There is a popular view that Descartes and Pascal were antagonists. I argue instead that Pascal was a Cartesian, in the manner of other Cartesians in the seventeenth century. That does not, of course, mean that Pascal accepted everything Descartes asserted, given that there were Cartesian atomists, for example, when Descartes was a plenist and anti-atomist. Pascal himself was a vacuust and thus in opposition to Descartes in that respect, but he did accept some of the more distinctive and controversial aspects of Cartesianism, including his mechanistic philosophy and the consequent view that animals are automata.

1. Pascal and the French Mind

There is a current discussion in France about whether Descartes or Pascal best represents the French mind. The matter is well represented by Jacques Attali’s intellectual biography of Pascal, *Blaise Pascal ou le génie français*, and especially by its final chapter, the culmination of the book to which the title refers (2000, 459–85). There Attali starts his argument with a concession that “in this time of convergence toward a single model constructed out of Anglo-Saxon democracy, Hollywood-style entertainment, and American commerce,” the French mind is but the faint trace of a forgotten history. People no longer identify France with Pascal, the prodigal child of that great seventeenth century; “everything seems to separate the 21st century from Blaise Pascal: his disdain of the world, his refusal to be loved, his religious obsession, his asceticism, his defense of soli-

1. Attali, the author of more than two-dozen books whose topics range from political economy to euthanasia, is a practicing economist, a prominent financial capitalist, socialist, and technocrat, who was a close adviser to President Mitterrand.
tude, his love of penitence, his aversion to diversion, are all foreign to our times” (2000, 460). Similarly,

Everything also seems to separate the France of today from that of Pascal: it has stopped being the demographic, cultural, and political superpower it was then; we no longer find there the greatest giants of the world in literature, philosophy, and science, as we did then; it is no longer dominated by Christian culture; Jansenism has totally disappeared; it has become one of the least religious places in the planet, and many people glory in recognizing in themselves a caricature of Descartes constructed out of rationality and atheism, out of intellectual skepticism and naturalist pragmatism (2000, 460–61).

Still, Attali argues, France today is the heir of its past: “As long as there is a country bearing its name, glory, absoluteness, and universality will continue to constitute its dreams; . . . Jansenism will remain forever in it under other names: conscience, exigency, resistance, dissidence . . . And Pascal, pivotal figure of the Great Century, will remain forever the exemplary incarnation of the French mind” (2000, 461). Attali continues:

The French mind is not fashioned out of reason alone; it is not satisfied, as was Descartes, to dream of universal mathematics, of harmony, order, and symmetry; it mixes reason and heart, science and faith, logic and whim, power and rebellion, demonstration and intuition. As with Pascal, the French mind is constantly in a state of rebellion against its own reason, against that of its State and its Church, when they prefer lies to the truth, pride to humility, egoism to charity, and logic to intuition (2000, 470).

Now, to talk of a collective mind is odd. Either thesis—the French mind is Cartesian, the French mind is Pascalian—may be thought bizarre. However, they are likely inoffensive and might in fact contain some insight, as when Napoleon (following Adam Smith) called the English a nation of shopkeepers. Pierre Duhem thought that nineteenth century English science was overly experimental and French science was overly theoretical, so, following Pascal, he depicted the English as broad, but shallow minds (constituted by esprit de finesse) and the French as narrow, but deep minds (esprit de géométrie). It is clear that one can construct caricatures of historical personages that embody the traits one considers to be especially revealing of some mentalities; Duhem thought of the English as

2. Attali is right, of course, to call that image of Descartes a caricature, since Descartes rejected atheism, skepticism, and pragmatism.
if they were all like Charles Dickens and the French like Jean Racine. But such things cannot be taken too seriously. I find more objectionable the stark opposition depicted by Attali between Descartes and Pascal, as if they were genuine antagonists. We might construct for ourselves comic book versions of Descartes and Pascal that might fill the bill, but is this how we have to view them? Is this how they would have been regarded in their times?

In the process of diminishing the contrast between Descartes and Pascal, one can try to bring Descartes closer to Pascal or Pascal closer to Descartes. For example, Attali artificially widens the gap he perceives between Descartes’ and Pascal’s science; he contrasts Descartes, who undertakes physics as a mathematician, who “thinks the world willed by God is rational and that its laws can be discovered by logic alone,” with Pascal, who never stops being a physicist, always “observing the effects before inquiring into the principle” (2000, 199). For Attali, Pascal, in contrast with Descartes, “thinks that the world is a chaos to decipher, a code to break... that the laws of the world are not always logical but that one can approximate them by studying a great number of cases” (2000, 199). The irony is that, in his description of Pascal, Attali could well have been quoting Descartes.

