATO (which in reality means the United States) can fight wars without casualties” is prophetic. The attacks on Yugoslavia and Iraq, combined with threats to repeat similar attacks against Iran, North Korea, Syria, and other rogue states, has served no doubt as a lesson for previously “defenseless” states who are now scrambling to develop nuclear deterrents.

Although many of the essays were first written years ago and have not undergone substantial revisions since, Thomas hoped that the essays would prove timeless and that they therefore did not require updating in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001. In most cases, Thomas’s instincts were correct, and he is to be commended for assembling a fine collection that is sure to stand the test of time, particularly given the propensity of our political leaders to repeat the errors of the past.

**Alan L. Heil Jr.: *Voice of America: A History*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. 499 pages. ISBN 0-231-12674-3. \$37.50. Reviewed by Walter R. Roberts**

When Guglielmo Marconi developed wireless telegraphy, or radio, over a hundred years ago, he laid the seeds for a revolution in the conduct of diplomacy. A method became available by which one government could reach the people of another country by crossing frontiers without border controls. However, then and for decades thereafter, it was considered utterly undiplomatic in peacetime for a government to establish a direct connection with the citizens of another country. Diplomacy was confined to the relationship between two governments. In wartime, of course, these diplomatic rules did not apply; trying to affect the will of enemy warriors to continue fighting is as old as history.

The rules of diplomacy were broken after the Bolsheviks took power in what was to become the Soviet Union. For the first time in the modern era, a government urged the peoples of other countries, in peacetime, to rise against their own government, and radio was used as the main method to transmit the message—not only in Russian but also in other languages.

Walter R. Roberts, a former associate director of the U.S. Information Agency, started his governmental career at the Voice of America. He was appointed by President George H. W. Bush and reappointed by President Bill Clinton to serve as a member of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.

The world was not prepared to follow the Soviet example. But when Nazi Germany adopted the same methods, indeed improved on them, other countries woke up. Britain, for instance, started the BBC World Service, first confining it to English but slowly branching out into other languages.

Of course, when World War II broke out, all diplomatic gloves were off. Radio became a major psychological warfare weapon. Within ten weeks after America's entry into the war, the United States created its own short-wave radio service, later officially named the Voice of America (VOA).

Alan Heil Jr.'s *Voice of America: A History* not only traces VOA's evolution from its beginnings in 1942 to the present but provides a highly readable account of accomplishments and problems in the organization's sixty-year history. Heil is an excellent writer and researcher who bases his book on his own observations as a VOA employee and executive for almost forty years as well as on an enormous amount of written material and interviews with nearly everyone who has had anything to do with the organization.

Although the book's subtitle is *A History*, its first chapter deals with Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989. Heil wishes to introduce the reader to one important event in VOA's more recent history to make the evolution of the Voice more understandable. He quotes from a VOA correspondent's report: "It's a sultry May evening and many of the demonstrators in the huge plaza are camping out. They've been here for days as their numbers have swelled to epochal proportions. . . . Suddenly there is a hush. . . . Scores of transistor radios [appear] . . . aerials pointed skyward . . . [and VOA's] signature tune 'Yankee Doodle' sounds from the radios. It's nine P.M. and the Voice of America China Branch is on the air."

The book is full of similar vignettes giving the reader a vivid picture of life in the VOA, an organization peopled by native-born Americans, naturalized Americans, and foreign citizens broadcasting on behalf of VOA to their native countries. Early in 1942 VOA broadcast in only four languages—English, German, French, and Italian—but the number increased over the years and depending on budgetary allocations hovered around fifty; at this time it is fifty-three.

VOA went through many crises—budgetary, organizational, and substantive. It started out as a part of the Coordinator of Information (1942), then became an important element of the Office of War Information (1942–45), was transferred to the Department of State (1945–53), thereafter became a division of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) (1953–99), and now reports to the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

The term *journalistic independence* dominates the narrative throughout the book. Clearly, the employees of VOA from the director down have felt strongly on this issue. In the present organizational setup, VOA's journalistic independence is ensured—VOA is no longer part of the State Department or USIA. It reports to a bipartisan board with

the secretary of state an ex-officio board member. However, in insisting on journalistic independence, VOA must keep in mind that its “publisher” is the U.S. government, that its funds come exclusively from congressional appropriations, that VOA’s sole reason for existence is that it is an important element of American public diplomacy, that it consumes a large slice of the government’s public diplomacy budget, and that VOA’s listeners abroad universally regard the station as government supported.

Although Heil applauds the VOA for its independence and journalistic standards, the reader is left to ponder whose standards should apply. Journalists at the *Washington Post* and the *Washington Times* also make judgments about the newsworthiness of a story with strikingly different results. The same is true in broadcast journalism, as viewers of CNN and Fox readily recognize. There is no impingement of journalistic independence when, on a particular foreign policy issue, the secretary of state, who is a statutory member of the Broadcasting Board, exercises his function, established by law, to provide “information and guidance on foreign policy issues.”

Heil cites the case of dissident Wei Jingsheng, whom China had released for health reasons and sent into exile in 1997. When the American embassy in Beijing learned that Wei was due to give an interview at VOA, it pointed out that the Chinese government might regard such an interview as a violation of a promise by the U.S. not to “exploit” the freeing of Wei. This was not tampering with journalistic independence. For VOA it was a judgment call. After many exchanges with the State Department and the National Security Council, VOA broadcast the interview.

Heil also cites VOA’s interview with the Taliban leader Mullah Omar. It seems that the head of VOA’s Pashtun service, two weeks after 11 September, interviewed Mullah Omar. The United States was about to launch an attack on Taliban-led Afghanistan and on Osama bin Laden, who was believed to have been sheltered by the Taliban regime. The question whether the interview should be broadcast back to Afghanistan became an issue between the State Department and VOA. Again, it was a matter of judgment. VOA determined to broadcast the interview, followed by comments putting it into perspective.

It is worth recalling that the commercial media are also faced with similar judgment calls. Two weeks after 11 September, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice approached the news divisions of the major American television networks urging them not to broadcast an Osama bin Laden tape because of fears that it might contain coded language. The networks, which unlike VOA are privately funded, complied.

Regrettably, Heil fails to emphasize the *raison d’être* of the VOA, namely that it is an important element of American public diplomacy, in other words that it exists for one purpose only: to further U.S. interests abroad. This aim can best be achieved with VOA enjoying journalistic independence while its editors and writers exercise mature judgment.

Nevertheless, Heil's book is a must read for anyone who is interested in enhancing America's standing in the world. It shows that the United States possesses a precious asset that has carefully been built over a sixty-year period. Nearly a hundred million citizens of foreign countries regularly listen to VOA and hear about America, its culture, history, institutions, and policy. There is no other medium at the disposal of the United States with such an enormous reach. Hence, it should be preserved and indeed, in line with the information revolution, be expanded—as it already has—to include satellite broadcasting, television, and the Internet.