

## Reviews

**Roy Palmer Domenico: *Remaking Italy in the Twentieth Century*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002. 200 pages. ISBN 0-8476-9637-5. \$21.95 paper. Reviewed by Constantine A. Pagedas.**

What is Italy? Is it simply the boot-shaped peninsula located south of the Alps? What about the “frontier” region of the Piedmont, which was excluded from Italy proper by the ancient Romans, or Trentino and Alto-Adige, which have strong influences from Austria, or Sicily and Calabria, with their ties to Africa and the Mediterranean world? Can Italy be defined by where Italian is primarily spoken? What of the multitude of dialects spoken within Italy, not to mention the Italian-speaking areas of Switzerland? Are there any clues to be found in Italian politics, economics, culture, or society? Not really, as author Roy Palmer Domenico aptly points out in his excellent book *Remaking Italy in the Twentieth Century*. Italy, like most other Mediterranean countries, is something of an amorphous entity whose current borders are partly based on centers of ancient and medieval civilizations and partly on nineteenth- and twentieth-century political realities. In the case of Italy, Domenico properly notes that

the Po Valley of Bologna, Pavia, and Allessandria is far removed from Apulia’s Tavoliere, while Sardinia’s is closer to Barcelona’s than it is to Venice’s. Milan and Turin are nearer to Zurich and Paris than they are to Sicily. Such matters have influenced what a country should look like and have accentuated the differences between wealthier European Italy in the north and poorer Mediterranean Italy in the south.

Italy is as diverse and divided a country as any, and defining exactly what Italy is poses a serious challenge to historians. Indeed, it is Italy’s indefinability that has posed a constant and ongoing challenge to Italian leaders and revolutionaries ever since the Risorgimento (resurgence), which began with Napoleon’s invasion in 1796. Every Ital-

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ian leader from Crispi to Craxi, Garibaldi to Giolitti, Il Duce to De Gasperi, and even Berlusconi and Bossi today, has been forced to balance and compromise with numerous competing forces both within and outside of Italy. Domenico is clearly up to the challenge and has written a very accessible, concise, and balanced introductory history of Italy from the formation of the kingdom of Italy in the mid-nineteenth century to the republic of the present day.

As the book's title suggests, Italy is a country that was made and remade several times during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This volume consists of five well-written and fast-paced chapters, beginning with the revolutionary struggles, which beset Italy prior to and immediately after unification. As Domenico shows throughout his book in subtle ways, Italy continually underwent political, economic, societal, and even cultural metamorphoses, which made governing the country a very challenging task. Four main competing forces in Italy—the Liberals, the Catholic Church, the Fascists, and the Marxists—have been in constant conflict with each other in bids to shape the future Italian state, a conflict that has survived through various permutations even to the present day.

The Liberals, the primary architects of Italian unification, attempted to bring a politically, economically, socially, and culturally disparate entity into being. This began with small though important measures brought to the fore by Domenico. Dante's "standard" Italian, for example, which was spoken by approximately only 650,000 Italians in a country of 25 million in 1860, was made the official, national language of government, commerce, and education. Even so, Domenico, who has at hand a bevy of statistics to make his history flow fairly seamlessly, shows that even with the invention of the wireless radio by the Italian inventor Guglielmo Marconi in the early twentieth century, and later with the proliferation of television sets in Italian households, "polling results revealed that as late as 1991, only 48 percent of Italians used the national tongue when speaking with friends and colleagues."