At the end of Principles, Part IV, Descartes reflects generally on the method he uses in his physics, trying to make clear the limitations of his

3. Incidentally, on questions of science, Attali grossly exaggerates Pascal’s importance in a “Whiggish” mode, that is, his pronouncements simply judge Pascal’s work according to whether it leads to present science: Attali claims that Pascal in 1639 invented a new branch of mathematics: projective geometry (2000, 62); he says that Pascal’s arithmetical machine was three centuries in advance and computers today are only a more perfect realization of Pascal’s machine (2000, 89). Regarding Pascal’s studies of the void, he claims that experimental science has been born (2000, 142); concerning his studies of the cycloid, he says, “without it, there would be no metal bridges, planes, computers... It will inspire the differential calculus” (2000, 322). (The cycloid is the subject of Douglas Jesseph paper, “Descartes, Pascal, and the Epistemology of Mathematics: The Case of the Cycloid,” which gives a considerably different account of the episode.) These kinds of exaggerations and defective historiography might be thought benign if they did not also influence Attali’s analysis of the materials before him. For example, Attali rejects the assertion by Descartes that he suggested the Puis de Dôme barometric experiment to Pascal, saying, “This is highly unlikely. Descartes’ theories on the void are too distant from the truth for him to think of demonstrating his own error in this way” (2000, 116). The wrong criterion is thus invoked to dismiss a historically valid possibility, that the experiment underdetermines the two theories, those of Pascal and Descartes, though it might count against the Aristotelians’ explanations (as Daniel Garber argues in 1992, 136–44 and 342–44). Descartes’ explanation of the alleged void certainly would not have been thought too distant from the truth in the nineteenth century (with wave theorists such as Faraday, Maxwell, et al.) and clearly cannot be considered so in the seventeenth.
explanations of phenomena that refer to corpuscles our senses do not perceive. He uses an analogy of two clocks identical on the outside being able indicate the time equally well but using different operating mechanisms. So also God could have produced the phenomena we perceive in innumerable different ways. As a result, the causes postulated by Descartes to explain some effects may correspond to the phenomena manifested by nature, but may not be the ones by which God produced those effects. These explanations, according to Descartes, are only morally certain, they suffice for the conduct of life, although, given the absolute power of God, they can be doubted. The situation is different with absolute certainty, which “arises when we believe that it is wholly impossible that something should be otherwise than we judge it to be” (art. 206). Thus absolute certainty accrues to those metaphysical principles passing the test of hyperbolic doubt and to the general physical principles that can be derived from them. Mere moral certainty accrues to the physical principles about particular things that cannot be perceived. They fail the test of hyperbolic doubt because we understand that God could have brought about things in some other way.

Descartes uses another example to illustrate moral certainty. He refers to a code-breaker who has decoded a message and who is certain of his solution, but who understands that another solution might be possible. He states: “It is true that his knowledge is based merely on a conjecture, and it is conceivable that the writer... encoded quite a different message” (art. 206). He concludes that his situation as a physicist is the same as that of the code-breaker—the confidence he has in his solution is dependent in part on the diversity and number of cases he has dealt with:

Now if people look at all the many properties relating to magnetism, fire, and the fabric of the entire world, which I have deduced in this book from just a few principles, then, even if they think that my assumption of these principles was arbitrary and groundless, they will still perhaps acknowledge that it would hardly have been possible for so many items to fit into a coherent pattern if the original principles had been false (art. 206).

This is still a fairly optimistic Descartes, but he is far from the mathematician who is alleged to discover, by logic alone, the laws of the world that God willed. He is certainly closer to the scientist depicted by Attali who thinks that the world is some chaos to be deciphered, a code to be broken, that the laws of the world are not always logical but reply on a multiplicity of cases.

So Descartes can be brought closer to the Pascal sketched by Attali, but
it is the historical Pascal with whom I am concerned, and thus I wish to see how close I can bring Pascal to Descartes. For the sake of argument, I want to defend the proposition that Pascal should be considered a Cartesian.

