

Thoughts on Citizenship in Latin America, with Particular Reference to Mexico

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This essay analyzes citizenship in Latin America, providing both comparative context and a schema for the phenomenon in Mexico. It identifies a region-wide “century of citizenship” that ran from the rise of liberal regimes in the 1850s to the eclipse of populist government in the 1960s, using concepts from historical sociology to discuss the common outlines of citizenship and the extent to which they apply or fail to apply to Mexican history. Key among those outlines are the prevalence of the ideas and practices of citizenship, both inside and outside of the state’s formal structures, and the spaces and places where those ideas and practices are developed and perpetuated. It concludes with the exploratory typology of the “four Bs,” the processes through which historical actors build, form boundaries, bicker over, and break citizenship.

Keywords: citizenship, civil society, Latin America, liberalism, Mexico, nineteenth century, populism, practice, public sphere, space, state formation, twentieth century.

Este artículo analiza la ciudadanía en América Latina, proporcionando un contexto comparativo y esquemático para este fenómeno en México. Identifica un “siglo de ciudadanía” que empieza con el surgimiento de los regímenes liberales de los años 1850 y termina con el eclipse de los gobiernos populistas en los años 1960, utilizando algunos conceptos de la sociología histórica al analizar los rasgos comunes de la ciudadanía para comprender en qué medida la historia mexicana sigue o desafía estos rasgos. Destaca en estos rasgos la prevalencia de las ideas y las prácticas sobre ciudadanía, dentro y afuera de las estructuras formales del Estado, y los espacios y lugares en donde esas ideas y prácticas son desarrolladas y perpetuadas. Concluye con una tipología exploratoria sobre los procesos

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a través de los cuales los actores históricos construyen, forman límites, confrontan, y rompen la ciudadanía.

Palabras clave: América Latina, ciudadanía, esfera pública, espacio, formación del estado, liberalismo, México, populismo, práctica, siglo XIX, siglo XX, sociedad civil.

The literature on citizenship in Latin America is vast. Its scholarly avatars in Mexico alone stretch from the “imaginary” to the “unexpected,” the concept joining civil society and the public sphere in a holy trinity for understanding how people interact with each other in the time of state formation.¹ This essay uses a layman’s historical sociology to see how well that has worked.

The first concept of the trinity, civil society, gained currency through a combination of historiographical-cultural turn and real-life democratization, though its origins are much older; colonial officials spoke of “the sacred ties of civil society.”² What it actually is and does, however, varies notably across the works of Alexis de Tocqueville, Antonio Gramsci, and contemporary commentators. The most important point of variation (often overlooked, despite all the Gramsciphilia) is that Gramsci’s *The Prison Notebooks* present civil society as not oppositional but rather integral to the apparatus of state power, one of its “two major superstructural levels”—its intellectuals no “autonomous and independent social group” but rather “the dominant group’s ‘deputies’ exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government.” Gramsci saw civil society as an ally, not an antagonist, of the state in the “war of position” that was politics.³ For Tocqueville, by contrast, civil society

1. Fernando Escalante Gonzalbo, *Ciudadanos imaginarios* (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1992); Ariadna Acevedo Rodrigo and Paula López Caballero, eds., *Ciudadanos inesperados: Espacios de formación de la ciudadanía ayer y hoy* (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 2012); Wil G. Pansters, *Citizens of the Pyramid: Essays on Mexican Political Culture* (Amsterdam: Rijksuniversiteit te Utrecht, 1997). For a review of citizenship’s take-off as a concept, see Hilda Sabato, “On Political Citizenship in Nineteenth-Century Latin America,” *American Historical Review* 106, no. 4 (October 2001): 1290–1315. Early influential collections are Hilda Sabato, ed., *Ciudadanía política y formación de las naciones: Perspectivas históricas de América Latina* (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1999); and Joseph S. Tulchin and Meg Ruthenberg, eds., *Citizenship in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006). All translations from Spanish to English are my own, unless otherwise noted.

2. Fiscal Valenzuela, an eighteenth-century administrator in central Mexico, quoted in Paul Ramírez, *Enlightened Immunity: Mexico’s Experiments with Disease in the Age of Reason* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018), 131.

3. “The massive structures of the modern democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of associations in civil society, constitute for the art of politics

and state were separate realms that might well divorce and go their own ways; in eighteenth-century Europe, “political society drifted down into barbarism at the very time when civil society was finally achieving enlightenment,” leaving a political world “divided into two separate provinces with no shared commerce.”⁴ The concept of an enlightened and autonomous civil society mobilizing against an imperfect (or downright loathed) state is the one that entered popular usage. The second and complementary concept is Jürgen Habermas’s public sphere. This is, in Pablo Piccato’s description, “an unfinished historical transformation rather than a stable structure,” the product of twin processes: the evolution of capitalist markets, to which the circulation of information is as fundamental as the circulation of goods, and the emergence of spaces—both physical and metaphorical—in which very different individuals could argue over how life was and how it should be.⁵ The two concepts are cousins to a third, likewise normative, analytic framework and liberal ideal, one that rests on members of civil society entering the public sphere and engaging with the structures of state power: citizenship.

Yet, in Latin America, citizenship encompasses not just these processes but also their opposite: a straightforward opting out of the formal structures of rule. A highly specific trait of citizenship in the region is that people frequently act like citizens not within their states but outside of or in spite of those states.⁶ Spaces for citizenship in the classic sense have always existed, as those sites where people are brought together with bureaucrats and politicians, on a formally egalitarian and democratic basis, to argue and woo, request and demand. But equally—if not more—characteristic across the history of independent Latin America are the phenomena that arise when those sites fail. When spaces like town halls or welfare agencies are filled by *licenciados* and *apadrinhados políticos* practicing everyday forms of disenfranchisement, people with egalitarian and democratic

as it were the ‘trenches’ and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position.” Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1996), 5, 12, 243.

4. Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Ancien Régime and the Revolution* (London: Penguin Classics, 2008), 31, 147.

5. Pablo Piccato, “Public Sphere in Latin America: A Map of the Historiography,” *Social History* 35, no. 2 (May 2010): 167.

6. Wil Pansters, “Theorizing Political Culture,” in Pansters, *Citizens of the Pyramid*, 9; Carlos A. Forment, *Democracy in Latin America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), xi–xii; Miguel Angel Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America* (University Park: University of Pennsylvania State, 2002), 6.

instincts can and do act like citizens elsewhere: they vote. Often, however, they vote with their feet, forming civic associations and debating, electing, fund-raising, administering, and generally mobilizing within them to pursue common goals. These goals can be propitiating Iemanjá, the goddess of the sea, building a road, fixing pulque prices, or, as in the Mexican cases elsewhere in this issue, joining the Rotarians to defend the interests of the *grande bourgeoisie*, protesting when women of easy virtue colonize the land of the *gente decente*, and gathering in militant groups to right a murderous wrong.⁷

Two clarifications are in order before some sweeping generalization. In the first place, the main body of this analysis is synchronic. It proposes that a widespread citizenship beyond paper formalism—“deep citizenship”—emerged with the liberal, state-building regimes of the mid- to late nineteenth century and was repressed by the Cold War regimes of the 1960s and 1970s. The period between the rise of liberalism and the fall of populism, from the 1850s to the 1960s, might consequently be deemed the century of citizenship. This essay focuses on that century, the common outlines of Latin American citizenship within it, and how far those outlines apply to Mexico, given that country’s notorious *idiosincrasia*.⁸

In the second caveat, the invocation of space is frequent in writings on citizenship and could be an invitation to refigure the culture wars of the turn of the century, an invitation to a Civil War re-enactment that I intend to decline.⁹ In the analysis of political culture, the category of

7. For self-starting road builders, see Michael Bess, *Routes of Compromise: Building Roads and Shaping the Nation in Mexico, 1917–1952* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018), 12–17, 82–85; for pulque price fixers, see Forment, *Democracy in Latin America*, 104–5.

8. For an overview emphasizing the *idiosincrasia*, see Alan Knight, “The Peculiarities of Mexican History: Mexico Compared to Latin America, 1821–1992,” in “Quincentenary Supplement 1992: Five Centuries of Spanish and Portuguese America,” ed. Tulio Halperín Donghi, Victor Bulmer-Thomas, and Laurence Whitehead, special issue, *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24 (1992): 99–144.

9. In the best-known collection on the cultural turn in Latin American history, the “Lucha libre” special edition of *Hispanic American Historical Review* (1999), Stephen Haber wrote off space—a concept prominent in the work of other authors in the volume—as “nothing more than a conceptual catchall – a word to be used whenever nothing else readily comes to mind.” Stephen Haber, “Anything Goes: Mexico’s ‘New’ Cultural History,” in “Mexico’s New Cultural History: *¿Una Lucha Libre?*,” special issue, *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79, no. 2 (May 1999): 324–25. For acerbic conciliation, see Alan Knight’s reassurance that “we do not have to choose between the pomo funny farm and the positivistic prison.” Alan Knight, “Subalterns, Signifiers, and Statistics: Perspectives on Mexican Historiography,” *Latin American Research Review* 37, no. 2 (2002): 156.

space is useful in three descriptive/phenomenological ways: first, literally, to encompass mountains, river valleys, factories, schoolrooms, polling booths, church porches, cafés, town halls, *lieux de mémoire*, and assorted other precisely defined features of physical and political geography;¹⁰ second, figuratively, to encompass civic associations, religious organizations from *cabildos* to *cofradías*, newspaper columns, radio shows, parades, patriotic ceremonies—in sum, institutions, practices, and discourses; and third, sociologically, as an antinomy to place, that is, space conceived of as an already existing neutral geographical area, which groups of humans pass through the wringer of culture and history to transform into place—in David Harvey’s words, “Space to which meaning has been ascribed and endowed with value.”¹¹ This is a useful, if Platonic, perspective on processes of social change, a complement, perhaps, to such other influential binaries of modernization as *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, or mechanical and organic solidarity.¹² In short, it can be good to think of space in terms of a highly specific, carefully delineated scene that shapes, delimits, and even determines human action or as a highly specific product of human action or as shorthand for the idea that geographies are historical creations and not givens. Ray Craib’s work on maps, the state, and local societies in Mexico exemplifies this usage. It is not as good to think of space in indefinite or causal terms; the invocation of space as a reified causal agent is imprecise and obfuscatory. When a reader is told that “space constructs ideas of self and other,” they are being asked to imagine the void making the virtual.¹³ I don’t have that good an imagination and would rather follow the suggestion of Marc Bloch, who—having helped radically to change the way we do history precisely to account for space, for the very long term, the cultural, and the technological—ended with the observation that “the ABC of my trade consists in avoiding big-sounding abstract terms . . . seeking the solid and the concrete behind the empty and

10. For a *lieu de mémoire* as “any significant entity . . . which by dint of human will or the work of time has become a symbolic element of the memorial heritage of any community,” see Pierre Nora, *Rebinking France: Les lieux de mémoire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 1: xvii.