One of the primary themes in Domenico's book is Italian foreign affairs. The country under Liberal leadership generally convulsed between its membership in the European concert of powers and its late entry into the race for colonies, thus never quite living up to much of its population's expectations. For some Italians, however, Italy should have remained out of foreign entanglements altogether and instead concentrated on the construction of a more prosperous state built from within. Nevertheless, as Domenico demonstrates, Italy did not fit in neatly with either the Central Powers or completely into the grand designs of the victorious Allies in World War I. Entry into the war in May 1915 on the side of the Allies for the promise of greater spoils than what the Central Powers were offering eventually proved a disaster. The general skepticism by the Italian population about entering a war in which the country was not directly an injured party—entering, in fact, for pure self-aggrandizement—demonstrated how fragile Lib-

eral power had become. By October 1917, with the poor state of the Italian military fully exposed by its defeat at Caporetto, Italy barely survived to sit at the victor's table—and even then, Premier Orlando had to leave the Paris Peace Conference at key moments to attend to domestic tensions in Rome. In any event, Italian nationalists felt that Italy received short shrift from the Allies for the loss of 571,000 soldiers, as well as 57,000 who died in prison camps and another 60,000 missing.

Domenico further explores the enigma that is Italy with his story of Benito Mussolini and Italian fascism. For those not familiar with Italian history in general, Domenico's story of Mussolini and all the contradictions of his life, his rise to power, his rule, and his ultimate downfall perhaps best demonstrates all the many contradictions that make up Italy itself. It may seem ironic to some that Mussolini, the son of an anarchist father who had spent time in jail and a devout Catholic mother, was first aligned with the socialists before he went his own way to form his fascist movement. Having estranged himself from his party comrades for espousing Italian intervention in World War I, Mussolini left the party to publish his own newspaper, *Il popolo d'Italia*, in which the soon-to-be dictator articulated fascist politics uniting elements from both the Left and the Right of Italian society. As Domenico writes, Mussolini was able to marry the odd mixture of “nationalist aims, anticommunism, worker's participation in management, tax reform, abolition of the monarchy and the senate, women's suffrage, confiscation of church property, ‘economic democracy,’ and an attack on war profiteers.” The evolution of Mussolini's fascism and its very complex nature during the *ventennio*, or what Italians call “the twenty years,” is carefully and thoughtfully discussed throughout his chapter on Italy's “Fascist Reformation.”

Italy's defeat and liberation in World War II, and its postwar recovery, are the subjects of Domenico's third and fourth chapters. Again, in what category did Italy belong? Was it a defeated member of the Axis powers brought down by Mussolini's miscalculations or the valiant Ally that switched sides in the middle of the war, suffered reprisals from Nazi Germany, yet made some heroic military stands contributing to Hitler's eventual defeat? It was only after Italy's political situation solidified under the continual, if not chaotic, Christian Democrat rule over the four decades after 1945, buttressed by Italy's economic boom in the postwar years, that the country finally found its bearings firmly rooted in the West through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. Italian society, if reluctantly, followed the societal trends of the United States and the rest of Western Europe during the Cold War on such issues as the expansion of the welfare state, women's roles, family size, abortion, and divorce as it developed into a heavily industrialized and consumer-based society.

In lieu of a conclusion, Domenico brings the evolution of the Italian state into the twenty-first century in his final chapter. Modern Italy remains almost as divided today as it was nearly two centuries ago, and Italian contradictions and extremes continue to

be felt to this day. The fall of the Christian Democrats following the *tangentopoli* scandals of the early 1990s, the rise of the center-left under Massimo D'Alema, and the creation of the center-right alternative through current Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia are all briefly discussed by Domenico. He touches on old issues that continue to divide Italy, such as the lag in the economic performance of the south as compared to the north, as well as new challenges in the era of globalization, such as the growing popularity of fast food versus the traditional Italian diet, the increase of both legal and illegal immigration, and crossborder health issues and environmental concerns. Overall, Domenico provides an elegant survey of Italian history over the past two hundred years in a book that one hopes is not overlooked by anyone seeking a solid piece of historical scholarship.

**Pauline Green: *Embracing Cyprus: The Path to Unity in the New Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. 150 pages. ISBN: 1-8606-4840-1. \$39.50. Reviewed by Irene Kyriakopoulos.**

Cyprus will be admitted to membership in the European Union in May 2004. The expansion of the EU, to include eight Eastern European states and two islands in the Mediterranean (Cyprus and Malta), will mark the beginning of a new phase on the long road to Europe's economic and political unification. It will also mark the beginning of a new phase for Cyprus.