2. What is a Cartesian?

Descartes and Pascal take divergent positions on many issues; after all, Descartes is a plenist and Pascal a vacuunist. But being a vacuunist does not disqualify one from being a Cartesian. There is the case of the Cartesian atomist—and hence vacuunist—Géraud de Cordemoy. In *Le discernement du corps et de l’âme* (1666), Cordemoy offered a variation of Cartesian mechanical philosophy—everything in the physical world is explained in terms of the size, shape, and motion of particles—but one that required atoms and the void. He rejected the indefinite division of body and the Cartesian identification of space and extension. He distinguished body and matter, matter being an assemblage of bodies, and claimed that bodies as such were impenetrable and could not be divided or destroyed. He even criticized the Cartesian principle of individuation of bodies as shared motion, pointing out that a body at rest between other bodies would have to constitute a single body with the other bodies, even though we have a clear and natural idea of a body at rest between other bodies. Cordemoy proposed that shape, rather than motion distinguishes the indivisible atoms. But Cordemoy also attempted to extend Cartesian philosophy to the fields of language and communication (in Cordemoy 1668a) and championed some key Cartesian views, defending the doctrine of animal-machines and the consistency of Cartesianism with Genesis (in Cordemoy 1668b). In Cordemoy, we have somebody who considered himself—and whom others considered a Cartesian—and who held such seemingly unorthodox views as atomism and vacuism.

To be a Cartesian, therefore, does not entail agreeing with everything Descartes propounded. Elsewhere, I have argued that there were Cartesian occultists, such as the astrologer Claude Gadroys, who attempted to extend Cartesian principles to astrology, to talismans and their effects (Gadroy 1671; see Ariew 2006), and even Cartesian empiricists. In fact, I have asserted that Cartesian empiricism seems be the predominant view in the second half of the seventeenth century, being held by such well-known followers as Robert Desgabets and Pierre-Sylvain Régis, and lesser-known ones as Jacques Du Roure, Bernard Lamy, and François Bayle.

The aforementioned Desgabets and Regis also propounded other, ostensibly non-Cartesian theses, such as the “indefectibility” or indestructibility of matter and union of mind and body requiring even pure thoughts.
to be accompanied by bodily processes. They even rejected the proposition that the mind is better known than the body and the doctrine that there is only a rational distinction between creation and conservation. They abandoned the method of doubt. One does not have to delve too deeply into Cartesian philosophy to understand that, as a result, they cast off much of Cartesianism. And yet one can argue that Desgabets and Régis were good Cartesians and that they were led to their doctrines by an attempt to maintain and to fix what they saw as serious defects in central Cartesian doctrines. According to Desgabets, he was proposing what he called the first supplement to Descartes’ philosophy, in as much as he “tries in it to correct Descartes’ thoughts when it seems to [him] that Descartes has left the right path leading to the truth,” comparing it with what he called “the second supplement, the new application of Descartes’ incontestable principles to phenomena he had not known, or to truths he had not spoken of,” what Cordemoy, Rohault, de la Forge, Clauberg, and others have done (Desgabets, Supplément, “Nouvelle ou autre Préface,” 1985, 156).

It is clear that Desgabets and Régis saw themselves as Cartesians and others saw them as such. In sharp contrast, though he gave lessons and published treatises in Cartesian philosophy, Spinoza ultimately did not view himself as a Cartesian and Cartesians failed to see him as one of their own. Spinoza wrote in 1675 that “the stupid Cartesians, in order to remove from themselves the suspicion of being on my side, did not cease to denounce my opinions and my writings everywhere, and still continue to do so” (letter 68). This is a far cry from Desgabets viewing himself, as “supplementing” Descartes’ philosophy. It brings us back to Pascal. Did Pascal see himself as a Cartesian? Did others see him as such? The evidence for the first question is slim, or nonexistent; the evidence for the second question is only slightly better.