11. Quoted in Raymond B. Craib, *Cartographic Mexico: A History of State Fixations and Fugitive Landscapes* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 3–4.

12. On the potential and flaws of such binaries, see Anthony Giddens, *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 228–30.

13. Ageeth Sluis, “For Further Research: Space, Sense, and Sensibility,” in *A Companion to Mexican History and Culture*, ed. William H. Beezley (London: Blackwell, 2011), 635.

the abstract. In other words, it is on men rather than functions that [we] should concentrate.”¹⁴

Bloch also informs us about citizenship through his biography. He was a French citizen who joined the Resistance and was executed by the Gestapo some eighty years ago; as “the Marseillaise” demands, “Aux armes, citoyens.” If his is a moving story and the “Marseillaise” a moving song, it is largely because of the emotional charge of the ideas of egalitarianism, freedom, and dignity that the song embodies, ideas that emerged from the Enlightenment to form the spine of modern definitions of citizenship. A citizen, Denis Diderot said, “is someone who is a member of a free society with many families, who shares in the rights of this society, and who benefits from these freedoms,” and who is also a political actor bound to uphold and defend them. Subsequent definitions enlarge on and modify this but preserve the essence of a way of life that is *engagé* and fundamentally opposed to authoritarianism.¹⁵ Any analytical category this normative has pitfalls. Generalized approval for the ideal of citizenship means that the scholarship does not abound with studies of its nastier side: members of free societies who freely choose to uphold discrimination, inequality, xenophobia, slavery, and torture. Citizenship is, moreover, a phenomenon that by definition coldly excludes at the same time as it warmly includes, and women, slaves, indigenous peoples, peasants, the poor, and the illiterate are just some of the groups that Latin Americans have at times defined out of the body politic.¹⁶ Spaces of inclusion have their exclusionary mirror images in penitentiaries, madhouses, barracoons, and kitchens. But citizenship works and is good to think in scholarly terms, in part precisely because it is charged with sentiment and has historically mattered so much to so many people, and because it has been a key organizing concept not just for analyzing but also for living life. In short, a reflexive empathy might help scholars grasp citizenship, in Pierre

14. A more highfalutin version of this has common currency, but I have been appropriately unable to find its origin. Marc Bloch, *Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940* (New York: Norton, 1999), 27.

15. Denis Diderot, “Citizen,” trans. Sujaya Dhanvantari, in *The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project*, MPublishing, University of Michigan Library, 2005, <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.did2222.0000.070>; Dominique Leydet, “Citizenship,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2014, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/citizenship>.

16. At times even as that body politic expanded, as, for example, Rio de Janeiro’s urban poor under the populist governments of the mid-twentieth century. Brodwyn Fischer, *A Poverty of Rights: Citizenship and Inequality in Twentieth-Century Rio de Janeiro* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).

Bourdieu's terms, through the lens of "both an objectively intelligible practice and also an objectively enchanted experience of that practice."¹⁷

Advancing the above is wholly unoriginal. Citizenship is commonly viewed as a tripartite concept, consisting of legal status, political agency, and a subjective/psychological sense of community.¹⁸ As such, it might be useful to view it through the dual prisms of the affective/ideational and the institutional/behavioral: feeling and thinking like a citizen, on the one hand, and exercising the rights of—or behaving like—a citizen, on the other. And when viewed in these terms, when citizenship goes beyond the constitutional form of *garantías* and elections and becomes a question of habitus or practice of what Carlos Forment describes as "civic democracy, understood in Tocquevillian terms as a daily practice and form of life rooted in social equality, mutual recognition, and political liberty," then it acquires real explanatory richness.¹⁹

Citizens without States and States without Citizens

That explanatory richness is particularly the case in Latin America because of the long-term weakness of the state and the pronounced mistrust of elites for popular politics (and of popular classes for elite politics). This weakness and mistrust frequently interact to divorce the exercise of citizenship from nation-state formation. Even the largest states in Latin America are, in comparative terms, historically feeble. They have been, in Miguel Angel Centeno's pithy description, "fiscal dwarves" who failed to achieve institutional autonomy, to provide basic services ranging from health to public education, to establish anything like a legitimate monopoly of violence or, in many cases, legitimacy *tout court*.²⁰ Under Juan Perón, as few as one in twenty Argentines filed tax returns. One in two Chileans, a notoriously more Weberian bunch, lied on their filings.²¹ Under the reformist Getúlio Vargas, annual Brazilian state spending rose to all

17. Self-aware, emotionally engaged participant-observation identified as a third mode of theoretical knowledge alongside the phenomenological and the objectivist. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1977), 4.

18. Leydet, "Citizenship."

19. Forment, *Democracy in Latin America*, xi.

20. Centeno, *Blood and Debt*, 2–6, 10.

21. Marcelo Bergman, "Tax Evasion, Law Obedience and the Rule of Law in Latin America" (Presentation, Violence, Insecurity and the State in Mexico conference, Academieggebouw, Utrecht, June 2007).

of \$1.35 per capita.²² In Guatemala, the more ambitious reformer Jacobo Árbenz was hampered by the lack of any income tax at all and was overthrown before he could implement one.²³ Even the supposedly obese states of the populist years were in reality undernourished. As for *priista* Mexico, that notorious leviathan, there were, until the mid-1960s, all of one bureaucrat per 176 citizens and two soldiers per one thousand Mexicans.²⁴

The state in the nineteenth century was, naturally enough, even smaller. Town halls, army barracks, tax collectors, schoolhouses, and census takers were all contact points with the state; but they were few and far between, sedulously and quite successfully avoided. Mexico's first modern census, that of 1895, was so flawed that it had to be rerun five years later. Courtrooms, those schools for citizenship in Tocqueville's eyes, were among the fundamental institutions notable by their absence. Vaccinators against smallpox, impressively successful in Bourbon New Spain, seem to have largely disappeared until the Porfiriato.²⁵ That war-torn nineteenth-century Mexico should lag in putting up the Weberian struts and joists of the state—though the rubble was useful for building a Great Arch—was eminently predictable, but it was not unique. In Brazil, the failure of elites to man courts and primary schools was striking, as it was in Argentina, where in 1863 the entire province of La Rioja contained one school.²⁶ In Porfirian Mexico, a well-developed—and well-founded—concern for public relations meant that Potemkin villages abounded. In B. Traven's (fictional but believable) Chiapas, for

22. Adalberto Cardoso, "A Brazilian Utopia: Vargas and the Construction of the Welfare State in a Structurally Unequal Society," *Dados: Revista de Ciências Sociais* 53, no. 4 (2010): 775–819.

23. Piero Gleijeses, "The Agrarian Reform of Jacobo Arbenz," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 31, no. 3 (October 1989): 478–80.

24. Paul Gillingham and Benjamin T. Smith, introduction to *Dictablanda: Politics, Work, and Culture in Mexico, 1938–1968*, ed. Paul Gillingham and Benjamin T. Smith (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 21; Benjamin T. Smith, "Building a State on the Cheap: Taxation, Social Movements, and Politics," in Gillingham and Smith, *Dictablanda*, 260–61.

25. The colonial record is admittedly an impressive benchmark, given the reach of the contemporary bureaucracy. In colonial Michoacán, twenty-five thousand children had been vaccinated against smallpox by 1808; in late nineteenth-century Veracruz, one of the most developed states, a majority of children were vaccinated, but only 5 percent of adults, suggesting a near-total breakdown of such a program in the interim. Ramírez, *Enlightened Immunity*, 175; Moisés González Navarro, *El Porfiriato: La vida social* (Mexico City: Editorial Hermes, 1957), 69–70.