For Europe, Cyprus's status as a sovereign country has been problematic. How "sovereign" is a country occupied by foreign troops? While the island is recognized as a single entity by the international community, it has been de facto divided into north and south since its invasion and occupation in 1974 by Turkish military forces. In social, political, and economic terms, Cyprus consists of not one but two entities, which have been deprived of normal interaction with one another for over a quarter century. In addition to hosting Turkish troops, the occupied north has a separate administration and a self-proclaimed status as an independent state. Yet, from the standpoint of international law, there is only one Cyprus, and it is about to become an EU member state.

How can—indeed, how will—the EU embrace Cyprus? What is the importance of EU enlargement for the divided island? What does its successful membership application demonstrate about the geopolitical role of the EU in conflict mediation and resolution? What are the implications of the precedent set by Cyprus's admission to the EU

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for security, stability, prosperity, and prevention of future conflict in Europe? Pauline Green has approached these questions from her perspectives as a British politician (with 120,000 Cypriots in her north London constituency) and former leader of the Parliamentary Group of European Socialists in the European Parliament from 1994 to 1999. She has done so in a book that is generally optimistic, even idealistic, appealing in its conceptual framework and uplifting in its message. This is quite an achievement. Readers already familiar with the contemporary history of Cyprus will be reminded of all the reasons for which cynicism, rather than optimism, has been the operative word associated with “the Cyprus issue.” Green’s book challenges this view, even if only temporarily.

*Embracing Cyprus* is about the role of the EU as an effective mediator of the seemingly intractable conflict and military occupation of Cyprus since 1974 and the potential of European institutions to promote conflict resolution and, ultimately, reunification of the island’s territory and constituent communities. The author traces her interest in the Cyprus issue to the decision of the Cypriot government to apply for EU membership in July 1990. In this, Green saw “a real opportunity to contribute to the efforts which would subsequently be made in Brussels to break the stalemate on a solution to the Cyprus problem.” As she makes clear from the start, she did not intend to focus on the history of conflict. Rather, she chose to concentrate on the “potential for the evolution of a new political infrastructure in Europe, about its pressure points and its weaknesses, and to discuss the interactions between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey and the role which Britain can play in influencing the future of Cyprus.”

Green’s other interest was to examine the dynamism of the EU in terms of its ability “to act on issues in which it has a strong vested interest.” She rejects the charge that the EU and its institutions are “hidebound, bureaucratic and moribund.” As a former Euro-parliamentarian, Green can claim with credibility that the European Parliament, as “the only truly democratic institution of the EU,” played a critical role in the decision making on EU enlargement issues, which included Cyprus’s prospective membership. Using this as a point of departure and frame of reference, she examines events, issues, decisions, and policies through the lens of the EU as a potent force in forging unity among and within its member states.

Green’s principal hypothesis, as it applies to Cyprus, is that the institutions, dynamics, and processes of the EU offer the best hope for unification of the divided island. This is a powerful and engaging claim. Will it prove valid? Green thinks so. In the postscript, written after the announcement of the EU decision, she concludes, “The EU has fulfilled all its promises, and Cyprus will now be admitted to membership of the Union in May 2004.” In reaching this conclusion, she draws on the preceding eleven chapters of the book dealing with key factors, events, relationships, and policy options and their implications for Cyprus—as seen prior to the EU’s decision. Green describes

the critical developments and turning points of Cyprus's strategy of "unity plus EU membership"; the attempts and failures of other political actors before the EU to promote the island's unity; the special role played by the United Nations in identifying the issues that divided the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots for decades; and the reasons for which several solution packages, prepared and presented by the UN, proved ineffective. This may be one example of an optimist's understatement: "ineffective" describes the many (at least one hundred) UN resolutions dealing with Cyprus that have not been enforced for nearly three decades.