There is an obscure fragment of the Pensées that might be useful in these regards. In it Pascal discusses transubstantiation and the criterion of identity that allows one to accept the real presence of Christ in the consecrated host. The fragment is clearly a criticism of a letter Descartes wrote to the Jesuit Denis Mesland about the Eucharist (February 9, 1645). Descartes’ previous utterances on the subject were limited to explaining mechanistically, that is, without using the scholastic doctrines of real accidents and substantial form, how the bread after transubstantiation might still look like bread to us. He understood he had previously said nothing about the

4. This is the thesis of Schmaltz 2002.
5. I wish to touch briefly upon this fragment; it plays a large role in Vlad Alexandrescu’s paper, “Descartes, Pascal, and the Eucharist.”
real presence of Christ in the sacrament. For that he needed to specify a criterion of individuation for surfaces, bodies, and humans, something he discusses in the letter:

The numerical identity of the surface does not depend on the identity of the bodies between which it exists, but only on the identity or similarity of the dimensions. Similarly we can say that the Loire is the same river as it was ten years ago, although it is no longer the same water, and perhaps there is no longer even a single part of the earth, which then surrounded that water. (Descartes 1996, 4:164–165)

In the case of a human body, it remains the same through changes of matter, on account of its union with a soul: “they are numerically the same (eadem numero), only because they are informed by the same soul” (Descartes 1996, 4: 167). Thus, humans naturally transubstantiate other matter by incorporating it and making it part of their bodies, bodies that are informed by a soul (Descartes 1996, 4: 167–68). Descartes then accounted for the miracle of transubstantiation by the soul of Christ supernaturally informing the matter of the host upon consecration (Descartes 1996, 4: 168–69; see also Descartes 1996, 4: 345–348 and 371–373).

Pascal comments critically:

It is, in its idiom, wholly the body of Jesus Christ, but it cannot be said to be the whole body of Jesus Christ.

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The union of two things without change does not enable us to say that one becomes the other.

In this way the soul is united to the body, and the fire to the wood, without change.

But change is needed to make the form of the one become the form of the other. [. . .]

———

Numerical (de numero) identity with respect to the same time requires the identity of matter.

———

Thus, if God united my soul to a body in China, the same body numerically the same (idem numero) would be in China.
The same river that runs there is *numerically the same* (*idem numero*) as the one running at the same time in China. (S794/L957).  

Descartes' literary executor Claude Clerselier published three volumes of Descartes' letters from 1657 to 1667. Though he circulated in private the letter to Mesland, he did not publish it because he thought it too politically sensitive; he took the advice of the Benedictine Antoine Vinot, who told Clerselier not to show that particular letter to the Jesuit Jean Berthet: "you could not deliver a more deadly blow to the philosophy of M. Descartes . . . than to communicate your views on the Eucharist to those people the Jesuits" (quoted in McClaughlin 1979, 571). Thus the letter waited until the nineteenth century to be published (in Descartes 1811). Pascal's comments, critical as they are, would seem to indicate that the Cartesians trusted him—that he was on the inside.

Obviously, this does not go very far in showing Pascal as a Cartesian. It does indicate at least that there is a political element in being a Cartesian. In fact, political factors about Cartesianism loomed large during the second half of the seventeenth century. Cartesian philosophy was actually prohibited from being taught then, something reiterated in 1671 by an edict from Louis XIV, who thought that Cartesian principles undermined the mysteries of the faith. As a result, deciding who was a Cartesian became a cottage industry with administrators and censors. For example, one can see, as early as 1673, the General of the Oratorians eliciting a promise from Bernard Lamy, who had just taught his first philosophy course at the College of Saumur, to stop teaching the opinions of Descartes (Girbal 1964, 29). Subsequently, Lamy and three other Oratorian professors of the College of Angers (Fathers Fromentier, Cyprien de Villecrose, and Vincent Pélaut) were dismissed from their teaching for having disobeyed these mandates.

The censors of Angers identified a number of Oratorian theses as Cartesian; for example, they objected to Fromentier's teaching that real accidents are not to be distinguished from substances and to his explanation of the Eucharist without having recourse to real accidents. They also complained about the doctrine of the indefiniteness of the universe and to Cartesian doubt, against which they asserted: “To say that we must doubt all things is a principle that tends toward atheism and upsets the foundations of the highest of mysteries. . . . It manifestly entails atheism or at least the