26. Sabato, *Ciudadanía política*, 343; John Lynch, "From Independence to National Organization," in *Argentina since Independence*, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 41.

example, the mestizo secretary of an indigenous community teaches schoolchildren to bawl the first two lines of the oath of allegiance and the first two lines of the national anthem. And that is that; a visiting bureaucrat reports the children as “well advanced in reading, writing, and history,” and the secretary’s career correspondingly advances.²⁷

Even after the dramatic expansion of revolutionary schooling, the Mexican state flattered to deceive. The numbers of *maestros rurales*—conceived as missionaries of reform and rationalism, and perhaps the best single measure of government penetration—were depressing for Cardenistas; as the 1930s ended, ratios of pupils to teachers in Guerrero were often well in excess of one hundred to one, many places lacked government teachers at all, while illegal Catholic schools flourished.²⁸ One of the reasons for a scarcity of teachers was rational fear for their anticlerical, meddling lives; similar fear ran strong among Mexican tax collectors, who occupied a professionally profitable but personally vile job—for Tocqueville, “there never was in the Ancien Régime, or, I think, under any regime, a worse position than that of the parish tax-collector”—with a correspondingly appreciable casualty rate, whether through dismissal for corruption or violent death (the social bandit El Tallarín targeted taxmen in 1930s Morelos).²⁹ That tax collection should be hit-and-miss was a natural consequence. And even had there been enthusiasts for state expansion in the remote spaces of Chiapas, Amazonas, or the Pampas, it would have been difficult to engage with the state’s nonexistent spaces of citizenship. Even non-Argentines know that it takes two to tango.

But if Latin American political elites found it difficult to rule, they also found it difficult to trust the ruled to get on with the tricky business of politics. It wasn’t necessarily their fault; as Domingo Sarmiento put it, Argentines were “characterized by love of idleness and incapacity for industry,” an “unfortunate result . . . owing to the incorporation of the native tribes, effected by the process of colonization.”³⁰ Colonial fractures of race, region, and theocracy met

27. B. Traven, *Government* (London: Allison and Busby, 1994), 38–41.

28. Inspector Federal de Educación Iguala to Secretaría de Educación Pública, 27 April 1940, SEP/DGEP-5564 ant. 3369 exp 16-13-35-20, Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City.

29. Tocqueville, *Ancien Régime*, 97; Informes de tesorería, 1229/024/0, Archivo Histórico del Estado de Veracruz; Salvador Salinas, “Untangling Mexico’s Noodle: El Tallarín and the Revival of Zapatismo in Morelos, 1934–1938,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 46, no. 3 (August 2014): 486, 489.

30. Domingo Sarmiento, *Life in the Argentine Republic in the Days of the Tyrants, or, Civilization and Barbarism* (New York: Hurd & Houghton, 1868), 10–11.

with the experiences of popular rebellion at independence to foster what might be called the tutelary attitude: the idea that, while democracy was naturally a good idea, Latin Americans were regrettably too childlike to exert it and would require extended tutelage to earn the gift of true citizenship. The American delegates at the Cortes de Cádiz pushed the inclusion of the *castas*—individuals of African origins—as citizens and were defeated.³¹ Early *indigenista* policy in Brazil was doomed to failure, said one Mato Grosso newspaper, because it did not compel Indians to become “responsible citizens.”³² (One indigenous Andean saw things the other way round, arguing that dominant nonindigenous intellectuals were unfit to write the Indians’ history because Colombian elites lacked “civic pride, honour and morality”; they were not very good citizens.)³³ As Simón Bolívar—the Liberator—put it in 1812, “Our fellow-citizens are not yet able to exercise their rights in their fullest measure, because they lack the political virtues that characterize true republicans—virtues that are not acquired under absolute governments.”³⁴

Nearly a century later, Porfirio Díaz explained his ideals of democracy and his practice of dictatorship in much the same way. Upon taking office decades beforehand, he told a journalist (with baffling candor) that he had felt that giving “the masses the whole responsibility of government at once” was a poor idea, and that the moment instead demanded “a patriarchal policy in the actual administration of the nation’s affairs, guiding and restraining popular tendencies.” Only some thirty years on were the plebs finally “prepared to choose and change their government at every election without danger of armed revolutions and without injury to the national credit or interference with national progress,” even though he feared that “the principles of democracy have not been planted

31. François-Xavier Guerra, “El soberano y su reino: Reflexiones sobre la génesis del ciudadano en América Latina,” in Sabato, *Ciudadanía política*, 39.

32. Todd A. Diacon, *Stringing Together a Nation: Cândido Mariano da Silva Rondon and the Construction of a Modern Brazil, 1906–1930* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 122.

33. Manuel Quintín Lame, *Los pensamientos del indio que se educó dentro de las selvas colombianas*, cited in Joanne Rappaport, *The Politics of Memory: Native Historical Interpretation in the Colombian Andes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 110–11.

34. Simón Bolívar, “Memorial to the Citizens of New Granada by a Citizen of Caracas, Cartagena de las Indias, December 15 1812,” in *Selected Writings of Bolívar*, ed. Harold A. Bierck Jr., trans. Lewis Bertrand, comp. Vicente Lecuna (New York: Colonial, 1951), I:1, 22.

very deep in our people.”³⁵ Some cronies only agreed with the last observation; according to José Yves Limantour, the revolutionaries’ call for a real vote in 1910 ignored “the real needs of a people who lack the indispensable enlightenment and mentality to assimilate democratic values.”³⁶ The powerful cross-class appeal of Francisco Madero’s straightforward slogan, *Sufragio efectivo y no reelección*, suggested the opposite; “Peace and Bread” or “All Power to the Soviets” it was not. Yet whether docile or disruptive, Mexican voters were damned either way in the eyes of their elites. When an election was fought with the rigging, drinking, mocking, and beatings standard in pre-reform Britain or the early nineteenth-century United States, it could be compared to a Platonic ideal of democracy to conclude that the commoners had once again displayed their *falta de educación cívica*. If they opted out in rational expectation of futility, though, they were too apathetic to be citizens. In either case, Mexicans had no business questioning the unpopular results of their lose-lose contests.

The ruled in Latin America, across two centuries, reacted to such tutelary disenfranchisement in three main ways: by enforcing competitive elections, by rebelling, and by turning their backs on the state altogether. Whatever the appreciation of conservative or authoritarian liberal leaders, there were in fact deep cultural roots to representative politics in the region. From the Spanish side came the tradition of municipal autonomy and the contractarian nature of monarchic rule in the Middle Ages, exemplified in the Aragonese oath of allegiance to the Crown: “We who are as good as you swear to you who are no better than we, to accept you as our king and sovereign lord, provided that you observe all our liberties and laws; but if not, not.”³⁷ From the indigenous side came the deliberative assemblies that characterized the political life of many indigenous groups, with attendant voting, and the colonial elections inside the *repúblicas de indias*. When these met what has been described as the first wave of democratization, the result was, on paper, some of the earliest democratic republics in the world: Peru, Mexico, and Argentina all began the independence era with universal manhood suffrage. Elections were widely popular: when Chile lowered its suffrage qualification,

35. The Creelman interview, reproduced in Gilbert M. Joseph and Timothy J. Henderson, eds., *The Mexico Reader: History, Culture, Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 285–91.

36. José Yves Limantour, *Apuntes sobre mi vida política* (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1965), 174.

37. John Elliott, *Imperial Spain: 1469–1716* (London: Penguin, 2002), 16.

the electorate doubled, while in Brazil, by the 1870s, national elections attracted over a million voters.³⁸ And elections could mobilize large cross-sections of society: 39 percent of the turnout in Sao Paulo's 1882 election was illiterate.³⁹ Finally, they could count in even the most restrictive systems. In early nineteenth-century Peru, where 95 percent of the population was disenfranchised by income and literacy barriers, the presidential election of 1831 went unpredictably against the official candidate.⁴⁰ Even the most reputedly corrupt and clientelist elections demanded attentive stage management.⁴¹ A lumpen electorate this was not.

Nor was the Mexican electorate, despite the odds, apathetic. Voters from independence onward seized the opportunities afforded by national conflicts. The aftermaths of independence (c. 1820–35), French intervention (c. 1867–c. 1880), revolution (c. 1920–40), and World War II (c. 1945–50) were all characterized by newly competitive provincial elections in which popular votes and violence gave more representation to *los de abajo* (and *los de en medio* into the bargain). Municipal autonomy was an enduring Mexican obsession, and Mexicans operationalized it whenever they could: forming *municipios* with frantic speed in the 1820s and then struggling to preserve and control them against local bosses and national meddlers; imposing pluralist *ayuntamientos* in the 1870s; and creating a myriad of local parties in the 1920s and 1930s, and riding them to power in places as varied as Tlaxcala, Acapulco, and Chiapas.⁴² When possible,

38. Hilda Sabato, introduction to *Ciudadanía política*, 23.

39. Eduardo Posada-Carbó, "Latin American Elections: Parties and State Formation, 1850–1880" (lecture, University of Oxford Latin American Centre research seminar, 4 March 2003).

40. Forment, *Democracy in Latin America*, 180–82.

41. Eduardo Posada-Carbó, "Elections before Democracy: Some Considerations on Electoral History from a Comparative Approach," in *Elections before Democracy: The History of Elections in Europe and Latin America*, ed. Eduardo Posada-Carbó (London: University of London, 1996), 1–15.

