MULTIPRODUCT FIRMS AND PRODUCT TURNOVER IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: EVIDENCE FROM INDIA

Pinelopi K. Goldberg, Amit K. Khandelwal, Nina Pavcnik, and Petia Topalova*

Abstract—This paper provides evidence on the patterns of multiproduct firm production in a large developing country, India, during a period that spans market reforms. In the cross-section, multiproduct firms in India look remarkably similar to their U.S. counterparts. The time-series patterns, however, exhibit important differences. In contrast to evidence from the United States, product churning, particularly product rationalization, is far less common in India. We find no link between product rationalization and output tariff declines following India’s 1991 trade liberalization. The lack of “creative destruction” is consistent with the role of industrial regulation in preventing an efficient allocation of resources.

I. Introduction

FIRM-LEVEL studies have emphasized substantial gains in aggregate output that arise when policy reform, such as international trade liberalization, or changes in market fundamentals induce a reallocation from low- to high-performance firms within industries.1 This literature typically treats each firm as producing a single product and abstracts from the reallocation of output within multiproduct firms through changes in product mix in response to changes in the economic environment. A notable exception is recent work on multiproduct firms by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (henceforth, BRS; 2006a, 2006b), Nocke and Yeaple (2006), Eckel and Neary (2006), and Baldwin and Gu (2006).

The focus on multiproduct firms’ product mix decisions is relevant to the extent the changes in the product mix account for a significant portion of changes in firms’ output over time. BRS (2006a, 2006b) indeed document that the contribution of firms’ product margin toward output growth trumps the contribution of firm entry and exit, a widely studied channel in the literature on firm dynamics. This evidence suggests that product mix changes represent a potentially important channel through which resources are reallocated from less to more efficient uses within U.S. firms. While this work has uncovered thought-provoking new facts, it has focused mainly on the United States.2 This paper provides evidence on the characteristics and product mix decisions of multiproduct firms in a large developing country, India.

The extension of firms’ product mix literature to a developing country setting is relevant for several reasons. First, it is well known that countries at different stages of development exhibit notable differences in the size distribution of firms, as well as differences in the efficiency of resource allocation across heterogeneous firms.3 These differences stem in part from differences in the regulatory environments in which firms operate (Tybout, 2000). Firms in developing countries often face constraints that are irrelevant to U.S. firms. In India, for example, private sector activity was heavily regulated through the license raj, a system of complex industrial license requirements for establishing and expanding capacity in the manufacturing sector, while the Industrial Disputes Act (1947) provided significant protection for labor in the organized sector (Kochhar et al., 2006). Given these constraints, it is questionable whether Indian firms had the necessary flexibility to adjust their product mix in order to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources. Second, many developing countries implemented sweeping market reforms in recent years that altered the environment in which firms had operated in the past. In India, such reforms include the trade liberalization of the early 1990s and a stepped-up dismantling of the license raj. These reforms provide an interesting setting for the purpose of investigating how firms adjust product mix in a changing economic environment.

We use a unique firm-level panel database that contains detailed information on products that each firm manufactures to study firms’ product mix changes during a period of major market reforms in India. Our data are particularly well suited to examine whether Indian firms change their product scope in response to India’s large-scale tariff liberalization. India’s trade reform provides an attractive setting for the study in part because firms were unlikely to have anticipated the reform; tariff changes between 1991 and 1997 were less prone to the usual political economy pressures (Topalova and Khandelwal forthcoming).

The data indicate that Indian multiproduct firms are quite similar to their counterparts in U.S. manufacturing studied by BRS along several dimensions. Multiproduct firms are strong performers: within narrowly defined industries, India’s multiproduct firms are larger, more productive, and more likely to export than single-product firms. We also find a striking resemblance of the within-firm product distribution to the U.S. data. Finally, we document a positive correlation between the firms’ extensive and intensive margins. These cross-sectional patterns are consistent with predictions of theoretical models of multiproduct firms, especially BRS (2006b).