Green explains why the UN has not had success in resolving the Cyprus issue. The internationalization of the Cyprus problem did not change the basic fact that "the UN had always lacked the single ingredient that traditionally drives such negotiations to a conclusion. . . . That ingredient was leverage." Green's analysis focuses on how the EU provided "the missing ingredient. . . . From Finland to Malta and from Portugal to Turkey . . . , states had lined up to enter the EU. They came for a variety of reasons and a complex of motivations, but come they did with a clear desire to be part of the European project." In the case of Cyprus, EU membership offered significant political, economic, and security guarantees. Hence the "target for Cyprus": joining Europe, with or without reunification.

Green does not invite the reader to draw an analogy with the former West Germany, but one could. After World War II, European visionaries created a supranational entity, known today as the EU, to link France and West Germany closely with one another and with the rest of Europe in economic, commercial, and political terms so as to avoid future wars. Obviously, this linkage did not apply to the former East Germany; it was occupied by Soviet troops in the Soviet bloc and was a member of the Warsaw Pact. Germany's reunification, after the collapse of the USSR in 1989, took place and was made possible under the auspices of the EU. This was a historic event, all the more so because it involved two sovereign countries, two internationally recognized governments, and two economic systems that were polar opposites of each other. The reunification of East and West Germany required massive financial and economic reallocations and radical political and social adjustments.

In view of the precedent of such enormous proportions and cost, why, one wonders, was the Cyprus admission so problematic for the EU? Cyprus is tiny and relatively rich. With less than a million inhabitants, Cyprus has a small economy of about \$10 billion. Yet it has the highest per capita income (about \$20,000) in the group of ten new members joining the EU in 2004. Moreover, Cyprus's legal status is that of a single sovereign country, not two. Clearly, the reasons that made Cyprus's EU membership so difficult lie elsewhere. Green explains: "Europe has a vested interest in both [Cyprus and Turkey] as future members of the club, and is therefore prepared to put significant resources into both. In its dealings with both countries the EU has endeavored to cre-

ate space for innovation in the relationship.” Is this an optimist’s understatement, resting as it does on a key assumption of symmetry in the triangular relationship among the EU, Cyprus, and Turkey? The reality is that as an EU member state, Cyprus will have a vote to cast when Turkey’s application as an EU candidate member is presented; this vote is an important factor contributing to symmetry.

Green devotes separate chapters to the discussion and analysis of the policies pursued by Cyprus’s guarantor powers, Britain, Greece, and Turkey. Throughout the Cold War, Britain’s policy toward Cyprus reflected the prevailing geopolitical realities, which included Turkey’s strategic position in the bipolar world of East versus West and the British military bases on the island of Cyprus. Although a guarantor power, Britain, like other major powers (and most notably the United States), would not exert pressure on Turkey to promote resolution of the Cyprus issue at the expense of global security interests. In assessing the “London effect,” Green speaks candidly of the way in which Britain’s “vacillation and lack of at least a basic strategic plan to restore stability on the island and prevent a Turkish invasion with or without the help of the United States created the perception of British impotency that has been the stuff of rumor and suspicion for ordinary Greek Cypriots ever since.” This impression remains unchanged, even though Green is generous in crediting political and civic leaders of the Cypriot community of London for their contributions to the cause of Cyprus’s reunification through accession to the EU.

By contrast, the chapter on Greece emphasizes the importance of dynamic political leadership at the national level. There, “Prime Minister Simitis presented an absolute break with the past.” He combined two ingredients: his commitment to place Greece in Euroland (through accession to European Monetary Union) with his pursuit of “a policy of dialogue with Turkey.” Then there were the earthquakes: the August 1999 earthquake in Turkey, which generated an “outpouring of sympathy and help from ordinary Greeks,” followed by the reverse expression of sympathy and help from Turkey when Greece was hit by an earthquake months later. To what degree did these factors promote Cyprus’s membership to the EU by improving the strained relationship between two of its three guarantor powers? Green argues that after “the earthquake dialogue,” it was evident to the international community “that leadership can be exercised from within the region, and need not depend on power brokers from outside.” Possibly there was also “hope for discussion on issues like the territorial disputes in the Aegean and the Cyprus problem.” But can all this be credited to the “earthquake dialogue?”