42. Peter F. Guardino, *Peasants, Politics and the Formation of Mexico's National State: Guerrero, 1800–1857* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 84–96; Peter F. Guardino, *The Time of Liberty: Popular Political Culture in Oaxaca, 1750–1850* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Michael T. Ducey, *A Nation of Villages: Riot and Rebellion in the Mexican Huasteca, 1750–1850* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2004), 94–118; Matthew Butler, *Popular Piety and Political Identity in Mexico's Cristero Rebellion: Michoacán, 1927–1929* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 37; Florencia Mallon, *Peasant and Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 248–56; Guy C. Thomson and David G. LaFrance, *Patriotism, Politics, and Popular Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Mexico: Juan Francisco Lucas and the Puebla Sierra* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 1998), 202–4; Armando Bartra, *Guerrero bronco: Campesinos, ciudadanos y guerrilleros en la Costa*

national elites generally closed such windows. The centralizers of the mid-1830s set a property qualification of one hundred pesos for the vote and did away with elected governors, state legislatures, and most municipios.⁴³ The restored local liberties of the Restored Republic were largely demolished by the Porfirians, and the 1929 foundation of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario did away with thousands of revolutionary parties in favor of a new centralization. That centralization, however, was weak and stuttering. It was also largely reversed by the 1945 foundation of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), whose rhetorical commitment to democracy—modish after the Allies' victory—was substantiated with primary elections for its first five years. The wars that favored representative elections were ephemeral phenomena, and yet, in the boom-and-bust cycle of Mexican democratic politics, bust never led to outright bankruptcy. Even the most ambitious of dictators made some concessions to electoral culture. For all of his authoritarian swagger, Antonio López de Santa Anna was incapable of invariably fixing congressional elections and was forced to discuss openly the burning question of local autonomy.⁴⁴ A century later, the PRI at its peak of power still had to deal with the veto power of its constituents, making serial concessions to those local voters angry enough to worry Mexico City in order to maintain the facade of electoral inevitability.⁴⁵ Fernando Escalante was right to see *caciquismo* as a ubiquitous feature of Mexican politics; that did not automatically make Mexicans “imaginary citizens.”⁴⁶

Yet for such enthusiasm and persistence, Latin American elections in general worked only erratically, and legitimacy was a sporadic achievement. One reaction was violence: that of the 1880 presidential election in Argentina or Mexico's 1910 election or Colombia's multiple civil wars. This violence had both factional and popular aspects. The other, and more universal, reaction was to disengage:

Grande (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 2000), 52–54; Timothy J. Henderson, *The Worm in the Wheat: Rosalie Evans and Agrarian Struggle in the Puebla-Tlaxcala Valley of Mexico, 1906–1927* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 104–7; Sarah Osten, *The Mexican Revolution's Wake: The Making of a Political System, 1920–1929* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 161–94.

43. Guardino, *Peasants, Politics*, 98–100.

44. Michael Costeloe, “Generals versus Politicians: Santa Anna and the 1842 Congressional Elections in Mexico,” *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 8, no. 2 (1989): 257–58; Pablo Piccato, review of *Forty Miles from the Sea*, by Rachel Moore, *American Historical Review* 117, no. 2 (April 2012): 577.

45. Paul Gillingham, *Unrevolutionary Mexico: The Birth of a Strange Dictatorship* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, forthcoming), ch. 5.

46. Wil G. Pansters, “Introduction: Theorizing Political Culture,” in Pansters, *Citizens of the Pyramid*, 17–18.

to take the instincts and beliefs of a democratic citizenry and apply them in other spaces, in horizontal interactions with other members of society rather than in vertical interactions with the agencies of the state.⁴⁷

Spaces and Places of Citizenship

In terms of political geography, we could distinguish three levels of space: the national, the regional, and the local. Most people would agree that the national, for most of postindependence history for most Latin Americans, was quite abstract in both institutional (states remained small) and affective terms. Convincing national identities were formed not before independence but rather well after independence—in some cases not until a good century later. Dominant classes may have aspired to move the idea of belonging to their particular nation-state into the field of *doxa*, “the universe of that which is undiscussed, unnamed, admitted without argument or scrutiny,” but they failed, achieving at best a heterodoxy in which the national community was one of several solidarities.⁴⁸ Regions counted for more in affective terms but were also important enough in material terms to be controlled as much as possible by central government: in *priista* Mexico, it took until 1989 for an opposition candidate to win a governorship. Local communities, however, were a different story. Major cities, towns, and *barrios* developed identities and some of the spaces and practices of citizenship at an earlier stage, and when independence came, the new movements were of cities and *pueblos*, not nations.⁴⁹ The compelling metropolitan snobberies of Buenos Aires, Bogotá, and Mexico City, or the vigorous competition between *paulistas* and *cariocas*, are well known. Less well known is the citizenship practiced in lesser spaces. Towns and village could be sites for despotism on a scale that actually worked, the petty dictatorships of *caciques*, *gamonales*, and *coronéis*. They could also be sites not quite for Athenian democracies but certainly for rough-and-ready polyarchies, polities that, in Robert Dahl’s classic definition, permitted both participation and contestation. And voters who took part and talked back could exert influence

47. Forment, *Democracy in Latin America*, xi; Antonio Annino, “Ciudadanía ‘versus’ gobernabilidad en México: Los orígenes de un dilema,” cited in Sabato, introduction, 20.

48. Bourdieu, *Outline*, 170.

49. Guerra, “El soberano,” 36–37, 39, 42.

ranging from veto power to straightforward (or, more likely, tangled) representation.⁵⁰

This phenomenon was particularly notable in Mexico, where both the densely populated central plateau, with its long-settled villages, and the recalcitrant mountain communities of north and south were propitious to citizenship on a microlevel—hence the widespread enthusiasm for the decentralized politics of federalism and municipal autonomy after independence; as one centralist sighed, “Even the most miserable village consider[s] itself competent to opine on the appropriateness of changing the system of government.”⁵¹ Other spaces and social structures were less favorable: according to Sarmiento, the *gauchos* were condemned to barbarism due to “the conditions of pastoral life, . . . [which raise] serious obstacles in the way of creating any political organization, and much more for the introduction of European civilization and institutions.”⁵² Yet the comparative appeal, and resulting strength, of locally representative politics was more than a Mexican phenomenon. In 1854, Peruvians rebelling against corruption demobilized in exchange for *municipios* and a new federal constitution; in the 1870s, political participation and competition in those *municipios*—“sentinels of freedom,” according to a contemporary author—increased dramatically.⁵³ As Trevor Stack observes, at times “the citizenship of towns is widely disjointed from the citizenship of nations,” as were the related ideas of what history was and how it was known.⁵⁴ (For the O’odham people of the borderlands, “their ‘little history’ *was* their ‘big history’—and vice versa.”)⁵⁵ And this citizenship of *barrio* or *patria chica* has been, for much of Latin American history, more real, immediate, and powerful: geographical zones where collectivities of people turn the neutral given of space into the specific, meaningful realities of place.

50. Robert Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 85–90.

51. Carlos María de Bustamante, quoted in Raymond Buve, “Between Ballots and Bullets: Long-Term Trends in Nineteenth Century Mexican Political Culture,” in Pansters, *Citizens of the Pyramid*, 45.

52. Sarmiento, *Life*, 24. For all of its unfortunate phrasing, Sarmiento’s statement echoes something of the environmental determinism of the *Annales* school.

53. Forment, *Democracy in Latin America*, 188–91, 420.

54. Trevor Stack, “Citizens of Towns, Citizens of Nations: The Knowing of History in Mexico” (paper presented at the Meeting of the American Anthropological Association, Washington, DC, 2001); Trevor Stack, *Knowing History in Mexico: An Ethnography of Citizenship* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2012), 14–15, 90.

55. Karl Jacoby, *Shadows of Dawn: An Apache Massacre and the Violence of History* (New York: Penguin, 2009), 34.

What bound together these citizens of towns and cities was, in part, history. It was the shared public places of plazas, markets, cafés, cantinas, country stores, churches, bullrings, theaters, and, later, factory floors, cinemas, and sports arena, and the quite specific common social practices therein. Urging on Newell's Old Boys or Flamengo or *los cementeros* created instant and quite intense bonds (intense enough, in extremis, to trigger war between Honduras and El Salvador.) Brazil's second oldest club, Ponte Preta, had a black railwayman, Miguel do Carmo, as one of its three founders and main players.⁵⁶ More cross-class solidarities came out of churches, where very rich and very poor and everyone in between knelt together to receive Communion. Interactions in these places were frequently political. At the lowest and commonest level, they were theaters of gossip, where *vecinos* could reveal corruption, wonder at sexual peccadillos, and generally assassinate character. The idea that just going up the pub makes you a citizen is not, sadly, a universal truth: not all watering holes act like E. P. Thompson's pubs, cradles to nascent class identity.⁵⁷ Some drinking, however, does foster citizenship. In Lima, lower-class taverns were critical for forming "counter-publics"; in their Argentine equivalents, gauchos sounded off with obscene creativity at their masters, acting as foul-mouthed members of an alcoholic public sphere.⁵⁸

As for Mexico, there was clear civic pride in one governor's list of his state's forty breweries, harbingers of industrial civilization, or in the Cervecería Cuauhtémoc Moctezuma's Dos Equis, released in a show of optimism for the imminent twentieth century.⁵⁹ (However, traditional disdain for plebeian pulque swiggers, unable to afford modern beer, worked the other way, establishing barriers rather than bonds.)⁶⁰ The PRI's secret police were revealingly obsessed with barroom chatter, undoubtedly in part because gathering it was an enjoyable line of research—rewarding in and of itself—but certainly because their bosses cared. (They acted on their

56. Mário Rodrigues, *O negro no futebol brasileiro* (Rio de Janeiro: MAUAD, 2003).

57. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage, 1966), 142, 149, 254, 393.

58. Forment, *Democracy in Latin America*, 224; Ariel de la Fuente, *Children of Facundo: Caudillo and Gaucho Insurgency during the Argentine State-Formation Process (La Rojita, 1853–1870)* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 1.

59. Dehesa Rioja 1894, cited in Carmen Blázquez Domínguez, *Estado de Veracruz: Informes de sus gobernadores, 1826–1986* (Xalapa: Gobierno del Estado de Veracruz, 1986), 7:4556.