Perhaps more surprising, our analysis also suggests that despite the regulatory constraints described, changes in firms’ product mix had a nonnegligible contribution to growth; on net, they account for approximately 25% of the increase in Indian manufacturing output during our sample period. This validates the focus on firms’ product margin in recent empirical work. However, a closer examination of the gross changes in the product mix of Indian firms reveals important differences that countries at different stages of development exhibit important differences in the size distribution of firms, as well as differences in the efficiency of resource allocation across heterogeneous firms.3 These differences stem in part from differences in the regulatory environments in which firms operate (Tybout, 2000). Firms in developing countries often face constraints that are irrelevant to U.S. firms. In India, for example, private sector activity was heavily regulated through the license raj, a system of complex industrial license requirements for establishing and expanding capacity in the manufacturing sector, while the Industrial Disputes Act (1947) provided significant protection for labor in the organized sector (Kochhar et al., 2006). Given these constraints, it is questionable whether Indian firms had the necessary flexibility to adjust their product mix in order to achieve a more efficient allocation of resources. Second, many developing countries implemented sweeping market reforms in recent years that altered the environment in which firms had operated in the past. In India, such reforms include the trade liberalization of the early 1990s and a stepped-up dismantling of the license raj. These reforms provide an interesting setting for the purpose of investigating how firms adjust product mix in a changing economic environment.

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1 See Bernard et al. (2003); Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2007); Melitz (2003); Roberts and Tybout (1994b); and Tybout (2003).

2 Roberts and Lee (2008) and Navarro (2008) study multiproduct firms in Taiwanese electronics and Chile.

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differences to U.S. firms in the time series. While BRS (2006a) uncover a substantial amount of product churning within U.S. firms, Indian firms exhibit far less frequent changes in their product mix over a 5-year period. Moreover, firms in India infrequently drop a product or simultaneously add and drop a product. The contribution of the net product margin to total output growth is therefore driven almost exclusively by product additions, not by discontinuation of product lines that have become obsolete. Hence, our results suggest that product churning, or “creative destruction” along the product dimension, was not happening in India in the 1990s, despite major trade and other structural reforms during this period. Furthermore, we are unable to connect the changes in firms’ product mix to changes in pro-competitive trade policy. The empirical framework that exploits differential changes in tariffs across Indian industries finds no relationship between declines in output tariffs and a firm’s “creative destruction” along the product dimension. The lack of product dropping seems surprising given predictions from recent multiproduct firm models in trade. For example, BRS (2006b), a multiproduct extension of Melitz (2003), predict that a decline in trade costs causes firms to rationalize their extension by shedding products outside their core competency. More generally, theories emphasizing the role of creative destruction in the growth process predict that product dropping plays an important role in firms’ adjustment to a changing economic environment.

However, these models assume a frictionless environment that easily allows an efficient allocation of resources across and within firms. These assumptions are at odds with the conditions firms faced in India during our sample period. A plausible explanation for our findings is that remnants of industrial licensing and rigid labor market regulations continue to affect the daily operations of firms, potentially precluding them from eliminating unprofitable product lines. This interpretation is consistent with the explanations put forth for the lack of product dropping in case studies on product scope of Indian conglomerates by Khanna and Palepu (1999). Some of our results also suggest that declines in tariffs are associated with somewhat larger changes in firms’ product scope in industries no longer subject to licenses at the onset of the 1991 reform compared to regulated industries. Given the high sunk costs facing firms that wanted to expand their operations in the past, it is not surprising that firms that paid these high sunk costs are reluctant to withdraw established product lines, even when these are unprofitable, as markets become more liberalized.

Alternatively, the low degree of product shedding might reflect the rapid growth of the Indian economy. In a fast-growing economy, the relative share of output of a given product could be declining considerably without an absolute decline of output and inputs, and hence the lack of product dropping. Because of huge wealth disparities in India’s population, it is also possible that there is always a demand for older products, which would have become obsolete in more developed countries like the United States. Accordingly, we do not interpret our results as evidence against recent theories.

II. Data

We compile a firm-level panel data set that spans the period from 1989 to 2003 based on the Prowess database, collected by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE). The database contains information primarily from the income statements and balance sheets of about 9,500 publicly listed companies, almost 5,000 of them in the manufacturing sector. This database is a firm-level panel and the only Indian database, to our knowledge, that records detailed annual information on firms’ product mix. Indian firms are required by the 1956 Companies Act to disclose product-level information on capacities, production, and sales in their annual reports. The CMIE compiles these detailed quantitative data and therefore enables us to track a firm’s adding and dropping of products over time. Furthermore, for each product manufactured by the firm, the data set provides the value of sales, quantity, and units. The Prowess is therefore particularly well suited for understanding how firms adjust their product lines over time and how their responses may be related to policy changes.