6. S794/L957 and similar annotations refer to the Sellier and Lafuma editions of Pascal; these can be located in Pascal 2005.
heresy of the Manicheans, who accepted a good and an evil principle for all creatures” (Babin 1679, 40–1). And they objected to both Fromentier’s doctrine about the immateriality and immortality of animal souls and to Descartes’ animal-machines as originating from the same impoverished ontology (Babin 1679, 36, 41). In the case of Father Lamy, the censors protested against ten different propositions identified as Cartesian. Two of these concerned problems previously raised against Fromentier about the explanation of the Eucharist. However, with Lamy, instead of just complaining about real accidents, they objected to the definition of extension as the essence of body and the rejection of substantial forms (Babin 1679, 37, 43–45). They also derided Lamy’s acceptance of the cogito, his definition of the soul as cogitatio, the assertion that children think in their mother’s womb and that sensations such as pain are experienced in the soul, not in the body (Babin 1679, 37, 43–44). The Oratorian Fathers replied that they were not trying to follow Descartes but to teach what they perceived to be the truth. This did not sway the authorities, who convicted them of teaching Cartesian philosophy. In short, for the authorities of Angers, to be a Cartesian was mostly equated with the acceptance of mechanism for bodies, entailing the denial of real qualities and substantial forms, and dualism, requiring the clean separation of soul as immaterial thinking substance and body as material extended substance. Armed with this two-fold criterion, let us return to Pascal.

3. Pascal as a Cartesian

Pascal, of course, is famous for his epithet “Descartes, inutile et incertain (Descartes, useless and uncertain)” (S445/L888 in Pascal’s own hand; also crossed out in a copyist’s hand). This is an unusual and doubly negative assessment; it is generally taken to be Pascal’s wholesale indictment of Descartes’ irreligious philosophy and deeply flawed science. But do we really understand the fragment? Descartes is both useless and uncertain: Is he useless in all respects and uncertain in all domains? Useless because uncertain? As Vincent Carraud reminds us (1992, 220), Zacharie Tourneur in his “paleographic” edition of the Pensées, indicates that one of the versions of the fragment was originally “Descartes, inutile et certain,” the “in” having been added to the “certain” afterwards. Now, “Descartes, useless and certain” might have made more sense, if read as “Descartes though certain,

7. The censors also criticized the atomism of Fromentier and Descartes, even though they recognized that both philosophers formally rejected atomism, and they objected to some of Lamy’s physics: that God is the principal cause of motion, that the quantity of motion is conserved, and that the only kind of movement is local motion.
is useless.” But we don’t have to decide what Pascal really meant with this particular fragment; fortunately, Pascal repeats “Descartes, useless and uncertain” in another, slightly longer pensée:

Descartes

We must say in general: “This happens through shape and motion,” because it is true. But to say which shapes and motions and to constitute the machine is ridiculous, for it is useless, uncertain, and laborious. And if it were true, we do not believe all of philosophy to be worth an hour of labor. (S118/L84.)

Here Pascal is clearly supporting the reductive aspects of Cartesian philosophy—the behavior of bodies is to be explained through “shape and motion”—against the philosophy of its scholastic opponents. What is useless and uncertain (and laborious) is only the extension of Cartesian metaphysics to particular physical phenomena—“saying which shapes and motions”—what Pascal calls “constituting the machine.” It is useless because Pascal thinks all such activities to be useless, as they do not lead to salvation: they are not worth an hour of labor. This is consistent with another of Pascal’s fragments: “Write against those who delve too deeply in the sciences. Descartes” (S462/L553; see also Carraud 2005). It allows one to relate what Pascal says about Descartes with what he says about Copernicus:

Prison.

———

I find it good that we do not further examine Copernicus’ opinion, but this:

———

It matters to all of life to know whether the soul is mortal or immortal. (S196/L164)

It is not clear whether all these statements are supposed to hang together in a single fragment, separated as they are by horizontal lines, but they do make sense as a unified thought. “Prison” in the fragment refers to Pascal’s previous pensée about how one should spend an hour of life:

A man is in prison, not knowing whether his sentence has been passed, with only an hour to find out, this hour being sufficient to obtain its repeal if he knew that it had been passed. It would be un-
natural if he spent the hour not finding out whether his sentence had been passed, but playing piquet. [. . .] (S195/L163).

Our situation is like that of the man in prison: when we are delving too deeply into the sciences or further examining Copernicus' opinion, we are not dealing with what is important; we are just playing games. This is useless behavior. Likewise, Descartes' science is useless, whether certain or uncertain—but so is all science. And Descartes' science is uncertain to boot. Now, as we have said, Descartes would have agreed that his science was not absolutely certain, though he would have preferred calling it morally certain. Still, this is enough for Pascal to call it uncertain.