60. Alan Knight, *The Mexican Revolution* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1990), 1:167, 443.

findings: getting, for example, the voluble Spanish owner of one cantina deported or calling a congressman to account for mocking the president in the Hotel Regis.)⁶¹ The micromanagement of public opinion was trickier in the larger crowds of bullrings, theaters, cinemas, and stadiums, where dissenters used the anonymity of the crowd to be pointedly and untouchably rude: the PRI's secret police were also fixated on cinema audiences' reactions to newsreel in the dark. (Again, they acted on their findings, cutting segments that sparked jokes, booing, whistling, or catcalling.)⁶² Such rowdy exercises of citizenship were more than mere catharsis. States listened to the insults or the eloquent silences of certain, particular places; sometimes they reacted.

Towns were also scenes of more genteel exercises of citizenship in the form of civic associations, of which Forment identifies five types: social, cultural, public service, recreational, and religious. The most numerous tended to be in the fields of development, education, and welfare.⁶³ Some were straightforwardly elitist, such as the Havana landowners' Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País, which promoted education and literary and scientific discussions, together with improved farming techniques, and formed something of a criollo think tank.⁶⁴ Others were deliberately egalitarian and carefully quarantined from government; in their more radical forms, such associations could trump all of the former colonies' profound social divisions. (Although, in some cases, there was a clear sociological continuity from the colony in those who formed associations, as artisans and traders drew on guild traditions, much as they had in France or England.) The Sociedades Democráticas of Nueva Granada inverted class hierarchy by promoting the manual laborer, and not the bourgeois, as the epitome of civic virtue.⁶⁵ Others bridged the class divide, such as the numerous Lancasterian societies that provided primary schooling to both elites and poor in and around Mexico City (and did so well enough to endure until the present).⁶⁶

61. Memo from Lamberto Ortega Peregrina, 5 December 1949, Fondo Dirección General de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales (DGIPS), Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City (AGN), *Excélsior*, 30 December 1949.

62. Memo to Gobernación, 14 August 1948, DGIPS-111/2-1/260/82, AGN.

63. A sixth type, economic, was of very minor salience across the nineteenth century. Forment, *Democracy in Latin America*, 102–3.

64. Louis A. Pérez Jr., *Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 50–54.

65. Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, "La literatura plebeya y el debate alrededor de la propiedad (Nueva Granada, 1849–1954)," in Sabato, *Ciudadanía política*, 181–201.

66. Forment, *Democracy in Latin America*, 110–11.

Even gender was not invariably a barrier to voting or holding office in these educational societies, or in Mexico City's *junta patriótica*, which provided a rudimentary safety net for the poor and refugees during the Wars of Independence, or in the Catholic lay society the Vela Perpetua, whose officers were mandatorily women (though men were permitted to join in this "kind of religious citizenship").⁶⁷ Nor was gender disqualifying in the *cabildos de nación* of Cuba, friendly societies for slaves and free coloreds, which owned their own meeting houses and provided community services, including education, welfare, fiestas, funerals, and credit. In some cases, the *cabildos* also cut across ethnic identities, bringing together rival West African groups with Cuban-born blacks.⁶⁸ By the end of the nineteenth century, Cubans would be improbably further down the road to multiracial politics than any other people in the region, gathering in mixed-race social and political clubs like Tampa's Liceo Cubano to hear José Martí promise the unification of "el hermano negro" with Creoles and Spaniards in a revolution "con todos, y para el bien de todos."⁶⁹ Civic associations brought together pragmatic self-interest and democratic idealism in the pursuit of very concrete goals: an idealism that was both institutional—egalitarian membership, affordable dues, open debate, officers elected in vigorous contests—and ideational.

Both the ideas of citizenship and the practices of citizenship were spread by the media, whose circulation and politicization rose and fell with the tides of censorship and repression. Elites compared its power to that of violence: as one Argentine governor said, "A newspaper for a man in public life is like a knife for a quarrelsome gaucho; he should always have it at hand,"⁷⁰ while for Antonio Maceo, fighting the Spanish across Cuba, the printing presses were "the artillery of the revolution."⁷¹ In the twentieth century, the technology changed,

67. Margaret Chowning, "The Catholic Church and the Ladies of the Vela Perpetua: Gender and Devotional Change in Nineteenth-Century Mexico," *Past & Present* 221, no. 1 (November 2013): 198.

68. Matt D. Childs, *The 1812 Aponte Rebellion in Cuba and the Struggle against Atlantic Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 95–115; Forment, *Democracy in Latin America*, 107, 244–45.

69. José Martí, "Discurso en el liceo cubano, 26 noviembre 1891," in *Obras completas* (Havana: Editorial Nacional de Cuba, 1975), 4:269–79.

70. Ramón Cárcano, quoted in Ezquiel Gallo, "Society and Politics 1880–1916," in *Argentina since Independence*, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 98.

71. The rebels printed five papers for distribution among and discussion with the peasantry. Philip Sheldon Foner, *Antonio Maceo: The "Bronze Titan" of Cuba's Struggle for Independence* (New York: Monthly Review, 1977), 185.

but the idea remained the same: as Chilean president Eduardo Frei put it, “The transistor [radio] is a much more revolutionary factor than Karl Marx.”⁷² Latin America contained a very broad range of media, from the primitive mass media of *corridos* or gaucho songs to the most sophisticated, such as the radio station La Voz de Antioquia, which broadcast its *radioperiódicos* to Colombians as far away as Manhattan.⁷³ At the very end of the century of citizenship, there would be television, whose centralized and highly capitalized business model made it more of an instrument of social control.⁷⁴ The degree of political independence of other media varied according to time and place, but even in the more controlled regimes, political commentary could slip in the back door, as in the second editions, sports sections, or crime pages in Mexico.⁷⁵ Once again, there was sometimes a correlation with space: the local Colombian shock jocks or the scurrilous regional newspapers of priista Mexico managed direct social and political commentary to some extent because of their insignificance in the national scheme of things.⁷⁶ The cumulative impact, however, could be marked partly through sheer quantity. Fin de siècle Mexico City had multiple working-class papers, the most successful running to tens of thousands of copies and a swagger at times political, despite the dictatorship.⁷⁷ In 1887, Argentina had seventeen daily papers, with a total print run in excess of one hundred thousand copies.⁷⁸ This amounted to a mere one paper per forty people, and most were

72. Quoted in Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 40.

73. Philip Raine to State Department, 2/24/1950, NARG-712.00/2-2450, 24 February 1950, National Archives, Washington, DC; de la Fuente, *Children of Facundo*, 116; Mary Roldán, *Broadcast Nation: Radio, Culture, and Politics in Colombia, 1930–1962* (unpublished manuscript), ch. 3.

74. Not just through the message, Andrew Paxman suggests, but also through the sheer volume. Andrew Paxman, “Cooling to Cinema and Warming to Television: State Mass Media Policy, 1940–1964,” in Gillingham and Smith, *Dictablanda*, 314–15.

75. Pablo Piccato, “Pistoleros, *Ley Fuga*, and Uncertainty in Public Debates about Murder in Twentieth-Century Mexico,” in Gillingham and Smith, *Dictablanda*, 322; Pablo Piccato, “Murders of *nota roja*: Truth and Justice in Mexican Crime News,” *Past & Present* 223, no. 1 (May 2014): 195–231.

76. Paul Gillingham, “The Regional Press Boom, ca.1945–1965: How Much News Was Fit to Print?,” in *Journalism, Satire, and Censorship in Mexico*, ed. Paul Gillingham, Michael Lettieri, and Benjamin T. Smith (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2018), 153–82; Roldán, *Broadcast Nation*, ch. 3.

77. Robert M. Buffington, *A Sentimental Education for the Working Man: The Mexico City Penny Press, 1900–1910* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015), 9, 89, 120.

78. Posada-Carbó, “Latin American Elections.”

distributed in Buenos Aires; but media consumption was highly leveraged, that is, the audience tended to outstrip the number of papers printed or radio sets owned. Newspapers were discussed on the Mexico City street corners where they were sold, or in the “reading circles” that workers formed in the provinces, or passed around *porteño* cafés; families and friends congregated around Colombian radio receivers. In perhaps the ultimate example, entire Cuban cigar factory floors had *lectores*, communally funded employees whose sole job was to read out loud to the workers; their choices spanned working-class newspapers, treatises on political economy, and the novels of Victor Hugo.⁷⁹ These were effective, even if partial and/or fragmented, places for the evolution of a public sphere and, with it, citizenship.

The Four Bs of Citizenship

Mentioning evolution leads to the question of process, that is, how citizenship was constructed, delimited, and at times rejected, or what might be called, for alliterative effect, the question of the four Bs: How was citizenship built, bounded, bickered over, and broken?

In considering the first question, of how people became citizens, two contrasting models of biological evolution might work as metaphors: namely, the gradualist model, which sees species slowly changing in small gradations under natural selection, and that of punctuated equilibria, which proposes long periods of stasis interspersed with short, sharp bursts of extreme change. There are places where this punctuated equilibrium serves as a good metaphor, where citizenship emerges rapidly as dramatic events make people quite suddenly feel and act like citizens. This was perhaps the impact of the French intervention in Mexico or the Cuban rebels’ emancipation of slaves in the Ten Years’ War or the Chilean invasion of Junín in Peru.⁸⁰ Mass mobilization in National Guard units or guerrilla bands is often perforce democratic, and initially small forces and the battles that they fight are archetypal spaces for the overnight emergence of citizenship. Once again, “Aux armes, citoyens.” The outbreak of war with the United States in 1846 brought at least some citizen-soldier

79. On street corners, see Forment, *Democracy in Latin America*, 201, 394; on *lectores*, see Araceli Tinajero, *El lector de tabaquería: Historia de una tradición cubana* (Madrid: Editorial Verbum, 2007); on Colombian radio communal listening, see Roldán, *Broadcast Nation*, ch. 3.