The definition of a product is based on the CMIE’s internal product classification. There are 1,886 products linked to 108 four-digit NIC industries across the 22 manufacturing sectors (two-digit NIC codes). As a comparison, the U.S. data used by BRS (2006a) contain approximately 1,500 products, defined as five-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, across 455 four-digit SIC industries. Thus, our definition of a product is slightly more detailed than that of BRS (2006a).

We complement the data on firm product mix with various measures on trade policy at the industry level. Detailed description of data sources, product classification, variable construction, and data quality is included in an unpublished appendix available on the authors’ Web sites.

III. A Portrait of Multi-Product Firms

While we are particularly interested in the implications of theories of multiproduct firms for the way firms adjust to structural changes in an open economy, recent models (BRS, 2006b; Nocke & Yeaple, 2006) also yield several predictions about the characteristics of multiproduct firms in a cross section. In this section, we document the economic significance and characteristics of multiproduct firms in India and examine the extent to which the cross-sectional patterns observed in the Indian data are consistent with these predictions.

We begin by examining the relative importance of single- and multiproduct firms in India. Given the scant empirical evidence on multiproduct firms, particularly for developing countries, the facts uncovered by BRS (2006a) for U.S. firms serve as a useful benchmark for the Indian firms. We emphasize, however, that comparisons between the two studies should be interpreted with caution given that the United States and India are two countries quite distinct along several dimensions of their respective economic environments. Table 1 reports the share of each type of firm in the total number of firms, as well as their share in total manufacturing output in the Prowess sample. The table illustrates that multiproduct firms account for 47% of manufacturing firms and 80% of manufacturing output.

4 Managers pointed to the costs of reducing the scope of operations such as “lack of liquid markets for assets, regulatory restrictions on cost cutting through reduction of employees, lack of professionals with experience in takeovers, buyouts and restructuring, and prohibitive taxes on gains on asset sales” (Khanna & Palepu, 1999, p. 286).

5 This database is not well suited to study firm entry and exit because firms are under no legal obligation to report to the data collecting agency. However, since Prowess contains only the largest Indian firms, entry and exit is not necessarily an important margin for understanding these firms.

6 The ASI rounds in 1997/98, 1999/2000, and 2001/02 record product-level information for manufacturing plants. These data are not suitable for analysis of firms’ product mix changes because the ASI neither contains product information prior to the reforms nor is a panel. However, in these rounds, multiproduct plants are 51% of total plants and account for 78% of manufacturing output. These figures are remarkably similar to the Prowess sample.
comparison, 39% of U.S. firms manufacture more than one product, and these firms account for 87% of total output.

The third column of table 1 shows that multiple-product firms manufacture on average 3 products, compared to 3.5 products for U.S. multiproduct firms. Thirty-three percent and 24% of firms manufacture products that span more than one industry and sector, respectively. These multiple-industry and multiple-sector firms account for 62% and 54% of output, respectively. Again for comparison’s sake, 28% and 10% of U.S. firms span multiple industries and sectors and account for 81% and 66% of output, respectively. Thus, Indian firms tend to span more sectors, but multiple-sector firms account for a smaller share of output than do multiple-sector U.S. firms. These facts are consistent with observations by Kochhar et al. (2006) that India’s economic policies have led to more diversification and firms of smaller capacity. Another explanation, proposed by Khanna and Palepu (1999), is that diversification may be a response to the lack of well-functioning capital, labor, and product markets. The absence of market intermediaries may force firms to become more diversified to overcome these imperfections.