There was much more to the Greek dimension than the human interactions generated by the earthquakes. At some point in the mid-1990s, the Greek government made a strategic decision with regard to Cyprus. This was to link the admission of Cyprus to the EU’s eastward expansion. By all accounts, Greece was prepared to block such an enlargement unless or until Cyprus was included. The significance of this strategy, and

Greece's firm commitment to its realization, is not fully addressed by Green. One of the prime architects of this strategy was Yannis Kranidiotis, who served as Greece's deputy foreign minister until his death in an airplane accident in September 1999. Green mentions Kranidiotis for his visionary service as a Euro-parliamentarian and then as a diplomat and also credits him for his deep knowledge of, and close contacts with, European institutions. These brought immense benefits to Greece; as Green points out, the "close interlinking of Greek work on the international agenda with both the U.S. and Europe would be a vital strength for [Premier] Simitis." As events proved, Kranidiotis's untimely death, which, as Green notes, could have caused a major dislocation in the foreign policy front, did not diminish the Greek government's determination to solve the Cyprus issue through the EU's enlargement. Greece's strategy made Europe's embrace of Cyprus possible.

Green's analysis of Turkey's posture and reactions to Cyprus's prospective admission to the EU is sharp yet thoughtful. In a chapter titled "Future Perspectives," written before the announcement of Cyprus's admission, she asks, now that the EU has said yes to Cyprus, what is one to make of Turkey's "oft-stated threat of 'serious consequences' if Cyprus is admitted to the EU? . . . How can it be explained that a candidate country believes it has the right to issue such statements designed to prevent the admission of another candidate country? . . . Why does Turkey perceive Cyprus's entry to be such a threat to it? . . . What are the 'serious consequences' they speak of, and should the EU have cause to worry?" Green examines several possible explanations: the possibility that Turkey may not be ready or truly interested in joining the EU, the "lack of confidence of Turkish politicians in their ability to engage constructively" in the solution to the Cyprus problem, a perceived need by the same politicians "to assuage the views of their military overseers," the degree to which the Turkish army values the opportunities that Cyprus offers in its military relationship with the United States, and the possibility that Turkish politicians "may fear that with Cyprus united, those forces in the EU antagonistic to Turkish membership . . . may reappear in a more significant manner."

In Green's judgment, the options for Turkey have crystallized and choices must be made by the time of Cyprus's actual entry to the EU in May 2004. The status quo, which Turkey has been able to maintain for the past twenty-nine years, is no longer an option. The UN plan, calling for a variety of measures that require each side to make compromises, is on the table and under negotiation. From the standpoint of the Cypriot citizen, EU membership cannot possibly make the divided island worse off. The economic advantages of integration will be immensely important, especially for the Turkish Cypriots who reside in the occupied north; their income is much lower (by as much as one-fourth in per capita terms) than the income of Greek Cypriots in the south. But the significance of political benefits for all citizens of Cyprus is even greater; the *acquis communautaire*, the body of law of the EU, will apply throughout Cyprus. The failure of



the two parties, the Cyprus government and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, to adopt the most recent UN plan is easily understood. The Cypriot government has no compelling reason to accept an agreement that is inferior to European law—or not subsumed by it. The Turkish Cypriot leadership has no compelling reason to speed reunification if it means the end of its hold on power.