80. The latter is an exception to general Peruvian patterns. Forment, 382–83; Ada Ferrer, *Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation, and Revolution, 1868–1898* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).

idealists into Mexico's National Guard (and even the press-ganged were supposed to be men of honor, very different from the recalcitrant underclasses of the regular army).⁸¹ Emiliano Zapata's uncles and grandfathers fought against the French; his Plan de Ayala, which talks of "the nation to which we belong and which we love," is stuffed full of references to nation and citizenry.⁸² In Cuba, revolutions made first-generation immigrants into Cubans with remarkable regularity: Martí, Frank País, Camilo Cienfuegos, and the Castro brothers all had foreign parents.⁸³ Such catalysis should not be oversold: war against the French may have made citizens in parts of central Mexico and Oaxaca, but it certainly did not in the Southeast.⁸⁴ Yet while wars and revolutions are the obvious triggers, they are not the only ones. Agrarian reforms, constitutions, political campaigns, and nationalizations can all have similar effects, as can forces well beyond human control, such as natural disasters. Major contingencies, in short, can crystallize citizenship with great speed, much as they can crystallize the overlapping phenomenon of national identity—what Rogers Brubaker described as "nationness as a contingent event or happening."⁸⁵

Yet spectacular contingencies can also mask underlying gradualist processes of evolution. In 1952–53, for example, the revolutionaries of Bolivia's Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) made a tardy but sweeping declaration of universal citizenship, admitting women and the illiterate to the electorate, abolishing the

81. Peter Guardino, "Gender, Soldiering, and Citizenship in the Mexican-American War of 1846–1848," *American Historical Review* 119, no. 1 (2014): 41.

82. John Womack Jr., *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1969), 7–8, 400–4.

83. Carmen Alborch Bataller, ed., *José Martí: Obra y vida* (Madrid: Ministerio de Cultura, 1995), 15; Samuel Farber, *The Origins of the Cuban Revolution Reconsidered* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 50.

84. Terry Rugeley, "An Unsatisfactory Picture of Civil Commotion: Unpopular Militia and Tepid Nationalism in the Mexican South East," in *Forced Marches: Soldiers and Military Caciques in Modern Mexico*, ed. Ben Fallaw and Terry Rugeley (Albuquerque: University of Arizona Press, 2012), 41. For places where militias formed citizens, see Patrick McNamara, *Sons of the Sierra: Juárez, Díaz, and the People of Ixtlán, Oaxaca, 1855–1920* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Guy C. Thomson, "Bulwarks of Patriotic Liberalism: The National Guard, Philharmonic Corps and Patriotic Juntas in Mexico, 1847–1888," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 22 (1990): 31–68; for less certainty, Florencia Mallon, "Los campesinos y la formación del Estado en el México del siglo XIX: Morelos, 1848–1858," *Secuencia* 15 (1989): 64–65.

85. This description is offered within a useful comparative treatment of Central and Eastern Europe. Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2010), 21.

unpaid domestic service on haciendas called *pongueaje*, and promoting labor and agrarian reform. Behind this apparent rupture with a past of discrimination and disenfranchisement, however, Laura Gotkowitz traces the shift in ideas and practices of citizenship back as far as the Indian and peasant movements of the 1920s.⁸⁶ In Mexico, civic associations such as patriotic juntas, electoral clubs, mutual-aid societies, and educational charities multiplied with extraordinary speed after the final victory over the French—by 1881, well over a thousand had come to life—but this was in part a resumption of the growth of citizens' societies from the first half of the century, interrupted by the catastrophic wars of the 1840s, '50s, and '60s.⁸⁷ In Tocqueville's unsentimental analysis of the US, small spaces, just like these associations and local governments, formed the basis for democracy on a larger national scale. Local politics might well be spaces for petty dictatorships; the prospect of meaningful, decentralized power, however, might lead to a quite un-Hobbesian world, one in which self-interest drives people to build coalitions to increase the common wealth and their own within it. Out of a primarily economic calculus, over years, a political culture committed to free elections and responsive, democratic decision making might emerge, taking hold first at the local and subsequently at the national level.⁸⁸ Assessments of the rise of civic democracy in Latin America tend to be more sentimental, laying greater stress on the affective and ideational side, yet they suggest the same broad scaling up. François Xavier Guerra, for example, sees a general evolutionary process across Latin America's nineteenth century, whereby *tertulias* and social clubs gave rise to electoral clubs and other political associations by the midcentury, which then served as the schools for subsequent political parties.⁸⁹

The growth and increasing currency of citizenship outside the state was not guaranteed; the stocks and shares of citizenship fell as well as rose. From the commanding heights, the trajectory of citizenship within the state was simpler. Elite promotion of its affective and discursive side, of national identities that might mobilize and control, fluctuated notably in content. There was, for example, a surprisingly universal and radical turn to the indigenous past, during the first

86. Laura Gotkowitz, *A Revolution for Our Rights* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 127, 284.

87. Forment, *Democracy in Latin America*, 101, 239–40.

88. Robert T. Gannett, "Tocqueville and Local Government: Distinguishing Democracy's Second Track," *Review of Politics* 67, no. 4 (Autumn 2005), 725–26.

89. Guerra, "El soberano," 60.

years of independence, as raw material for new, popular identities. The use of indigenous history as part of an explicitly “Mexican” identity runs far back, to at least the seventeenth-century public art and writing of Carlos Sigüenza y Góngora, perhaps even back to the University of Mexico of the sixteenth century, with its chairs in Náhuatl, Otomí, and indigenous paleography, and its self-identifying “Mexican” Creole students.⁹⁰ By the time of independence, intellectuals and rebels were drawing on the Mexica Empire as a source of legitimacy, depicting the colony as an aberration in the course of an independent country that Padre Morelos and Carlos María de Bustamante, among others, would call Anáhuac.⁹¹ The enthusiasm subsequently waned across the nineteenth century—conservatives were unenthusiastic from the start—but endured, invoked again by the liberals of the 1850s and 1860s, and the nation builders of the Porfiriato, in another of the important disjunctures between the history of Mexico and the rest of the region.

Yet, while lacking the raw material, rebels and nationalists of the Wars of Independence nevertheless reached for *indigenismo* in unlikely spaces, such as Argentina, whose first coin, the *sol*, was stamped with the Inca sun; whose first national anthem called the new republic a renewed Inca *patria*; and where José San Martín named his revolutionary society after the Araucanian chief Lautaro. This did not last a generation, and governments did not return to *indigenismo*, or at least to hawking the indigenous past as a root of the mestizo present, until the late nineteenth century. Messages shifted fluidly over time: in 1892 conservatives in Colombia and liberals in Guatemala both celebrated the quatercentenary of Columbus’s arrival in the Americas.⁹² The messages could be profoundly contradictory, for example, the image of Cuba’s last indigenous leader, Hatuey, branding the beer bottles produced by Facundo Bacardi, a rum-

90. J. Rojas Garcidueñas, “Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora y el primer ejemplo de arte neoprehispánico en América,” in *La polémica del arte nacional en México, 1850–1910*, ed. D. Schavelzón (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1988), 49–51; Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, *How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth Century Atlantic World* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 94–95; Solange Alberro, *El águila y la cruz: Orígenes religiosos de la conciencia criolla* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1999), 87–88.

91. David Brading, *The Origins of Mexican Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 51–52, 83; Enrique Florescano, *Memoria mexicana* (Mexico City: Editorial J. Mortiz, 1987), 305–6.

92. Rebecca Earle, *The Return of the Native: Indians and Myth-Making in Spanish America, 1810–1930* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 31, 60–63, 72–75, 94.

distilling Catalan immigrant whose son was an enthusiastic Cuban nationalist (and at the same time very much a citizen of his town, Santiago, whose chronicle he wrote).⁹³ The effort to culture imagined communities, however, tended strongly to increase with time and wealth and stability, an elite search for a working idea of citizenship, common identity, and duties, without necessarily concurrent rights. Peru built its first statue to Bolívar during the 1860s guano boom; Venezuela assembled others under the liberal dictatorship of the 1870s and 1880s. Mexico's liberal dictatorship, with more raw material to play with, erected statues of the great and the good, ranging from Cuauhtémoc to now-forgotten provincial worthies, and shipped in crowds to celebrate them with free tram tickets. By the time the century of citizenship was well underway, just about all Latin American governments had decided that the nation should exist—not the city-state or the supranational—and the figurative spaces of citizenship, namely, speeches, parades, festivals, and history lessons, multiplied accordingly.

The building of the state's literal places of citizenship was also more of a one-way street for the simple reason that these were cumulative. As one Mexican governor said to his congressmen,

Nobody pays any attention to the progress that an unimportant village makes when it builds, for example, a schoolhouse; it is a fact that passes unnoticed, without making anyone think of the results it may bring in due course; but if ten, fifteen or twenty obscurely-named places bring to a happy end the same improvement . . . that is when the work of progress is felt and the providential action of the Government that presides over, supports and stimulates this progress is made manifest.⁹⁴

A different *Government*—Traven's eponymous satire—made the work of progress felt in a different way, describing how Díaz would “cook up statistics” for education, because “a country which has many schools stands high in the scale of civilized nations, and there is nothing like it for attracting foreign investment.”⁹⁵ After the revolution, however, the rhetoric of teachers and schoolhouses as a metric of civilization was more substantiated, as very different governments shared the commitment to education even as budgets wavered. There were abundant reasons for schoolteachers to be disliked, either for

93. Tom Gjelten, *Bacardi and the Long Struggle for Cuba: The Biography of a Cause* (New York: Penguin, 2008), 6, 5–42.

94. Teodoro Dehesa, “Memoria presentada a la H. Legislatura Libre y Soberano del Estado de Veracruz Llave el 16 de septiembre de 1894,” in Blázquez Domínguez, *Estado de Veracruz*, 8:4251.