The recent multiproduct models provide a number of cross-sectional predictions that we can examine using the Indian data. One important prediction of these models is that multiproduct firms are stronger performers than single-product firms. This occurs because the presence of headquarters fixed costs implies that the more “able” firms will self-select into becoming multiproduct firms. Accordingly, all models predict that multiproduct firms will at the equilibrium have higher total sales and will be more likely to export. We find strong evidence consistent with these predictions reported in table 2. In particular, we observe that Indian multiproduct firms produce, on average, 125% (e^{0.81} − 1) higher output and are 13% more likely to export than single-product firms. These relative comparisons are quite similar to the average percentage differences between U.S. single- and multiple-product firms in BRS (2006a). We also observe that multiproduct firms are 1% more productive than single-product firms, although the estimate is not statistically significant. Overall, the evidence suggests that multiproduct firms are stronger performers across several dimensions, and this evidence is strongly consistent with BRS (2006b).

The BRS (2006b) model also predicts that firms possess core competencies, so that output should be highly skewed toward products for which firms have particular expertise. We also find evidence that Indian firms possess a core competent product with output inside the firm unevenly distributed across products in table 3. The largest product accounts for 86% to 65% to 46% of total sales in firms that produce at most two, five, and ten products, respectively, and these figures are similar to the United States (BRS, 2006a).

Finally, one implication of the BRS (2006b) model is that depending on the distribution of productivity and product expertise draws, it is possible to generate a positive correlation between the firm’s intensive and extensive margins. Our analysis suggests that approximately 8.5% to 11.5% of the variation in output across firms can be attributed to the variation in the extensive margin. Moreover, we find a positive correlation (0.43) between multiproduct firms’ extensive and intensive margins. We again note the similarity to the U.S. data along this dimension as well.

In general, differences in the design of firm-level surveys and product classifications make it hard to compare results related to firm and product characteristics across countries. With this caveat in mind, we cannot help but note that in the cross-section, Indian firms appear remarkably similar to U.S. firms in terms of the prevalence and characteristics of multiple-product firms, the distribution of products within the firm, and the correlations between the intensive and extensive product margins. These similarities are surprising given the vast differences between the two countries, especially those related to their regulatory environments. Furthermore, the cross-sectional patterns of multiproduct Indian firms, like the ones documented for U.S. firms, are consistent with the main predictions of recent multiproduct firm models.

### IV. Changes in Product Mix over Time

In this section we examine the importance of changes in firms’ product margin over time, which for the typical Indian firm steadily increased from about 1.4 products in 1989 to almost 2.3 products by 2003.

We first examine in greater detail the nature of product mix changes that led to the observed expansion of the extensive margin. We classify firm activity into one of four mutually exclusive groups: no activity, add products only, drop products only, and both add and drop products. A product is added in period $t$ if it is produced in period $t$ but not in period $t - 1$. A product is dropped in period $t$ if it was produced in period $t - 1$ but it is not produced in period $t$. We compute these figures only for surviving firms, so that the analysis focuses on product mix changes at incumbents. We report in table 4 the summary of overall, five-year, three-year, and annual firm activity. The top panel reports the share of firms participating in each activity, and the bottom panel weighs participation in each activity by firm output.
In contrast to the cross-sectional descriptive results, this table shows large differences in the activities of Indian and U.S. firms. First, Indian firms are characterized by less product churning. Over a 5-year period, only 28% of firms report changes in their product mix, and most of these were larger firms. The firms that switch products over a five-year interval account for 43% of the total output. Second, Indian firms that change their product mix are far more likely to add products over time than to shed product lines: 22% of the firms report adding at least one product, 4% of firms drop a product, and 2% of firms simultaneously add and drop a product. This is in contrast to the United States, where 54% of firms report a change in their product mix. However, a common feature of the Indian and U.S. data is that changes in product mix are more common among multiproduct than single-product firms.

The lack of product dropping in the data raises the concern that it may reflect reporting problems. Several reasons suggest that the lack of product shedding is not due to data problems. If there were inertia that it produced in the previous time period. These definitions imply that a single-product firm cannot drop a product only.

We also show that the shrinking of products sales is limited as well, suggesting that the lack of reallocation from shrinking to growing along many dimensions discussed earlier. In the analysis that follows, we show that the shrinking of products sales is limited as well, suggesting that the lack of reallocation from shrinking to growing products is real.