As of mid-September 2003, settlement on the UN plan remains elusive. A settlement, while highly desirable, is not a precondition for Cyprus's entry in the EU. But such a settlement could become a litmus test for Turkey's future status as a candidate state. Green hopes for a choice and a solution that will allow the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to live together in one country; a solution that will remove Cyprus as an issue in Turkish relations with the rest of the world and the EU; a solution that will bring greater stability and peace in the region, while promoting better relations between Turkey and Greece; and a "solution that will demonstrate to the rest of the world that partnerships in international relations can be based on respect for different cultural traditions and religions."

To American readers, Green's message of hope may seem distant, or even naïve in the face of the geopolitical shifts emerging after the events of 11 September, the war on terrorism, and the subsequent U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq. Green's book, which was published a few months before the onset of military action against Saddam Hussein's regime, strongly reflects Europe's belief and bold experiment in political and economic integration as the best means to achieve and safeguard peaceful coexistence by adherence to the rule of international law. Green's message of hope and optimism is an antidote to the darkness of cynicism bred by conflict. *Embracing Cyprus* should be mandatory reading, mostly for this reason, by students of military, diplomatic, and political history. If Green's optimism is vindicated, the identity of the EU as a global political actor will become more definitive and more distinct. And, if Cyprus turns out to be a successful test case, the EU's role in world affairs may resemble more and more the embrace envisaged by the author.

**Sven Biscop: *Euro-Mediterranean Security: A Search for Partnership*. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2003. 160 pages. ISBN 0-7546-3487-6. \$79.95. Reviewed by C. Edward Dillery.**

Sven Biscop is a research fellow in the security and governance department of the Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels. *Euro-Mediterranean Security: A Search for Partnership* is part of the International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series. Biscop is a specialist on the political economy of the Mediterranean region and its relationship with Europe. This book considers the recent history of the relationship and the policies and institutions of the European Union vis-à-vis the countries of the region. It concludes with recommendations for actions to be taken by the EU to ensure peace and stability in the region.

Biscop begins with a helpful description of the Mediterranean security environment, pointing out the conflicts in the area and describing the entities that the EU has developed to deal with the region. One of the most notable parts of the latter descriptions is a list of sixty-three acronyms for organizations and programs that affect the relationship, ranging from ACRS (Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group) to WMD (weapons of mass destruction). It is important because it suggests the complexity of the relationship.

Europe and the twelve countries of the littoral are inextricably tied to each other by economic, humanitarian, and security interests. The partnership has been notable in that it includes countries that normally do not have relations with each other—for example, Israel and the Arab nations, the parties on Cyprus, and Greece and Turkey. Remarkably, it has been possible to assemble all the participants at several meetings.

Economic relations are important. North Africa's natural gas is vital to the economy of the EU, and the trade of each "party" is heavily oriented toward the other. Europe needs a stable Mediterranean in order to further this relationship, as do the countries of the littoral. Biscop points out the mechanisms the EU established to pursue the relationship, one of which is the European Security and Defense Policy, the purpose of which is to create an EU military capability.

In one of the very helpful parts of the book, Biscop describes the history of the relationship, beginning in 1956 and leading to the formation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) at the Barcelona Conference of 1995. He describes the three baskets of the EMP: (1) a political and security partnership, (2) an economic and financial partnership, and (3) a partnership in social, cultural, and human affairs. Biscop points out, however, that despite numerous meetings and declarations, the EMP has not made tangible progress on the security and defense aspect of the relationship. He cites sev-

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eral reasons for this. First and foremost, the Arab-Israeli crisis has made it difficult, if not impossible, to take any regional actions, since both Israel and neighboring Arab countries participate in the EMP. Biscop comes back to this point in almost every chapter of the book; his research identifies the absence of progress in the Middle East peace process as the single most important obstacle to promoting regional stability. Other regional conflicts—those on Cyprus and in the Western Sahara—also have created difficulties in achieving common policy. As a result, it has been almost impossible to design confidence- and security-building measures as an engine to advance the goals of the partnership.