95. Traven, *Government*, 28.

their insensitive idealism, like the *maestro* who paraded schoolchildren around Hueyapan shouting, “¡Viva el socialismo!” or for their unabashed realpolitik, like the operators who colonized the *ayuntamientos* and *ejidos* of Naranja or Chamula, or set up mezcal distilleries in the mountains.⁹⁶ Results were equivocal too, with later students (ironically) unaware of who Lázaro Cárdenas was. Yet results were cumulative, not just in the catechisms of nationalism, which more and more students did pick up, but also in the socializing impact of a schoolhouse’s mere existence and the importance attached to it by the outside world.⁹⁷

Boundaries and Bickerings

Latin Americans largely achieved the stabilization of the largest spaces, the national, by the 1850s, as the wars to define borders of the independence years gave way to the relative international peace of the region; this peace was broken only occasionally, by the War of the Triple Alliance against Paraguay in the late 1860s, or the War of the Pacific, which pitted Chile against Bolivia and Peru in the early 1880s, or the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay in 1932–35. Even Mexico, the great exception to this pattern, traded the intense instability of 1830s and 1840s, when Texas, Zacatecas, Tabasco, Sonora, and Yucatán launched secession movements, and when, in the classic phrase, the US took half the national territory (debatable, in terms of how “national” it actually was) for the lesser instability of borders that were stable, if indefensible. Internal borders, similarly, had largely stabilized at both the regional and local level; across much of Latin America, municipal borders continued to be fluid, with their expansion or contraction acting as scoreboards in the game of provincial politics. Inside these borders, political stability allowed leaders at all levels to build, while export-led growth provided the finance. In the first decade of the twentieth century, nearly all Latin American countries dramatically increased their earnings. The

96. Judith Friedlander, *Being Indian in Hueyapan: A Study of Forced Identity in Contemporary Mexico* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1975), 128–64; Paul Friedrich, *The Princes of Naranja: An Essay in Antbrohistorical Method* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 27–29, 70, 99; Paul Gillingham, “Ambiguous Missionaries: Rural Teachers and State Façades in Guerrero,” *Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos* 22, no. 2 (Summer 2006), 331–60.

97. One-third of Segovia’s 1970s sample of schoolchildren did not know of Cárdenas. The schoolhouse remained, however, the main place of political discussion in rural communities. Rafael Segovia, *La politización del niño mexicano* (Mexico: Colegio de México, 1975), 15, 26, 35–36.

central-government revenues of Argentina and Bolivia more than doubled; those of Nicaragua tripled, and those of Guatemala quintupled.⁹⁸ Such funds went into pomp, such as Mexico's pavilion at the 1889 World Fair, which absorbed 1.6 percent of the 1892 budget.⁹⁹ (There were revealing arguments concerning space at the exhibition, whose organizers proposed a single region-wide Pavilion of Central and Southern America; the Latin American countries refused categorically to be lumped together, held out successfully for individual places, and took up residence on prime real estate next to the Eiffel Tower.)¹⁰⁰ The new wealth also went into government offices, schoolhouses in remote villages, town halls, plazas, and bandstands. The regimes that specialized in building these were initially mainly liberal, and subsequently mainly populist; but by the end of the nineteenth century, as Hilda Sabato observes, "the liberal matrix had definitely prevailed in the institutional structure of most nations,"¹⁰¹ and increasing the contact points for state and citizens was more than just a liberal or populist goal.

But if the spaces for citizenship—both those built by the rulers and those built by the ruled—tended to increase with the passage of time and the accumulation of wealth, access to them was subject to multiple boundaries. The most primordial of those boundaries in Latin America was race. Afro-Latinos were in some ways a microcosm of more general exclusionary strategies. Their liberation and eventual incorporation into the larger polity were promoted as a desirable ending by liberals from independence onward, achieved early in Haiti and Mexico, the first with a black and the second with an Afro-Mexican president. Elsewhere, abolition was postponed until as late as the 1850s: emancipation came in a flurry to Colombia and Ecuador in 1851; to Argentina in 1853; to Venezuela, Jamaica, and Peru in 1854 (a set of dates that fit well with the suggestion of a century of citizenship). In Cuba, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes explicitly declared his own fifty-three slaves—nearly half of his ragtag army—free citizens when he rose against Spain on 10 October 1868. As for everyone else's slaves, he clarified two months later,

98. Data from Montevideo-Oxford Latin American Economic History Database, accessed 8 June 2020, <http://moxlad.cienciassociales.edu.uy/en>.

99. Mauricio Tenorio-Trillo, *Mexico at the World's Fairs* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 49, 54; INEGI, *Estadísticas históricas de México* (CD-ROM, 2000).

100. Alejandra Uslenghi, *Latin America at fin-de-siècle Universal Exhibitions: Modern Cultures of Visuality* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 118.

101. Sabato, "On Political Citizenship," 1314.

A free Cuba is incompatible with a slaveholding Cuba; and the abolition of Spanish institutions must include, and out of necessity and for reasons of the highest justice does include, the abolition of slavery as the most iniquitous of all. . . . But the country can only fulfil this goal . . . when in full use of those rights it can, by means of free suffrage, agree upon the best manner to carry it out to the true advantage of both its old and its new citizens.¹⁰²

Indigenous communities in some zones were subject to the same promise and retrenchment. In 1825, Bolívar ended the head tax levied exclusively on Bolivian Indians as “degrading to the dignity of citizens”; in 1826, it was restored.¹⁰³ Jorge Ubico abolished Guatemala’s *habilitación*, debt peonage, in 1936 but replaced it with a vagrancy law that stipulated that every Indian who did not have titled property was a vagrant and subject to a certain number of days of forced labor every year.¹⁰⁴ Such ethnically determined *corvée* labor endured informally in Mexico through the same period in the guise of *faenas* or *tequio*.¹⁰⁵ To such a fundamental denial of equality before the law, regimes added multiple denials of the rights to space on grounds of ethnicity: space at the polling booth, in schools, in town halls, and, at the most fundamental, even in Mexico, public space full stop. Indians were banned from the plaza in turn-of-the-century Tlapa and forced to ask permission from the army to dance in honor of the Aztecs in Mexico City.¹⁰⁶ The Bourbons had done much the same, banning some Indian carnival dances as “hateful performance of their ancient pagan customs,” not just heretic but also plagued with “the incorrigible vice of drunkenness”; but that had been in the dark days of the late colony.¹⁰⁷ Such exclusions were also contingent upon the overlapping category of class: the poor were often denied the vote by literacy or property qualifications and denied government services in general by the everyday forms of disenfranchisement. Gender, finally, disqualified around 50 percent of Latin Americans from a host of spaces, ranging from the polling booth to the jury to most government positions. Universal male suffrage spread in the second half of the nineteenth century; it only

102. Reproduced in Aviva Chomsky et al., eds., *The Cuba Reader: History, Culture, Politics* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019), 115.

103. Gotkowitz, *Revolution*, 17–18.

104. Carol A. Smith, ed., *Guatemalan Indians and the State, 1540–1988* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 141–142.

105. Gillingham, *Unrevolutionary Mexico*, ch. 7.

106. *El Universal*, 23 August 1890.

107. Enrique Florescano, *Etnia, estado y nación: Ensayo sobre las identidades colectivas en México* (Mexico City: Aguilar, 1997), 307–8.

became standard for women in the second half of the twentieth century.¹⁰⁸

Given these multiple boundaries, it is unsurprising that so many should have sought citizenship elsewhere, at the local level, in civic associations, or in the extraconstitutional but influential deliberative assemblies of some indigenous communities. (And not just indigenous—in the mestizo rancher town of San José de Gracia, central Mexico, all critical decisions, until well into the 1960s, were made by such assemblies.)¹⁰⁹ Albert Hirschman argued that there were two possible routes for a society to deal with injustice, either “voicing” complaints or “exiting” the entire process; small Mexican communities often hedged their bets by doing both at the same time, writing numerous protest letters while getting on with their daily business by themselves.¹¹⁰ Yet, while the point that many turned their backs on the spaces of the state is well made, many others disputed exclusion by claiming the vote, labor rights, equality before the law, access to services, and access to government office. Rebellions, social movements, political organizations, strikes, and the weapons of the weak were all means to these ends. Such mobilizations occurred in some of the most unlikely circumstances, whether among the slaves who struck in Cuba in 1865, citing international law, or the Guatemalan Maya who formed unions in a poultry plant in North Carolina in the 1990s.¹¹¹ Others were more predictable, such

108. Female suffrage became standard in the second half of the twentieth century among the early adopters of Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela. Women first voted in Mexico in the municipal elections of 1949, standard for the larger countries of Latin America: women won the suffrage in Brazil in 1945; Argentina, 1949; Chile, 1949; and Colombia, 1957. Ecuador, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, and El Salvador were the regional frontrunners, all establishing women’s suffrage in advance of the “second wave” of democratization of the 1940s. For Francesca Gargallo, the key period for women’s suffrage in Latin America falls between 1870 and 1947. Stephanie Rivera Berruz, “Latin American Feminism,” in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Stanford University, 1997–, Winter 2018 ed., <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/feminism-latin-america/>.

109. Luis González y González, *Pueblo en vilo: Microhistoria de San José de Gracia* (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1968).

110. The choice between the two is determined by how vocally obstreperous a society is and how accessible a potentially useful institution is. Laura Nader, “Powerlessness in Zapotec and United States Societies,” in *The Anthropology of Power: Ethnographic Studies from Asia, Oceania, and the New World*, ed. Raymond D. Fogelson and Richard N. Adams (New York: Academic, 1977), 314.