Changes in product mix provide a nonnegligible contribution to changes in output of continuing firms despite the relatively lower product switching in India relative to the United States. We decompose the aggregate change in output of continuing firms into changes in output due to changes in product mix (the extensive margin) and changes in output due to existing products (the intensive margin) in table 5. Let $Y_p$ denote the output of product $i$ produced by firm $j$ at time $t$. $C$ the set of products that a firm produces in both periods $t$ and $t-1$ (the intensive margin), and $E$ the set of products that the firms produce only in $t$ or $t-1$ (the extensive margin). Then changes in a firm’s total output between periods $t$ and $t-1$ can be decomposed as follows: $\Delta Y_p = \sum_{i \in C} \Delta Y_{pi} + \sum_{i \in E} \Delta Y_{pi}$. 

9 The middle and right parts of the table repeat the analysis for single and multiproduct firms separately. As in the United States, multiproduct firms in India are more likely than single-product firms to churn products.

longer produced, we would observe a large share of observations with no production. Yet only 13% of the original product name-firm-year observations report no production (we count these products as dropped). Furthermore, the product sales account for 92% and 99% of total output and manufacturing output reported by the firm on its annual statements (Goldberg et al., 2008). Finally, apart from the product dropping patterns, the Indian data appear similar to the U.S. data along many dimensions discussed earlier. In the analysis that follows, we show that the shrinking of products sales is limited as well, suggesting that the lack of reallocation from shrinking to growing products is real.

We perform this decomposition for continuing firms, as Prowess is not well suited for studying firm entry and exit.
due to growing and shrinking products. The growth in the intensive margin is an order of magnitude larger than the net extensive margin. Similar patterns significantly contribute to output changes, leaving the gross margin an explanation is also consistent with the fact that when we examine the degree of product churning in India, we believe that this pattern could be driven by two factors.

First, it is plausible that labor market regulation and the remnants of industrial regulation still affect the operation of Indian firms, constraining their flexibility to adjust to new economic conditions. Although we do not have direct evidence on this hypothesis, earlier work has consistently found that pro-worker labor legislation, industrial licensing, and especially their interaction lead to a less efficient allocation of resources, that is, lower output and productivity in manufacturing industries (Besley & Burgess, 2004; Aghion et al., 2008; Ahsan & Pages, 2008). While this evidence does not cover product churning observed in India, the extensive margin accounts for a considerable portion of output changes over longer time periods: 25% between 1989 and 2003. As in the United States, the importance of the extensive margin fluctuates considerably over shorter horizons.

The relative contributions of the net extensive and intensive product margins over longer time horizons appear similar to those documented for the United States. However, important differences emerge between the Indian and U.S. firms in comparing the gross margins. While product shedding is an important channel through which firms adjust their output in the United States, its contribution to changes in output in India is negligible (with the exception of 1992). The changes in output stemming from the extensive margin are almost entirely driven by output growth due to product additions. Consequently, gross and net contributions of the extensive margin to output growth are of similar orders of magnitude. This is in large contrast to the United States, where both product additions and subtractions significantly contribute to output changes, leaving the gross margin an order of magnitude larger than the net extensive margin. Similar patterns emerge when we decompose changes in the net intensive margin due to growing and shrinking products. The growth in the intensive margin in India is predominantly driven by growth in growing products, with little reallocation of output away from shrinking products, so that the net and gross output changes are of similar orders of magnitude. Again, this in stark contrast to the U.S. data, where the gross intensive margin is an order of magnitude larger than the net intensive margin.

While product shedding is an important channel through which firms adjust their output in the United States, its contribution to changes in output in India is negligible (with the exception of 1992). The changes in output stemming from the extensive margin are almost entirely driven by output growth due to product additions. Consequently, gross and net contributions of the extensive margin to output growth are of similar orders of magnitude. This is in large contrast to the United States, where both product additions and subtractions significantly contribute to output changes, leaving the gross margin an order of magnitude larger than the net extensive margin. Similar patterns emerge when we decompose changes in the net intensive margin due to growing and shrinking products. The growth in the intensive margin in India is predominantly driven by growth in growing products, with little reallocation of output away from shrinking products, so that the net and gross output changes are of similar orders of magnitude. Again, this in stark contrast to the U.S. data, where the gross intensive margin is an order of magnitude larger than the net intensive margin.