The partnership also has been hampered by suspicion among the twelve non-EU countries that the entire effort is designed to further the policy goals of the northern members—the EU. The twelve, Biscop says, are troubled by the fact that all initiatives seem to come from the EU countries and that they have little input in the work of the partnership. They also are troubled that many of the EMP initiatives involve reductions or limitations on the military structures of the southern members. This also is exacerbated by the fact that Israel is understood to have a nuclear weapons capability when none of the other regional countries have this or any other credible deterrent.

Finally, the attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 caused the issue of terrorism to be important in the equation. Even before the tragedy, the partners had found it impossible to define terrorism, with the Arab states wanting the inclusion of Israel's actions against the Palestinian community and Israel resisting. Biscop believes that the absence of agreement on this point has been a major factor in stopping the development of confidence- and security-building measures.

Biscop proposes an ambitious program for the partnership. First, he proposes that the “EU should resolutely claim its role as co-sponsor alongside the United States” in achieving a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The EU role would be to counterbalance that of the United States, “which almost unconditionally support(s) Israel.” He points out that the EU is one of the most important financial supporters of the Palestinian Authority, and therefore “a joint EU-U.S. effort is the only way that can lead to a settlement.” This is vital to the partnership, because without a settlement the arrangement will never be effective in bringing real security to the region—this theme is reinforced in every chapter of the book and is the most important substantial element of Biscop's program.

The second recommendation is that the EU should “assume responsibility and should actively work towards a settlement between Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot communities,” using as the principal tool the accession process. He feels that a breakthrough might have been achieved in these issues if the EU had been more active and sees progress here as a vital step in achieving real partnership.

In a similar manner, Biscop contends that “EU security policy towards North Africa, too, has so far been very passive.” His third recommendation is that the EU should

“carefully make use of the economic instrument to affect” the policies of regional countries in order to solve existing conflicts.

Fourth, Biscop would “open up the European Security and Defence Policy for participation by all Mediterranean partners.” This would involve a role for the non-EU partners in planning, provision of military forces, and crisis management and would be aimed at alleviating what Biscop sees as distrust of the European countries by the others.

Finally, Biscop would establish a permanent council for the first basket of the partnership, which would have its own secretariat and secretary-general. He suggests that it would be good to locate this entity in one of the southern countries of the EMP. One of Biscop’s main criticisms of the EU approach to Mediterranean security is that the union has spent too much effort on declarations and not enough on action to make the EMP work. His proposals for future action would require the EU to take more initiative in solving regional conflicts. To the nonexpert reader, the call for the union to play a role equal to that of the United States in the Middle East peace process appears somewhat quixotic, given the long and deep—and unsuccessful—involvement of the other players in efforts to solve the problem. The suggestion that the United States could apply more pressure to the government of Israel to be conciliatory while the EU does the same to the Palestinian Authority might well be counterproductive.

Biscop’s proposals for an EU approach to the other regional disputes are more practical. In the case of Cyprus, the union is using the possibility of Turkish accession to push for a solution, although the imminent full membership in the EU of the government of Cyprus takes away any pressure that might be applied on that side of the equation. The North African disputes do not seem to the outsider to be as important as the others in the EMP context.

Biscop’s structural proposals would help to create a more positive relationship between the EU countries and their partners in the Mediterranean. It would be important for all the twelve partners to participate in these efforts (some of them will shortly become members of the EU) as they would provide new forums for the discussion of regional problems. To me, it appears, however, that the proposals for strengthening the EMP are oriented more toward process than toward substance. This could be an effective way to encourage dialogue without forcing acrimonious debate on the intractable problems of the region.

In *Euro-Mediterranean Security: A Search for Partnership*, Biscop has produced an excellent analysis of relationships between the EU and other Mediterranean countries. His carefully researched history of the initiatives, conferences, and treaties will be most useful in further work on this important set of issues. His proposals for creating an effective partnership should be a challenge for government and EU officials to find ways to improve stability in the Mediterranean region, and his book will provide valuable insights for researchers in this field.