speeches, records of rituals, memoirs of religious leaders and members, periodicals, and outsider perspectives—including state authorities, court decisions, FBI files, press coverage, and anthropologists' accounts—without grammatical alterations to the original documents. In their prose, these latter primary source perspectives also reveal racialized attitudes regarding the groups from those who opposed their growth. Importantly, the editors' introductions engage the relevant scholarship for each group; for example, including Yvonne Chireau's discussion of the problematic dichotomy between Christianity and Conjure in southern African American life (17–18). Additional reading lists follow each group's documents, and the book contains a bibliography and an index for additional research.

With *Race and New Religious Movements in the USA*, Clark and Stoddard have produced a novel and accessible documentary reader. It is well suited for introductory religion courses, courses that center the role of whiteness in the construction of "religion," "lived religion" approaches to Christianity that observe its modification and adaptation in specific cultural contexts, and courses that center on alternative and emerging religious movements, where students will engage intersections of race and religion seriously through written sources. With illuminating primary source examples and carefully conceived editors' introductions, this volume also extends Judith Weisenfeld's "religio-racial" framework beyond the religious groups dominated by people of African descent in *New World A-Coming* (2016). *Race and New Religious Movements in the USA* collects religions whose leaders and adherents are Native American, Black, White, and/or multiracial, extracting these groups from their usual subfield silos in American religious studies and making them available for study across time, space, and place. And, like Weisenfeld, Clark and Stoddard present their audience with these religious documents descriptively as historians of religion. While they acknowledge and situate the groups that have histories of "hate" and violence that come with their religious advocacy of racial supremacy, they also appropriately transcend the commonplace, evaluative narrations of the controversial rhetoric and racial exclusivity that these groups receive when they attract mainstream attention.

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Religion, Law, USA. Edited by Joshua Dubler and Isaac Weiner. New York University Press, 2019. 336 pages. $99.00 cloth; $35.00 paper; ebook available.

Joshua Dubler and Isaac Weiner have edited a volume that takes a retrospective look at an "established and vibrant subfield" in

American religious studies—"the intersection of American religion and American law" (2). The subfield, the editors contend, began with Winnifred Fallers Sullivan's groundbreaking book *The Impossibility of Religious Freedom* (2005). This work, as well as several others in her corpus, "urged scholars to attend to the marked disjuncture between the discourse of constitutional jurisprudence and the phenomenology of American religious life" (14). Answer the call religion scholars did, and at the fifteen-year anniversary of Sullivan's *Impossibility*, the editors, along with the volume's fourteen contributors, evaluated whether their efforts have led to a better understanding "about religion, about law, and about American society" (3). The answer is a clear affirmative.

The book itself is divided into four parts with three or four chapters in each part. Each chapter has a single-word concept that undergirds the argument, such as belief, sexuality, friend, hope, and much more. The editors, two scholars of religion in the United States, urged the authors to choose a court case or event as the starting point for examining their own concept and how it helps or does not help us to understand the complexities of the interrelationship between religion and law. They were free to explore associated "paths of inquiry" in their chapters as well (18).

This diversity of concepts for interrogating the relationship between religion and law suggests the careful and nuanced interdisciplinary nature of the book, which is its most notable strength. For example, in chapter 8, Ashon Crawley employs the term "noise." He grew up in a raucous "Blackpentecostal" church (Crawley's spelling) and, for him, noise is central to the performed, embodied practice of his childhood faith (157–58). He also examines the origins of the famous 1906 Azusa Street revival in Los Angeles led by black preacher William J. Seymour. Then, as now, Crawley notes how "in courtrooms and legal proceedings, it is determined not only what normal looks like but also how normal sounds" (158). Police tried to shut down the loud revival on Azusa Street, and it was only because of a legal technicality that the revival was allowed to continue. Nevertheless, the "agitational sound of blackness, was considered, and still is today, a public nuisance, a sound and vibration that needed to be remedied" (159). It contrasted with the orderly, staid, "normal" worship of white Protestant churches and was a target for management by the law. Crawley extends his analysis of "noise" to queer studies and the massacre at the Pulse Nightclub in Florida in 2016, observing that the loud queerness of Pulse upset the stillness of heteronormativity (168).