So while the patterns we documented suggest many similarities between the U.S. and Indian multiproduct firms in the cross section, their dynamic behavior, measured by the degree of product churning over time, appears quite distinct. These observed differences over time speak to how much more dynamic the U.S. economy is relative to India. Despite the significant reforms taking place in India during the 1990s, we find little evidence of creative destruction. Although our data do not allow us to pin down the reasons behind the lower degree of product churning in India, we believe that this pattern could be driven by two factors.

First, it is plausible that labor market regulation and the remnants of industrial regulation still affect the operation of Indian firms, constraining their flexibility to adjust to new economic conditions. Although we do not have direct evidence on this hypothesis, earlier work has consistently found that pro-worker labor legislation, industrial licensing, and especially their interaction lead to a less efficient allocation of resources, that is, lower output and productivity in manufacturing industries (Besley & Burgess, 2004; Aghion et al., 2008; Ahsan & Pages, 2008). While this evidence does not cover product turnover, it strongly suggests that the sunk costs of firm entry and new product introduction were high. Therefore, it is not surprising that firms that did pay these high sunk costs are reluctant to withdraw products, even as markets become more liberalized.

The low degree of product shedding could also reflect that India is a fast-growing developing country, so that the relative share of output of a given product could be declining considerably without an absolute decline of output and inputs and hence no product dropping. This explanation is also consistent with the fact that when we examine the intensive margin, we find little evidence of shrinking but strong evidence of growing products. Given that India is also characterized by huge wealth disparities in its population, it is also possible that there

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gross Sales</th>
<th>Product Entry</th>
<th>Product Exit</th>
<th>Intensive Margin</th>
<th>Growing Products</th>
<th>Shrinking Products</th>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
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<td>12.8</td>
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<td>-0.3</td>
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<td>1998</td>
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<td>2000</td>
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<td>-0.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
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<tr>
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The table reports the aggregate output growth of continuing firms. Column 2 reports gross sales growth. Columns 3–5 report the contribution to growth from the firms’ extensive margin. Columns 6–8 report the contribution to growth from the firms’ intensive margin. Values are deflated by sector-specific wholesale price indices.

Source: Authors’ calculations from the Prowess database.
is always demand for older products, which would have become obsolete in more developed countries like the United States.\footnote{We thank a referee and Janak Raj from the Reserve Bank of India for these two explanations for our findings.}

We are not able to distinguish between these hypotheses given the data available to us. However, a different approach toward explaining product turnover in India (or the lack thereof) is suggested by India’s recent trade reforms. India underwent a significant trade liberalization in the early 1990s, which provides us with fairly precisely measured changes in trade barriers. In the next section, we relate these changes in the early 1990s, which provides us with fairly precisely measured changes in trade barriers. In the next section, we relate these changes in trade barriers to changes in firms’ product mix to examine if the patterns we observe in the Indian data can at least partly be explained by changes in the economic environment.

V. Product Mix and Trade Policy

Several studies emphasize the adjustments to trade reform that occur within industries, and recent papers focus on the role of firms’ product margin in this process (BRS, 2006b; Eckel & Neary, 2006; Nocke & Yeaple, 2006; Baldwin & Gu, 2006). These models generally predict that lower trade costs lead firms to reduce their extensive product margin by dropping products. For example, in BRS (2006b), a symmetric bilateral decline in trade costs induces firms to reduce their product scope by shedding relatively unproductive products. This is because such a decline is associated with an increase in the domestic productivity cut-off (since the increase in exports leads to an increase in domestic labor demand, which in turn leads to higher wages). The least productive domestic firms exit, and all firms reduce product scope. This leads to productivity growth within and across firms and in the aggregate. While these results are derived using a bilateral trade liberalization, similar predictions hold under unilateral liberalization. A multiproduct firm extension of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) also predicts that unilateral trade reform induces product rationalization because foreign entry intensifies product market competition (Baldwin & Gu, 2006).