111. Hugh Thomas, *Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1971), 232–44; Leon Fink, *The Maya of Morganton: Work and Community in the nuevo New South* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

as the marches and strikes of the Buenos Aires anarchists, the marriage of a numerous proletariat with radicalism, both domestic and imported.

Here again Mexico is something of an outlier in the frequency of violent horse-trading between rulers and ruled. Mobilizations to dispute exclusion from the rights of citizenship were much more likely there due to long-term experience of collective bargaining by riot, a communal haggling over land, bread, tax, justice, and even vaccination through periodic, choreographed low-intensity violence, often with women at the front.¹¹² Elections offered another flash-point, and electoral riots intensified greatly after the revolution to form a staple of much local political competition across the rest of the twentieth century. The procedure was highly patterned: committed voters who felt that they had been disenfranchised would storm, with surprising regularity, the town hall and physically install their favored candidate. This was, like early modern bread riots, generally a simulacrum of violence on both sides: state agents were not lynched, and protesters were neither shot nor jailed. Machetes, billhooks, pistols, and the odd hunting rifle might be displayed and waved; generally, they were not employed. Both crowds and higher authorities understood the phenomenon as a performance and a bargaining procedure, one that worked relatively well, as hard-nosed crowds that bargained with determination usually obtained either some representation or veto. It was characteristic enough to appear as a trope in films such as *Redes* (1936), *Río escondido* (1948), or *La ley de Hérodes* (1999), or in novels such as Fernando Benítez's *Agua envenenada* (1961). In extremis, it led to lynching, similarly patterned, if less productive.¹¹³ In everyday terms, this process made elites wary of too obviously or too frequently ignoring at least some of the rights of citizenship.

Breaking Citizens

My last question is how citizenship is broken. The simple answer, historically, is violence; the reason is that citizenship has both concrete benefits and extraordinary ideological and sentimental power. Consequently, while boredom and individualism pose threats, it is

112. Eric Hobsbawm, "The Machine Breakers," *Past & Present* 1 (February 1952), 57–70.

113. Gema Kloppe-Santamaria, "Lynching and the Politics of State Formation in Post-Revolutionary Puebla (1930s–50s)," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 51, no. 3 (August 2019), 499–521.

violence that is generally required to definitely remove citizens' rights and beliefs. This has happened with regularity across the entire post-independence period. In Cuba, for example, Afro-Cubans fought the War of 1895–98 in part in the name of racial equality but were systematically excluded from the army, judiciary, and bureaucracy of the new republic. When they formed the Partido Independiente de Color (PIC) to campaign against these injustices, the government passed a law banning political parties organized on a racial basis, and in 1912 the PIC was driven into rebellion, its members killed by the thousands.¹¹⁴ During the century of citizenship, however, there were numerous countercurrents: the Mexican and Bolivian Revolutions; expanding franchises; the development of feminist pressure groups; the emergence of powerful unions in the larger industrializing economies; the hegemony of populist parties; the biodiversity of a left that included meaningful socialist, communist, and anarchist components; the indigenous congresses of the 1930s and 1940s; and finally, the brief *apertura democrática* of the mid- to late 1940s. By 1946, all of the South American countries (bar Paraguay, the eternal outlier) were at least formally democracies.¹¹⁵ Yet during the Cold War, these countercurrents weakened, and by the end of the 1970s, only Mexico and Costa Rica had not experienced either a coup or a dictatorship.

Not all Cold War regimes shut down all forms of citizenship: General Velasco's Peru, for example, attempted meaningful land and labor reforms. Repression ebbed and flowed: while dictators came to form a majority after Árbenz's 1954 ouster in Guatemala, democracies rebounded briefly in the early 1960s before a series of further-reaching coups in the region's largest countries. In general, however, during this period states used new levels of technology and power to systematically shut down elections, ban political parties, repress union and peasant militants, exclude minorities, and silence printing presses. The militarist states benefited from unprecedented levels of foreign—principally but not exclusively US—support in the form of subsidies, propaganda, military training, arms, and foreign aid. Aid to Guatemala rose from \$500,000 in 1954 to \$11 million in 1955; in Brazil, it rose from \$15 million in the last year of the Goulart government to \$122 million after the coup; half of all Food for Peace aid

114. Aline Helg, *Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Struggle for Equality, 1886–1912* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).

115. Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, "Latin America between the Second World War and the Cold War: Some Reflections on the 1945–1948 Conjuncture," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 20, no. 1 (1988): 167–89.

went to Chile in the first year of the Pinochet government.¹¹⁶ Newly large and aggressive security services manifested an intrinsic suspicion of associational activity, which translated into its general withering and the emergence of an insurgent left with little faith in bourgeois democracy. Uruguay, the home of *batllismo*, one of the most powerful civil societies in the region, imprisoned one in six of its citizens under the military dictatorship; by the end of the 1970s, one in five had gone into exile, in the ultimate surrender of the spaces of citizenship.¹¹⁷

Mexico once more was an outlier—although not to the extent once thought—in all three areas: civil society, the public sphere, and citizenship. The PRI ran a civilian and rigorously electoral one-party state; they managed to do so—despite considerable inequality and the discourse of a revolution betrayed—with less overt violence than most of the other Latin American and Caribbean dictatorships. Whether at Tlatelolco, in the *Guerra sucia*, or through the petty under-the-radar brutality of small-town garrisons, the PRI was in the final analysis dependent on whatever violence was necessary to complement its blandishments and tactical flexibility in the carving up of power and resources. A civil society endured throughout, one that fell between the stools of outright Tocquevillian opposition—protesting disappearances, producing and reading newspapers, mounting simulacra of storming the town-hall barricades—and Gramscian bulwark of the state, with Mexican intellectuals simultaneously criticizing and dealing with the regime. The year 1968 did not completely change that: while Octavio Paz resigned as ambassador to India, Carlos Fuentes subsequently took up the ambassadorship in France, with the ambiguity encouraged by the *sexenio* system persisting. Julio Scherer, the deacon of opposition journalists, later regretted writing off Lucio Cabañas and Génaro Vázquez in the pages of *Excélsior* as misguided criminals, echoing government rhetoric; all “heads of the media” received regular confidential briefings on the *Guerra sucia*; the critical columnists of the 1970s and 1980s needed politicians’ assistance to bring out their criticism.¹¹⁸ In part because of that intertwining, in part because of a vigorous provincial press, in

116. Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the US: A History of US Policy toward Latin America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 360–61.

117. David Mares, “The National Security State,” in *A Companion to Latin American History*, ed. Thomas H. Holloway (London: Blackwell, 2011), 399.

118. For *columnismo*, see Vanessa Freije, *Citizens of Scandal: Journalists, Secrecy, and the Politics of Reckoning in Mexico* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2020); for Scherer’s mea culpa, see Jacinto Rodríguez, “The Invisible Tyranny; or, the Origin of the Perfect Dictatorship,” in *Journalism, Satire, and Censorship in Mexico*,

part because of elite tolerance for mild indirect criticism in the national press, a public sphere—albeit fragmented—endured. Mexicans in the capital were faced with the pap of *El Nacional* on their newsstands, but in Guadalajara or Veracruz or Torreón, they had the more critical eminences of those states' independent broadsheets, and in Acapulco they got *La Verdad*, a ragtag Marxist *New York Post*. Finally, the practices of citizenship endured, even after the Thermidor of the 1940s, in numerous grassroots movements like the Asociación Cívica Guerrerense or the Navistas of San Luis Potosí. In Mexico City, the state's failure to cope with the 1985 earthquake led *chilangos* to form volunteer disaster-relief networks, which in turn grew into the Asamblea de Barrios, which in turn was key in electing the opposition in the first ever mayoral election.

To end in the triumphalism of the democratization of the 1990s would be out of date in an age that is more one of competitive authoritarianism, and would-be Whig history to boot. To do so for Mexico, where the Drug Wars are far more important—the most significant political and social phenomenon since the revolution—would be Whig history writ large. In the eyes of various scholars, the Cold War and the economies it ushered in did not have a happy ending; they destroyed an older, more capacious, and civic idea of citizenship, leaving behind free elections and individual economic liberty as the hollowed out definitions of democratic success.¹¹⁹ Community, Gemeinschaft, gave way to an extraordinarily diffuse, globally consumption-based, anomic Gesellschaft, whose ultimate incarnation was perhaps the hypercapitalism of the drug business. Yet as the very terms might suggest, worries concerning the decline of community at the hands of modernization are nothing new. At a time when swathes of Latin America were still part of the Spanish Empire, Benjamin Constant pointed out that republican citizenship of the classical variety was incompatible with “large modern states.”¹²⁰ Writing at the turn of the twentieth century, the first professional sociologists—Ferdinand Tönnies, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim—were fascinated with the problem of how social bonds could survive the scaling up of modern societies. By the 1960s, the same problem was occupying anthropologists and microhistorians of remote Latin American

ed. Paul Gillingham, Michael Lettieri, and Benjamin T. Smith (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2018), 192.

119. Forment, *Democracy in Latin America*, 3–6; Greg Grandin, *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 197–98.

120. Leydet, “Citizenship.”

places: How could tested ideas of community survive the shock of consumer culture, advertising, and mass mobility? Could they be translated to or remade in the growing cities? Was citizenship compatible with the individualism, commodity fetishism, and general anomie of late capitalism?¹²¹ These questions, however, are neither Mexican nor Latin American but rather universal questions of the ends—in both senses of the word—of citizenship, and not just in the past.

121. For examples, see González y González, *Pueblo en vilo*; Frank Cancian, *The Decline of Community in Zinacantán: Economy, Public Life, and Social Stratification, 1960–1987* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).