Pascal's criticism of Descartes' science should not obscure for us his acceptance of Descartes' metaphysics: We must say in general: "This happens through shape and motion," because it is true. To constitute the machine may be ridiculous, but what needs to be constituted is a machine. Following Descartes, Pascal thinks of plants, animals, and human bodies as machines. The machine plays a large role in Pascal's thought. Even the fragment we call "The Wager" is found under the heading "Discourse on the Machine." As Pascal explains in another pensée:

After the letter about the necessity of seeking God, put in the letter about removing obstacles, which is the discourse on the machine, on preparing the machine, on searching through reason. (S45/L11)\(^8\)

In this and other texts, the machine is the human body.\(^9\) Similarly, for Pascal, animals are machines whose behavior is explained as responses to stimuli, or "instinct"; here are three short fragments:

If an animal did with a mind what it does by instinct, and if it spoke with a mind what it speaks by instinct when hunting and warning its mates that the prey is found or lost, it would certainly also speak about things that affect it more, as for example, "Gnaw on this cord which is hurting me and I cannot reach." (S137/L105)

8. "Order. A letter of exhortation to a friend to induce him to seek. And he will reply, "But what good will seeking do for me? Nothing comes of it." Then reply to him, "Do not despair." And he will answer that he would be glad to find some illumination, but that, according to this very religion, if he believed it in his way, it would not do him any good, and hence he prefers not to seek. The answer to that is: "The machine." S39/L5 Also S41/L7: “Letter indicating the usefulness of proofs. By the machine.”

9. The custom of seeing kings accompanied by guards, drums, officers, and all the things that direct the machine to yield respect and fear, makes their faces, when they are sometimes seen alone without these trappings, impress respect and fear in their subjects, because we cannot separate in thought their persons from what usually accompanies them. [. . .] S59/L25.
The parrot’s beak, which it wipes although it is clean. (S139/L107)

Liancourt’s story of the pike and the frog: they always act in this way, and never otherwise, nor in any other way entailing a mind. (S617/L738)\(^{\text{10}}\)

As for humans, their nature (setting aside the question of the Fall) transcends mere mechanism. Here are three more short fragments:

I can certainly conceive of a man without hands, feet, head, for it is only experience that teaches us the head is more necessary than the feet. But I cannot conceive of man without thought. He would be a stone or a beast. (S143/L111)

What feels pleasure in us? Is it the hand, the arm, flesh, blood? We will see that it must be something immaterial. (S140/L108)

Man’s greatness lies in his knowing himself to be wretched.

A tree does not know itself to be wretched.

So is wretched to know you are wretched, but it is great to know you are wretched. (S146/L114)\(^{\text{11}}\)

Obviously one can continue indefinitely in this vein, discussing what Pascal has to say about the limits of skepticism—the intuition of the heart and deduction of reason—about the Cogito, the dream argument, and the usefulness of the metaphysical proofs of God’s existence, but I shall leave these topics for another occasion.\(^{\text{12}}\) I believe I have shown that Pascal can be read as accepting the two aspects of Descartes’ philosophy that so upset the censors of Angers, that is, mechanism, entailing the denial of real qualities and substantial forms, and dualism, requiring the clean separation of soul as immaterial thinking substance and body as material extended substance. The authorities of Angers declared that they were

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10. The following fragment is also revealing, as long as it is not interpreted as Pascal attributing will to animals: “The arithmetical machine produces effects that come closer to thought than all the actions of animals. But it does nothing that would allow us to attribute will to it, as to the animals” (S617/L741). See also S564/L685. Le Guern treats the fragment as Pascal having accepted Cartesian philosophy and then having surpassed it; see 1971 140–46, 153–55.

11. “Man’s greatness is so obvious that it can be derived even from his wretchedness. For what in animals is nature we call wretchedness in man. In this way we recognize that, his nature being now like that of animals, he has fallen from a better nature that once was his own” (S149/L117). See also S164/L131.

12. Vincent Carraud’s paper, “Pascal’s Anti-Augustinianism,” constitutes such a discussion.
“fighting at once the two greatest enemies that the Catholic Church had at the time: the Jansenists and the Cartesians” (Babin, 1679, Avis au Lecteur). I suspect that they would have found Pascal culpable of the first crime and I have argued that they would have had no difficulty in finding him guilty of both.

References