To our knowledge, this link between declines in trade costs and firms’ extensive margin has not been previously examined empirically in the context of developing countries, of which several have experienced substantial declines in their trade barriers in the past two decades. The large tariff declines resulting from India’s 1991 trade liberalization provide a good setting for such analysis for several reasons. First, India’s reforms came as a surprise, so it is reasonable to assume that they were not anticipated by firms prior to the reform. Second, tariff cuts were large (average tariffs where reduced from over 90\% in 1987 to about 30\% in 1997) and brought a substantial decline in the dispersion of tariffs across industries. Industries with larger prereform tariffs experienced larger tariff declines, a pattern unlikely to be observed if traditional political economy concerns played an important role in India’s trade liberalization of 1991. In fact, there is no evidence that industry tariff changes, which were mostly spelled out in the Eighth Five Year Plan (1992–1997), were correlated with prereform industry characteristics such as productivity, and industry size (Topalova & Khandelwal, forthcoming). However, Topalova and Khandelwal (forthcoming) provide evidence that tariff changes begin to appear susceptible to political economy pressures following the election of the BJP party in 1997. We thus restrict the analysis of the impact of the trade liberalization on the firms’ extensive margin from 1989 to 1997.

We regress the (log) number of products manufactured by firm $j$ in time $t$, $n_{ijt}$, on the tariff rate of the firm’s main industry ($m$), lagged one year, $\tau_{m,t-1}$:\footnote{Tariffs are matched to the firm’s four-digit NIC industry code that reflects each firm’s initial main line of business.}

$$\log n_{ijt} = \alpha_j + \alpha_t + \beta \tau_{m,t-1} + \varepsilon_{ijt}. \tag{1}$$

The regression includes firm fixed effects and year fixed effects to control for time-invariant firm characteristics and unobserved aggregate shocks. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.

Column 1 of table 6 reports the results using output tariffs as the trade policy measure. The coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant. This suggests that declines in tariffs are uncorrelated with changes in the number of products at the firm level. In column 2, we include sector (NIC2)-year fixed effects to control for sector-specific
demand or supply shocks. The coefficient on tariffs remains statistically insignificant, and the magnitude is quite similar to the baseline result that included year fixed effects. Given that some sectors were still subject to nontariff barriers (NTBs) during this period, the lack of relationship between changes in product mix and output tariffs could be due to the fact that these sectors remained protected despite the decline in tariffs. By 2001, however, over 90% of the HS6 lines were not subject to NTBs. We therefore estimated regression (1) using data on only one pre-(1990) and one postreform year (2001), by which the majority of NTBs were dismantled. The results of this regression are shown in column 3; the coefficient on the output tariff continues to be small in magnitude and insignificant. In column 4 we adopt a simple difference-in-differences approach by regressing firm-level number of products on an indicator if the industry had above-average declines in tariffs interacted with the post-1991 indicator, firm fixed effect, and year effects. The interaction effect is statistically insignificant, consistent with the earlier columns.

If lower output tariffs induce firms to simultaneously add and drop products, the firm’s extensive margin might remain unchanged. While none of the existing models generate produce switching in response to trade reforms, Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) find that U.S. firms that are exposed to a greater degree of foreign competition are more likely to switch an industry. Recall from table 4 that simultaneous adding and dropping of product lines is quite rare for Indian firms. Nevertheless, in columns 5 and 6 of table 6, we replace the dependent variable in equation (1) with an indicator \((add_i)\) if firm \(i\) adds a product in year \(t\) and a separate indicator \((drop_i)\) if firm \(i\) drops a product in time \(t\) that it manufactured at \(t - 1\), respectively. The coefficients on the output tariffs remain small and statistically insignificant in both cases. Column 7 provides an alternative specification where firm-level tariffs are constructed by weighting industry tariffs according to the initial industry shares of firm output. As before, the coefficient on tariffs remains statistically insignificant. In column 8, we assign a firm-specific tariff based on the least important (initial-period) product manufactured by the firm. This idea is motivated by the theoretical models suggesting that firms should rationalize the least important products in response to tariff liberalization. We find a small and statistically insignificant coefficient on this tariff measure. The message of table 6 is that the firm’s product scope does not appear to be correlated with tariffs.

The lack of a relationship between declines in trade costs and firms’ extensive margin is somewhat surprising in light of the predictions of theoretical models. As we noted earlier, the Indian trade liberalization of the early 1990s is best characterized as a unilateral trade reform, so there is no tension between our results and the predictions of models that focus on symmetric bilateral trade reductions (BRS, 2006b). However, the tension does exist, when one considers models that encompass the case of unilateral trade reform. At this point, it is important to note that the previous literature on the effects of the Indian trade reforms does find firm adjustments to the 1991 trade barrier reductions. Lower output tariffs induce productivity gains (Krishna & Mitra, 1998; Sivadasan, 2009; Topalova & Khandelwal, forthcoming). Yet our results suggest that lower tariffs are not associated with product rationalization within surviving firms in India.