Another strength of the book is the contention, implicit in almost every chapter, that virtually any non-white and non-Protestant religious person or group will find it difficult to have the courts consider them to be sincere religious practitioners and thus protected under the religion clauses of the First Amendment. For instance, in her chapter on "belief,"

Sarah Imhoff analyzes the 1879 Supreme Court case *Reynolds v. United States*, "the first time that the Supreme Court explicitly interpreted the free exercise clause" (29). A Mormon named George Reynolds married another woman while still married to his first wife, and the territorial court of Utah ruled that he was guilty of bigamy. He took his argument to the Supreme Court, claiming that his religious beliefs required him to engage in plural marriage. The Supreme Court ruled against him, however, noting that sincerity was insufficient because his personal belief resulted in committing an act which was a crime against the state and violated what was "real" religious practice (29–31). According to Imhoff, the *Reynolds* ruling demonstrated that "concerns about public order often justified the limits on religious freedom in the nineteenth century in ways that advanced Protestant moral precepts, even when they denied that they were privileging Protestant Christianity" (31).

Likewise, Tisa Wenger, in her treatment of "sovereignty," shows how the "doctrine of discovery" established and justified the United States' claims to sovereignty against various Native American peoples throughout American history. In 1493, Pope Alexander VI "divided the newly discovered lands between Spain and Portugal" (109). The early United States, deeply influenced by English Christendom, continued the practice of dispossessing indigenous people that had begun in the fifteenth century with the "doctrine of discovery" promulgated by Pope Alexander VI. Wenger observes that "the US Supreme Court first defined the doctrine of discovery as the foundation for US sovereignty in the 1823 case *Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. William M'Intosh*" (111). William M'Intosh received a land grant in the Illinois territory from the state of Virginia in 1779, although the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians also claimed the same land. The court ruled in favor of M'Intosh because Virginia had sovereignty over the land that it earned by defeating the British, who had the original rights to the land under the doctrine of discovery. Supreme Court justice John Marshall argued that this doctrine was the basis for American sovereignty and could not be overturned. Moreover, he declared that European Christian civilization was superior to that of New World civilization—the descendants of Christians should own title to the land regardless of indigenous land claims (111–12). More recently, the doctrine of discovery, with its unmistakable Christian roots, was also indispensable to American officials deciding to build the Dakota Access oil pipeline on the Standing Rock Sioux Nation, despite various Native American groups' protests in 2016 (108).

Although the courts claim to have neutrality, white English Protestantism is foundational to the concepts of religion and law themselves in America. If individuals do not conform to the expectations of white English Protestantism, they receive unequal justice. *Religion, Law, USA* is therefore essential reading for scholars of new and alternative religious movements because the book provides concrete examples of

people and groups who do not conform to white Protestant norms. It describes their struggle under the burdens that come as a result of the ways in which religion and law are adjudicated in the United States. The reviewer highly recommends the book to religion scholars in general, legal scholars, as well as graduate students in those fields.

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The Limits of Tolerance: Enlightenment Values and Religious Fanaticism. By Denis Lacorne. Translated by C. Jon Delogu and Robin Emlein. Columbia University Press, 2019. xiii + 280 pages. $35.00 cloth; ebook available.

The concept of religious tolerance, now a virtue in Western democracies, has not always been considered a human value. What is more, the word *tolerance* has not itself been consistently understood, either in its meaning or in its application. Indeed, as a signifier, tolerance, which is derived from the Latin *tolerare* (to suffer or endure), has been burdened by centuries of pulling and stretching to fit changing political conditions. What princes and prelates past and present have deigned to tolerate politically and religiously among the populace seems to have been guided more so by convenience than by evolving views of justice and human dignity. In truth, writes the French political philosopher Denis Lacorne in his recent book, *The Limits of Tolerance*, "these values were not readily accepted. It was only through the persuasive and growing influence of philosophers . . . the efforts of political activists . . . and the acquiescence of modern rulers that [the currently-held view of tolerance] eventually prevailed" (2). Accordingly, in his book, Lacorne endeavors to trace the development, at times circuitous, of religious tolerance, both in thought and in practice. At the same time, he offers proscriptive advice aimed at political advisors seeking guidance in crafting equitable public policies.

In the first half of the book, Lacorne deftly traverses multiple terrains, wending his way through a number of English and French philosophical pamphlets from the eighteenth century and then over the diverse landscape of colonial New England (as largely reported by contemporaneous French writers), and then back two centuries to examine two cases of autocratic tolerance, namely the Ottoman empire and the republic of Venice. The thread that connects these examples, without reading back too much, seems to have been their interest in balancing the competing aspirations of ethnic and religious communities with their economic interests and desire for political self-governance—not to mention the level of trust (or mistrust) civil authorities seemed to possess in the goodness of human nature. As Lacorne puts it: "The