A potential explanation for our findings is that remnants of the strict industrial regulation of the past may be inhibiting firms from shedding existing product lines, even when these become less profitable; the lack of shedding could in this sense be interpreted as indirect evidence that Indian firms faced high sunk costs when introducing a new product. As discussed above, industrial licenses were important parts of the economic climate in India during this period. India started dismantling its license system during the 1980s and stepped up this process in 1991. The removal of licenses would have lowered product-specific entry costs and may have enabled firms to increase their extensive margins. On the other hand, it may have allowed firms to become more flexible to shocks by shutting down or restarting a product line in the absence of license requirements. Column 9 of table 6 reports the results of estimating equation (1) that includes an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the industry was license free as an additional control. The inclusion of delicensed variable does not affect the coefficient on output tariffs, and the coefficient on delicensed is statistically insignificant.

In order to examine the link between tariff reforms and delicensing in influencing firms’ product scope more directly, we distinguish between industries that were delicensed in the 1980s and those that continued to be regulated after 1988. One would expect tariff declines to have a larger effect on product scope in industries that were no longer regulated by licenses at the onset of trade reform. We interact an indicator for whether an industry was delicensed by 1988 with the output tariff and include this interaction as an additional regressor in equation (1). Column 10 of table 6 presents the results. The tariff coefficient is insignificant, but the negative and significant coefficient on the interaction suggests that lower tariffs are associated with more product additions in industries that were delicensed by 1988. This result provides some tentative evidence that regulation might play some role in explaining the limited product churning in Indian firms. Still, a striking feature of our data is that they indicate that firms expand their product scope during a period of substantial reforms; changes in the extensive margin are driven by product addition, not product destruction. Existing models focus on product scope reduction as a channel through which firms adjust to external shocks. Against this background, it may not come as a surprise that we cannot relate the product additions we observe to changes in trade policy, as suggested in these models.

VI. Conclusion

We study multiproduct firms in India. In the cross-section, India’s multiproduct firms look remarkably similar to their U.S. counterparts, despite many differences in the regulatory environments in which these firms operate. We also find that changes in firms’ product mix had a nonnegligible contribution to growth; on net, they account for approximately 25% of the increase in Indian manufacturing output during our sample period. However, Indian and U.S. firms differ in gross changes in product mix. Product churning is substantially lower

13 This regression includes year and firm fixed effects, so the post-1991 indicator and an indicator if the industry had above-average declines in tariffs are not identified. Industry tariff decline is measured between 1997 and 1989.

14 Firms could drop products by exiting the market, but our data are not well suited to examine this channel. Moreover, given the size of these firms, firm exit is unlikely to be an important margin of adjustment.

15 The coefficient on the delicensed dummy is similar in the unconditional regressions. Using the industry-level ASI data from 1980 to 1997, Aghion et al. (2008) find that delicensing affected output only in states that pass more flexible labor market legislation. Our unreported results find no heterogeneous impact of delicensing on the firm’s extensive margin across labor markets. Many Prowess firms have plants in states with different labor markets, which may wash away any heterogeneity. In addition, there were no state amendments to labor market regulation after 1989 during the period of our sample (Aghion et al., 2008; Ahsan & Pages, 2008).
among Indian firms and almost entirely driven by product additions rather than the shedding of existing product lines.

The lack of product shedding is consistent with the high regulation of the past that placed constraints on Indian manufacturing firms’ operating decisions. While India initiated market-oriented reforms in the early 1990s, firms faced high sunk costs of expanding operations prior to the reforms. It is therefore likely that once these costs were sunk, firms were reluctant to withdraw established product lines, particularly given the rapid growth rate of the Indian economy. Given that we do not find evidence of product dropping in raw data, perhaps unsurprisingly, we are then unable to connect the changes in firms’ product mix through product additions to changes in trade policy. In future work, we plan to investigate additional channels through which changes in the economic environment, trade policy in particular, affect the product decisions of multiproduct firms in developing countries.

REFERENCES